



National Defence

Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0K2

Quartier général de la Défense nationale  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0K2

DRDC | RDDC



# Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments

## *From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion*

Barbara T. Waruszynski, DSocSci, Department of National Defence (Canada)

Yantsislav Yanakiev, DSc, Bulgarian Defence Institute “Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov” (Bulgaria)

Mathias De Roeck, PhD, Royal Military Academy (Belgium)

Delphine Resteigne, PhD, Royal Military Academy (Belgium)

Jessica Lowen, PhD, Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (United States)

Daniel McDonald, PhD, Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (United States)

Sven Hertel, Lt Col, DEU Ministry of Defence (Germany)

NATO-STO-TR-HFM-301  
2023, pp. 1-186, ISBN 978-92-837-2439-1

Date of Publication from External Publisher: April 2023

**Terms of Release:** This document is approved for public release.

The body of this CAN UNCLASSIFIED document does not contain the required security banners according to DND security standards. However, it must be treated as CAN UNCLASSIFIED and protected appropriately based on the terms and conditions specified on the covering page.

**Defence Research and Development Canada**

**External Literature (N)**  
DRDC-RDDC-2023-N076  
June 2023

Canada

**IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS**

This document was reviewed for Controlled Goods by Defence Research and Development Canada using the Schedule to the *Defence Production Act*.

**Disclaimer:** This document is not published by the Editorial Office of Defence Research and Development Canada, an agency of the Department of National Defence of Canada but is to be catalogued in the Canadian Defence Information System (CANDIS), the national repository for Defence S&T documents. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence, makes no representations or warranties, expressed or implied, of any kind whatsoever, and assumes no liability for the accuracy, reliability, completeness, currency or usefulness of any information, product, process or material included in this document. Nothing in this document should be interpreted as an endorsement for the specific use of any tool, technique or process examined in it. Any reliance on, or use of, any information, product, process or material included in this document is at the sole risk of the person so using it or relying on it. Canada does not assume any liability in respect of any damages or losses arising out of or in connection with the use of, or reliance on, any information, product, process or material included in this document.



STO TECHNICAL REPORT

TR-HFM-301

# **Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments: From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion**

(Diversité au sein de l'armée dans les environnements de défense  
multinationaux : de l'intolérance ethnique à l'inclusion)

Final report of Research Task Group HFM-301.



April 2023





STO TECHNICAL REPORT

TR-HFM-301

# **Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments: From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion**

(Diversité au sein de l'armée dans les environnements de défense  
multinationaux : de l'intolérance ethnique à l'inclusion)

Final report of Research Task Group HFM-301.

---

# The NATO Science and Technology Organization

Science & Technology (S&T) in the NATO context is defined as the selective and rigorous generation and application of state-of-the-art, validated knowledge for defence and security purposes. S&T activities embrace scientific research, technology development, transition, application and field-testing, experimentation and a range of related scientific activities that include systems engineering, operational research and analysis, synthesis, integration and validation of knowledge derived through the scientific method.

In NATO, S&T is addressed using different business models, namely a collaborative business model where NATO provides a forum where NATO Nations and partner Nations elect to use their national resources to define, conduct and promote cooperative research and information exchange, and secondly an in-house delivery business model where S&T activities are conducted in a NATO dedicated executive body, having its own personnel, capabilities and infrastructure.

The mission of the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) is to help position the Nations' and NATO's S&T investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and technology advantage for the defence and security posture of NATO Nations and partner Nations, by conducting and promoting S&T activities that augment and leverage the capabilities and programmes of the Alliance, of the NATO Nations and the partner Nations, in support of NATO's objectives, and contributing to NATO's ability to enable and influence security and defence related capability development and threat mitigation in NATO Nations and partner Nations, in accordance with NATO policies.

The total spectrum of this collaborative effort is addressed by six Technical Panels who manage a wide range of scientific research activities, a Group specialising in modelling and simulation, plus a Committee dedicated to supporting the information management needs of the organization.

- AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel
- HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel
- IST Information Systems Technology Panel
- NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group
- SAS System Analysis and Studies Panel
- SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel
- SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel

These Panels and Group are the power-house of the collaborative model and are made up of national representatives as well as recognised world-class scientists, engineers and information specialists. In addition to providing critical technical oversight, they also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies.

The scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created under one or more of these eight bodies, for specific research activities which have a defined duration. These research activities can take a variety of forms, including Task Groups, Workshops, Symposia, Specialists' Meetings, Lecture Series and Technical Courses.

The content of this publication has been reproduced directly from material supplied by STO or the authors.

Published April 2023

Copyright © STO/NATO 2023  
All Rights Reserved

ISBN 978-92-837-2439-1

Single copies of this publication or of a part of it may be made for individual use only by those organisations or individuals in NATO Nations defined by the limitation notice printed on the front cover. The approval of the STO Information Management Systems Branch is required for more than one copy to be made or an extract included in another publication. Requests to do so should be sent to the address on the back cover.

# Table of Contents

	Page
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>List of Acronyms</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>Foreword</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>xiv</b>
<b>HFM-301 Membership List</b>	<b>xv</b>
<b>Executive Summary and Synthèse</b>	<b>ES-1</b>
<b>Chapter 1 – Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in Multinational Military Environments</b>	<b>1-1</b>
1.1 Background	1-1
1.1.1 Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the Military Context	1-2
1.1.2 NATO Exploratory Team and Research Task Group	1-4
1.2 Overview of Chapters	1-6
1.3 Conclusion	1-6
1.4 References	1-7
<b>Chapter 2 – The Challenges and Implications of Ethnic Intolerance: A Primer</b>	<b>2-1</b>
2.1 Background	2-1
2.2 Defining Ethnic Intolerance	2-2
2.3 Theoretical Framework on Ethnic Diversity and Intolerance	2-3
2.3.1 Ethnicity Theory: Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism	2-3
2.3.2 Psychology of Intolerance Theory: Prejudicial, Intuitive and Deliberative Intolerance	2-4
2.3.3 Critical Race Theory	2-5
2.3.4 Social Identity Theory	2-5
2.3.5 Realistic Group Conflict Theory	2-6
2.3.6 Theory of Cultural Racism	2-7
2.4 Factors that Influence Ethnic Intolerance	2-7
2.4.1 Political, Economic, Social, and Structural Factors	2-8
2.4.2 Socio-Psychological Factors	2-9
2.4.2.1 Unconscious Biases	2-9
2.4.2.2 Microaggressions	2-10
2.4.2.3 Racism and Systemic Racism	2-11
2.4.2.4 Hateful Conduct and Right-Wing Extremism	2-13
2.5 Implications of Ethnic Intolerance in the Military	2-16

2.6	Conclusion	2-18
2.7	References	2-18

**Chapter 3 – Ethnic, Cultural and Gender Diversity in the Bulgarian Armed Forces: A Vision for a Multicultural Force** **3-1**

3.1	Introduction	3-1
3.2	Defining Diversity	3-2
3.3	Advantages and Challenges of Diversity in Defence Organizations	3-3
3.4	Integrating Ethnic and Cultural Groups into the Bulgarian Military: The Historical and Current Situation	3-3
3.5	Integrating Women in the Bulgarian Military	3-4
3.6	Attitudes Toward Ethnic, Cultural, and Gender Diversity in the Bulgarian Armed Forces	3-5
3.7	From a Plural to a Multicultural Bulgarian Armed Forces: SWOT Analysis	3-7
3.7.1	Strengths	3-7
3.7.2	Weaknesses	3-8
3.7.3	Opportunities	3-8
3.7.4	Threats	3-9
3.8	Recommendations for Transforming the Bulgarian Armed Forces into a Multicultural Organization	3-10
3.9	Conclusion	3-11
3.10	References	3-12

**Chapter 4 – Military Socialization and Prejudice: The (Mediating) Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation** **4-1**

4.1	Facing Institutional Resistance	4-1
4.2	Attitudes, Values and Military Socialization	4-2
4.3	Method	4-3
4.3.1	Participants	4-3
4.3.2	Measures	4-5
4.3.3	Military Socialization	4-5
4.3.4	Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation	4-5
4.3.5	Diversity Attitudes	4-7
4.3.6	Controls	4-7
4.4	Results	4-9
4.4.1	Preliminary Analyses	4-9
4.4.2	Primary Analyses	4-9
4.5	Discussion and Conclusion	4-13
4.6	References	4-14



**Chapter 5 – Perceptions of Racism and Hateful Conduct in the Canadian Armed Forces: Promoting a Culture Change to Foster Greater Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion** **5-1**

5.1	Introduction	5-1
5.2	Ethnic Diversity and Racism Within the Canadian Context: A Brief Historical Overview	5-1
5.3	Racism and Hateful Conduct Within the Canadian Armed Forces	5-4
5.3.1	Perceptions of Racism in the Canadian Military	5-6
5.3.1.1	Diversity and Inclusion in the CAF and DND	5-6
5.3.1.2	Racial Insensitivities and Microaggressions	5-7
5.3.1.3	Challenges with Career Progression	5-7
5.3.1.4	Leadership	5-8
5.3.1.5	Cultural Awareness	5-8
5.3.1.6	Recommendations	5-8
5.3.2	Perceptions of Hateful Conduct in the Canadian Military	5-10
5.4	Promoting a Culture Change for Greater Diversity and Inclusion	5-11
5.5	Conclusion	5-13
5.6	References	5-14

**Chapter 6 – Race and Ethnic Diversity in the United States Armed Forces: A Continued Evolution Toward an Inclusive and Lethal Force** **6-1**

6.1	Introduction	6-1
6.1.1	The Meaning and Purpose of Inclusion in the United States Armed Forces	6-1
6.1.2	Chapter Organization	6-2
6.2	Force Integration to Increase Military Readiness	6-2
6.2.1	From Desegregation to Equal Opportunity (1943 – 1970)	6-3
6.2.2	Improving Race Relations to Reduce Critical Threats to Readiness (1969 – 1973)	6-4
6.2.3	Disproportionate Diversification of the Force and Potential Impacts on Early D&I Efforts (1970s – 1990s)	6-5
6.2.4	Leveraging Command Climate Assessment (CCA) to Hinder Discrimination (1990s – 2018)	6-7
6.3	The Inclusion Paradigm	6-8
6.3.1	Inclusion as a Response to Persistent Discrimination Despite Diversity Gains	6-8
6.3.2	Operationalizing Inclusivity to Increase Accountability	6-9
6.4	Recent Actions and Recommendations	6-11
6.4.1	Recent DoD Actions	6-11
6.4.2	Recommendations	6-13
6.4.2.1	NATO Human Goals Charter	6-14
6.4.2.2	Identify and Analyze Disproportionate Diversity Gains, Especially Disparities Between Enlisted and Commissioned Officer Components	6-14

6.4.2.3	Leverage Command Climate Assessment (CCA) to Increase Leadership Skills and Prevent Grievances from Escalating to Conflict	6-14
6.4.2.4	Develop Politically Neutral Policies to Hinder Supremacist Extremism Among Military Members by Focusing on Specific Activities and Outwardly Observable Component Behaviors that these Activities Entail, Creating Preventive Anti-Extremism Training that is Relevant to Members' Lived Experiences, and Leveraging Existing Climate and Mental Health Intervention Programs	6-15
6.4.2.5	Implement Evidence-Based Training for Commanders in Verbal Communication and Discussion Facilitation Skills	6-15
6.4.2.6	Counter Negative Stereotypes by Promoting Images that Depict the Accomplishments of Service Members from Historically Underrepresented Groups	6-16
6.5	Conclusion	6-16
6.6	References	6-17
 <b>Chapter 7 – From Migration in Germany to Inclusion in the Bundeswehr – An Appreciative and Inclusive Approach to Diversity in the Bundeswehr</b>		<b>7-1</b>
7.1	Defining Diversity and Inclusion Implications for Organizations	7-1
7.1.1	Ethnicity and Nationality as a Dimension to be Considered	7-2
7.1.2	History of Migration in Germany	7-3
7.1.3	Measures of Integration in Germany Today	7-4
7.2	Diversity in the Bundeswehr	7-4
7.2.1	Diversity as a Contribution to the Future Viability of the Bundeswehr	7-5
7.2.2	The Grundgesetz as the Basis for Understanding Diversity in the Bundeswehr	7-5
7.2.3	Diversity and Inclusion as Concepts	7-6
7.2.4	<i>Colorful in the Bundeswehr?</i> The Basis for Improving the Diversity and Inclusion Climate	7-7
7.2.5	Ethnicity as a Dimension of Diversity in the Bundeswehr	7-8
7.2.6	Agenda Diversity for Diversity Management	7-8
7.2.7	Operationalization: Diversity in Military and Civilian Education in the Bundeswehr	7-9
7.3	Way Forward	7-11
7.4	Conclusion	7-11
7.5	References	7-11
Appendix 7.1: Specifications for Acquiring Competency in Managing the Diversity of Female and Male Soldiers on the Basic Qualification Level		7-14
Appendix 7.2: Specifications for Acquiring Competency in Dealing with Diversity of Female and Male Soldiers in the Career Group of Officers at the Supervisor Qualification Level		7-15

Appendix 7.3: Specifications for Acquiring Competency in Dealing with Diversity of Civilian Employees at the Supervisor Competency Level	7-16
Appendix 7.4: Specifications for Acquiring Competency in Dealing with Diversity Among Civilian Employees as well as Female and Male Soldiers as Specialists in Diversity Issues Function and Capability Level	7-17
<b>Chapter 8 – Future Insights for Enabling Greater Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in Multinational Military Environments: Strategies, Tools, Recommendations, and Conclusion</b>	<b>8-1</b>
8.1 Introduction	8-1
8.2 From Ethnic Tolerance to Ethnic Inclusion – Management Strategies and Tools	8-2
8.2.1 Culture of Belonging	8-4
8.2.2 Inclusive Leadership	8-5
8.2.3 Cultural Awareness and Cultural Competence Training	8-6
8.2.4 Bystander Intervention Training	8-7
8.2.5 Unconscious Bias Training	8-8
8.2.6 Prevention Programs Against Right-Wing Extremism	8-8
8.2.7 Establishment of Allies Through Allyship Training and Practices	8-9
8.3 Towards Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion: Factors that Impact Ethnic Intolerance – A Recap	8-10
8.4 Conceptual Model on Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion	8-11
8.5 Recommendations	8-14
8.6 Military Relevance	8-15
8.7 Summary and Conclusion	8-16
8.8 References	8-18
<b>Annex A – Glossary</b>	<b>A-1</b>
A.1 References	A-6
<b>Annex B – Contextual Factors that Promote Ethnic Inclusion: Factors, Interventions, and Potential Positive and Negative Outcomes</b>	<b>B-1</b>

## List of Figures

<b>Figure</b>		<b>Page</b>
Figure 2-1	Racial Extremism Continuum of Harm (McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021)	2-15
Figure 3-1	Percentage of Female Service Members in the Bulgarian Armed Forces: 2009 – 2019 (NATO, 2021)	3-4
Figure 4-1	CFA Measurement Model for Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism	4-6
Figure 6-1	DEOCS Timeline	6-7
Figure 6-2	DoD Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Actions from June 2020 to December 2021	6-12
Figure 7-1	Core Dimensions of Diversity	7-1
Figure 7-2	Schematic Representation of the Position-Related Training	7-10
Figure 8-1	Ethnic Intolerance Factors (Paradigm and Legend)	8-11
Figure 8-2	Conceptual Model to Enable Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in Multinational Military Environments	8-13

## List of Tables

<b>Table</b>		<b>Page</b>
Table 1-1	RTG HFM-301 Meetings	1-5
Table 3-1	Arithmetic Mean Scores to the Items Measuring the Climate, Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of Women in the BAF	3-5
Table 3-2	Arithmetic Mean Scores to the Items Measuring the Climate, Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of the Minority Groups in the BAF	3-6
Table 4-1	Student Participation Rates in 2020 RMA Diversity Survey	4-4
Table 4-2	Cronbach's Alphas, Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Variables	4-8
Table 4-3	Standardized Effects of Academic Year and Different Types of Prejudice with Correlated Residuals for SDO and RWA	4-11

## List of Acronyms

A2S	Assessment to Solutions
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ADS	Anti-Discrimination Agency
AIAN	American Indian and Alaska Native
ALOY	Aboriginal Leadership Opportunities Year (Program)
ASD(FM&P)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel
ASI	Ambivalent Sexism Inventory Scale
AVF	All-Volunteer Forces
BAF	Bulgarian Armed Forces
BDI	Bulgarian Defense Institute
BIPOC	Black, Indigenous, and Persons (or People) of Colour
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defence (Germany)
CA	Canadian Army
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CCA	Command Climate Assessment
CCRF	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
CEAWG	Countering Extremist Activity Working Group
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Order
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CHRA	Canadian Human Rights Act
CO	Commissioned Officers
CoBRAs	Color-Blind Racial Attitudes
COPSOQ	Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire
CPCC	Chief Professional Conduct and Culture
CRT	Critical Race Theory
DAAG	Defence Aboriginal Advisory Group
D&I	Diversity and Inclusion
DAOD	Defence Administrative Order and Directive
DCEOP	Directorate for Civilian Equal Opportunity Policy
DEI	Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
DEOCS	Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DGM	Designated Group Member
DGMPRA	Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
DHRD	Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMOC	Diversity Management Operations Center
DND	Department of National Defence
DoD	Department of Defense (US)
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DP	Displaced Persons
DPM	Dual-Process Model
DRRI	Defense Race Relations Institute
DVMAG	Defence Visible Minority Advisory Group

ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EE	Employment Equity
EEA	Employment Equity Act
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EO	Equal Opportunity
E.O.	Executive Order
EOA	Equal Opportunity Advisor
ET	Exploratory Team
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GBA+	Gender-Based Analysis Plus
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HE	Hierarchy-Enhancing
HFM	Human Factors and Medicine
ICD	Intercultural Dialogue
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
IRC	Independent Review Commission
IRO	International Refugee Organization
LGBTQ2S+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Two-Spirited Plus
Lt. Col.	Lieutenant Colonel
MBIE	Mor Barak Inclusion-Exclusion Scale
MCA	Multicultural Attitude (Scale)
MCDC	Multinational Capability Development Campaign
Memo	Memorandum
MEO	Military Equal Opportunity
MEOCS	Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey
MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
MoD	Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCM	Non-Commissioned Member
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSA	National Security Agency
OHRC	Ontario Human Rights Commission
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPA	Office of People Analytics
PEA	Prohibited Extremist Activity
PME	Professional Military Education
PoW	Program of Work
RMA	Royal Military Academy
RTG	Research Task Group

---

RWA	Right-Wing Authoritarianism
RWE	Right-Wing Extremism
SAPR	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
SDO	Social Dominance Orientation
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TAP	Technical Activity Proposal
3C	Cross-Cultural Competence
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
US/USA	United States/United States of America
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
VSA	Very Short Authoritarianism Scale
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WSE	White Supremacist Extremism
WWII	World War II



---

# Foreword

The following chapters highlight international perspectives on the factors that contribute to ethnic intolerance, tolerance, and inclusion in multinational military settings.

## **Chapter 1**

Waruszynski, B.T. (2022). *Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in Multinational Military Environments*.

## **Chapter 2**

Waruszynski, B.T. (2022). *The Challenges and Implications of Ethnic Intolerance: A Primer*.

## **Chapter 3**

Yanakiev, Y. (2022). *Ethnic, Cultural and Gender Diversity in the Bulgarian Armed Forces: A Vision for a Multicultural Force*. Gewerbestrasse, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

## **Chapter 4**

De Roeck, M. and Resteigne, D. (2022). *Military Socialization and Prejudice: The (Mediating) Role of Right-wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation*.

## **Chapter 5**

Waruszynski, B.T. (2022). *Perceptions of Racism and Hateful Conduct in the Canadian Armed Forces: Promoting a Culture Change to Foster Greater Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion*.

## **Chapter 6**

Lowen, J. and McDonald, D.P. (2022). *Race and Ethnic Diversity in the United States Armed Forces: A Continued Evolution toward an Inclusive and Lethal Force*.

## **Chapter 7**

Hertel, S. (2022). *From Migration in Germany to Inclusion in the Bundeswehr: An Appreciative and Inclusive Approach to Diversity in the Bundeswehr*.

## **Chapter 8**

Waruszynski, B.T. (2022). *Future Insights for Enabling Greater Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion: Strategies, Tools, Recommendations, and Conclusion*.

---

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Mr. Waylon Dean (with Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Department of National Defence, Canada), who helped to edit parts of this report.

# HFM-301 Membership List

## CHAIR

Dr. Barbara T. WARUSZYNSKI  
Department of National Defence  
CANADA  
Email: [barbara.waruszynski@forces.gc.ca](mailto:barbara.waruszynski@forces.gc.ca)

## MEMBERS

Dr. Mathias DE ROECK  
Royal Military Academy  
BELGIUM  
Email: [mathias.deroeck@mil.be](mailto:mathias.deroeck@mil.be)

Prof. Dr. Delphine RESTEIGNE  
Royal Military Academy  
BELGIUM  
Email: [delphine.resteigne@mil.be](mailto:delphine.resteigne@mil.be)

Lt Col Sven Oliver HERTEL  
DEU Ministry of Defence  
GERMANY  
Email: [svenlhertel@bmvg.bund.de](mailto:svenlhertel@bmvg.bund.de)

Lt Col (OF-4) Peter VAN DEN KERKHOFF  
Ministry of Defense  
NETHERLANDS  
Email: [pg.vd.kerkhoff@mindef.nl](mailto:pg.vd.kerkhoff@mindef.nl)

Dr. Daniel MCDONALD  
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute  
UNITED STATES  
Email: [daniel.mcdonald@us.af.mil](mailto:daniel.mcdonald@us.af.mil)

Dr. Diana Alexandra WITT  
Federal Ministry of Defence  
GERMANY  
Email: [dianawitt@bmvg.bund.de](mailto:dianawitt@bmvg.bund.de)

## ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS

Lt Col Dr. Habil Youssouf DIALLO  
Ministry of Defence  
GERMANY  
Email: [dr.youssoufdiallo@bmvg.bund.de](mailto:dr.youssoufdiallo@bmvg.bund.de)

Prof. Dr. Jennifer RUBIN  
Home Office and King's College (London)  
UNITED KINGDOM  
Email: [jennifer.k.rubin@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:jennifer.k.rubin@kcl.ac.uk)

Dr. Corine VAN NIEUWBURG-HOFTE  
Ministry of Defense  
NETHERLANDS  
Email: [cm.v.nieuwburg.hofte@mindef.nl](mailto:cm.v.nieuwburg.hofte@mindef.nl)

Mr. Jerry C. SCARPATE, LtCol (ret.)  
United States Air Force (USAF)  
UNITED STATES  
Email: [scarpatej@bellsouth.net](mailto:scarpatej@bellsouth.net)

## PANEL/GROUP MENTOR

Prof. Dr. Yantsislav YANAKIEV  
Bulgarian Defence Institute "Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov"  
BULGARIA  
Email: [y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg](mailto:y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg)



# Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments: From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion (STO-TR-HFM-301)

## Executive Summary

**Issue and Purpose:** Ethnic intolerance continues to challenge NATO’s efforts to promote “military diversity as a key transformational element” in overcoming cultural differences.<sup>1</sup> Promoting ethnic inclusion is necessary to foster greater cultural diversity in multinational military environments. Research indicates that discrimination, harassment, racism, intergroup threats, and ethnic conflicts and hatred are attributed to ethnic intolerance which negatively impact people’s perceptions of diverse ethnic and cultural groups. Overcoming cultural differences can lead to more cooperative relations within and between military organizations, improve cross-cultural military-civilian interactions, and further enhance operational and organizational effectiveness in military environments. Hence, the purpose of the Research Task Group (RTG) HFM-301 was to identify the key factors associated with ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion and provide a framework to explain these factors, develop a conceptual model to enable ethnic inclusion, and offer evidenced-based educational programs designed to foster a more inclusive organizational culture in NATO and across multinational defence organizations.

**Scope and Procedure:** The scope of RTG HFM-301 was to:

- a) Review the current research on ethnic intolerance and inclusion, and identify international best practices in diversity management, policies, and practices;
- b) Examine the strategies, methods, and tools that prevent ethnic intolerance in the military;
- c) Develop a framework on the factors that impact ethnic intolerance and a conceptual model to explain the factors that enable ethnic inclusion; and
- d) Provide strategies, tools, evidenced-based educational programs, and recommendations to help foster ethnically diverse and inclusive organizational cultures in multinational defence organizations.

**Results and Recommendations:** Based on the international case studies and literature on ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion, the RTG members uncovered several key findings. First, ethnic intolerance is attributed to historical, political, economic, social, and socio-psychological factors. Second, the socio-psychological factors that influence ethnic intolerance include more contemporary characteristics such as unconscious biases, microaggressions, racism and systemic racism, hateful conduct, and right-wing extremism. Third, diversity and inclusion management strategies are at the heart of fostering ethnic inclusion across multinational defence environments.

The RTG also developed a set of recommendations to help foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion. First, diversity management policies, strategies, programs and tools need to be incorporated within defence organizations to enable greater ethnic diversity and inclusion. Second, leaders need to align the mission and vision of diversity management policies and strategies with programs and activities designed to enable positive culture change. Third, organizations need to foster a culture of ethnic inclusion by incorporating the strategies,

---

<sup>1</sup> NATO, Allied Command Transformation, 10 Years of Transformation: Military Diversity as a Key Transformational Element, 2013.

methods and training, including: culture of belonging; inclusive leadership; cultural competence and cultural awareness training; bystander intervention training; unconscious bias training; evidence-based prevention programs against right-wing extremism; and establishment of allies through allyship training and practices. Fourth, the conceptual model on ethnic inclusion will help defence leaders to understand the factors that would enable greater ethnic inclusion and to employ these factors to support inclusive policies and programs.

Furthermore, several RTG members contributed to a new publication on “Team Diversity and Inclusion in Defence and Security: International Perspectives,” which will be published by Springer (2023 – 2024). Key chapters are devoted to systemic issues related to ethnic intolerance and inclusion, including ethnic diversity, unprofessional conduct, ideological extremism, and racism, and international case studies that are employing diverse and inclusive management practices across defence and security-based organizations. The main goal is to provide evidenced-based diversity and inclusion strategies, programs, and leadership practices to bolster ethnic diversity and inclusion across the defence and security communities.

**Military/NATO Significance:** The main outcome of this RTG is to help inform NATO’s strategic efforts to uphold ethnic diversity and inclusion as key transformational elements in overcoming cultural differences in multinational military environments. This cross-national research activity will inform policies, programs, and organizational cultural changes intended to promote ethnic inclusion and improved military readiness and resilience. Moreover, the findings will contribute to the development of a NATO Lecture Series and a STANAG on how to foster improved ethnic diversity and inclusion across multinational military environments. Finally, the results and recommendations will further inform NATO’s defence capabilities (i.e., doctrine, education, training, leadership, personnel, and human interoperability) to support ethnic diversity and inclusion across multinational military organizations and operations.

# Diversité au sein de l'armée dans les environnements de défense multinationaux : de l'intolérance ethnique à l'inclusion

## (STO-TR-HFM-301)

### Synthèse

**Problème et objectif :** L'intolérance ethnique continue de remettre en question les efforts de l'OTAN visant à promouvoir « la diversité au sein de l'armée comme élément de transformation clé » pour surmonter les différences culturelles (OTAN, 2013).<sup>2</sup> Il est nécessaire de promouvoir l'inclusion ethnique pour favoriser une plus grande diversité culturelle dans les environnements militaires multinationaux. D'après les recherches, la discrimination, le harcèlement, le racisme, les menaces intergroupes, les conflits ethniques et la haine sont liés à l'intolérance ethnique qui nuit à la façon dont certains perçoivent divers groupes ethniques et culturels. Surmonter les différences culturelles peut conduire : à davantage de relations de coopération au sein des organisations militaires et entre ces dernières, à améliorer les interactions interculturelles entre militaires et civils, et à améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle et organisationnelle dans les environnements militaires. De ce fait, l'objectif du groupe de recherche (RTG) HFM-301 consistait à : identifier les facteurs clés associés à l'intolérance et à l'inclusion ethniques et fournir un cadre pour les expliquer ; développer un modèle conceptuel pour permettre l'inclusion ethnique ; et proposer des programmes d'enseignement, fondés sur des données probantes, conçus pour favoriser une culture organisationnelle plus inclusive au sein de l'OTAN et dans toutes les organisations multinationales de défense.

**Portée et procédure :** Le RTG HFM-301 avait pour mission : a) d'examiner les recherches actuelles sur l'intolérance et l'inclusion ethniques, et d'identifier les meilleures pratiques internationales en matière de gestion, de politiques et de pratiques dans le domaine de la diversité ; b) d'examiner les stratégies, les méthodes et les outils qui empêchent l'intolérance ethnique au sein de l'armée ; c) de développer un cadre compte tenu des facteurs qui ont un impact sur l'intolérance ethnique ainsi qu'un modèle conceptuel pour expliquer les facteurs qui empêchent l'intolérance ethnique ; et d) de proposer des stratégies, des outils, des programmes d'enseignement fondés sur des données probantes et des recommandations pour favoriser la diversité ethnique et l'inclusion des cultures au sein des organisations multinationales de défense.

**Résultats et recommandations :** Sur la base des études de cas internationales et de la documentation sur l'intolérance et l'inclusion ethniques, les membres du RTG ont obtenu plusieurs résultats clés. Tout d'abord, l'intolérance ethnique est liée à des facteurs historiques, politiques, économiques, sociaux et sociopsychologiques. Deuxièmement, les facteurs sociopsychologiques qui influencent l'intolérance ethnique englobent des caractéristiques plus contemporaines, telles que les préjugés inconscients, les microagressions, le racisme et le racisme systémique, le comportement haineux et l'extrémisme de droite. Troisièmement, les stratégies de gestion de la diversité et de l'inclusion sont au cœur de la promotion de l'inclusion ethnique dans les environnements de défense multinationaux.

Le RTG a également élaboré un ensemble de recommandations pour favoriser une plus grande diversité ethnique et une meilleure inclusion ethnique. Tout d'abord, les politiques, stratégies, programmes et outils

---

<sup>2</sup> NATO, Allied Command Transformation, 10 Years of Transformation: Military Diversity as a Key Transformational Element, 2013.

de gestion de la diversité doivent être intégrés au sein des organisations de défense pour permettre une plus grande diversité et inclusion ethniques. Deuxièmement, les dirigeants doivent aligner la mission et la vision des politiques et stratégies de gestion de la diversité sur les programmes et les activités conçus pour permettre un changement positif de la culture. Troisièmement, les organisations doivent promouvoir une culture de l'inclusion ethnique en intégrant les stratégies, les méthodes et la formation, y compris : la culture de l'appartenance ; le leadership inclusif ; la compétence culturelle et la formation à la sensibilisation culturelle ; la formation sur l'intervention des spectateurs ; la formation sur les préjugés inconscients ; les programmes de prévention fondés sur des données probantes contre l'extrémisme de droite ; et la mise en place d'alliances par le biais de la formation et des pratiques connexes. Quatrièmement, le modèle conceptuel sur l'inclusion ethnique aidera les dirigeants du domaine de la défense non seulement à comprendre les facteurs qui permettraient une plus grande inclusion ethnique, mais également à utiliser ces facteurs pour soutenir des politiques et des programmes inclusifs.

Par ailleurs, plusieurs membres du RTG ont contribué à la rédaction d'une nouvelle publication intitulée « Team Diversity and Inclusion in Defence and Security: International Perspectives » (Diversité et inclusion au sein des équipes dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité : perspectives internationales), qui sera publiée par Springer (2023 – 2024). Les chapitres clés sont consacrés non seulement aux questions systémiques liées à l'intolérance et à l'inclusion ethniques, y compris la diversité ethnique, la conduite non professionnelle, l'extrémisme idéologique et le racisme, mais également aux études de cas internationales qui utilisent des pratiques de gestion fondées sur la diversification et l'inclusion dans les organisations basées sur la défense et la sécurité. L'objectif principal est le suivant : fournir des stratégies, des programmes et des pratiques de leadership fondés sur des données probantes en matière de diversité et d'inclusion afin de renforcer la diversité et l'inclusion ethniques au sein des communautés de défense et de sécurité.

**Importance au sein de l'armée/OTAN :** Le principal résultat de ce RTG est de contribuer à éclairer les efforts stratégiques de l'OTAN afin de soutenir la diversité et l'inclusion ethniques en tant qu'éléments transformationnels clés pour surmonter les différences culturelles dans les environnements militaires multinationaux. Cette activité de recherche transnationale documentera les politiques, les programmes et les changements culturels organisationnels destinés à promouvoir l'inclusion ethnique et à améliorer la préparation et la résilience militaires. En outre, les conclusions contribueront au développement d'une série de conférences de l'OTAN et d'un accord de normalisation (STANAG) sur la manière de favoriser l'amélioration de la diversité et de l'inclusion ethniques dans les environnements militaires multinationaux. Enfin, les résultats et les recommandations permettront de mieux documenter les capacités de défense de l'OTAN (doctrine, éducation, formation, leadership, personnel et interopérabilité humaine) afin de soutenir la diversité et l'inclusion ethniques au sein des organisations et des opérations militaires multinationales.



# **Chapter 1 – ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS**

**Barbara T. Waruszynski**  
Department of National Defence  
CANADA

## **1.1 BACKGROUND**

Ethnic intolerance continues to challenge NATO’s efforts to promote “military diversity as a key transformational element” in overcoming cultural differences (NATO, 2013), particularly during multinational military operations, coalitions, and alliances. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) highlights that “overcoming cultural differences requires ... a willingness of members to put aside their national, or traditional, way of doing business and adopt the ACT way which is cooperation” (NATO, 2013). Perceptions of cultural diversity can influence military-military and military-civilian relations, during deployments, military exercises, and in peacetime establishment. Accordingly, “the increase in multinational missions has led to the identification of a number of potential areas of conflict or stress between collaborating countries that stem from intergroup relations and dynamics, which themselves emanate from differences in culture, language, religion, class and gender customs, work ethics, military values, political systems, levels of expertise, and standards of living” (Plante, 1998; cited in Febraro, McKee and Riedel, 2008, pp. 1-2). Furthermore, existing studies indicate that although the majority of perceptions towards ethnic groups are generally positive, there are individuals and groups who exhibit negative attitudes and behaviors toward people belonging to different ethnic groups (e.g., Abderrazaq, 2021; Kunovich and Hodson, 1999; Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). Specifically, research has demonstrated that ethnic intolerance (e.g., ethnic conflict, discrimination, racism, intergroup threats, and ethnic and inter-ethnic hatred) negatively impact people’s experiences and perceptions of specific ethnic and cultural groups as well as those cultural groups’ perceptions and experiences in military organizations (e.g., Daniel, Claros, Namrow, Siebel, Campbell, McGrath, and Klahr, 2019; Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020; Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019). Societal attitudes and behaviors toward different ethnic groups can also impact attitudes within and across diverse societies and organizations. Indeed, the factors that influence ethnic intolerance in defence and security environments are important to examine, particularly from multinational military perspectives. Promoting ethnic inclusion is essential to creating greater cultural diversity in national and multinational military environments and in attracting new recruits who come from multicultural or pluralistic backgrounds. As a result, ethnic intolerance and inclusion and their impacts on cultural diversity need to be better understood within the military context, particularly how these concepts impact military personnel’s perceptions of diversity and inclusion. Overcoming cultural differences can lead to more cooperative relations across global communities and can further enhance cross-cultural military-military and military-civilian interactions for improved operational and organizational effectiveness.

To enable a more comprehensive understanding of ethnic intolerance and the factors that would foster more effective inclusion, a new Research Task Group (RTG) HFM-301 was formed in 2018, with the goal to help identify cross-national perspectives of ethnic intolerance by examining the origins of ethnic intolerance through cultural, social, and organizational behaviors found in diverse and pluralistic environments. Moreover, the RTG reviewed the factors that could help organizations bridge cultural differences and encourage greater inter-cultural and intra-cultural inclusion across organizations and in multinational military environments. International participation in this RTG has contributed to an added awareness of the strategies, methods, and tools that will help to foster ethnic diversity and inclusion in defence organizations and further improve military-military and military-civilian interactions. The RTG has also developed a conceptual framework and model to help explain the key factors that are attributed to

ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion as well as evidenced-based educational programs designed to foster more inclusive organizational cultures in defence organizations.

The following chapter provides a brief background on ethnic diversity and inclusion in the military context and helps to set the stage for the factors that influence ethnic intolerance and inclusion across multinational military environments (including operations, coalitions, and alliances), particularly as threats to international peace continue to escalate on a global scale. This context provides an overview on the importance of ethnic diversity and inclusion and the associated impacts on multinational military operations. These international perspectives will help to inform NATO countries on how the proposed strategies, methods, and tools will enable greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in defence organizations and across NATO alliances.

### **1.1.1 Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the Military Context**

Many defence organizations are embedding diversity and inclusion into their policies and programs to help foster cultures that are accepting of multicultural differences. For example, in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), values of fair treatment and respect of all military personnel are encouraged across the ranks, as these values represent “force multipliers” and contribute to operational effectiveness:

*Military personnel who are culturally diverse, multiethnic, and multilingual represent force multipliers during both domestic and international operations. With the recent dominance of coalition led operations, leveraging CAF personnel with wide ranging backgrounds facilitates integration and synchronization with global partners. With the preponderance of international operations evolving from high intensity warfighting to full spectrum operations, possessing personnel with both gender and cultural variety better facilitates interfacing with civilian populations, non-governmental organizations, and other actors within the operating environment. (Department of National Defence, 2015, p. 1)*

The Australian Department of Defence has also developed their Diversity and Inclusion Strategy taking into consideration the importance of enabling greater diversity and inclusivity in a team-based environment:

*Defence’s professionalism and war fighting strength is underpinned by our ability to problem solve, innovate and adapt quickly. We achieve outcomes by drawing on the different strengths, attributes and characteristics of the many individuals who make up our teams. We understand that teamwork requires that we think about how we relate to one another, respect one another, recognise the value of each person’s contribution, are fair and inclusive, and that we work collaboratively to achieve the best results on all days and in all ways. ‘Diversity’ is broader than the labels of gender, age, language, ethnicity, cultural background, disability, sexual orientation and religious beliefs; it is a way of thinking and an approach to delivering the best results. Through diversity we gain the varied perspectives needed to tackle complex problems and come up with innovative solutions. Recognising this Defence is committed to creating an inclusive environment which values, respects and draws on the diverse backgrounds, experiences, knowledge and skills of our people. (Department of Defence, 2014, p. 3)*

The United States Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2012 – 2017 Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan also describes diversity as “a strategic imperative, critical to mission readiness and accomplishment” and essential to leadership development and accountability (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). The 2011 National Military Strategy asserts:

*As the challenges we face require a Joint Force that is flexible, agile, and adaptive, it emphasize[s] people as much as platforms. It recognizes that the unique character of our Service members...is a formidable advantage. (Department of Defense, 2012)*

As defence forces become more flexible, agile, adaptive, fair, and inclusive to better represent force multipliers, there is a need to examine some of the fundamental attributes underpinning diversity and inclusion. Within the Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy 2016, diversity is defined as “respect for and appreciation of differences in ethnicity, language, gender, age, national origin, disabilities, sexual orientation, education, and religion,” including people’s experiences, skills, knowledge, and abilities (Department of National Defence, 2016, p.1). Moreover, diversity “is about understanding each other and moving beyond simple tolerance to embracing, celebrating, and integrating the rich dimensions of diversity within each individual” (Department of National Defence, 2016, p.1).

Inclusion represents a key component of the future force’s environment. Inclusion is defined as having a sense of belonging to an organization, unit, group, and team, and adopting a work environment that values diversity, promotes mutual respect, and enhances organizational and operational effectiveness. According to the Australian Department of Defence (2014, p. 4), inclusion means “fostering a work environment where individual differences...are appreciated and valued as characteristics that enhance our work environment, our productivity and our capability.” The United States DoD 2012 – 2017 *Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan* also focuses on creating an inclusive environment, where “diverse backgrounds, experiences, and ways of thinking are essential to optimal performance within the Department’s increasingly fiscally constrained environment” (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). Moreover, the United States 2011 Department of Defense’s National Military Strategy declares that the military needs to reflect the nation that it serves:

*An all-volunteer force must represent the country it defends. We will strengthen our commitment to the values of diversity and inclusivity, and continue to treat each other with dignity and respect. We benefit immensely from the different perspectives, and linguistic and cultural skills of all Americans.*  
(Department of Defense, 2012, p. 4)

Indeed, ethnicity represents a key variable in diversity and inclusion. Ethnicity is defined as a state of belonging to a particular social group(s) which may include common cultural identities and traditions (e.g., ancestry, history, language, religion, or association). Ethnicity is about ethnic identities, groups, associations, and social interactions. As a form of collective identification, ethnicity makes particular use of linguistic-cultural traits and resources, the evocation of history, and in some cases, a territorial unit (Barth, 1969). Ethnicity is heavily dependent on boundaries that distinguish between “belonging” and “not belonging”. Groups often maintain their cohesion with the ties of kinship, language, religion, or neighbourhood and draw a dividing line between “we” and “they” (Elwert, 1997). Religious institutions, ethnic associations and nationalist movements are examples of “we-identities” which generate a “they” by erecting barriers against participation from outside (see Elwert, 1997). Most theories of ethnicity note a close connection between ethnicity and feelings (Wicker, 1997). In this perspective, “we-groups” stand for emotional ties that may lead to intolerance and exclusion. Even so, not all “we-groups” are hermetically closed since they may overlap and interact in everyday life (Elwert, 1997).

Ethnic diversity refers to multicultural settings in which different ethnic groups define and differentiate themselves from each other (Smith, 1986). People who identify with a particular ethnic group or ethnic community have a collective name, speak the same language, and claim a common lineage, history, and tradition (Smith, 1986). In essence, ethnic communities are associated with having a “strong sense of belonging and an active solidarity” (Smith, 1986, p. 30). Ethnic groups are often considered as quasi-natural extensions of families. This perspective on ethnicity enables ethnic groups to delineate themselves from other social groups through factors attributed to class, religious institutions, and voluntary associations. Ethnic units usually define themselves in opposition to other similar units. In practice, various ethnic groups may overlap and cooperate with other groups in ethnically heterogeneous states, organizations, or companies.

People who identify with particular ethnic groups or come from multiethnic backgrounds can impact the social fabric and the interrelationships found in multicultural and pluralistic environments. For example,

ethnic intolerant behaviors have led researchers to explore the factors that may influence negative attitudes and behaviors among individuals and groups. Ethnic intolerance refers to a lack of acceptance or hostility towards specific groups based on people's ethnicity, race, religion, economic, cultural, and political affiliations (see Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). This lack of acceptance may be evidenced in expressions of ethnic conflict, hatred, and xenophobia (i.e., an irrational aversion to people who come from foreign countries; see Oxford English Dictionary, 2022) and is primarily based on one's ethnicity, religion, and social-cultural identity. Moreover, ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance can be evidenced in countries and diverse societies that experience ethnic tensions and conflict, bigotry and ethnic cleansing. In addition, racial stereotypes and prejudice, ethnic or racial discrimination, ethnic exclusionism, and ethnic microaggressions (e.g., criticisms, jokes, and insults attributed to one's ethnicity) are also examples of ethnic intolerant mindsets and behaviors. These forms of negative attitudes and behaviors can also be evinced in defence and security-based environments, as will be apparent in the following chapters. As a result, it is important to examine ethnic intolerance in the military context, particularly how intolerant attitudes and behaviors may impact the interrelationships and social interdependencies of military personnel interactions with other military members, civilians, and the globally diverse societies in which they live and serve. Promoting ethnic inclusion becomes an essential component to attaining greater acceptance of cultural diversity and inclusion in multinational military environments and across global communities.

### **1.1.2 NATO Exploratory Team and Research Task Group**

As issues of ethnic intolerance continue to challenge NATO's efforts to promote military diversity, a Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Exploratory Team 159 met in Sofia, Bulgaria in 28 – 29 September 2018 to coordinate a new RTG that would examine the factors impacting ethnic intolerance and the associated factors that would help to foster greater ethnic inclusion across multinational defence environments. This new RTG held its first meeting at the NATO Collaboration Support Office from 11 – 13 December 2018 (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France) for 2.5 days and discussed and developed the research Program of Work (PoW) based on the initial Technical Activity Proposal (TAP). This new RTG was developed to help identify the origins of ethnic intolerance through cultural, social, and organizational behaviors found in diverse and pluralistic environments, including the military and other security-based organizations, to help build more agile, adaptable, inclusive, and cooperative relations within and between military organizations.

The scope of the RTG was to:

- a) Review the current research and identify any best practices and shortfalls in diversity management, policies, and practices, and where applicable, draw lessons from other sectors.
- b) Understand the current knowledge and research on ethnic intolerance, tolerance and inclusion, and its applicability to the military context.
- c) Develop a framework on the factors that influence ethnic intolerance.
- d) Develop a conceptual model and operationalize the measures for enabling ethnic inclusion.
- e) Examine the strategies, methods, and tools to prevent ethnic intolerance in the military.
- f) Provide evidenced-based educational programs that will contribute to the development of diverse and inclusive organizational cultures in defence organizations and multinational defence environments.
- g) Generate recommendations on the factors that promote ethnic inclusion and hinder ethnic intolerance among military personnel.

The RTG panel discussed several topics and focused on key areas to help understand ethnic intolerance and the strategies and programs required for enabling greater ethnic inclusion in multinational military environments.

These topics included:

- a) International perspectives on the strategies, methods, and tools that enable inter-ethnic relations in military organizations (e.g., diversity and inclusion strategies, cross-cultural communications, and cultural sensitivity training).
- b) Cross-national perspectives on issues particularly related to ethnic intolerance, including research on ethnic tolerance and inclusion.
- c) Impact of ethnic intolerance on operational and organizational effectiveness.
- d) Conceptual framework and model that describe the factors that impact ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion (e.g., attitudes and behaviors).
- e) Leadership styles that promote diversity and inclusivity.
- f) Existing strategies, tools, and best practices to enable greater diversity and inclusivity in the military (e.g., ethnic conflict management and evidenced-based educational programs and practices).

As listed in Table 1-1, RTG members took part in 16 meetings (five face-to-face meetings and 11 virtual meetings) to examine interdisciplinary research that would help to identify the factors associated with ethnic intolerance and the mechanisms and best practices that would enable greater military ethnic diversity and inclusion. The majority of the meetings were held virtually due to international travel restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 to June 2022. The scheduled meetings included:

**Table 1-1: RTG HFM-301 Meetings.**

28 – 29 September 2018	Face-to-face ET meeting at the Defence Institute “Professor Tsvetan Lazarov” in Sofia, Bulgaria.
11 – 13 December 2018	Face-to-face RTG meeting at the Collaboration Support Office, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
27 – 29 March 2019	Face-to-face RTG meeting at the Defence Institute “Professor Tsvetan Lazarov” in Sofia, Bulgaria.
26 July 2019	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
26 – 28 November 2019	Face-to-face RTG meeting at the Federal Ministry of Defence in Berlin, Germany.
23 – 26 March 2020	Planned face-to-face RTG meeting at DEOMI in Cocoa Beach, Florida, United States (meeting cancelled due to international governmental travel restrictions attributed to the global pandemic).
20 May 2020	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
28 July 2020	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
27 October 2020	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
28 January 2021	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
29 April 2021	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
30 September 2021	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
23 November 2021	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
26 January 2021	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
16 March 2022	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
25 May 2022	Virtual WebEx RTG meeting.
25 – 28 July 2022	Face-to-Face RTG meeting at DEOMI (Cocoa Beach, Florida, United States).



## **1.2 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS**

In this Technical Report, the authors highlight cross-national perspectives on issues related to ethnic intolerance, including the factors that impact different forms of ethnic intolerance. The chapters also examine international perspectives on the strategies, methods, and tools that enable positive ethnic relations in military organizations (e.g., diversity and inclusion strategies, cross-cultural communications, cultural sensitivity training, ethnic conflict management and evidenced-based educational programs and practices). Part of these strategies is the need for leadership styles (e.g., inclusive leadership) that promote diversity and inclusivity. Finally, the authors describe the factors that are attributed to ethnic intolerance (framework) and the existing strategies, tools, and best practices to measure and promote ethnic inclusion (conceptual model), such as, unconscious bias training and bystander intervention training, to enable greater diversity and inclusivity in the military.

**Chapter 2:** Dr. Barbara Waruszynski provides an overview of the literature and research that examine ethnic intolerance and introduces the associated factors attributed to ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors to help explain the interrelationships and impacts on people, organizations, and communities.

**Chapter 3:** Dr. Yantsislav Yanakiev presents an overview of ethnic, cultural and gender diversity in the Bulgarian Armed Forces, and highlights the need for a future vision that will transform the Bulgarian military into a multicultural organization.

**Chapter 4:** Dr. Mathias De Roeck and Dr. Delphine Resteigne examine the concepts of military socialization and prejudice and the mediating role of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.

**Chapter 5:** Dr. Barbara Waruszynski presents the key findings of a few recent research studies on the Canadian Armed Forces, particularly the perceptions of racism and hateful conduct, and the call for greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in the Canadian military.

**Chapter 6:** Dr. Jessica Lowen and Dr. Daniel McDonald present a timeline of race and ethnic diversity and inclusion in the United States Armed Forces, including the challenges and future recommendations to enable greater diversity and inclusion.

**Chapter 7:** LCol Sven Hertel examines migration in Germany to inclusion in the Bundeswehr, specifically the appreciative and inclusive approaches to diversity in the Bundeswehr.

**Chapter 8:** Dr. Barbara Waruszynski highlights future insights, strategies, tools, and a conceptual diagram to explain ethnic inclusion in multinational and pluralistic environments, including a summary on the factors that influence ethnic intolerance. Dr. Waruszynski also outlines the recommendations and conclusion for enabling greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in multinational military environments.

The chapters in this Technical Report are designed to help influence policies and organizational changes that reflect greater ethnic diversity and inclusion, with the goal to improve military readiness and resilience and enhanced NATO defence capabilities (i.e., doctrine, education, training, leadership, personnel, and human interoperability). The resulting conceptual framework and model and the factors attributed to ethnic intolerance and inclusion will be a part of a NATO Lecture Series on how to manage ethnic diversity and inclusion across defence organizations to ensure greater interrelationships and interdependencies among military personnel who serve in multinational military environments.

## **1.3 CONCLUSION**

This chapter introduced a brief background on ethnic diversity and inclusion in the military context to situate the factors that may influence ethnic intolerance and inclusion across multinational military operations,

coalitions, and alliances. This chapter also provided an overview of the RTG's mandate, including the scope, methods and topics that were discussed during the RTG's working meetings. The next chapter will examine the concept of ethnic intolerance, including the factors that may influence ethnic intolerance in defence and security-based organizations.

## 1.4 REFERENCES

- [1] Abderrazzaq, M. (2021). Social experiences of Muslim Americans regarding intolerance displayed by non-Muslims. *Journal of Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences*, Volume 15(1), pp. 278-292.
- [2] Barth, F. (1969). "Introduction", in F. Barth (Ed.), *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of culture difference* (pp. 9-38), Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin.
- [3] Daniel, S., Claros, Y., Namrow, N., Siebel, M., Campbell, A., McGrath, D., and Klahr, A. (2019). Office of People Analytics. (2019). 2017 workplace and equal opportunity survey of active duty members: Executive report. DTIC# AD1113643. OPA Report No. 2018-023, August 2019. United States. Retrieved from: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1113643.pdf>
- [4] Davey, J., Hart, M., and Guerin, C. (2020). An online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. Interim report. ISD.
- [5] Department of Defence (Australia). (2014). Defence diversity and inclusion strategy. Centre of Diversity Expertise; 2014 [cited Oct 14, 2021]. Available from: <https://www.defencejobs.gov.au/-/media/DFR/Files/DefenceDiversityandInclusionStrategy.pdf?>
- [6] Department of Defense (United States). (2012). Department of Defense diversity and inclusion strategic plan 2012 – 2017.
- [7] Department of National Defence. (2015). Canadian Armed Forces employment equity plan 2015 – 2020. Director Human Rights and Diversity: Ottawa.
- [8] Department of National Defence. (2016). Canadian Armed Forces diversity strategy 2016. Ottawa: Department of National Defence.
- [9] Elwert, G. (1997). Boundaries, cohesion and switching: On we-groups in ethnic national and religious forms. In, Hans-Rudolf Wicker, *Rethinking nationalism and ethnicity* (pp. 251-271). The struggle for meaning and order in Europe, Oxford, New York, 1997.
- [10] Febbraro, A.R., McKee, B., and Riedel, S.L. (2008). *Multinational military operations and intercultural factors*. RTO-TR-HFM-120. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: NATO Research and Technology Organization.
- [11] Kunovich, R., and Hodson, R. (1999). Religious identity, conflict and ethnic tolerance in Croatia. *Social Forces*, 78, pp. 643-674.
- [12] NATO. Allied Command Transformation. (2013). 10 years of transformation: Military diversity as a key transformational element. Retrieved 28 January 2016 from <http://www.act.nato.int/10-years-of-transformation-military-diversity-as-a-key-transformational-element> Archived.
- [13] Plante, E.D.J. (1998). *Leading a multinational force without leaving anyone behind: The human dimensions of marginalisation*. Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence. Cited in: Febbraro, A. R., McKee, B. and Riedel, S. L. (2008). *Multinational military operations and intercultural factors*. RTO-TR-HFM-120. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: NATO Research and Technology Organization.

- [14] Rubin, J., Taylor, J., Pollitt, A., Krapels, J., and Pardal, M. (2014). Intolerance in Western Europe: Analysis of trends and associated factors: Summary report. RAND Europe.
- [15] Smith, A. (1986). The ethnic origins of nations. Blackwell Publishing.
- [16] Waruszynski, B., MacEachern, K., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2019a). Perceptions of racism and harassment among visible minority and Indigenous members in the Defence Team (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDDC-2019-L257). Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [17] Wicker, H.-R. (1997). 'Introduction: Theorizing ethnicity and nationalism', in H.-R. Wicker, (Ed.) Rethinking nationalism and ethnicity. The struggle for meaning and order in Europe. Oxford: New York.



## **Chapter 2 – THE CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC INTOLERANCE: A PRIMER**

**Barbara T. Waruszynski**  
Department of National Defence  
CANADA

### **2.1 BACKGROUND**

Ethnic intolerance in defence and security environments may influence military personnel’s interpersonal relationships as they work within defence organizations, during training exercises, and across multinational operations, alliances, and other international military cooperation. Throughout history, examples of intolerant mindsets and behaviors have been evidenced in people’s perceptions of immigrants and refugees, diverse religious and ethnic groups, and those who hold different ideological perspectives (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeewaran, 2020). During the course of the past 100 years, many examples of historical accounts of ethnic and racialized intolerance have been evidenced around the world. For instance, anti-Semitism ideologies led to the elimination of Jews, Roma, Slavs, political activists and homosexuals during the Holocaust period (1933 to 1945). From 1948 – 1994, apartheid and colonialism in South Africa were based on white supremacy, institutionalized racial oppression, exploitation and segregation of non-whites (i.e., Black Africans, Colored and Indigenous or Asian people), where inequality along racial lines continues to exist. Ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1991 – 2001) led to the killings of predominately ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The Rwandan genocide (1994) resulted in the Hutu ethnic majority killing the Tutsi (minority group) due to economic disparities. The 9/11 militant Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States (2001), the security lockdown in Brussels in response to coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2015), and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris (2015) were all prompted by Islamic terrorism. Examples of racially motivated attacks included Black Lives Matter protests in the United States in response to police brutality and the killing of Black people, for example the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police (2013), the synagogue shootings of Muslim men praying in Quebec City (2017), the Tree of Life synagogue murders in Pittsburgh (2018), Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand (2019), and the recent racially motivated shootings of Black people in a Buffalo supermarket (2022). The Rohingya Muslims refugee crisis in Myanmar (2017) was brought about by the brutal slaying of Rohingya Muslims by the Burmese military. More recently, the Russian invasion of the Ukraine (2022), which has accelerated since the Russo-Ukrainian conflict began in 2014, made calls for the denazification of the Ukrainian people and the need to gain territorial regions. Throughout many of these examples, ethnic intolerance has led to injustices and inequities, prejudicial stereotypes, discrimination, harassment, bigotry, racism, aggression, oppression, exclusion, extremism, xenophobia, Islamophobia (anti-Muslim sentiments), anti-Semitism (including the rise of fascism post-WWII), and genocide. As a result, people, communities, and nations have been divided based on cultural, social, political, geo-political, economic, geographical and religious differences. Ethnic-racial identity, within the context of political, economic, geographic, structural and cultural dimensions, including ethnocentric attitudes, behaviors and ideologies, have been at the core of these differences.

Research on ethnic intolerance highlight many examples of intolerant attitudes and behaviors among people or groups of people who come from pluralistic backgrounds or diverse societies. RAND, for example, uncovered the social, political, cultural and national dimensions attributed to ethnic intolerance in Western Europe, and revealed that the Roma and Muslims were two groups who encountered the highest levels of experienced ethnic intolerance (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). Kunovich and Hodson (2002) analyzed the relationships between ethnic diversity, segregation, and inequality in Bosnia and Croatia and found that “ethnic diversity and ethnic occupational segregation decrease ethnic prejudice while ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudice” (p. 185). Lebedva and Tatarko (2004) examined the

relationships between ethnic identities, perceptions of discrimination and ethnic attitudes across multicultural regions in Russia, where ambivalence of ethnic identity was considered to be the strongest predictor of ethnic intolerance. It seems that “a society that is culturally, religiously, and ideologically plural implies diversity of substantive worldviews and lifestyles” (Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021, p.172). These worldviews and lifestyles may impact people’s attitudes towards individuals and groups who come from pluralistic backgrounds and may contribute to the manifestation of intolerant mindsets and behaviors toward specific ethnic individuals or groups.

This chapter provides an overview of the challenges and implications of ethnic intolerance, and highlights several definitions, theoretical approaches, and research studies that help to explain the factors that may influence ethnic intolerance in communities. By examining these definitions, theoretical perspectives, and the factors attributed to ethnic intolerance, defence organizations will have a better appreciation of ethnic intolerance and the challenges and implications for creating inclusive organizations across the defence communities.

## **2.2 DEFINING ETHNIC INTOLERANCE**

In general, intolerance is defined as “a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on the grounds of their minority status,” and is primarily based on one’s ethnicity, race, religion, culture, or nationality (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 1). Intolerance is also portrayed as “the refusal and unwillingness to respect or tolerate persons of a different social group or members of minority groups who hold beliefs contrary to one’s own” (e.g., social or cultural intolerance; Abderrazzaq, 2021, p. 278). Intolerance is attributed to individuals or a group of people who exhibit prejudicial, judgmental and discriminatory attitudes and behaviors, and lack empathy (Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021). These attitudes and behaviors are also displayed through various forms of ethnic intolerance (e.g., stereotypes, racism, and ethnic hatred) toward people who belong to specific ethnic, racialized, or social groups.

According to Fréjuté-Rakauskienė (2009),

*Ethnic intolerance is defined as the opposite/different opinion/belief, refusal to recognize equal opportunities and justification of dominance or violence. Ethnic intolerance in discourse is defined as the negative sentiments/activities directed against the ethnic/racial/religious groups, arising from the prejudices towards those groups and occurring in public discourse (in the media) in the forms of verbal harassment (verbal abuse, threats, defiance), incitement of ethnic intolerance (hate speech), and incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence. (p. 10)*

Ethnic intolerance is evidenced through different forms and expressions, including ethnic discrimination and harassment (e.g., stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes); xenophobia primarily based on diverse religious, political, economic and social-cultural identities and ideologies; ethnic conflict; and ethnic hatred (e.g., ethnic cleansing and genocide). Other more subtle forms of behaviors are evidenced in ethnic-based microaggressions (e.g., remarks, insults, and jokes attributed to one’s ethnicity or culture). Such behaviors can lead people to ask, for example, “whether antifascist activists assaulting far-right demonstrators are ever justified or whether it is acceptable for Western countries to enforce a “burka ban” on Muslim women or a ban on the building of new minarets” (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeewaran, 2020, p. 467). Moreover, ethnic intolerance develops through socially, culturally, politically, and economically motivated issues found in pluralistic communities and societies. Research has shown that ethnic intolerance is exacerbated by an “unwillingness to extend economic, political, and social rights to other ethnic groups, regardless of perceived similarities or differences in basic values, norms, or beliefs” (Kunovich and Hodson, 1999, p. 644).

As a result, it behooves us to examine the theoretical paradigms and factors that may help to explain people’s intolerant attitudes and behaviors toward particular ethnic or racialized groups.

## **2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INTOLERANCE**

Scholars have tried to explain ethnic diversity and the critical elements attributed to intolerant attitudes and behaviors among diverse ethnic groups. Although the scope of the research on ethnic diversity is multidisciplinary in nature (e.g., sociological, historical, anthropological, psychological and biological perspectives), this chapter will focus on several theories that help to explain ethnic diversity and the theoretical perspectives and factors that contribute to ethnic intolerance. These theories include ethnicity theory (primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism); psychology of intolerance theory (prejudicial intolerance, intuitive intolerance, and deliberative intolerance); critical race theory; social identity theory; realistic group conflict theory; and theory of cultural racism. This theoretical framework will help to unfold the factors that contribute to ethnic intolerance in pluralistic societies and the social conflicts and oppression that exist between minority and majority groups living in pluralistic environments.

### **2.3.1 Ethnicity Theory: Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism**

Ethnicity has been primarily studied along three main theoretical perspectives, including primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. Scholars argue that how people perceive others' intolerance, and their own intolerance dictates how they will respond in given situations (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeewaran, 2020). For example, the primordialist perspective refers to inherited or fixed ethnic identities that are based on "language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory," where "nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience" (Smith, 1986, p. 12). These elements represent "the organizing principles and bonds of human association throughout history" (Smith, 1986, p. 12). The primordialist perspective argues that people with particular ethnic identities see their cultures as being fixed in their traditions, languages, and nationalistic backgrounds. Their identities are ascribed at birth (Isajiw, 1993) and their membership is passed along generational lines (Chandra, 2012, cited in Williams, 2015). Adlparvar and Tadros (2016) suggest that the primordialist approach takes into account "the 'ancient hatreds' argument" where differences manifested through differing cultures and values among ethnic groups can trigger ethnic conflicts, including violence. However, the primordialist perspective overlooks the economic, political and structural conduits that trigger [ethnic] conflicts (McKay, 2011, cited in Williams, 2015). As a result, there is a need to better explain the nuances attributed to ethnic intolerance among diverse groups of people.

The instrumentalist approach uses ethnicity as a tool where people belonging to specific groups take advantage of their race, ethnicity, religion, and cultural beliefs to fulfill larger tasks and goals (e.g., trying to attain power over scarce economic or natural resources or attain political control; see Williams, 2015 and Yeghiazaryan, 2018). Accordingly, the instrumentalist theoretical approach argues that people use their ethnic lineage for greater "prosperity, power and security" (Williams, 2015, p. 148). However, Williams (2015) argues that using ethnicity as a tool for material gain and power does not fully address the reasons why people engage in ethnic conflicts.

Constructivism looks at the social construction of one's identity, where individuals may have multiple identities that help to shape or socially construct who they are. In essence, "ethnic identities are constructed, reconstructed, and mobilized in accordance with social and political factors" (Yeghiazaryan, 2018, p. 48). The construction and reconstruction of one's ethnic identity is based on the social and political beliefs, norms and practices that help to refine people's identities and worldviews. However, researchers point out that the constructivist approach does not account for people who remain the same even though the social and political contexts change (Yeghiazaryan, 2018).

Some scholars argue for a combined theoretical approach to better understand ethnic diversity and the reasons why particular groups of people engage in ethnic conflicts. For example, Yeghiazaryan (2018) suggests that taking a combined theoretical perspective by employing the instrumentalist and constructivist approaches would provide a more comprehensive explanation of warring ethnic groups in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova.

Ethnicity Theory provides a foundational backdrop to help understand the factors that may influence ethnic intolerance, whether in the workplace setting or within the diverse societies that hold pluralistic worldviews. However, Ethnicity Theory does not fully explain ethnic intolerance at the individual, group, organizational, societal and global levels. Scholars need to apply an intersectional lens through multidisciplinary theoretical perspectives to help explain the factors that impact ethnic intolerance. By addressing these theoretical approaches, people will have a better appreciation of why diverse ethnic groups may become intolerant of one another, including the characteristics that lead to intolerant mindsets and behaviors. These theories will also contribute to the application of evidenced-based programs that are designed to foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion across organizations and communities. These evidenced-based programs will be examined in greater depth in the last chapter of this report and will contribute to a new framework and conceptual model to help explain the factors that elicit ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion.

### **2.3.2 Psychology of Intolerance Theory: Prejudicial, Intuitive and Deliberative Intolerance**

The Psychology of Intolerance Theory provides a theoretical approach to help explain prejudicial, intuitive, and deliberative intolerance (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). From a cognitive perspective, prejudicial intolerance is normally equated with generalized feelings of negativity and antipathy (e.g., ethnic hatred) towards people belonging to a different group other than one's own (e.g., intolerance toward people who belong to a particular religion or race; Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). Behaviors associated with prejudicial intolerance include a lack of flexibility or closedmindedness, where the underlying causes are attributed to reticence, uncertainty, feelings of being threatened, and fear (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). According to Verkuyten, Adelman and Yogeeswaran (2020), such attitudes and behaviors are associated with rigid forms of thinking about individuals or groups of people who are different from oneself. This rigidity may lead to "in-group superiority and out-group discrimination" (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020, p. 468). For example, Gordon Allport (1954) highlighted in his book "The Nature of Prejudice" the notion that prejudicial attitudes in intergroup relations are based on preconceived stereotypes (i.e., overgeneralized beliefs about specific social, ethnic, or cultural groups) that people use in their everyday lives, and that these stereotypes are historically rooted throughout many cultures and generational lines that may have led to different forms of discrimination (e.g., Indian caste system; Talati, 2022). Prejudicial attitudes are a part of the social fabric that people grow up in and are evident through expressions of gender, gender identity or sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, race, religion and culture. From an ethnicity standpoint, "ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (Allport, 1979, p. 9). People's implicit or unconscious biases may trigger prejudicial attitudes and behaviors toward those that are different than oneself (e.g., people who come from diverse ethnic backgrounds or countries and are depicted as foreigners, or even discrimination that may be based on different caste systems within one's country).

Intuitive intolerance can be evidenced when people respond with their immediate intuitions and emotions (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). As a result, people who exhibit intuitive intolerance tend to move away from self-reflection and understanding of other ethnic groups and are too quick to judge other religions, beliefs, customs, and worldviews. Intuitive intolerance is a result of not being able to see different viewpoints other than one's own (e.g., acceptance of other religious views and practices). For example, "what makes a cultural, religious, or ideological belief critical and psychologically meaningful is that it is taken to be true, and devout believers, for instance, may intuitively consider other faiths as being misguided" (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020, p. 468).

Deliberative intolerance refers to intolerance that is specific to reflective reasoning and is based on values-based reasoning (e.g., moral values) that help to determine what is acceptable and what is not acceptable (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). For example, people who hold deliberative intolerant attitudes and behaviors may do so as a result of the discordance of religious beliefs held by Muslims in comparison to “Western liberal norms and values” (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020, p. 469). In so doing, people may oppose certain religious beliefs held by Muslims but may not have prejudicial feelings in general towards them (Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020). Another example looks at the banning of wearing religious symbols in Quebec, Canada. A study in Quebec “found that feelings of cultural threat and generalized prejudice predicted support for banning minority religious symbols, whereas holding liberal values predicted support to ban all religious symbols” (Bilodeau, Turgeon, White, and Henderson, 2018; cited in Verkuyten, Adelman, and Yogeeswaran, 2020, pp. 469-470).

The Psychology of Intolerance Theory contributes to a more thorough understanding of the different forms of intolerance when examining theories on intergroup relations.

### **2.3.3 Critical Race Theory**

Critical Race Theory (CRT), predominantly attributed to scholars such as Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell, looks at race as a social construct. According to Crenshaw (2011), the premise behind CRT is that the civil rights laws that make up the existing institutions and systems may have created racial disparities which have led to systemic or structural racism and racial inequalities. Although CRT continues to be controversial in the United States (e.g., the banning of CRT by right-wing campaigns), this theory is important to examine as it helps people to understand systemic racism and the need to create better awareness of racial equity and racial justice. As Crenshaw (n.d.) states:

*[CRT] is a way of seeing, attending to, accounting for, tracing and analyzing the ways that race is produced...the ways that racial inequality is facilitated, and the ways that our history has created these inequalities that now can be almost effortlessly reproduced unless we attend to the existence of these inequalities.* (Fortin, 2021)

From an analytical perspective, Crenshaw applies CRT to examine systemic racism within the institutions and systems from a historical perspective, and how doctrine has contributed to generating divides between privileged white people and people of color. Scholars have used the term “white privilege” (see Peggy McIntosh’s (1990) essay on “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack”) to describe the notion that people who are white have been able to enjoy the merits of daily living without seeing or understanding the privileges allotted to them. In essence, CRT focuses on the need to learn about the experiences of people of color and the need to understand how race is entrenched in legal policies, systems, and institutions. The focus is on better understanding how race and structural racism impact diversity, equity and inclusion to enable a true multiracial and multicultural democracy.

Drawing from CRT, Crenshaw focuses on the need to apply an intersectional lens to understand more holistically the factors that may contribute to stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and racism. Scholars may potentially offer additional analytical insights into how characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, religion, and language, for example, may contribute to intersecting identities and thereby influence prejudicial stereotypes, discrimination and oppression. Understanding people’s lived experiences is at the core of intersectionality. For example, intersectionality allows people to understand oppression from different perspectives (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, and/or different ethnic backgrounds).

### **2.3.4 Social Identity Theory**

Henri Tajfel’s and John Turner’s Social Identity Theory looks at the process that people go through when they identify as a member of a particular group (e.g., ethnic or racialized groups, religious groups, political parties,



sexual orientation, gender, or sports teams). According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), people's social identities are embedded in the memberships that they hold with groups. The in-group or intergroup membership becomes a salient part of who people are and how they communicate and behave, both individually and within a group. In essence, group membership is based on belonging to in-groups. People who identify with in-groups have a sense of belonging which contributes to their positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

There are three stages that people go through when they identify with a particular group. These stages include social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. Social categorization enables people to look at the world and organize themselves and others into social groups or categories. When people categorize themselves and others into groups, they also create a comparative group, known as the out-group. This is when conflicts arise between groups (e.g., people who come from different religious backgrounds or are affiliated with specific political parties). Part of categorizing people into social groups may involve the unconscious social biases and microaggressions that are ingrained through our socialization and cultural development (e.g., prejudicial mindsets).

Social identification refers to when people alter their attitudes and behaviors to identify with a particular in-group. As people identify with certain social groups, they invest their emotions and attitudes into the groups in which they hold membership. Accordingly, social identification embodies three components: "a cognitive component (self-categorization); an evaluative component (the degree to which a person evaluates a group in positive or negative terms); and an affective component (the extent to which a person feels emotionally tied to a group)" (Reimer, Schmid, Hewstone, and Ramiah, 2020, p. 6).

Social comparison allows individuals within the in-group to make comparisons to the out-groups. As people identify with in-groups, stereotypes can lead to prejudice and discrimination. As a result, those who identify with groups will modify their behaviors to become a part of that group and will make comparisons to other groups. Social identities generate in-groups (e.g., religious or ethnic groups), and in turn, create out-groups. People identify with the in-group as "us" and the out-group as "them". These identities are based on biased interpretations (e.g., individuals in the in-group who form positive stereotypes about the in-group). Negative stereotypes are attributed to the out-group, which in turn, can lead to conflict and aggression. For example, why are people motivated to join right-wing extremist groups? What motivates Russia to invade Ukraine and create a massive exodus of Ukrainians needing to escape war and death? The social identities and the ways in which people identify with in-groups and out-groups create the factors that may lead to prejudices, discrimination and conflicts.

### **2.3.5 Realistic Group Conflict Theory**

Realistic Group Conflict Theory or Realistic Conflict Theory looks at the conflict attributed to inequalities that exist between groups particularly when there is competition for (scarce) resources (e.g., the use of treaties during colonialism to obtain land and natural resources from Indigenous Peoples; Sherif, 1967). The intergroup tensions and competition for scarce resources can lead to stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination between two opposing groups. Sherif (1967) asserts that stereotypes "reflect the stance of our own group in past/or current relationships with the particular group in question" (p. 37). The focus is on group interests, and the group membership elects who is allotted the resources.

The historical backgrounds and relations between groups provide a better understanding of how group conflict can lead to prejudice and war. Examples of this theoretical approach can include conflicts between neighbouring communities, including genocide (e.g., the Holocaust, Rwanda's Hutu Tutsi class warfare, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine). To resolve this group conflict, scholars propose the need for intergroup cooperation as opposed to competition for scarce resources. However, there is a need to understand the historical relations between the groups to determine how prejudicial attitudes and behaviors were formed that fuelled the conflict (e.g., political interests, power, competition, interrelationships, religious conflicts, and cultures, values and customs).

### 2.3.6 Theory of Cultural Racism

Etienne Balibar represents one of the key scholars who looked at cultural racism as “neo-racism” and later on as “cultural differential racism.” It has been evidenced that when multi-ethnic groups co-exist, conflicts may arise due to preconceived stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and discrimination between groups of people. In essence, Balibar (1991) asserts that cultural differences emerge between racial or ethnic groups, where one culture may feel superior to the other culture (e.g., negative perceptions attributed to immigrants; Chua, 2017). Moreover, biologically ascribed markers are not at the core of cultural racism. Chua (2017) states:

*Cultural racism refers to the institutional domination and sense of racial-ethnic superiority of one social group over others...justified by...culturally constructed markers [such as] language use, religious practice, immigrant status, social welfare dependency, and the profiling of criminal and terrorist behavior. (p.1)*

For example, Bratt (2022) examined Europeans’ beliefs about cultural superiority and its link to biological racism. Based on a survey of approximately 33,000 people across 21 European countries, there were large disparities of beliefs attributed to cultural superiority. However, “expressed beliefs in cultural superiority and cultural concerns [were] strongly associated with traditional racism” (Bratt, 2022, p. 207). The concept of white privilege may be at the root of cultural racism.

Addy (2008) proposed the notion that cultural racism and white privilege are “two sides of the same coin” (p. 11). Whiteness is described as the “default standard” (Sue, 2006; cited in Addy, 2008), where white privilege becomes the norm. Akin to CRT, Akamatsu (2002) states:

*If cultural racism is like the air we breathe; if it is everywhere amongst us; if it is within the social discourses and social histories that shape our very identities; then we will enact racist thoughts and practices without necessarily realising that we are doing so, or realising the effects on other people’s lives. (Cited in Addy, 2008, p. 50)*

Understanding cultural differentiation (Balibar, 1991) is at the core of racial disparities between groups and the intergroup conflicts that lead to fear and anxiety, biases, stereotypes, bigotry, discrimination, and even war. These racial disparities can be evidenced in ethnocentric groups found in diverse ethnic, racialized, and religious groups. From an anthropological perspective, ethnocentrism may be the driving force where one group may hold perceptions of superiority over another ethnic group (e.g., the rise of right-wing extremism). These perceptions are part of a collective group identity and mentality of a perceived dominant group that tries to exert power and superiority over other groups.

Tribalism may also be at the core of ethnocentrism where individuals within groups may feel a stronger ethnic identity to a particular tribe, and may in turn, marginalize people in the out-groups. For example, ethnocentrism and tribal identities have contributed to slavery, apartheid, and genocide. In-groups that carry their own norms, beliefs and values may demonstrate hatred towards other groups that are more diverse in their cultures. As a result, there is a greater need to move towards cross-cultural relationships to better understand the different cultures and their respective traditional practices, including the interrelationships found across diverse cultures and ethnic groups.

From an ethnic diversity perspective, the above theoretical explanations help to contextualize how ethnic intolerance can manifest itself in intergroup relations. Next, the factors that influence ethnic intolerance will be examined along with newer forms of racism found in pluralistic communities.

## 2.4 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE ETHNIC INTOLERANCE

Researchers purport that there are specific factors that may explain why people are intolerant toward specific ethnic groups. Although the literature on ethnic intolerance is vast in nature, this chapter will focus on

several factors that may influence ethnic intolerance from political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and socio-psychological perspectives. Moreover, several key factors that may influence ethnic intolerance, such as implicit or unconscious biases, microaggressions, systemic racism, and hateful conduct and right-wing extremism, may help to explain past and present intolerant attitudes and behaviors toward diverse ethnic groups. Examples will be taken from the literature along with research in defence organizations to help illustrate the factors that may influence ethnic intolerance.

#### **2.4.1 Political, Economic, Social, and Structural Factors**

Perceived threats that are based on ethnic and racial stratification, social polarization, competition and power, conflict, immigration overflow, human rights issues, economic disparity, social injustices, religious identities and fanaticisms represent several examples of why people and the communities in which they live become intolerant towards others who come from different ethnic backgrounds. For example, RAND examined high-level trends between 1981 and 2008 to explain intolerant attitudes and behaviors in Western Europe (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). By analyzing European datasets, empirical literature and trends across different countries, RAND was able to explore the increase in intolerant attitudes in specific countries, and among groups and subgroups, and the associated trends or patterns found in relation to political, economic, social, and cultural factors. Although the authors state that it was difficult to discern specific trends on ethnic intolerance across different ethnic, religious and national groups, there were specific factors that explained intolerance, including:

- a) Evidence of association with intolerance is strong for some economic factors, such as macroeconomic prosperity, and much less so for others, such as unemployment rate.
- b) There is strong evidence of an association between intolerance and demographic factors such as age, education and socioeconomic class, but somewhat less strong evidence for an association between intolerance and personal income.
- c) All socio-political factors examined in this study – citizenship regime, welfare state regime and political orientation – have been found to be associated with intolerant attitudes (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 2).

The RAND report also stated that among the different ethnic groups surveyed, the Roma encountered the “highest levels of expressed intolerance,” with Muslims as the second in line to experience intolerant attitudes from other groups (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 7). The RAND study also disclosed that “attitudes to people of a different race vary more from country to country than intolerance by nationality, ethnicity or religion, with some countries being, on average, very accepting of different races and others much more intolerant” (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 9). Similarly, Strabac, Listhaug and Jakobsen (2012) also uncovered in their study the patterns related to ethnic intolerance in Europe and found that Gypsies (more commonly known as Roma) experienced the most intolerance, with higher levels of intolerance experienced in Turkey in comparison to Western Europe which had the lowest intolerance levels. Research also shows that there is a higher level of intolerance towards Jews in Turkey (Strabac, Listhaug and Jakobsen, 2012).

Moreover, Atanassova (1999) examined the impact of ethnic related issues on the security of South-Eastern Europe (i.e., Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania, and Albanians in Macedonia and in Serbia). Atanassova (1999) discovered that economic and social factors that impacted ethnic relations included economic adversity and an inequitable economic system (Atanassova, 1999, p. 25). Political factors included “discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics” (Atanassova, 1999, p. 21). Structural factors that impacted ethnic issues included weak states, intra-state security issues, and ethnic geography (Atanassova, 1999, p. 19).



## **2.4.2 Socio-Psychological Factors**

Researchers have shown that the interrelationships between social and psychological factors contribute to ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors, particularly between cultural, ethnic and religious groups (e.g., intra and intergroup relations which can contribute to distrust between groups). For example, Atanassova (1999) discovered that fear and insecurity were attributed to “hostile images, mistrust, negative stereotypes and prejudices about the ‘other ethnic group’” (p. 12) due to the historical nature of territorial disputes across South-Eastern Europe. Inter-ethnic psychological stereotypes defined by “master” or “subject” dictated these intergroup relationships (Atanassova, 1999). Cultural/perceptual factors included “cultural discrimination against minorities” and “ethnic groups’ histories and perceptions of themselves and others” (Atanassova, 1999, p. 27). As such, cultural and ethnic identities tend to create greater in-grouping of people which can lead to mistrust of out-groups. Interestingly, RAND uncovered cultural factors, such as levels of social trust and contact with minorities, to be generally likened to decreased levels of intolerance (see Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 2). Consequently, mistrust at a group or societal level becomes an important factor to consider when examining intergroup relations.

In determining the socio-psychological factors of ethnic intolerance within multicultural regions in Russia, Lebedva and Tatarko (2004) discovered that the “most powerful predictor of ethnic intolerance is the ambivalence of ethnic identity”... where it tends to promote “general ethnic intolerance, negative ethnic stereotypes of out-groups, increased social distance toward ethnic out-groups, and [the] willingness to distinguish among people according to ethnic and religious criteria” (p. 528). According to these authors, the second significant predictor of ethnic intolerance is the degree of “perceived discrimination” (Lebedva and Tatarko, 2004). Perceived discrimination is attributed to people’s ability to distinguish others based on their religions, the negative stereotyping of different ethnic minority groups, and the increased social distancing between groups (Lebedva and Tatarko, 2004). Verkuyten and Kollar (2021) also showed in their study that examples of intolerance were understood as being narrow-minded or prejudice towards someone or a specific group. People with intolerant attitudes were regarded as lacking empathy and were judgmental or discriminatory towards others. Intolerance was attributed to “race and ethnicity”, including “disabilities, sexual orientation, and difference of opinion” (p. 177).

In the next section, the associated factors attributed to ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors will be examined and will help to explain the interrelationships and impacts on people, organizations, and communities. These associated factors include unconscious biases, microaggressions, racism and systemic racism, and hateful conduct and Right-Wing Extremism (RWE). The attribution of stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination, and ethnic conflict to ethnic intolerance will include examples found in defence organizations and pluralistic societies.

### **2.4.2.1 Unconscious Biases**

In general terms, unconscious biases are entrenched prejudicial beliefs and hasty judgements that are based on social and cultural norms, stereotypes and personal experiences, and are evidenced through preconceived opinions of people, predominantly attributed to their race and ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientation or gender identity, religion, or other personal characteristics that segregate people into specific groups (Rodriguez, 2018). These entrenched beliefs are based on deeply ingrained systemic attitudes and behaviors in modern society which are developed over time through people’s development, experiences and socialization. Misconceptions, prejudices, and ethnic or racial stereotypes of specific groups of people are evidenced through preconceived notions and attitudes about people which are filtered into social categories. These social categories (e.g., religion, race, ethnicity, political preference, socioeconomic status, age, and gender) can lead to the development of judgement-based decision-making, which in turn, may result in negative stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and harassment (e.g., ethnocentrism).

Unconscious biases come in several forms (e.g., affinity bias, halo effect, horns effect, attribution bias, and confirmation bias; Burton-Hughes, 2017). Affinity bias refers to the biases that are created as a result of identifying with people who hold similarities to each other (e.g., appearance, actions, etc.). When individuals focus on creating relationships with people who are similar to them, they tend to exclude the possibility of having relationships with people who are dissimilar. Affinity biases may lead to in-groups who hold preferential treatment towards those who are similar to the in-group and thereby create negative stereotypes of people belonging to the out-groups. Halo effect refers to the biases that are attributed to individuals' perceptions and beliefs of those people that they hold in the highest regard, hence to the exclusion of others. Horns effect refers to our ability to attribute negative perceptions of individuals based on the things that we personally dislike. Attribution bias denotes making judgements about people based on either positive or negative behaviors. Confirmation bias signifies the biases that people have which are based on the beliefs and perceptions that they already hold about people. Theoretical perspectives, such as Social Identity Theory, Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Theory of Cultural Racism, all demonstrate how unconscious biases can lead to positive stereotypes of an in-group and negative stereotypes of an out-group, which in turn, can result in prejudicial mindsets and behaviors, discrimination, and conflict between groups.

Unconscious biases can be attributed to the notion of white privilege. In other words, white individuals have benefited from their participation in this dominant group, and have enjoyed, both consciously and unconsciously, the advantages associated with being white. In this sense, researchers have called into question the notion of white privilege and the need for white people to recognize their privileges and what these privileges mean to people who are non-white (DiAngelo, 2018). According to Edwards (2017), "White privilege and the background of institutional racism in which White privilege is inherently embedded along with the prejudice upon which they are based are often expressed, transmitted, perpetuated, and maintained in subtle ways" (p. 11). Recognizing white privilege is an important step to overcoming stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination attributed to unconscious biases.

#### **2.4.2.2 Microaggressions**

Microaggressions are defined as subtle forms of expression and may include overt racist attitudes and behaviors, such as negative stereotypes or derogatory jokes (e.g., Sue, Capodilupo, Torino, Bucceri, Holder, Nadal, and Esquilin, 2007). Conscious or unconscious microaggressions refer to intentional or unintentional insults, remarks, jokes (small, big, verbal, and non-verbal) aimed at criticizing a person because of a person's membership in a group (Pierce, 1970). Sue et al. (2007) define microaggressions as "brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or group" (p. 273). Oftentimes, microaggressions are not intentional and can be a reflection of one's unconscious bias towards a particular person or group of people. However, microaggressions can lead to the demeaning of one's racialized [or ethnic] identities (Sue et al., 2007), and can also reinforce 'white privileged' attitudes and behaviors (Edwards, 2017).

From a sociological perspective, racialization or ethnicization may be at the pinnacle of our unconscious biases or microaggressions (e.g., Omi and Winant, 1986). The social construction of race can be evidenced in people's behaviors and actions toward racialized groups, where power or dominance is held by one group over another on the grounds of one's race or ethnicity. This can be seen in people who portray themselves to be color-blind, thereby not recognizing individual races, ethnicities or cultures (e.g., Sue and Sue, 2013). From a microaggression perspective, color blindness may be attributed to our unconscious biases and beliefs. Research has evinced that people who apply a color-blinded approach in comparison to a multicultural approach tend to have more racial biases (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; cited in Edwards 2017). Edwards (2017) states: "How can we accept each other if we refuse to see each other? How can we truly accept someone if we refuse to acknowledge different values, experiences, and traditions that are part of their identity?" (p. 13). Color-blind racial ideologies or Color-Blind Racial Attitudes (CoBRAs) represent obstacles to attitudes and behaviors that generate prejudice and discrimination (Edwards, 2017).

### 2.4.2.3 Racism and Systemic Racism

Within the social sciences, race and ethnicity are regarded as distinct concepts (Clair and Denis, 2015). Race is based on perceived fixed physical characteristics; whereas ethnicity is determined by history, ancestry, and cultural heritage, norms and practices (Cornell and Hartmann, 2006; cited in Clair and Denis, 2015). Ostensibly, “race, ethnicity, and nationality are socially constructed, and, as such, groups once considered ethnicities have come to be seen as races and vice versa” (Clair and Denis, 2015, p. 857).

The social construction of race and ethnicity has been evidenced through historical accounts (e.g., the domination of racialized people by Europeans in the eighteenth century; colonialism and appropriation of Indigenous lands in North America, including the abuse of Indigenous Peoples; and the enslavement of Africans beginning in the sixteenth century; see Clair and Denis, 2015, pp. 857-858). Throughout history, racist ideologies have led to the development of ethnic and cultural stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, harassment and conflict.

Racism is “a belief that one group is superior to others,” and is exhibited through actions or systemic practices which discriminate people solely on their skin color or ethnicity and characteristics attributed to the community (e.g., physical characteristics, customs, and geography; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2019). Racism primarily results from the “transformation of race prejudice and/or ethnocentrism through the exercise of power against a racial group defined as inferior, by individuals and institutions with the intentional or unintentional support of the entire culture” (Jones, 1972, p. 117, cited in Ponterotto, Utsey, and Pedersen, 2006, p. 16).

From a global perspective, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (Article 2) addresses the importance of combatting racism and racial discrimination and defines racism as:

*Racist ideologies, prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalized practices resulting in racial inequality as well as the fallacious notion that discriminatory relations between groups are morally and scientifically justifiable; it is reflected in discriminatory provisions in legislation or regulations and discriminatory practices as well as in anti-social beliefs and acts; it hinders the development of its victims, perverts those who practise it, divides nations internally, impedes international co-operation and gives rise to political tensions between peoples; it is contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and, consequently, seriously disturbs international peace and security. (United Nations (Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 1978, p. 2)*

Moreover, the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD; Article 1) defines racial discrimination as:

*Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. (United Nations, 1965, p. 2)*

At the individual level, racist attitudes and behaviors are found in jokes, slurs or hate crimes that represent specific ethnic or racialized groups (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2019). For example, Jones (1997) states that the individual racist is:

*One who considers the [B]lack people as a group (or other human groups defined by essential racial characteristics) [to be] inferior to whites because of physical (i.e., genotypical and phenotypical) traits. He or she further believes that these physical traits are determinants of social behavior and of moral or intellectual qualities, and ultimately presumes that this inferiority is a legitimate basis for that group’s inferior social treatment. An important consideration is that all judgments of superiority are based on the corresponding traits of white people as norms of comparison. (p. 417, cited in Ponterotto, Utsey, and Pedersen, 2006, pp. 16-17)*

Systemic or institutional racism, on the other hand, is racism that has been ingrained in the institutional underpinnings of organizations and society which, in turn, have led to colonial oppression and social injustices and inequities for marginalized groups (e.g., Black people, Chinese people, and Indigenous Peoples). As highlighted in Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy:

*Systemic or institutional racism consists of patterns of behaviour, policies or practices that are part of the social or administrative structures of an organization, and which create or perpetuate a position of relative disadvantage for racialized persons. These appear neutral on the surface but, nevertheless, have an exclusionary impact on racialized persons. (Canadian Heritage, 2019)*

Research shows that racist and discriminatory attitudes and behaviors tend to be more subtle (e.g., microaggressions or perceived discriminatory practices). For example, racialized military members in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) highlighted the challenges that they underwent in their work environment, including perceptions of unfair evaluations, a perceived lack of career progression and employment opportunities, and the need to work twice as hard to prove one's abilities (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019). Moreover, based on the United States 2017 Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active Duty Members (2017 WEOA), 16.5% of the Department of Defense's (DoD) members experienced some form of racial/ethnic harassment in the past 12 months prior to the administration of the survey (Daniel, Claros, Namrow, Siebel, Campbell, McGrath, and Klahr, 2019). Black (29.3%) and Asian (21.6%) members were more likely to experience this form of harassment in comparison to whites (11.8%) and American Indian/Alaskan Native (10.5%) members who were less likely to experience this form of harassment (Daniel, Claros, Namrow, Siebel, Campbell, McGrath, and Klahr, 2019).

Likened to Critical Race Theory, systemic or institutional racism is based on the embedded systems, unequal power structures and biases that include written or unwritten policies, processes, guidelines, cultural norms and traditions, and attitudes and behaviors that were formed over time. These organizational structures and other systems of oppression have been ingrained within institutions and have led to the unequal treatment of Black, Indigenous, and People Of Color (BIPOC). Research highlights that "once racism becomes part of a system, it is self-replicating, and can be difficult to detect, because most organizational members are not disadvantaged by these inherent biases and thus take for granted the underlying socio-cultural assumptions and histories upon which they were formed" (Wright, Waruszynski, Silins, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2021, p. 4).

A recent panel discussion on systemic racism in the Canadian military states that "historically, Canadian interests have been colonial, anti-Indigenous, and anti-Black, and that the [CAF] have contributed to enforcing and upholding those interests" (Department of National Defence, 2022). The Canadian panel highlighted the following:

- 1) Systemic racism erodes public trust in institutions and creates resentment and disillusionment amongst racialized groups;
- 2) Eliminating systemic racism in [the Department of National Defence; DND]/CAF will require an institution-wide evolution of values; and
- 3) Changing the cultural mindset of DND/CAF necessitates a review of how the institution functions (Department of National Defence, 2022).

Like many countries around the world, colonialism has been at the root of systemic racism, and has contributed to the historical oppression, racist ideologies, and inequities of marginalized or underrepresented groups and communities. Different forms of oppression and racist ideologies have resulted in ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors in pluralistic societies.

#### 2.4.2.4 Hateful Conduct and Right-Wing Extremism

White nationalist attitudes and actions have been evidenced around the world, including examples of harassment, threats, violence, crimes, and terrorism linked to hate groups or right-wing extremists (e.g., La Meute / The Pack, Proud Boys, The Base, Three Percenters, etc.). Within the defence environment, military institutions are developing policies and programs designed to stop expressions of hateful conduct and RWE. For example, a new amendment to the Canadian Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5019-0 on *Conduct and Performance Deficiencies* in the CAF defines hateful conduct as:

*An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability.* (Department of National Defence, 2020)

This new directive prohibits any CAF military member from taking part in hateful conduct behavior or right-wing extremist groups. RWE represents:

*A loose movement, characterized by a racially, ethnically and sexually defined nationalism. This nationalism is often framed in terms of white power [e.g., sympathizers of white nationalism], and is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by such groups as non-Whites, Jews, immigrants, homosexuals and feminists.* (Lamoureux, 2017, as cited in Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 10)

According to Perry and Scrivens (2019), hatred and hostile behaviors emanating from right-wing extremist individuals or groups manifest through “power, identity and belonging that result in a social hierarchy where societal power is placed with white, Christian and heterosexual males” (cited in Chana, 2020). Extremist (hate) groups refer to “organizations or groups that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, colour, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion; advocate using force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights” (Department of Defense, 2007). These extremist groups are driven by “solidarity” that is “grounded in hate” (Chana, 2020). RAND highlights that “there has been a documented increase in support for and visibility of extremist and populist political parties, and an apparent rise in manifestations of intolerant attitudes, both in national policy and more widely in the behaviour of individuals” (Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014, p. 1). Many countries around the world are seeing an insurgence of hate groups or RWE.

In Canada, an environmental scan of RWE revealed that “acts of terrorism committed by the far-right have increased by 320% over the past five years [see the Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index], supported by an increasingly connected and internationalist community of right-wing extremism” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p.4). These right-wing extremists use social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 4chan, Gab, Fascist Forge and Iron March) to draw attention and recruit people around the world to take part in “broadcasting disinformation and propaganda, harassing opponents, and co-ordinating activity including publicity stunts, protests and acts of violence” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 4). These authors underscore the existence of “6,660 right-wing extremist channels, pages, groups and accounts across 7 social media platforms; and Anti-Muslim and anti-Trudeau [Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada] rhetoric [as] the most salient topics of conversation among RWE actors in Canada” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 5). In this report, RWE actors include skinheads, white supremacists (e.g., neo-Nazis), anti-Muslim, alt-right, manosphere (extreme misogyny), anti-authority, and lone actors, ideologues and gurus. Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic period over the last two years, RWE activists have been targeting Asian communities as they are perceived by right-wing extremists to be the cause of the coronavirus (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020). These authors state that “far-right extremist groups have also grown in number and boldness in Canada, especially on the heels of the 2016 election of



Donald Trump as president of the US” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 7); and the insurrection on Washington D.C.’s Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, in support of Donald Trump, which marked the height of “acute polarization, the sway of conspiracy theorists [e.g., QAnon] and the incitement of violence by unsavoury political actors” (Huls, 2022, p. 37). Anti-vaccine movements, such as the trucker convoy in Canada in the early 2022 timeframe, have also been “fuelled by misinformation and disinformation online” (Huls, 2022, p. 38). Moreover, a recent RAND report disclosed that “two-thirds of white supremacists and Islamic extremists interviewed felt they were radicalized by online propaganda” (Huls, 2022, p. 39).

Davey, Hart and Guerin (2020) state that there are several types of right-wing extremist groups, including: white supremacists (e.g., Combat 18 which represents a neo-Nazi terrorist group that originated in the United Kingdom); ethnonationalists (which involve the linking of nations who share the same heritage and culture but exercise implicit racist attitudes and beliefs against other ethnic groups); anti-Muslim; manosphere; and sovereigntists and militia groups (see Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 11). For example, RWE groups, such as the Milice Patriotique Quebecois [Quebec Patriotic Militia] and the Permanent Active Militia in Quebec and Three Percenters (Islamophobic militia group) in Alberta, “train in weaponry, paramilitary tactics and survivalist strategies” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 9). Ethnonationalists are tied together because of their shared ethnicity and identity. An example includes the Identitarianism movement, which propagated out of the Nouvelle Droite in France (late 20th century), and inspired many youth movements across Europe (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020). Consequently, “the ethnonationalists ‘great replacement’ theory (which believes that ethnic Europeans are being replaced through migration and miscegenation) helped inspire the 2019 Christchurch attack” (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 41). Many of these perceptions are based on conspiracy theories (e.g., Islamophobia) intended to sway people into rationalizing their hatred towards non-whites.

More alarming, “RWE groups have openly boasted on their social media platforms that their membership includes former and active military and law enforcement personnel” (e.g., two former military personnel founded one of the most notorious RWE groups in Quebec called La Meute; Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020, p. 9). The authors state that RWE groups invite others with similar backgrounds and training to join the group and encourage newcomers to get reservist training so that they may apply their new training and skills within the in-group. The Ku Klux Klan in the United States is a good example of how military personnel have been sought after to join the group since the 1920’s (McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021).

Moreover, white supremacist attitudes and behaviors extend to other marginalized groups. For example:


*White supremacist online ecosystems also depict the intersection of anti-woman and anti-feminist content with racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-democratic and other hateful content” where “[a] range of this content advocates for violence against feminists, lesbians and members of LGBTQ+ community, women in interracial relationships, and women ‘traitors’ in media, in advocacy and even in law enforcement and security. (The Soufan Center, 2020)*

A United States report on racial extremism in the military, highlights four examples that have led to the need to further examine racial intolerance in the United States DoD, including:

- In 1995, three white soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg, and in possession of white supremacist and neo-Nazi paraphernalia, were charged with killing a Black couple presumably targeted for racial reasons. A year later, the secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities issued a report titled “Defending American Values.”
- In 2005, DoD sponsored work culminating in a report titled “Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process.” This report included questions such as “Have you ever advocated or practiced discrimination or committed acts of violence or terrorism against individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or loyalty to the U.S. government?”

- In 2009, following the mass shooting at Fort Hood, DoD issued new regulations regarding service member engagement in violent extremism that prohibited actively advocating “supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology or causes . . . or advocate[ing] the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.”
- In 2020, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submitted a report to the Armed Services Committees titled “Screening Individuals Who Seek to Enlist in the Armed Forces” that explicitly identified white supremacy and white nationalist ideologies as a critical threat (McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021, pp. 2-3).

McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney (2021) looked at several critical elements that address sexual harassment and prevention in DoD and examined their applicability to racial extremism. These authors suggest that both sexual assaults and racial extremism exist “on continuums of harm in which tolerance of less onerous behaviors leads to more egregious offenses, ultimately damaging military cohesion and readiness,” ranging from “respectful behaviors to racist jokes to racially motivated acts of violence” (McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021, p. 5; p. 9). Figure 2-1 illustrates the continuum of experienced harm attributed to racial extremist behaviors: from being in a healthy and inclusive environment, to one that is unwelcoming, or to one that is hostile and violent. These authors highlight the importance of looking at racial extremism from a systemic perspective (e.g., institutional structures, hierarchies, and written and unwritten policies and practices) rather than from an individual (e.g., lone wolf) perspective.



**Figure 2-1: Racial Extremism Continuum of Harm (McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021). Reproduced with the Permission of CNA Corporation. Copyright, 2021. The CNA Corporation. Note: This chart is not meant to communicate a progression from green to red, as it does not center the actor or perpetrator; instead, it is intended to capture the full, possible environment experienced by victims.**

In 2021, the establishment of the Countering Extremism Working Group updated the DoD's definition of extremist activities (DoD Instruction 1325.06) and military members partaking in RWE-based activities:

*Military personnel must not actively advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes, including those that advance, encourage, or advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin or those that advance, encourage, or advocate the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. (Cited in McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney, 2021, p. 8)*

These authors also state that racial extremism is linked to power differentials among races (e.g., white power ideology that focuses on racism and hate). For example, in DoD and in the Canadian military, there are more white military personnel than there are non-white military personnel, particularly at the senior leadership level. From a racialized extremist perspective, McBride, Gold, Faber and Haney (2021) state:

*Both women and people of color operate at a disadvantage within this culture, and when they are harmed, they are implicitly and indirectly coerced to laugh it off, to forgive, and to be a good sport rather than to challenge the existing norms and the institutional structures and hierarchies that propagate them. (p. 15)*

The above factors may influence ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors in the military, particularly as personnel come together to work in multinational military contexts. Indeed, intolerant behaviors and attitudes toward people of different ethnic backgrounds are attributed to people's lack of acceptance or hostility towards specific ethnic groups, including their diverse cultures, religions, and ideologies. As a result, the above associated factors attributed to ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors may have an impact on the interrelationships between military personnel and the communities in which they serve.

## **2.5 IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC INTOLERANCE IN THE MILITARY**

Within NATO, multinational forces come together with personnel from different countries and backgrounds, speak various languages, and possess worldviews through varied customs, beliefs and values, motivations and social mores. Part of this diversity is the need to achieve cultural competence to enable people to interact more effectively with each other, especially when engaged within national and multinational military forces and alliances. A lack of cultural awareness can contribute to cultural barriers and the inability for people to recognize and appreciate others who come from diverse cultures and pluralistic societies. By creating greater cultural awareness, people can move away from stereotypes and prejudices, including the microaggressions and unconscious biases found in institutions which create a culture of discrimination, harassment, and conflict. Discrimination against ethnic groups may lead to exclusionary practices that perpetuate a lack of respect and mistrust and may further exacerbate polarized groups.

Researchers have explored the different multicultural challenges experienced by armed forces personnel engaged in deployed operations around the world. For example, Tresch (2007) highlights that although alliances like NATO have military personnel from different nations, the tendency is to get along under a "supranational military culture" (p. 35). However, these alliances still experience different subcultures, and require a stronger need for greater communication, adaptability, and flexibility to better address the multicultural challenges across integrated military personnel (Tresch, 2007). It seems that "soldiers have to show intercultural competence, be loyal to their nation and, at the same time, integrate themselves into multinational forces" (Tresch, 2007, p. 42).

Assimilation can occur where individuals take on the identity of others in order to belong to particular groups, communities, cultures or societies. For example, in industrialized societies, assimilation into a Western culture can include the acquisition of the national language and the acceptance of core values, such as democracy and tolerance of other religious and cultural differences. However, people, including military



personnel who come from different cultural backgrounds, may feel forced to assimilate into cultures where the norms and practices may differ significantly from their own cultural norms and practices. This can lead to the creation of in-groups and out-groups which can ultimately result in the development of stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, discrimination, and conflict.

Soeters and van der Meulen (2007) highlight that although ethnic minorities and gender are recognized as fundamental to legitimizing more diverse armed forces, many issues attributed to one's ethnicity and gender exist across international defence organizations. For example, although Belgium's armed forces have been progressive in many ways (including the need to integrate ethnic minorities), racist attitudes and behaviors have been evident among the military ranks. Based on a 1998 quantitative survey on the Belgian armed forces which examined attitudes toward ethnic relations, far-right sympathizers, and "overtly racist and xenophobic attitudes were more common among enlisted personnel than among officers" and "the higher the rank, the less the tendency to think that Belgian military employees were racist" (Biehl, Klein, and Kümmel, 2007, p. 183). Moreover, Richardson, Bosch, and Moelker (2007) stated that "while in 1999, [the Dutch] armed forces employees showed positive multicultural attitudes (i.e., positive perceptions on ethnic minorities) and positive attitudes towards diversity policies and their effectiveness, in 2005 overall they showed a 'negative' to 'neutral' attitude towards multiculturalism" (p. 205). The difference in perceptions is important to consider, particularly as the Dutch armed forces were focusing on the need to foster a more diverse and inclusive culture.

Dandeker and Mason (2007) state that ethnic diversity in the British armed forces needs to ensure that "racial and ethnic tensions do not undermine the cohesion that is at the heart of all military activities" (p. 150). Establishing an understanding of ethnic and culture awareness is key to fostering cohesive and inclusive environments. Otherwise, racist attitudes and behaviors may prevail, leading to ethnic tensions and conflicts, even during deployments. For example, in 1993, a few members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, while on a United Nations mission in Somalia, killed a Somali teenager named Shidane Arone (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2022). Several members of this Regiment were reported to be white supremacists who engaged in violent and racist acts. A public inquiry led to the disbandment of the Regiment, with the need to re-examine racist attitudes and behaviors in the Canadian military. The 2016 CAF Diversity Strategy continues to be a priority to ensure that all military personnel are respectful of all people.

Indeed, ethnic diversity and inclusion are fundamental to successful defence interoperability and operational effectiveness. Interoperability and trust between multinational partners are key elements to enabling operational effectiveness. As a result, diverse cultural perspectives provide an innovative platform for personnel to work together in developing interoperable solutions. For example, the NATO Allied Command Transformation has developed the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) which focuses on interoperability for future joint combined force operations (NATO ACT, 2021). Diversity is a core principle with MCDC, where multinational subject matter experts work together to identify common capability gaps and focus on interoperable solutions and outcomes through a collaborative approach.

Issues attributed to ethnic intolerance (e.g., unconscious bias, microaggressions, racism, hateful conduct and right-wing extremism) in multinational defence environments are important to address as these issues may impact the interrelationships among military personnel as well as operational effectiveness. Seemingly, systemic racism across defence organizations needs to be better understood, particularly how it shapes the stereotypes, unconscious biases, and discrimination of different ethnic groups. As a result, applying policies, programs, strategies, tools, and learning platforms designed to mitigate ethnic intolerance is key to developing more inclusive cultures.

The last chapter of this Technical Report will focus on ethnic diversity and inclusion management strategies and training programs to enable more effective interoperability among multinational military personnel and overall operational effectiveness. These strategies are intended to help assuage ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors in multinational military environments and focus more on enabling greater ethnic diversity and inclusion across defence personnel.

## **2.6 CONCLUSION**

This chapter focused on the theoretical framework that spoke to in-groups and out-groups and the factors that influence ethnic intolerance. Ethnic intolerance has been examined through a theoretical framework encompassing ethnicity theory, psychology of intolerance theory, critical race theory, social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory, and theory of cultural racism. Throughout this theoretical framework, the development of intolerant attitudes and behaviors toward different ethnic groups or individuals has been equated with the formation of in-groups and out-groups and the accompanying stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, harassment, and discrimination that may arise among people who live in pluralistic societies. Several factors that may influence ethnic intolerance were examined from political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and socio-psychological perspectives. The factors that may influence ethnic intolerance have been predominantly examined under the socio-psychological lens, taking into account newer forms of ethnic intolerance, including unconscious biases, microaggressions, systemic racism, and hateful conduct and right-wing extremism. These factors may help to explain intolerant attitudes and behaviors toward diverse ethnic groups and the need to look into diverse and inclusive management strategies designed to foster greater awareness, respect, empathy, and cultural competence. Understanding the implications of ethnic intolerance in the military is key to enabling defence cultures that are diverse and inclusive of all military personnel.

## **2.7 REFERENCES**

- [1] Abderrazzaq, M. (2021). Social experiences of Muslim Americans regarding intolerance displayed by non-Muslims. *Journal of Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences*, Volume 15(1), 278-292.
- [2] Addy, N. (2008). White privilege and cultural racism: Effects on the counselling process. *New Zealand Journal of Counselling*, Vol 28(1), 10-23.
- [3] Adlparvar, N., and Tadros, M. (2016). The evolution of ethnicity theory: Intersectionality, geopolitics and development, *Development studies – Past, present and future*. In A. Aghajanian and J. Allouche (Eds.), *IDS Bulletin, Transforming Development Knowledge*, Volume 47(2), May 2016, 123-136. Retrieved from [https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/11547/IDSB\\_472\\_10.190881968-2016.136.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/11547/IDSB_472_10.190881968-2016.136.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
- [4] Akamatsu, N. (2002). Cultural racism: The air we breathe. *The International Journal of Narrative Therapy and Community Work*, 4, 48-51.
- [5] Allport, G.W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- [6] Allport, G.W. (1979). *The nature of prejudice*. Third Edition. Addison-Wesley.
- [7] Atanassova, I.N. (1999). *The impact of ethnic issues on the security of South Eastern Europe*. Report commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1999. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/atanassova.pdf>
- [8] Balibar, E. (1991). *Racism and Crisis*, in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (Eds.), *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities*, London: Verso.
- [9] Biehl, H., Klein, P., and Kümmel, G. (2007). Diversity in the German armed forces. In J.L. Soeters and J. Van der Meulen (Eds.), *Cultural diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison* (pp. 171-184). Routledge.

- [10] Bilodeau, A., Turgeon, L., White, S., and Henderson, A. (2018). Strange bedfellows? Attitudes toward minority and majority religious symbols in the public sphere. *Politics and Religion*, 11, 309-333. Doi: 10.1017/s1755048317000748. In M. Verkuyten, L. Adelman, and K. Yogeeswaran. (2020). *The psychology of intolerance: Unpacking diverse understandings of intolerance*. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 29(5), 467-472. Sage, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0963721420924763>
- [11] Bratt, C. (2022). Is it racism? The belief in cultural superiority across Europe. *European Societies*, 24(2), 207-228. Doi: 10.1080/14616696.2022.2059098
- [12] Burton-Hughes, L. (2017). What is unconscious bias in recruitment? High-speed training. December 18, 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.highspeedtraining.co.uk/hub/types-of-unconscious-bias/#:~:text=The%20horns%20effect%20is%20the,dislike%20everything%20else%20they%20say>
- [13] [The] Canadian Encyclopedia. (2022). Somalia affair. Retrieved May 30, 2022 from: <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>
- [14] Canadian Heritage. (2019). Building a foundation for change: Canada's anti-racism strategy 2019-2022. Retrieved July 7, 2020 from <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/anti-racism-engagement/anti-racism-strategy.html>
- [15] Chana, S. (2020). Book review: Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, *Right-wing extremism in Canada*. London: Palgrave Hate Studies, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2019. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/06/04/book-review-barbara-perry-and-ryan-scrivens-right-wing-extremism-in-canada-london-palgrave-2019-pp-277/>
- [16] Chandra, K. (2012). *Constructivist theories of ethnic conflict*: Oxford University Press Inc. In D.U. Williams, (Ed.). (2015). How useful are the main existing theories of ethnic conflict? *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 4(1), MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy. Doi: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n1p147.
- [17] Chua, P. (2017). Cultural racism. In B.S. Turner (Ed.). *The Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of social theory*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Doi: 10.1002/9781118430873.est0079.
- [18] Clair, M., and Denis, J.S. (2015). Racism (Sociology of). *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (2nd ed.), Vol. 19, pp. 857-863. Retrieved from: Doi: /10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.32122-5.
- [19] Cornell, S., and Hartmann, D. (2006). *Ethnicity and race: Making identities in a changing world* (2nd ed.), Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, CA. Cited in: M. Clair and J.S. Denis (2015). Racism (Sociology of). *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (2nd ed.), Vol.19, pp. 857-863. Retrieved from: Doi: /10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.32122-5.
- [20] Crenshaw, K.W. (2011). Twenty years of critical race theory: Looking back to move forward commentary: Critical race theory: A commemoration: Lead Article. *Connecticut Law Review*, 117. Retrieved from [https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law\\_review/117](https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/117)
- [21] Dandeker, C., and Mason, D. (2007). Ethnic diversity in the British armed forces. In J.L. Soeters and J. Van der Meulen (Eds.), *Cultural diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison* (pp. 140-153). Routledge.

- [22] Daniel, S., Claros, Y., Namrow, N., Siebel, M., Campbell, A., McGrath, D., and Klahr, A. (2019). Office of People Analytics. 2017 workplace and equal opportunity survey of active duty members: Executive report. DTIC# AD1113643. OPA Report No. 2018-023, August 2019. United States. Retrieved from <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1113643.pdf>
- [23] Davey, J., Hart, M., and Guerin, C. (2020). An online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. Interim report. ISD. Retrieved from <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Online-Environmental-Scan-of-Right-wing-Extremism-in-Canada-ISD.pdf>
- [24] Department of Defense. (2007). OPNAVINST 5354.1F. (2007). Department of the Navy.
- [25] Department of National Defence. (2020). DAOD 5019-0, Conduct and performance deficiencies. Retrieved January 7, 2021 from <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html>
- [26] Department of National Defence. (2022). Systemic racism in Canadian defence and security. Expert briefing series – Strategic report. MINDS Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security. Internal Report.
- [27] DiAngelo, R. (2018). *White fragility: Why it's so hard for white people to talk about racism*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- [28] Edwards, J. (2017). Color-blind racial attitudes: Microaggressions in the context of racism and white privilege. *Administrative Issues Journal: Connecting Education, Practice, and Research*, Summer 2017, Vol. 7(1), 5-18. Doi: 10.5929/2017.7.1.3
- [29] Fortin, J. (2021). Critical race theory: A brief history. *The New York Times*, Nov. 8, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-critical-race-theory.html>
- [30] Frėjutė-Rakauskienė, M. (2009). Manifestations of ethnic intolerance and xenophobia in Lithuanian press in the framework of European Union preventive policies. Summary of Doctoral Dissertation. Social Science, Sociology (05 S). Institute for Social Research Vilnius University.
- [31] Huls, A. (2022). Out of the shadows: How Concordians are exposing online extremism. Spring 2022. *Concordia University Magazine*, 36-41.
- [32] Isajiw, W.W. (1993). Definitions and dimensions of ethnicity: A theoretical framework. *Statistics Canada & US Bureau of the Census. Challenges of measuring and ethnic world: Science Politics and Reality. Proceedings of the Joint Canada-United States conference on the measurement of ethnicity, April 1 – 3 1992, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 407-427. In D.U. Williams (Ed.). (2015). How useful are the main existing theories of ethnic conflict? Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 4(1), MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy. Doi: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n1p147.*
- [33] Jones, J.M. (1972). *Prejudice and racism*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishers. As cited in: J.G. Ponterotto, S.O. Utsey, and P.B. Pedersen (2006). *Preventing prejudice: A guide for counselors, educators, and parents*. SAGE.
- [34] Jones, J.M. (1997). *Prejudice and racism (2nd ed.)*. New York: McGraw-Hill. As cited in: J.G. Ponterotto, S.O. Utsey, and P.B. Pedersen (2006). *Preventing prejudice: A guide for counselors, educators, and parents*. SAGE.

- [35] Kunovich, R., and Hodson, R. (1999). Religious identity, conflict and ethnic tolerance in Croatia. *Social Forces*, 78, 643-674.
- [36] Lamoureux, M. (2020). The birth of Canada's armed, anti-Islamic, 'Patriot' group. *Vice*, 14 June 2017, [https://www.vice.com/en\\_uk/article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadas-armed-anti-islamic-patriot-group](https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadas-armed-anti-islamic-patriot-group).  
In J. Davey, M. Hart, and C. Guerin. (2020). An online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. Interim report. ISD.
- [37] Lebedva, N., and Tatarko, A. (2004). Socio-psychological factors of ethnic intolerance in Russia's multicultural regions. In B.N. Setiadi, A. Supratiknya, W.J. Lonner, and Y.H. Poortinga (Eds.), *Ongoing themes in psychology and culture: Proceedings from the 16th International Congress of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology*. [https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/iaccp\\_papers/243](https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/iaccp_papers/243)  
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/220124392.pdf>
- [38] McBride, M.K., Gold, Z., Faber, P.G., and Haney, K. (2021). Racial extremism in the military: A continuum of harm. CNA Independent Research Funding. October 2021.
- [39] McIntosh, P. (1990). *White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack*. Wellesley College Center for Research on Women. Wellesley.
- [40] McKay, A. (2011). The study of modern intra-state war. *E-International Relations Online*. Retrieved 6 March, 2014 from <http://www.eir.info/2011/2/03/the-study-of-modern-intrastate-war/>. As cited in D.U. Williams (2015). How useful are the main existing theories of ethnic conflict? *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 4(1), MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy. Doi: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n1p147.
- [41] NATO ACT. (2021). Joint Force Development operational experimentation 2021 fact sheet – MCDC Multinational Capability Development Campaign: [https://cdissz.wp.mil.pl/u/MCDC\\_Overview.pdf](https://cdissz.wp.mil.pl/u/MCDC_Overview.pdf) and Retrieved from <https://www.act.nato.int/application/files/8416/3234/8559/2021-MCDC-2.pdf>
- [42] Omi, M., and Winant, H. (1986). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s*. New York City: Routledge.
- [43] Ontario Human Rights Commission. (2020). *Racism and racial discrimination: Systemic discrimination (fact sheet)*. Retrieved July 07, 2020 from <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racism-and-racial-discrimination-systemic-discrimination-fact-sheet>
- [44] Perry, B., and Scrivens, R. (2019). As cited in S. Chana (2020) Book Review: Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, *right-wing extremism in Canada*. London: Palgrave Hate Studies. Palgrave, Macmillan, 2019. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/06/04/book-review-barbara-perry-and-ryan-scrivens-right-wing-extremism-in-canada-london-palgrave-2019-pp-277/>
- [45] Pierce, C. (1970). Offensive mechanisms. In F.B. Barbour (Ed.). *The Black seventies*, (pp. 265-282). Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
- [46] Ponterotto, J.G., Utsey, S. O., and Pedersen, P.B. (2006). *Preventing prejudice: A guide for counselors, educators, and parents*. SAGE.
- [47] Reimer, N.K., Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., and Ramiah, A.A. (2020, March 18). Self-categorization and social identification: Making sense of us and them. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/gub8a>



- [48] Richardson, R., Bosch, J., and Moelker, R. (2007). Diversity in the Dutch armed forces. In J. Soeters and J. Van der Meulen, J. (Eds.), *Cultural diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison* (pp. 200-214). Routledge.
- [49] Richeson, J.A., and Nussbaum, R.J. (2004). The impact of multiculturalism versus color-blindness on racial bias. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 417-423. Doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2003.09.002. Cited in Edwards, J. (2017). *Color-blind racial attitudes: Microaggressions in the context of racism and White privilege*. *Administrative Issues Journal: Connecting Education, Practice, and Research*, Summer 2017, Vol. 7(1), 5-18. DOI: 10.5929/2017.7.1.3.
- [50] Rodriguez, R. (2018). Bias: The hidden figure in diversity. Retrieved July 06, 2020 from <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/bias-hidden-figure/>
- [51] Rubin, J., Taylor, J., Pollitt, A., Krapels, J., and Pardal, M. (2014). *Intolerance in Western Europe: Analysis of trends and associated factors: summary report*. RAND Europe.
- [52] Sherif, M. (1967). *Group conflict and cooperation*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- [53] Soeters, J.L., and Van der Meulen, J. (2007). *Cultural Diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison*. Routledge.
- [54] Smith, A. (1986). *The ethnic origins of nations*. Blackwell Publishing.
- [55] (The) Soufan Center. (2020). IntelBrief: Women in white supremacist online ecosystems. Retrieved 8 April, 2022 from <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-women-in-white-supremacist-online-ecosystems/>
- [56] Strabac, Z., Listhaug, O., and Jakobsen, T.G. (2012). Patterns of ethnic intolerance in Europe. *Int. Migration & Integration* 13, 459-479. Retrieved from Doi: /10.1007/s12134-011-0222-4.
- [57] Sue, D.W. (2006). The invisible whiteness of being: Whiteness, white supremacy, white privilege, and racism. In M.G. Constantine and D.W. Sue (Eds.), *Addressing racism: Facilitating cultural competence in mental health and educational settings* (pp. 15-30). Hoboken: Wiley. Cited in: Addy, N. (2008). *White privilege and cultural racism: Effects on the counselling process*. *New Zealand Journal of Counselling*, Vol 28(1), 10-23.
- [58] Sue, D.W., Capodilupo, C.M., Torino, G.C., Bucceri, J.M., Holder, A.M, Nadal, K.L., and Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. *American Psychologist*, 4, 271-286.
- [59] Sue, D.W., and Sue, D. (2013). *Counseling the culturally diverse: Theory and practice* (6th Ed). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. As cited in J. Edwards (2017), *Color-blind racial attitudes: Microaggressions in the context of racism and white privilege*. *Administrative Issues Journal: Connecting Education, Practice, and Research*, summer 2017, Vol. 7(1), 5-18. Doi: 10.5929/2017.7.1.3.
- [60] Tajfel, H., and Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. In W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of inter-group relations* (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- [61] Talati, S. (2022). How prejudice rooted in an ancient social system has migrated from India to Canada. Retrieved May 16, 2022 from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/caste-india-canada-students-1.6450484>

- [62] Tresch, T.S. (2007). Multicultural challenges for armed forces in theatre. *Military Power Revue*, Issue 2, 34-43.
- [63] United Nations. (1965). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, UN General Assembly. Retrieved 21 June, 2022 from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html>
- [64] United Nations (Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). (1978). Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening the Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Retrieved 21 June, 2022 from: [https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.11\\_declaration%20on%20race%20and%20racial%20prejudice.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.11_declaration%20on%20race%20and%20racial%20prejudice.pdf)
- [65] Verkuyten, M., Adelman, L., and Yogeewaran, K. (2020). The psychology of intolerance: Unpacking diverse understandings of intolerance. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 29(5), 467-472. SAGE. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0963721420924763>
- [66] Verkuyten, M., and Kollar, R. (2021). Tolerance and intolerance: Cultural meanings and discursive usage. *Culture & Psychology*, Vol. 27(1) 172-186. SAGE: Doi: 10.1177/1354067X20984356. Retrieved from <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354067X20984356>
- [67] Waruszynski, B., MacEachern, K., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2019). Perceptions of racism and harassment among visible minority and Indigenous members in the Defence Team. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDDC-2019-L257. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [68] Williams, D.U. (2015). How useful are the main existing theories of ethnic conflict? *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 4(1), MCSEER Publishing, Rome, Italy. Doi: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n1.p147.
- [69] Wright, J.C., Waruszynski, B.T., Silins, S., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2021). Systemic racism and discrimination in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF): A primer. DRDC-RDDC-2021-D121, September 2021.
- [70] Yeghiazaryan, L. (2018). Which of the three main ethnic conflict theories best explains the ethnic violence in the post-soviet states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova? *Comparative Politics*, Section B. California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. <https://www.cpp.edu/class/political-science/participate/undergraduatejournal/vol3/yeghiazaryan-3.pdf>





## **Chapter 3 – ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES: A VISION FOR A MULTICULTURAL FORCE**

**Yantsislav Yanakiev<sup>1</sup>**  
Bulgarian Defence Institute  
BULGARIA

### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

Bulgaria is a multi-ethnic and multicultural society. Ethnic Bulgarians represent 84.8% of the population, with the balance composed of ethnic Turks, Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), Roma (Gipsy), Armenians, Russians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Karakachans, Jews, and other minority populations (*Bulgaria Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions, 2021*).

This chapter analyzes the advantages, possible challenges, and opportunities related to institutionalizing the concept of diversity in the Bulgarian defence organization from the perspective of civil-military relations, organizational performance, cohesion, and teamwork. The focus is on how general trends in democratic societies may affect the Bulgarian military and what the implications are for building an effective system for diversity management.

The chapter begins with a short review of the concept of diversity in the literature, and then explores the process of integrating women and the main ethnic and cultural groups into the Bulgarian military, identifying the main Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) of this process. I also examine perceptions of service members toward women and minority groups' integration into the military, arguing that there are two interconnected aspects of diversity in defence organizations:

- 1) The internal aspect or the awareness of diversity and equal opportunity (EO) / equal employment opportunity (EEO) issues in the national context; and
- 2) The international aspect of diversity associated with cross-cultural communication in multinational military operations.

In both cases, diversity management appears to be vital for military effectiveness, teamwork, cohesiveness, and the defence organization's performance.

Finally, the chapter summarizes for the Bulgarian political and military leadership some policy recommendations to improve the organizational effectiveness of ethnically and culturally mixed military units in the national context and when deployed on international operations. The goal is to transform the Bulgarian military from a plural type of organization to one that is multicultural and inclusive.

For the analyses in this chapter, I rely on the literature, official documents, and data from two representative and comparative sociological surveys carried out in the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) in 2015 and 2017 to identify the perceptions of the people in uniform regarding ethnic, cultural, and gender differences in the military.

---

<sup>1</sup> The author is a full professor of sociology at the Bulgarian Defense Institute "Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov" (BDI). Contact: [y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg](mailto:y.yanakiev@di.mod.bg). The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the BDI or the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. This chapter will also appear in a forthcoming publication: B. Waruszynski, Y. Yanakiev, and D. McDonald (eds.), *Team Diversity and Inclusion in Defence and Security: International Perspectives*, Springer.

### **3.2 DEFINING DIVERSITY**

Before analyzing the advantages, challenges, and opportunities of diversity in the BAF, it is important to start with a definition of diversity, particularly as it applies to the Bulgarian military. A review of the literature leads to several conclusions regarding the definition of the concept.

First, some understand diversity as an aggregate of the differences and commonalities—i.e., socially defined characteristics, personal traits, or both – of the people in a society or organization, which represents the basis for demographic, ethnic, cultural, and cognitive diversity (Cox, 2001).

Second, diversity involves an interpersonal component, which has important consequences for the diversity management processes. Whenever different people work together, the differences and commonalities among them become visible, and this is related to mutual acceptance among the members of the organization, the organizational performance, satisfaction, and promotion opportunities (Hays-Thomas, 2004).

Third, each and every member's perception of inclusion is an organizational outcome. Three dimensions of this form of inclusion can be identified. One dimension is called human diversity, which includes age, race, ethnicity, physical disabilities, gender, and sexual orientation. Another is cultural diversity, which includes all aspects of culture, such as language, nationality, religion, origin, learning patterns, etc. This dimension of diversity can be considered unlimited in its variations. The last is organizational diversity, which includes aspects such as formation, rank, position, and place in the organization (Yuengling, 2009).

Fourth, some researchers argue that the most important differences are historical ones that have led to positions of power and privilege for some people or groups inside the organization or in the society as a whole (Thomas, 2005).

Fifth, some researchers focus on both internal (demographic, cultural, cognitive, and organizational factors in the armed forces) and external (global) dimensions of diversity in defence organizations as a result of participation in international coalition operations (Nelson et al., 2008).

Sixth, most research suggests two levels of diversity in organizations: the first is what we can see at the surface and can be comparatively and easily measured (i.e., the tip of the iceberg). These are racial, ethnic, gender differences, disabilities, level of education, socio-economic status, age, etc. The second, or the deep level of diversity, includes characteristics that are difficult to observe and measure, like behavioral models and individual abilities, personal traits, attitudes, beliefs, and values (McGuire, 2012).

Finally, some researchers warn about a risk of a too-broad definition of diversity (Frost, 1999) or too narrow (e.g., only legally protected groups of people). They recommend prioritizing different components of diversity in the organization according to the specific circumstances (legislation, the specific tasks, demographic trends, and traditions), as well as to cascading the efforts in diversity management strategies and action plans (Nelson et al., 2008).

This chapter uses the narrow definition of diversity, which includes ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity in defence organizations. The reason is that diversity management in the BAF is a comparatively new process and, therefore, we need to focus first on the visible differences among people in defence and on their perceptions of ethnic, cultural, and gender differences. I suggest this is the first important step for introducing diversity management policy and practice. For that reason, I discuss the process of ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity management in the BAF. Additionally, some aspects of the deep dimension of diversity will be presented and analyzed – namely, the perceptions and attitudes of the people in uniform.

### **3.3 ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY IN DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS**

Several benefits of diversity for the military organization have been discussed in the academic literature. The first is related to social justice and citizenship-building in a democratic multi-ethnic society like Bulgaria.

Usually, the military institution is presented as a model for providing EO/EEO for professional realization in the public sector and it is, to quote Charles Moskos, “a bridging environment” in which the majority and minority ethnicities become significantly closer in egalitarian settings with shared experiences (1999, p. 13). As well, military service is considered a vehicle that can provide ethnic minorities with a sense that they are valuable elements of the social and political systems and enhances their socio-economic mobility (Dandeker, 1999).

The next benefit of diversity in defence organizations is related to the abolition of conscription and the shift to all-volunteer forces (AVF), a trend in post-modern defence organizations. Pursuing increased representation of minority groups in the military could access a wider recruitment pool as the armed services compete with civilian companies for qualified labor (Dandeker, 1999). Additionally, implementing diversity policy and practice would improve public respect for military organizations, and the military could benefit from being viewed as an EO employer. The development of AVFs raises the question of how to keep the military fully integrated into society; making the composition of the armed forces reflect the population they serve is one way of pursuing that integration (Winslow, 1999).

Another advantage of increasing diversity of defence organizations is related to participation in nontraditional military missions like international peacekeeping, where race and gender-mixed military organizations seem to be more effective than homogenous ones (Miller and Moskos, 2004).

At the same time, the challenges of diversity in defence organizations also have to be discussed, rendering an account of the balance between political aspirations and organizational effectiveness. Some research on diversity and heterogeneity of teams and their effectiveness has found that diversity in organizations leads to poor integration and dissatisfaction as cultural diversity increases and, in turn, negatively impacts team effectiveness (Jackson et al., 1991; O’Reilly et al., 1989; Wagner et al., 1984). Some studies also found that diversity in defence organizations harms cohesion when not managed properly (Whatley, 2001).

From an international perspective, research shows that the lack of cross-cultural competency is among the biggest problems for the Bulgarian military in multinational and multicultural environments (Yanakiev and Sabev, 2010).

In light of all this, it may be time to consider a comprehensive policy to transform the BAF from a pluralistic into a multicultural organization in terms of race, ethnicity, culture, and gender and to elevate cross-cultural competency as an endeavor that deserves special research attention.

### **3.4 INTEGRATING ETHNIC AND CULTURAL GROUPS INTO THE BULGARIAN MILITARY: THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SITUATION**


During socialism in Bulgaria (1944 – 1989), Bulgarian Turks and Roma were denied equal access to the regular armed forces in Bulgaria. According to the law of the time, all Bulgarian male citizens had to serve as conscript soldiers. But the conscripts of Turkish and Roma origin were usually selected to serve in the Construction Troops and Transportation Troops, which were paramilitary formations not belonging to the regular armed forces. The official explanation of this practice was the low educational level and insufficient proficiency in the Bulgarian language on behalf of the Bulgarian Turks and Roma. The unofficial reason, which was a public secret, was the mistrust of the Bulgarian Turks’ and Roma’s loyalty to the socialist state.

This background is important for understanding the current situation with the integration of the people from minority groups in the military more than 30 years after the Bulgarian transition toward democracy. It was a period that prevented a broader representation of different ethnic and cultural groups in the military, particularly in the officer corps.

An analysis of national legislation and institutional regulations confirms that steps have been taken to integrate members of the main ethnic groups into the Bulgarian military. Yet there is no comprehensive vision, strategy, and policy for EO/EEO and diversity management institutionalized in the Bulgarian military. Nor is the BAF monitoring the demographic characteristics of its members; thus, no figures on demographics can be presented in this chapter. Nonetheless, data from recent representative sociological surveys in the BAF demonstrate significant underrepresentation of the main minority groups (i.e., Bulgarian Turks and Roma) in the BAF, but these are internal, unpublished reports.

### **3.5 INTEGRATING WOMEN IN THE BULGARIAN MILITARY**

The integration of women in the BAF is a more encouraging story than the integration of people from different ethnic and cultural groups. Currently, there are no restrictions on women serving in the armed forces, nor are there restrictions that apply to participation in operations abroad. All active-duty positions in the BAF are open to women. Since these formal barriers against woman were abolished, there has been a gradual increase in women’s representation over the last ten years (Figure 3-1).



**Figure 3-1: Percentage of Female Service Members in the Bulgarian Armed Forces: 2009 – 2019 (NATO, 2021).**

As shown in Figure 3-1, the representation of women was 16% in 2019, surpassing the NATO average (12%) for the same year. Since 2018, the overall representation of women and men in the BAF remained relatively the same. The issue that deserves attention is the low representation of women among commissioned officers, especially at the senior officer level (OF-4 and OF-5).

Important recent developments regarding the integration of women in the BAF are the Defence Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2017 – 2021 and the Implementation of the National Action Plan on WPS 2017 – 2021, which came into force in 2018.

### 3.6 ATTITUDES TOWARD ETHNIC, CULTURAL, AND GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES

This section describes the deep level of diversity or the perceptions of the service members from the BAF about women and minority group integration, based on the data from two representative sociological surveys from 2015 and 2017. The original items included in the questionnaire are part of the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey developed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), adapted for the BAF in 2005 (Yanakiev et al., 2005). We used 5-point Likert type scales where the minimum is equal to 1 and maximum to 5.

Table 3-1 presents perceptions of the military personnel regarding the integration of women in the BAF and securing equal opportunities for professional realization.

**Table 3-1: Arithmetic Mean Scores to the Items Measuring the Climate, Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of Women in the BAF.**

<b>Items Measuring Perceptions of Organizational Climate, Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of Women in the BAF</b>	<b>Arithmetic Mean (M) 2015 N = 1553</b>	<b>Arithmetic Mean (M) 2017 N = 1655</b>
I'm not bothered by the idea of having a boss/commander of the opposite sex.	3.79	3.76
Commanders/leaders are more likely to give heavy additional tasks to men than to women service members.	3.63	3.71
The service would go better in a completely male environment.	3.23	3.31
Female service members use their femininity to receive special privileges in the service.	3.22	3.20
Female service members from this formation/structure do not perform their tasks as well as men with similar skills.	3.01	2.98
A female service member from my formation/structure is likely to receive a reward for a certain action, even if she is not perceived by her colleagues as qualified as most men.	3.03	2.98
In my formation/structure, women service members are more likely to be neglected in promotion just because they are women.	2.15	2.25
The organization of the service in my formation/structure helps men to receive more benefits than women service members.	1.91	2.14

The analysis of data presented in Table 3-1 shows that BAF members do not support discriminating against women service members. This is confirmed by the high degree of agreement with the statements like “The organization of the service does not create more benefits for men than for women” and “Women are not neglected in promotion just because they are women.” Further, military members strongly agree with the statement “I am not bothered by the idea of having a commander/chief of the opposite sex,” which shows a tendency toward perceived gender equality in holding positions of power.

At the same time, there are some prejudices against women in uniform, which deserve attention. Indicative in this regard are statements like “Commanders/leaders are more likely to give men additional tasks than women,” “Women service members use their femininity to receive special privileges in the service,” and “Service would go much better in a completely masculine environment.”

Finally, concerning statements such as “Women service members in this formation/structure do not perform their tasks, as well as men with similar skills” and “Women service members in my formation/structure, are likely to receive a reward for a certain action, even if she is not perceived by her colleagues as qualified as most men,” the opinions of the respondents are almost equally distributed in support and against.

There are no statistically significant differences in the estimates obtained in the two surveys carried out in 2015 and 2017.

The picture outlined shows that the measures taken by the leadership of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) to remove regulatory and organizational barriers to ensure gender equality are working. The problem is to overcome prejudices and stereotypes in people’s minds. This is a process that will require targeted policy, systematic work, and education.

Because the perceptions of equal opportunities for men and women in the military greatly affect those responsible, it is possible to expect a significant impact of gender differences in assessments. Due to this assumption, parallel arithmetic mean scores for men and women were calculated for individual items. According to the data, male service members do perceive women as being in a privileged position. In contrast, female service members believe that men are in a more privileged position. Women, to a greater extent than men, declare that they would accept a boss of the opposite sex. (All gender differences discussed are statistically significant.)

Table 3-2 presents the arithmetic mean scores of the items in the questionnaire measuring how well the organizational climate ensures equal opportunities for the professional realization of the representatives of ethnic minority groups in the BAF. The original items included in the questionnaire are also part of DEOMI’s Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey quoted above.

**Table 3-2: Arithmetic Mean Scores to the Items Measuring the Climate, Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of the Minority Groups in the BAF.**

<b>Items Measuring Perceptions of Organizational Climate Guaranteeing Equal Opportunities for the Professional Realization of Minority Groups in the BAF</b>	<b>Arithmetic Mean (<i>M</i>) 2015 <i>N</i> = 1553</b>	<b>Arithmetic Mean (<i>M</i>) 2017 <i>N</i> = 1655</b>
I am open to developing close friendships in my formation/structure with a person belonging to an ethnic group other than mine.	3.55	3.53
The colleagues in my formation/structure believe that its functioning will decline if more representatives of minority groups are appointed to it.	2.89	3.31
I am not bothered by the idea of having a leader/commander from an ethnic group other than mine.	3.03	3.15
My formation/structure will perform its tasks better if we are all from the same ethnic group.	3.32	2.71

The analysis presented in Table 3-2 shows that the attitudes of service members toward people from different ethnic and cultural groups can be defined as tolerance while maintaining differences.



Indicative in this respect is the relatively strong agreement with the statement “I am open to developing close friendly relations in my formation/structure with a person belonging to an ethnic group other than mine” ( $M = 3.53$ ) with a maximum of 5, and disagreement with the statement “My formation/structure will perform its tasks better if we are all from the same ethnic group” ( $M = 2.71$ ) with a minimum of 1.

The people from minority groups seem to be accepted relatively tolerantly, and the data do not identify strong negative attitudes. At the same time, military members were still almost equally divided over the statement “I am not bothered by the idea of having a commander/chief of an ethnic group other than mine” ( $M = 3.15$ ). This indicates prejudice that should be recognized. Another indicator of prejudice against people from minority groups is the relatively high level of support for the statement “Colleagues in my formation/structure believe that its functioning will decrease if more representatives of minority groups are appointed in it” ( $M = 3.31$ ).

There are no statistically significant differences in the estimates obtained in the two surveys carried out in 2015 and 2017.

In short, there are no strong negative attitudes toward service members from different ethnic/cultural minority groups in the BAF. At the same time, the established prejudices deserve attention because they could easily be exploited to influence the behavior of the people in defence in one direction or another. There are many examples of this around the world. It would be the right decision to devote special research to this topic.

### **3.7 FROM A PLURAL TO A MULTICULTURAL BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES: SWOT ANALYSIS**

Using Cox’s (1994) monolithic-plural-multicultural continuum for organizations, the BAF is in the process of transitioning from a pluralist organization to a multicultural one. The BAF lacks a sufficient number of candidates for voluntary service, and it suffers from under-utilization of human resources. The latter is a problem because the increasing ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity in a military – typical in the pluralist organization – can create tensions and inter-group conflict, particularly in a situation where inter-ethnic prejudices and discriminatory attitudes are still “alive” in the society. At any rate, the next subsections discuss the most important strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in this process of transition of the BAF into a multicultural organization.

#### **3.7.1 Strengths**

First, the BAF is a non-partisan, national institution in which all service members – regardless of ethnic, religious, and cultural identification – are united around common goals and have equal rights and obligations. They work together continuously and share common risks and difficulties, and they have to work in teams to address common tasks. All these factors make the defence organization a “bridging environment” (Moskos 1999, p. 25).

Second, by virtue of its hierarchical structure, based on order and discipline, the military organization has the power to regulate tensions, including ethnic and religious ones.

Third, the defence organization is a conservative system, which can limit negative influences from the parent society and an influx of problems in inter-ethnic relations inside the military. On the other hand, the traditional conservatism of the defence institution can be viewed as a barrier to diversity, with the organization preferring the traditional masculine culture.

Fourth, the traditional high public prestige of the military institution in Bulgaria is an important factor supporting EO and diversity policy in the BAF.

Fifth, a significant proportion of the military, and particularly the commissioned officers, demonstrate comparatively tolerant attitudes toward different ethnic and cultural groups. Some of the officers have personal experience working with the Bulgarian Turk and Roma conscripts in 1990–2007. The commanders are highly educated and qualified, and the military institution can develop additional, specialized education and training of the cadre to cope with specific, new situations like managing diversity in the BAF. Most of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the BAF have internalized the requirements of the successful commander and leader to treat their subordinates in a just manner, to stimulate teamwork, etc., which is a good basis for the development of skills to manage diversity in the BAF.

Sixth, over the last three decades, a significant number of the Bulgarian military participated in international UN, NATO-led, and EU-led operations and obtained important tacit knowledge and experience working with the military from other cultures and local populations. This experience is a valuable prerequisite for the further, successful development of Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) in the defence organization.

### **3.7.2 Weaknesses**

First, the BAF leadership lacks a deep understanding of the diversity management process and how it relates to organizational performance, readiness, and mission accomplishment. The existing EO/EEO activities are legally driven, based on the requirements of the anti-discrimination law (Republic of Bulgaria, Antidiscrimination Law, 2003), as well as EU and UN directives, and most of them are focused on providing equitable treatment of men and women in uniform. Other important ethnic and cultural differences are underappreciated.

Further, among the most important weakness of the Bulgarian defence organization is the insufficient training of its personnel to work in multi-ethnic and multicultural environments, whether in the national armed forces or during international deployments. The BAF urgently needs a comprehensive diversity management policy and 3C education and training for military and civilian leaders to respond to the challenges of global diversity.

Third, the capacity of the defence organization for EO/EEO and diversity management policy development, coordination, organizational climate assessment and monitoring, specialized education and training planning is insufficient. Currently, the human resources management structures and social policy directorate of the MoD, along with many other responsibilities, are in charge of the EO/EEO activities that are partially and occasionally implemented. Except for the Ombudsman at the national level and the Inspectorate of the MoD, there are no specialized structures in the BAF responsible for dealing with complaints and implementing diversity management policy and activities.

Finally, the MoD has no proactive personnel policy to attract and recruit service members from the main minority groups. The mismatch between the demographics of society and the military organization remains significant more than three decades after the democratic changes in the country.

### **3.7.3 Opportunities**

First, a basic positive factor at the societal level is the gradual improvement of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria after the democratic changes in 1989. This is particularly true regarding the relations between the Christian Bulgarians, on the one side, and the Bulgarian Turks and the Muslim Bulgarians, on the other. There have also been significant achievements in legislation that guarantees equality of Bulgarian citizens before the law. As a result, many barriers to the full integration of minority groups and women in the military have been lifted.

The next vital opportunity is related to the integration of Bulgaria into the EU and NATO and the acceptance of a system of common values that exclude discrimination based on ethnicity, culture, gender, age, and so on.



Finally, a positive factor that should be mentioned is the participation of units from the BAF in multinational coalition operations and multinational regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. This helps to foster the skills of military personnel to work in a multicultural environment and instils favorable attitudes toward ethnic, gender, and cultural diversity.

### **3.7.4 Threats**

The majority of possible threats to the success of diversity in the BAF are at the macro-societal level, but they have their indirect influence in the military. One of the most important that has generated ethnic tension in Bulgaria during the period of transition to democracy is the unequal burden-sharing between the majority and the minority groups during the painful economic reforms. The economic inequality, which resulted in ethnic differences in employment, living standards, housing, education, health care opportunities, etc., especially in the regions with mixed ethnic populations, has remained among the burning issues of inter-ethnic relations in the context of the social-economic transition in Bulgaria. The indirect influence on the organizational climate in the military is related to the fact that economic disparity usually fuels inter-ethnic prejudices and stereotypes, which is a negative factor hanging over successful diversity management in the BAF.

The next serious weakness at the macro level is the attempts by some political parties to politicize inter-ethnic relations. Typically, this is the practice of ethno-mobilization, which most of the mainstream political parties, as well the party of the Turkish minority (Movement for Rights and Freedom) bring into play, particularly during the pre-election campaigns in the ethnically mixed regions. Although the military is a non-partisan institution, this process has had a negative influence on inter-ethnic relations in the BAF.

Another important and unfavorable factor at the societal level is the declining standards in education: the rising level of illiteracy among young people from minority groups (particularly Roma) and the insufficient command of the Bulgarian language. This situation inevitably has an effect on military recruitment from the main minority groups. The lack of education among young Bulgarian Turks and, particularly, Roma people is the primary reason for their very low representation in the BAF.

Along with the economic and the political factors at the macro level, there are many social-psychological factors that could generate inter-ethnic tensions in Bulgaria and, thus, negatively influence diversity in its military.

First, the maintenance of certain prejudices among the Bulgarian majority about minorities (Turkish, and mainly Roma) and among minorities about ethnic Bulgarians needs to be addressed. There are conflicting perceptions and attitudes (having emotional dimensions), which are expressed as feelings of fear, mistrust, scorn, and in some cases, hatred, as a result of the influence of history. Finally, the gap between the restrictive attitudes of the Bulgarian majority toward the rights of the ethnic/cultural minorities, and especially among the young people, and the radical perceptions of minorities regarding their rights, are important sources of ethnic tension (Yanakiev, 2013).

At the level of the defence organization itself, negative factors or barriers for successful diversity management are related to the deep level of attitudes, beliefs, and values of its personnel. The data from sociological surveys carried out in 2015 and 2017 show comparatively tolerant attitudes of the majority toward minority groups and only small social distances. At the same time, the data confirmed a lack of understanding of the value of diversity. More than half of the respondents would not support a proactive policy to achieve proportional representation of minority groups in the military. Additionally, the perception prevails that ethno-cultural diversity in the defence organization would harm group cohesion and organizational performance (Yanakiev, 2013).

### **3.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSFORMING THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES INTO A MULTICULTURAL ORGANIZATION**

The demographic trends in Bulgarian society along with other global factors will undoubtedly influence recruitment in the BAF, and these trends will result in a growing ethnic and cultural diversity in the military in the future. The share of women and civilians in defence organizations is also expected to increase with the lack of candidates for professional soldiers. These facts make the introduction of EO/EEO and diversity management policy and strategy in the BAF a compelling issue.

The plan should focus on transforming the BAF into a multicultural organization over 15 years. This, according to the indicators formulated by Cox (2001), means an organization that stimulates pluralism and full structural integration of minority groups and women at all levels of its hierarchy; full integration of the minority groups in informal networks; an absence of prejudice and discrimination; no gap in organizational identification based on ethnic/cultural background; and low levels of inter-group conflict.

Another important recommendation, along with guaranteeing equality before the law in the defence organization, is that the political-military leadership of the MoD has to establish and maintain an organizational climate that encourages the inclusion of all people. Mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for diversity in people's day-to-day interaction will stimulate an increase in organizational effectiveness.

Based on the analyses of the existing literature, identified best practices, and the current situation in the BAF, this chapter suggests several steps be undertaken to transform the defence organization in Bulgaria from a pluralistic to a multicultural one.

The first and most important step for the leadership of the MoD is to introduce a unified definition of diversity for the BAF and corresponding diversity management policy and practices. The definition should be a broad one that is sensitive to Bulgaria's laws, social and cultural context, demographic trends and traditions, lessons learned from our NATO and EU allies, as well as to the BAF's mission.

The second important step is to formulate the mission, the vision, the strategy, and the scope of diversity management activities. Based on the experience of our NATO and EU allies, two options can be followed. One is to formulate a separate diversity management mission and to designate a structure in the MoD responsible for implementation – whether a human resources management directorate or specialized office for equal opportunity and diversity management. In this way, diversity management will become a specialized human resources concern. The other option is to integrate the diversity management mission into the overall mission of the defence organization and relate it to all day-to-day activities (Nelson et al., 2008). I suggest the second option, tying the diversity management mission to organizational performance, mission readiness, and the human component of defence capability development.

The third step is to formulate the strategic goals of diversity management in the Bulgarian defence organization. Such a goal could be to further implement anti-discrimination legislation and to guarantee equality before the law of all Bulgarian citizens without prejudice toward ethnicity, cultural background, gender, religion, sexual orientation, age, disabilities, etc. A new image of the BAF as an equal opportunity employer and an employer of choice could emerge among the public as a result.

The fourth step is to implement a proactive policy to attract and recruit young people from the largest ethnic and cultural groups and to achieve a higher representation among the professional military corps over the next 5 to 10 years. Thus, the BAF will be able to reach a broader pool of possible candidates for professional soldiers and create the image of the institution as a symbol of national unity.

The fifth step is to identify, continuously monitor, and remove all normative and organizational barriers and to provide full access to minority groups and women to leadership positions at all levels of the defence hierarchy.

The sixth step is to establish and maintain an organizational climate that does not allow discrimination and stimulates the inclusion of all members of the organization to fully utilize the available human capital and guarantee organizational performance and mission readiness.

Last but not least, the Bulgarian defence organization's leadership should introduce a system for cross-cultural competence development in the BAF as an integral part of professional military education and training to respond to the challenges of global diversity during international deployments. Although the Bulgarian military did not experience serious tensions with colleagues from other nations or the local populations when participating in international operations, this endeavor deserves attention.

Among the most important principles of diversity management policy is the active, top-level leadership commitment to a shared vision for implementation in the military. Diversity management should be closely related to the mission of the organization, the strategic goals and tasks of the military, as well as the long-term plans for restructuring and human capital development. Additionally, strong political-military and public support for integrating minority groups into the military is particularly important in an environment where prejudices against some minority groups are still comparatively widespread in society. It would help to create a highly positive environment in which to implement the diversity management policy to motivate people to accept the changes.

Next, implementing the diversity management policy in the military does require a sound scientific basis. There is a need for comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, and policy-oriented studies for organizational climate assessment and decision-making support. Further, the diversity management policy should be implemented step-by-step and should correspond to the priorities of different levels of the military organization. Moreover, it should cover all differences in the defence organization (gender, ethnic, cultural, religious, disabilities, age, cognitive, organizational, etc.). It is not practical to focus only on the problems of one particular minority group or another group in an unequal position. Likewise, it should have a long-term perspective and constantly improve the normative regulation of the implementation process. Last but not least, it is important to provide accountability and transparency for the full spectrum of diversity management activities as an integral part of human capital development that focuses on the results achieved as well as the pitfalls and challenges.

### **3.9 CONCLUSION**

The literature shows that diversity is much more than race, ethnicity, and gender. Focusing only on demographic measures (statistics, percentages, and quotas) is an over-simplified approach and does not reflect current requirements of effective organizational performance, either in the national armed forces or in the context of international deployments.

Diversity management is a complex process that involves creating a positive climate and entails a change in individual mindsets. It is an essential element of force readiness, contributes to human interoperability, and responds to globalization and the new roles of the defence organization. In this respect, a clear distinction must be made between diversity management and legally driven EO/EEO policies and practices. Diversity has a positive effect on the organization and team performance, if managed successfully. If not managed successfully, it can present a challenge. Among the most important lessons learned for the BAF is that more attention should be paid to the secondary dimensions of diversity (attitudes, values, and beliefs of personnel). The organizational structure and demographic composition of the force are comparatively easy to change, but the processes, organizational culture, and mindset changes take more time and effort.

Second, diversity should be defined as a multidimensional construct. It covers several core dimensions:

- 1) The internal aspects of diversity for national defence organizations (EO/EEO awareness, policies and practices, cross-services cultural differences, cognitive diversity, etc.);

- 2) Civil-military aspects in a national context (inter-agency cooperation in crisis management and disaster relief); and
- 3) International dimension (language proficiency and cultural awareness, coalition partners, civil-military cooperation in multinational coalitions, awareness about the adversary culture to guarantee better human terrain work, etc.).

In addition, a proactive approach to defining diversity is needed to focus on what is more important now as well as to forecast the requirements in 10 – 15 years. In this regard, the definition of diversity in a defence organization is a moving target that changes over time to reflect developments in the rest of society. Up to now, more attention has been focused on the internal aspects of diversity. There is a lack of research in Bulgaria on the interrelation among the three dimensions of diversity and their effect on organizational outcomes.

Third, another important conclusion is that diversity management should not be considered a human resources management issue only. Diversity must be incorporated into the core mission of the organization. Inclusion and equity must become core values of the service, be aligned with the other organizational processes, cover the whole career path of the military and civilian personnel, and become a priority of the leadership at all levels. Therefore, diversity management should be considered in the context of the overall process of human capital development.

Fourth, the bottom line is that building 3C is the key factor in successful diversity management in defence organizations in terms of internal, civil-military, and global dimensions of diversity. 3C contributes to a defence organization's capability by preparing troops to operate effectively in complex cultural encounters. 3C should be defined, studied, and trained at the individual, team, and organizational levels and should become a key requirement in the context of military professional development.

Last but not least, various important research gaps need further exploration. Among them are:

- 1) Development of inclusion and equity as core values in an organization where uniformity is the traditional goal and is perceived as of high importance for military cohesion and effectiveness;
- 2) Construction of matrixes to evaluate diversity plan implementation encompassing observable, as well as secondary/deep dimensions of diversity;
- 3) Design of matrixes to assess the effect of diversity management on organizational outcomes (team cohesion, commitment, perceived organizational effectiveness, identification with the organization, etc.) in the context of internal, inter-agency, and global dimensions of diversity;
- 4) Specific requirements for effective leadership in diverse/heterogeneous defence organizations;
- 5) Building diversity competencies for managing internal, inter-agency, and global aspects of diversity;
- 6) Operational validation of 3C models in international coalition operations.

I suggest that the best forum for this ambitious research is the framework of multinational collaborative teams in the NATO Science and Technology Organization.

### **3.10 REFERENCES**

- [1] Bulgaria Population: Demographic situation, languages and religions, 2021. (2021). [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/bulgaria/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/bulgaria/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions_en)

- [2] Cox, T.H. Jr. (1994). The multicultural organization. In R. Noe, J. Hollenbeck, B. Gerhart, and P. Wright (Eds.), *Readings in human resource management*. Irwin.
- [3] Cox, T.H. Jr. (2001). *Creating the multicultural organization: A strategy for capturing the power of diversity*. Jossey Bass.
- [4] Dandeker, C. and Mason, D. (1999). Diversity in the UK Armed Forces: The debate about the representation of women and minority ethnic groups. In J. Soeters and J. van der Meulen (Eds.), *Managing diversity in the armed forces*. Tilburg University Press.
- [5] Frost, D.D. (1999). Review of worst diversity practices. To learn from others' mistakes. *HR Focus* 76(3), 11.
- [6] Hays-Thomas, R. (2004). Why now? The contemporary focus on managing diversity. In M.S. Stockdate and F. J. Crosby (Eds.). *The psychology and management of workplace diversity*. Blackwell.
- [7] Jackson, S.E., Brett, J.F., Cooper, V.I., Julin, J.A., and Peyronnin, K. (1991). Some differences make a difference: Individual dissimilarity and group heterogeneity as correlates of recruitment, promotions, and turnover. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 76(5), 675-689.
- [8] McGuire, G. (2012). 2k10 and beyond. Diversity, inclusion and respect for others in the US culture. In D.P. McDonald and K.M. Parks (Eds.). *Managing diversity in the military. The value of inclusion in a culture of uniformity*. Routledge.
- [9] Miller, L., and Moskos, C. (1995). Humanitarians or warriors? Race, gender and combat status in Operation Restore Hope. *Armed Forces and Society*, 21(4), 635-652.
- [10] Moskos, C. (1999). Diversity in the armed forces of the United States. In J. Soeters and J. van der Meulen (Eds.), *Managing diversity in the armed forces* (pp. 13-32). Tilburg University Press.
- [11] NATO (2021). Summary of the national reports of NATO member and partner nations to the NATO committee on gender perspectives, 2009 – 2019. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132342.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132342.htm)
- [12] Nelson, L., Michelle C., and Kimberly, C. (2008). *Planning for diversity. Options and recommendations for DoD leaders*. RAND Corporation.
- [13] O'Reilly, C.A., Caldwell, D.F., and Barnett, W.P. (1989). Work group demography, social integration, and turnover. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 34(1), 21-37.
- [14] Republic of Bulgaria. Antidiscrimination Law. State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria, Issue 86, 30 September 2003.
- [15] Scoppio, G. (2009). Diversity best practices in military organizations in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. *Canadian Military Journal*, 9(3), 17-30.
- [16] Thomas, K.M. (2005). *Diversity dynamics in the workplace*. Thomson Wadsworth.
- [17] Wagner, G.W., Pfeffer, J., and O'Reilly, C.A. (1984). Organizational demography and turnover in top-management groups. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 29(1), 74-92.

- [18] Whatley, G. (2001). Three levels of diversity: An examination of the complex relationship between diversity, group cohesiveness, sexual harassment, group performance and time. In M. Dansby, J. Stewart, and S. Webb (Eds.), *Managing diversity in the military* (pp. 65-70). Transaction Publishers.
- [19] Winslow, D. (1999). Diversity in the Canadian Forces. In J. Soeters and J. van der Meulen (Eds.), *Managing diversity in the armed forces* (pp. 33-54). Tilburg University Press.
- [20] Yanakiev, Y. (2013). People in defense – unified in diversity. St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia University Press, Sofia, Bulgaria. (In Bulgarian).
- [21] Yanakiev, Y., Gerganov E., and Petkov, G. (2005). Methodology for equal opportunity climate assessment. In Y. Yanakiev (Ed.), *Equal opportunity for professional realization and prevention of discrimination in the Bulgarian military*. NATO Defense College, Alumni Organization in Bulgaria, Sofia, 130-159. (In Bulgarian).
- [22] Yanakiev, Y., and Sabev, S. (2010). Challenges of multinationality in current military operations, G. S. Rakovski National Defense College Press, Sofia, Bulgaria.
- [23] Yuengling, R. (2011). Foundation for diversity training: Competency model and learning objectives, DEOMI Internal Report. DEOMI Press.



## **Chapter 4 – MILITARY SOCIALIZATION AND PREJUDICE: THE (MEDIATING) ROLE OF RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**

**Mathias De Roeck and Delphine Resteigne**  
Royal Military Academy  
BELGIUM

### **4.1 FACING INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE**

Western militaries have become more diverse in their operations and their demographics (Manigart and Resteigne, 2013, 2016). Current missions are extremely varied, taking place in culturally, ethnically, linguistically diverse theatres around the world, and they are conducted, most of the time, in a multinational framework. The demographic changes in Western societies, particularly within the European Union, have pushed Western armed forces (including United States, United Kingdom and Canadian militaries) to open their doors to new populations, such as women and ethno-cultural minorities. In other words, Western militaries are no longer primarily composed of young white men.

This diversity requires a new flexibility on behalf of individuals and organizations. Individual members need to be able to interact with colleagues of different origins, both in terms of professional roles and cultural identities. Meanwhile, the military needs to take into account the “human environment” of deployments, where its personnel come into contact with the local population and a variety of stakeholders, such as foreign military personnel, non-governmental organizations and members of international organizations. Therefore, acquiring intercultural skills will greatly facilitate contacts between people with different norms and practices and will increase the abilities of troops (Resteigne, 2012).

Another argument in favor of a greater diversity is that it creates systemic flexibility. Given the complexity of the current economic environment, organizations need to transpose this variety inside, to have what has been called a “requisite variety” (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997, p. 228). In addition to this complexity, the pace of environmental change requires the ability to live with, and even enjoy ambiguity and chaos in order to reach the maximum of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity (Vego, 2013). Multicultural organizations encourage both the variety of perspectives and practice the management of ambiguity. Fewer things can be taken for granted, and there can be no assumption that there is only one good way to do things.

Despite its added value for the organization, this greater openness is not always well accepted by the workforce, and this diversity is very often only tolerated rather than fully appreciated. For “organizations in uniforms” (Soeters, 2002, p. 465), this growing differentiation remains a challenge and a real acceptance of diversity will no doubt require a change in organizational culture. For the conduct of operations, for example, many continue to highlight the importance of social cohesion (between male buddies) and the feeling of closeness between “similar” soldiers. This type of social cohesion was indeed important when the armies were homogeneous and operated in less complex configurations, as Shils and Janowitz (1948) pointed in their analysis of the German Wehrmacht during the Second World War. However, similarity between peers is much less required for armies operating in complex environments. It is, rather, a “task-oriented cohesion” (King, 2016, p. 717) that is based on complementary skills, professionalism, and expertise and is considered to be more efficient. And, among organizations which are still highly hierarchical, the role of those who occupy the highest ranks, through their attitudes and behaviors, are vital in order to promote a climate of inclusion.



## **4.2 ATTITUDES, VALUES AND MILITARY SOCIALIZATION**

Social scientists have long been interested in the effects of higher education on (liberal) attitudes and values. Various studies have found that higher education beneficially affects liberal values, including greater tolerance for minority groups, gender equality, and homosexuality, among others (for an overview, see Hastie, 2007a). Yet more recent studies have also discovered important differences across academic disciplines, indicating that some students become more liberal (like social science and psychology students) and others less liberal (like law and engineering) as they proceed through their academic career (Guimond, 1997; Guimond et al., 2003; Hastie, 2007b; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).

Importantly, only a few in this field of study have examined the attitudinal effects of one peculiar type of higher education, namely, military university education (for exceptions, see Dorman, 1976; Goertzel and Hengst, 1971; Guimond, 1995; Nicol et al., 2007). Most of these studies also ignored the role of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988, 1998) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), despite the fact that both value orientations have been associated with forms of prejudice (Cantal et al., 2015; Duckitt and Sibley, 2007; Gatto et al., 2009; Gatto and Dambrun, 2012; Whitley, 1999) and both are salient in militaries (Nicol et al., 2007; Nicol, 2009).

The present chapter examines the transmission of RWA and SDO during military university education and how this process influences different types of prejudice. Prejudice is defined here as the existence of negative affect toward specific subgroups, such as ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals (Esses et al., 1993). Consistent with Duckitt (2001), RWA and SDO are conceptualized as ideological dispositions rather than personality traits. This implies that we conceive RWA and SDO as being social rather than biological in origin. RWA involves a person's loyalty to social norms and established authorities, including readiness to use violence against deviant persons or groups. More particularly, RWA indicates the degree to which a person values order and discipline and perceives the surrounding world as a threat (Altemeyer, 1988).

Meanwhile, SDO refers to a person's tacit acceptance and cultivation of unequal or hierarchical group relations. People high on SDO typically see the world in competitive terms and emphasize power and dominance over equality and respect (Pratto et al., 1994). In this chapter, we assume that RWA and SDO are implicitly yet actively cultivated during military university education for two main reasons. First, following the impressionable years hypothesis, adolescents like cadets are especially vulnerable to changes in ideological beliefs when compared with children or older adults (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020). Impressions during early adulthood are lasting on individual attitudes and become almost immune to change afterwards. Within a military university, logically, the type of impressions are thoroughly military. Second, these military impressions closely resemble the ideological content of RWA and SDO (Nicol et al., 2007). The military, for instance, assigns great importance to submission and authority. It also expects respect for tradition and established rules and punishes rule-violators. All this is close to RWA. The military is also a hierarchy-enhancing organization (De Oliveira et al., 2012; Haley and Sidanius, 2005; Sidanius et al., 2003; Tesi et al., 2020), meaning that it emphasizes status, rank, hierarchy, and competition. These organizational values are also close to SDO and, like RWA, we may expect these core organizational values to be reinforced the more one gets exposed to this type of environment. Needless to say, the salience of military values is stronger during military education, which is all about turning civilians into soldiers. Given cadets' exposure to this climate, we expect the military climate to have a significant effect on cadets' ideological orientations, stimulating the transmission of RWA and SDO.

The first objective of the study, therefore, is to investigate the effects of military university education on RWA and SDO. The second is to examine the implications of this dynamic for prejudice. Given that armed forces in the West, and the Belgian military in particular, are recruiting more and more new (minority) groups in order to better represent society, it goes without saying that knowledge about the determinants of prejudice is key. Without the right mindset, the transition to a more diverse workforce is bound to stumble. Of course, prejudice is a multifaceted concept and group-bound. Although the idea of generalized prejudice

holds that prejudice against one outgroup implies prejudice against another (Akrami et al., 2010), we look at different types of prejudice, which are only moderately related.

Within the military, a predominantly masculine and white environment, not every group is equally likely to experience prejudice. A pertinent question then becomes which groups to focus on. Consistent with a dual-process theory of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001), we differentiate between challenging groups (i.e., groups considered as threatening but not subordinate), dissident groups (i.e., groups that are both threatening and subordinate), and derogated groups (i.e., subordinate groups but not threatening). In our view, a prime example of a challenging group are female soldiers, who have not only become more numerous within the military, but they have gradually taken up high-level positions and become more vocal and powerful. Thus, they constitute a threat for the status and position of men within the organization. Ethnic minorities are examples of a dissident group. In Belgium, these are soldiers of Moroccan, Turkish, and Congolese descent, among others. Although the presence of these groups is currently limited within Belgian Defence, it is assumed that – like female soldiers – they will become more numerous and hence more powerful over time. As a corollary, they might threaten the status and position of white men in the future. Having non-European backgrounds, however, they are more likely than women to be perceived as subordinate. Finally, we reserve the status of a derogated group to gay and lesbian people to the extent they do not conform to traditional family values, which could render them subordinate in the moral sense of the word but not a threat.

We assume that RWA and SDO differentially affect types of prejudice because (in dual-process theory) RWA and SDO operate through distinct social-cognitive mechanisms. Although RWA and SDO are related (Hodson et al., 2017), therefore, they are nevertheless distinct drivers of prejudice. Thus, we hypothesize that RWA primarily affects prejudice against challenging groups (i.e., prejudice against women), while SDO mainly determines prejudice against dissident groups (i.e., prejudice against ethnic minorities). We do not postulate any significant effects of RWA on attitudes toward gay and lesbian people, given that members of this group frequently come from their own in-group and therefore do not constitute a threat. Only SDO is expected to explain independent variance in prejudice against gay and lesbian people, to the extent that this group is seen as morally subordinate. Overall, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate the socialization of RWA and SDO in a military academy and to examine whether RWA and SDO differentially affect types of prejudice.

## **4.3 METHOD**

### **4.3.1 Participants**

Participants were around 500 students in the Belgian Royal Military Academy (RMA; mean age = 20.07; SD = 2.17; 79.61% male; 52.87% Flemish-speaking). The RMA is a Belgian higher-education military university focused on the education of officers for Belgian Defence. The participants were selected from a larger online questionnaire on diversity (Diversiteitsonderzoek, 2020), which was sent to all RMA members (N = 1,100). As the population of interest was of manageable size, and the survey received the support of the RMA commander, a total population sample was taken. The main advantage of such a sample, compared with any random sample, is that it reduces the risk of biased sample selection. In total, 513 people participated in the survey, yielding a response rate of 46.6%, which is rather common in organizational research. Another 114 persons opened the survey but did not contribute any information. They were therefore omitted from the dataset.

RMA members were invited to participate voluntarily in the survey. They were also assured full confidentiality and anonymity of the results and informed about their legal rights as participants. The diversity survey consisted of six main sections. The first examined general attitudes and ideological predispositions of participants, including RWA and SDO. The second zoomed in on attitudes toward different types of diversity – i.e., ethnic, gender, and sexual diversity. The third looked at personal experiences with diversity and being different, while the fourth and fifth sections asked questions about diversity policy and general well-being at RMA. The last section introduced socio-demographic background questions. Participants completed the survey in an online platform in LimeSurvey (96.3%) or BelADL (3.7%).

**MILITARY SOCIALIZATION AND  
PREJUDICE: THE (MEDIATING) ROLE OF  
RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**



Focusing on the student sample, the overall response rate was 39.4%. This is slightly below the general response rate, but still acceptable. Table 4-1 summarizes the response rate by academic track and gender and language group.

**Table 4-1: Student Participation Rates in 2020 RMA Diversity Survey. Totals and numbers by language group and gender.**

Course	Total			By Language			By Gender		
	Participants	Total Number of Students	Participation Rate (in %)	Participants (N,F)	Total Number of Students	Participation Rate (in %)	Participants (M,F)	Total Number of Students	Participation Rate (in %)
<b>SSMW</b>									
1BA SSMW	41	79	51.9	23FR; 18NL	39FR; 40NL	59.0; 45.0	28M; 13F	56M; 23F	50.0; 56.5
2BA SSMW	44	94	46.8	22FR; 22NL	54FR; 40NL	40.7; 55.0	34M; 9F	73M; 21F	45.9; 42.9
3BA SSMW	9	52	17.3	7FR; 2NL	22FR; 30NL	31.8; 6.70	7M; 2F	40M; 12F	17.5; 16.7
1MA SSMW	25	48	52.1	12FR; 13NL	22FR; 26NL	54.5; 50.0	21M; 3F	43M; 5F	48.8; 60.0
<b>POL</b>									
1BA	17	43	39.5	4FR; 13NL	17FR; 26NL	23.5; 50.0	14M; 3F	34M; 9F	41.1; 33.3
2BA	20	33	60.6	7FR; 13NL	20FR; 13NL	35.0; 100	17M; 3F	29M; 4F	58.6; 75.0
3BA	9	28	32.1	4FR; 5NL	13FR; 15NL	30.8; 33.3	8M; 1F	27M; 1F	29.6; 100
1MA	5	28	17.9	3FR; 2NL	14FR; 14NL	21.4; 14.2	4M; 1F	23M; 5F	17.3; 20.0
2MA	4	37	10.8	0FR; 4NL	15FR; 22NL	0.00; 18.2	4M	36M; 1F	0.11; 0.00
<b>Total</b>	174	442	513	82FR; 92NL	216FR; 226NL	38.0; 40.7	137M; 35F	361M; 81F	38.0; 43.2

**Notes.** Data on student numbers were obtained from the RMA education department.

It bears emphasizing that the RMA offers two academic tracks: Social and Military Sciences (SSMW) and Polytechnic Studies (POL). SSMW involves 4 years of study (3BA and 1MA) while POL involves 5 years of study (3BA and 2MA). Without going into detail, response rates by track were quite variable: SSMW students were somewhat more likely (43.6%) than POL students (32.5%) to respond. Participation rates by academic year were also rather erratic. For POL, participation rates declined over the years, while for SSMW participation was lowest in 3BA. Figure 4-1 further shows that French-speaking (38.0%) and Flemish-speaking (40.7%) students were almost equally likely to participate. Moreover, in terms of gender, female students were a bit more likely to participate (43.2%) in the survey than men (38.0%).

### 4.3.2 Measures

We developed our own instruments for all constructs under investigation because we work in a military context and were restricted in what we could ask. As a rule, we looked for short rather than long versions of each instrument to limit the survey's length and reduce non-response. Several measurement items had to be omitted from the original scales because the military hierarchy considered them problematic, controversial or too repetitive. Nevertheless, we assured a relative balance between pro-trait and con-trait items.

All survey items were administered in Dutch and French, and 5-point Likert scale items anchored by *completely agree* and *completely disagree* were used for all measures, except military socialization and socio-demographic background variables. Items were translated into Dutch and French based on feedback from three bilingual researchers or by relying on already existing validated translations of the specific instrument (Bosman et al., 2007; Van Hiel and Duriez, 2002).

### 4.3.3 Military Socialization

Consistent with (Guimond, 1995; Guimond et al., 2003), military socialization was measured as the amount of exposure to the military environment. Given that we are dealing with cross-sectional data, the best proxy at hand for military socialization is academic year, which is measured as an ordinal variable: 1 for first BA, 2 for second BA, 3 for third BA, 4 for first MA, and 5 for second MA. The higher the score, the longer the academic career, and the more exposure to the military environment there has been. Admittedly, this is an imperfect operationalization of the socialization process for reasons discussed below; nevertheless, it is *consistent with* the socialization hypothesis and perhaps the best approach with cross-sectional data.

### 4.3.4 Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation


Participants completed the 5-item Very Short Authoritarianism Scale (VSA; Bizumic and Duckitt, 2018) to measure RWA. Items included "What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity" and "It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority." One item of the original VSA scale, "There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse," was omitted from the questionnaire because we believed this question lacked relevance in the Belgian (secular) context. Measurement variables were recoded so that high scores reflect high levels of right-wing authoritarianism.

To measure SDO, participants completed a 10-item SDO scale based on Pratto et al.'s (1994) original 14-item SDO scale. Items included "It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others" and "Some people are not equal to other people." Items were recoded so that high values indicate high degrees of social dominance orientation.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the measurement properties of the RWA and SDO scales. Because some scholars suggest that RWA and SDO are part of the same authoritarian personality and almost indistinguishable (Adorno et al., 1950; Hodson et al., 2017), we tested two types of models, one specifying two latent RWA and SDO factors and one specifying only one factor. The goodness

of fit measures, however, suggested a two-factor solution to the data. Measurement variables capturing RWA also systematically scored below the conventional 0.30-loading on the single factor model, providing additional evidence for a two-factor solution.

Figure 4-1 shows the results of the CFA. We used maximum likelihood estimation for the parameters. The measured variables did not contain any missing values. In order to get a satisfactory model fit, we had to drop two items from the model, one from SDO (“It’s sometimes necessary to step on others to get ahead in life”) and one from RWA (“Religious laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late”). We also allowed error terms for several pairs of items to be correlated. As Figure 4-1 shows, all this led to a good model fit: The chi-squared with 58 degrees of freedom,  $\chi^2(58) = 73.356$ ,  $p > 0.05$ , was not significant, and the measures of goodness of fit were excellent, with RMSEA = 0.039 and CFI = 0.965. All measurement variables had a substantive loading on their respective dimension that was significant at the 0.001 level. Standardized loadings ranged from 0.30 to 0.70. The scale reliabilities were 0.73 for SDO and 0.64 for RWA, and SDO and RWA were weak yet significantly correlated ( $r = 0.38$ ).



**Figure 4-1: CFA Measurement Model for Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism.**



#### 4.3.5 Diversity Attitudes

Attitudes of prejudice toward ethnic minorities were measured indirectly by investigating overall support for a multi-ethnic society. We measured ethnic minority attitudes indirectly rather than directly to avoid targeting any specific social group. Although our measure is more holistic, it still captures aspects of concern (i.e., attitudes of prejudice against ethnic minorities). Participants filled out a 7-item Multicultural Attitude (MCA) Scale, based upon the original 15-item Multicultural Ideology Scale (Berry and Kalin, 1995, 1997). Examples of items are “If ethnic cultural minorities want to keep their own culture they should keep it to themselves” and “A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.” Items were recoded so that high values indicated support for multiculturalism and low values indicated sympathy for segregation, assimilation, and exclusion.

Attitudes of prejudice toward women were measured with a 7-item General Sexism Scale, based on the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) Scale (Glick and Fiske, 1996). The latter scale distinguishes between hostile and benevolent sexism, with the former implying a negative and inferior view of women and the latter defining women as weak beings in need of protection and with the time and space to fulfil traditional gender roles. Items measuring hostile sexism are “When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against” and “Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.” Items measuring benevolent sexism, on the other hand, are “Women should be cherished and protected by men” and “Women, as compared to men, are better able to take care of others.” Although Glick and Fiske’s (1996) theory of ambivalent sexism distinguishes between two types of sexism, a factor analysis on the data suggested a one-dimensional solution. Measurement items were recoded so that high values indicate positive attitudes toward women and low values negative attitudes.

A scale of attitudes toward gay and lesbian people was created using 7-items from the Multidimensional Scale of Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men (Gato et al., 2012). As the name suggests, this scale measures different types of attitudes toward lesbian and gay people: pathologizing of homosexuality (i.e., the moral condemnation and medicalization of homosexuality), rejection of proximity (i.e., avoidance of homosexuals in diverse social contexts), and modern heterosexism (i.e., aspects related to modern homo-negativity, including same-sex marriage and homosexual parenting). As we were primarily interested in attitudes toward homosexual peers, we decided to emphasize (and select items from) the rejection of proximity dimension. Examples of items are “I would not mind working together with a lesbian/gay man” and “I would be hesitant to support lesbian and gay individuals for fear of being perceived as one.” Again, items were recoded so that high values indicate positive attitudes toward lesbian and gay people and low values negative attitudes.

#### 4.3.6 Controls

Socio-demographic questions included participants’ gender, language group, academic track, academic year, socio-economic status, and military background. All items except for academic year and socio-economic status were dichotomous. Gender was coded 1 for men and 2 for women. Language group was 1 for French-speaking and 2 for Flemish-speaking. Academic track was 1 for SSMW and 2 for POL. Military background was 1 when parents were soldiers and 2 when parents were not. Socio-economic status was measured as an ordinal variable, looking at the education level of the mother. Because there was no mother with any or only elementary school education, 1 indicates lower secondary school diploma, 2 higher secondary school, 3 professional BA, and 4 academic BA or higher. Cronbach’s alphas, means, and standard deviations for all instruments can be found in Table 4-2, along with correlations between the variables.

**MILITARY SOCIALIZATION AND  
PREJUDICE: THE (MEDIATING) ROLE OF  
RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**



**Table 4-2: Cronbach's Alphas, Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Variables.**

Measure	Alpha	Mean	SD	01.	02.	03.	04.	05.	06.	07.	08.	09.	10.
01. SDO	0.73	0	0.58										
02. RWA	0.64	0	0.34	0.47***									
03. Ethnic Prejudice	0.72	3.13	0.63	-0.59***	-0.45***								
04. Women Prejudice	0.70	3.05	0.70	-0.41***	-0.28***	0.34***							
05. Gay and Lesbian Prejudice	0.76	4.13	0.64	-0.37***	-0.20***	0.34***	0.47***						
06. Gender	n/a	1.20	0.40	-0.24**	-0.19*	0.19	0.44***	0.34***					
07. Language	n/a	1.53	0.50	0.07	0.00	0.12	0.14	0.00	0.03				
08. Academic Track	n/a	1.32	0.47	-0.04	-0.02	0.06	0.10	0.05	-0.09	0.20**			
09. Academic Year	n/a	2.18	1.14	0.23**	0.17*	-0.24**	-0.06	-0.03	-0.17*	0.01	0.04		
10. SES	n/a	4.23	0.77	0.02	0.06	-0.00	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.04	
11. Military Background	n/a	1.83	0.38	-0.10	-0.02	0.17*	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.14	0.04	-0.09	-0.01
* $\rho < .05$ .													
** $\rho < .05$ .													
*** $\rho < .05$ .													



## 4.4 RESULTS

### 4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses

Independent group  $t$  tests indicated that men scored higher on SDO [ $t(170) = 3.21, \rho < 0.01$ ] and RWA [ $t(170) = 2.49, \rho < 0.05$ ] than women. They also reported the same gender divide for prejudice against ethnic minorities [ $t(170) = -2.48, \rho < 0.05$ ], women [ $t(170) = -6.34, \rho < 0.05$ ], and gay and lesbian people [ $t(170) = -4.73, \rho < 0.05$ ]. But the  $t$  tests did not show any significant differences for language group, academic track and military background on SDO, RWA, and most types of prejudice. Only on prejudice against ethnic minorities were children of service personnel slightly more prejudiced than children whose parents were not service personnel [ $t(170) = -2.21, \rho < 0.05$ ]. One-way ANOVAs indicated that SDO differed significantly by academic year [ $F(4, 169) = 2.69, \rho < 0.05$ ], but not RWA [ $F(4, 169) = 1.91, \rho = 0.11$ ]. Looking at the group means, RWA and SDO also seem to be rising by academic year, although Tukey post hoc comparison did not show any statistically significant differences between specific academic years. The one-way ANOVAs, however suggested statistically significant differences for prejudice toward ethnic minorities by academic year [ $F(4, 169) = 2.78; \rho < 0.05$ ], but not for prejudice against women [ $F(4, 169) = 0.83; \rho = 0.51$ ] or gay and lesbian people [ $F(4, 169) = 0.67; \rho = 0.62$ ]. In this case, the Tukey post hoc comparison revealed that prejudice toward ethnic minorities is statistically significantly higher in the first master year than the first bachelor year ( $-0.42 \pm 0.14$  units,  $\rho < 0.05$ ). Finally, we did not find any significant differences across socio-economic status for any type of prejudice, SDO, or RWA.

### 4.4.2 Primary Analyses

Structural equation modelling or path models with manifest variables using maximum-likelihood estimation on all observed variables were performed to investigate the transmission of RWA and SDO within the RMA and to examine whether RWA and SDO act as ideological variables mediating the effect of military socialization on different types of prejudice. The path models allow for correlated error terms between RWA and SDO because they are significantly correlated parallel mediators. We could not calculate the fit indices of the path models due to insufficient degrees of freedom (Acock, 2013).

First, we examined the effects of military socialization on the transmission of RWA and SDO within the RMA. The results in Table 4-3 showed that academic year, which acts as a cross-sectional proxy for military socialization, had a positive and statistically significant direct effect on SDO ( $\beta = 0.17; z = 2.24; \rho < 0.05$ ) and RWA ( $\beta = 0.16; z = 2.05; \rho < 0.05$ ), *ceteris paribus*. With each standard deviation increase in academic year, SDO increases with 0.17 standard deviations and RWA with 0.16 standard deviations. Arguably, this finding implies that the more one proceeds through one's academic career, the higher levels of SDO and RWA become, keeping all other covariates constant. This finding supports our claim that military socialization positively affects levels of SDO and RWA. The models further showed that gender was significantly and negatively related to SDO ( $\beta = -0.21; z = -2.79; \rho < 0.01$ ) and RWA ( $\beta = -0.18; z = -2.31; \rho < 0.05$ ), with women having lower SDO and RWA scores than men, *ceteris paribus*. All other control variables, on the other hand, failed to reach standard levels of statistical significance. Overall, the model explains 10.5% of the variance in SDO and 7.0% of the variance in RWA.

Second, we investigated the direct effects of SDO and RWA on different types of prejudice. Above we suggested that SDO and RWA were differentially related to various forms of prejudice. We postulated that SDO primarily determines prejudice against dissident and derogated groups (i.e., ethnic minorities and gay and lesbian people), while RWA predominantly affects prejudice against challenging groups (i.e., women). We did not hypothesize any effect of RWA on attitudes toward derogated groups (i.e., gay and lesbian people) because they do not constitute a threat. The results of the analysis, however, only partly confirmed these hypotheses. Table 4-3 shows that SDO was a strong predictor of all types of prejudice, irrespective of the group under consideration. SDO had a negative and statistically significant direct effect on prejudice against ethnic minorities ( $\beta = -0.47; z = -6.69; \rho < 0.001$ ), prejudice against women ( $\beta = -0.31; z = -4.29;$

$\rho < 0.001$ ), and against gay and lesbian people ( $\beta = -0.30$ ;  $z = -3.77$ ;  $\rho < 0.001$ ). With every standard deviation increase in SDO, prejudice against ethnic minorities increased with 0.47 standard deviations, prejudice against women with 0.31 standard deviations, and prejudice against gay and lesbian people with 0.30 standard deviations, *ceteris paribus*. These are rather strong effects, with SDO explaining most variance in prejudice against ethnic minorities.

The path models further showed that RWA was only significantly related to prejudice against ethnic minorities ( $\beta = -0.20$ ;  $z = -2.96$ ;  $\rho < 0.01$ ), while not so for other types of prejudice. With every standard deviation increase in RWA, prejudice against ethnic minorities increased with 0.20 standard deviations, *ceteris paribus*. Negative direct effects of RWA on prejudice against women ( $\beta = -0.08$ ;  $z = -1.14$ ;  $\rho = 0.26$ ) and lesbian and gay people ( $\beta = -0.05$ ;  $z = -0.64$ ;  $\rho = 0.52$ ) were obtained but were not statistically indistinguishable from zero. A chi-squared test of equality of the standardized coefficient for ethnic prejudice yielded  $\chi^2(1) = 5.08$ ,  $\rho < 0.05$ , suggesting that the difference in effects between SDO and RWA is statistically significant and that, in explaining ethnic prejudice, SDO is more important than RWA. Regarding control variables, Table 4-3 shows a positive and statistically significant direct effect of language group ( $\beta = 0.19$ ;  $z = 2.38$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ) on prejudice against minorities, with Dutch-speaking students having lower prejudice scores than French-speaking ones. Likewise, the table indicates a positive and statistically significant direct effect of gender on prejudice against women ( $\beta = 0.61$ ;  $z = 5.13$ ;  $\rho < 0.001$ ) and lesbian and gay people ( $\beta = 0.42$ ;  $z = 3.64$ ;  $\rho < 0.001$ ), with women associated with lower prejudice scores.

In a third step, we examined how much of the effect of military socialization on prejudice was mediated by RWA and SDO. Above we suggested that the effect of military socialization on various types of prejudice went primarily through SDO and RWA. Again, the results only partially support this argument. Table 4-3 shows small yet statistically significant negative indirect effects of academic year on prejudice against ethnic minorities ( $\beta = -0.11$ ;  $z = -2.37$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ), women ( $\beta = -0.07$ ;  $z = -2.17$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ) and lesbian and gay people ( $\beta = -0.06$ ;  $z = -2.04$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ) via SDO and RWA. These numbers are consistent with our argument, yet only reflect overall indirect effects, failing to distinguish between SDO and RWA as mediators. Interestingly, additional analyses not shown in the table indicated that the indirect effect of military socialization on the three forms of prejudice ran almost exclusively through SDO (for ethnic prejudice:  $\beta = -0.08$ ;  $z = -2.14$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ; for women prejudice:  $\beta = -0.05$ ;  $z = -1.96$ ;  $\rho < 0.05$ ; for prejudice against gay and lesbian people:  $\beta = -0.05$ ;  $z = -1.90$ ;  $\rho < 0.06$ ), and not via RWA, where the effects were not only much smaller, but also not statistically significant (for ethnic prejudice:  $\beta = -0.03$ ;  $z = -1.68$ ;  $\rho = 0.09$ ; for women prejudice:  $\beta = -0.01$ ;  $z = -0.99$ ;  $\rho = 0.32$ ; for prejudice against gay and lesbian people:  $\beta = -0.01$ ;  $z = -0.31$ ;  $\rho = 0.54$ ). These findings imply that when it comes to the effects of military socialization on various types of prejudice, it is the transmission of socially dominant attitudes that engender prejudice, rather than the transmission of authoritarian values.

Finally, Table 4-3 also reports the total effects – i.e., the effect of direct and indirect influences on prejudice combined. Because SDO and RWA are mediators in the model, direct and total effects were the same. Table 4-3 indicates a negative and statistically significant total effect of academic year on prejudice toward ethnic minorities ( $\beta = -0.19$ ;  $z = -2.56$ ;  $\rho < 0.01$ ), while no significant total effects were found for prejudice toward women ( $\beta = 0.03$ ;  $z = 0.35$ ;  $\rho = 0.72$ ) or gay and lesbian people ( $\beta = 0.07$ ;  $z = 0.93$ ;  $\rho = 0.36$ ). Additional analyses suggested that, of the significant total effect of academic year on ethnic prejudice, 42% of the effect was direct and 58% indirect via SDO. For prejudice against women and prejudice against gay and lesbian people, there were no significant direct effects for military socialization, suggesting that these types of prejudice can only be explained indirectly by the effects of military socialization on SDO. Overall, the path models explain 42.78% of the variance in ethnic prejudice, 33.42% of the variance in women prejudice, and 21.41% of the variance in prejudice toward gay and lesbian people.

**Table 4-3: Standardized Effects of Academic Year and Different Types of Prejudice with Correlated Residuals for SDO and RWA.**

Outcome	Prejudice towards Ethnic Minorities			Prejudice towards Women			Prejudice towards Gay Men and Lesbians		
	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
<b>SDO</b>									
Academic Year	0.17**	-	0.17*	0.17*	-	0.17*	0.17*	-	0.17*
Gender	-0.21***	-	-0.21**	-0.21**	-	-0.21**	-0.21**	-	-0.21**
Language Group	0.08	-	0.08	0.08	-	0.09	0.08	-	0.08
Academic Track	-0.09	-	-0.09	-0.09	-	-0.09	-0.09	-	-0.09
SES	0.02	-	0.02	0.02	-	0.02	0.02	-	0.02
Military Background	-0.09	-	-0.09	-0.09	-	-0.09	-0.09		-0.09
<b>RWA</b>								-	
Academic Year	0.16*	-	0.16*	0.16*	-	0.16*	0.16*	-	0.16*
Gender	-0.18**	-	-0.18*	-0.18*	-	-0.18*	-0.18*	-	-0.18*
Language Group	0.03	-	0.03	0.03	-	0.03	0.03	-	0.03
Academic Track	-0.06	-	-0.07	-0.07	-	-0.07	-0.07	-	-0.07
SES	0.06	-	0.06	0.06	-	0.06	0.06	-	0.06
Military Background	0.00	-	0.00	0.00	-	0.00	0.00		0.00

**MILITARY SOCIALIZATION AND  
PREJUDICE: THE (MEDIATING) ROLE OF  
RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**



Outcome	Prejudice towards Ethnic Minorities			Prejudice towards Women			Prejudice towards Gay Men and Lesbians		
	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
<b>Prejudice</b>								-	
SDO	-0.47***	-	-0.47***	-0.31***	-	-0.31***	-0.30***	-	-0.30***
RWA	-0.20**	-	-0.20**	-0.08	-	-0.08	-0.05	-	-0.05
Academic Year	-0.08	-0.11*	-0.19**	0.09	-0.07*	0.02	0.13	-0.06*	0.07
Gender	0.03	0.13**	0.17*	0.35***	0.08**	0.43***	0.27***	0.07*	0.34***
Language Group	0.15*	-0.05	0.10	0.12	-0.03	0.09	0.01	-0.03	-0.02
Academic Track	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.13	0.04	0.03	0.07
SES	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.09	-0.01	0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Military background	0.08	0.04	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04

*Notes.* Outcome variables are highlighted in bold. Significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solutions.  
\* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001

## 4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The first objective of the study was to examine the effects of military academy education and socialization on RWA and SDO, two variables typically associated with prejudice. Although previous research (Nicol et al., 2007) suggested that being educated at a military college or military socialization increases SDO but not RWA, a statistical analysis on our data, by contrast, revealed that military socialization increases both SDO and RWA, even after taking several relevant background variables into account.

One of the unintended consequences of studying at a military academy is that it seems to change students' ideological dispositions. The socialization process is not unique to military academies; every university and study program affects students' attitudes (Guimond, 1997, 2000; Hastie, 2007a). What is unique is the nature of the ideological change. As our analysis suggests, studying at a military academy not only transmits authoritarian values – including loyalty to social norms and established authorities as well as readiness to use aggression against deviant groups – it also fosters a socially dominant worldview and a preference for hierarchical rather than equal intergroup relations. The present study is one of the first to lay bare this trend, even though similar findings have been uncovered among police forces (Gatto et al., 2009; Gatto and Dambrun, 2012).

A second objective of the study was to investigate the differential impact of SDO and RWA on various forms of prejudice within the military (i.e., prejudice against ethnic minorities, women and gay and lesbian people). In line with the dual-process theory, we postulated that SDO mainly affects prejudice against dissident (i.e., ethnic minorities) and derogated groups (i.e., gay and lesbian people) within the military, while RWA predominantly influences prejudice against challenging groups (i.e., women). In accordance with previous research (Asbrock et al., 2010; Cantal et al., 2015; Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Duckitt and Sibley, 2007), we found that SDO and RWA differentially affect prejudice against these groups and that RWA mainly explained prejudice against challenging groups.

Yet our findings also differ from this literature. We found that SDO not only affected prejudice against derogated and dissident groups, but also against challenging groups. Most likely, this finding can be explained by the fact that women are not only seen as a threat, but also as subordinate in a military context where masculine traits such as power, strength, and courage are all salient. By disclosing these differential effects, our findings go against previous work conceiving prejudice as a general mindset rather than being group-specific (Adorno et al., 1950; Akrami et al., 2010; Allport, 1954; Bäckström and Björklund, 2007; Bierly, 1985; Bratt, 2005; McFarland, 2010; Zick et al., 2008), although this is more so for RWA than SDO.

A final objective was to examine how much military socialization influences prejudice via its effects on SDO and RWA. Quite a few studies have investigated the effects of military socialization on various forms of prejudice and other attitudes (Dornbusch, 1954; Goertzel and Hengst, 1971; Guimond, 1995, 2000; Jennings and Markus, 1977; Roghmann and Sodeur, 1972). To the best of our knowledge, however, no study looked at the mediating role of SDO and RWA on prejudice. Some have looked at these variables in the military (Nicol, 2009; Nicol et al., 2007) and others have investigated the mediating role of SDO and RWA in non-military environments (Gatto et al., 2009; Gatto and Dambrun, 2012; Guimond et al., 2003) or looked at the social origins of SDO and RWA beyond (military) education (Duriez and Soenens, 2009). Our study showed that, besides a small significant direct effect, most of the effect of military socialization on prejudice against ethnic minorities, women, and gay and lesbian people is indirect. Although we expected SDO and RWA to play a differential yet significant role in this regard, what we found was that the indirect effect of military socialization on prejudice was mainly mediated by changes in social dominance orientation. Specifically, the results suggest that military socialization breeds prejudice through the transmission of a socially dominant worldview – that is, an emphasis on hierarchy and the domination of perceived inferior groups by superior groups, and not via the development of authoritarian values. These findings are different from, say, studies with police forces, where no such mediating effects for SDO or RWA were found (Gatto and Dambrun, 2012). Yet our findings are consistent with other studies illustrating the importance of SDO as a mediator for prejudice in hierarchy-enhancing environments (Guimond et al., 2003).

A major limitation of the current study is its cross-sectional design. Strictly speaking, the static nature of the data precludes inferring real socialization influences because it is impossible to rule out confounding factors, such as self-selection (i.e., the tendency of defence organizations to recruit relatively authoritarian and socially dominant people), growth effects (i.e., changes that occur as one grows older), attrition-dynamics (i.e., those who drop out may score lower on RWA and SDO than those who stay) or mere group differences that have nothing to do with socialization.

While these are important limitations, of course, and they imply caution when dealing with the results, we do not wish to throw the baby out with the bathwater. First, despite its cross-sectional design, our operationalization of military socialization via academic year is consistent with a socialization approach, given that it captures time spent in the organization. A fourth year cadet in a military academy has spent more time in the military environment than a first year cadet and, hence, has received more socialization. What is more, one finds a similar type of operationalization in other studies examining socialization effects making use of cross-sectional data (Duriez et al., 2011; Guimond et al., 2003; Hastie, 2007b). This is not to say that we have found smoking-gun evidence of the link between military socialization, SDO and RWA, and various types of prejudice, but rather that our findings support a socialization explanation.

Future research could build on the findings in this study with a longitudinal design, where the same group of students would be followed over time and periodically asked about their ideological attitudes and types of prejudice. Of interest here, then, are changes in these variables over time and the complex relations between the variables. Another way to build on this research would be to compare socialization dynamics in a military university with dynamics in a civilian university. One would look for potentially divergent socialization dynamics in both schools and investigate the implications for different types of prejudice. What would also be interesting is extending this research to the army in general, going beyond the small world of the military university. This approach would offer more information on general ideological attitudes in the army as a whole as well as the nature of prejudice against various groups. In our view, such research will become more important as defence organizations become more diverse, and we need to know what type of environment new groups are ending up in. After all, the military academy is only a small microcosm in a much larger organization. From a broader point of view, military organizations need to accommodate diverse people and should take advantage of the potential benefits. A more diverse workforce offers long-term advantages in terms of image, recruitment and performance, notably for conducting operations in culturally-complex environments.

## **4.6 REFERENCES**

- [1] Acock, A. C. (2013). *Discovering structural equation modeling using stata*. Stata Press.
- [2] Adorno, T.W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D.J., and Sanford, R.N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. Harper.
- [3] Akrami, N., Ekehammar, B., and Bergh, R. (2010). Generalized prejudice: Common and specific components. *Psychological Science*, 22(1), 57-59.
- [4] Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Addison-Wesley.
- [5] Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. Jossey-Bass.
- [6] Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.” In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (30th ed.). Academic Press.
- [7] Alwin, D.F., and Krosnick, J.A. (1991). Aging, cohorts, and the stability of sociopolitical orientations over the life span. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(1), 169-195.



- [8] Asbrock, F., Sibley, C.G., and Duckitt, J. (2010). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice: A longitudinal test. *European Journal of Personality*, 24(4), 324-340.
- [9] Bäckström, M., and Björklund, F. (2007). Structural modeling of generalized prejudice. *Journal of Individual Differences*, 28(1), 10-17.
- [10] Berry, J.W., and Kalin, R. (1995). Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 National Survey. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement*, 27(3), 301-320.
- [11] Berry, J.W., and Kalin, R. (1997). Diversity and equity in the Canadian forces. In M.R. Dansby (Ed.), *Proceedings, 2nd Biennial EO/EEO Research Symposium*.
- [12] Bierly, M.M. (1985). Prejudice toward contemporary outgroups as a generalized attitude. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 15(2), 189-199.
- [13] Bizumic, B., and Duckitt, J. (2018). Investigating right wing authoritarianism with a very short authoritarianism scale. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 6(1), 129-150.
- [14] Bosman, F., Richardson, R., and Soeters, J. (2007). Multicultural tensions in the military? Evidence from the Netherlands Armed Forces. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 31(3), 339-361.
- [15] Bratt, C. (2005). The structure of attitudes toward non-Western immigrant groups: Second-order factor analysis of attitudes among Norwegian adolescents. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 8(4), 447-469.
- [16] Cantal, C., Milfont, T.L., Wilson, M.S., and Gouveia, V.V. (2015). Differential effects of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on dimensions of generalized prejudice in Brazil. *European Journal of Personality*, 29(1), 17-27.
- [17] De Oliveira, P., Guimond, S., and Dambrun, M. (2012). Power and legitimizing ideologies in hierarchy-enhancing vs. hierarchy-attenuating environments. *Political Psychology*, 33(6), 867-885.
- [18] Dorman, J.E. (1976). ROTC cadet attitudes: A product of socialization or self-selection? *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, 203-216.
- [19] Dornbusch, S.M. (1954). The military academy as an assimilating institution. *Social Forces*, 33(4), 316-321.
- [20] Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 41-113.
- [21] Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(5), 684-696.
- [22] Duckitt, J., and Sibley, C.G. (2007). Right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. *European Journal of Personality*, 21(2), 113-130.
- [23] Duriez, B., Klimstra, T.A., Luyckx, K., Beyers, W., and Soenens, B. (2011). Right-wing authoritarianism: Protective factor against or risk factor for depression? *European Journal of Personality*, 26, 536-549.



- [24] Duriez, B., and Soenens, B. (2009). The intergenerational transmission of racism: The role of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 43(5), 906-909.
- [25] Esses, V.M., Haddock, G., and Zanna, M.P. (1993). Values, stereotypes, and emotions as determinants of intergroup attitudes. In D.M. Mackie and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition and stereotyping. Interactive processes in group perception* (pp. 137-166). Academic Press.
- [26] Gato, J., Fontaine, A.M., and Carneiro, N.S. (2012). Multidimensional scale of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: Construction and preliminary validation. *Paidéia (Ribeirão Preto)*, 22(51), 11-20.
- [27] Gatto, J., and Dambrun, M. (2012). Authoritarianism, social dominance, and prejudice among junior police officers: The role of the normative context. *Social Psychology*, 43(2), 61-66.
- [28] Gatto, J., Dambrun, M., Kerbrat, C., and De Oliveira, P. (2009). Prejudice in the police: On the processes underlying the effects of selection and group socialisation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 40(2), 252-269.
- [29] Glick, P., and Fiske, S.T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), 491-512.
- [30] Goertzel, T., and Hengst, A. (1971). The military socialization of university students. *Social Problems*, 19(2), 258-267.
- [31] Guimond, S. (1995). Encounter and metamorphosis: The impact of military socialisation on professional values. *Applied Psychology*, 44(3), 251-275.
- [32] Guimond, S. (1997). Attitude change during college: Normative or informational social influence? *Social Psychology of Education*, 2(3), 237-261.
- [33] Guimond, S. (2000). Group socialization and prejudice: The social transmission of intergroup attitudes and beliefs. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(3), 335-354.
- [34] Guimond, S., Dambrun, M., Michinov, N., and Duarte, S. (2003). Does social dominance generate prejudice? Integrating individual and contextual determinants of intergroup cognitions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84(4), 697-721.
- [35] Haley, H., and Sidanius, J. (2005). Person-organization congruence and the maintenance of group-based social hierarchy: A social dominance perspective. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 8(2), 187-203.
- [36] Hastie, B. (2007a). Higher education and sociopolitical orientation: The role of social influence in the liberalisation of students. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, 22(3), 259-274.
- [37] Hastie, B. (2007b). Cold hearts and bleeding hearts: Disciplinary differences in university students' sociopolitical orientations. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 147(3), 211-241.
- [38] Hodson, G., MacInnis, C.C., and Busseri, M.A. (2017). Bowing and kicking: Rediscovering the fundamental link between generalized authoritarianism and generalized prejudice. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 104, 243-251.
- [39] Jennings, M.K., and Markus, G.B. (1977). The effect of military service on political attitudes: A panel study. *The American Political Science Review*, 71(1), 131-147.

- [40] Kiley, K., and Vaisey, S. (2020). Measuring stability and change in personal culture using panel data. *American Sociological Review*, 85(3), 477-506.
- [41] King, A. (2016). On combat effectiveness in the infantry platoon: Beyond the primary group hypothesis. *Security Studies*, 25(4), 699-728.
- [42] Manigart, P., and Resteigne, D. (2013). *Sortir du rang : la gestion de la diversité à la Défense belge*, L'Académie en poche, Brussels, 2013.
- [43] McFarland, S. (2010). Authoritarianism, social dominance, and other roots of generalized prejudice. *Political Psychology*, 31(3), 453-477.
- [44] Nicol, A.A.M. (2009). Social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and their relation with leadership styles. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 47(6), 657-661.
- [45] Nicol, A.A.M., Charbonneau, D., and Boies, K. (2007). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in a Canadian military sample. *Military Psychology*, 19(4), 239-257.
- [46] Pascarella, E., and Terenzini, P. (1991). *How college affects students: Findings and insights from twenty years of research*. Jossey-Bass.
- [47] Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L.M., and Malle, B.F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67, 741-763.
- [48] Resteigne, D. (2012). *Le militaire en opérations multinationales. Regards croisés en Afghanistan, en Bosnie, au Liban*, Bruylant.
- [49] Roghmann, K., and Sodeur, W. (1972). The impact of military service on authoritarian attitudes: Evidence from West Germany. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(2), 418-433.
- [50] Schneider, S.C., and Barsoux, J.L. (1997). *Managing across cultures*. Prentice Hall.
- [51] Shils, E.A., and Janowitz, M. (1948). Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12(2), 280-315.
- [52] Sidanius, J., and Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance*. Cambridge University Press.
- [53] Sidanius, J., Van Laar, C., Levin, S., and Sinclair, S. (2003). Social hierarchy maintenance and assortment into social roles: A social dominance perspective. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 6(4), 333-352.
- [54] Soeters, J. (2002). *Cultuur in geüniformeerde organisaties [Culture in uniformed organizations]*. In R. Richardson D. Verweij, A. Vogelaar, and H. Kuipers. (Eds.), *Mens en Organisatie: De krijgsmacht in verandering [Human and organization: The changing armed forces]* (pp. 32-58). Mets & Schilt.
- [55] Tesi, A., Pratto, F., Pierro, A., and Aiello, A. (2020). Group dominance in hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy-enhancing organizations: The role of social dominance orientation, need for cognitive closure, and power tactics in a person-environment (mis) fit perspective. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 24(2), 102-114.
- [56] Van Hiel, A., and Duriez, B. (2002). *Een Meetinstrument voor Individuele Verschillen in Sociale Dominantie Oriëntatie [A scale to measure individual differences in social dominance orientation]*. *Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor de Psychologie En Haar Grensgebieden*, 57, 114-116.

- [57] Vego, M. (2013). On military creativity. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 70, National Defense University Press, 83-90.
- [58] Whitley, B.E. (1999). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77(1), 126-134.
- [59] Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., and Heitmeyer, W. (2008). The syndrome of group-focused enmity: The interrelation of prejudices tested with multiple cross-sectional and panel data. *Journal of Social Issues*, 64(2), 363-383.

## **Chapter 5 – PERCEPTIONS OF RACISM AND HATEFUL CONDUCT IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: PROMOTING A CULTURE CHANGE TO FOSTER GREATER ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION**

**Barbara T. Waruszynski**  
Department of National Defence  
CANADA

### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

The vision of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Diversity Strategy seeks to create: “A CAF that is comprised of members who reflect the rich diversity of Canada and who are recognized and encouraged to maintain and contribute through their unique experiences, abilities, and perspectives within a respectful and inclusive environment” (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 2). Part of this vision is to ensure that the Canadian military is reflective of the people in Canadian society in which it serves, including the sharing of values, beliefs and diverse cultures found in pluralistic communities (Department of National Defence, 2016). Reflecting the Canadian mosaic will enable military personnel to develop more meaningful relationships with people in the communities, both at home and abroad, and will contribute to operational effectiveness around the world. The ultimate goal is to foster greater diversity and inclusion across the Canadian Defence Team, and to promote a culture of respect for all military and civilian personnel.

Moreover, the Canadian federal government has developed several initiatives to help promote diversity and inclusion (e.g., Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019 – 2022, Multiculturalism Program, and Commitment to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action as well as other initiatives designed to promote better cultural integration; Canadian Heritage, 2019). Although many initiatives have been undertaken to help eradicate racism in the federal government and Canadian society, perceptions of racism, harassment, and hateful conduct in the federal government have been evidenced, including the CAF and the Department of National Defence (DND).

To better understand racist and hateful attitudes and behaviors in the CAF/DND, this chapter examines racism and hateful conduct in the Canadian context and provides a brief historical overview of ethnic diversity, and racial discrimination and prejudice in Canada. The author examines the systemic attitudes and behaviors toward ethnic groups (e.g., Indigenous Peoples, Chinese Canadians, Japanese Canadians, Black Canadians, and South Asian Canadians) that have been deeply ingrained within the social structures of federal institutions and Canadian society as a whole. In addition, this chapter summarizes the main findings from two recent research studies that examined perceptions of racism in the CAF/DND and hateful conduct in the CAF. Finally, the chapter provides a discussion on the salient issues and the key recommendations to help address and stamp out racist and hateful attitudes and behaviors in the Canadian military, and to help foster a sustainable culture change that supports the enhancement of ethnic diversity and inclusion across the Defence Team.

### **5.2 ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND RACISM WITHIN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

Ethnic diversity in the Canadian context is important to consider from both historical and racial discrimination perspectives. Canada is “ethnically heterogeneous,” with immigrants coming in from different countries around the world (Li, 2000). Canada is known for its European migration “between 1896 and the beginning of the First

World War, [where] Canada's population was indeed mainly made up of those of British and French origin" (Li, 2000, p. 1). However, with changing immigration patterns and changes to the Canadian immigration policies in 1967, an emergence of visible minorities was evidenced, as Canada was now focusing on selecting immigrants for their education, knowledge, and occupational skills, while still accepting family sponsored immigrants and providing refugee settlement opportunities (Li, 2000). In essence, Canada, like other countries, was part of the global competition for skilled labor (Li, 2000). As Li (2000) states:

*The term "visible minorities" received official recognition in 1984 when Commissioner Rosalie S. Abella identified this group as constituting one of the four designated categories in the Royal Commission Report on Equality in Employment (Canada, Royal Commission on Equality of Employment, 1984). The subsequent Employment Equity Act of 1986 also specifically included "persons who are, because of their race or colour, in a visible minority in Canada" as one of the designated groups to whom employers on federal works or federal crown corporations had to take special measures to improve their employment opportunities (S.C., 1986, c. 31, s. 3). In the 1986 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada operationalized membership in a visible minority to include ten origins: Blacks, Indo-Pakistani, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, South-East Asian, Filipino, Other Pacific Islanders, West Asian and Arab, and Latin American, excluding Argentinean and Chilean [people] (Statistics Canada, 1990: 71-72) ... The removal of racial or national barrier[s] in immigrant selection in 1967 [had] facilitated immigration from Asia, Africa and other non-traditional sources that historically were restricted to enter Canada. (p. 5)*

Since the early 1970s, the proportion of immigrants from Europe has been steadily declining while the proportion of visible minorities immigrating to Canada has been increasing. Li (2000) states:

*...about 2.3 to 2.6 million members of visible minorities were added to the Canadian population between 1968 and 1995. In view of the fact that the total number of visible minorities was 1.6 million individuals in the 1986 Census, 2.6 million individuals in the 1991 Census, and 3.2 million individuals in the 1996 Census (Statistics Canada, 1998), then it is clear that immigration between the 1970s and 1990s alone would largely account for the emergence of the visible minority population. The immigration pattern also means that most members of the visible minority [population group] are first-generation immigrants born outside of Canada, in contrast to most European-Canadians who, because of a historical immigration policy in favour of their admission, tend to be native born in Canada. (p. 6)*

Decades later, the 2016 Census reveals that people with "English (6.3 million), Scottish (4.8 million), French (4.7 million) and Irish (4.6 million) origins were still among the 20 most common ancestries reported by the Canadian population" (Statistics Canada, 2017). The 2016 Canadian Census also revealed that more than one-fifth of Canadians represented visible minorities or people of color (other than Indigenous persons; Statistics Canada, 2019 cited in Catalyst, 2021). Visible minorities are projected to be one-third (31% to 36%) of the total Canadian population by 2032 (Statistics Canada, 2019 cited in Catalyst, 2021). In the 2016 Canadian Census, South Asian (25.1%), Chinese (20.5%), and Black (15.6%) people accounted for the majority of visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2019 cited in Catalyst, 2021). Also in 2016, Indigenous Peoples, referred to as First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples, made up over 1.6 million people in Canada (4.9% of the national population [approximately 35.2 million]; Canadian Encyclopedia, 2022a).

Based on historical accounts of racialized discrimination in Canada, visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples continue to experience racism and racialized discrimination, both in the workplace and in Canadian society. The Canadian Race Relations Foundation (2015a) defines racism as "a belief that one group is superior to others", and this dominance is based on the social structures that dictate power of one group and the subjugation of the other group(s). Racism represents a social construct that is based on diverse cultural customs, dress, physical characteristics, and geography; Ontario Human Rights Commission [OHRC], 2019). As will become evident below, racist attitudes and behaviors have been deeply rooted in the systemic structures (e.g., social, historical, political and economic) that continue to govern people in Canadian society,



including the policies, programs, and laws that have led to stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, white privilege, power struggles, inequities, and acts of injustice against visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Both explicit and implicit racial biases have been at the core of racist attitudes and behaviors toward visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples.

From a historical perspective, colonialism played a significant role in developing systemic discrimination policies and practices that have and continue to disadvantage racialized people (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2022). Examples of racism, discrimination, and prejudice in Canada have been deeply entrenched across various ethnic groups (e.g., First Nations Peoples, Chinese Canadians, Japanese Canadians, Black Canadians, and South Asian Canadians). According to the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (2015b), Canada has a “racist history” that has been embedded in modern-day policies. For example, the First Nations Peoples “have been segregated in reserves, their children have been taken from them and their governments, [and] traditions and ceremonies have been regulated and banned” (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). Relations between First Nations Peoples and the Canadian state have been sullied by “social, economic, political, and cultural suppression” (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). Racist policies prevented First Nations Peoples from having the “right to vote, prohibition from purchasing land, outlawing spiritual ceremonies, forced relocation and segregation on reserves, restrictions on civil and political rights and expropriation of land (Indian Act of 1876)” (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). The socio-economic problems experienced by many First Nations Peoples today are a direct and indirect result of racism, subjugation, and exploitation of Indigenous Peoples through colonial oppression and ethnocentric attitudes and behaviors that have led to racialized discrimination (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). For example:

*Ethnocentrism plays an important role when a group, usually dominant, wants to force another to adopt its ways and preferences. In Canada, this was especially the case between Indigenous [P]eoples and French or British settlers who sought to impose their practices while eradicating Indigenous cultures. After the Confederation in 1867, the federal government took ethnocentric and racist measures, such as the Indian Act and the residential schools, to force Indigenous [P]eoples to abandon their traditions and adopt western norms and customs. This attitude towards Indigenous communities persisted and led to the Sixties Scoop<sup>1</sup> among others. (See also Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Racial Segregation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada; The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2022b).*

For visible minorities or people of color, “legalized racism” has been evidenced across the Black Canadian community, including slavery, segregated schooling and communities, and property rights (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). Moreover, Chinese Canadians were subjected to anti-Chinese legislation which restricted their civil and political rights (Li, 1988), and were prevented from taking part in public office and professional occupations (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). Japanese Canadians endured fixed immigration quotas, experienced segregation in schools and public domains, and were placed in internment camps through forced labor initiatives (Miki and Kobayashi, 1991, as cited in Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). South Asian Canadians also experienced overt discrimination and legislation, where they were “unable to enter professional occupations, had restricted property rights, and were subjected to discrimination in housing” (Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2015b). More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic led to anti-Asian sentiments culminating in racist overtones known as “shadow pandemic” (Shore, 2020). Based on an Angus Reid and University of Alberta survey of 500 Canadians of Chinese ethnicity, half of the respondents stated that they had been insulted or called names attributed to their ethnic backgrounds since the beginning of the pandemic and 43% stated that they were vulnerable to threats and intimidation

---

<sup>1</sup> The term “Sixties Scoop” refers to “the large-scale removal or “scooping” of Indigenous children from their homes, communities and families of birth through the 1960s, and their subsequent adoption into predominantly non-Indigenous, middle-class families across the United States and Canada. This experience left many adoptees with a lost sense of cultural identity. The physical and emotional separation from their birth families continues to affect adult adoptees and Indigenous communities to this day...The Sixties Scoop...[was] an extension of paternalistic policies in Canada that sought the assimilation of Indigenous cultures and communities” (Sinclair and Dainard, 2022).

tactics (Shore, 2020). Microaggressions, which can include subtle forms of racial slights (e.g., jokes and name-calling; Sue et al., 2007), have been predominant throughout the pandemic and usually insinuated that Chinese people are carriers of the coronavirus. These types of microaggressions stem from systemic racism, stereotypes, prejudice, and racialized discrimination in Canadian society.

Since the 1980s, legislation in Canada was introduced to prevent overt, systemic and racialized discrimination. For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF) stipulates equality for all Canadians (Constitution Act, 1982). The Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) highlights the importance for Canadians to employ human rights principles to help foster fair treatment of people in society and in the workplace (Canadian Human Rights Act, 1985). The Employment Equity Act (EEA) also requires that regulated employers need to focus on proactive employment plans and practices to ensure the full representation of women, Aboriginal people, visible minorities, and persons with disabilities (Employment Equity Act, 1995). Moreover, many initiatives have been brought forward to address racial discrimination in Canada and to help start the healing process for Indigenous Peoples and visible minorities (e.g., intergenerational trauma experienced by Indigenous Peoples which have led to Pope St. Francis apologizing to Indigenous delegates in Italy [and recently in Canada] for the mistreatment and abuse of Indigenous children in residential schools; Stefanovich, 2022).

The above Canadian context provides a brief historical overview of colonial oppression and the ethnocentric attitudes and behaviors that culminated in racial discrimination, harassment, and abuse of Indigenous Peoples and visible minorities. Although governmental policies and programs designed to eradicate racial discrimination and harassment have been progressive in changing mindsets and behaviors, Indigenous Peoples and visible minorities continue to experience racist attitudes and more covert behaviors (e.g., microaggressions) in the workplace and in Canadian society as a whole. Such racist mindsets and behaviors have been evidenced in organizations such as the Canadian military.

### **5.3 RACISM AND HATEFUL CONDUCT WITHIN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES**

The 2016 CAF Diversity Strategy draws on the need to foster a cultural identity that embraces diversity and inclusion among its ranks. Whether on domestic or international operations and exercises, military personnel engage with people who come from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. As a result, CAF members need to learn more about people who come from pluralistic cultures and societies to better understand and appreciate the multicultural mosaic that exists across the Canadian landscape.

The new *Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve* (Department of National Defence, 2022a) reflects the way in which Canadian military members must serve their country and people around the world. The *CAF Ethos* is a reflection of Canadian values, where each military member will be judged based on their conduct and performance. The *CAF Ethos* calls for the highest ethical standards and professionalism to enable greater respect and inclusion. According to the *CAF Ethos*:

*Those who are inclusive reject racism, sexism, heteronormativity, homophobia, xenophobia or any other form of hateful, discriminatory or hurtful behaviour, conduct or association. They take a proactive approach to prevent, stop and report such conduct and support those affected. Inclusive leaders and team members take deliberate steps to identify and challenge inequities both within their teams and within the institution.* (Department of National Defence, 2022a)

The recently amended Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5019-0 on Conduct and Performance Deficiencies, which, along with the CF Military Personnel Instruction 01/20, superseded the Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) 19-43 on Racist Conduct, defines hateful conduct as:



*An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability. (Department of National Defence, 2020)*

The DAOD 5012-0 on Harassment Prevention and Resolution also supports employees' rights to work in an environment that is free from unacceptable behaviors:

*The DND and the CAF affirm that a work environment that fosters teamwork and encourages individuals to contribute their best effort in order to achieve the defence objectives of Canada is essential. Mutual trust, support and respect for the dignity and rights of every person are essential characteristics of this environment and are directly linked to the first ethical principle (Respect the Dignity of all Persons) in the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics. (Department of National Defence, 2017)*

Hateful conduct represents attitudes and behaviors that are associated with hatred against people who come from diverse backgrounds, including one's national or ethnic origin, race, color, genetic characteristics, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, religion, age, marital and family status, or disability (House of Commons Canada Standing Committee on Taking Action to End Online Hate, 2019). The House of Commons Canada Standing Committee (2019) stated that hate crimes in Canada were 47% higher in 2017 in comparison to 2016. These hate crimes were mainly motivated by race or ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation (House of Commons Canada Standing Committee, 2019). The report highlighted that, "of all hate crimes reported by police in 2017, 43% were motivated by hatred of a race or ethnicity, 41% were against a religion, and 10% targeted sexual orientation" (House of Commons Canada Standing Committee, 2019, p. 19).

In Canada, white nationalist attitudes and behaviors have included hate or right-wing extremist groups, such as, La Meute/The Pack, Proud Boys, The Base, Three Percenters, Atomwaffen Division (also known as National Socialist Order or Northern Order in Canada), and many other hate groups. Right-wing extremists tend to use different social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, 4chan, Gab, Iron March and Fascist Forge) to communicate their ideologies and recruit and train people to take part in terrorist activities in Canada and around the world (Davey, Hart, and Guerin, 2020). At the time of the published report, there were "6,660 right-wing extremist channels, pages, groups and accounts across 7 social media platforms; and Anti-Muslim and anti-Trudeau [Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada] rhetoric [as] the most salient topics of conversation among RWE actors in Canada" (Davey et al., 2020, p. 5). Chapter Two in this report provides a more comprehensive overview of right-wing extremism in Canada.

Moreover, the CAF Employment Equity strategy focuses on the need to increase the representation rates of visible minorities to 11.8% and Indigenous members to 3.5% by 2026 (Department of National Defence, 2015). Currently, there are 10.1% visible minority and 2.7% Indigenous members in the CAF, based on total Regular Force and Primary Reserve members (Department of National Defence, 2022b). By increasing the representation rates of visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples in the CAF, military personnel will be able to interface better with people who come from diverse cultural backgrounds, whether in the Canadian military, Canadian society, or around the world. As a result, "military personnel who are culturally diverse, multiethnic, and multicultural represent force multipliers during both domestic and international operations" (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 3). As such, research that explores the perceptions of military members on issues related to race, racism, and discrimination provide additional insights to CAF leadership on how to improve the military's current directives, policies and programs for enabling greater cohesion, equity, diversity, and inclusion among all personnel.

### **5.3.1 Perceptions of Racism in the Canadian Military**

A qualitative research study was conducted with racialized members who self-identified as being either Indigenous or visible minorities within the CAF and DND (Waruszynski, MacEachern, Browne, and Woycheshin, 2022). The main purpose of this research was to provide an opportunity for racialized personnel to voice their thoughts and concerns about racism and harassment in the CAF and DND. The study objectives were:

- 1) To determine the existence and nature of racist conduct and harassment based on race against visible minorities and Indigenous members in the CAF and DND;
- 2) To understand racist behaviors and conduct in the CAF and DND, including the implications of these behaviors;
- 3) To identify ways in which prevention, intervention, and training can improve the mindsets and behaviors among serving and civilian members; and
- 4) To inform the development of strategies for combatting racism and harassment and further improve inclusion in the CAF and DND (Waruszynski et al., 2022, p. iii).

Between November 2017 and June 2018, a total of 59 focus groups and 18 individual interviews were conducted with 277 visible minority and Indigenous military and civilian members to learn about their experiences of racial discrimination and harassment across the Defence Team. The findings are based on the perceptions and experiences of four groups: visible minority CAF members (60%), visible minority civilians (11%), Indigenous CAF members (22%), and Indigenous civilians (7%) located across 12 bases/wings/units in Canada, including Bagotville, Cold Lake, Comox, Edmonton, Esquimalt, Gagetown, Greenwood, Halifax, Petawawa, Trenton, Valcartier, and Winnipeg. The following section summarizes the key findings that are published in detail elsewhere (Waruszynski et al., 2022; Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019; Waruszynski, 2019).

For both military and civilian personnel, focus groups and individual interviews were stratified according to Employment Equity (EE) status (i.e., visible minority or Indigenous person), military or civilian service, and rank (for military members). Based on the total number of participants ( $n = 277$ ), the majority of study participants were in the military (81.2%;  $n = 225$ ) in comparison to civilians (18.8%;  $n = 52$ ). The vast majority of participants in the military represented the Regular Force (96.4%;  $n = 162$ ) and were Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs; 68.0%;  $n = 151$ ) in comparison to officers (32.0%;  $n = 71$ ). A higher proportion of men (71.8%;  $n = 199$ ) in comparison to women (28.2%;  $n = 78$ ) took part in the study.

The focus groups and individual interviews were audio-recorded and ranged from 20 minutes to two hours. The audio-recordings were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents to enable inductive and deductive coding of the qualitative data. Researchers analyzed the transcripts, developed a coding scheme, and established the main themes using the qualitative software package MAXQDA Plus 12 (VERBI Software, 2017).

The main themes were examined across the four groups of participants, taking into account the key challenges and recommendations to help address racism and harassment across the bases/units/wings. In this chapter, several major themes are highlighted across the four groups, including: diversity and inclusion in the CAF and DND, racial insensitivities and microaggressions, challenges with career progression, leadership, cultural awareness, and recommendations (Waruszynski et al., 2022).

#### **5.3.1.1 Diversity and Inclusion in the CAF and DND**

In general, the majority of visible minority and Indigenous military and civilian participants felt that the CAF and DND leadership are focused on fostering a culture that is diverse and inclusive. For example, there were several visible minority military participants who expressed that the CAF structure reinforced a sense of

belonging. The concept behind the ‘Defence Team’ umbrella promoted an environment where people felt accepted and were part of a larger team.

Many Indigenous CAF participants highlighted the benefits of working with the Defence Aboriginal Advisory Group (DAAG), a group that counsels CAF leadership on the issues impacting Indigenous military and civilian personnel and helps Indigenous personnel with policies and programs designed to accommodate those practicing cultural traditions and customs. The Indigenous participants stated that the DAAG influenced the need for greater cultural awareness, which in turn, helped to support Indigenous military personnel (e.g., National Aboriginal Day and Aboriginal Awareness Week). Cultural awareness (e.g., spiritual accommodations for sweat lodges and smudging ceremonies) helped to address stereotypes and prejudices and promoted the importance of building relationships and appreciating different customs. The Aboriginal Leadership Opportunities Year (ALOY) program, offered through the Royal Military College of Canada, also enabled Indigenous military members to develop their leadership skills, along with training and engaging in sports, while maintaining their cultural traditions and customs.

Although the majority of the participants felt that the CAF and DND were focused on fostering a diverse and inclusive environment, there were a number of participants who expressed challenges attributed to racial insensitivities and microaggressions.

#### **5.3.1.2 Racial Insensitivities and Microaggressions**

Socializing in the military context usually leads to the creation of social and personal bonds with friends and colleagues. These bonds can include telling jokes and teasing each other with nicknames, which can be a natural part of everyday life in the military. However, many participants expressed that joking sometimes led to insensitive name-calling or using derogatory nicknames. Both visible minority and Indigenous participants (military and civilian) provided examples of attitudes and behaviors that were racially insensitive. For example, people engaged in subtle or unconscious behaviors that were considered to be discriminatory or racist (e.g., offensive jokes). Some visible minority military participants expressed that, at times, people used derogatory nicknames and were not aware about the negative impacts of their statements; while others used more overt forms of racialized harassment and discrimination that were considered to be very hurtful. Indigenous CAF participants felt that people, in general, were too quick to accept misconceptions and stereotypes about Indigenous Peoples found in society as opposed to learning about different Indigenous cultures and customs. Several Indigenous participants felt that Indigenous women in the military were perceived to be sexually available, especially when drinking alcohol was involved in social interactions. One participant, a female Indigenous military member, considered leaving the Canadian military a few times as a result of negative connotations attributed to Indigenous women. Also, male Indigenous military participants stated that although the DAOD 5516-3 on Religious or Spiritual Accommodation is intended to support Indigenous people, challenges with the chain of command were apparent when Indigenous military personnel wanted to grow their hair long or wear braids as part of their traditional customs. These participants felt disrespected by their chain of command when spiritual and cultural accommodations were not accorded to them.

#### **5.3.1.3 Challenges with Career Progression**

A number of participants were challenged throughout their careers and felt that racist overtones may have impacted their career progression. For instance, some visible minority military participants perceived that they had to work twice as hard just to demonstrate their abilities when carrying out their roles and tasks. Some of these participants felt that their race or ethnicity may have negatively impacted their job evaluations and career opportunities. Others felt that they may have been excluded from taking part in social activities (e.g., socializing with others over drinks after work or playing hockey with the chain of command) or feared retribution if they reported incidents of discrimination or harassment. Participants also recounted wanting to leave the CAF as a result of needing to work harder or feeling discriminated against (e.g., chain of command denying harassment complaints made by visible minority military personnel).

Indigenous and visible minority civilians highlighted that tokenism was not uncommon and felt that they were given their positions as a result of their Indigenous or visible minority status as opposed to their knowledge, skills, and abilities. In addition to feeling the need to prove one's abilities, these participants felt that there were inequities in hiring and promotional practices (including biased performance evaluations). These inequities led to a perceived lack of career progression and the inability to understand why they had not received promotions or jobs that they had applied for.

#### **5.3.1.4 Leadership**

Most of the participants across Indigenous and visible minority personnel stressed the important role that leadership plays in promoting meaningful diversity and inclusion across the Defence Team. These participants observed that many leaders continue to make concerted efforts to foster greater inclusion and are cognizant of understanding and accommodating visible minorities and Indigenous military and civilian personnel. However, some visible minority military members felt that their chain of command failed to act appropriately when members had filed complaints of harassment; and some Indigenous CAF members perceived their supervisors to be unsupportive and racist.

#### **5.3.1.5 Cultural Awareness**

Many visible minority and Indigenous participants spoke about the importance of culture and their ability to exercise their customs. Although cultural awareness, practice, and well-being were important to the participants, several Indigenous CAF members revealed that they were not able to practice their customs once they left their community of origin. Once posted to other bases, these Indigenous participants highlighted that there are many Indigenous cultures, and each culture practices different customs which need to be respected.

Both visible minority and Indigenous participants asserted that there was insufficient cultural awareness training which may explain discriminatory attitudes and behaviors. Attitudes and behaviors would be substantially improved if CAF members were given accurate information about diverse ethnic groups. Indigenous participants also expressed the need to rectify misperceptions and stereotypes that continue to be spread about Indigenous Peoples. Moreover, several Indigenous participants recounted being questioned about one's Indigenous identity because their physical appearance resembled Caucasian people. These participants highlighted that visible physical characteristics may dictate whether an Indigenous person will be accommodated to practice their cultural traditions and beliefs.

#### **5.3.1.6 Recommendations**

Within the qualitative research study on racism and harassment across DND/CAF, several recommendations were highlighted by the participants, including:

- a) Instilling greater respect through a collective leadership approach;
- b) Leadership, peer and mentor support;
- c) Access to Indigenous Elders and surrounding communities;
- d) Speaking-up to change racist behaviors and eliminate racism; and
- e) Cultural awareness through education and training (Waruszynski et al., 2022).

**Instilling greater respect through a collective leadership approach:** Fostering a more socially cohesive and inclusive Defence Team requires respect toward everyone to combat racism. The participants in this study spoke about the need to develop a shared and collective leadership approach to help foster greater mutual respect and a sense of belonging. This would enable everyone to embrace the concept of 'respect and dignity for all' by applying ethical and moral principles, values, and behaviors that would help to eradicate racist mindsets in the Canadian defence environment.

The majority of participants felt that senior leaders need to exercise similar measures and initiatives as Operation HONOUR, a program designed to eradicate sexual misconduct in the Canadian military. Although there were many challenges attributed to Operation HONOUR, there was a consensus that a program of an equal scope and scale aimed at eradicating racism would help to reduce racial discrimination and harassment. Several visible minority participants expressed a need to promote such a program, which they suggested could be called Operation RESPECT, where senior leaders would help to promote a more equitable, diverse and inclusive environment. Moreover, it was recommended that there needs to be a greater representation of visible minority leaders to affect a positive culture change and working environment for visible minorities.

**Leadership, peer and mentor support:** Participants highlighted that CAF and DND leaders need to continue to be instrumental in promoting a diverse and inclusive defence culture. Through the provision of peer and mentor support programming for military and civilian personnel, participants felt that Defence Team members can learn the benefits of working in a culture that promotes diversity, equity and inclusion. For instance, peer support programs can help to integrate newly recruited civilians and military personnel, especially those individuals who are stationed in more isolated environments that are less diverse. Such integration can include teaching accommodation policies and procedures that are intended to support Indigenous Peoples and visible minorities. A mentoring program could also provide support to new recruits who are trying to navigate through the defence environment. Finally, as with Indigenous military members and civilian personnel, it was recommended for leaders who are visible minorities to provide support to younger visible minority members to help them understand the policies and accommodations available to them.

**Access to Indigenous Elders and surrounding communities:** Participants emphasized that creating stronger relationships with Elders across the Indigenous reserves and surrounding communities is key to instilling greater respect for Indigenous cultures and accommodating Indigenous Peoples. Taking part in conversations with Indigenous Elders provides opportunities to learn about the different Indigenous cultures and customs. Several participants stated that having access to Indigenous Elders is akin to military personnel having access to Padres.

**Speaking-up to change racist behaviors and eliminate racism:** Many participants spoke about the need to take a bystander intervention approach to help support people who are Indigenous people or visible minorities. Challenging inappropriate attitudes and behaviors is key to combatting harassment, discrimination and racism in the Canadian military environment. Participants asserted that people need to speak up to change racist attitudes and behaviors by letting others know when they had crossed the line using inappropriate language, whether covert or overt. Calling out inappropriate comments, name-calling, jokes, stories, and stereotypes will help to eliminate prejudice and racism across the CAF and DND.

**Cultural awareness through education and training:** The vast majority of participants highlighted the need for greater cultural awareness through interactive education and training programs (e.g., diversity training as part of basic training, and interactive learning activities, such as, participation in smudge ceremonies and sweat lodges). Greater cultural awareness training would help to rejuvenate and encourage Indigenous people to speak to racialized groups about a career in DND or the CAF.

In addition, many participants highlighted that the Defence Advisory Groups (i.e., Defence Visible Minority Advisory Group [DVMAG] and DAAG) will continue to foster greater cultural awareness within the CAF/DND. By educating senior leaders on Indigenous and visible minority customs, and by instilling a comprehensive approach to help prevent racial discrimination and harassment across the Defence Team, participants felt that there would be a positive cultural shift based on respect for all military and civilian personnel.

This qualitative research study helped to illustrate the challenges experienced by visible minority and Indigenous military and civilian personnel in the CAF and DND, and the need for greater diversity, equity, and inclusion in the Canadian defence environment.



The next section focuses on a recent survey that examined participants' perceptions of hateful conduct and extremism in the Canadian military.

### **5.3.2 Perceptions of Hateful Conduct in the Canadian Military**

A recent online CAF Harassment and Discrimination Survey (October to December 2020) on Regular Force and Primary Reserve members examined hateful conduct and extremism in the Canadian military (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021). Based on 4,715 respondents (36.2% response rate), the survey asked participants about four areas attributed to hateful conduct in the military:

- a) Knowledge of updates to Canadian DAOD 5019-0 on hateful conduct;
- b) Being affiliated with extremist groups;
- c) Prevalence of hate speech within the unit;
- d) Prevalence of CAF members posting hate material on social media;
- e) Prevalence of CAF members encouraged to become involved with extremist groups; and
- f) CAF member behavioral responses to instances of hateful or extremist behaviors (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021).

**Knowledge of updates to DAOD 5019-0 on hateful conduct:** The survey results revealed that an estimated 40.0% of Regular Force members and 51.4% of Primary Reserve members indicated that they were knowledgeable or very knowledgeable about the updates to the DAOD on Hateful Conduct. For both Regular Force and Primary Reserve members, 29.2% were moderately knowledgeable about the policy updates; while 30.8% of Regular Force members and 19.4% of Primary Reserve members were slightly or not at all knowledgeable about the policy updates (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021).

**Being affiliated with extremist groups:** When asked if CAF members were aware of other members being affiliated with extremist groups, the results indicated that an estimated 4.7% of Regular Force members and 6.3% of Primary Reserve members were aware of at least one CAF member (whether inside or outside the unit) who was affiliated with an extremist group (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021).

**Prevalence of hate speech within the unit:** CAF members were asked if they heard any member within their unit communicate hatred against those who identify with a particular race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity. The survey uncovered an estimated 8.7% of Regular Force members and 7.5% of Primary Reserve members who reported to have heard at least one CAF member within their unit express hate speech against others in the past 12 months (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021). Based on the participants who had not heard any hate speech within their units, an estimated 8.4% of Regular Force members and 8.6% of Primary Reserve members reported having heard at least one member outside of their unit express hate speech within the past 12 months (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021).

**Prevalence of CAF members posting hate material on social media:** The survey revealed that a total of 10.3% of Regular Force members and 9.5% of Primary Reserve members stated that they had viewed an online post that promoted hatred towards other people by a CAF member in the last 12 months (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021).

**Prevalence of CAF member encouraged to become involved with extremist groups:** CAF members were asked if they had ever been approached by anyone within the past 12 months of the survey, whether inside or outside of the CAF/DND, to become involved with an extremist group. For both Regular Force and

Primary Reserve members, the vast majority (99.6% and 99.0%, respectively) stated that they had never been encouraged to become involved with an extremist group (Wright, LeBlanc, and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021).

**CAF member responses to instances of hateful or extremist behaviors:** Based on 16.2% of Regular Force members who observed one or more aspects of hateful conduct or extremist behaviors, the most common actions taken were to do nothing (35.7%) or to speak to the person directly about their behavior (32.3%). An estimated 22.0% reported avoiding the person after observing the behavior, and 11.2% reported that they had informed their chain of command (Wright, LeBlanc and Peach, 2021, p. 6). Based on 15.5% of Primary Reserve members who observed one or more aspects of hateful conduct or extremist behaviors, the most common actions were to do nothing (33.1%E) or to speak to the person directly about their behavior (28.7%E). An estimated 18.4%E reported avoiding the person after observing the behavior, and 12.7%E reported they informed their chain of command (Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021, p. 6).

In addition to the above CAF Harassment and Discrimination Survey study, the research findings in the qualitative racism study revealed that some members in the Canadian military may be associated with right-wing extremist groups such as, ‘La Meute’, or a Neo-Nazi group called ‘The Base’ (Waruszynski et al., 2022). Based on the CAF’s stance on hateful conduct and extremism, further evidenced by the definition of hateful conduct added to DAOD 5019-0, these right-wing extremist groups are antithetical to the Canadian military’s Ethos.

Taken all together, these studies demonstrate that there is a need to examine racism and hateful conduct in greater depth, and to further assess recruitment and retention strategies to help weed out members who are motivated by racialized hatred. Although the results of the CAF Harassment and Discrimination Survey provide an initial indication of hateful conduct occurring in the CAF, there remains a need to examine this area more closely by using other methodologies (e.g., focus groups or individual interviews) to understand the issues impacting hateful attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, the qualitative study on racism and harassment looked at the issues attributed to racist attitudes and behaviors across the units/bases/wings; however, this study was not asking personnel about specific questions associated with right-wing extremism. By employing focus groups and individual interviews, participants in the qualitative study were able to discuss hate groups such as La Meute and The Base. As a result, the above studies and other related research can help senior defence leaders to understand the issues impacting racist and hateful attitudes and behaviors, and how to incorporate some of the recommendations from the studies to enable better and sustainable culture change.

## **5.4 PROMOTING A CULTURE CHANGE FOR GREATER DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION**

Racism, systemic racism, and hateful conduct continue to challenge Canadians, the CAF/DND, and militaries worldwide. Within Canada, news stories on racism continue to demonstrate that racial discrimination and harassment exist in Canadian institutions and Canadian society as a whole (e.g., Rukavina, 2015). For example, a 2019 public opinion poll on race relations in Canada, conducted by Environics Institute for Survey Research in conjunction with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, revealed that about 20% of the participants surveyed experienced racial discrimination. Of the approximately 20% of Canadians who experienced racial discrimination, about 40% stated that they had experienced racial discrimination primarily “on the street” (38%) or “in the workplace” (38%). Participants who identified as being Black or Indigenous were more likely to report that they had faced some form of racial discrimination. The results also revealed that “Indigenous people were less likely than others to see race relations as good or having improved over time” (Environics Institute for Survey Research, 2019, p. 3).

The federal government’s anti-racism strategy, *Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019 – 2022* (Canadian Heritage, 2019), highlights the need to take a whole-of-government approach



to eradicate and prevent racism, harassment and discrimination. Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy focuses on three guiding principles to combat racism by: "demonstrating federal leadership; empowering communities; and building awareness and changing attitudes" (Canadian Heritage, 2019, p. 3). The goal is to develop public policies, services and programs that are designed to promote more inclusive communities and environments. Organizations, such as the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (2022), also focus on monitoring, researching, and countering hate crimes found in Canadian society by establishing better education and information on hate groups. Moreover, Canada's *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* focuses on the "prevention of radicalization to violence and also recognizes the increasing concern about expressions of intolerance and hate in the public and online spheres" (Government of Canada, 2018, pp. 1-2).

Within the Canadian military, the two recent research studies discussed in this chapter examined racism (Waruszynski et al., 2022) and hateful conduct (Wright, LeBlanc and Peach, 2021; Wright, Peach, and LeBlanc, 2021). The main findings from these studies add to a growing body of evidence that addresses the challenges attributed to racial discrimination, harassment, and hateful conduct. The findings and recommendations from this body of work will further inform policies, programs, and procedures to help foster greater cultural change, with the goal to eradicate racist and hateful attitudes and behaviors in the Canadian Defence Team environment. For instance, addressing the challenges associated with racial discrimination and hateful conduct in the Canadian Defence Team has led to the establishment of the Anti-Racism Secretariat within the newly formed Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) organization. The aim of this Secretariat is to help address racism and to further refine and build policies and programs intended to tackle racist mindsets and behaviors and promote culture change across the Defence Team. The goal is to uphold sustainable organizational culture change through diversity, equity, and inclusion which will require a closer examination of the issues that may be perpetuating negative systemic racist attitudes and behaviors as well as hateful conduct in the workplace.

Moreover, the qualitative study on racism and harassment in the CAF/DND highlights the need for leaders and all personnel to embrace a vision of diversity, equity, and inclusivity for all individuals (Waruszynski et al., 2022). The success of diversity management policies and programs is contingent on people's ability to recognize the value of working in a diverse, equitable and inclusive organization. Indeed, building cultural awareness and intercultural competence through education and training is important to embed in any diversity management policy and program; however, inclusion can only be attained once people embrace and respect individuals who come from diverse backgrounds. Learning about different ethnic groups and cultures provides a more holistic environment by being flexible to different worldviews and by learning the importance of accepting these differences as part of a larger multicultural worldview. It is through the everyday social relations that enable people to be more cognizant of how they approach diverse communities. As such, there is a need to blend cultural awareness and intercultural competence with team performance and provide safe environments for personnel to learn about individual and societal stereotypes and prejudice, and how to be more cognizant of individual and collective unconscious biases.

Stereotypes, prejudice, harassment, discrimination and conflict are contingent on the societal influences and military socialization of defence personnel. Microaggressions, primarily found within people's unconscious biases which may perpetuate stereotypes and prejudices, need to be better understood to encourage positive attitudes and behaviors. According to Chester Pierce (1974), covert acts of racial discrimination can be found in microaggressions, which are depicted as "black-white racial interactions [that] are characterized by white put-downs, done in an automatic, preconscious or unconscious fashion" (p. 515; cited in Williams, 2020, p. 3). Whether through racialized jokes or nicknames, the intent is to establish greater awareness of the impacts of microaggressions and the implicit biases that each person may carry. Implicit biases start at a very early age, including the power dynamics and different levels of socio-economic statuses that may lead to racialized discrimination and hateful conduct. As such, unconscious and conscious biases are at the root of our attitudes and behaviors. Explicit and implicit biases attributed to racism, misogyny, harassment, discrimination, and ethnic intolerance need to be better understood to enable a more inclusive and psychologically safe working environment.

Berry and Kalin (1997) state that there is “long-standing and contemporary evidence of a link between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism: those who are intolerant of diversity (and reject employment equity principles and practices) tend to be those who espouse authoritarian views that are often present in ‘tight’ and ‘hierarchical’ organizations” (cited in Winslow, Browne and Febbraro, 2007, p. 40). The military is no exception. Indeed, respect and having a sense of shared humanity are at the core of the Canadian military. Leaders and personnel who embrace a respectful and trusted work environment that is non-discriminatory, diverse, and inclusive, will help to promote a culture change of inclusion. As highlighted in the new CAF Ethos:

*All military personnel must frequently return to our ethos for guidance and regularly discuss it with other members of the Profession of Arms. This is especially true when faced with challenging situations and decisions. All CAF personnel regardless of rank must play an active role in reshaping military culture by embodying the CAF Ethos and helping others to do the same. Finally, we remind all leaders of their responsibility to consistently reinforce these values and principles through action, especially when it may seem challenging to do so. Our actions or inactions influence others whether we realize it or not. The example we make is the standard that we set. Remember, if we commit to and live our ethos, we will have earned the trust and respect of our team, the Government, and our fellow Canadians. (Department of National Defence, 2022a)*

## **5.5 CONCLUSION**

The Canadian Defence Team continues to focus on creating a sustainable culture change that promotes greater diversity, equity, and inclusion. The above research studies indicate that listening to the voices of Defence Team members is critical to fostering greater culture change. Indeed, the brief historical overview of colonial oppression in Canada has emphasized the need to better understand ethnocentric attitudes and behaviors that inevitably lead to racial discrimination, harassment, and abuse of visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Although governmental policies and programs designed to eradicate racial discrimination and harassment have been progressive in changing mindsets and behaviors, visible minorities and Indigenous Peoples continue to experience racist attitudes and more covert behaviors (e.g., microaggressions) in the workplace and in Canadian society as a whole. Such racist mindsets and behaviors have been evidenced in organizations such as the Canadian military.

The qualitative research study on racism and harassment across the Defence Team highlights that racism (whether overt or covert) continues to exist in the Canadian military. However, participants in the qualitative study have put forward their recommendations on what can be done to eradicate racist attitudes and behaviors in the CAF/DND and to help create a culture of belonging. Although the recent CAF Harassment and Discrimination Survey revealed preliminary evidence of hateful conduct in the Canadian military, it behooves leadership to further examine hateful conduct in the CAF as recent reports continue to uncover military members who have taken part in RWE groups (see Davey et al., 2020).

The new CAF Ethos calls for the highest ethical standards and professionalism to enable mutual trust, respect, and inclusion. Part of enabling mutual trust, respect, and inclusion requires a better understanding of how microaggressions and implicit biases play a key role in creating stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, harassment and conflict in the workplace and in society. As a result, senior leaders have an opportunity to examine the current diversity management policies, programs, and cultural practices within the CAF/DND, and the required changes to help create a sustainable culture change that will enable the Canadian military to be “Strong at home, Secure in North America, and Engaged in the world.”

## **5.6 REFERENCES**

- [1] Berry, J.W., and Kalin, R. (1997). A conceptual framework for achieving diversity and equity in the Canadian Forces, Report to the CFPRT, Kingston, Ontario: Department of Psychology, Queen's University, Multicultural Associates Inc., 1997.
- [2] Canadian Anti-Hate Network. (2022). <https://www.antihate.ca/>
- [3] Canadian Encyclopedia, The. (2022a). Indigenous Peoples in Canada. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-people#:~:text=In%20the%202016%20census%20by,cen%20of%20the%20national%20population>
- [4] Canadian Encyclopedia, The. (2022b). Ethnocentrism. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ethnocentrism>
- [5] Canadian Heritage. (2019). Building a foundation for change: Canada's anti-racism strategy. Retrieved August 27, 2019, from <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/pch/documents/campaigns/anti-racism-engagement/ARS-Report-EN-2019-2022.pdf>
- [6] Canadian Human Rights Act. (1985). Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6). Retrieved from the Justice Laws website: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-6/>
- [7] Canadian Race Relations Foundation. (2015a). Glossary of terms. Retrieved from: <https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/en/site-content/10-crrf-glossary?start=100>
- [8] Canadian Race Relations Foundation. (2015b). Legalized racism. <https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/images/stories/pdf/ePubFaShLegRac.pdf>
- [9] Catalyst. (2021). People of colour in Canada (Quick Take). Dec 15, 2021, <https://www.catalyst.org/research/people-of-colour-in-canada/>
- [10] Constitution Act. (1982). Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Retrieved August 30, 2019, from the Justice Laws website. Retrieved from <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html>
- [11] Davey, J., Hart, M., and Guerin, C. (2020). An online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. Interim Report. ISD. Retrieved from <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Online-Environmental-Scan-of-Right-wing-Extremism-in-Canada-ISD.pdf>
- [12] Department of National Defence. (2015). Canadian Armed Forces employment equity plan 2015 – 2020. Director Human Rights and Diversity: Ottawa.
- [13] Department of National Defence. (2016). Canadian Armed Forces diversity strategy 2016. Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2016.
- [14] Department of National Defence. (2017). Defence administrative orders and directives, harassment prevention and resolution (DAOD 5012-0). Retrieved from: <http://intranet.mil.ca/en/defence-admin-orders-directives/5000/5012-0.page>
- [15] Department of National Defence (2020). DAOD 5019-0, Conduct and performance deficiencies. Retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html>

- [16] Department of National Defence. (2022a). Canadian Armed Forces ethos: Trusted to serve. Retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html>
- [17] Department of National Defence. (2022b). CAF employment equity statistics, May 2022. [http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/assets/CMP\\_Intranet/docs/en/support/ee-stats-slide.pdf](http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/assets/CMP_Intranet/docs/en/support/ee-stats-slide.pdf) (Intranet)
- [18] Employment Equity Act. (1995). Employment Equity Act (S.C. 1995, c.44). Retrieved from the Justice Laws website: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-5.401/>
- [19] Environics Institute for Survey Research. (2019). Race relations in Canada 2019. A Survey of Canadian public opinion and experience. Final Report. Canadian Race Relations Foundation.
- [20] Government of Canada. (2018). National strategy on countering radicalization to violence. Cat No.: PS4-248/2018E. Retrieved from: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc-en.pdf>
- [21] House of Commons Standing Committee. (2019). Taking action to end online hate. Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Retrieved from: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Reports/RP10581008/justrp29/justrp29-e.pdf>
- [22] Li, P. (1988). *The Chinese in Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Cited in: Canadian Race Relations Foundation. (2015b). Legalized racism. <https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/images/stories/pdf/ePubFaShLegRac.pdf>
- [23] Li, P. (2000). Cultural diversity in Canada: The social construction of racial differences. Department of Justice, Research and Statistics Division, Strategic Issues Series, rp02-8e.
- [24] Miki, R., and Kobayashi, C. (1991). *Justice in our time: The Japanese Canadian Redress Agreement*. Vancouver and Winnipeg: Talon Books and National Association of Japanese Canadians. Cited in: Canadian Race Relations Foundation. (2015b). Legalized racism. <https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/images/stories/pdf/ePubFaShLegRac.pdf>
- [25] Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC). (2019). Racial discrimination, race and racism (fact sheet). Ontario Human Rights Commission. Retrieved August 15, 2019, from: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racial-discrimination-race-and-racism-fact-sheet>
- [26] Pierce, C. (1974). Psychiatric problems of the Black minority. In S. Arieti (Ed.), *American handbook of psychiatry* (pp. 512-523). New York, NY: Basic Books.
- [27] Rukavina, A. (2015). Quebec judge wouldn't hear case of woman wearing hijab. CBC. Retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-judge-wouldn-t-hear-case-of-woman-wearing-hijab-1.2974282>
- [28] Shore, R. (2020). Anti-Chinese racism is Canada's 'shadow pandemic,' say researchers. Vancouver Sun, 22 June 2022. <https://vancouversun.com/news/anti-chinese-racism-is-canadas-shadow-pandemic-say-researchers>
- [29] Sinclair, N.J., and Dainard, S. (2022). Sixties scoop. *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, <https://www.the-canadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/sixties-scoop>

- [30] Statistics Canada. (2017). Census in brief: Ethnic and cultural origins of Canadians: Portrait of a rich heritage. <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016016/98-200-x2016016-eng.cfm>
- [31] Statistics Canada. (2019). In Catalyst (2021). People of colour in Canada (Quick Take). Dec 15, 2021, <https://www.catalyst.org/research/people-of-colour-in-canada/>
- [32] Stefanovich, O. (2022). Pope Francis apologizes to Indigenous delegates for ‘deplorable’ abuses at residential schools. CBC. Posted: 01 Apr 2022: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pope-francis-responds-indigenous-delegations-final-meeting-1.6404344>
- [33] Sue, D.W., Capodilupo, C.M., Torino, G.C., Bucceri, J.M., Holder, A.M, Nadal, K.L., and Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. *American Psychologist*, 4, 271-286.
- [34] VERBI Software. (2017). MAXQDA 2018 [computer software]. Berlin, Germany: VERBI Software. Available from <https://www.maxqda.com>
- [35] Waruszynski, B. (2019). Addressing intersectionality – Achieving equality, International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (IDERD) 2019 Keynote Speech, Keynote speech written for IDERD event, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 23 March, 2019.
- [36] Waruszynski, B., MacEachern, K., Browne, P., and Woycheshin, D. (2022). Perceptions of racism and harassment in the Defence Team: A qualitative inquiry among visible minority and Indigenous personnel. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Report, DRDC-RDDC-2022-R081, March 2022. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [37] Waruszynski, B., MacEachern, K., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2019). Perceptions of racism and harassment among visible minority and Indigenous members in the Defence Team. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDDC-2019-L257. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [38] Williams, M.T. (2020). Microaggressions: Clarification, evidence, and impact. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 2020, Vol. 15(1), 3-26.
- [39] Winslow, D., Browne, P., and Febraro, A. (2007). Diversity in the Canadian Forces. In J.L. Soeters and J. Van der Meulen (Eds.), *Cultural diversity in the armed forces: An international comparison* (pp. 31-47). Routledge.
- [40] Wright, J., LeBlanc, M., and Peach, J. (2021). Canadian Armed Forces harassment and discrimination survey: Hateful conduct findings, Regular Force (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Letter DRDC-RDDC-2021-L131). Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [41] Wright, J., Peach, J., and LeBlanc, M. (2021). Canadian Armed Forces harassment and discrimination survey: Hateful conduct findings, Primary Reserve (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis Scientific Letter DRDC-RDDC-2021-L269). Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.



## **Chapter 6 – RACE AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES: A CONTINUED EVOLUTION TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE AND LETHAL FORCE**

**Jessica Lowen and Daniel P. McDonald**  
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute  
UNITED STATES

### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

#### **6.1.1 The Meaning and Purpose of Inclusion in the United States Armed Forces**

In late March 2022, the faculty and staff of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) gathered at a beachside pavilion in Florida to celebrate the promotion of Lt. Col. Rodney Jackson to the senior ranks of the United States (U.S.) Army. Jackson’s impeccable poise in winter wool full-dress uniform despite the unseasonable heat attested to his mission readiness, as did the litany of his accomplishments listed by the ceremony officiant, a decorated Colonel who had mentored Jackson during Jackson’s tenure as an instructor at West Point, the U.S. Army’s premier training academy. For Jackson, the ceremony marked a crucible moment in his career. For observers, it provides insights about how the U.S. Armed Forces understand Diversity and Inclusion (D&I).

Throughout its history, the U.S. military has relied on the demographic diversity of its population in the defence of our Nation. As an African American officer, Jackson’s 2022 promotion helped diversify the senior ranks. However, as society’s understanding of equality has evolved, integrating the Force has required new policies and new perspectives. Whereas early efforts sought to expand the pool of available warfighters by increasing participation among historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) now leverages D&I policies to cultivate strategic leadership qualities: self-awareness, humility, cultural savvy, and human relations skills. The shift in the meaning and purpose of D&I was clear at Jackson’s promotion ceremony. Speakers proffered praise for Jackson’s military leadership and operational prowess in the context of his various personal roles: husband, father, friend. With authentic wit and affection that belied the event’s formality, they described Jackson as an immensely talented, extraordinarily accomplished, and yet humanly flawed, individual whose rise through the ranks was enabled by his personal growth and family’s support as much as by his battlefield achievements.

The U.S. Army defines diversity as, “[a]ll the different attributes, experiences, and backgrounds of our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members that further enhance our global capabilities and contribute to an adaptive, culturally astute Army” (U.S. Army, 2020). This definition of diversity, which reflects language used throughout the DoD, links individual members’ unique contributions to collective military strengths. The DoD defines inclusion as a “set of behaviors (culture) that encourages service members and civilian employees to feel valued for unique qualities and to experience a sense of belonging” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020a p. 24). Defined in this way, D&I requires recognizing the unique qualities of each member, as well as the personal circumstances and constraints under which they perform. Such recognition emerges organically at key moments, such as promotion ceremonies. However, it also presents challenges within a rank-stratified, performance-based culture that prioritizes conformity and compliance as essential to achieve operational success. This chapter explores this challenge by analyzing pivotal events in our history.



## **6.1.2 Chapter Organization**

This chapter begins by reviewing DoD efforts to integrate the U.S. Armed Forces and promote equitable ethnic and racial representation during the 20th century. Taking its point of departure as the 1943 Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) on defence racial integration, this historical analysis demonstrates that the U.S. military's interest in diversity is longstanding and strategic. Since World War II (WWII), the U.S. Armed Forces have leveraged diversity and equity policies to respond to social justice concerns and to achieve readiness goals.

The discussion in this chapter then narrows focus to explore current DoD D&I programs. Since the 1970s, the U.S. military has coupled procedures for reporting potential incidents of unlawful discrimination with programs to hold Commanders accountable for upholding organizational climate standards. Operationalizing this paradigm at scale has entailed concomitant commitments to Professional Military Education (PME) that emphasizes cross-culturally competent leadership, socio-psychological factors such as unconscious bias, and linking these factors to readiness and mission success. This chapter shows how such commitments extend historical readiness efforts by aligning DoD policies with human relations science. A principal vector for implementing these commitments is the Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) program and DEOMI, which is the central authority that trains and supports MEO personnel. Recently, the DoD tasked DEOMI to redesign itself as the DoD's Center of Excellence for human relations and D&I. Since the 1970s, DEOMI has conducted the work that is necessary for operationalizing inclusion in the military setting: proactive training, research, and accountability procedures to evaluate and increase organizational climate health and promulgate a sense of belonging among individual Service members despite race, culture, or religion. By examining specific training, research, and scientific innovations that DEOMI has developed to hold Commanders accountable for combating discrimination and promoting inclusion, this chapter explores how DEOMI has stood as a bulwark against racial exclusion and ethnic segregation in the U.S. Armed Forces for over 50 years.

Having established the basic tenants of the DoD's current D&I paradigm, its historical origins, and the current methods by which the DoD assesses and improves organizational climate, this chapter then analyzes sweeping changes undertaken by the DoD since June 2020 to standardize its D&I paradigm across the Force. To do so, it presents a timeline of these actions. It also discusses major challenges associated with their implementation. Furthermore, it proposes recommendations based on lessons learned.

Promoting individual inclusion within a rank-stratified, uniform culture presents inherent as well as historical challenges. In recent years, increased public awareness about racially motivated violence in the U.S., as well as concerns about potential Prohibited Extremist Activity (PEA) by members who advocate for widespread unlawful discrimination, have spurred major policy revisions throughout the DoD. Within this context, two interrelated questions emerge. First, how can a military preserve a sense of individualism among its members while also fostering their sense of belonging to their units and the Force? Likewise, how can military D&I practitioners in a democratic nation best equip leaders and members to respect one another's cultural and ideological diversity, even in instances when the expression of that diversity might contradict military values, engender conflict, or inspire strife? These questions are not new. Since its earliest efforts to integrate the Force, desegregate units, and mandate equitable treatment for members regardless of race or ethnicity, the U.S. military has weathered complaints from critics who fail to grasp the tactical value and operational need for such actions. This chapter explores the U.S. military's legacy as a D&I pioneer by examining how recent policies extend the military's historic use of D&I to maximize operational readiness and mission success.

## **6.2 FORCE INTEGRATION TO INCREASE MILITARY READINESS**

While racial desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces did not occur until well after 1948, the U.S. military has long benefited from the service of members who society historically marginalized based on their race or ethnicity. For example, African American soldiers and sailors enabled key U.S. military victories going back to

the American War of Independence, even as the military relegated such members to race-segregated units and their participation frequently went unrecognized (Army Information and Education Division, 1947; Greene, 1951; Segal and Segal, 2004). Such negative experiences reinforced societal discrimination, impaired morale, and prevented demographically representative leadership. In response to discrimination complaints, and to accommodate fluctuating manpower needs, the U.S. military enacted numerous policies to increase racial and ethnic diversification across the Force. From the 1940s into the 1990s, the DoD sought to integrate the Force along racial and ethnic lines, establish discrimination reporting procedures, and develop race relations training programs such as those administered by DEOMI (Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion, 2020). Such efforts placed the U.S. military on the vanguard of racial equity and anti-discrimination efforts (Day, 1983; Hampton, 2012; Hope, 1979). However, to understand the motivation and intended impacts of military efforts in this domain, it is essential to understand them in terms of military readiness. Historically and today, American military leadership at the highest levels articulates combating internal discrimination and expanding the pool of available warfighters as interrelated Force-building goals.

### **6.2.1 From Desegregation to Equal Opportunity (1943 – 1970)**

Throughout WWII, the U.S. military took steps to prohibit ethnic discrimination in the Armed Forces. In June 1941, then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued E.O. 8802 to prohibit race-based hiring in the Federal Government and defence-related administration. The action responded to a collective self-advocacy campaign, which prefaced African American involvement in the war effort with defence for democratic equal rights principles (Gates, 2013). The resulting establishment of the Fair Employment Practice Committee, which was the first Federal action to prohibit employer discrimination in the U.S., linked demographic diversity to military readiness by identifying historically underrepresented communities as sources of defence labor (Collins, 2001). As a result, over one million Black men and women served in WWII (Gates, 2013; McIntyre, 2019).

Inclusion of African American service members during WWII increased positive perceptions of Black service members within the ranks (e.g., Army Information and Education Division, 1945; McKibben, 2011). However, persistent bias against members of German, Italian, Japanese, and African American heritage, as well as dogged adherence to the Jim Crow Era segregation customs in some Commands, impeded the universal implementation of top-down desegregation orders (King, 1993; Kryder, 1994; Rice, 2018). Indeed, most Black members were assigned to unskilled jobs, for example, road building, stevedoring or dock work, laundry, and fumigation. These restrictions to non-combat roles precluded African American service members' opportunities for leadership and promotions. In the context of increasing racial tensions nationally, this further impaired African American member morale and contributed to internal tensions that disrupted discipline and order in ways that compromised readiness (King, 1993; Kryder, 1994, 1996; Taylor, 1989).

Force integration occurred after WWII. In 1948, then-President Truman signed E.O. 9981 requiring equality of treatment for all members of the military without regard for race, color, or national origin, thus ushering in the era of integration the following year (Taylor, 2013). In 1949, Truman established the Fahy Committee to identify how the military could accomplish its diversity goals (Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011). From 1948 to 1954, desegregation occurred at military installations, hospitals, training schools, and within units, increasing with "breathhtaking speed" after President Eisenhower assumed office in 1953 (Nichols, 2007, p. 43). Notably, desegregation of all schools attended by military dependents occurred prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's historic ruling *Brown v. Board of Education*. This timeline "provides profound evidence regarding Eisenhower's personal stance on that issue" (Nichols, 2007, p. 45). It also affirms the U.S. military's longstanding status as a pioneer for racial progressivism in American society.

Early integration efforts met internal resistance and widespread political criticism. Internal and external critics (in the U.S. and abroad) challenged the interpretation of E.O. 9981 and subsequent actions, how the DoD implemented them, and their merits well into the 1950s and beyond the Korean War (Edgerton, 2001; Ingimundarson, 2004; McIntyre, 2019; Nichols 2007). So, while historical evidence shows that as early as

WWII, U.S. military leadership recognized the Force-building capacity of desegregation, and, further, that hindering the discrimination and prejudice that desegregation amplified was key to achieving this goal, systemic implementation of evidence-based efforts to tackle this problem did not occur until after 1960.

The MEO program emerged in the early 1960s at the behest of top Federal authorities. In 1961, then-President John F. Kennedy appointed Gehard Gesell to chair the Committee on *Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services*. The Gesell Committee's final recommendations (released in 1964) resulted in only minimal changes.<sup>1</sup> However, their work contributed to the MEO program as we know it today. On June 7, 1963, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert McNamara issued DoD Directive (DoDD) 5120.27, *Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces*, concerning Equal Opportunity (EO; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, 1963). It stated that the policy of the DoD was to conduct all activities free of racial discrimination and to provide EO for all personnel. McNamara's 1963 directive derided racial discrimination as a threat to morale and mission accomplishment, and charged military Commanders with the responsibility to oppose discrimination (Landis, 1990, p. 10). A follow-on directive expanded Commander's authority to act. In July 1963, McNamara issued DoD Directive 5120.36, which empowered Commanders to prohibit members from patronizing off-post and off-base establishments that discriminated against patrons based on race, creed, or national origin (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, 1963b). McNamara's understanding of discrimination as systematic (involving various societal domains) and as a hindrance to individual performance reflected his systems-based approach to human resource management, which he developed and refined during his time in the private sector.<sup>2</sup> Under McNamara, the DoD also took steps to centralize anti-discrimination authorities, including by forming the Office of Deputy Assistant of Defense for Civil Rights, which led to the issuance of regulations within each of the services for implementing DoDDs 5120.27 and 5120.36. In this way, early MEO efforts reflected the DoD's understanding that responding to potential racial discrimination complaints from individual members was essential to promoting equality of opportunity for all. Moreover, such programs established anti-discrimination efforts squarely within broader efforts to develop a professional evidence-based approach to military human resource management.

### **6.2.2 Improving Race Relations to Reduce Critical Threats to Readiness (1969 – 1973)**

The period from the late 1960s through the early 1970s ushered in a new era of public awareness about ethnic and racial discrimination, especially discrimination directed toward African Americans. This period is widely known for increasing racial tension, including numerous public protests and race riots, and a wave of civil rights self-advocacy that introduced minority racial power rhetoric to the mainstream public debate. The U.S. military was not immune (Burgin, 2015; Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2021; Hampton, 2012; Hope, 1979; Murray, 1971; Rohall et al., 2017).

In 1969, the DoD took steps to address racial conflict within the ranks, which continue to set the tone for military D&I policies today. On August 18, 1969, SecDef Melvin Laird signed the first DoD Human Goals Charter. Subsequently renewed and revised by each incoming Secretary of Defense (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Directorate for Civilian Policy, 1990), the 1969 Charter emphasized the "dignity and worth" of "the individual" and mandated respect for "individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities" (Laird, 1969). Additional efforts included issuing new policies to prohibit certain kinds of protest activities that were contrary to good order and discipline. DoDD 1325.06, *Handling Dissident and Protest Activities among Members of the Armed Forces*, established guidelines for handling dissident and protest activities among members (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

---

<sup>1</sup> According to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), while "few even remember that the Gesell Committee existed ... it recommended policies that might have enabled the military to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam War" (MLDC, 2011, p. xix).

<sup>2</sup> From 1946 to 1963, Robert McNamara helped lead efforts to transform Ford Motor Company, returning the company to profitability and preserving its legacy as one of the first major American corporations to implement equal pay policies for African Americans (e.g., Lanning, 2021; Rosenzweig, 2010; The Henry Ford, 2013).

Readiness, 1969). A 1970 Race Relations Task Force, headed by Air Force Col. Lucius Theus and charged with defining the means of providing “race relations education,” led to, among other actions, the issuance of DoDD 1322.11, *Department of Defense Education in Race Relations for Armed Forces Personnel* (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve, 1971; Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2022), which outlined the most comprehensive race relations education program ever attempted by any major institution in the U.S. Of critical importance, this directive established the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI; now DEOMI) and initiated education requirements for military leaders designed to combat racial inequality and conflict (Burgin, 2015; Hampton, 2012).

On June 24, 1971, the DoD established the DRRI with a proactive mission to conduct training, develop mandatory educational doctrine, and conduct research and evaluation to improve “race relations” throughout all sectors of the Armed Forces at the advent of the implementation of DoDD 1322.11 (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve, 1971; Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2022). Early DRRI training attempted to do this by increasing opportunities for contact over a multi-week intensive officer training at DRRI’s Florida headquarters. Through integrated classes, guest speakers, and community field trips to the Miami metro area, students interacted with individuals from racial minority, immigrant, and low socioeconomic status communities. As evidenced by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity) Donald L. Miller’s 1972 address to the initial DRRI graduating class, the DoD understood the DRRI as being pivotal to the nascent inclusion goals outlined in the 1969 Human Goals Charter. At the inaugural graduation ceremony, Miller charged the DRRI graduates with the responsibility to uphold the charter: “If this document is allowed to become just another piece of paper, then ... you and I have failed our fellow Servicemen, our Services, our country but most important, we have failed ourselves as human beings” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Directorate for Civilian Personnel Policy, 1990, p. 31).

Despite the DoD’s lofty goals for the DRRI, historians have identified potential contradictions surrounding the institute’s founding. The DRRI taught a progressive curriculum with a nuanced understanding of racial rhetoric that was far more sophisticated than that of the general population (Hampton, 2012). However, records show that DoD leaders also regarded DRRI as a tool to stem what they perceived to be the rising threat of “black militancy” in the ranks (Burgin, 2015). Thus, the commissioning of the DRRI reflected the DoD’s continued awareness that race-related conflict within the ranks posed a critical threat to operational readiness. As such, it was part of an immediate crisis response. On May 22, 1971, just over one month prior to issuance of DoDD 1322.11 and the establishment of the DRRI, airmen at Travis Air Force Base in Solano County, California, protested the arrest of an African American Sergeant. Over multiple days, demonstrations escalated to riot conditions resulting in property destruction, the arrests of 135 military personnel, and one death (Osur, 1981).

### **6.2.3 Disproportionate Diversification of the Force and Potential Impacts on Early D&I Efforts (1970s – 1990s)**

The end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the initial establishment and implementation of a nascent inclusion paradigm in two key domains: defence manpower research and military training and professionalization programs. Many historians credit the transition to an all-volunteer Force in 1973 as central to the demographic diversification of the U.S. Armed Forces (e.g., Burk and Espinoza, 2012; King 1993; Sider and Cole, 1984). However, demographic data from this period requires clarification of this claim. The DoD did not systematically collect race data prior to 1973. What information does exist suggests the potential continuation of an existing trend. For example, Army data from the years immediately prior to the end of conscription indicates that African Americans were already overrepresented relative to their percentage of the U.S. civilian population. In 1971, African Americans comprised 12.8% of the Army vs. 10.87% of the U.S. population on the 1970 census (Bradtmiller et al.,



1985). Moreover, while the post-1973 period realized increases in the participation of non-White members, this diversification primarily resulted from African American enlistments,<sup>3</sup> happened principally within the subordinate ranks,<sup>4</sup> and occurred disproportionately across minority demographic groups.<sup>5</sup> So, while eliminating the military draft dismantled a set of policies and programs that had long reinforced major social inequities,<sup>6</sup> examination of disproportionate diversity gains from 1973 to 1990 raises questions about the intended outcomes and efficacy of contemporaneous interventions. For example, research studies conducted on EO in the military indicate that proactive efforts occurred centrally at the DoD and at the service level during this time. However, the implementation of research-based recommendations was limited. For example, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), of the 72 studies GAO identified as having occurred on EO training in the military from 1974 to 1990, only 38 produced recommendations; of those, only 26 (or 36%) resulted in action taken in response to these research-based recommendations (GAO, 1995).

From the perspective of contemporary military D&I practitioners, questions arise about how disproportionate diversity gains during this period might have shaped the direction and reception of MEO programs. Specifically, it is of interest to consider the extent to which the visible overrepresentation of African Americans within the subordinate enlisted ranks might have diminished interest in implementing policies to increase African Americans within the officer ranks or to benefit non-African American minority membership. In exploring this question, it is essential to recognize another key impact of the end of the draft: the expansion of continuing military education programs. The transition to an all-volunteer force in 1973 spurred the development of numerous professional schools and leadership development institutions to support the training necessary to support a professionalized all-volunteer Force. The military used this pedagogical infrastructure to revise interracial tolerance policies to promulgate workplace inclusion for the purpose of maximizing individual service member performance (e.g., Department of Defense, 2012; Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011). For example, rebranding the DRRI as DEOMI in 1979 reflected the DoD's transition from an interest in managing interracial conflict to one that prioritized training MEOs to operate as human relations professionals in the broad sense of the term.

---

<sup>3</sup> According to Table D-17 of Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness; USD(P&R))'s FY 2002 annual report, from 1973 to 1990, the percentage of African American active-duty enlisted members across the DoD (excluding the Coast Guard) consistently exceeded the percentage of African Americans aged 18 – 44 in the U.S. civilian population (USD(P&R), 2004). From 1977 (the first year the census reported comparison groups) to 1990, the percentage of African Americans aged 18 – 44 in the U.S. civilian population rose modestly from 10.6% (1977) to 13.9% (1990). Yet, African Americans comprised 14.04% of the total enlisted Force in 1973, 17.79% in 1977, and 23.19% in 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Despite the overrepresentation of African Americans in the subordinate ranks, the percentage of African Americans in the officer ranks was relatively comparable to their civilian counterpart group (African American college graduates). As shown in Table D-27 of USD(P&R)'s FY 2002 report, African Americans comprised 2.4% of the total active-duty officer component in 1973, 3.87% in 1977, and 6.93% in 1990. However, the number of African American college graduates as a percentage of civilian college graduates rose from 5.5% in 1977 to 6.0% in 1990 (USD(P&R), 2004).

<sup>5</sup> In contrast with African Americans, the situation was quite different for Hispanics, who remained consistently *underrepresented* relative to their civilian counterparts from 1973 – 1990. As shown in Table D-18 of USD(P&R)'s FY 2002 report, from 1978 to 1990, the percentage of Hispanics aged 18 – 44 in the U.S. civilian population rose modestly from 5.2% in 1977 to 8.6% in 1990 (USD(P&R), 2004). Yet, Hispanics comprised only 1.17% of the total enlisted Force in 1973, 3.52% in 1977, and 5.03% in 1990 (USD(P&R), 2004). In contrast to African Americans, although Hispanic representation in military leadership increased during this period, the percentage of Hispanic officers remained lower than their civilian counterparts (college graduates). As shown in Table D-28, Hispanics comprised 0.15% of the total active-duty officer component in 1973, 1.07% in 1977, and 2.06% in 1990, while the number of Hispanic college graduates as a percentage of civilian college graduates rose modestly from 1.9% in 1977 to 3% in 1990 (USD(P&R), 2004).

<sup>6</sup> For example, the U.S. military inducted African American draftees, who were unable to secure financial and educational deferments at rates comparable to their White counterparts, at disproportionately higher rates than White draftees during WWII, Korea, and Vietnam (Murray, 1971). Conversely, historical racial quotas limiting Black enlistments, in conjunction with persistent racial bias among selection boards and discriminatory induction standards, increased barriers for African Americans who voluntarily sought to serve (Burgin, 2015; Murray 1971).

### 6.2.4 Leveraging Command Climate Assessment (CCA) to Hinder Discrimination (1990s – 2018)

The DoD has centrally collected and analyzed data through annual Force-wide demographic surveys and detailed investigations of climate at the Command unit level. Since its inception in the 1970s, DEOMI has trained and equipped MEO personnel to assist members in reporting EO complaints involving discrimination and harassment. And, since 1990, DEOMI has linked the process for reporting individual complaints with the process of conducting CCA research using the Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS), which was formerly called the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS).

Administered by DEOMI-trained MEO personnel, the DEOCS is a survey tool for CCA that anonymizes individual member perceptions of bias and prejudice to provide information about the frequency with which such behaviors occur. The DEOCS instrument includes questions related to perceived discrimination and harassment, plus various factors related to the Command environment from members’ perspectives. Although many leaders adopted the DEOCS soon after its introduction, the DoD did not mandate the DEOCS across the Armed Forces until 2012 (see Figure 6-1).



Figure 6-1: DEOCS Timeline.



From 1990 to 2018, DEOMI continuously updated, revised, and administered the DEOCS to maintain alignment with DoD policy and respond to external stakeholder needs. For example, in 2012, DEOMI's Research and Development department collaborated with the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program to develop and add new questions related to sexual harassment. The DEOCS also provided military leadership and MEO personnel with insights into key trends that signaled the potential need for intervention at the local level. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2014 and the May 6, 2013, memorandum from the SecDef (Wright, 2013) required the DoD to implement measures to facilitate, conduct, and report CCAs on sexual assault responses. To fulfil this requirement, all DoD service branches, military Academies, the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard Academy implemented the DEOCS to enable and equip MEO staff to address sexual harassment as a human relations concern.

Ultimately, the DEOCS became the DoD's primary tool for tracking perceived discrimination and harassment at the unit level. As the service branches continued to increase utilization of the DEOCS, it began to provide a clearer picture of global sentiment. From fiscal years 2005 to 2017, DEOMI administered between 154,000 (Fiscal Year [FY] 2005) to over three million (FY 2018) surveys annually, achieving an average survey response rate of 41% during this time. This continuous research and development process resulted in longitudinal data about climate health and discrimination in the military. As a result, policy offices and military leadership began to rely upon the instrument, not only for their local units but also as a global indicator. It also resulted in evidence-based theoretical frameworks for clarifying the foundational principles of D&I in the military context as we implement them today.

### **6.3 THE INCLUSION PARADIGM**

Since the mid-20th century, the U.S. military has leveraged diversity and equity policies to further its readiness goals. Increasing demographic diversity (through Force desegregation and unit integration) expanded the pool of available warfighters. Diversity education programs sought to hinder inter-group conflicts that disrupted good order and discipline within the ranks. MEO reporting procedures helped identify and mitigate incidents of discrimination that had the potential to damage trust and morale. However, since the 1990s, the DoD has transitioned from a reactive approach (centered on discrimination complaint reporting) to a proactive one. Using methods grounded in management and organizational science, this proactive approach focuses on hindering the psycho-social environmental factors that foster discrimination by promulgating signature leadership behaviors through MEO training. So, while official DoD policy has only articulated military readiness goals through the language of inclusion since 2011, following recommendations of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC; e.g., Department of Defense, 2012; Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion [DoD Board on D&I], 2020; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020b; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020a; MLDC, 2011), MEO practitioners have implemented an inclusion paradigm since the 1990s.

#### **6.3.1 Inclusion as a Response to Persistent Discrimination Despite Diversity Gains**

Congress established the MLDC in 2009 to evaluate and recommend changes to increase diversity among military leadership. Multiple policy changes ensued. The 2011 MLDC report outlined three goals that articulated a vision for the future of D&I in the military. These were, first, to establish the foundation for effective diversity leadership with a definition of diversity that aligns with the DoD's core values and vision of its future. Second, develop future leaders who represent the face of America and who can effectively lead a diverse workforce to maximize mission effectiveness. Third, implement policies and practices that will make leaders accountable for instilling diversity leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces.

The MLDC recommendations shifted how the military addressed diversity in policies. Rather than focusing on demographic representation, the MLDC recommended the DoD focus on inclusive practices, promote leadership skills, and establish accountability enforcement procedures. The language MLDC proposed went beyond race-, gender-, or religion-based categories. The paradigm the MLDC proposed, which the DoD later

adopted, defined diversity as all characteristics that individuals possess that are consistent with DoD “core values,” “reflective” of the U.S. demographic composition, and integral to “readiness and mission accomplishment” (DoD Board on D&I, 2020, p. 3; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020a, p. 23). Furthermore, it defined inclusion as a “set of behaviors” or a “culture” that encourages individuals to feel “valued” and “to experience a sense of belonging” (DoD Board on D&I, 2020, p. 3; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020a, p. 24). The inclusion language recommended by the MLDC, used across the Force today, links the skills, experiences, and contributions of individual members to collective military strengths (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020a). In doing so, it suggested new ways to address persistent equity problems that a focus on diversity of representation alone failed to resolve, for example, the persistence of perceived and actual incidents of racial bias, prejudice, and discrimination despite the demographic overrepresentation of non-White racial groups within the enlisted community, including asymmetrical representation across such groups.

By 2009, the year that Congress commissioned the MLDC, White enlisted and commissioned officer members were no longer overrepresented as a percentage of the total Force.<sup>7</sup> However, a demographic snapshot from this period shows that this increased racial and ethnic diversification did not include representative leadership gains, nor was it symmetrical across all demographic groups. For example, in FY 2009, Hispanics and Asian Americans remained underrepresented within the enlisted ranks and among commissioned officers.<sup>8</sup> However, while African American and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) males were overrepresented in the enlisted ranks, they remained underrepresented among commissioned officers.<sup>9</sup>

Such numbers provide a picture of the asymmetry of face value diversity among and across ranks that existed at the time of the MLDC’s establishment. By reframing prejudice and discrimination as issues of exclusion, the MLDC sought to leverage an inclusivity framework to highlight the persistent underrepresentation of key demographic groups despite perceived diversity gains, and to increase accountability for identifying and addressing the myriad factors that fostered persistent inequity. Ensuring equitable demographic representation continues to be an important goal of military recruitment, retention, and promotion efforts (DoD Board on D&I, 2020). However, from an operational perspective, one significant result was to bring military Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) into alignment with human resource goals more broadly. This is evident in changes to the CCA research.

### **6.3.2 Operationalizing Inclusivity to Increase Accountability**

Operationalizing inclusivity policies entails the need to strategically define, assess, and address granular human relations factors that impact individual member performance, operational effectiveness within units, and leader capacity to lead diverse teams. Tracking the historical shift toward inclusion, and how this shift is operationalized in research and training programs, also provides a context for understanding the challenges posed by recent SecDef actions to address discrimination.

---

<sup>7</sup> According to Table B-17 of Duquette et al. (2014), in FY 2009, White males comprised 81.04% of the civilian population aged 18 – 44, but only 71.35% of the active enlisted component (Coast Guard excluded). As shown in Table B-25, Whites comprised 80.07% of civilian college graduates, but only 78.6% of active commissioned officers (Duquette et al., 2014).

<sup>8</sup> In FY 2009, the percentage of enlisted males by race within the active component (Coast Guard excluded) as compared to the percentage of civilian males by race aged 18 – 44 was 3.54% (Asian enlisted) vs. 5.02% (Asian civilian) and 11.49% (Hispanic enlisted) vs. 20.56% (Hispanic civilian), and the percentage of officers by race within the active component compared to the percentage of civilian college graduates by race was 3.74% (Asian commissioned officers) vs. 9.24% (Asian civilian college graduates) and 5.2% (Hispanic commissioned officers) vs. 7.31% (Hispanic civilian college graduates). Source: Table-17 and Table 25 of Duquette et al. (2014).

<sup>9</sup> At the enlisted level, Black men comprised 11.06% of the total military-age male civilians in FY 2009, but more than 16.4% of the active enlisted component and AIAN males comprised 1.83% vs. 0.78%. Yet, at the officer level, Blacks comprised 8.86% of civilian college graduates but only 8.74% of commissioned officers; and AIAN individuals comprised 0.35% (civilian college graduates) vs. 0.52% (commissioned officers). Source: Table 17 and Table 25 of Duquette et al. (2014).

In 2014, DEOMI refined its primary assessment tool in ways that operationalized inclusion principles, such as those articulated by the MLDC. Evaluating measures of inclusivity requires significant analysis to identify factor components and to verify survey efficacy. It also requires leader adoption, which can be especially difficult in the military context where leaders traditionally understood subordinate conformity and compliance as essential to operational effectiveness and mission accomplishments. To overcome these challenges, DEOMI leveraged additional core values of the military culture: a Commander's desire for continuous personal improvement and their accountability to senior leadership.

The release of DEOCS 4.0 expanded measures of factors related to EO, introduced new measures of inclusive behaviors, and operationalized their assessment for a continuous proactive climate improvement process: Assessment to Solutions (A2S). New survey factors, accompanied by evidence-based resources that Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOAs), Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) representatives, and Commanders could use to improve measures on these factors, sought to identify and assess the prevalence of protective factors and to track and enhance the balance between personal identity and personal belonging that members experienced within a Command. For example, leaders and EO/EEO professionals understood the relative "psychological safety" within a unit as a function of the extent to which members in that unit report that they are motivated to request help or to speak openly about their concerns without fear that doing so may compromise their rank or status. Similarly, the DEOCS 4.0 evaluated "connectedness" by assessing members' "perceptions of belongingness, well-being, and social support" and by measuring the extent to which a member believes that they are "relevant, contributing, and have relationships upon which they can confidently depend in times of need" (DEOMI, 2017, p. 3).

This shift also entailed programmatic changes within CCA. No longer given only "on demand," organizations would administer the DEOCS at key points across the Commander's professional lifecycle. This change in part fulfilled congressional mandates for regular climate surveys within all DoD organizations. In 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) issued a memorandum requiring Commanders to engage in annual CCAs upon assumption of a new Command and every year thereafter (Wright, 2013). During this period, use of the DEOCS increased to approximately 3.6 million surveys administered annually. This essentially gave every individual in the Department a voice regarding the EO and inclusion within their units.

The introduction of the A2S also entailed bottom-up changes to the MEO program. Importantly, it placed EOAs increasingly in the role of human relations professionals spanning issues traditionally outside the EO program. In addition to administering the DEOCS, MEOs played a more central role in helping leaders to interpret their survey findings in ways that provided actionable feedback they could use to address potential problems. Additionally, leaders received support from MEO staff who could educate and counsel Commanders regarding human relations best practices and based on their specialized training. A2S also provided evidenced-based best practice materials related to various factor components. From 2014 to 2018, Commanders, leaders, EO professionals, and others downloaded nearly 400,000 human relations support products for units annually.

In 2018, the DoD expanded the MEO mission to assist with efforts to hold leaders accountable for fostering a climate of inclusion, which supports diversity, is free from harassment, and does not tolerate retaliation against those filing harassment complaints (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2018). This change precipitated major changes in the content and administration of the DEOCS. When the DoD expanded the MEO mission, it also transferred the administration of the DEOCS to the Office of People Analytics (OPA). This administrative move coincided with an overall shift by DoD to consolidate human relations issues under a single program, the Office of Force Resiliency, and to codify D&I priorities. From 2020 to 2021, OPA revised the DEOCS instrument to address critical issues related to the prevention of sexual violence. This shift reflects the DoD's responsiveness to new challenges related to gender-based integration and increased public awareness of sexual assault within the ranks. However, it is also creating new challenges for the administration of MEO programs. Notably, it meant the discontinuation of many of the supplemental Commander resources related to A2S, EO, and diversity, and factors related to

discrimination and harassment are no longer available. The severing of DEOCS development and analysis functions from the programs that train personnel who administer the survey and counsel Commanders on their DEOCS results has created a gap that potentially undermines MEO mission accomplishment. More recently, the SecDef issued an Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault in the Military, which identified a “serious gap” in DoD capability that DEOMI used to provide for follow-on action planning, consultation, and tools and resources (Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, 2021, p. 52). At the time of this writing, the DoD is developing a long-range plan to fill the gap related to follow-on analysis, intervention post-CCA, and the interpretation of results.

## **6.4 RECENT ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Since the second half of 2020, the DoD has updated DEI-related policies across the total Force (see Figure 6-2). In their totality, these efforts further standardize MEO goals and increase accountability for their implementation across the Force. However, the speed and succession of these changes also reflect conflicting political concerns, which manifest in attempts to redefine D&I core concepts at the executive and departmental levels. These rapid-fire changes have signaled changes to the MEO mission space. For example, DoD personnel who prepare, educate, and support military EOAs and DoD civilian EEO representatives have responded by conducting major needed revisions to their MEO training curricula. So, while the speed and succession of these recent policy actions (and their correlating on-the-ground responses) highlight inherent challenges of implementing DEI in a free democratic society, they have also spurred and streamlined difficult conversations among MEO personnel. As DoD researchers and trainers re-engage core questions about the MEO mission within this historical moment, their lessons learned translate into key recommendations for military D&I.

### **6.4.1 Recent DoD Actions**

In what historians describe as the largest mass demonstrations in U.S. history, from May to June 2020, an estimated 15 to 26 million Americans publicly protested race-related police violence (Buchanan et al., 2020; Kishi and Jones, 2020). Protests occurred in 40% of U.S. counties and triggered widespread public debate about questions related to racial disparity broadly, including in ways that polarized Americans along partisan lines. The DoD was not immune. Following a pattern reminiscent of previous historical eras, recent actions reflect the DoD’s responsiveness to domestic civil unrest and societal shifts in thinking about race relations.

On June 19, 2020, the SecDef issued sweeping memoranda directing Service branches to examine policies, programs, and processes for those that may negatively affect EO, diversity, and inclusion across the total Force (Esper, 2020a, 2020b). The SecDef followed with a memo on July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2020, which outlined a three-pronged strategy for addressing D&I disparities across the DoD and charging the USD(P&R) to coordinate much of this work (Esper, 2020b).

Based on internal recommendations, these memoranda identified immediate actions to reduce discrimination, including (but not limited to) the establishment of a “long-term Defense Advisory Commitment on Diversity and Inclusion in the Armed Services” (known as the DoD D&I Board), planning for new procedures by which MEO data is collected and analyzed, and the development of new training for “violence prevention,” combating “unconscious bias,” and equipping leaders to have “relevant, candid, and effective discussions” (Esper, 2020a). Some of these actions triggered immediate widespread policy revisions, but with questionable impacts on diversity outcomes. For example, eliminating photographs from promotion materials to promote “blind promotion” (Cooper, 2020) may have inadvertently compromised military DEI goals (Cooper, 2020; Prescott, 2020). Other revisions resulted in beneficial changes, such as new service-specific grooming and hairstyle codes that updated discriminatory standards, which had disproportionately impacted the health, safety, and well-being of females and non-White service members (Military Times, 2021; United States Army Public Affairs, 2021).





**Figure 6-2: DoD Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Actions from June 2020 to December 2021.**

Events leading up to and surrounding the 2020 U.S. Presidential election triggered further shifts in DEI priorities and how the DoD operationalized these priorities. In September 2020, former President Donald Trump affirmed by E.O. 13950 that inclusive workplace training is “appropriate and beneficial” (The White House, 2020, p. 60685). However, in doing so, this Executive Order instructed Federal authorities to prohibit references in training to “divisive topics” that may make individuals “feel discomfort, guilt, anguish or any other form of psychological distress” on account of their race or sex (The White House, 2020, p. 60685). This language, especially the prohibition of discussion of topics that cause “discomfort,” created challenges for implementing directives previously issued by the SecDef and the USD(P&R), namely, directives to develop training to hinder the potential negative impacts of “unconscious bias” and to promote “relevant, candid, and effective discussions” within the ranks (i.e., Esper 2020a, 2020b). It also triggered an agency-wide audit of DoD MEO training lesson plans, which resulted in the suspension of multiple courses (Office of the Inspector General [OIG], 2020). Notably, during the second half of 2020, at least two agencies

were conducting simultaneous reviews of MEO programs: the DoD Board on D&I and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The differences in their recommendations (which were released on December 18, 2020, and December 30, 2020, respectively) established potentially competing sets of priorities for MEO practitioners (see DoD Board on D&I, 2020 and c.f. OIG, 2020).

Domestic socio-political events from 2020 to 2021 also triggered revisions that aligned the MEO mission with DoD efforts to identify and hinder PEA in the ranks. While crime data analysis indicates that the widespread civil unrest that occurred during the summer of 2020 was largely peaceful, the events reignited historical debates about racial discrimination (Buchanan et al., 2020; Kishi and Jones, 2020). Moreover, the size and scope of these demonstrations emphasized the need for preventive action to hinder potential race-based conflict within the ranks. In addition, the domestic attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, that disrupted the counting of electoral ballots from the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, further demonstrated the multiple potential forms and origins of extremism-motivated violence. Additionally, a dramatic increase in anti-Asian violence amidst the Coronavirus pandemic spurred the SecDef to condemn and direct actions to combat “racism, xenophobia, and intolerance against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders,” (e.g., Austin, 2021b; Farivar, 2021).

On February 5, 2021, SecDef Lloyd Austin directed a department-wide cease in non-essential operations to address “extremism in the ranks” (Austin, 2021a). Among other actions, this stand-down order affirmed the DoD’s intolerance for oath violating principles, “including actions associated with extremist or dissident ideologies” and ordered leaders to facilitate group discussions and listening sessions with personnel about “impermissible behaviors” and reporting procedures in accordance with DoDI 1325.06. However, the stand-down also raised questions about how the DoD could best balance its explicitly apolitical mission, its desire to respect the diverse political views of military personnel, and its awareness that the ideologies that motivate extremist violence are, by definition, political.

With these concerns in mind, the DoD refined its understanding of the types of extremist activities that compromise military operations and service oath later that year. In December 2021, the DoD Countering Extremist Activity Working Group (CEAWG) released its initial report recommendations to the SecDef. Among other contributions, the CEAWG report recommended that further policies focus on activities as opposed to the ideologies that may motivate those actions (2021). In December 2021, changes adopted in DoDI 1325.06 clarified that PEA includes, among other activities, the promotion and advocacy of “widespread unlawful discrimination” (e.g., based on race, gender, religion, and other protected classes) and as well as violence against local, state, and Federal governments (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2009). These changes, which focused on activities carried out by individuals, raised questions about previous MEO directives, especially those that had directed MEO training programs to include education about the attributes of “hate groups” based on law enforcement guidance (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2020b). It also paved the way for a preventative approach to intervention. From the perspective of those charged with creating proactive and evidence-based MEO training, clarifying the early warning signs of potential extremist recruitment *to* and involvement *in* prohibited extremist activity is paramount. This approach to countering extremism also provides a potential strategy for balancing the violence prevention goals with the need to remain apolitical.

#### **6.4.2 Recommendations**

While the military expresses inclusivity values in official policy and celebrates them in crucible moments, such as during observation events and at military promotion ceremonies like that of Lt. Col. Jackson, operationalizing D&I policies in the military context is a far more complex task. Historical events, DoD policy responses, and MEO operational moves from 2020 to 2021 resulted in multiple lessons learned for military D&I practitioners. Reflection on these lessons, in the context of MEO program changes since 2018, suggest the following recommendations to promote diversity and inclusion principles in the U.S. military context.



#### **6.4.2.1 NATO Human Goals Charter**

To clarify NATO's DEI goals, align them with democratic ideals and human rights values, and to affirm how they are essential to achieving unique military needs, the authors recommend that NATO adopt a joint charter in the style of the DoD Human Goals Charter. First established by SecDef Laird in 1969 and later revised by subsequent Secretaries, the DoD Human Goals Charter is a brief but impactful statement that affirms the U.S. military's inclusion principles (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Directorate for Civilian Policy, 1990). It does so by affirming the dignity and worth of each individual and mandating respect for their families, needs, aspirations, and capabilities. Furthermore, it links the inclusion of individuals to diversity and, in turn, operational capacity, readiness, and mission success.

#### **6.4.2.2 Identify and Analyze Disproportionate Diversity Gains, Especially Disparities Between Enlisted and Commissioned Officer Components**

Historical evidence from the U.S. context shows that increasing the face value of diversity within the ranks does not necessarily indicate the achievement of inclusion goals. For example, the persistent overrepresentation of African Americans members among the enlisted ranks as early as 1971 and since that time has not corresponded with representative inclusion of other racial and ethnic communities (Barroso, 2019), nor has it translated to systematic representative inclusion among officers, especially at the senior ranks (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; Military Diversity Leadership Commission, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Implementation of inclusion principles requires taking actions to ensure that military leaders at all levels represent the diversity of the Nation they serve (Military Diversity Leadership Commission, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Investigating disproportionate diversity numbers across ranks and among demographic groups also provides information about the unique barriers that different racial and ethnic communities face.

#### **6.4.2.3 Leverage Command Climate Assessment (CCA) to Increase Leadership Skills and Prevent Grievances from Escalating to Conflict**

CCA should be scientifically sound and assess clearly defined constructs that are cross-culturally relevant. Such measures should function together with intervention resources for unit leaders that are strategic, accessible, and feasible to implement. To achieve this goal, the authors recommend that NATO consider adopting standards for CCA like those developed for the DoD DEOCS A2S program prior to 2018.

By administering a standard CCA survey instrument upon assumption of Command, and periodically throughout their careers, leaders can obtain a retrospective view of their professional development, as well as an immediate snapshot of the relative health of the climate under their Command. This enables continuity within each unit and eventually across tours of duty and frequent changes of station. When a core set of assessment factors remains constant throughout a leader's professional lifecycle, leaders can use CCA as a tool to refine, make improvements, and evaluate their developmental progress on a continuous basis. Requiring leaders to share the results of their CCA with their next-level Commanders creates accountability for their results and promotes a proactive orientation toward improving potential problems identified in the survey.

Coupling CCA processes with support from trained human relations professionals who specialize in military workplace issues can benefit military leaders in multiple ways. Trained professionals can provide guidance in performing the complex climate assessment process (i.e., administering surveys and conducting interviews). They also facilitate the sharing of facts and research to educate leadership about the various factors measured and reported on in the CCA instrument. Trained professionals can also provide strategic guidance to help leaders implement needed changes within their units, including by connecting leaders with human relations educational materials.

**6.4.2.4 Develop Politically Neutral Policies to Hinder Supremacist Extremism Among Military Members by Focusing on Specific Activities and Outwardly Observable Component Behaviors that these Activities Entail, Creating Preventive Anti-Extremism Training that is Relevant to Members’ Lived Experiences, and Leveraging Existing Climate and Mental Health Intervention Programs**

Historically, law enforcement categorized terrorist actors by the specific political ideologies that motivated them. This is especially the case in the U.S. context wherein racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism – especially White Supremacist Extremism (WSE) – is a terrorist threat of increasing primary concern (Department of Justice, 2021; Rose et al. 2020, p. 6; United States Department of Homeland Security, 2020). However, traditional ideological typologies fail to capture the “fluidity” of extremist actors’ beliefs (Williams et al., 2021. pp. 3-4). For example, an October 2020 report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) emphasized that WSE’s increasingly combine the targeting of racial minorities with the targeting of members of “religious minorities, [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer/Questioning] communities, politicians, and those whom they believe promote multi-culturalism and globalization at the expense of WSE identity” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2020, p. 18). The historically contingent and socially emergent nature of such typologies makes them difficult to operationalize in intervention and prevention programs. It also does not engender the politically neutral policy language that is necessary to uphold free expression ideals. So, while extremist ideologies that advocate for racial, gender-based, or religious supremacist violence contradict core D&I values, inclusion goals require recognizing that members bring a diverse array of personal beliefs, which do not necessarily escalate to discriminatory behaviors, and which rarely result in violence.

Organizations should tailor internal counter-extremist activity programs to the military context and be relevant to service members’ lived experiences. Importantly, such efforts should be coupled with military-specific training programs that increase online literacy to inoculate members against extremist recruitment. For example, research in the domestic U.S. context indicates that while incidence of extremist-motivated crimes among military members is rare, military connected individuals (active duty, reservists, and veterans) are at increased risk of being targeted by extremist entities for recruitment, that this recruitment frequently happens online (e.g., social media), and that extremist recruiters leverage common military grievances to potentially radicalize current and former service members (FBI Counterterrorism Division, 2008; Jensen and Braniff, 2021; Koehler, 2019; Posard et al., 2021; Presley, 1996; Ralston et al., 2022; Smith et al., 2011; Toropin, 2022; Yates et al., 2022).

Extremism prevention programs should focus on prohibited activities and define these activities in ways that are politically neutral and lend themselves to apolitical intervention. Programs should identify risk factors associated with potential extremist recruitment and radicalization and identify and leverage existing intervention programs (e.g., suicide prevention, CCA). For example, research indicates that individual risk factors that predispose individuals to extremist violence are similar to those that negatively impact military climate and morale in general, for example, recent negative life events, financial instability, social isolation, confusion about personal identity or life purpose, and involvement in bullying, either as a perpetrator or victim (Baele et al., 2021; Bavel et al., 2021; Beneda and Jaros, 2020; Braddock, 2022; Brown et al., 2021; Haugstvedt and Koehler, 2021; Jensen and Braniff, 2021; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine et al., 2017; National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [NSPCC], n.d.; Posard et al., 2021; RAND Corporation, 2022; Saleh et al., 2021; Schafer and Navarro, 2003).

**6.4.2.5 Implement Evidence-Based Training for Commanders in Verbal Communication and Discussion Facilitation Skills**

Value, respect, and dignity for the individual are core principles of inclusion. Operationalizing these principles is a challenge within military settings, which necessitate uniformity and compliance. A strategic way to balance conformity with individual expression is to provide members with bracketed opportunities to

speak candidly *with* and be listened to *by* their leaders and, when possible, one another. Research on discussion practices in education, healthcare, and private sector organizations indicates that by listening to their subordinates, leaders can help mitigate members' grievances and increase their trust in leadership and the organization itself (Bentley, 2000; Brownell, 1994; Brunner, 2008; Daresh and Playko, 1995; Cooperrider, 2017; Grenny et al., 2007; Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Weisbord, 1992; Young and Cates, 2010). Decades of accumulated evidence from industry and the public sector show that employees' positive perceptions of workplace communication are a significant determinate of organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and employee engagement, including for reducing absenteeism (Johnston et al., 2007; Miller, 2015; Pettit et al., 1997; Pincus, 1986; Putti et al., 1990; Turner, 2020; Varona, 1996). For leaders, such conversations can help identify potential safety concerns (Maxfield et al., 2005; Moss and Maxfield, 2007; Roberto, 2002; Rocha, 2011). For members, such discussions enable individuals to establish common ground amidst internal conflict by reaffirming that members and leaders share mutual objectives (Fischer, 2012; Fischer and Ferlie, 2013; Head and Alford, 2015; Rittel, 1972; Roberts, 2000).

#### **6.4.2.6 Counter Negative Stereotypes by Promoting Images that Depict the Accomplishments of Service Members from Historically Underrepresented Groups**

Counter-stereotypic imaging is an evidence-based proactive strategy to reduce prejudicial bias that involves exposure to positive depictions of specific individuals who represent socially stigmatized populations, groups, or communities. Common examples include famous athletes, military heroes, or other widely admired public figures (Blair et al., 2001). While research shows training individuals in constructed strategies for counter-stereotypic imaging to reduce unconscious bias measures effectively (Carnes et al., 2015; Devine et al., 2012; Forscher et al., 2017; Smith School of Business, 2015), organizations can adopt a similar strategy by promoting positive counter-stereotypic images in military publications, on websites, or through special observance campaigns.

## **6.5 CONCLUSION**

Despite its reputation as being slow to adopt change, the U.S. military has been a historic pioneer for D&I in our Nation (Rohall et al., 2017). It has done so through highly visible policy pronouncements in which senior leaders articulate D&I goals in terms of core Service values. It has also done so by innovating evidenced-based programs to train members to work effectively on racially and culturally diverse teams. Racial integration, as well as racial strife, characterize the history of our Nation (Gates and West, 1996; Hope, 1979; McKibben, 2011; Rothstein, 2018; Tempo et al., 2022). In this context, promoting dignity and respect for all members despite their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, culture, or creed reinforces our Nation's democratic ideals. By inventing and implementing mechanisms to assess organizational climate, facilitate discrimination reporting, and hold Commanders accountable for upholding inclusivity standards, entities like DEOMI serve as a bulwark against social elements that seek to engender racial strife, inflame cultural conflict, and re-segregate the ranks along racial and ethnic lines. They also improve operational performance to increase mission accomplishment. For example, evidence from the private sector shows that best practices for inclusion, such as improving leaders' interpersonal skills, increase subordinates' engagement, morale, and thus, performance and retention. The military already recognizes many cross-cultural competencies as strategically valuable, for example, for gathering intelligence, increasing situational awareness during foreign deployments, and maximizing individual performance (e.g., self-awareness, self-discipline, and self-control; Hubal et al., 2015; Klein et al., 2014). Training leaders in best practices for D&I, and holding leaders accountable for D&I outcomes, equips them with skills and frameworks that they can promulgate across the ranks. Whereas early diversity and equity efforts sought merely to expand the pool of available warfighters by increasing participation among historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, the DoD is now using such methods to build a fully inclusive Force that values unique differences as part of the fabric of the national tapestry.

## 6.6 REFERENCES

- [1] Aptheker, H. (1947). Negro casualties in the civil war. *The Journal of Negro History*, 32(1), 10-80.
- [2] Army Information and Education Division. (1945, July 3). Opinions about Negro infantry platoons in White companies of 7 divisions. Desegregation of the Armed Forces Collection. National Archives Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.
- [3] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. (1971). DoDD 1322.11, Department of Defense education in race relations for armed forces personnel. Department of Defense
- [4] Austin, L. (2021a, February 5). Stand-down to address extremism in the ranks [Memorandum]. Secretary of Defense. <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Feb/05/2002577485/-1/-1/0/STAND-DOWN-TO-ADDRESS-EXTREMISM-IN-THE-RANKS.PDF>
- [5] Austin, L. (2021b, February 16). Condemning and combating racism, xenophobia, and intolerance against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. Secretary of Defense. [https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2021SAF/04\\_Apr/CONDEMNING\\_AND\\_COMBATING\\_RACISM\\_XENOPHOBIA\\_IN\\_TOLERANCE\\_AGAINST\\_ASIAN\\_AMERICANS\\_AND\\_PACIFIC\\_ISLANDERS\\_16\\_Feb\\_21.pdf](https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2021SAF/04_Apr/CONDEMNING_AND_COMBATING_RACISM_XENOPHOBIA_IN_TOLERANCE_AGAINST_ASIAN_AMERICANS_AND_PACIFIC_ISLANDERS_16_Feb_21.pdf)
- [6] Baele, S.J., Brace, L., and Coan, T.G. (2021). Variations on a theme? Comparing 4chan, 8kun, and other chans' far-right "/pol" boards. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 15(1), 65-80.
- [7] Barroso, A. (2019, September 10). The changing profile of the U.S. military: Smaller in size, more diverse, more women in leadership. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/10/the-changing-profile-of-the-u-s-military/>
- [8] Bavel, J.J.V., Rathje, S., Harris, E., Robertson, C., and Sternisko, A. (2021). How social media shapes polarization. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 25(11), 913-916.
- [9] Beneda, J., and Jaros, S.L. (2020). The PAR capabilities and the convergence of workplace violence prevention, counter-insider threat, and personnel vetting policies in DoD (OPA Report No. 2020-047; PERSEREC-RN-20-01). Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC).
- [10] Bentley, S.C. (2000). Listening in the 21st century. *International Journal of Listening*, 14(1), 129-142.
- [11] Blair, I.V., Ma, J.E., and Lenton, A.P. (2001). Imagining stereotypes away: The moderation of implicit stereotypes through mental imagery. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(5), 828-841.
- [12] Braddock, K. (2022). Vaccinating against hate: Using attitudinal inoculation to confer resistance to persuasion by extremist propaganda. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 34(2), 240-262.
- [13] Bradtmiller, B., Ranaparkhi, J., and Tebbets, I. (1985). Demographic and anthropometric assessment of US Army anthropometric database. U.S. Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center.
- [14] Brown, R.A., Helmus, T.C., Ramchand, R., Palimaru, A.I., Weiland, S., Rhoades, A.L., and Hiatt, L. (2021). What do former extremists and their families say about radicalization and deradicalization in America? RAND Corporation.
- [15] Brownell, J. (1994). Women in hospitality management: General managers' perceptions of factors related to career development. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, 13(2), 101-117.

- [16] Brunner, B.R. (2008). Listening, communication and trust: Practitioners' perspectives of business/organizational relationships. *International Journal of Listening*, 22(1), 73-82.
- [17] Buchanan, L., Bui, Q., and Patel, J.K. (2020, July 3). Black Lives Matter may be the largest movement in U.S. history. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>
- [18] Burgin, S. (2015, August). The most progressive and forward looking race relations experiment in existence: Race "militancy", whiteness, and DRRI in the early 1970s. *Journal of American Studies*, 49(3), 557-574. Doi: 10.1017/S0021875814001856.
- [19] Burk, J., and Espinoza, E. (2012). Race relations within the US military. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, 401-422.
- [20] Carnes, M., Devine, P.G., Manwell, L.B., Byars-Winston, A., Fine, E., Ford, C.E., Forscher, P., Isaac, C., Kaatz, A., Magua, W., Palta, M., and Sheridan, J. (2015). Effect of an intervention to break the gender bias habit for faculty at one institution: A cluster randomized, controlled trial. *Academic Medicine: Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges*, 90(2), 221-230.
- [21] Collins, W.J. (2001, March). Race, Roosevelt, and wartime production: Fair employment in World War II labor markets. *American Economic Review*, 91(1), 272-286.
- [22] Cooper, H. (2020, June 25). Addressing diversity, Army will remove photos of officer candidates in promotion reviews. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/politics/army-pentagon-race-promotions.html>
- [23] Cooperrider, D.L. (2017). The gift of new eyes: Personal reflections after 30 years of appreciative inquiry in organizational life. In A.B. (Rami) Shani and D.A. Noumair (Eds.), *Research in Organizational Change and Development* (pp. 81-142). Emerald Group Publishing.
- [24] Council on Foreign Relations. (2020, July 13). Demographics of the U.S. military. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-military>
- [25] Countering Extremist Activity Working Group. (2021). Report on Countering Extremist Activity Within the Department of Defense (p. 21). Department of Defense.
- [26] Daresh, J.C., and Playko, M.A. (1995, April). Mentoring in educational leadership development: What are the responsibilities of the proteges? *American Educational Research Association*.
- [27] Day, H.R. (1983). Race relations training in the U.S. military. In D. Landis and R.W. Brislin (Eds.), *Handbook of Intercultural Training: Volume II, Issues in Training Methodology* (pp. 241-289). Pergamon Press.
- [28] Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. (2017). DSPO climate report monthly snapshot: Active and reserve component results (DSPO Climate Report No. 561-17). Department of Defense.
- [29] Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. (2021). Celebrating 50 years: Past, present, and future. Department of Defense. <https://www.defenseculture.mil/Portals/90/Documents/AboutDEOMI/Anniversary/50th%20Anniversary%20Booklet.pdf?ver=FxTokqwfk9PJGUPMXX3cGA%3d%3d>



- [30] Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. (2022). About DEOMI: History. <https://www.defenseculture.mil/About-DEOMI/History/>
- [31] Department of Defense. (2012). Department of Defense diversity and inclusion strategic plan 2012 – 2017. Department of Defense. [https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD\\_Diversity\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_%20final\\_as%20of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf](https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%20of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf)
- [32] Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion. (2020). Recommendations to improve racial and ethnic diversity and inclusion in the U.S. military. (p. 88). Department of Defense.
- [33] Department of Justice. (2021, September 21). Worldwide threats. Statement of Christopher Wray Director Federal Bureau of Investigation before the committee on homeland security and governmental affairs U.S. Senate. <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Wray-2021-09-21-REVISED.pdf>
- [34] Devine, P.G., Forscher, P.S., Austin, A.J., and Cox, W.T.L. (2012). Long-term reduction in implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(6), 1267-1278.
- [35] Duquette, C., Shuford, R.W., Quester, A.O., and Gregory, D. (2014). Population representation in the military services fiscal year 2009. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)). <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2009/contents/contents.html>
- [36] Edgerton, R.B. (2001). *Hidden heroism: Black soldiers in America's wars*. Westview Press.
- [37] Esper, M. (2020a). Actions for improving diversity and inclusion in the Department of Defense (Secretary of Defense). Department of Defense (DoD).
- [38] Esper, M. (2020b). Immediate actions to address diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity in the military. Secretary of Defense.
- [39] Farivar, M. (2021, April 30). Attacks on Asian Americans spiked by 164% in first quarter of 2021. *Voice of America*. [https://www.voanews.com/a/usa\\_attacks-asian-americans-spiked-164-first-quarter-2021/6205172.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_attacks-asian-americans-spiked-164-first-quarter-2021/6205172.html)
- [40] FBI Counterterrorism Division. (2008, July 7). White supremacist recruitment of military personnel since 9/11. Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment. Federal Bureau of Investigation. <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNA6EC8184DB16cf1d9df3c1001d1f96bc4ad959025d752a4add4ba578a63a3164e0272f89bc92>
- [41] Fischer, M.D. (2012). Organizational turbulence, trouble and trauma: Theorizing the collapse of a mental health setting.
- [42] Fischer, M.D., and Ferlie, E. (2013). Resisting hybridisation between modes of clinical risk management: Contradiction, contest, and the production of intractable conflict. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 38(1), 30-49.
- [43] Forscher, P.S., Mitamura, C., Dix, E.L., Cox, W.T., and Devine, P.G. (2017). Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 72, 133-146.



- [44] Gates, H. (2013) What was Black America's double war? The Root. <https://www.theroot.com/what-was-black-americas-double-war-1790896568>
- [45] Gates, H., and West, C. (1996). The future of the race. Vintage Books.
- [46] General Accounting Office. (1995, April). Report to the ranking minority member, committee on national security, House of Representatives: Equal opportunity DoD studies on discrimination in the military (GAO/NSIAD-95-103). General Accounting Office. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-95-103.pdf>
- [47] Greene, L.J. (1951). The Negro in the War of 1812 and the Civil War. Negro History Bulletin, 14(6), 133-138.
- [48] Grenny, J., Maxfield, D., and Shimberg, A. (2007). How project leaders can overcome the crisis of silence. MIT Sloan Management Review, 48(4), 46-52.
- [49] Hampton, I. (2012). The Black officer corps: A history of Black military advancement from integration through Vietnam (1st ed.). Routledge.
- [50] Haugstvedt, H., and Koehler, D. (2021). Armed and explosive? An explorative statistical analysis of extremist radicalization cases with military background. Terrorism and Political Violence, 34, 1-15.
- [51] Head, B.W., and Alford, J. (2015). Wicked problems: Implications for public policy and management. Administration & Society, 47(6), 711-739. Doi: 10.1177/0095399713481601.
- [52] Helmus, T.C., Byrne, H.J., and Mallory, K. (2021). Countering violent extremism in the U.S. military (p. 20). RAND Corporation.
- [53] Hope, R.O. (1979). Racial strife in the U.S. military: Toward the elimination of discrimination. Praeger.
- [54] Hubal, R., van Lent, M., Wender, J., Lande, B., Flanagan, S., and Quinn, S. (2015). What does it take to train a good stranger [Paper presentation]. 6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2015) and the Affiliated Conferences, AHFE 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.930>
- [55] Huxham, C., and Vangen, S. (2005, May 19). Managing to collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative advantage. Routledge.
- [56] Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. (2021, July 2). Hard truths and the duty to change: Recommendations from the independent review commission on sexual assault in the military. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=855937>
- [57] Ingimundarson, V. (2004). Immunizing against the American other: Racism, nationalism, and gender in U.S.-Icelandic military relations during the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies, 6(4), 65-88.
- [58] Jensen, M.A., and Braniff, W. (2021). Extremism in the United States armed forces: Insights from the profiles of individual radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) Database. Department of Homeland Security National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.

- [59] Jensen, M.A., and LaFree, G. (2016). Final report: Empirical assessment of domestic radicalization (EADR) (No. 250481). U.S. Department of Justice.
- [60] Jensen, M.A., Patrick, J., LaFree, G., Safer-Lichtenstein, A., and Yates, E. (2018). The use of social media by United States extremists. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START\\_PIRUS\\_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists\\_ResearchBrief\\_July2018.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_ResearchBrief_July2018.pdf)
- [61] Johnston, M.K., Reed, K., Lawrence, K., and Onken, M. (2007). The link between communication and financial performance in simulated organizational teams. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, 19(4), 536-553.
- [62] Jones, S. (2021, April 12). The military, police, and the rise of terrorism in the United States. Center for Strategic & International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-police-and-rise-terrorism-united-states>
- [63] Jones, S., Doxsee, C., and Harrington, N. (2020, June 17). The escalating terrorism problem in the United States. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- [64] King, D. (1993, June). 'The longest road to equality': The politics of institutional desegregation under Truman. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 6(2), 119-163. Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.1993.tb00043.x.
- [65] Kishi, R., and Jones, S. (2020, September). Demonstrations and political violence in America: New data for summer 2020. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. [https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ACLED\\_USDataReview\\_Sum2020\\_SeptWebPDF\\_HiRes.pdf](https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ACLED_USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWebPDF_HiRes.pdf)
- [66] Klein, G., Altman-Klein, H., Lande, B., Borders, J., and Whitaker, J.C. (2014). The good stranger frame for police and military activities [Paper presentation]. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 58th Annual Meeting. <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN0D45560AB8E8d677f45591e782e38fbd8fe6298192677a966da051aed7ca5535138620e74be>
- [67] Koehler, D. (2019). A threat from within? Exploring the Link between the extreme right and the military. International Centre for Counterterrorism.
- [68] Kryder, D. (1994, Summer). The American state and the management of race conflict in the workplace and in the Army, 1941 – 1945. *Polity*, 26(4), 601-634. Doi: 10.2307/3235097.
- [69] Kryder, D. (1996). Race policy, race violence, and race reform in the U.S. Army during World War II. *Studies in American Political Development*, 10(1), 130-167.
- [70] Laird, M.R. (1969). DoD human goals charter. Secretary of Defense.
- [71] Landis, D. (1990). Military equal opportunity climate survey: Reliability, construct validity, and preliminary field test. Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA226077.pdf>
- [72] Lanning, J. (2021). How Ford motor's equal pay policies reduced overall labor market discrimination. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ProfitWise News and Views, 1.
- [73] Maxfield, D., Grenny, J., McMillan, R., Patterson, K., and Switzler, A. (2005). Silence Kills. *The Seven Crucial Conversations for Healthcare*. Aliso Viejo, CA: American Association of Critical Care Nurses, 4-9.

- [74] McIntyre, R.M. (2019, December 10). Formative evaluation of equal opportunity advisor training at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (Tech Report No. 19-07). Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1086470>
- [75] McKibben, C.L. (2011, November 23). Racial beachhead: Diversity and democracy in a military town. Stanford University Press.
- [76] Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010a). How did the military leadership diversity commission come about? Issue Paper No. 9, Implementation & Accountability. <https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/Commission/docs/Issue%20Papers/Paper%2009%20-%20Military%20Leadership%20Diversity%20Commission%20History.pdf>
- [77] Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010b). Department of Defense directive 1020.02: A foundation for effective, accountable diversity management? Issue Paper No. 50, Implementation & Accountability. <https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/Commission/docs/Issue%20Papers/Paper%2050%20-%20DOD%20Directive%201020-02.pdf>
- [78] Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2011, March 15). From representation to inclusion: Diversity leadership for the 21st-century military (Final Report). [https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Special%20Feature/MLDC\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Special%20Feature/MLDC_Final_Report.pdf)
- [79] Military Times. (2021, February 8). Ponytails, earrings and more: Army revamps grooming and uniform regs [Video]. Military Times. <https://www.militarytimes.com/video/2021/02/08/ponytails-earrings-and-more-army-revamps-grooming-and-uniform-regs-military-times-reports/>
- [80] Miller, S. (2015). Exploring incivility toward employee absenteeism, productivity, and effective communication: Veterans health administration. Walden University.
- [81] Moss, E., and Maxfield, D. (2007). Silence kills: A case manager's guide to communication breakdowns in healthcare Part I of III. Professional Case Management, 12(1), 52-54.
- [82] Murray, P. (1971). Blacks and the draft: A history of institutional racism. Journal of Black Studies, 57-76.
- [83] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Snair, J., Nicholson, A., and Giammaria, C. (2017). Countering violent extremism through public health practice: Proceedings of a workshop. The National Academies Press.
- [84] National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children. (n.d.). Protecting children from radicalisation. Retrieved June 12, 2022 from <http://www.nspcc.org.uk/keeping-children-safe/reporting-abuse/dedicated-helplines/protecting-children-from-radicalisation/>
- [85] Nichols, D.A. (2007). A matter of justice: Eisenhower and the beginning of the civil rights revolution. Simon and Schuster.
- [86] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. (July 1963). Equal opportunity in the armed forces, cancelled by (DoDD 5120.27). Department of Defense.
- [87] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. (7 June 1963). Equal opportunity in the armed forces, cancelled by: 1100.15, 12/14/1970 (DoDD 5120.27). Department of Defense.
- [88] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (Directorate for Civilian Personnel Policy). (1990, April 17). Human Goals Program. Department of Defense.

- [89] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve. (1971, June 24). Department of Defense education in race relations for armed forces personnel, cancelled by: DoDD1322.11, 8/6/1976 (DoDD 1322.11). Department of Defense.
- [90] Office of the Inspector General. (2020). Review of the agency's implementation of Executive Order 13950 on combating race and sex stereotyping (AD-21-0002). National Security Agency/Central Security Service. [https://oig.nsa.gov/Portals/71/Reports/Reviews/Implementation%20of%20Executive%20Order%2013950.pdf?ver=hJql\\_W\\_wbp29nz4V61w-uw%3D%3D](https://oig.nsa.gov/Portals/71/Reports/Reviews/Implementation%20of%20Executive%20Order%2013950.pdf?ver=hJql_W_wbp29nz4V61w-uw%3D%3D)
- [91] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (1969). DoDI 1325.6. Guidelines for handling dissident and protest activities among members of the armed forces. Department of Defense.
- [92] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2004). Population representation in the military services fiscal year 2002. Department of Defense.
- [93] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2009, November 27). DoDI 1325.06, Handling dissident and protest activities among members of the armed forces effective December 20, 2021, incorporating change 2. Department of Defense. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132506p.PDF>
- [94] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2018). DoDI 1020.03, harassment prevention and response in the armed forces. Department of Defense. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/102003p.PDF>
- [95] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2020a). DoDI 1020.05, DoD diversity and inclusion management program. Department of Defense. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/102005p.pdf?ver=2020-09-09-112958-573>
- [96] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2020b). DoDI 1350.02, DoD military equal opportunity (MEO) program. Department of Defense. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/135002p.pdf>
- [97] Osur, A.M. (1981). Black-white relations in the U.S. military, 1940 – 1972. *Air University Review*, 33, 69-78.
- [98] Pettit, J.D., Goris, J.R., and Vaught, B.C. (1997). An examination of organizational communication as a moderator of the relationship between job performance and job satisfaction. *The Journal of Business Communication* (1973), 34(1), 81-98.
- [99] Pincus, J.D. (1986, March). Communication satisfaction, job satisfaction, and job performance. *Human Communication Research*, 12(3), 395-419. Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.1986.tb00084.x.
- [100] Posard, M.N., Payne, L.A., and Miller, L.L. (2021, September). Reducing the risk of extremist activity in the U.S. military. *Perspective: Expert Insights on a Timely Policy Issue*. RAND Corporation.
- [101] Prescott, R. (2020, August 29). Removing photographs may not give a bigger picture for selection and promotion boards. *Army Times*. <https://www.armytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/29/removing-photographs-may-not-give-a-bigger-picture-for-selection-and-promotion-boards/>
- [102] Presley, S.M. (1996). Rise of domestic terrorism and its relation to United States armed forces, executive summary. Office of Justice Programs (NCJ Number: 193145). <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/rise-domestic-terrorism-and-its-relation-united-states-armed-forces>

- [103] Putti, J.M., Aryee, S., and Phua, J. (1990). Communication relationship satisfaction and organizational Commitment. *Group & Organization Studies*, 15(1), 44-52.
- [104] Ralston, R., Motta, M., and Spindel, J. (2022). When ok is not ok: Public concern about White nationalism in the U.S. Military. *Armed Forces & Society*, 48(1), 228-239.
- [105] RAND Corporation. (2022, May 3). How to avoid extremism on social media. <https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2022/05/how-to-avoid-extremism-on-social-media.html>
- [106] Rice, A. (2018). Black troops were welcome in Britain, but Jim Crow wasn't: The race riot one night in June 1943. *The Conversation*.
- [107] Rittel, H. (1972). On the planning crisis: Systems analysis of the "first and second generations". *Bedriftskonomen*, 8, 390-396.
- [108] Roberto, M.A. (2002). Lessons from Everest: The interaction of cognitive bias, psychological safety, and system complexity. *California Management Review*, 45(1), 136-158.
- [109] Roberts, N. (2000). Wicked problems and network approaches to resolution. *International Public Management Review*, 1(1), 1-19.
- [110] Rocha, R. (2011). Accident case study of organizational silence and communication breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, mission STS-107 – space shuttle lessons-learned and knowledge-capture forum at NASA KSC [PowerPoint slides]. [https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/553084main\\_Case\\_Study\\_Silence\\_Breakdown\\_Columbia\\_Rocha.pdf](https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/553084main_Case_Study_Silence_Breakdown_Columbia_Rocha.pdf)
- [111] Rohall, D.E., Ender, M.G., and Matthews, M.D. (Eds.). (2017). *Inclusion in the American military: A force for diversity*. Lexington Books, an imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
- [112] Rose, A.E., Prina, D.P., Palmer, M.D., and Rapoza, B. (2020, June). Leveraging FBI resources to enhance military accessions screening and personnel security vetting (Report No. 2020-080-0). Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, Office of People Analytics. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1117523.pdf>
- [113] Rosenzweig, P. (2010, December). Robert S. McNamara and the evolution of modern management. *Harvard Business Review*. <https://hbr.org/2010/12/robert-s-mcnamara-and-the-evolution-of-modern-management>
- [114] Rothstein, R. (2018). *The color of law: A forgotten history of how our government segregated America*. New York: Liveright.
- [115] Saleh, N.F., Roozenbeek, J., Makki, F.A., Mcclanahan, W.P., and Linden, S.V.D. (2021). Active inoculation boosts attitudinal resistance against extremist persuasion techniques: A novel approach towards the prevention of violent extremism. *Behavioural Public Policy*, 1-24.
- [116] Schafer, J.R., and Navarro, J. (2003, March). Seven-stage hate model: The psychopathology of hate groups. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72(3), 1-8. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
- [117] Segal, D.R., and Segal, M.W. (2004, December 1). American's military population. *Population Bulletin*, 59(4). <https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN41764650E81Def44175ab50d8b26f790e2267502bf8a34c3f204f64fe437d7090fdcff4bdfef8>



- [118] Sider, H., and Cole, (1984). The changing composition of the military and the effect on labor force data. *Monthly Labor Review* 107(7), 10-13.
- [119] Smith, B.L., Bringuel, A.J., Chermak, S.M., Damphousse, K.R., and Freilich, J.D. (2011). Right-wing extremism and military service. In A.J. Bringuel (Ed.), *Terrorism Research and Analysis Project: (TRAP): A Collection of Research Ideas, Thoughts, and Perspectives* (pp. 341-364). Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- [120] Smith School of Business. (2015, November 13). Patricia Devine on kicking the prejudice habit [Video]. YouTube. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OqRl3\\_m5WM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OqRl3_m5WM)
- [121] Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Harvard University Press.
- [122] Taylor, J. (2013). *Freedom to serve: Truman, civil rights, and Executive Order 9981*. Routledge.
- [123] Tempo, C.J.B., and Diner, H.R. (2022). *Immigration: An American history*. Yale University Press.
- [124] The Henry Ford. (2013, February 26). African American workers at Ford Motor Company. <https://www.thehenryford.org/explore/blog/african-american-workers-at-ford-motor-company/>
- [125] The White House. (2020, September 22). Executive order 13950 of September 22, 2020: Combatting race and sex stereotyping. *Federal Register* 85(188), 60683–60689. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-28/pdf/2020-21534.pdf>
- [126] The White House. (2022, January 26). Executive order 14062, 2022 amendments to the manual for courts-martial, United States. *Federal Register* 87(20), 4763-4786. <https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2022-02027.pdf>
- [127] Toropin, K. (2022, June 10). Proud boys and oath keepers, extremist groups that target vets for recruiting, at the center of Jan. 6 Investigation. *Military.Com*. <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/06/09/proud-boys-and-oath-keepers-extremist-groups-target-vets-recruiting-center-of-jan-6-investigation.html>
- [128] Turner, J.G. (2020). *Strategies to reduce absenteeism in the public sector workplace*. Walden University.
- [129] United States Army. (2020, May 4). Army diversity. United States Army. [https://www.army.mil/article/38542/army\\_diversity](https://www.army.mil/article/38542/army_diversity)
- [130] United States Army Public Affairs. (2021, January 26). Revised Army regulation and grooming standards support diversity, equity and inclusion and people first priority. United States Army. [https://www.army.mil/article/242719/revised\\_army\\_regulation\\_and\\_grooming\\_standards\\_support\\_diversity\\_equity\\_and\\_inclusion\\_and\\_people\\_first\\_priority](https://www.army.mil/article/242719/revised_army_regulation_and_grooming_standards_support_diversity_equity_and_inclusion_and_people_first_priority)
- [131] United States Department of Homeland Security. (2020, October). Homeland threat assessment. [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020\\_10\\_06\\_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf)
- [132] Varona, F. (1996). Relationship between communication satisfaction and organizational commitment in three Guatemalan organizations. *The Journal of Business Communication* (1973), 33(2), 111-140.
- [133] Weisbord, M.R. (1992). *Discovering common ground*. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.



- [134] Wilkie, R.L. (2018, February 21). Realignment of force resiliency elements of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [Memorandum]. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
- [135] Williams, H.J., Evans, A.T., Ryan, J., Mueller, E.E., and Downing, B. (2021). The online extremist ecosystem: Its evolution and a framework for separating extreme from mainstream. RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1458-1.html>
- [136] Wright, J.L. (2013, July 25). Command climate assessments [Memorandum]. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. <https://www.defenseculture.mil/Portals/90/Documents/Toolkit/SecWrightMemo.pdf>
- [137] Yates, E., Kane, S., and Jensen, M.A. (2022). Recruiting from the ranks: A typology of recruitment narratives targeting the U.S. military community final report (No. CLIN0005). The University of Maryland.
- [138] Young, R.W., and Cates, C.M. (2010). Listening, play, and social attraction in the mentoring of new teachers. *Mentoring & Tutoring: Partnership in Learning*, 18(3), 215-231.


## Chapter 7 – FROM MIGRATION IN GERMANY TO INCLUSION IN THE BUNDESWEHR<sup>1</sup> – AN APPRECIATIVE AND INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO DIVERSITY IN THE BUNDESWEHR

**Sven Hertel**

Federal Ministry of Defence  
GERMANY

### 7.1 DEFINING DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS

The term *diversity* can be understood as “variety,” “difference,” “inequality,” “otherness,” “heterogeneity,” or “individuality.” The subject area of diversity comprises so-called core dimensions that can be more or less sharply defined, including gender or gender identity, physical and mental abilities, ethnic origin and nationality, religion and worldview, age, and sexual orientation (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [BMVg]<sup>2</sup>, 2019). The core dimensions shape individual lifestyles and also affect the perception of family tasks and the interaction of those affected in each case. Diversity dimensions are external, subjective, and socio-cultural characteristics that distinguish people. They are usually interrelated but not hierarchically structured. The dimensions reflect the differences and commonalities between people, including their potentials and competencies. Each person has certain characteristics in the individual dimensions that make up their personality, and individual dimensions can change over time (e.g., age). In light of this, a multi-layered model is often used to describe diversity. At the center of this multi-layered model is the personality of each person. As Figure 7-1 shows, the unchangeable and changeable characteristics (dimensions) of a person are arranged in a circle around the personality.



**Figure 7-1: Core Dimensions of Diversity.**

<sup>1</sup> German Federal Armed Forces.

<sup>2</sup> German Ministry of Defence (MoD).

These dimensions – social origin, age, ethnic origin and nationality, gender and gender identity, physical and mental abilities, religion and worldview, sexual orientation – have the greatest influence on inclusion or exclusion. The components of this outer circle around personality are the core dimensions of diversity (BMVg, 2019). It is the core dimensions, moreover, that often give rise to expectations on the part of others in society, which can develop into challenges in the way people interact.

As a sociological term, *inclusive* describes a society in which every person is accepted and can participate in it on an equal footing and in a self-determined manner, regardless of the core dimensions of diversity or other individual characteristics. In an inclusive society, there is no defined normality that every member of this society has to strive for or fulfill. Normal is only the fact that differences exist. These differences are seen as enrichment and have no impact on the rights of individuals to participate. It is the task of society to create structures in all areas of life that enable the members of this society to move within it without barriers (Schöb, 2013). The state is committed to realizing the inclusion of all. This means that it safeguards human rights through its legal system and creates the conditions for everyone to be able to exercise their rights equally (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte [DIMIR]<sup>3</sup>, 2012).

Governmental organizations and companies must face up to these challenges, find solutions to overcome them, and achieve an inclusive working environment and certainty of action in dealing with diversity. Stereotypes and prejudices must be reduced and discrimination prevented (Krell, 2018). In order to be perceived as a modern, attractive, and inclusive employer, it is essential to see the diversity of people as an opportunity with its own value, wherever groups with their different talents and different life situations are employed.

### **7.1.1 Ethnicity and Nationality as a Dimension to be Considered**

When considering the dimensions of ethnic origin and nationality, statistical analysis in Germany uses either a person's country of birth or the country of birth of their parents as an indicator. Over the past two decades in Germany's public and political discourse – as well as in official statistics – *migration background* has supplanted *foreign national* for those whose parents were born outside the country. Compared with *foreigners*, the concept of migration background has the advantage that immigrants and their descendants – often referred to as the first or second generation of migrants – can be identified in statistical surveys and their evaluation, irrespective of citizenship and any naturalizations that may have taken place in the meantime (Statistisches Bundesamt [DE-Statist] <sup>4</sup>, 2021).

Despite this improvement, the concept of migration background has increasingly come under criticism in recent years (Ahyoud et al., 2018; El-Mafaalani, 2017). The first criticism is that the concept is based on an attribution of foreignness, which is obtained in surveys with several questions (some of which are comparatively complex), and now carries a social stigma that the term *foreigner* used to have. Second, the concept homogenizes an otherwise heterogeneous population. However, unequal opportunities for participation and discrimination impact specific geographic groups of origin, appearance, ethnicity, or linguistic competencies, and may be independent of one's own migration experience or the migration experience of one's parents. For this reason, in many countries of immigration – in addition to country of birth and nationality – a question about ethnicity is asked in the form of self-identification (Simon et al., 2015).

Despite these justified points of criticism, the concept of migration background is used here. On the one hand, there are still no alternative scientific concepts to represent cultural diversity in Germany. On the other hand, the concept of migration background – despite these limitations – offers a good basis for depicting the cultural diversity resulting from Germany's migration history.

---

<sup>3</sup> German Institute for Human Rights.

<sup>4</sup> German Federal Statistical Office.

### 7.1.2 History of Migration in Germany

Migration as a basic element of human history has shaped the territory of present-day Germany from the beginning of its settlement. Migration is thus much older than Germany, but defining migration as cross-border migration is closely linked to the development of the nation-state, which is why the following section outlines migration in German history in the twentieth century.

After the end of the Second World War, 10 to 12 million so-called Displaced Persons (DP) were in Germany, mainly survivors of concentration camps and prisoners of war, the majority of whom were resettled or repatriated in 1945. The remaining 1.7 million were resettled in other countries, especially in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and France, within the framework of resettlement programs of the International Refugee Organization, which was founded in 1947. Occupied Germany in the immediate postwar period was thus a society experiencing a lot of migration: Some 10 million people had been evacuated from bombed-out cities and, in some cases, could only return after a number of years, if at all. In addition, there were about 11 million German soldiers who had been demobilized or released from captivity. In the final phase of the war, and due to renewed cessions of territory and border shifts, there were extensive movements of refugees, especially toward the West. The divided postwar Germany was thus deeply marked by forced migration, but it also picked up on traditional patterns of mobility. Between 1946 and 1961, for example, nearly 800,000 Germans emigrated overseas, half of them to the United States. A special feature of domestic mobility was the division into two German states cemented in 1949: About 3.1 million people moved from “the eastern part of Germany”, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the Federal Republic by the time the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and about 500,000 migrated from West to East (including many who had previously come from there).

While this migration between a divided Germany was exploited for propaganda purposes by the respective government during the Cold War, the admission of the “GDR refugees” was also always controversial in public: They were accused of not being “real” (i.e., political) refugees, but of coming to the Federal Republic for selfish economic reasons. The supposed unambiguousness of migration motives thus caused migration-related discussions, even in the early days of the Federal Republic. In the GDR, on the other hand, in addition to propagandistic reports, attempts were made to prevent any discussion of migration. This was especially true of the people referred to as *Umsiedler* (resettlers), who had come to the GDR from Poland in the postwar period. In contrast, the Federal Republic created a legal right to immigration for ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, which was linked to extensive integration efforts (Berlinghoff, 2018).

The economic boom that followed the reconstruction created a growing demand for labor, which could be satisfied in the Federal Republic for a long time through immigration from the GDR and from ethnic German repatriates. With the later decline of new workers from the GDR, however, labor recruitment from outside the GDR suddenly gained importance: The number of foreigners employed in the Federal Republic rose from about 73,000 (1954) to 329,000 (1960) to 711,000 (1962) and, in 1965, exceeded the million mark (1.2 million) for the first time. After a brief decline in 1967, their numbers continued to rise to reach a peak of 2.6 million in 1973, the year of the recruitment freeze. Overall, a good third of foreign employees were *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers).

An important principle of *Gastarbeiter* migration, which was not formally laid down in the agreements with them (Hoerder, 2010) but was initially shared by all parties involved, was the so-called rotation of labor. Migrants were supposed to come and work in the industrial centers of Europe for a few years, and then return with the money they had saved to make room for new workers. This system worked for a long time: Between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, about 14 million foreign workers came to Germany, while about 11 million returned. Over time, more and more extended their stay and increasingly also brought their families, which, since the end of the 1960s, has resulted in an immigration situation that was officially denied for a long time. However, instead of responding to this migration (as to emigrants and returnees before) with appropriate integration measures, voices were raised warning of an unsustainable

burden of foreign employment. In the summer of 1973, a change in policy direction was implemented, providing for a slower increase in the employment of foreigners. The oil crisis in the fall of 1973 and the increasing criticism of guest worker recruitment by the trade unions finally gave rise to the recruitment freeze, which ended the placement of workers from most of the recruiting countries for the time being, although not completely.

In contrast to the expansion of freedom of movement within Western Europe, the possibilities for migration from outside Europe were further restricted during this period, so that in addition to family members of people already living in the Federal Republic and highly qualified people, only refugees had a chance to migrate. Accordingly, these groups determined immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, not without the federal governments of the time attempting to further close these access points by tightening the law and reversing immigration through return programs (Oltmer, 2017).

### **7.1.3 Measures of Integration in Germany Today**

The principle of “promoting and demanding” is the basis of today’s integration policy in Germany. This means that integration is on the one hand an offer by the state, but on the other hand also an obligation for every immigrant to make an effort. The integration strategy is based on a modular offer for different target groups and comprises three integration fields: a) language mediation; b) integration into training, work and (higher) education; and c) social integration (BMI, 2019).

Each mode of integration has broad-based services, such as the basic language course, information about social norms and values in Germany and tools for training and work. These measures are regulated by law, generally available throughout the country, and, in some cases, mandatory. On the other hand, there are more in-depth or complementary offerings for numerous target groups. These services are usually voluntary and complement the basic services. In this way, they meet different integration needs and close gaps in services. Some programs are carried out in close cooperation with the business community and its associations, ensuring a high degree of practical relevance. Further, the federal government supports many voluntary and full-time helpers and their structures within civil society, which are characterized by responsibility, initiative, and commitment. In many cases, it is also possible to draw on the many years of experience gained from measures for people with immigrant backgrounds, which have been or are being opened up and expanded for new immigrants. In the National Action Plan on Integration, integration measures are being further developed together with the federal states and municipal umbrella organizations, migrant organizations, welfare associations, and many other civil society actors.

Language skills are the necessary basis both for integration into the labor market and for integration into society and participation in social life. The federal government is therefore prioritizing German-language acquisition for all immigrants who will legally live in Germany permanently (or for an extended period of time). Depending on individual needs and prerequisites, language acquisition is supported in early childhood education, in primary school, on the way to a training preparation measure, and during training, study, and work (BMI, 2019).

## **7.2 DIVERSITY IN THE BUNDESWEHR**

As a result of the demographic changes mentioned above, German society has become increasingly heterogeneous. Against this backdrop, actively increasing the proportion of people with a migration background or immigration history in the Bundeswehr is a logical step and has already been formulated as a goal in (among other places) the German government’s 2016 White Paper, *German Society is Becoming More Colorful and Diverse* (BMVg, 2016). The Bundeswehr considers this diversity an opportunity, and the promotion of equal opportunities for women in leadership positions and diversity of ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity is seen as a leadership task in the Bundeswehr.

### **7.2.1 Diversity as a Contribution to the Future Viability of the Bundeswehr**

The professionalism and strength of the armed forces are determined by their ability to meet challenges quickly and innovatively and to adapt to new situations. Goals are best achieved when the various strengths, qualities, and characters of the people in the organization are used in the best possible way. Within the Bundeswehr, of course, this presupposes that the value of diversity itself is recognized and understood as an asset for future viability and attractiveness. Diversity makes the Bundeswehr strong. It allows things to be seen from different perspectives, helps develop different ideas and approaches to problems, and ultimately brings success.

Like any other employer, the Bundeswehr is also confronted with the effects of demographic and social change and the general shortage of skilled workers in Germany. It faces the challenge of attracting and retaining its most valuable resource – personnel – in competition with other employers on the labor market. A declining number of the working-age cohort, a growing proportion of working women and more people with an immigrant background are part of German society. Under these conditions, the German armed forces must be able to attract and retain talented individuals with diverse personal characteristics (e.g., age, ethnic origin and nationality, gender or gender identity, mental and physical abilities, religion and ideology, and sexual orientation).

The results of the study “Bunt in der Bundeswehr?<sup>5</sup>”, a scientific investigation of the climate of diversity and inclusion in the German military, show the need for action and optimization with regard to the sensitive and confident handling of diversity in general. For the first time, the study provides an empirically validated picture of the core dimensions of diversity and offers the basis for developing systematic diversity management for the Bundeswehr to positively shape the leadership culture in the German Ministry of Defence in the long term.

The conclusions of the study were used to develop Agenda Diversity, a holistic inventory for operationalizing diversity in the Bundeswehr. This provides a current overall picture of the concrete measures for diversity management in the German military. A large number of measures to strengthen diversity and inclusion have already been established and are making a decisive contribution to continuously improving the conditions for diversity. Further measures should positively shape and consciously promote diversity in the sense of an appreciative approach to the differences and commonalities of all members of the BMVg. In addition, there is regular exchange with other ministries, federal and civil service agencies, and interest groups on the topic of ethnicity and migration history – for example, in the Departmental Working Group, the Diversity Practice Forum, and the Federal Social Intranet, and especially on the recruitment of personnel with a migration history. In this way, the Bundeswehr benefits from the information gained from federal employee surveys and the exchange of ideas and suggestions for promoting cultural diversity and equal opportunities in the civil service as a whole.

### **7.2.2 The Grundgesetz<sup>6</sup> as the Basis for Understanding Diversity in the Bundeswehr**

The values of the free democratic order form the common canon of values of the Bundeswehr. At the heart of these values is the common obligation to serve the Federal Republic of Germany faithfully as a soldier and to defend the law and the freedom of the German people, to conscientiously fulfill one’s official duties as a civil servant or one’s duties as an employee, and to respect the laws in force in the Federal Republic of Germany. These common values also reject discrimination or preferential treatment on account of gender, ancestry, race, language, home country and origin, faith, or religious or political views. And no one may be disadvantaged because of his disability (BMJ, 1949).

---

<sup>5</sup> How diverse are the German armed forces?

<sup>6</sup> German Constitution.



The Bundeswehr therefore needs people with a strong conscience, character, and sense of responsibility. It does not look at the shell, but at the content. It enables the joint service of women and men who reflect the cultural, religious, biographical, and social diversity of our country. All members of the Bundeswehr perform their duties together in accordance with our leadership philosophy if they stand up for freedom, peace, human dignity, and democracy out of inner conviction. Decisions on personnel selection in the BMVg are therefore made exclusively on the basis of the German Constitution and on the basis of existing aptitude, ability, and professional performance without regard to any of the core dimensions of diversity already mentioned.

Strategic guidelines have been formulated for all diversity dimensions in the Bundeswehr with the aim of reducing any identifiable deficits, developing the performance potential of all employees in a way that is commensurate with opportunities and tapping into further talent (BMVg, 2019). In addition, mutual respect for groups at risk of discrimination is increased through dialogue with associations and interest groups in the fight against discrimination in the Bundeswehr. The goal is to increase and promote tolerance with and between ethnic and cultural groups within the German military.

### **7.2.3 Diversity and Inclusion as Concepts**

The concepts of diversity and inclusion were developed to consolidate the understanding of diversity in the Bundeswehr and to support the confident handling of diversity. Among other things, they inform the training and qualifications of soldiers, civil servants, and pay-scale employees that align with their needs and, at the appropriate level, to further sensitize them to the appreciation of diversity and to create behavioral security in dealing with diversity. Six guiding principles on the core dimensions of diversity were formulated as a basis for this:

- We offer all members an open and appreciative working environment, ensure gender-specific equal treatment and provide a fair opportunity to participate in all career paths.
- The Bundeswehr values experience, knowledge, and skills regardless of age and uses them profitably. It is an organization in which there is no discrimination or preferential treatment on the basis of age. As far as possible, it makes career paths more flexible in order to open opportunities for development regardless of age.
- We make room for disability-related diversity and ensure fundamental accessibility. System-related obstacles are identified and removed. The Bundeswehr enables the participation of people with disabilities, embeds this in its leadership and organizational culture, and creates an inclusive working environment wherever possible.
- People of different ethnicities and cultures serve in the Bundeswehr. Knowing this, we break down structural barriers and create an organizational framework for ethnic and cultural diversity.
- We recognize people with their different religions and worldviews and know how to value them. The Bundeswehr allows its members to practice their religion without restricting the functioning of the armed forces.
- The Bundeswehr offers an open working environment with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity and ensures equal treatment of all regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity (BMVg, 2019).

This concept is already a basic principle that forms the starting point for operationalizing a holistic diversity management and is being revised to align with sociopolitical developments in the sense of a diversity strategy. In the process, the core dimensions of diversity – based on the Diversity Charter – will be reviewed for relevance and topicality in the Bundeswehr.

#### 7.2.4 *Colorful in the Bundeswehr?* The Basis for Improving the Diversity and Inclusion Climate

The aim of the study *Colorful in the Bundeswehr?* was to record the various diversity dimensions and their quantitative manifestations in the organization. Opinions and attitudes were also recorded to reach conclusions about the state of diversity and inclusion in the Bundeswehr, including:

- First study on six core dimensions of diversity within the Bundeswehr;
- Survey of all organizational areas of the Bundeswehr;
- Questionnaire with 13,512 completed returns (response rate: 27%);
- Inclusion of civilian and military members in the Bundeswehr; and
- Representative data on diversity and inclusion in the Bundeswehr for the first time.

The study's anonymous questionnaire, which was sent out in paper form to members of the Bundeswehr, also follows a holistic approach. The first research question, "How diverse is the Bundeswehr?", asked participants for details about their diversity (e.g., sexual orientation or migration background) to ensure that each of the six core dimensions was given sufficient consideration. For the core dimension of gender, for example, respondents could select a third gender category in addition to male and female. For the core dimension sexual orientation, in addition to the category heterosexual, a total of five further categories were available (i.e., homosexual, asexual, bisexual, intersexual, and other sexual orientations).

To answer the research questions on inclusion in the Bundeswehr and on needed improvements, various questionnaires were included in the study, some of which were developed by independent researchers and were also used in other public institutions. These included the Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire (COPSOQ; Nübling et al., 2005) on work stress (e.g., bullying) and stress consequences (e.g., burnout) and the Mor Barak Inclusion-Exclusion Scale (MBIE Scale) on various aspects of inclusion in the workplace (Mor Barak, 2016). Individual questions were also adapted from the Germany-wide survey of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (Beigang et al., 2017).

With regard to diversity, a close examination of these diversity groups shows that the Bundeswehr supports diversity – and belonging and participation are central aspects of successful inclusion. In concrete terms, this means that it makes no difference to which diversity group a person belongs when it comes to participation in decision-making processes, to receiving important information, or the general working context. Almost all of the groups studied (e.g., people with and without a migration background) report comparable conditions on these issues.

The results of the study also show consistency across groups in the distribution of work stresses (e.g., workload and working hours) and the consequences of stress (e.g., burnout symptoms). Although there are slight differences between individual diversity groups, almost all are within a similar range. Compared with the general population, German military personnel show no disproportionate amount of work stress or stress consequences.

A different picture emerges with regard to the frequency of experienced discrimination. Each of the surveyed diversity groups is affected by discrimination. However, women and people with disabilities or limitations report perceived discrimination more frequently than other groups in the world of work outside the armed forces. Further the study shows that a significant proportion of members of the Bundeswehr attribute certain characteristics to other people because they belong to certain groups. Such stereotypes are particularly common when it comes to gender, with many members of the Bundeswehr attributing better leadership ability to men and higher performance across the board.

The climate of inclusion in the Bundeswehr was also surveyed. The operative assumption is that inclusion is successful when members, regardless of their diversity, can participate in important decisions (decision-making factor), are actively involved in everyday work activities (work activities factor), and are informed about important events (information factor). Together, these three factors make up the Inclusion Index (see Mor Barak, 2016), which uses 15 questions, five for each of three factors. The decision factor includes questions about the extent to which Bundeswehr members are included in important decisions at their work level and also at higher levels. Under the work activity factor, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they were involved in meetings or activities at work. Questions about whether they regularly received important information or learned about changes belonged to the information factor. Each factor additionally contains questions concerning the social sphere outside of everyday work. The Inclusion Index is given on a scale with values between 0 and 100 points, where the higher the value, the better the inclusion climate. With an average of 52.7 points in the German armed forces, they are within the statistically normal range in Germany that is between 34.7 and 70.7 points.

In general, the results on the diversity and inclusion climate are consistently positive. For the majority of the 28 diversity groups examined, fair conditions emerge with regard to the perceived climate of inclusion and the distribution of workloads and stress consequences. These are important signals that indicate the successes that the Bundeswehr has already achieved with its diversity and equal opportunity strategy. In those areas where the study results indicate a need for action, this is understood as a mandate and obligation for optimization and will be implemented in concrete measures, described in the following sections.

### **7.2.5 Ethnicity as a Dimension of Diversity in the Bundeswehr**

Service in foreign countries and foreign cultures, multinational cooperation, and diversity in its own ranks have shaped the German military. Almost 9% of Bundeswehr personnel have a migration background. This diversity of ethnic and cultural affiliation is recognized as an opportunity and used for more successful missions. Like other armed forces, the Bundeswehr benefits from a greater diversity of individual histories, experiences, and qualifications. Intercultural competence and multilingualism help to fulfill missions more effectively. Here, too, following the results of a study commissioned by McKinsey & Company in 2018, teams with different experiences and backgrounds operate more successfully than homogeneous groups and can cope more successfully with changing situations. At the same time, a conscious approach to diversity strengthens the team's anchoring in society.

For soldiers in the Bundeswehr, appreciative and tolerant interaction with different ethnic and cultural groups within the armed forces is a matter of course. Legally, this tolerant approach is based on Article 3 (1) and (3) of the *Grundgesetz*. For the German armed forces, a legal basis has also been established in §8 in conjunction with §2 of the *Soldiers' Act*. Section 12 of the *Soldiers' Act* also stipulates, among other things, comradely and tolerant interaction with one another.

Already today, where the primary consideration is the operational capability of the armed forces and the protection of the service personnel, the aspects of diverse ethnic and cultural affiliation are taken into account wherever possible in practical ways. Examples include the provision of different types of food and the intercultural education of the armed forces for basic operations and deployment. Overall, the measures being implemented aim at making the appreciative treatment of diverse ethnic and cultural affiliations within the Bundeswehr a tangible experience for those currently working in the military as well as for those who see it with interest in applying from outside.

### **7.2.6 Agenda Diversity for Diversity Management**

As part of the strategic development and operationalization of diversity in the Bundeswehr, the Minister of Defence commissioned Agenda Diversity in 2020, with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders within the Bundeswehr. The project, which was geared toward changing the leadership and organizational culture

and increasing tolerance for diversity, followed a top-down principle that examined conditions to optimize individual potential and identify new approaches in the Bundeswehr. The result was a holistic agenda geared toward tolerance, recognition, and appreciation of the diversity of German military members.

It became clear that a large number of measures that have been implemented are already making a noticeable contribution to strengthening the climate of diversity and inclusion. Nevertheless, there was still room for improvement. Above all, the Bundeswehr must keep its finger on the pulse of its personnel and respond adequately to social change.

As part of the Agenda Diversity project, the 2022+ goals were defined, the fields of action and individual measures were identified and bundled into an overall package of measures. For the ethnicity and nationality dimension of the project, 18 proposed measures were developed with the aim of promoting tolerant, interculturally competent interaction and respectful cooperation between people with and without a migration background in the Bundeswehr. The focus was on attracting talented people with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds to serve in the armed forces and on ensuring greater appreciation of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds among military and civilian personnel.

In addition to the expansion of diversity in open recruitment and staff recruitment, an active approach to people with a migration background was cited as an important building block. At the same time, it was pointed out that the increasing heterogeneity of the workforce requires a more inclusive management style. Additional measures proposed included providing information about people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds in the Bundeswehr and taking this diversity into account in the military's basic and advanced training programs. The new systematization of diversity management will be concretized and also operationalized in a targeted manner through the corresponding projects.

### **7.2.7 Operationalization: Diversity in Military and Civilian Education in the Bundeswehr**

The professionalism and operational readiness of members of the Bundeswehr are determined by their ability to meet challenges quickly and innovatively and to adapt to new situations. Achieving these goals is advanced by making the best possible use of the various competencies, strengths, approaches, characteristics, and personalities of the people in the organization. This presupposes that the value of diversity per se is recognized by members of the Bundeswehr as an important component of personal development as well as of leadership and management skills. Diversity must be understood as an asset for the future viability, attractiveness, and operational readiness of the Bundeswehr and used with confidence.


It was therefore necessary to define binding benchmarks for the training components and content in the organizational areas in order to create a basic capability for all members of the Bundeswehr, which was the objective of the diversity and inclusion concept mentioned above. To this end, it was necessary to specify minimum content requirements for teaching the topic that were common to both the military and civilian parts of the Bundeswehr in order to achieve a minimum level of qualifications and sensitization for all levels and target groups (see Figure 7-2).

As a result, the project was developed in cooperation with 12 departments in the Ministry of Defence, all organizational units, the Center for Innere Führung,<sup>7</sup> the Bundeswehr Education Center, the two universities of the Bundeswehr, the Federal University of Applied Sciences (Department of Bundeswehr Administration), the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and the Armed Forces Office. The project involved a directive on the integration of diversity issues into basic, advanced, and further training and qualification in the Bundeswehr to create level-appropriate (corresponding to the respective target group) understandings of diversity and inclusion for military and civilian training. The aim was to supplement the diversity topics already integrated into various training programs by specifying training

---

<sup>7</sup> Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre.

content and objectives, to achieve overarching harmonization of the basic principles for military and civilian training, and to define their implementation. In the future, diversity topics will be anchored in the training landscape for both courses and non-courses.



**Figure 7-2: Schematic Representation of the Position-Related Training.**

Overall, the directive identifies three ways to implement diversity in training:

- Course-bound teaching of diversity topics by using the Federal Armed Forces’ own training system, including courses;
- Non-course-based individual training using web-based training; and
- Non-course-based onsite training by supervisors or diversity specialists for members of the BMVg without IT access.

In this way, all members of the Bundeswehr can be sensitized to diversity issues through suitable training and qualification formats. This minimum requirement will be implemented throughout the Bundeswehr for the relevant target groups and qualification levels (Figure 7-2). To this end, it is necessary to acquire the necessary skills for the tasks to be performed at the respective duty stations in the sense of competence-oriented training (Streitkräfteamt [SKA]<sup>8</sup>, 2018). See Appendices 7.1 – 7.4.

In addition to this, the conception of training and qualification also takes into account the importance of diversity in the Bundeswehr through a dialogue with those responsible for science and research at the universities of the Bundeswehr as well as through the optional integration of diversity topics in the social science and academic components of the respective courses of study and training. This will foster a tolerant and appreciative approach to diversity.

<sup>8</sup> Armed Forces Office.



### 7.3 WAY FORWARD

The results of Agenda Diversity are to be operationalized through the harmonized and obligatory integration of diversity topics into training and the other measures described above. An example of this is the National Action Plan on Integration: “The intercultural competence of all employees, whether with or without a family history of immigration, is to be promoted. Intercultural opening in the federal administration is a central goal of the federal administration” (Integrationsbeauftragte [IntB]<sup>9</sup>, 2021). The fields of action and core projects formulated in the Action Plan, which are also anchored as measures in the sustainability strategy of the federal government (see Chapter X on Diversity; Deutsche Bundesregierung [BReg]<sup>10</sup>, 2021), will be transferred to the Bundeswehr in 2023 through a diversity strategy for the BMVg. Also included will be projects from the National Action Plan for the Acceptance and Protection of Sexual and Gender Diversity of the Federal Government, which is currently being drawn up.

### 7.4 CONCLUSION

To be a competitive and attractive employer, the Bundeswehr needs a working environment in which everyone can contribute in the best possible way and has a fair chance at development opportunities and unrestricted access to career options, regardless of age, disability, ethnic or cultural origin, gender, religion/belief, or gender identity and sexual orientation. Creating inclusive and appreciative work environments is as important as overcoming possible disadvantages. Respect includes the acceptance of different individual lifestyles as well as ethnic and cultural tolerance and support for employees with family obligations.

In order to cope with future challenges and ensure the operational capability and future viability of the Bundeswehr, diversity must therefore be seen as an opportunity by all employees and ethnic intolerance must be prevented. This is the only way to establish and continuously develop an inclusive work environment characterized by a culture of togetherness, openness, respect and tolerance. It is important to actively demand and promote a tolerant and appreciative approach to diversity so that it can be experienced in each member’s working life.

### 7.5 REFERENCES<sup>11</sup>

- [1] Ahyoud, N., Kwesi Aikins, J., Bartsch, S., Bechert, N., Gyamerah, D., and Wagner, L. (2018). Wer nicht gezählt wird, zählt nicht. Antidiskriminierungs- und gleichstellungsdaten in der einwanderungsgesellschaft – eine anwendungsorientierte einföhrung [Those who are not counted do not count. Anti-discrimination and equality data in the immigration society – an application-oriented introduction]. Vielfalt entscheidet – Diversity in Leadership, Citizens For Europe (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [2] Beigang, S., Fetz, K., Kalkum, D., and Otto, M. (2017). Diskriminierungserfahrungen in Deutschland. Erste ergebnisse einer reprä-sentativen erhebung und einer betroffenenbefragung [Experiences of discrimination in Germany. First results of a representative survey and a survey of affected persons]. Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, Berlin.
- [3] Berlinghoff, M. (2018). Geschichte der migration in Deutschland [The history of migration in Germany]. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Hrsg.), Bonn.

---

<sup>9</sup> Integration Commissioner of the German Government.

<sup>10</sup> German Government.

<sup>11</sup> Titles translated into English by author.



- [4] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [BMVg]. (2016). Weissbuch zur sicherheitspolitik und zur zukunft der Bundeswehr [White Paper on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr]. BMVg (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [5] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [BMVg]. (2019). Fachkonzept vielfalt und inklusion BMVg [Diversity and inclusion concept]. (Hrsg.), Bonn.
- [6] Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat [BMI]. (2019). Darstellung der maßnahmen der Bundesregierung zur sprachförderung und integration [Presentation of the Federal Government's measures for language promotion and integration]. BMI (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [7] Bundesministerium für Justiz [BMJ]. (1949). Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany]. Bundesminister der Justiz (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [8] DE-Statistik. (2021). Bevölkerung in privathaushalten nach migrationshintergrund [Population in private households by migration background]. Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsg.), Bonn.
- [9] Deutsche Bundesregierung [BReg]. (2021). Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie der Bundesregierung: Weiterentwicklung 2021 [Sustainability strategy of the Federal Government: Further development 2021]. Bundesregierung (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [10] Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte [DIMR]. (2012). Inklusion – ein menschenrecht [Inclusion – a human right]. Deutsches Institut für Menschenrecht2 (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [11] El-Mafaalani, A. (2017). Handbuch diskriminierung theoretische, empirische und praktische aspekte zu diskriminierung für wissenschaft und praxis [Handbook on discrimination. Theoretical, empirical and practical aspects of discrimination for science and practice]. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH (Hrsg.), Wiesbaden.
- [12] Hoerder, D. (2010). Geschichte der deutschen migration: Vom Mittelalter bis heute [History of migration in Germany: From the middle ages to the present day]. C.H. Beck (Hrsg.), München.
- [13] Integrationsbeauftragte der Bundesregierung [IntB]. (2021). Nationaler Aktionsplan integration [National Action Plan for integration]. Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration [IntB] (Hrsg.), Berlin.
- [14] Krell, G., Ortlieb, R., and Sieben, B. (2018). Gender und diversity in organisationen: Grundlegendes zur chancengleichheit durch personalpolitik [Gender and diversity in organizations: Basic principles of equal opportunities through human resources policy]. Springer Gabler (Hrsg.), Cham.
- [15] Mor Barak, M.E. (2016). Practical steps for creating an inclusive workplace: Climate for diversity, Climate for Inclusion, and Survey Scales. In: Managing Diversity (S. 301-313), SAGE (Hrsg.), Thousand Oaks, California.
- [16] Nübling, M., Stöbel, U., and Michaelis, M. (2005). Methoden zur erfassung psychischer belastungen. Erprobung eines mess-instruments (COPSOQ) [Methods for the assessment of mental stress. Testing of a measuring instrument (COPSOQ)]. Wirtschaftsverlag NW (Hrsg.), Bremerhaven.
- [17] Oltmer, J.(2017). Globale Migration: Geschichte und gegenwart [Global migration: Past and present]. C.H. Beck (Hrsg.), München.
- [18] Schöb, A. (2013). Definition inklusion. Inklusion schule [Definition of inclusion. Inclusion school]. HABA Sales (Hrsg.), Bad Rodach.

- [19] Simon, P., Piché, V., and Gagnon, A.A. (2015). Social statistics and ethnic diversity. Springer International Publishing (Hrsg.), Cham.
- [20] Streitkräfteamt SKA. (2018). Werkzeugkasten zur kompetenzorientierten ausbildung in den Streitkräften Streitkräfteamt [Toolbox for competence-oriented training in the Armed Forces]. Abteilung Ausbildung Streitkräfte (Hrsg.), Bonn.

## Appendix 7.1: SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACQUIRING COMPETENCY IN MANAGING THE DIVERSITY OF FEMALE AND MALE SOLDIERS ON THE BASIC QUALIFICATION LEVEL

### Learning Area:

Innere Führung<sup>12</sup> / Human Leadership/Intercultural Education/Dealing with Diversity.

General military basic qualification military personnel.

Soldiers serve in the Bundeswehr in an increasingly heterogeneous environment and work with a wide variety of people, regardless of, for example, their age, disability, ethnic or cultural affiliation, gender, religion/belief or gender identity and sexual orientation.

### Individual Actions:

**A-1:** The soldiers deal with the concept of diversity and name opportunities and challenges of diversity in the Bundeswehr.

**A-2:** The soldiers illustrate the handling of diversity in the Bundeswehr using examples from their service and describe the added value resulting from diversity.

According to Competence-oriented training in the armed forces.

---

<sup>12</sup> Leadership Development and Civic Education.

## Appendix 7.2: SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACQUIRING COMPETENCY IN DEALING WITH DIVERSITY OF FEMALE AND MALE SOLDIERS IN THE CAREER GROUP OF OFFICERS AT THE SUPERVISOR QUALIFICATION LEVEL <sup>13</sup>

### Learning Area:

Innere Führung/people management/intercultural education/dealing with diversity.

Flag officer course/officer course general military or comparable.

Officers serve in the Bundeswehr in an increasingly heterogeneous environment, working with a wide variety of people regardless of, for example, their age, disability, ethnic or cultural affiliation, gender, religion and worldview, as well as gender identity and sexual orientation. In doing so, they perform tasks as supervisors, leaders, trainers and educators of the staff under their supervision. At times, these officers may also be responsible for disciplining supervisors/senior officers, and unit leaders.

### Individual Actions:

- A-1:** The officers deal with the concept of diversity and identify opportunities and challenges of diversity in the Bundeswehr.
- A-2:** The officers illustrate how diversity is dealt with in the Bundeswehr using examples from their service practice and describe the added value resulting from diversity.
- A-3:** The officers are able to conduct effective discussions with their subordinates on the value of diversity for the fulfillment of the mission, both preventively and on the basis of any misconduct that may have been identified.
- A-4:** Officers can select and apply targeted measures for their area of responsibility to prevent and sanction uncomradely/uncollegial behavior or discrimination in the area of one of the diversity dimensions.
- A-5:** Officers proactively use diversity in their area of responsibility to expand options for action and take care to involve all stakeholders without discrimination.

---

<sup>13</sup> See Figure 7-2.

### Appendix 7.3: SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACQUIRING COMPETENCY IN DEALING WITH DIVERSITY OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AT THE SUPERVISOR COMPETENCY LEVEL <sup>14</sup>

#### **Learning Area:**

Innere Führung/people management/intercultural education/leadership/management of diversity.

General supervisor competency “dealing with diversity.”

Civilian employees in a supervisor function, as defined in Figure 7-2, work in the Bundeswehr in an increasingly heterogeneous environment with a wide variety of people, regardless of, for example, their age, disability, ethnic or cultural affiliation, gender, religion and world view as well as gender identity and sexual orientation. In doing so, they perform duties as supervisors of the personnel under their control in their respective assigned areas of responsibility and may issue official orders in this context.

#### **Individual Actions:**

- A-1:** Civilian employees in a supervisory role deal with the concept of diversity and identify opportunities and challenges of diversity in the Bundeswehr.
- A-2:** Civilian employees in a supervisory role illustrate how diversity is dealt with in the Bundeswehr division using examples from their work and describe the added value resulting from diversity.
- A-3:** Civilian employees in a supervisory role are able to hold effective discussions with their subordinates on the value of diversity for the fulfillment of the mission, both preventively and on the basis of any misconduct that may have been identified.
- A-4:** Civilian employees in a supervisory role can select and apply targeted measures for their area of responsibility to promote an inclusive organizational and leadership culture and to prevent and sanction antisocial/uncollegial behavior and discrimination in the area of one of the diversity dimensions.
- A-5:** Civilian employees in a supervisory role proactively use diversity in their area of responsibility to expand options for action and take care to involve all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory manner.

---

<sup>14</sup> See Figure 7-2.

**Appendix 7.4: SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACQUIRING COMPETENCY IN DEALING  
WITH DIVERSITY AMONG CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AS WELL AS FEMALE  
AND MALE SOLDIERS AS SPECIALISTS IN DIVERSITY ISSUES  
FUNCTION AND CAPABILITY LEVEL <sup>15</sup>**

**Learning Area:**

Innere Führung/people management/intercultural education/leadership/managing diversity.

Specialist level capability “dealing with diversity.”

Civilian employees and soldiers with training as specialists in diversity issues operate in an increasingly heterogeneous environment in the Bundeswehr division and work with a wide variety of people inside and outside the Bundeswehr division, regardless of their age, disability, ethnic or cultural affiliation, gender, religion and ideology, gender identity and sexual orientation.

In accordance with Figure 7-2, they are predominantly active in an advisory, auditing or teaching capacity on diversity issues; e.g., in the area of personnel recruitment, personnel development and as equal opportunities officers.

**Individual Actions:**

- A-1:** Diversity specialists deal with diversity and identify opportunities and challenges of diversity in the Bundeswehr.
- A-2:** Diversity specialists illustrate how diversity is dealt with in the Ministry of Defence using examples from their work and describe the added value resulting from diversity.
- A-3:** Diversity specialists are familiar with the mechanisms of prejudice, stereotypes, and errors of perception and judgment (e.g., unconscious bias). They recognize behavior in themselves and others that is influenced by perceptual distortions. They can apply methods to consciously counteract these mechanisms or can communicate these methods to others.
- A-4:** Diversity specialists recognize errors in dealing with diversity issues in their advisory, auditing, and teaching function and can independently develop solutions for dealing with diversity in an appreciative and tolerant manner in their area of responsibility.
- A-5:** Diversity specialists can apply methods to support the acquisition of an appreciative and tolerant approach to diversity depending on their respective function.

---

<sup>15</sup> See Figure 7-2.





## **Chapter 8 – FUTURE INSIGHTS FOR ENABLING GREATER ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS: STRATEGIES, TOOLS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION**

**Barbara T. Waruszynski**  
Department of National Defence  
CANADA

### **8.1 INTRODUCTION**

Ethnic diversity refers to multicultural settings in which various ethnic groups identify and differentiate themselves from other groups (Smith, 1986). One's ethnicity is primarily dependent on defined boundaries that differentiate a sense of belonging or not belonging to groups, and may include common cultural traditions (e.g., history, ancestry, religion, language, and customs). Ethnicity is a form of collective identification that is based on linguistic-cultural traits, resources, and history (Barth, 1969). People who identify with a particular ethnic group have a shared name, communicate in the same language, and maintain a common history, lineage, and traditions (Smith, 1986). As Elwert (1997) suggests, a group's cohesion is based on one's kinship, religion, language, or community, where boundaries define the in-groups and out-groups and their affiliations (e.g., ethnic groups or associations, religious institutions, national movements or political parties). Creating a sense of inclusion with in-groups can also send a message of feelings of exclusion or possible intolerance toward out-groups (Elwert, 1997). From a theoretical perspective, ethnicity theory, psychology of intolerance theory, social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory, and theory of cultural racism, all point to the creation of in-groups and out-groups and the stereotypes and prejudicial mindsets and behaviors that result from identifying with a more powerful group.

Ethnic intolerant mindsets and behaviors are contingent on people's lack of acceptance or opposition towards groups as a result of differences in people's ethnic backgrounds, religion, race, and cultural, economic and political affiliations (see Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). People's opposition to particular individuals or groups can be expressed in the forms of stereotypes, prejudice, ethnic conflict or hatred (e.g., ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance). We have read throughout this report examples of racial stereotypes and prejudice, ethnic or racial discrimination and exclusion, and ethnic microaggressions (e.g., jokes, criticisms, and insults attributed to one's ethnicity), all which impede ethnic inclusion. These forms of ethnic intolerance continue to impact people's interrelationships and social interdependencies, including military personnel interactions with other military members and civilians. Thus, exercising greater ethnic inclusion becomes an imperative in creating a diverse, equitable, and respectful working defence environment.

This chapter examines the future insights for enabling greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in multinational military environments. It focuses primarily on ethnic diversity and inclusion management strategies and the tools designed to promote an inclusive workplace, including educational programs intended to foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in defence organizations. Based on the chapters in this report, a framework outlining the factors attributed to ethnic intolerance are summarized, with a focus on historical, political, economic, social, and socio-psychological factors. In addition, a conceptual diagram highlights the factors that are essential for bridging organizational cultural differences and creating greater intercultural and intracultural inclusion across multinational military environments. Key recommendations and concluding thoughts are also put forward, including the research gaps that need to be addressed to help foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion in multinational military settings. The intent is to promote ethnic diversity and inclusion to help support doctrine, education, training, leadership, personnel, and human interoperability for improved NATO capabilities. Follow-on work will include a proposed draft STANAG (Standard Agreement) for NATO, and the

implementation of the results in a NATO Lecture Series to help validate the factors that impede ethnic intolerance and enable ethnic inclusion. A proposed new research activity is highlighted and includes a proposal to organize a workshop to validate the findings of this Technical Report, and to better understand the implications of ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion in multinational military environments related to human interoperability, cultural interoperability, strategic risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict management, and confidence-building measures to advance NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept (Alberque, NATO, 2022).

## **8.2 FROM ETHNIC TOLERANCE TO ETHNIC INCLUSION – MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND TOOLS**

From an ethnic diversity standpoint, tolerance is defined as a “willingness to accept behavior and beliefs that are different from your own, even if you disagree with or disapprove of them” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). Tolerance “tends to emphasize an attitude of inclusiveness regarding diversity especially the extent to which minority populations otherwise susceptible to discrimination are accepted in society” (see Huggins and Debies-Carl, 2014, pp. 9-10). Ethnic or racial tolerance refers to an acceptance of specific individuals or groups who come with different ethnic backgrounds, including race, religions, political affiliations, social-cultural identities, beliefs, and perceptions (see Rubin, Taylor, Pollitt, Krapels, and Pardal, 2014). Indeed, tolerance is necessary for peace; yet, throughout history, intolerant attitudes and beliefs have led to many differences, discrimination, harassment, (systemic) racism, conflicts, violence, and death. Verkuyten and Kollar (2021) state: “Tolerance of dissenting beliefs and ways of living is seen as a necessary condition for societal functioning, whereas intolerance breeds separation, and tensions and hostilities between individuals and groups” (p. 173).

The United Nations, European Union, and political organizations and leaders have emphasized the need for greater tolerance to ensure peace across globally diverse societies by commemorating special days, events and initiatives, including *The International Day for Tolerance* (November 16<sup>th</sup>), *UN Year for Tolerance in 1995*, *European Day of Tolerance*, and *European Commission against Racism and Intolerance* (ECRI; cited in Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021). In 1996, the UN General Assembly promulgated Resolution 51/95 to commemorate November 16<sup>th</sup> as the International Day for Tolerance and a Declaration of Principles on Intolerance (UNESCO, 2018). The Director-General for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) highlighted the need “to defend and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and diversity of knowledge, especially [I]ndigenous knowledge, so that all these outlooks and ways of seeing the world can open up new vistas for humankind through dialogue and exchange” (see UNESCO, 2018; [en.unesco.org/commemorations/toleranceday](http://en.unesco.org/commemorations/toleranceday)). UNESCO continues to focus on education, science and culture to further communicate, motivate, and connect people around the world, and to help foster greater understanding and respect for all people.

The word tolerance focuses on acceptance but is not necessarily all-encompassing. Tolerance toward people or groups of people may take on different cultural meanings that may imply a more negative tone (Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021). According to Klix (2019), the concept of tolerance can be regarded as a negative perception or assessment of something or someone, which “perpetuates negative attitudes towards various minorities and maintains thereby unjust societal relations” (p. 61). The concept of tolerance “can sustain prejudices rather than mitigate them, create pejorative conceptions of the “tolerated” others, and undermine their self-esteem” (Lähdesmäki et al., 2021, pp. 46-47). This develops a “power relation between the tolerating agent and the tolerated subject(s)” as being unequal (Lähdesmäki et al., 2021, p. 47). Thus, tolerance has various meanings, and lends itself to various discursive uses for making “us-them” distinctions” (Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021, p. 181). Seemingly, the classical viewpoint of tolerance focuses on one's ability to tolerate a person or to be tolerated, which implies a more negative viewpoint. This perspective can impact people's perceptions of minorities and may classify a person or group as being inferior to another. Verkuyten and Kollar (2021) state:

*The classical tolerance discourse can also cast minority members in an inferior position. This discourse construes minorities as deviant and marginal, makes a moral distinction in favor of those who are tolerant, and provides a justification for defining some minority practices as beyond the boundaries of what can be tolerated, making intolerance the morally appropriate response. Minority members can recognize these “us-them” implications of the classical tolerance discourse and therefore tend to reject the notion of being tolerated. (p. 182)*

Inclusion, on the other hand, is defined as having a sense of belonging to a group, unit, team, or organization by promoting a work environment that values diversity and equity, promotes a sense of belonging and respect, and further enhances organizational and operational effectiveness. Inclusion represents “the degree to which an employee perceives that he or she is an esteemed member of the work group through experiencing treatment that satisfies his or her needs for belongingness and uniqueness” (Shore et al., 2011, p. 1265). According to the Australian Department of Defence (2014), inclusion “[fosters] a work environment where individual differences...are appreciated and valued as characteristics that enhance our work environment, our productivity and our capability” (p. 4). Inclusion is the driving force that moves away from systemic barriers that are entrenched in organizations and society and encourages individual differences to unfold and be part of the norm.

In their study, Verkuyten and Kollar (2021) state that modern-day perspectives of tolerance attribute empathy as “an antidote to intolerance” (p. 177), where a person is able to take on the experience of another. An empathic person may understand the true meaning and cost of racial or ethnic discrimination and human suffering (see Verkuyten and Kollar, 2021). According to Riess (2017):

*Empathy plays a critical interpersonal and societal role, enabling sharing of experiences, needs, and desires between individuals and providing an emotional bridge that promotes prosocial behavior. This capacity requires an exquisite interplay of neural networks and enables us to perceive the emotions of others, resonate with them emotionally and cognitively, to take in the perspective of others, and to distinguish between our own and others’ emotions. (p. 74)*

As such, empathy can help shape people’s ability to understand the importance of inclusion. Inclusion represents an outcome of how people actually feel whether they are among people or within particular groups (e.g., sports teams), organizations, or society in general.

Diversity management strategies, methods, and tools designed to promote ethnic diversity, equity, and inclusion tend to focus on several key attributes. including:

- a) Culture of belonging;
- b) Inclusive leadership;
- c) Cultural competence and cultural awareness training;
- d) Bystander intervention training;
- e) Unconscious bias training (with a focus on microaggressions and where societal influences have played a major role in creating systemic discrimination and racist attitudes);
- f) Evidence-based prevention programs against right-wing extremism; and
- g) Establishment of allies through allyship training and practices.

Each of these areas will be examined next.

### **8.2.1 Culture of Belonging**

Culture is defined as a complex whole consisting of knowledge, techniques, beliefs, laws, norms, and customs. It represents the shared property of distinct groups and is transferable from generation to generation through language, imitation, and learning. Culture represents “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25). Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension Theory provides a framework that explains cross-cultural dimensions, including power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, long-term vs. short-term orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint. These cultural dimensions shape behavior, structure people’s view of the world, and describe characteristics of a country’s whole culture by explaining cultural differences between nations (Hofstede, 2001).

A culture of belonging requires people to be self-reflexive and cognizant of the language that they use, specifically when attributed to different cultural groups. A culture of belonging can include people participating as allies where safe spaces are created to help open up discussions about racialized and marginalized groups or identities (Ng, Ware, and Greenberg, 2017). Lirio et al. (2008) highlight that inclusion refers to “a sense of belonging,” where “inclusive behaviors such as eliciting and valuing contributions from all employees are part of the daily life in the organization” (p. 443). Shore et al. (2011) also highlight that inclusion encompasses feelings of “belongingness” and “uniqueness.” Shore et al.’s (2011) framework is built around Brewer’s (1991) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, which purports that people feel the need to be similar to others yet want to be unique, all at the same time. Brewer (1991) states that people look for “human needs for validation and similarity to others and [have] a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation [simultaneously]” (p. 477).

Defence organizations around the world are also more focused on developing a culture of belonging. For example, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) highlights the need to create a culture of belonging by setting the following strategic goal in the Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy:

*At its core, diversity is about strong relationships with people both internal and external to the CAF. With our members, we need to establish and maintain relationships that reflect a sincere desire to understand, value, and embrace what makes us different. The aim of this strategic goal is to develop the military’s organizational culture to be more inclusive and respectful which will demonstrate to Canadian society that the CAF truly values and embraces diversity. (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 8)*

The Australian Department of Defence (2017) also asserts:

*To achieve a more inclusive and capable organisation, we will foster work practices which enable men and women, people of different cultural backgrounds, sexual orientation, and those with a disability to contribute to their best potential. We will provide greater education on how respect for individual differences and more inclusive approaches improve Defence and team performance. (p. 9)*

Defence related research is focused on examining the strategies and tools needed to help foster inclusive cultures. For example, research on women in the Regular Force and Primary Reserve in the CAF discovered the need for a sustainable culture change that focuses on promoting better integration of women in the military (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Ouellet, 2018; Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019a). Part of creating sustainable culture change is to understand the role of hegemonic masculinity and how it may impact diversity and inclusion efforts in the military (Waruszynski et al., 2022, p. 77). From an intersectionality perspective, women who are also visible minorities or Indigenous may further experience feelings of exclusion (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019b). Perceptions of visible minorities and Indigenous military and civilian personnel in the CAF have highlighted the importance of creating greater cultural awareness and applying more inclusive approaches to eradicate racist and discriminatory behaviors and attitudes (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019b).

A culture of belonging is contingent on how psychologically safe people feel within an organization. For example, Shore et al. (2018) underscore six specific areas for creating a culture of inclusion:

- 1) Psychological and physical safety (feeling safe when sharing different perspectives from others);
- 2) Involvement in the work (feeling like an insider and having access to important information and resources);
- 3) Feeling respected and valued (being treated as a valued member of the group and organization);
- 4) Influence in decision-making (believing that ideas and perspectives are significant and feeling heard by other members);
- 5) Authenticity (organizations promoting transparency and the sharing of valued identities); and,
- 6) Recognizing, honoring, and advancing diversity (treating individuals fairly, sharing differences for learning and growth, respecting diversity through words and actions by top management; cited in Cheung, Ste-Croix, and Thomson, 2020, pp. 43-44).

In essence, senior leaders and managers need to demonstrate a strong commitment to help promote a culture of inclusion, one that encourages all employees to fully participate and feel a sense of belonging (Shore et al., 2018). Shore et al. (2018) argue that the above six practices and processes of inclusion are important to achieve organizational effectiveness and success (cited in Cheung, Ste-Croix, and Thomson, 2020).

### **8.2.2 Inclusive Leadership**

Leadership plays a fundamental role in fostering inclusive behaviors and in denouncing negative behaviors such as discrimination and harassment. From a leadership perspective, the focus is on ensuring that diversity is a core value that embraces differences and highlights the importance of everyone's contributions. Different worldviews allow organizational leaders and their personnel to examine problems in different ways by listening to everyone's perspectives. Leveraging organizational human capital becomes a key role for all leaders, including defence leaders. Promoting equity, fairness, and equal access to resources and opportunities (including career opportunities) enables personnel to engage in greater collaboration, innovation, and team performance.

Inclusive leadership becomes more apparent with marginalized social groups. Shore and Cheung (2021) highlight the need to research "leader inclusion for employees with marginalized social identities" (p. 1). A qualitative study on visible minorities and Indigenous military and civilian personnel's perceptions on racism and harassment in the CAF discovered that supportive leaders need to take an inclusive approach to help eradicate racialized intolerance and discrimination (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019b). Moreover, a culture change that promotes equity and respect requires a greater representation of visible minority and Indigenous leaders (Waruszynski, MacEachern, and Giroux-Lalonde, 2019b). In essence, "leader inclusion is a style that promotes psychological safety, work group identification, and psychological empowerment" (Shore and Cheung, 2021, p. 11).

Shore et al.'s (2021) inclusion model is grounded in social identity theory where people identify, categorize and compare themselves to other specific social groups. Seemingly, "inclusive leaders who display behaviors that promote the experience of belongingness and uniqueness for all work group members provide an environment in which members (even stigmatized members) are likely to feel that they are part of the in-group" (Shore and Cheung, 2021, p. 11). However, leaders who exercise social exclusion often contribute to people feeling rejected, ostracized or end up being the recipients of microaggressions (Williams, 2007, as cited in Shore and Cheung, 2021). Therefore, it becomes important for leaders to develop a culture of inclusion, particularly for marginalized social groups to ensure that everyone is heard and respected (Shore and Cheung, 2021).



### **8.2.3 Cultural Awareness and Cultural Competence Training**

Cultural awareness refers to being sensitive towards other cultures, including the customs and traditions that are practiced among people who come from various cultures and backgrounds. Indeed, “someone’s cultural awareness is their understanding of the differences between themselves and people from other countries or backgrounds, especially differences in attitudes and values” (Collins Dictionary, 2022). Training in cultural and intercultural awareness allows people to learn about and respect the differences and similarities among people and across cultures. Our cultural awareness impacts how we verbally communicate and how we use body language to communicate our thoughts, beliefs, and customs with people who come from diverse cultures and backgrounds. Chapter two highlighted that by creating cultural awareness, people start to move away from creating stereotypes and prejudiced views which are normally embedded in microaggressions and unconscious biases.

People develop their cultural competence when they demonstrate an “ability to understand, appreciate and interact with people from cultures or belief systems different from one’s own” (DeAngelis, 2015). Intercultural competence is based on four key building blocks: “knowledge, awareness, attitudes, and skills” (Diversity Atlas, 2020). Additional supporting skills involve “critical reflection and emotional intelligence,” and “intercultural teamwork, conflict management and relationship building” (Diversity Atlas, 2020).

Part of cultural competence is cultural intelligence, which is:

*A combination of emotional and social intelligence that is acquired through the maturation process of observing and analyzing how people function in different societal situations. Further, the application of culture on the emotional and social intelligence generates human understanding and culturally informed solutions within the cultural context. (Kannan, 2018, cited in Diversity Atlas, 2020)*

Essentially, when cultural intelligence is highly developed, mindfulness can allow individuals to act and respond to a situation in a more culturally intelligent manner (e.g., being more aware of one’s assumptions, keeping an open mind, and being empathic toward people’s perceptions from a cultural perspective; Davis and Wright, 2009). Maintaining an open-mindedness approach could help to identify racist behaviors and attitudes and could also encourage cultural change and inclusiveness through Intercultural Dialogue (ICD) and human understanding of different worldviews.

The European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (2008) conducted a study for the European Commission to understand how European, national and local authorities and civilian actors could improve the ICD that would enable greater cultural diversity and intercultural communications. The findings focused on four key areas to help promote economic and social inclusion policies and policies designed to foster greater cultural diversity, including:

- 1) “Mapping roads” to help identify and eliminate exclusionary and discriminatory practices;
- 2) “Break down walls” to fight inequality, prejudice, stereotypes, and racism;
- 3) “Building bridges” through the establishment of intercultural skills, education, and develop competencies to improve intercultural dialogue; and,
- 4) “Sharing spaces” to allow for interactive communication and dialogue in safe environments (pp. XIII-XIV).

To enable greater ICD and acceptance of different worldviews, the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (2008) put forward several key recommendations, including:

- 1) *Recognise that ICD depends upon the full implementation of human, civic, economic, social and cultural rights;*
- 2) *Acknowledge ICD at the heart of citizenship and integration strategies;*

- 3) *Approach ICD as a transversal issue which is part of a complex system of governance based on diversity, equality and participation;*
- 4) *Develop strategies which recognise ICD as a process of interactive communication within and between cultures;*
- 5) *[Acknowledge that] ICD depends on the opening up of institutional structures;*
- 6) *Encourage the active participation of the media/culture industries in ICD;*
- 7) *Integrate the development of intercultural competencies and skills as part of an overall political vision or national strategy on life-long learning;*
- 8) *Strengthen ICD in EU neighbourhood policies;*
- 9) *Further expand EU cooperation with other European and international bodies;*
- 10) *Establish a clear concept/definition of ICD;*
- 11) *Implement and harmonise evaluation methods for ICD programmes and activities; and,*
- 12) *Improve research methodologies for intercultural comparisons (pp. XIV-XV).*

Promoting greater cultural awareness and competence becomes one of the key drivers for enabling greater ethnic inclusion. In essence, cultural competence “requires an open attitude, self-awareness, awareness of others, cultural knowledge, and cultural skills” (CultureVision, 2022).

#### **8.2.4 Bystander Intervention Training**

Bystander intervention is defined as “the willingness to safely take action and help someone in time of need” (Department of Defense, 2014, p.21). Bystander intervention training helps to address the many issues and challenges presented as a result of the systemic barriers that remain within our institutions. Bystander intervention training has been used to prevent harassment and discrimination, including (systemic) racism and hateful conduct, sexual assaults, and bullying. McBride, Gold, Faber, and Haney (2021) state:

*Training should focus upon certain elements present in SAPR [Sexual Assault Prevention Response] training, such as the importance of bystander intervention strategies and the idea of the collective responsibility model, emphasizing the role every servicemember can play in preventing harm by recognizing red flags, reporting warning signs, and creating a climate that is inhospitable to racial extremism. (p. 27)*

Bystander intervention training has proved to be an effective way of demonstrating responsibility when faced with inappropriate or harmful behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, bullying, or racialized harassment). A key training component in bystander intervention training is to help people develop enough confidence to call out inappropriate and harmful behaviors. Bystander intervention training was highlighted in the study on racism in the Canadian military in Chapter 5, emphasizing the need for people to speak-up to change racist behaviors and eliminate racism through a bystander intervention approach intended to support Indigenous people or visible minorities.

The United States Department of Defense has put forward “favorable and unfavorable indicators and outcomes” to ensure more effective bystander intervention training (Department of Defense, 2020, para. 2). As such, leaders need to focus on promoting favorable behaviors that would generate positive culture change (Department of Defense, 2020). Similarly, the Canadian military has developed a bystander intervention program designed to mitigate sexual misconduct across the military environment. This program helps people to learn how to “react decisively to sexual misconduct and harassment when they see it” (Department of National Defence, 2022, para. 1.19). Bystanders and leaders learn the positive steps required to mitigate sexual misconduct in the military by stepping up (e.g., allies) to support any personnel who undergo incidents of sexual misconduct (Department of National Defence, 2022). A bystander intervention program

can also be used to address factors that influence ethnic intolerance (e.g., overt and covert racism, including microaggressions and unconscious biases). Calling out inappropriate behaviors is key to creating a culture of respect and inclusion.

### **8.2.5 Unconscious Bias Training**

Unconscious bias training is being used across organizations to help personnel understand the implicit biases that are ingrained in our social development and thinking. Our mindsets and behaviors are based on our social development, experiences, perceptions and worldviews. The goal is for people to learn about themselves and take heart in changing certain behaviors and stereotypes to avoid creating in-groups and out-groups. As such, organizations are employing scenarios and role playing to understand how our biases can impact other people's feelings (e.g., use of microaggressions, stereotypes, and misconceptions that may lead to discrimination, harassment and racist attitudes and beliefs).

Gino and Coffman (2021) highlight that unconscious bias training is used to raise people's awareness of making quick judgments about others, particularly when these judgments are attributed to people of color, ethnic backgrounds, or gender. According to these authors, however, the conventional methods used for unconscious bias training have proved to be ineffective, sometimes leading to more discrimination among people of color and women. For example,

*In a 2019 meta-analysis of more than 490 studies involving some 80,000 people, the psychologist Patrick Forscher and his colleagues found that UB [unconscious bias] training did not change biased behavior. Other studies have revealed that the training can backfire: Sending the message that biases are involuntary and widespread – beyond our control, in other words – can make people feel they're unavoidable and lead to more discrimination, not less. (para. 2)*

The most effective methods associated with unconscious bias training demands for more than creating awareness: people need to understand and manage their own biases and focus on changing their behaviors. Part of this change requires the need for people to monitor their progress over time to determine if they are demonstrating less biased behaviors and prejudicial stereotyping after training (Gino and Coffman, 2021).

### **8.2.6 Prevention Programs Against Right-Wing Extremism**

Programs designed to prevent people from joining right-wing extremist groups will help individuals to better understand and address racial extremism. The focus is on preventing racial extremism and understanding the repercussions of extremist attitudes and behaviors. McBride, Gold, Faber, and Haney (2021) put forward several recommendations to prevent right-wing extremist attitudes and behaviors:

- 1) Develop and apply an evidence-based prevention framework to understand and address racial extremism (p. 18);
- 2) Adopt the robust and multidimensional approach [used] for responding to the problem of sexual harassment and assault [and applying it] to the problem of racial extremism (p. 22);
- 3) Develop evidence-based training requirements and learning objectives to guide [the] development of a training curriculum to prevent racial extremism (p. 24);
- 4) Adopt a system for reporting racial extremism and documenting its full effects (p. 28); and
- 5) Consider removing reporting of racism and racial extremism from the chain of command (p. 34).

Furthermore, Canada's *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* focuses on early prevention of harmful behaviors, including for example, raising awareness about radicalization to violence, enhancing people's critical thinking skills to prevent future influences or manipulation from extremist groups, and providing training and curricula to channel people's grievances into positive social action and away from violent extremist ideologies (Government of Canada, 2018, pp. 15-16). By building on the current knowledge

on extremism in society and sharing and using the knowledge for greater prevention of extremist attitudes and behaviors, the Government of Canada is focusing on building greater resilience to counter online radicalization to violence and providing supportive intervention strategies. For example, “preventing and countering radicalization to violence online is complex and requires a multi-stakeholder approach that includes national and international engagement with [youth], technology companies, [front-line workers and practitioners], academic researchers, and civil society” (Government of Canada, 2018, p. 25).

The European Union (EU) also states that the criminal justice system and law enforcement alone will not prevent extremism across and within European societies (European Parliament, 2022). Among several priorities, the highest priority for the EU member states is to look at measures that will effectively address right-wing extremism:

*The EU should launch campaigns against right-wing extremism at [the] EU level and encourage the development and funding of long-term-programmes supporting local grassroots organisations and citizens’ initiatives at [the] local level to help develop the population’s resistance to right-wing extremism.* (European Parliament, 2022, p. 15)

The EU acknowledges related priorities that are important in the prevention of radicalism and extremism in its societies. These priorities include:

- a) Additional research to help prevent extremism;
- b) The political will and leadership and responsibility in leading efforts designed to prevent extremism;
- c) The need to strengthen civil society to uphold democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights;
- d) The need to keep in mind the potential for “Euroscepticism” if the messaging is not clear; and
- e) Removing online “right-wing extremist groups that use, promote and incite hate speech, hate crime and violence from popular global platforms” (European Parliament, 2022, pp. 15-16).

The *United States National Strategy on Countering Domestic Terrorism* also outlines a blueprint to help improve the EU counter-terrorism model through four key areas, including:

- 1) Information gathering;
- 2) Prevention;
- 3) Enforcement; and
- 4) Building resilience (Leidig and van Mieghem, 2021).

### **8.2.7 Establishment of Allies Through Allyship Training and Practices**

The Merriam-Webster (2021) dictionary defines ‘ally’ as “one that is associated with another as a helper; [or] a person or group that provides assistance and support in an ongoing effort, activity, or struggle.” Forbes defines ally as “any person that actively promotes and aspires to advance the culture of inclusion through intentional, positive and conscious efforts that benefit people as a whole” (Atcheson, 2018, para. 5). Furthermore, DasGupta and Polsinello (2020) define ally as “someone who actively questions, rejects, and combats exclusionary ideology and works against oppression. Allies support and advocate for populations and communities of which they are not a part, using their power and privilege to uplift others” (para. 3).

Research highlights that a culture that embraces the concept of allies generally fosters greater inclusion in the workplace. For example, organizations focusing on creating gender equity have incorporated allies as part of their organizational diversity efforts (Johnson and Smith, 2018). For instance, male allies are regarded as “members of an advantaged group committed to building relationships with women, expressing as little sexism in their own behavior as possible, understanding the social privilege conferred by their gender, and demonstrating active efforts to address gender inequities at work and in society” (Johnson and Smith, 2018,

para. 4). Johnson and Smith (2018) also show that when “men are deliberately engaged in gender inclusion programs, 96% of organizations see progress – compared to only 30% of organizations where men are not engaged” (para. 2).

Moreover, a research study examined over 5,000 Canadians and uncovered that women, LGBTQ2+ communities, and Black, Indigenous and people of color who have allies at work felt 1.6 times less likely to perceive barriers in their work environment and twice as likely to perceive their workplace as being bias-free (DasGupta and Polsinello, 2020). However, less than 50% of under-represented groups in Canada feel that they have allies to support them at work (DasGupta and Polsinello, 2020).

In fostering diversity and inclusion in the workplace through the establishment of allies, leaders and personnel need to create a culture of belonging. Positive change may be manifested through effective allies as these allies hold the power to help minority groups. It follows that a culture of belonging dictates that “the majority must help, support and advocate for the minority” (Atcheson, 2018, para. 4).

### **8.3 TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: FACTORS THAT IMPACT ETHNIC INTOLERANCE – A RECAP**


Based on the chapters in this report, there are specific factors that may impact ethnic intolerance. First, ethnic intolerance is attributed to historical, political, economic, social, and socio-psychological factors. As illustrated in Figure 8-1, these factors impact people’s attitudes and behaviors towards others and influence ethnic intolerance. Historical factors include primarily intergenerational grievances that have resulted in oppression, trauma, and conflict experienced by people in particular cultures or countries. Political factors include political parties, political systems and structures, poor relations between states, and military conflicts based on political interference. Economic factors are attributed to competition for scarce resources and economic instability. Social factors are primarily concerned with power relations, competition, polarization, social instability, and conflict ascribed to ethnic, cultural and religious identities. For example, people may be influenced by social networks such as family members and friends to take part in extremist ideologies; while others may go through personal grievances, vulnerabilities, need a sense of belonging to a group, or have an inclination towards violence (Government of Canada, 2018, pp. 8-9).

Second, the socio-psychological factors that were explored in this report focused on those factors which may have an influence on ethnic intolerance, including: unconscious biases, microaggressions, racism and systemic racism, and hateful conduct and right-wing extremism. The attribution of stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination, and ethnic conflict help to explain the interrelationships of ethnic intolerance between individuals, organizations, and communities. As illustrated throughout this report, ethnic intolerance can take on different forms of expression, including ethnic discrimination and harassment (e.g., stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes, both individually and from a societal perspective); racism (e.g., Waruszynski, MacEachern, Browne, and Woycheshin, 2022); xenophobic attitudes that are based on religious, political, economic and social-cultural identities and beliefs; and ethnic conflict and hatred. Inter and intra-group influences, competition between and within groups and social networks, separation and isolation, past experiences and historical influences, and perceived threats (Government of Canada, 2018) play a critical role in extremist behaviors and tend to be at the root of intolerance. These factors impact individuals, families, communities and society in general, e.g., “physical, emotional and psychological impacts; normalization of violent action and rhetoric; polarization; and reduction of trust” (Government of Canada, 2018, pp. 13-14). For instance:

*Individuals who hold far-right violent extremist views are also very active online. Through chat forums and online networks, these individuals participate in a community that extends beyond borders. Individuals and groups with far-right violent extremist views use the online space to legitimize and normalize their views and narratives. They exploit public concerns in a way that will create a culture of fear, hatred, and mistrust, and to espouse and promote the use of violence. (Government of Canada, 2018, p. 24)*



Chapter 2 highlighted in greater detail how these factors may influence negative attitudes and behaviors towards ethnic individuals, groups and communities who come from different cultures, ethnicities, and racialized backgrounds.



**Figure 8-1: Ethnic Intolerance Factors (Paradigm and Legend).**

The above factors help to shape a proposed conceptual model on ethnic inclusion. These factors have been drawn from the literature on ethnic intolerance and have served to illustrate the implications on creating greater ethnic diversity and inclusion across multinational defence environments. It is also important to examine the intersectionality of the socio-psychological factors and the cultural, ethnic, and gender-based experiences that may better explain ethnic intolerant attitudes and behaviors in pluralistic and multicultural environments. Moreover, the historical, political, economic, and social factors need to be placed within the context of the cultures under study.

## 8.4 CONCEPTUAL MODEL ON ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION

The conceptual model in Figure 8-2 illustrates the strategies and planning that are needed for the development of ethnic inclusion in multinational military environments. From strategic, operational, and tactical planning perspectives, defence organizations can employ evidenced-based strategies and programs designed to generate ethnic inclusion in multinational military cultures. For example, military defence organizations need to foster multinational military cultures, shared communications and situational awareness, operational and organizational effectiveness, mental health and well-being, shared knowledge, skills, expertise and abilities, and greater human interoperability. At the strategic level, multinational military organizations need to generate work cultures that are inclusive of diverse ethnic groups. Based on previous research, “there is evidence to suggest that subtle differences in the organizational and national cultures of the countries that contribute personnel to missions can have an impact on the overall operational effectiveness of the multinational force” (Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 2008, p. 1-1).

Moreover, by taking on an inclusive leadership approach, diverse leaders need to establish shared governance and policies, including a shared vision and mission, core values, ethics, and human rights policies. Political, economic and social factors need to be considered when examining the interrelationships in multinational defence environments, and diversity and inclusion management strategies, methods and



tools should be available to help foster better working relations and social interdependencies. The aim is to enable a climate of inclusion where everyone contributes to the overall mission and feels that their contributions have merit in achieving defence mission goals.

Shared communications and situational awareness across multidisciplinary teams require people to use collaborative tools and technologies, share information and knowledge, employ team mental models and promote cross-cultural communications. As Tresch (2007) points out, multicultural alliances, such as NATO, experience different subcultures, and thereby require greater communication skills, adaptability, and flexibility to help focus on the many multicultural challenges that exist across integrated military personnel.

Operational and organizational effectiveness represents the ultimate outcome in achieving mission goals. As NATO continues to reassess its defence and security posture in response to global threats, it becomes important for NATO defence organizations to come together and focus on strategic risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict management, and confidence-building measures (Alberque, NATO, 2022). Enabling improved interoperable forces across NATO will involve an integrated approach to shared situational awareness, information sharing, and decision-making capabilities. Part of this integrated approach will include the need for greater ethnic diversity and management across all NATO national defence organizations and their allies for enabling greater global peace and security through advanced alliance capabilities.

Mental health and well-being are contingent on multinational military personnel coming together within a socially cohesive environment. Resilience is dependent on fostering a culture of belonging where ethnic diversity is a key contributor to the health and wellness of personnel. Psychological safety plays a significant role in enabling greater ethnic diversity and inclusion across the international defence membership.

Training and development initiatives (e.g., cultural awareness and competence, unconscious bias, bystander intervention, and right-wing extremism prevention programs) need to focus on promoting ethnic inclusion in the workplace and across alliances. Ethnic diversity and inclusion curricula will be based on promoting a shared understanding of different ethnicities and cultures through cross-cultural awareness and competence training, bystander intervention training, unconscious bias training, allyship, and right-wing extremism prevention training. For example, education and training in cultural awareness and cultural competence will contribute to greater social cohesion and integration, thereby advancing interoperability across allies.

Human interoperability is contingent on enhancing mutual trust and respect, team and social cohesion, sense of belonging, interpersonal relationships and conflict management. In essence, interoperability is the capability to work together by employing “harmonized doctrines, standards, equipment, and procedures” (Linganna, 2022, para. 2). Winslow and Everts (2001) highlight the importance of cultural interoperability, specifically, the “shared way by which multinational military coalitions or alliances ‘do business’ that contributes to mission success” (cited in McKee, Febraro, and Riedel, 2008, pp. 1-3). This cultural interoperability becomes an essential component for multinational defence organizations who are examining joint responses to the changing threat environment. The implications of cultural interoperability would “require mutual understanding in a joint multinational scenario as well as the ability of a military to work together with soldiers from varied cultures” (Linganna, 2022, para. 5).

Based on the information provided in this report, and as depicted in Figure 8-2, it is proposed that any of the historical, political, economic, social and socio-psychological factors attributed to ethnic intolerance would impact the strategic, operational, and tactical pillars and their interrelationships. Annex B provides an overview of the factors, interventions and outcomes that promote ethnic inclusion at the individual, group, organizational, societal, and global levels.

**FUTURE INSIGHTS FOR ENABLING GREATER ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS: STRATEGIES, TOOLS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION**



**Figure 8-2: Conceptual Model to Enable Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in Multinational Military Environments.**

## **8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the chapters in this report, there are several recommendations that need to be highlighted in helping to support and foster ethnic diversity and inclusion in multinational military environments. These recommendations include:

- 1) Develop and incorporate diversity management policies, strategies, programs and tools within NATO to enable greater ethnic diversity and inclusion, and support research on related topics (e.g., research on ethnic diversity and inclusion through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme).
- 2) Examine NATO's existing Diversity and Inclusion Programme and Action Plan and assess the effectiveness of the Programme and Action Plan as they relate to "ethnic diversity and inclusion" and the associated policies, strategies, programs, tools and activities intended to enable positive culture change for personnel working in multinational military environments.
- 3) Promote a culture of ethnic inclusion within NATO by incorporating the following evidenced-based strategies, methods and training:
  - a) Foster a culture of belonging;
  - b) Learn and develop inclusive leadership skills;
  - c) Promote and institute cultural competence and cultural awareness training;
  - d) Implement bystander intervention training;
  - e) Employ unconscious bias training;
  - f) Put into practice evidence-based prevention programs against right-wing extremism; and
  - g) Develop allyship training and practices.
- 4) Examine the impacts of historical, political, economic, social, and cultural factors and how they influence ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion across different NATO and non-NATO countries.
- 5) Undergo a systematic review of the existing recruitment, retention, and promotion policies to determine if there are ethnic and racial barriers across personnel's career life cycle.
- 6) Identify the factors that influence diverse and inclusive organizational climates (e.g., morale, trust, group cohesion, respect, culture of belonging, and leadership) and assess how these factors impact organizational performance, job satisfaction and readiness across NATO.
- 7) Establish ethnic diversity and inclusion criteria for measuring performance in multinational defence environments.
- 8) Develop an unbiased recognition program (i.e., an incentive program) to promote effective ethnic diversity and inclusion across alliances.
- 9) Develop and implement procedures for members to report incidents of ethnic and racial discrimination and harassment (including gender), establish procedures for tracking complaints, and ensure members are protected from any retaliation (e.g., whistle blower protection act).
- 10) Establish structures to help institute a coaching and mentoring program designed to promote and educate personnel on ethnic and racial disparities and injustices and the importance of ethnic diversity and inclusion.
- 11) Develop a multinational committee (representation based on race and ethnicity) to help promote an inclusive culture and examine the intersectional factors that may impact military and civilian personnel (e.g., using a Gender-based Analysis Plus lens).

- 12) Institute equity and inclusion experts/advisors in ethnic and racial inclusion to address systemic racism and help promote a diverse and inclusive culture.
- 13) Develop a Lecture Series on ethnic diversity and inclusion with a focus on the factors that influence ethnic intolerance and promote ethnic inclusion.
- 14) Develop a conference to examine equity, ethnic diversity, and ethnic inclusion within the NATO alliance.
- 15) Establish best practices and lessons learned on how to institute greater ethnic inclusion and prevent ethnic intolerance.

## **8.6 MILITARY RELEVANCE**

NATO's role within the collective defence and security environment focuses on having the right people and capabilities to protect the freedoms and security of all its members. Through political and military means, NATO concentrates on establishing collective defence and security through the spirit of solidarity and cohesion across the alliance (NATO, 2022). Securing peace and freedom through collective cooperation across its allied members is fundamental to NATO's mission. Changes in the security environment (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, threats impacting energy and food resources, cyber-attacks, and damages against infrastructure) have prompted NATO to exercise greater flexibility in promoting peace and security with its Euro-Atlantic partner countries both inside and outside of NATO (NATO, 2022). NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept moves away from arms control and focuses primarily on strategic risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict management, and confidence-building measures to deal with adversaries who continue to impinge on global peace and security, including the threats and proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on earth and in outer space (see Alberque, NATO, 2022). As a result, part of this strategic concept needs to include the relevance of ethnic diversity and inclusion across the alliance, and how examples of ethnic intolerance and ethnic conflict (including racism and right-wing extremism) and ethnic inclusion need to be embedded in education and training to enable positive culture change for personnel working in multinational military environments.

Through the establishment of NATO-led operations and exercises, and the need to focus on human security through risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict management and confidence-building measures, it becomes necessary to examine the cultural implications of building effective alliances with member countries. Fostering strong relationships and social cohesion focus on the need to have policies in place that promote and reflect ethnic inclusion. Ethnic inclusion helps to shape organizational performance and the operational environment by providing greater awareness of ethnic diversity and its impact on civil and military cooperation, integration, and readiness.

Promoting an equal opportunities program within NATO would include the need to establish ethnic diversity and inclusion doctrine, policies, programs and activities to help educate military personnel on the importance of cultural awareness and cultural intelligence. Using climate surveys on ethnic diversity and inclusion would also provide defence leaders with a better understanding on how to address issues attributed to racial or ethnic racism, harassment and discrimination. Through international discussions on ethnic diversity and inclusion, leaders will be better prepared to address the issues attributed to ethnic intolerance and the tools and training required to develop standardized education and training on ethnic diversity and inclusion. These discussions can lead to an effective STANAG on ethnic diversity and inclusion to prevent ethnic intolerance, including racism and right-wing extremism within the NATO alliance.

Comprehensive change will involve cultural changes that foster open mindsets to advance NATO's operational military capabilities and interoperability. These cultural changes will also contribute to more desirable changes reflected within the organizational climates, and doctrine, policies, and processes across national defence environments, and will further impact human security capabilities.

To enable a more collective defence and security environment, a lecture series on ethnic diversity and inclusion, with a focus on ethnic or racial intolerance, is being proposed to NATO and will provide a learning environment in three locations (National Defence College in Sofia, Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute in Florida, United States, and the Royal Military Academy in Brussels). This lecture series will be the culmination of the research highlighted in the RTG HFM-301 Technical Report and additional literature and case studies found in multinational defence environments. This lecture series will include examples of ethnic intolerance, the factors that contribute to ethnic intolerance, a conceptual model on fostering ethnic inclusion, and the associated factors that are integral to enabling greater ethnic inclusion, including diverse management practices and training in:

- a) Culture and climate of belonging;
- b) Inclusive leadership;
- c) Cultural competence and cultural awareness training;
- d) Bystander intervention training;
- e) Unconscious bias training (with a focus on microaggressions and where societal influences have played a major role in creating systemic discrimination and racism);
- f) Evidence-based prevention programs against right-wing extremism; and
- g) The establishment of allies through allyship training and practices.

Finally, a potential follow-on activity is being proposed as the next step to further examine ethnic diversity and inclusion within NATO. This proposed Technical Activity Proposal (TAP) will include the conduct of a research study based on interviews and focus groups with defence personnel in the NATO School and will include an organized workshop to validate the findings of this Technical Report. The aim is to better understand the implications of ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion in multinational military environments as these implications are related to human interoperability, cultural interoperability, strategic risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict management, and confidence-building measures to advance NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept (Alberque, NATO, 2022). Discussions as well as education and training in ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion will help to support current and future NATO-based missions, operations, strategies, policies, doctrine, procedures and capabilities. The goal is to strengthen mutual cooperation across NATO and other multinational alliances by creating diverse and inclusive environments for all NATO personnel.

## **8.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

NATO's efforts to promote "military diversity as a key transformational element" (NATO, 2013) will require its defence and security member-based organizations to foster greater cultural and ethnic diversity in multinational military environments. To better understand how NATO and its member countries could foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion, the RTG HFM-301 examined ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion in defence organizations. Specifically, the team examined national case studies attributed to the different forms of ethnic intolerance, and the need to overcome cultural differences to enable more cooperative relations within and between military organizations to help improve cross-cultural interactions and operational and organizational effectiveness.

The main purpose of RTG HFM-301 was to identify the key factors associated with ethnic intolerance and ethnic inclusion among military personnel, develop a framework to explain these factors, and offer evidenced-based strategies, tools and programs to generate inclusive organizational cultures in defence organizations. For the past four years, the RTG reviewed the current research on ethnic intolerance and inclusion and identified the best practices and lessons learned in diversity management, policies, and practices from an international perspective. Part of this effort was to examine the strategies, methods, and tools to prevent ethnic intolerance in the military, with a focus on the impacts of ethnic intolerance and inclusion on operational and organizational effectiveness in the military.



Based on the literature and international case studies reviewed in this Technical Report, the main findings revealed that ethnic intolerance is attributed to historical, political, economic, social, and socio-psychological factors that impact the interrelationships across and between military personnel and defence organizations. Moreover, the socio-psychological factors that influence ethnic intolerance were discussed at great length and focused on the elements that impact intolerant attitudes and behaviors towards ethnic minority groups, including unconscious biases, microaggressions, racism and systemic racism, and hateful conduct and right-wing extremism. These factors were illustrated in a framework that spoke to the elements impacting ethnic intolerance.

The RTG members also provided strategies, tools, and evidenced-based training programs to help foster diverse and inclusive organizational cultures in multinational defence organizations, including:

- a) Fostering a culture of belonging;
- b) Establishing inclusive leadership practices and skills;
- c) Promoting cultural competence and cultural awareness training, bystander intervention training, and unconscious bias training;
- d) Developing evidence-based prevention programs against right-wing extremism; and
- e) Establishing allies through allyship training and practices.

Moreover, a conceptual model on ethnic diversity and inclusion was illustrated to help organizational leaders to understand the factors that would enable greater ethnic inclusion in defence organizations and to employ these factors to develop new knowledge and skills, strategies, policies, and programs on ethnic diversity and inclusion.

The RTG members also developed a set of recommendations to help foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion. These recommendations are intended to establish diversity management policies, strategies, programs and tools that will help NATO and defence organizations to enable greater ethnic diversity and inclusion. To generate greater positive culture change, defence organizations have an opportunity to examine the factors that would help to explain greater inclusion (e.g., inclusive leadership, unconscious bias training, bystander intervention, and prevention of right-wing extremism). Leaders need to align their mission and vision of diversity and inclusion management policies and strategies within their programs and activities to enable positive culture change.

The main outcome of this RTG is to inform NATO's strategic efforts to promote ethnic diversity and inclusion as key transformational elements to help overcome cultural differences in multinational military environments. This cross-national research activity will inform policies, programs, and organizational cultural changes intended to promote greater ethnic diversity and inclusion and improved military readiness and resilience. The findings will be used in a NATO Lecture Series and a STANAG on how to foster greater ethnic diversity and inclusion across multinational military environments.

In addition, several RTG members contributed to a new edited volume on "Team Diversity and Inclusion in Defence and Security: International Perspectives," which will be published commercially in 2023 – 24, with co-editors Dr. Barbara Waruszynski, Dr. Yantsislav Yanakiev, and Dr. Daniel McDonald. Several chapters are devoted to systemic or institutional issues related to racism, ethnic diversity, unprofessional conduct, ideological extremism, international case studies looking at diverse and inclusive defence and security-based organizations, and the recommended practices to promote greater diversity and inclusion (e.g., evidenced-based diversity programs and training, leadership practices, intersectionality research, allyship practices to foster diversity and inclusion, and cross-cultural competencies through cultural awareness and training).



Finally, as defence organizations are coming up against right-wing extremism within their ranks, it is hoped that the results and recommendations stemming from this report will further inform NATO's defence capabilities (i.e., doctrine, education, training, leadership, personnel, and human interoperability) to help promote greater ethnic diversity and inclusion within NATO and across its multinational member defence organizations, alliances, and operations.

## **8.8 REFERENCES**

- [1] Alberque, W. NATO. (2022). The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control. <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/the-new-nato-strategic-concept-and-the-end-of-arms-control>
- [2] Atcheson, S. (2018). Allyship – The key to unlocking the power of diversity. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shereatcheson/2018/11/30/allyship-the-key-to-unlocking-the-power-of-diversity/?sh=5d4236e649c6>
- [3] Barth, F. (1969). Introduction, in F. Barth (Ed.) Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of culture difference (pp. 9-38), Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin.
- [4] Brewer, M.B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17(5), 475-482.
- [5] Cambridge Dictionary. (2022). Tolerance definition. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tolerance>
- [6] Cheung, I., Ste-Croix, C., and Thomson, M. H. (2020). Team diversity and inclusion: A literature review. HumanSystems<sup>®</sup> Incorporated. Contract Report, DRDC-RDDC-2020-C140, September 2020. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [7] Collins Dictionary. (2022). Cultural awareness. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/cultural-awareness>
- [8] CultureVision. (2022). Cultural competence learning guide. <https://www.crculturerevision.com/Documents/CultureVisionCulturalCompetenceLearningGuide.pdf>
- [9] DasGupta, N., and Polsinello, K. (2020). Small actions, big impact: How to be an ally at work and why it matters. 24 November 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.bcg.com/en-ca/publications/2020/how-to-practice-allyship-foster-ally-culture>
- [10] Davis, K.D., and Wright, J. (2009). Culture and cultural intelligence. In K.D. Davis (Ed.), *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership* (pp. 9-22). Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press.
- [11] DeAngelis, T. (2015, March). In search of cultural competence. *Monitor on Psychology*, 46(3). <https://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/03/cultural-competence>
- [12] Department of Defence (Australia). (2014). Defence diversity and inclusion strategy 2012 – 2017. Centre of Diversity Expertise; 2014 [cited 2021 Oct 14]. Available from: <https://www.defencejobs.gov.au/-/media/DFR/Files/DefenceDiversityandInclusionStrategy.pdf>
- [13] Department of Defence (Australia). (2017). Department of Defence, Pathway to change: Evolving defence culture 2017 – 22, November 2017, p. 9.

- [14] Department of Defense. (2014). 2014 – 2016 Sexual assault prevention strategy. 30 April 2014. [https://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/prevention/DoD\\_SAPR\\_Prevention\\_Strategy\\_2014-2016.pdf](https://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/prevention/DoD_SAPR_Prevention_Strategy_2014-2016.pdf)
- [15] Department of Defense. (2020). Bystander intervention. [https://www.defenseculture.mil/Portals/90/Documents/Toolkit/Key%20Topics/PSTRAT-Bystander\\_Intervention-20201216.pdf?ver=CJuvvCYD5bxa1QfAA8911Q%3D%3D](https://www.defenseculture.mil/Portals/90/Documents/Toolkit/Key%20Topics/PSTRAT-Bystander_Intervention-20201216.pdf?ver=CJuvvCYD5bxa1QfAA8911Q%3D%3D)
- [16] Department of National Defence. (2016). Canadian Armed Forces diversity strategy 2016. Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2016.
- [17] Department of National Defence. (2022). The Operation HONOUR manual. Chapter 1 – Overview. Bystander intervention training. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/sexual-misconduct/orders-policies-directives/operation-honour-manual/overview.html>
- [18] Diversity Atlas. (2020). What’s the difference between CQ, cultural competency, cultural awareness and what does your organization actually need? <https://www.diversityatlas.io/whats-the-difference-between-cq-cultural-competency-cultural-awareness-and-what-does-your-organization-actually-need/>
- [19] Elwert, G. (1997). Boundaries, cohesion and switching: On we-groups in ethnic national and religious forms. In H.-R. Wicker (Ed.), *Rethinking nationalism and ethnicity. The Struggle for Meaning and Order in Europe* (pp. 251-271). Oxford, New York.
- [20] European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research. (2008). Sharing diversity final report. National approaches to intercultural dialogue in Europe. Study for the European Commission.
- [21] European Parliament. (2022). Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Liger, Q., and Gutheil, M., Right-wing extremism in the EU, European Parliament. Retrieved from: <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/462122>
- [22] Febbraro, A., McKee, B., and Riedel, S. (2008). Multinational military operations and intercultural factors. NATO. RTO-TR-HFM-120. The Research and Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
- [23] Gino, F., and Coffman, K. (2021). Unconscious bias training that works. *Harvard Business Review*. September – October 2021 Issue. <https://hbr.org/2021/09/unconscious-bias-training-that-works#:~:text=UB%20training%20seeks%20to%20raise,interactions%20with%20customers%20and%20colleagues>
- [24] Government of Canada. (2018). National strategy on countering radicalization to violence. Canada Centre for Community Engagement and prevention of violence. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc-en.pdf>
- [25] Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture’s consequences*. SAGE: Beverly Hills, CA.
- [26] Huggins, C. M., and Debies-Carl, J. S. (2014). Tolerance in the city: The multilevel effects of urban environments on permissive attitudes. *Journal of Urban Affairs*. 37(3), August 2015, 255-269. Article first published online: 23 July 2014, DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12141
- [27] Johnson, B., and Smith, D. (2018). How men can become better allies to women. Retrieved 12 October 2018. <https://hbr.org/2018/10/how-men-can-become-better-allies-to-women>

- [28] Kannan, R.S. (2018). Cultural intelligence. Research Starters Education. <http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/45827545/cultural-intelligence>. Cited in: Diversity Atlas. (2020). What's the difference between CQ, cultural competency, cultural awareness and what does your organization actually need? <https://www.diversityatlas.io/whats-the-difference-between-cq-cultural-competency-cultural-awareness-and-what-does-your-organization-actually-need/>
- [29] Klix, N. (2019). On the conceptual insufficiency of toleration and the quest for a superseding concept. *Public Reason* 10 (2) – *Public Reason* 11(1), 61-76, <https://philpapers.org/archive/KLIOTC.pdf>
- [30] Lähdesmäki, T. et al. (2022). Tolerance, empathy, and inclusion. In: *Learning cultural literacy through creative practices in schools*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-89236-4\_4.
- [31] Leidig, E., and van Mieghem, C. (2021). The US National Strategy on countering domestic terrorism as a model for the EU. International Center for Counter-Terrorism. <https://kbb9z40cmb2apwafcho9v3j-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/the-us-national-strategy-on-countering-domestic-terrorism-as-a-model-for-the-eu-1-1.pdf>
- [32] Linganna, G. (2022). NATO's diversity empowers its struggle with interoperability. *The Kootneeti.in*. 1 August 2022. <https://thekootneeti.in/2022/08/01/natos-diversity-empowers-its-struggle-with-interoperability/>
- [33] Lirio, P., Lee, M.D., Williams, M.L., Haugen, L.K., and Kossek, E.E. (2008). The inclusion challenge with reduced-load professionals: The role of the manager. *Human Resource Management*. 47(3), 443-461. doi:10.1002/hrm.20226
- [34] McBride, M.K., Gold, Z., Faber, P.G., and Haney, K. (2021). Racial extremism in the military: A continuum of harm. CNA Independent Research Funding. October 2021.
- [35] McKee, B., Febraro, A., and Riedel, S. (2008). Multinational military operations and intercultural factors. Introduction. NATO. RTO-TR-HFM-120. The Research and Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.
- [36] Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. (2021). <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ally>
- [37] NATO. Allied Command Transformation. (2013). 10 years of transformation: Military diversity as a key transformational element.
- [38] NATO. (2022). NATO's purpose. Retrieved 4 July 2022 from: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm)
- [39] Ng, W., Ware, S.M., and Greenberg, A. (2017). Activating diversity and inclusion: A blueprint for museum educators as allies and change makers, *Journal of Museum Education*, 42(2), 142-154.
- [40] Riess, H. (2017). The science of empathy. *Journal of Patient Experience*, 4(2) 74-77. SAGE. Retrieved 8 August 2022 from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2374373517699267>
- [41] Rubin, J., Taylor, J., Pollitt, A., Krapels, J., and Pardal, M. (2014). Intolerance in Western Europe: Analysis of trends and associated factors: Summary report. RAND Europe.
- [42] Shore, L.M., and Chung, B.G. (2021). Inclusive leadership: How leaders sustain or discourage work group inclusion, *Group & Organization Management* 2021, 1-32, Special Issue on Inclusive Leadership. <https://business.sdsu.edu/students/iido/shore-chung.pdf>

- [43] Shore, L.M., Cleveland, J.N., and Sanchez, D. (2018). Inclusive workplaces: A review and model. *Human Resource Management Review*, 28, 176-189.
- [44] Shore, L.M., Randel, A.E., Chung, B.G., Dean, M.A., Ehrhart, K.H., and Singh, G. (2011). Inclusion and diversity in work groups: A review and model for future research. *Journal of Management*, 37, 1262-1289.
- [45] Smith, A. (1986). *The ethnic origins of nations*. Blackwell Publishing.
- [46] Tresch, T.S. (2007). Multicultural challenges for armed forces in theatre. *Military Power Revue*, 35, 23-30.
- [47] UNESCO. (2018). UN Declaration on racism: Declaration on race and racial prejudice adopted and proclaimed by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at its twentieth session, on 27 November 1978. [https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.11\\_declaration%20on%20race%20and%20racial%20prejudice.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.11_declaration%20on%20race%20and%20racial%20prejudice.pdf)
- [48] Verkuyten, M., and Kollar, R. (2021). Tolerance and intolerance: Cultural meanings and discursive usage. *Culture & Psychology*, 27(1) 172–186. SAGE: DOI: 10.1177/1354067X20984356. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354067X20984356>
- [49] Waruszynski, B., MacEachern, K.H., Browne, P., and Woycheshin, D. (2022). Perceptions of racism and harassment in the Defence Team: A qualitative inquiry among visible minority and Indigenous personnel, DRDC-RDDC-2022-R081, March 2022. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [50] Waruszynski, B.T., MacEachern, K.H., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2019a). Perceptions of women in the Primary Reserve on the recruitment and employment of women in the Canadian Armed Forces: Top-line Findings, (Unclassified, Internal Use), DRDC-RDDC-2019-L260, September 2019.
- [51] Waruszynski, B.T., MacEachern, K.H., and Giroux-Lalonde, V. (2019b). Perceptions of racism and harassment among visible minority and Indigenous members in the Defence Team. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Scientific Letter, DRDC-RDDC-2019-L257. Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [52] Waruszynski, B.T., MacEachern, K.H., and Ouellet, E. (2018). Women in the profession of arms. Female regular force members' perceptions on the attraction, recruitment, employment, and retention of women in the Canadian Armed Forces (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Scientific Report DRDC-RDDC-2018-R182). Ottawa, ON: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Defence Research and Development Canada.
- [53] Williams, K.D. (2007). Ostracism. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58, 425-452.
- [54] Winslow, D., and Everts, P. (2001). It's not a question of muscles: Cultural inoperability for NATO. In Gustav Schmidt (Ed.), *NATO – The first fifty years*. Hampshire, United Kingdom: Palgrave/MacMillan.



## Annex A – GLOSSARY

Ethnic intolerance, tolerance, and inclusion can manifest themselves through many different factors and interpretations. To ensure consistency in the ontology of concepts discussed throughout this report, a common lexicon of the concepts impacting ethnic intolerance, tolerance and inclusion in the NATO military context was developed by the NATO STO RTG HFM-301.

<i>Assimilation</i>	Assimilation is a process by which individuals or groups take on the identity of others in order to belong to them (e.g., in industrial societies, assimilation of Western European culture includes the acquisition of the national language and the acceptance of core values, such as democracy and tolerance of other religious and cultural differences).
<i>Bullying</i>	Bullying is “an act of aggression with the intent of harming an individual(s). Bullying may involve the singling out of an individual because the individual is considered to be different or weak. It often involves an imbalance of power between the aggressor and the victim. Bullying can be conducted through the use of electronic devices or communications” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2018, pp. 11-12). Bullying can also involve the use of coercion.
<i>Bystander Intervention</i>	Bystander intervention refers to members’ observations of a high-risk situation and how they intervened (DEOMI, Equal Opportunity Climate Survey 4.1).
<i>Conscious or Unconscious Microaggression</i>	Conscious or unconscious microaggression refers to a collection of insults, remarks, jokes (small, big, verbal, and non-verbal) aimed at criticizing a person because of his/her membership of a group and can be intentional or unintentional. See term developed by Chester M. Pierce in 1970.
<i>Cross-Cultural Competencies</i>	Cross-cultural competencies refer to: An “ability to understand, appreciate and interact with people from cultures or belief systems different from one’s own” (DeAngelis, 2015). “Military personnel who are culturally diverse, multiethnic, and multicultural represent force multipliers during both domestic and international operations...Leveraging CAF personnel with wide ranging backgrounds facilitates integration and synchronization with global partners. With the preponderance of international operations evolving from high intensity war-fighting to full spectrum operations, possessing personnel with diverse backgrounds better facilitates interfacing with civilian populations, non-governmental organizations, and other actors within the operating environment” (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 3).
<i>Cultural Dimension Theory</i>	Cultural Dimension Theory is a framework that explains six cross-cultural dimensions, including: 1) Power Distance (Authority); 2) Uncertainty Avoidance (Uncertainty Avoidance); 3) Individualism vs. Collectivism (Self); 4) Masculinity vs. Femininity (Gender); 5) Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation (Time Perception); and 6) Indulgence vs. Restraint (Moral Economy). These cultural dimensions shape behavior and structure the view of the world. They serve to describe characteristics of a country’s whole culture and explain cultural differences between nations (Hofstede, 2001).



<i>Culture</i>	Culture is defined as a complex whole consisting of knowledge, techniques, beliefs, laws, norms, and customs. It represents the shared property of distinct groups and is transferable from generation to generation through language, imitation, and learning. “Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25).
<i>Discrimination</i>	Discrimination means to treat someone differently or unfairly because of a personal characteristic or distinction which whether intentional or not, has an effect which imposes disadvantages not imposed upon others or which withholds or limits access to other members of society (Fall 2018 to Winter 2019 Your Say Survey, Department of National Defence, 2019). The prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act are race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered (CHRA, 2019).
<i>Diversity</i>	Diversity is defined as “respect for and appreciation of differences in ethnicity, language, gender, age, national origin, disabilities, sexual orientation, education, and religion,” including people’s experiences, skills, knowledge, and abilities (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 1). “It is about understanding each other and moving beyond simple tolerance to embracing, celebrating, and integrating the rich dimensions of diversity within each individual” (Department of National Defence, 2016, p. 1).
<i>Equal Opportunity</i>	Equal opportunity refers to “the right of all persons to participate in, and benefit from, programs and activities for which they are qualified. These programs and activities will be free from social, personal, or institutional barriers that prevent people from rising to the highest level of responsibility possible” (Army Headquarters, 2006, p. 120).
<i>Ethnic Diversity</i>	Ethnic diversity is defined as a ‘multicultural setting in which different ethnic groups define and differentiate themselves from each other. Members of an ethnic group or ethnic community have a collective name, speak the same language, claim a common descent, history and tradition, and display a strong sense of active solidarity’ (Smith, 1986). Ethnic groups are often considered as quasi-natural extensions of families. Ethnic units usually define themselves in opposition to other similar units. In practice, various ethnic groups may overlap and cooperate with other groups in ethnically heterogeneous states, organizations or companies.
<i>Ethnic or Racial Intolerance</i>	Ethnic or racial intolerance is defined as a lack of acceptance or hostility towards specific groups based on their ethnicity, race, religion, and political affiliation (Rubin et al., 2014). Additional definitions include: An “unwillingness to extend economic, political, and social rights to other ethnic groups” (Kunovich and Hodson, 1999). According to Frèjutè-Rakauskienè (2009, p. 10), “Ethnic intolerance is defined as the opposite/different opinion/belief, refusal to recognize equal opportunities and justification of dominance or violence, whereas ethnic intolerance in discourse is defined as the negative sentiments/activities directed against the ethnic/racial/religious groups, arising from the prejudices towards those groups and occurring in public discourse (in the media) in the forms of verbal harassment (verbal abuse, threats, defiance), incitement of ethnic intolerance (hate speech), and incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence.”

---

<i>Ethnic or Racial Tolerance</i>	Ethnic or racial tolerance is defined as an acceptance of specific individuals or groups who come with different ethnic backgrounds, including race, religion, political affiliation, social-cultural identity, beliefs and perceptions (Rubin et al., 2014).
<i>Ethnicity</i>	Ethnicity is defined as the state of belonging to a social group which may include common cultural identities and traditions (e.g., ancestry, history, language, religion, or association). Ethnicity is about ethnic identities, groups, associations and social interactions. As a form of collective identification, ethnicity makes particular use of linguistic-cultural traits and resources, the evocation of history and in some cases a territorial unit (Barth, 1969). Ethnicity is heavily dependent on boundaries that distinguish between “belonging” and “not belonging”. Groups often maintain their cohesion with the ties of kinship, language, religion or neighborhood and draw a dividing line between “we” and “they”. Religious institutions, ethnic associations and nationalist movements are examples of “we-identities” which generate a “they” by erecting barriers against participation from outside. Most theories of ethnicity note a close connection between ethnicity and feelings (Wicker, 1997). In this perspective, “we-groups” stand for emotional ties, intolerance and exclusion. Even so, not all “we-groups” are hermetically closed since they may overlap and interact in everyday life (Elwert, 1997).
<i>Exclusion</i>	Exclusion is defined as “the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded or denied from full participation in the society within which they live” (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1995, p. 4).
<i>Extremist (Hate) Groups</i>	Extremist (hate) groups refers to “organizations or groups that espouse supremacist causes; attempts to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion; advocate using force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil right[s]” (Department of Defense, 2007, OPNAVINST, 5354.1F).
<i>Harassment</i>	“Harassment is any improper conduct by an individual that is directed at and offensive to another person or persons in the workplace, and that the individual knew or ought reasonably to have known would cause offence or harm. It comprises any objectionable act, comment or display that demeans, belittles or causes personal humiliation or embarrassment, and any act of intimidation or threat. It includes harassment within the meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA)” (Department of National Defence, 2015). Types of harassment can include personal harassment, abuse of authority, sexual harassment, and hazing (Department of National Defence, 2015).
<i>Hazing</i>	Hazing refers to “any activity that is part of an initiation ceremony or rite of passage which offends, demeans, belittles, or humiliates those who participate. Hazing could include, but is not limited to, bullying or cruel horseplay” (Department of National Defence, 2015). Hazing refers to physical and psychological injury or the creation of a risk of physical or psychological injury through the initiation into, admission into, affiliation with, change in status or position within, or as a condition for continual membership in any military organization. Hazing also can be conducted through the use of electronic devices and communications (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2018, pp. 11-12).

<i>Human Relations Climate</i>	Human relations climate refers to the prevailing perceptions of individuals concerning interpersonal relationships within their working, living, or social environment (Secretary of the Air Force, 2010, p. 146).
<i>Identity</i>	Identity refers to traits and feature complexes that are used to delineate individuals or groups from members of other groups. The complementary concept of identity is difference. Differences do not always mean hostility and they are not causes of conflict (Schlee and Hortsman, 2018). Among the various competing (collective) identities is that special form called ethnicity. Ethnic names, traditional norms or specific cultural traits (music, forms of dress) are indicative of social belonging. They constitute markers of distinction which the bearers of a particular group may use to draw their limits and design their identity.
<i>Inclusion</i>	Inclusion is defined as having a sense of belonging to an organization, unit, group, and team, and fostering a work environment that values diversity, promotes mutual respect, and enhances organizational and operational effectiveness. According to the Australian Department of Defence (2014, p. 4), inclusion means “fostering a work environment where individual differences...are appreciated and valued as characteristics that enhance our work environment, our productivity and our capability.”
<i>Leadership</i>	Leadership is defined as the “process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation” (U.S. Army, 2001, p. 2-1-3). Leadership attributes can include vision, empathy, creativity, thoroughness, team building skills, etc.
<i>Masculinized Culture</i>	Masculinized culture is defined as an environment where males dominate the ideologies, and social and cultural norms of a workplace.
<i>National or Ethnic Origin</i>	National or ethnic origin is defined as an individual’s or ancestor’s place of origin. It also applies to a person who has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national group (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1995, p. 17).
<i>Operational and Organizational Contexts</i>	“An operational context refers to a setting in which major campaigns (operations) are planned and conducted within a broader dimension of time and space” (Rønn, 2011). Organizational context refers to “The broader environment in which employees work, including organizational commitment and job satisfaction” (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, and DeShon, 2003), effort and problem solving in semi-autonomous teams (Morgeson et al., 2006), and employee well-being (Parker, 2003). Cited in: Morgeson et al., 2010, p. 355.
<i>Prejudice</i>	Prejudice refers to favorable and unfavorable assumptions toward a person or group that is formed beforehand without any logical or rational base.
<i>Race</i>	Race is a division of human beings identified by the possession of traits that are transmittable by descent and that are sufficient to characterize persons possessing these traits as a distinctive human genotype (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1995, p. 18).
<i>Racism</i>	The Canadian Race Relations Foundation (2015) defines racism as “a belief that one group is superior to others,” and is evinced through actions or systemic practices which discriminate people solely on their skin color or ethnicity and characteristics attributed to the community (e.g., physical characteristics, customs, and geography; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2019).

---

<i>Religion</i>	Religion refers to a personal set or institutionalized system of attitudes, moral or ethical beliefs, and practices that are held with the strength of traditional religious views, characterized by ardor and faith, and generally evidenced through specific religious observances (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1995, p. 18).
<i>Safe Work Environment</i>	Safe work environment refers to a workplace that guarantees protection from physical hazards and risks, the well-being of employers and employees, or creates an atmosphere of mutual understanding through communication, conflict management, and negotiation.
<i>Segregation</i>	Segregation “is the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social intercourse, by separate educational facilities, or by other discriminatory means” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2022).
<i>Sense of Belonging</i>	Sense of belonging is defined as having sentiments of group loyalty and membership which bind people together, such as kinship structures, associations (clubs), professional or ethnic groups, and nation-states (Elwert, 1997).
<i>Sexual Assault</i>	“Sexual assault is an assault ... which is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated” (Department of Justice, Canada, 2009).
<i>Social Cohesion</i>	Social cohesion refers to the degree to which groups maintain a constant and loyal membership over time. Loyalty, corporate identity, a sense of belonging, trust and interdependence between the members of a group are factors that contribute to social cohesion and the strengthening of internal order.
<i>Social Integration</i>	Social integration refers to the density of connection between individuals and the social institutions which fosters sense of meaning and belonging. In the work of Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917), the term social integration refers to the density of connection between individuals and social institutions. He assumes that a society requires intense individual participation in a wide range of institutions for it to maintain social integration and provide individuals with a sense of meaning and belonging.
<i>Stereotypes</i>	Stereotypes refer to mainly overgeneralized beliefs about specific social, ethnic, or cultural groups.
<i>Strategy, framework, method, and tools</i>	Strategy refers to a set of ideas to pursue desired goals through the optimization of resources. A framework refers to a general overview of the project’s structural outline of the concepts and operational definitions which reflect the strategy. Method refers to a systematic process with a defined sequence of steps within the framework in order to achieve the overarching goals of the strategy. Tools refer to the items and instruments that will be used to achieve the method and framework and to address the goals of the strategy.
<i>Warrior Paradigm/Ideal Soldier</i>	Warrior paradigm/ideal soldier refers to a “culturally idealized form of masculine character” (Connell, 2000, p. 69). The Combat Masculine Warrior depicts a traditional perspective on masculinity in military organizations (Dunivin, 1994).

**A.1 REFERENCES**

- [1] Army Headquarters. (2006, June 7). Army Command Policy. US Army Regulation 600-20.
- [2] Barth, F. (1969). "Introduction", in F. Barth (Ed), *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of culture difference* (pp. 9-38), Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin.
- [3] Canadian Human Rights Act. (1985). Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, C. H-6). Retrieved from: The Justice Laws Website: <https://Laws-Lois.Justice.Gc.Ca/Eng/Acts/H-6/>
- [4] Canadian Race Relations Foundation. (2015). Glossary of terms. Retrieved from: <https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/en/site-content/10-crrf-glossary?start=100>
- [5] Carr, J. Z., Schmidt, A. M., Ford, J. K., and DeShon, R. P. (2003). Climate perceptions matter: A meta-analytic path analysis relating molar climate, cognitive and affective states, and individual level work outcomes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(4), 605-619. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.605>
- [6] Connell, R.W. (2000). *The men and the boys*. Allen & Unwin.
- [7] DeAngelis, T. (2015, March). In search of cultural competence. *Monitor on Psychology*, 46(3). <https://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/03/cultural-competence>
- [8] Department of Defence (Australia). (2014). *Defence diversity and inclusion strategy*. Centre of Diversity Expertise. <https://www.defencejobs.gov.au/-/media/DFR/Files/DefenceDiversityandInclusionStrategy.pdf>
- [9] Department of Defense. (2007). OPNAVINST 5354.1f. (2007). Department of the Navy.
- [10] Department of Justice (Canada; 2009). *An estimation of the economic impact of violent victimization in Canada*. [https://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rr14\\_01/p10.html](https://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rr14_01/p10.html)
- [11] Department of National Defence. (2015). *Canadian Armed Forces employment equity plan 2015 – 2020*. Director Human Rights and Diversity: Ottawa.
- [12] Department of National Defence. (2016). *Canadian Armed Forces diversity strategy 2016*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence.
- [13] Department of National Defence. (2019). *Your say survey*. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Canada.
- [14] Dunivin, K.O. (1994). Military culture: change and continuity. *Armed Forces & Society*, 20(4), 531-547. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1177/0095327X9402000403>
- [15] Elwert, G. (1997). Boundaries, cohesion and switching: On we-groups in ethnic national and religious forms. In, Hans-Rudolf Wicker, *Rethinking nationalism and ethnicity* (pp. 251-271). *The struggle for meaning and order in Europe*, Oxford, New York, 1997.
- [16] European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. (1995). *Public welfare services and social exclusion: The development of consumer oriented initiatives in the European Union*, Dublin: The Foundation. Cited in de Haan, A. (1999). *Social exclusion: Enriching the understanding of deprivation*. <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arjan-Haan/publication/2373>

[89092\\_Social\\_Exclusion\\_Enriching\\_the\\_Understanding\\_of\\_Deprivation/links/54ec5e0e0cf27bfd76f9e59/Social-Exclusion-Enriching-the-Understanding-of-Deprivation.pdf](https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/200902/89092_Social_Exclusion_Enriching_the_Understanding_of_Deprivation/links/54ec5e0e0cf27bfd76f9e59/Social-Exclusion-Enriching-the-Understanding-of-Deprivation.pdf)

- [17] Frėjutė-Rakauskienė, M. (2009). Manifestations of ethnic intolerance and xenophobia in Lithuanian press in the framework of European Union preventive policies. Summary of Doctoral Dissertation. Social Science, Sociology (05 S). Institute for Social Research Vilnius University.
- [18] Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences*. SAGE: Beverly Hills, CA.
- [19] Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.). California: Sage Publications.
- [20] Kunovich, R., and Hodson, R. (1999). Religious identity, conflict and ethnic tolerance in Croatia. *Social Forces*, 78, 643-674.
- [21] Merriam-Webster Dictionary. (2022). Segregation. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/segregation>
- [22] Morgeson, F.P., Dierdorff, E.C., and Hmurovic, J.L. (2010). Work design in situ: Understanding the role of occupational and organizational context. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 31, 351-360.
- [23] Morgeson, F.P., Johnson, M.D., Medsker, G.J., Campion, M.A., and Mumford, T.V. (2006). Understanding reactions to job redesign: A quasi-experimental investigation of the moderating effects of organizational context on perceptions of performance behavior. *Personnel Psychology*, 59, 333-363.
- [24] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (1995, August 18). DODI 1350.2 Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, cancelled by DODI 1350.2, 9/4/2020 (DODI 1350.2).
- [25] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2018, February 8). DODI 1020.03. Harassment prevention and response in the armed forces, cancelled By DODI 1012.3, 12/29/2020 (DODI 1020.03).
- [26] Ontario Human Rights Commission [OHRC], 2019; 2022. Ontario Human Rights Commission. (2019). Racial discrimination, race and racism (fact sheet). Ontario Human Rights Commission. Retrieved August 15, 2019, from: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racial-discrimination-race-and-racism-fact-sheet>
- [27] Parker, S. K. (2003). Longitudinal effects of lean production on employee outcomes and the mediating role of work characteristics. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88, 620-634.
- [28] Pierce, C. (1970). Offensive mechanisms. In F.B. Barbour (Ed.), *The Black seventies*, (pp. 265-282). Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
- [29] Rønn, H. (2011). Complexity and leadership: Conceptual and competency implications. Dissertation, Stellenbosch University. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37344933.pdf>
- [30] Rubin, J., Taylor, J., Pollitt, A., Krapels, J., and Pardal, M. (2014). Intolerance in Western Europe: Analysis of trends and associated factors: Summary report. RAND Europe.



- [31] Schlee, G. and Horstmann, A. (2018). Difference and sameness as modes of integration. Anthropological perspectives on ethnicity and religion. New York/Oxford, Berghahn Publishers.
- [32] Secretary of the Air Force. (2010, October 5). AFI36-2706 equal opportunity program military and civilian, superseded by AFI36-2710, 6/18/2020 (AFI36-2706). <https://www.af.mil/portals/1/documents/eo/afi-36-2706.pdf>
- [33] Smith, A.D. (1986). The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- [34] U.S. Army. (2001). Leading soldiers: Primary leadership development course. Module 2. June 1, 2001. Preresident Training Support Package, Reserve Component Soldiers, U.S. Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas.
- [35] Wicker, H.-R. (1997). Introduction: Theorizing ethnicity and nationalism, in Wicker, H.-R. (ed.) Rethinking nationalism and ethnicity. The struggle for meaning and order in Europe. Oxford: New York.

## Annex B – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTE ETHNIC INCLUSION: FACTORS, INTERVENTIONS, AND POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES

	Factors	Interventions	Positive Outcomes	Negative Outcomes
<b>Individual Level</b>	Cross-Cultural Competencies	Cultural Awareness Training	Mental Health and Well-Being	Mental Health Issues
	Socialization (Customs)	Self-Reflection Exercises	Self-Confidence	Conflict; Confusion
	Self-Identity (Gender, Sexual Orientation, Ethnicity, Religion, Ideology, Language)	Citizenship and Awareness of Values	Feeling in Control (Self-Confidence)	Fear and Lack of Confidence
	Personality	Mandatory Core Competencies	Resilience	Frustration; Stress; Anxiety; Suicide
	Position, Rank, and Status	Encouraging Constructive Behaviours	Pride; Leadership	Lack of Pride; Poor Leadership
	Knowledge, Skills, Expertise, and Abilities	Training and Coaching	Self-Confidence	Feelings of Insecurity
	Attitudes and Behaviours	Training and Coaching	Tolerance; Empathy; Inclusion	Intolerance; Lack of Understanding
	Values and Ethics	Training and Coaching	Self-Respect; Empathy; Trust	Alienation; Isolation; Anxiety
	Political Affiliation or Orientation	Community Outreach	Community Spirit	Political Distrust; Social Instability
	Socioeconomic Status	Community Outreach	Individual Satisfaction	Poverty
	Social Networks	Community Outreach	Effective Relations	Confusion; Radicalization
	Personal Expectations	Mentoring and Coaching	Motivation/Incentives; Individual Success; Satisfaction	Disincentives; Individual Failure
Family	Awareness of Family Values	Commitment	Lack of Commitment	

**ANNEX B – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
THAT PROMOTE ETHNIC INCLUSION: FACTORS,  
INTERVENTIONS, AND POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES**



	<b>Factors</b>	<b>Interventions</b>	<b>Positive Outcomes</b>	<b>Negative Outcomes</b>
<b>Group Level</b>	Group Culture	Bystander Intervention; Cultural Awareness Training	Mutual Trust and Respect	Group Think; Hazing; Radicalization
	Group Composition and Size	Conflict Management	Group Effectiveness	Group Fragmentation
	Social Networks	Training and Coaching	Group Cohesion	Conflict; Harassment
	Formal and Informal Groups	Coaching and Mentoring	Mutual Trust and Respect	Conflict; Lack of Trust and Respect
	Group Identity	Group or Team Training	Cooperation	Isolation; Violence
	Group Vision, Mission, Strategy	Brainstorming Techniques	Common Understanding	Frustration
	Shared Values	Group or Team Training	Group Adaptability	Fear
	Leadership	Cross-Cultural Training	Sense of Belonging	Stress and Anxiety; Isolation
	Roles, Tasks/Responsibilities	Modeling Leadership Behaviours	Shared Mental Models	Stress and Anxiety; Harassment
	Environment/Context	Group Dynamics Training	Social Trust; Mental Health and Well-Being	Mental Health Issues
	Group Relationships	Mediation; Cultural Awareness Training	Social Trust; Mental Health and Well-Being	Mental Health Issues; Conflict; Confusion
	Group Knowledge, Skills, Expertise, and Abilities	Group or Team Training	Effective Problem-Solving	Isolation; Alienation
	Communication	Listening Skills; Training and Coaching	Effective Information and Knowledge Sharing; Group Satisfaction	Conflict; Radicalization
	Politics, Political Affiliation, Ideology	Community and Political Outreach	Social Trust; Mental Health Well-Being	Conflict; Radicalization
	Economic Factors (Socio-Economic Status, Macroeconomic Prosperity, Threat)	Economic, Community and Political Outreach	Stability; Social Trust; Mental Health and Well-Being	Conflict; Radicalization
Ethnic Factors (Ethnic Threat)	Community and Political Outreach	Social Trust; Mental Health and Well-Being	Conflict; Radicalization	



**ANNEX B – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
THAT PROMOTE ETHNIC INCLUSION: FACTORS,  
INTERVENTIONS, AND POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES**

	<b>Factors</b>	<b>Interventions</b>	<b>Positive Outcomes</b>	<b>Negative Outcomes</b>
<b>Organizational Level</b>	Organizational Mission, Vision, Goals, Core Values	Cultural Ergonomics	Social Trust	Harassment; Radicalization
	Organizational Culture and Climate	Cultural Accommodations	Positive Cultural Climate	Negative Cultural Climate
	Group Ideologies	Non-Partisanship Training	Organizational Integration	Fragmentation; Exclusion
	Personnel Recruitment and Selection	Cultural Awareness Training and Strategies	Operational Effectiveness	Radicalization
	Policies, Doctrine, Processes, Plans, Governance	D&I Management	Organizational Effectiveness	Organizational Fragmentation
	Learning Organization	Evidenced-Based Programs	Inclusiveness	Isolation
	Strategic Leadership	Leadership Training	Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Lack of Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect
	Management	Transformation of Policies, Doctrine, Processes, Plans, Governance	Organizational Integration and Effectiveness	Organizational Fragmentation
	Internal Communications	Communications Strategies; Conflict Management	Shared Situational Awareness	Organizational Fragmentation
	Interpersonal Relationships	Information and Education (Awareness Training, Cross-Cultural)	Cultural Awareness; Inclusiveness	Harassment; Radicalization
	Command and Control (Hierarchy vs Network)	Leadership Training	Organizational Trust and Respect	Isolation; Alienation
	Social Networking Tool and Technologies	Social Networking Technologies and Tools; Training	Organizational Integration	Fragmentation; Exclusion
Ethnic Relations	Cultural Awareness Training; Practice Impartiality	Improved Ethnic Relations	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict; Radicalization	

**ANNEX B – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
THAT PROMOTE ETHNIC INCLUSION: FACTORS,  
INTERVENTIONS, AND POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES**



	<b>Factors</b>	<b>Interventions</b>	<b>Positive Outcomes</b>	<b>Negative Outcomes</b>
<b>Societal Level</b>	Media (Social Media) and Journalism	Strategic Communications	Integrated and Cohesive Society (Collective Identity)	Lack of Integration; Fragmentation
	Politics	Political Affiliations; Elections	Resilience; Stability	(Ethnic) Tensions and Conflict
	Economy	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Economic Stability; Innovation	Radicalization
	Geography	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Integration	Dislocation; Instability
	Multiculturalism	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Integration; Inclusion; Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Violence
	Traditions, Customs, Cultures	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Alienation
	Human Resources	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Amicable Use of Resources	Human Trafficking; Slavery; Abuse
	Leadership	Leadership Training	Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Lack of Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect
	Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Lack of Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect
	Government	Laws; Policies; Programs; Services	Order; Stability	Chaos; Alienation; Anomie; Anarchy; Oppression
	Defence and Security	Laws; Policies	Stability	Alienation; Anomie; Anarchy; Oppression
	Infrastructure	Policies; Programs; Services	Shared Infrastructure	Fragmented Infrastructure
	Social Services and Programs	Policies; Programs; Services	Shared Services and Programs	Fragmented Services and Programs
	Societal Values	Laws; Policies; Programs; Services	Shared Values	Lack of Integration
	Human Rights	Laws; Policies; Programs; Services	Tolerance; Empathy; Inclusion	Human Rights Abuses



**ANNEX B – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
THAT PROMOTE ETHNIC INCLUSION: FACTORS,  
INTERVENTIONS, AND POTENTIAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES**

Global Level	Factors	Interventions	Positive Outcomes	Negative Outcomes
	Political Ideologies	Political Affiliations; Elections	Resilience; Stability	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Economic Factors	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Economic Stability; Innovation	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Geography	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Integration	Dislocation; Instability; Conflict
	Religious Affiliations	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Cross-Cultural Tolerance	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Human Rights	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Tolerance; Empathy; Inclusion	Human Rights Abuses
	Societal Development	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Integration; Stability	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Country Values	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Tolerance; Shared Values	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Cross-Cultural Trust and Respect	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Global Investments and Trade	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Economic Stability; Innovation	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Innovation	Science and Technology Programs	Economic Stability; Innovation	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Government	Laws; Policies; Programs; Services	Order; Stability	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Defence and Security	Laws; Regulations; Policies	Order; Stability	Alienation; Anomie; Oppression
	Leadership	Inclusive Leadership	Cross Cultural Trust and Respect	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Energy and Resources (Supply and Demand)	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Cooperation and Collaboration	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	International Transactions	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Cooperation and Collaboration	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
	Immigration	Cross-Cultural Awareness Training	Tolerance; Empathy; Inclusion	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
Environment and Climate Change	Policies and Programs	Positive Contribution to World Climate Change	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict	
Technology	Collaboration/Cooperation Agreements	Shared Situational Awareness	Ethnic Tensions and Conflict	





<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			
<b>1. Recipient's Reference</b>	<b>2. Originator's References</b>	<b>3. Further Reference</b>	<b>4. Security Classification of Document</b>
	STO-TR-HFM-301 AC/323(HFM-301)TP/1026	ISBN 978-92-837-2439-1	PUBLIC RELEASE
<b>5. Originator</b>	Science and Technology Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization BP 25, F-92201 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex, France		
<b>6. Title</b>	Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments: From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion		
<b>7. Presented at/Sponsored by</b>	Final report of Research Task Group HFM-301.		
<b>8. Author(s)/Editor(s)</b>	Multiple		<b>9. Date</b> April 2023
<b>10. Author's/Editor's Address</b>	Multiple		<b>11. Pages</b> 186
<b>12. Distribution Statement</b>	There are no restrictions on the distribution of this document. Information about the availability of this and other STO unclassified publications is given on the back cover.		
<b>13. Keywords/Descriptors</b>	Allyship; Cultural awareness; Culture of belonging; Diversity; Ethnic inclusion; Ethnic intolerance; Ethnicity; Hateful conduct; Inclusion; Inclusive leadership; Microaggressions; Racism; Right-wing extremism; Unconscious bias		
<b>14. Abstract</b>	<p>NATO forces personnel strive to achieve cultural competence to enable interactions that are more effective across multinational military environments. Research shows that ethnic intolerance continues to challenge defence organizations, including NATO's efforts to promote "military diversity as a key transformational element" in overcoming cultural differences (NATO, 2013). The purpose of the Research Task Group (RTG) 301 was to identify the key factors attributed to ethnic intolerance, develop a conceptual model to explain ethnic inclusion, and offer evidenced-based educational programs intended to support a more inclusive organizational culture in NATO and across multinational defence organizations. Based on international case studies and the literature on ethnic intolerance and inclusion, several key findings highlight the historical, political, economic, social, and socio-psychological factors that explain intolerant attitudes and behaviours, as well as the strategies, tools, and evidenced-based programs designed to cultivate a culture of ethnic diversity and inclusion. Recommendations are put forward to help foster greater ethnic inclusion through diversity management strategies and evidenced-based programs across international defence organizations. The findings and recommendations will inform NATO's strategic efforts, policies, and programs to encourage greater ethnic diversity, inclusion, and improved military readiness and resilience.</p>		





BP 25

F-92201 NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE CEDEX • FRANCE  
Télécopie 0(1)55.61.22.99 • E-mail [mailbox@cs.o.nato.int](mailto:mailbox@cs.o.nato.int)



**DIFFUSION DES PUBLICATIONS**  
**STO NON CLASSIFIEES**

Les publications de l'AGARD, de la RTO et de la STO peuvent parfois être obtenues auprès des centres nationaux de distribution indiqués ci-dessous. Si vous souhaitez recevoir toutes les publications de la STO, ou simplement celles qui concernent certains Panels, vous pouvez demander d'être inclus soit à titre personnel, soit au nom de votre organisation, sur la liste d'envoi.

Les publications de la STO, de la RTO et de l'AGARD sont également en vente auprès des agences de vente indiquées ci-dessous.

Les demandes de documents STO, RTO ou AGARD doivent comporter la dénomination « STO », « RTO » ou « AGARD » selon le cas, suivi du numéro de série. Des informations analogues, telles que le titre et la date de publication sont souhaitables.

Si vous souhaitez recevoir une notification électronique de la disponibilité des rapports de la STO au fur et à mesure de leur publication, vous pouvez consulter notre site Web (<http://www.sto.nato.int/>) et vous abonner à ce service.

### CENTRES DE DIFFUSION NATIONAUX

#### ALLEMAGNE

Streitkräfteamt / Abteilung III  
Fachinformationszentrum der Bundeswehr (FIZBw)  
Gorch-Fock-Straße 7, D-53229 Bonn

#### BELGIQUE

Royal High Institute for Defence – KHID/IRSD/RHID  
Management of Scientific & Technological Research  
for Defence, National STO Coordinator  
Royal Military Academy – Campus Renaissance  
Renaissancelaan 30, 1000 Bruxelles

#### BULGARIE

Ministry of Defence  
Defence Institute “Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov”  
“Tsvetan Lazarov” bul no.2  
1592 Sofia

#### CANADA

DGSIST 2  
Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada  
60 Moodie Drive (7N-1-F20)  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

#### DANEMARK

Danish Acquisition and Logistics Organization  
(DALO)  
Lautrupbjerg 1-5  
2750 Ballerup

#### ESPAGNE

Área de Cooperación Internacional en I+D  
SDGPLATIN (DGAM)  
C/ Arturo Soria 289  
28033 Madrid

#### ESTONIE

Estonian National Defence College  
Centre for Applied Research  
Riia str 12  
Tartu 51013

#### ETATS-UNIS

Defense Technical Information Center  
8725 John J. Kingman Road  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

#### FRANCE

O.N.E.R.A. (ISP)  
29, Avenue de la Division Leclerc  
BP 72  
92322 Châtillon Cedex

#### GRECE (Correspondant)

Defence Industry & Research General  
Directorate, Research Directorate  
Fakinos Base Camp, S.T.G. 1020  
Holargos, Athens

#### HONGRIE

Hungarian Ministry of Defence  
Development and Logistics Agency  
P.O.B. 25  
H-1885 Budapest

#### ITALIE

Ten Col Renato NARO  
Capo servizio Gestione della Conoscenza  
F. Baracca Military Airport “Comparto A”  
Via di Centocelle, 301  
00175, Rome

#### LUXEMBOURG

*Voir Belgique*

#### NORVEGE

Norwegian Defence Research  
Establishment  
Attn: Biblioteket  
P.O. Box 25  
NO-2007 Kjeller

#### PAYS-BAS

Royal Netherlands Military  
Academy Library  
P.O. Box 90.002  
4800 PA Breda

#### POLOGNE

Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa  
ul. Ostrobramska 109  
04-041 Warszawa

#### PORTUGAL

Estado Maior da Força Aérea  
SDFA – Centro de Documentação  
Alfragide  
P-2720 Amadora

#### REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE

Vojenský technický ústav s.p.  
CZ Distribution Information Centre  
Mladoboleslavská 944  
PO Box 18  
197 06 Praha 9

#### ROUMANIE

Romanian National Distribution  
Centre  
Armaments Department  
9-11, Drumul Taberei Street  
Sector 6  
061353 Bucharest

#### ROYAUME-UNI

Dstl Records Centre  
Rm G02, ISAT F, Building 5  
Dstl Porton Down  
Salisbury SP4 0JQ

#### SLOVAQUIE

Akadémia ozbrojených síl gen.  
M.R. Štefánika, Distribučné a  
informačné stredisko STO  
Demänová 393  
031 01 Liptovský Mikuláš 1

#### SLOVENIE

Ministry of Defence  
Central Registry for EU & NATO  
Vojkova 55  
1000 Ljubljana

#### TURQUIE

Milli Savunma Bakanlığı (MSB)  
ARGE ve Teknoloji Dairesi  
Başkanlığı  
06650 Bakanlıklar – Ankara

### AGENCES DE VENTE

**The British Library Document  
Supply Centre**  
Boston Spa, Wetherby  
West Yorkshire LS23 7BQ  
ROYAUME-UNI

**Canada Institute for Scientific and  
Technical Information (CISTI)**  
National Research Council Acquisitions  
Montreal Road, Building M-55  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0S2  
CANADA

Les demandes de documents STO, RTO ou AGARD doivent comporter la dénomination « STO », « RTO » ou « AGARD » selon le cas, suivie du numéro de série (par exemple AGARD-AG-315). Des informations analogues, telles que le titre et la date de publication sont souhaitables. Des références bibliographiques complètes ainsi que des résumés des publications STO, RTO et AGARD figurent dans le « NTIS Publications Database » (<http://www.ntis.gov>).



BP 25  
F-92201 NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE CEDEX • FRANCE  
Télécopie 0(1)55.61.22.99 • E-mail [mailbox@cs.o.nato.int](mailto:mailbox@cs.o.nato.int)



**DISTRIBUTION OF UNCLASSIFIED  
STO PUBLICATIONS**

AGARD, RTO & STO publications are sometimes available from the National Distribution Centres listed below. If you wish to receive all STO reports, or just those relating to one or more specific STO Panels, they may be willing to include you (or your Organisation) in their distribution.

STO, RTO and AGARD reports may also be purchased from the Sales Agencies listed below.

Requests for STO, RTO or AGARD documents should include the word 'STO', 'RTO' or 'AGARD', as appropriate, followed by the serial number. Collateral information such as title and publication date is desirable.

If you wish to receive electronic notification of STO reports as they are published, please visit our website (<http://www.sto.nato.int/>) from where you can register for this service.

### NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION CENTRES

#### BELGIUM

Royal High Institute for Defence –  
KHID/IRSD/RHID  
Management of Scientific & Technological  
Research for Defence, National STO  
Coordinator  
Royal Military Academy – Campus  
Renaissance  
Renaissancelaan 30  
1000 Brussels

#### BULGARIA

Ministry of Defence  
Defence Institute "Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov"  
"Tsvetan Lazarov" bul no.2  
1592 Sofia

#### CANADA

DSTKIM 2  
Defence Research and Development Canada  
60 Moodie Drive (7N-1-F20)  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

#### CZECH REPUBLIC

Vojenský technický ústav s.p.  
CZ Distribution Information Centre  
Mladoboleslavská 944  
PO Box 18  
197 06 Praha 9

#### DENMARK

Danish Acquisition and Logistics Organization  
(DALO)  
Lautrupbjerg 1-5  
2750 Ballerup

#### ESTONIA

Estonian National Defence College  
Centre for Applied Research  
Riia str 12  
Tartu 51013

#### FRANCE

O.N.E.R.A. (ISP)  
29, Avenue de la Division Leclerc – BP 72  
92322 Châtillon Cedex

#### GERMANY

Streitkräfteamt / Abteilung III  
Fachinformationszentrum der  
Bundeswehr (FIZBw)  
Gorch-Fock-Straße 7  
D-53229 Bonn

#### GREECE (Point of Contact)

Defence Industry & Research General  
Directorate, Research Directorate  
Fakinos Base Camp, S.T.G. 1020  
Holargos, Athens

#### HUNGARY

Hungarian Ministry of Defence  
Development and Logistics Agency  
P.O.B. 25  
H-1885 Budapest

#### ITALY

Ten Col Renato NARO  
Capo servizio Gestione della Conoscenza  
F. Baracca Military Airport "Comparto A"  
Via di Centocelle, 301  
00175, Rome

#### LUXEMBOURG

See Belgium

#### NETHERLANDS

Royal Netherlands Military  
Academy Library  
P.O. Box 90.002  
4800 PA Breda

#### NORWAY

Norwegian Defence Research  
Establishment, Attn: Biblioteket  
P.O. Box 25  
NO-2007 Kjeller

#### POLAND

Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa  
ul. Ostrobramska 109  
04-041 Warszawa

#### PORTUGAL

Estado Maior da Força Aérea  
SDFA – Centro de Documentação  
Alfragide  
P-2720 Amadora

#### ROMANIA

Romanian National Distribution Centre  
Armaments Department  
9-11, Drumul Taberei Street  
Sector 6  
061353 Bucharest

#### SLOVAKIA

Akadémia ozbrojených síl gen  
M.R. Štefánika, Distribučné a  
informačné stredisko STO  
Demänová 393  
031 01 Liptovský Mikuláš 1

#### SLOVENIA

Ministry of Defence  
Central Registry for EU & NATO  
Vojkova 55  
1000 Ljubljana

#### SPAIN

Área de Cooperación Internacional en I+D  
SDGPLATIN (DGAM)  
C/ Arturo Soria 289  
28033 Madrid

#### TURKEY

Milli Savunma Bakanlığı (MSB)  
ARGE ve Teknoloji Dairesi Başkanlığı  
06650 Bakanlıklar – Ankara

#### UNITED KINGDOM

Dstl Records Centre  
Rm G02, ISAT F, Building 5  
Dstl Porton Down, Salisbury SP4 0JQ

#### UNITED STATES

Defense Technical Information Center  
8725 John J. Kingman Road  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

### SALES AGENCIES

**The British Library Document  
Supply Centre**  
Boston Spa, Wetherby  
West Yorkshire LS23 7BQ  
UNITED KINGDOM

**Canada Institute for Scientific and  
Technical Information (CISTI)**  
National Research Council Acquisitions  
Montreal Road, Building M-55  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0S2  
CANADA

Requests for STO, RTO or AGARD documents should include the word 'STO', 'RTO' or 'AGARD', as appropriate, followed by the serial number (for example AGARD-AG-315). Collateral information such as title and publication date is desirable. Full bibliographical references and abstracts of STO, RTO and AGARD publications are given in "NTIS Publications Database" (<http://www.ntis.gov>).

**CAN UNCLASSIFIED**

<b>DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA</b>		
*Security markings for the title, authors, abstract and keywords must be entered when the document is sensitive		
1. ORIGINATOR (Name and address of the organization preparing the document. A DRDC Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, is entered in Section 8.)  <b>NATO F-92201 NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE CEDEX FRANCE</b>	2a. SECURITY MARKING (Overall security marking of the document including special supplemental markings if applicable.)  <b>CAN UNCLASSIFIED</b>	
	2b. CONTROLLED GOODS  <b>NON-CONTROLLED GOODS DMC A</b>	
3. TITLE (The document title and sub-title as indicated on the title page.)  <b>Military Diversity in Multinational Defence Environments: From Ethnic Intolerance to Inclusion</b>		
4. AUTHORS (Last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used)  <b>Waruszynski, B. T.; Yanakiev, Y.; De Roeck, M.; Resteigne, D.; Lowen, J.; McDonald, D.; Hertel, S.</b>		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.)  <b>April 2023</b>	6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total pages, including Annexes, excluding DCD, covering and verso pages.)  <b>186</b>	6b. NO. OF REFS (Total references cited.)
7. DOCUMENT CATEGORY (e.g., Scientific Report, Contract Report, Scientific Letter.)  <b>External Literature (N)</b>		
8. SPONSORING CENTRE (The name and address of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development.)  <b>DGMPRA Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis NDHQ (Carling), 60 Moodie Drive, Building 9S.2 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2 Canada</b>		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)	9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)	
10a. DRDC PUBLICATION NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.)  <b>DRDC-RDDC-2023-N076</b>	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)	
11a. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)  <b>Public release</b>		
11b. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)		
12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.)  <b>diversity ethnic; diversity; Gender/Culture/Diversity in Teams/Organizations/The military; ethnic inclusion; inclusion; right-wing extremism; hateful conduct; racism; systemic racism; Inclusive Leadership; Gender/Diversity; Team Diversity; cultural awareness; Unconscious Bias; microaggressions; NATO operations; ethnic intolerance; gender integration; right wing authoritarianism</b>		