Maritime Security Capacity Building: Key Considerations

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Abstract

This Scientific Report discusses maritime security capacity building (MSCB) and its implications for the Royal Canadian Navy, as well as the Canadian Armed Forces. The objective of this project is to develop a Canadian perspective on MSCB based on Canada’s strategic interests and foreign policy priorities in the maritime domain and beyond. This Report defines MSCB and discusses its prevalence since the 2000s, especially with regard to two of Canada’s closest partners, the United States and Australia. The analysis is based on lessons learned from previous capacity-building experiences in different countries, in land and at sea. This Scientific Report first provides an overview of the current conceptual discussion surrounding MSCB, how it relates to broader debates about partner capacity building, and how lessons learned ashore can be applied at sea. Second, the Report addresses the recent evolution of the maritime security environment, and the increased prevalence of capacity building activities at sea as a result. Based on this assessment, the report then analyses the place and the role of MSCB in the most recent naval strategies of the United States and Australia. It also looks at recent programs implemented by both navies to reinforce the maritime security sector of traditional and more recent partners, and the rationale for these investments.

Significance to Defence and Security

This Report was prepared at the request of the Directorate of Naval Strategy for the Director General Naval Force Development. It provides an overview of what constitutes maritime security capacity building and the relevance of these activities in the current strategic maritime environment. By looking at the current conceptual discussion on MSCB and the rationale developed by some of Canada’s closest partners to justify such activities and investments, the report can inform the development of a Canadian approach to MSCB by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and in collaboration with the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada. Considering that Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy identifies capacity building as a core mission of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), this Report sets the foundation for a reflection about how the RCN and the CAF can maximize capacity building activities targeting the maritime security sector of partner states.
Résumé

Ce rapport scientifique étudie le renforcement des capacités de sécurité maritime (RCSM) et ses implications pour la Marine royale canadienne et les Forces armées canadiennes. L’objectif de ce projet est de développer une perspective canadienne sur le RCSM, basée sur les intérêts stratégiques et les priorités en matière de politique étrangère du Canada dans et au-delà du domaine maritime. Ce rapport définit le RCSM et explore sa prévalence depuis le début des années 2000, en particulier en ce qui a trait à deux des plus proches partenaires du Canada, les États-Unis et l’Australie. L’analyse est basée sur les leçons tirées d’efforts précédents de développement des capacités, tant en mer qu’à terre. La première section du rapport présente un état de la discussion conceptuelle sur le RCSM, la manière dont celle-ci se rapporte aux débats plus larges concernant le développement des capacités d’États partenaires, et comment les leçons apprises à terre peuvent être transposées dans le domaine maritime. La seconde section porte sur l’évolution récente de l’environnement stratégique maritime et la montée des activités de développement des capacités maritimes d’État tiers. Basé sur cet examen, le rapport analyse la place et le rôle du RCSM dans les plus récentes stratégies navales des États-Unis et de l’Australie. Le rapport présente également de récentes activités de RCSM mises en œuvre par les marines de ces deux États afin de renforces le secteur de la sécurité maritime de partenaires traditionnels et émergents, de même que les fondements de ces investissement.

Importance pour la défense et la sécurité

Ce rapport scientifique a été rédigé à la demande de la Direction de la stratégie navale, pour le Directeur Général développement de la Force Maritime. Son objectif est de fournir une vue d’ensemble de ce qui constitue le développement des capacités de sécurité maritime et sa pertinence dans l’environnement maritime stratégique actuel. En présentant la discussion conceptuelle actuelle concernant le RCSM et la logique développée par certains des plus proches partenaires du Canada pour justifier ce type d’activité et d’investissement, le rapport peut appuyer le développement d’une approche canadienne au RCSM par la MRC, en collaboration avec les FAC et le Gouvernement du Canada. Comme la Politique de défense du Canada identifie le développement des capacités comme étant une des missions principales des FAC, ce rapport établit les bases pour une réflexion sur la manière dont la RC et les FAC peuvent maximiser les activités de renforcement des capacités dans le secteur maritime des États partenaires.
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1 Introduction

Since the turn of the century, foreign and defence policies of many major and regional powers have increasingly emphasized the importance of partnership development and capacity building as ways to contribute to national defence and international stability.¹ As a result, the maritime security capacity building (MSCB) concept has emerged in policy and academic discussions surrounding security at sea and the promotion of the current rules-based order. In practice, MSCB has increasingly become part of the response to new security challenges and a key component of the maritime security strategy of some of Canada’s main allies, including the United States (U.S.) and Australia. In an evolving and challenging maritime environment where traditional and unconventional threats now cohabit, MSCB constitutes a significant way through which navies, maritime security forces, and armed forces more broadly can use their resources and capabilities to contribute to security and stability at sea.

Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (SSE), identifies reinforcing partner’s security and defence capacity as one of the eight core missions of the CAF.² Under the 2015 Global Partnership Strategy, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had already been given direction to develop partnerships with like-minded nations and support more vulnerable countries and their security forces to develop relevant capacities.³ Reinforcing this direction, SSE’s Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement identifies capacity building as a key defence engagement tool in a fast changing international context characterized by a return to major power competition, changing forms of conflict, and rapid technological advancements.⁴ Consequently, the CAF are mandated to engage in activities seeking to reinforce and professionalise partner countries’ security forces, which include but are not necessarily limited to national armed forces, police services, coast guards, intelligence agencies, and non-statutory armed groups.⁵ For its part, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has been engaged in capacity building activities falling under MSCB. For instance, since 2017 the RCN has deployed ships in the Gulf of

³ According to the Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance released in 2015, “the Defence Team must not only foster its traditional partnerships with like-minded allies, but must also engage new and emerging partners, including those facing instability or with whom tensions may exist.” Vulnerable states refers to the latter category. See Canada, Department of National Defence, Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance, April 2015, Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Guinea waters and personnel ashore to participate to OBAGAME EXPRESS, a U.S.-led annual training exercise with West African countries designed to improve maritime security in the region.\textsuperscript{6} Focusing on maritime interdiction operations and enhanced coordination among West African coastal countries, the RCN provides training and mentorship to regional security forces across a variety of scenarios, including counter-piracy, counter-narcotics and illegal fishing scenarios.\textsuperscript{7}

Yet, MSCB activities undertaken by the RCN and the rest of the CAF appear to be \textit{ad hoc} and developed on a case-by-case basis, reflecting a lack of doctrinal and policy guidelines on the issue. The RCN has yet to define a clear approach to MSCB in line with SSE and larger Canadian strategic interests. In fact, the lack of clear direction and strategic guidance related to MCSB across the RCN might lead to uncertainty among naval planners about what constitutes MCSB and its related activities.

This document is supports the development of a MSCB Strategic Framework,\textsuperscript{8} in line with SSE and the RCN 2017–2022 Strategic Plan.\textsuperscript{9} To start filling this gap in policy and doctrinal documents, this first Scientific Report provide a conceptual discussion of MSCB and presents the rationale developed by some of Canada’s main allies, the United States and Australia, to include MSCB in their naval strategy.

The report first provides an overview of the general discussion surrounding security capacity building across all domains as well as some of its key conditions of success, and then transposes the discussion to the maritime sector. Second, the Report captures changes in the maritime security environment and how they have contributed to the emergence of MSCB. Third, the report turns to the relatively new focus placed on partner capacity building by the U.S. and Australia as part of their most recent maritime security. As key Canadian allies and members of the Five Eyes Community, the U.S. and Australian experiences with MSCB can inform how the RCN will conduct MSCB going forward. On the one hand, some of the RCN’s most recent MSCB endeavours were conducted in cooperation with the U.S., highlighting the value of Canada–U.S. coordination and cooperation on the matter. On the other hand, Australia faces similar dilemmas to Canada when it comes to projecting power and influence: as middle powers, both Canada and Australia must make difficult choices when it comes to prioritizing specific regions and partnerships in an increasingly multipolar international system. Building on the U.S. and Australian experiences, the report concludes by drawing some implications for the RCN, the CAF, and the Canadian government more broadly. For clarity, hereinafter the contributor state or country refers to the nation providing assistance to a third-party state, and the latter is defined as the partner state or country.


\textsuperscript{8} Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, \textit{Partner Capacity Building Strategic Framework (draft)}, Ottawa, 2019.

2 Security Capacity Building and the Maritime Sector

Military assistance and security capacity building are not new concepts in the conduct of international and military affairs. Indeed, during the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union relied heavily on military assistance to project power, exert influence, and shape international system to their advantage. The end of bipolarity led to the progressive termination of proxy wars across the developing world. Without foreign military and financial support, warring parties hit stalemates in countries such as El Salvador, Ethiopia, Angola, and East Timor, forcing the conclusion of negotiated accords or the search for alternative sources of revenue. Elsewhere however, the withdrawal of superpowers’ stabilizing influence enabled inter-group tensions to blossom into violence, such as in Somalia and former Yugoslavia. For some experts, old wars, interstate conflicts, were giving way to new wars, intrastate conflicts along ethnic and religious lines.¹⁰

In response to these trends and following the publication of the United Nations’ Agenda for Peace in 1992,¹¹ Western states repackaged military assistance to some degree for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. While Governments continued to use military assistance and capacity building to increase state capacity to deter and respond to threats against state sovereignty, they also aimed at enhancing human security, ensuring that state security forces were willing and able to adequately protect civilian populations. Hence, in response to the rise of targeted violence against civilians, activities to support security capacity building in post-conflict settings became increasingly frequent during the 1990s, leading to the formulation of the security sector reform (SSR) concept toward the end of the decade.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on American soil shed new light on the relation between terrorism and fragile States, and led to a shift in the rationale for SSR and capacity building.¹² Building the security sector of fragile states became a prerequisite for development, based on the Wesphalian state model.¹³ Institution building and democratization came to compose the core of state building, ensuring long-term development and stability.¹⁴ Iraq and Afghanistan became laboratories for the development of new strategies for capacity building, in and out of the security and defence sectors and with varying results.

While recent lessons learned from capacity building and SSR initiatives identified important limits to the state-building paradigm, the security-development nexus continues to prevail in most donors’ rationale for SSR. Indeed, according to the 2013 Canadian Guidelines for Security System Reform: “SSR is intended to provide an enabling environment for economic and social development, the establishment of the rule of law, and political stabilization.”¹⁵ Additionally, the establishment of a stable and capable country as a result of capacity building and SSR is expected to diminish disruption in the international

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¹⁵ Canada, Canadian Guidelines for Security System Reform, 8.
system, contribute to international security, and share the burden of Western powers to ensure regional and global stability.

### 2.1 Defining Security Force Capacity Building

Capacity building is commonly understood as “the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to host nation individuals and institutions to help them develop effective processes and administer state services across the economic, social, political, and security realms.” In the security and defence sectors specifically, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines capacity building as an “effort to build the security and defence capabilities of partner countries, enabling them to make valuable contributions to coalition operations and to improve their own indigenous capabilities.” The CAF Defence Terminology Standardization Board defines capacity building as “the process of increasing a host nation’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development and reconstruction.” In its forthcoming Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) doctrine, the Canadian Army (CA) defines SFCB as “those activities undertaken to develop the institutional and operational capabilities of foreign security forces, in order to create appropriate, effective and legitimate security institutions and forces.” For its part, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a military alliance, adopts a narrower definition and conceives that its role “in capacity building is to develop the skills, abilities, and process in order to enable Partners to develop their defence capacity and to assist in achieving military capabilities.” Here, in line with the U.S. and Canadian definitions, capacity building is not limited to military forces and can target other security forces including but not limited to police forces, intelligence agencies, coast guards, paramilitary organizations, and non-statutory armed groups. This wide scope reflects the previous experience of both countries in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Activities included under the guise of security force capacity building vary greatly in scope and cost. They encompass, but are not limited to, expert team visits and mobile training teams, individual training and education courses, consultations, exercises, operational advice, assistance in defence policy formulation, security sector reform, training and education of local forces, security forces assistance, and human resource management and capacity. These activities can help achieve different objectives. For instance, they can target the transfer of skills and expertise to develop a specific capability, support the broader development of security institutions, or support the professionalization of a country’s security forces in accordance with good governance principles. The specific objectives of security forces capacity building are usually defined on a case-by-case basis, ideally in accordance with some key principles discussed in the next section.

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21 Keseah Silverman, “Capacity Building as a Tool for Comprehensive Security.”
Capacity building occurs across the continuum of operations, from operations other than war to war fighting. As an example, through exercise TRADEWINDS 2016 in Jamaica, a RCN diving unit and 30 soldiers provided training during a multinational exercise with partner nations from Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2014 under operation UNIFIER, the CAF, supported by Global Affairs Canada, has facilitated the transfer of non-lethal military equipment and trained Ukrainian defence forces to bolster their capacity to maintain sovereignty and stability in the context of ongoing clashes with pro-Russia separatist factions. In Iraq, the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) has provided military assistance and tactical training to local armed forces fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, while training assistance teams have been deployed to Jordan and Lebanon to support and implement capacity-building programs targeting soldier skills and equipment. These three examples illustrate how capacity building is often central to CAF activities and operations abroad and constitutes an important component of many operations in and outside war.

2.2 Maximizing Contributions to Security Force Capacity Building

In contrast to larger military deployments, capacity building is usually conceived as a light footprint endeavour that can generate important benefits in comparison to the resources required. Indeed, if done right, deploying trainers and advisors, participating in joint exercises, or facilitating equipment transfer to partner states can bolster the capacity of these countries to ensure their own security and contribute to regional stability. Consequently, it reduces over time the burden of contributing states to project force in order to ensure security and stability in regions of interest. It can also help to lay the foundation for more assertive operations if required. Yet, if it is assumed that capacity building is more cost-effective than large deployments of troops and kinetic operations, it is nonetheless a complex endeavour that should not be undertaken without appropriate training, planning, and support. Capacity building requires a pragmatic and realistic approach rooted in a fine understanding of the needs of the partner country and of international and domestic dynamics in order to meet its objectives and mitigate unforeseen consequences.

Irrespective of whether capacity building takes place at sea or ashore, lessons learned and academic research indicate that three conditions on the supply side of capacity-building programs can help attain their objectives. Matching interests between contributor and partner countries, a strong commitment from the contributor state, and selecting recipient countries presenting characteristics that make them ideal partners are all preconditions that increase the likelihood of success for capacity building.

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25 Eric Scheye refers to the need for realism and pragmatism when discussing the importance of striking a balance between the supply and demand for security development, and ensuring that these activities reflect the political and economic realities of the partner country. Eric Scheye, “Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development,” USIP Special Report 257 (Washington D.C.: United State Institute for Peace, 2010), 1.
2.2.1 Matching Interests

First and foremost, the alignment of interests and objectives between the contributing country and the partner state is crucial to the success of capacity-building programs. Matching interests and objectives implies that capacity building responds to specific needs that are recognized by partner states and towards which donors are willing to assign resources. A 2013 report by the RAND Corporation, which examined 55 cases of capacity building under U.S. leadership, highlights this relationship.26 There is a general understanding that security capacity building efforts should adopt a comprehensive approach that addresses the entire security sector of a partner country. Yet, the partner state might be willing to target some areas but not others, and the contributing country might be more willing and/or able to provide a specific type of assistance over others.27 When contributing and partner states can identify a capability or sector on which they share a common view, agree on the type of assistance required (training, equipment, advising, and so on) and what should be achieved, desirable results on both ends are more likely. In other words, capacity building success requires finding the right ladder and the right rung.28 However, when contributing and partner states’ interests and objectives are not aligned, competing priorities, coordination problems, distrust, and issues of ownership are more likely, potentially undermining capacity-building efforts. Hence, seeing eye-to-eye is a necessary first step toward sustainable results.

As an example, Canada has developed a significant partnership with Jamaica, thanks in part to security force capacity building activities. For the last 10 years or so, the Canadian government has funded security capacity building in the country, supporting the development of military training centres for members of the security forces from various Caribbean countries, some of whom are funded by the Department of National Defence’s (DND) Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC). While the Government of Canada does not provide trainers to the different training schools located in Jamaica, the Canadian Military Training and Cooperation Programme has provided funding to support different courses, including a bridge watch keeper course, staff and commanding officers development, and pilot training. These ties contributed to the signature a Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and Jamaica in 2012 and the establishment of a Canadian Forces Operational Support Hub in Kingston, the country’s capital.29 This particularly successful partnership relies in part on the right alignment between Canadian and Jamaican interests: the CAF have increased their presence in the Western Hemisphere and can now project force more easily in the Caribbean and Central America, while Jamaica, among other Latin American nations, benefits from a more professional military force and plays a more prominent role in the region.

In South East Asia, in response to China’s military development and its assertiveness in the South China Sea, the U.S. has increased its support to partner capacity building.30 Since 2013, the U.S. has become the

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26 Christopher Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?
single most important partner for coast guard capacity building in Southeast Asia,\textsuperscript{31} responding to the need of regional countries to better assert their sovereignty at sea and ensure maritime security. Military assistance, mostly through funding and transfer of military capabilities, is complemented by a reinforced presence of the U.S. Navy in the region. The U.S. Department of State (DoS) also funds maritime capacity building and law enforcement initiatives.\textsuperscript{32} These investments in the maritime security sector of Southeast Asian countries were part of the U.S. military rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region announced during the Obama presidency.

\textbf{2.2.2 Strong Commitment}

Significant commitment in terms of funding, resources, and political will from contributing states and agencies is also associated with higher rates of success for capacity-building programs. Evidence from partner capacity-building endeavours undertaken by the U.S. suggests that the amount of resources invested in the reinforcement of the partner state’s security capacity is correlated with the success of these programs, but that relationship is not linear; capacity-building investments present diminishing returns.\textsuperscript{33} Initial investments tend to yield greater results than subsequent ones. Nonetheless, significant resource commitments are associated with better outcomes over time, especially in the case of weaker states, and “small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.”\textsuperscript{34} As a result, capacity-building programs toward fragile states tend to be long-term enterprises where there is a significant lag between the investment of resources and the manifestation of results. Yet, significant investments early on to quick start capacity-building programs are more likely to produce outcomes in line with established objectives. Finally, it is important to note that progress achieved through capacity building is not guaranteed and can easily be reverted. All these points highlight the importance of a strong commitment of donors, both in terms of length and resources.

For example, in 1994, the U.S. armed forces intervened in Haiti to remove the military junta and implement the Governors Island Agreement negotiated a year earlier to facilitate a return to democracy. The intervention paved the way to the deployment the \textit{United Nations Mission in Haiti} (UNMIH). In its resolution 940 authorizing UNMIH, the United Nations (UN) Security Council called for “the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force,” alongside the stabilisation of the country and the organization of legislative elections.\textsuperscript{35} The stated objectives were to completely disband the armed forces and to create a new civilian national police that could count on 5,000 new police agents by the end of 1996. Yet, despite such ambitious tasks in a country known for its authoritarian legacy and its lack of functioning institutions and infrastructure, contributing countries were looking for a short deployment, planning to exit the country as soon as a domestic force could ensure basic order and security. By March 1995, six months after their arrival, most foreign troops had already left Haiti, leaving the country to a

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid}.
young and inexperienced police facing powerful spoilers.\textsuperscript{36} Less than a decade later, Haiti was back to square one.\textsuperscript{37} In 2004, the UN Security Council authorized an even more ambitious peace operations to reform the young, yet corrupt national police and restore order. In the words of Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “the demobilization of the Haitian Army and the creation of a new civilian police force […] were important steps that could have been successful had it not been for the short time frame allowed for success.”\textsuperscript{38}

2.2.3 The Right Partner

The previous points stress how working with some partner states might be more challenging than with others. Research has identified that capacity building is more likely to meet its objectives when a partner state presents five characteristics.\textsuperscript{39} First, the partner state is investing in its own capacity, which indicates both the will to do so and available resources. Second, it presents sufficient absorption capacity to implement and sustain reform programs. Third, the country has high governance indicators, the right institutions, and adequate checks and balances to ensure the sustainability of the capacity-building efforts and their outcomes. Fourth, it possesses an economy strong enough to allow for national investments. These first four elements emphasize the link between governance and security. Reinforcing security institutions in weak governance settings can result in less security and weaker governance.\textsuperscript{40} Fifth, the ideal partner state should share common security interests with the contributing country. This last point links back to the importance of mutual objectives and interests first discussed in this section.

However, if these five conditions help to identify ideal partner states on paper, they are rarely present all at once in countries targeted by SFCB. Indeed, advancing the contributing country’s security interests, among other factors, might justify establishing partnership with countries that do not necessarily constitute ideal partners. Human rights groups and experts have heavily criticized the U.S. for providing military assistance to countries governed by authoritarian regimes and characterized by recurrent military


\textsuperscript{39} Christopher Paul et al, \textit{What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?}

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capacity-building programs conducted ashore and should inform growing discussions surrounding SFCB
in the maritime realm.

2.3 Maritime Security Capacity Building

In this Report, and in line with the forthcoming CA doctrine on SFCB, MSCB corresponds to activities undertaken to develop the institutional and operational capabilities of foreign maritime security forces, in order to create appropriate, effective, and legitimate maritime security institutions and forces. Capacity does not equate to capability. To the contrary, a state’s military power—its capacity—depends on its ability to carry out a variety of operations to generate a desired effect—the security and defence capabilities of a country. Following this logic, SFCB usually implies the development of a partner state’s capabilities related to security and defence to improve its overall capacity. It is assumed that by enhancing
coups and widespread corruption, only reinforcing bad behaviours in doing so. For example, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, financed by DoD, received almost US$40 billion between 2011 and 2015. However, the Afghan Armed Forces have been unable to tame resurgent Taliban militants, while some key senior military officers have been arrested on charges of theft and corruption. In the case of Somalia, U.S. officials have indicated that: “to press Somalia to develop a military without a functional government, or a military that does not reflect the Somali political context on the ground is a recipe for folly.” The U.S. government nevertheless allocated almost US$117 million in military and police assistance to Somalia in 2017, mostly channeled through multilateral peacekeeping channels under UN and African Union leadership, which includes but is not limited to SSR efforts.

To summarize, security capacity building is more likely to lead to desirable outcomes when contributing and partner countries share mutual interests, programs are well-tailored and do not suffer from a deficit in terms of resources or commitment over time, and when target partner states present conditions that support the implementation of capacity building programs and their sustainability over time, ultimately promoting burden sharing. That said, countries most in need of competent security forces are not necessarily ideal partners, especially when it comes to fragile states. These conditions are not specific to capacity-building programs conducted ashore and should inform growing discussions surrounding SFCB in the maritime realm.

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45 “SFCB is defined as: those activities undertaken to develop the institutional and operational capabilities of foreign security forces, in order to create appropriate, effective and legitimate security institutions and forces.” Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Army Doctrine SSO Doctrine, Security Forces Capacity Building (draft), 1-1-3.
a partner’s security and military capabilities, said partner state will be more capable of defending itself and contributing to regional security.

MSCB concerns the capacity of a country to exercise power at sea and it targets specifically maritime security and naval capabilities. It includes the transfer of equipment, technical knowledge, and skills to develop such capabilities in order to enhance the overall capacity of littoral states to exercise their sovereignty at sea and protect their maritime infrastructure. At the regional level, MSCB can also enhance inter-state coordination, interoperability, and shared awareness through joint training and the development of various mechanisms, including joint maritime operations centres. For example, through the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Nestor, the European Union (EU) invested not only in the reinforcement of Somali maritime capabilities to conduct operations against piracy and control and regulate activities in domestic waters, but also promoted regional cooperation through multinational workshops for law makers and enforcers, as well as the development of the Critical Maritime Routes Programme to address security at sea.46

The scope of MSCB programs varies according to needs, resources, and objectives. It can target specific capabilities or the overall maritime security capacity of the partner state. In its narrowest and more traditional form, MSCB can facilitate the acquisition of new equipment through financial and material support. For instance, China gave patrol boats to Cambodia in 2007 to patrol oil installations in the Gulf of Thailand.47 In 2012, the Vietnamese Coast Guard became a civilian armed service under the country’s Ministry of Defence in order to be eligible to acquire Japanese patrol vessels through Japan’s foreign aid program.48 In both cases, the acquisition of new vessels sought to reinforce the ability of Cambodia and Vietnam to conduct constabulary operations to protect their strategic and economic interests at sea.

MSCB can also improve a country’s maritime capabilities by providing training and education for coast guard and navy personnel. Such training can target specific capabilities to enable partner states. For instance, a key component of the annual Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS is to train boarding parties around the Gulf of Guinea in order to improve their ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations through the development of boarding parties and enhanced interoperability.49 Training can also occur ashore. For instance, as described earlier, the Government of Canada supports financially the Caribbean Military Maritime Training Centre in Jamaica. The Centre now provides courses such as bridge watch keeper, coxswain, naval boarding party, and diving training, which support the development of key naval capabilities in the Caribbean. In East Africa, under the umbrella of Exercise CUTLASS EXPRESS 2018, the Canadian Coast Guard provided in-class training to members of the Tanzania and Mozambique maritime security forces to enhance the effectiveness of local maritime operation centres.50

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50 Canadian Coast Guard, Canadian Coast Guard Capacity Building Workshop Minutes, April 2018, Unpublished document.
More ambitious MSCB programs can target different capabilities simultaneously by providing various forms of assistance. For instance, former U.S. president Barack Obama announced in 2014 a $250 million aid package targeting countries surrounding the South China Sea: “the $250 million aid package will provide training, infrastructure construction, and vessels and other assets to bureaucracies charged with maritime security in the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.”

Finally, MSCB programs can support the reform or even the creation of new national institutions to deal with maritime security-related issues. In this case, MSCB goes beyond routine train-and-equip programs and multinational exercises. These initiatives are often more intensive in terms of time and resource. They not only seek to increase the effectiveness of the recipient’s maritime security forces and institutions, but also to improve their governance according to some key principles: participation and representativeness, respect for human rights and the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Such efforts are usually part of broader SSR programs that target the entire security system of a country. In recent years, partner states have contributed to the development of coast guards in regions of strategic interest, such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific. In Liberia, from 2006, the U.S. State Department’s SSR Program supported the complete reform of the Liberian Armed Forces, including the creation of the Liberian Coast Guard. On the other side of the continent, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government pledged in 2009 to develop a coast guard to combat piracy off its coast in return for international cooperation and assistance. In the Caribbean, the UN and bilateral donors, including Canada, have invested in the development of the Haitian Coast Guard under the police reform plan. These examples illustrate how MSCB is not limited to navies. Like SFCB on land, it can target civilian security forces and governing institutions, while intersecting with other types of assistance and reform programs. Indeed, MSCB and ashore capacity building are rarely isolated from one another and often face common challenges, especially in regards to governance, institutional oversight, and budgetary issues.

Overall, while the construct of individual MSCB programmes may vary, in general they reflect the intention to increase the partner state’s capacity to assert its sovereignty, protect its population and resources, and contribute to regional security through the development of its security and defence capabilities. The next section of this Report turns to the recent emergence of MSCB in response to the evolution of the maritime security environment, and its implications for the strategy at sea of the U.S. and Australia. The concluding section will discuss initial implications for Canada.

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A Changing Global Maritime Security Environment

Changes initiated decades ago in the global maritime security environment have become progressively more acute, increasing the relative importance of the maritime domain for current strategic considerations.\(^{56}\) First, as oceans have become crucial to world trade and communications, threats to security at sea and freedom of navigation in the global commons have become more diverse. As a result of this diversification, the concept of maritime security once relegated to domestic matters has been integrated in the most recent naval strategies and doctrines of many countries, including the U.S., Canada, and Australia. Second, after almost a decade focused on war fighting and post-conflict reconstruction ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. announced in 2011 their rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific in response to China’s rise and assertiveness in the region.\(^{57}\) While this shift has yet to happen, the announced rebalance of military capabilities and diplomatic resources toward the Asia-Pacific implies a higher reliance on naval forces as well as an increased focus on maritime issues and challenges due to the strategic and economic importance of the maritime commons in the region. As a consequence of both trends, capacity building in the maritime domain has come to play a more significant role in maritime strategies of many nations and organizations. In the next paragraphs, I briefly discuss each trend in more detail, before turning to the U.S. and Australian approaches to MSCB.

3.1 Maritime Security and Threat Diversification

Under the current rules-based order, managing maritime resources, ensuring freedom of navigation in the global commons for commercial purposes, and protecting lines of communication are as central to maritime security as traditional questions of power and dominion.\(^{58}\) Indeed, most sea routes pass through choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Hormuz, where regional instability, political tensions, and lawlessness can significantly affect free passage at sea.

Piracy, robbery at sea, terrorism, and transnational organized crime have increasingly been identified as a significant threat to maritime security since the late 1990s.\(^{59}\) In 2008, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a series of resolutions to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa. In its resolution 1816, the UNSC states that piracy constitutes a threat to international peace and security and urges countries with military vessels and aircraft in the region to “deter acts of piracy and armed robber,” and “provide technical assistance to Somalia and nearby coastal States upon their request to enhance the capacity of these States to ensure coastal and maritime security.”\(^{60}\) As a result, many initiatives have been put in place to ensure maritime security in the region. For instance, the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), led by the U.S., and to which Canada has contributed in the past, is

\(^{56}\) For an insightful and more detailed discussion of the changing maritime operating environment, see Ben Lombardi, *The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power*, DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085, 2016.


mandated to “disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”[^61] The EU has also committed resources to support MSCB in the Indian Ocean littoral to ensure that, in the long run, East African countries are able to ensure the security of their waters without a persistent international presence.[^62] In 2009, the EU put in place the Critical Maritime Route Program to increase information-sharing and training capacities in the Western Indian Ocean region to enhance the security of key commercial routes. In 2012, the organization also deployed EUCAP Nestor,[^63] a civilian capacity-building mission with enhanced military expertise targeting African states along the coast of the Indian Ocean. There has been no successful piracy attack against major merchant vessels off the Horn of Africa since 2012, but attacks against smaller vessels continue to occur.[^64] Piracy remains an issue in other regions of the world as well, including the Gulf of Guinea, off the coast of Nigeria, and the Strait of Malacca.[^65] Renewed tensions between Iran and Western countries also undermine security at sea for commercial vessels transiting in the Gulf of Oman, as illustrated by the British tanker seized by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in July 2019.[^66]

According to the 2008 United Nations Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, managing resource reserves and their exploitation also represents a challenge for maritime security, alongside illicit trafficking of arms and weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trade, human smuggling and trafficking, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as well as intentional and unlawful damage to the maritime environment.[^67] In response to these new challenges, MSCB emerged as one of the ways through which major and regional powers can manage these threats and promote security and stability at sea.

### 3.2 Power Shifts in the International System

Change in the distribution of power in the international system and the growing assertiveness of major powers, notably Russia and China, also contribute to the rising importance of the maritime domain for strategic considerations. The ongoing modernization of the Russian Navy will potentially have important implications for good order at sea in the North Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the


Crimean Sea. While NATO countries have mostly dominated these waters since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s naval military build-up suggests renewed competition for the control of the maritime domain, lesser access to strategic passages and choke points, and reduced freedom of navigation for NATO military and commercial vessels.

Concurrently, the economic and strategic rise of China has resulted in the growing strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region. 30 percent of the world’s sea trade passes through the South China Sea alone every year, and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Considering the size of the region’s ocean estate and its strategic importance for international trade and commerce, managing maritime resources and access to the region’s waterways is central to the interests of regional states and major powers. Yet in Southeast Asia, despite investments in navy and coast guard capabilities following rapid economic development in the 1980s, regional countries still face significant challenges in terms of capacity and professionalism due to the size of their ocean estate, corruption, and contending claims over regional waters that undermine cooperation. As a result, “the Asia-Pacific region lacks effective arrangements and the necessary capacities to provide for the safety and security of shipping and seaborne trade and to maintain law and order at sea generally.”

Moreover, recent Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has important repercussions on regional countries that see their sovereignty claims threatened by Chinese behaviour towards contested islands and reefs. In the South China Sea especially, the limited capacity at sea of regional states poses risks to their sovereignty in the face of China’s naval superiority. In response, reference to MSCB has become increasingly common in recent strategic documents addressing maritime security in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and Australia have both proposed to reinforce partner capacity as a way to maintain the current rules-based maritime order enshrined in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is discussed below.

In summary, the global maritime security environment is rapidly changing. In response to these changes, MSCB has emerged as a significant means by which regional and major powers intend to advance their interests at sea. The next sections turn to the U.S. and Australian approaches to MSCB, presenting their rationale for investing in the maritime capacities of partner states based on recent strategic documents and programs put in place by both countries.

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72 Sam Bateman, “Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?”

The U.S. and Maritime Security Capacity Building

Two trends have contributed to the prevalence of partner capacity building in U.S. security and defence maritime strategies since 2000. On the one hand, multiple challenges to international security combined with domestic fiscal constraints have increasingly shown the limits of U.S. power and undermined its position as the world hegemon. The U.S. simply can no longer meet the demand for global security and stability alone. On the other hand, the rising strategic importance of the maritime domain described in the previous section implies a shift towards a greater emphasis towards activities, challenges, and threats at sea. As a result of these two developments, recent years have witnessed an increase in U.S. endeavours in partner maritime capacity building, especially towards the Asia-Pacific region.

4.1 Partner Capacity Building

Security force assistance and partner capacity building, terms that are often used interchangeably, have been part of the U.S. security and defence strategy since the end of the Second World War. From South Korea to El Salvador, and from Egypt to Afghanistan, training, advising, and equipping foreign forces has been key to U.S. interventions and influence in countries and regions of interest. Maintaining strong alliances and partnerships has enabled the U.S. to protect and promote its strategic interests. In recent years, the diversification of threats to national security, including terrorism, and the relative decline of the American influence on the global stage have only reinforced the U.S. necessity to ensure that its allies and partners have the capacity to take care of their own security, and contribute to regional stability. Indeed, in 2010, Robert M. Gates, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, wrote in an article published by the journal Foreign Affairs: “the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners.” Hence, partner capacity building directly contributes to U.S. security and international stability, by facilitating burden sharing with like-minded allies and partners in regions of interest.

The rationale for partner capacity building is simple at first glance: it is assumed that providing assistance is less expensive than putting boots on the ground. The U.S. considers that partner capacity building potentially presents great returns for relatively limited investments, despite the fact that recent research on the subject suggests that it might be difficult to yield military results from security force assistance. Nonetheless, practitioners and policy-makers usually consider that well-executed capacity building can reduce the need for the U.S. and its armed forces to directly project force in regions of interest in order to maintain security and stability. Indeed, in January 2012, DoD published a new Strategic Guidance, which emphasises the importance of building partner capacity to serve U.S. security interests: “[b]uilding partnership capacity elsewhere in the world […] remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. […] Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

Partner capacity building and security force assistance are common in U.S. defence and national security documents, but these activities are actually not the traditional responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces and DoD. They are traditionally conceived as ways to advance U.S. foreign policy and serve the country’s national interest, with implications going beyond defence considerations. In fact, since 1945, most security assistance programs have been funded by the Department of State and delivered by DoD. To a lesser extent than DoS funding and programming, DoD has traditionally funded security cooperation programs on counter-narcotics, counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, and training and assistance of NATO forces. Oversight bodies, including congressional committees, have since raised concerns regarding the proliferation and duplication of capacity-building efforts.

After September 11, 2001, DoD funding for security assistance increased sharply, as a consequence of the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the 2005 Defence Authorization Act, under Section 1206, allowed the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $200 million on transfer of equipment to partner countries engaged in joint counter-terrorism operations and other activities supporting U.S. strategic objectives. Since 2005, what is referred to as Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority has been allocated between $200 and $500 million annually.

The greater role played by DoD in funding partner capacity building since 2005 has been criticized for allegedly militarizing U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the diversification of funds and programs aimed at providing security assistance is not limited to DoD and DoS. The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, as well as the U.S Agency for International Development are also involved in capacity building programs with partner nations, even though their contribution tends to be more marginal and ad hoc.

In 2013, the DoS’ International Security Advisory Board published the Report on Security Capacity Building, which highlighted the multiplicity of security assistance programs and a lack of national strategy, despite the fact that “the United States annually spends more than $25 billion on what is broadly

classified as “security assistance,” all of which is broadly aimed at improving the “security capacity” of the recipient states.\textsuperscript{85} According to the report, the vast majority of funds from DoD were allocated to bilateral programs with Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan. Only a small fraction of DoD funds were assigned to programs that did not target a specific recipient or focus on a specific objective, such as counter-terrorism or peacekeeping. Considering that funds from different sources are often allocated to programs with similar objectives, the report recommended the development of a comprehensive strategic framework for security capacity building across the U.S. government, a recommendation that has yet to be implemented. Other oversight bodies have pointed to the proliferation and duplication of capacity-building efforts,\textsuperscript{86} as well as significant challenges in regard to coordination, information sharing, sustainability, and evaluation.\textsuperscript{87}

At the operational level, regional combatant commands coordinate and implement partner capacity building programs, regardless of the environment targeted by these efforts. With respect to Section 1206 funding specifically, resources are allocated to combatant commands and are then used based on their respective Theater Security Cooperation Plan.\textsuperscript{88} In that regard, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized a rebalance of counter-terrorism efforts toward building partnership capacity in fragile states, with clear implications for the U.S. Central Command and Africa Command.\textsuperscript{89} The Review portrays partner capacity building as a key means through which the U.S. can contribute to peacekeeping in Africa.\textsuperscript{90} As discussed with CAF members deployed to the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.-led partner capacity building efforts in the Asia-Pacific are part of a regional campaign plan and are usually anchored in bilateral diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the partner state. Hence, partner capacity building is adapted by each command to advance U.S. interests in different regions, alongside more robust activities ashore and at sea.

To summarize, security assistance and partner capacity building has been a key tool used by the U.S. government to advance its national security and foreign policy objectives since 1945. Ultimately promoting burden sharing to ensure domestic, regional, and international security, it has been conceived as a means to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad. DoD has played a more significant role in terms of funding after September 11, 2001, as a way to offer more flexibility regarding who and how capacity building is provided, especially in regard to counter terrorism. Due to civil-military balance issues, as well as overlap and gaps in U.S. security assistance to partner countries, there have been discussions in Washington to rethink how security cooperation is conducted, and what role DoD is to play in engaging and partnering with foreign security forces. Nonetheless, partnerships remain central to U.S. security and defence strategies, which has important implications for the maritime domain, considering current challenges to global security and stability.

\textsuperscript{90} Id., 19.
4.2 U.S. Maritime Strategy and Partner Capacity Building

US maritime strategy has increasingly included an emphasis on partnerships and alliances since the turn of the century. In the early 2000s, American strategists highlighted the need and potential for cooperation and partnerships. Yet, fiscal constraints at home and the lack of a clear strategy to achieve ambitious goals abroad started to generate concerns in Washington by the end of the decade. In parallel, the rapidly changing security environment described earlier justified a turn toward a threat-based assessment of strategic requirements by 2010, and a more utilitarian approach to partnerships and cooperation, notably through security assistance and partner capacity building.

4.2.1 The 2007 Maritime Strategy

Published in October 2007, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* states: “our challenge is to apply sea power in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust. While defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of sea power, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest.” The document discusses the diversification of activities and challenges at sea, confirming the expansion of what constitutes maritime security beyond questions of power and dominion on the one hand, and domestic preoccupations on the other hand. Indeed, in the U.S., the concept of maritime security had traditionally been concerned with matters at home, such as the security of port activities and the protection of the U.S. ocean estate. From that perspective, maritime security fell mostly under the responsibility of the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security. *A Cooperative Strategy* breaks with the traditional view that domestic and national security are separate issues that require distinct strategies, a vision that dominated for decades in Washington. Indeed, for the first time, the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps all adopted *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* as their strategic guidance.

The 2007 maritime strategy brought together sea power with other elements of national power in order to protect the American “way of life” and support the globalized system profiting the U.S, emphasizing the central role of trade in the definition of the U.S. national interest. At the same time, it resonated with key partners for whom issues such as drug trafficking and piracy represented more immediate concerns than “hard security” matters; indeed, at the time, irregular warfare was conceived as the primary threat to U.S. security. Nevertheless, the 2007 strategy refused to focus on and identify specific threats: “the strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear; and on confidence—not doubt.” Sea power can contribute “to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world.” In other words, to respond to challenges posed by uncertainty and a rapidly evolving international environment, the document emphasizes the need for cooperation between the U.S. maritime forces, as well as with traditional and new partners and allies to defend U.S. vital interests.

94 *Id.*, 18.
More significantly for MSCB, the 2007 maritime strategy put partner capacity building as a core element rather than a by-product of the U.S. defence strategy. The centrality of partnerships and cooperation in the strategy originated from the “1000-ship Navy” concept advanced by Admiral Mike Cullen in 2005–2006. In response to political scepticism in Washington, the 1000-ship Navy concept became the Global Maritime Partnership, aiming to ensure collective security in the maritime global commons. According to this vision, cooperation between navies through existing regional structures and new maritime domain awareness technologies would help the U.S. and its partners to face asymmetrical and irregular threats to good order at sea. Indeed, new challenges called for new roles and capacities for maritime forces: “from performing roles connected primarily to deterrence and war fighting, to one that also emphasises the protection of shipping and safety of sea lanes, the maintenance of a stable and lawful maritime domain and prosecution of the fight against transnational terrorist groups, including in the littoral, and the ability to influence events ashore.”

The Global Maritime Partnership was conceived as an informal network of like-minded navies that would pool together capabilities and technologies to ensure peace and stability in the maritime domain, including the supply and demand of maritime security assistance by partner nations. Yet, as a voluntary initiative and considering the attention given at the time to expeditionary forces ashore, the Partnership never fully materialized. Nonetheless, the idea of enhanced domestic and international cooperation in the maritime domain remained.

The 2007 Strategy was criticized for its lack of attention to the ways and means required for its execution. While it clearly highlighted general strategic objectives the U.S. maritime forces should pursue, the document provided little, if any, insight on how those objectives should be reached. Hence, its strategic aim, lacking clear benchmarks and requirements, did not resonate with a Congress that showed unwillingness to allocate funds without clear guidelines about how objectives would be attained. As pointed out by one expert, there was little justification for U.S. sea power beyond the systemic argument of a global network of navies ensuring international stability and maritime security. Some have argued that the Global Maritime Partnership was a declinist concept, as the United States no longer had the capacity to shape, control, and protect the global maritime order. Yet, what was conceived by some analysts as dependency on partners to achieve U.S. security also suggests that the U.S. at the time recognized how allies in regions of interest could be powerbrokers since they would not cast automatically a hegemonic shadow on regional issues.

In 2011, the U.S. announced a rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region and the necessity for the United States to protect the current rules-based maritime order and preserve its influence in the region. Considering the importance of the maritime environment in the region, and in response to China’s growing assertiveness, the announced rebalance implied greater efforts towards maintaining access to and freedom of navigation in the region’s waters. As a result of this strategic shift, and carried by previous efforts towards international cooperation and partnership with Southeast Asian countries to promote maritime security in the Strait of Malacca, capacity building in the maritime sector became central to the U.S. maritime security strategy in the region under the Obama administration.

98 Id., 6.
100 Tangredi, “US Naval Efforts in Supporting Partner Maritime Capacity Building: Refocusing a Tradition,” 44.
This strategic rebalance corresponds in time to a general shift in discussions on cooperation and partnerships from the short-lived Global Maritime Partnership toward a more targeted and pragmatic approach to partner capacity building. For instance, in 2010, in an effort to bring together all the government agencies involved in maritime security capacity building with partner states (DoS, DoD, Homeland Security, Transportation, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development), the U.S. government published the *Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide*. The guide applies the principles and objectives of SSR to the maritime sector specifically, providing some answer to the lack of coordination and direction in security assistance. Yet, the Guide does not articulate its vision with respect to strategic considerations; it only offers tools to map and assess the maritime sector as a whole; to assess maritime security sector capabilities and gaps; and to enable coordination and collaboration to improve maritime safety and security. Hence, the Guide shows important limits considering the strategic and political implications of partner capacity building programs, focussing solely on the technical and tactical aspects of MSCB.

Yet, considering the role played by combatant commands in the implementation of capacity building programs and the role MSCB can play in achieving strategic ends, some regional issues can justify a higher reliance on MSCB. For example, a report published by the Atlantic Council, also in 2010, argues that the U.S. has clear strategic interest in West Africa’s maritime domain: “America must work harder, smarter, and better to help responsible West African leaders counter rampant exploitation of the region’s ungoverned waters by a host of illicit actors.” In Asia more than anywhere else, U.S. positioning in response to the rise of China explains the increased prevalence of partner capacity building as a way to advance U.S. interests. The relative decline of U.S. hard power in relation to rising China’s assertiveness, especially in the East and South China Seas, presents a classic scenario of balancing between major powers to shape the order that will prevail at sea and beyond. The region is the busiest worldwide in terms of sea trade and is therefore crucial to American prosperity. A redefinition of what constitutes good order at sea in the region would have significant consequences for the U.S. economy, its trading relations, and its influence in the Asia-Pacific. To this end, according to the 2016 *Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*, the U.S. Navy intends to “prioritize key international partnerships through information sharing, interoperability initiatives, and combined operations; [and] explore new opportunities for combined forward operations.”

Maintaining U.S. superiority at sea in the Asia-Pacific region is “feasible if done in tandem with capable allies and the implementation of serious partner capacity-building programs. A more vibrant network of security partners would allow for more dispersed access, greater distributed lethality, and heightened political-military uncertainty to induce greater caution on the part of Beijing officials.”

**4.2.2 The 2015 Maritime Strategy**

Published in 2015, the second iteration of a *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* addresses some of the criticisms of the 2007 maritime strategy, and confirmed a shift towards a threat-based assessment of the maritime environment initiated at the turn of the decade. While the 2007 maritime

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strategy talked of challenges and opportunities in ensuring international security and stability through partnerships, the 2015 document provides a more thorough evaluation of the global strategic environment and its implications for U.S. national interest. The new strategy reaffirms the need for partnerships and cooperation to ensure international security and stability: “by working together in formal and informal networks, we can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interests.” References to a global navy are left aside, but partnerships remain key to protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad: “[such a] global network of navies that brings together the contributions of like-minded nations and organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security challenges and respond to natural disasters.”

A key U.S. effort toward MSCB has certainly been the South East Asian Maritime Security Initiative announced in 2015. The Obama administration declared it would invest US$425 million over five years in South East Asia, targeting the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as regional maritime security mechanisms. While the Initiative proposes to support traditional partners, it also intends to build new relations with countries who had been left out of the U.S. circle of allies and partners since the Cold War—namely Vietnam. Proposed military assistance includes boosted capability, logistical support, institutional reinforcement, and the development of infrastructures. Each country benefits from a wide range of programs that target specific activities or capabilities identified through bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the partner state. At the regional level, the South East Asian Maritime Security Initiative seeks “to build a shared maritime domain awareness architecture that will help countries share information, identify potential threats, and work collaboratively to address common challenges.” By providing much needed assistance to countries bordering the South China Sea and who see their sovereignty claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands contested by China, the U.S. seeks to contain Beijing’s ambitions in the region and balance against its growing influence without directly engaging Chinese Power. Combined with reinforce partnerships with traditional regional allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) and freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, MSCB constitutes a key element of the U.S. strategy in the South East Asia under the Obama administration. Indeed, in the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, “building ally and partner capacity” constitutes one of the four lines of effort to advance U.S. objectives in the region.

In sum, given shifts in the current security environment, cooperation and reliance on partnerships have become increasingly important for the U.S. to advance its interests, ensure its security, and maintain its influence abroad. In 2007, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower highlighted for the first time the necessity to ensure cooperation among domestic agencies at home and with foreign partners and allies abroad to ensure U.S. security and prosperity. The changing global security environment called for a

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107 United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, Forward; Engaged; Ready: Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015, Washington DC, 1.
112 Parameswaran, “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia.”
more pragmatic approach to U.S. security and defence after 2010. As a result of those changes and in response to criticisms of the 2007 strategy, the U.S. proposed a new naval strategy in 2015. While the title remains the same and the document continues to be anchored in the importance of cooperation and partnerships, it emphasizes the presence of significant threats and challenges to the current U.S.-led world order, as well as the importance of means and ways to achieve strategic ends. As a result, partner capacity building has become a significant way for combatant commands to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world, and especially in the Asia-Pacific. In an increasingly multipolar world, capacity building is now conceived by U.S. strategists a way to project influence and shape the strategic environment at a lesser cost than expeditionary forces.
Australia and Maritime Security Capacity Building

Australia is, without a doubt, a maritime nation. More than twice the size of its land mass, its ocean estate is the third largest in the world (13.86 million km$^2$). As an insular country, Australia faces a unique set of challenges and opportunities when it comes its economy, security, and defence. In regards to the gross domestic product, in 2009–2010, the marine estate generated $43.2 billion in national value across sectors (including shipbuilding, tourism, port activities, offshore resource exploitation, and fisheries) in comparison to $39.6 billion from agriculture. Safeguarding the ocean estate and ensuring domain awareness are critical to ensure Australia’s security and prosperity. For instance, protecting the marine environment, preventing the illegal exploitation of offshore resources and fisheries, and combatting piracy and robbery at sea are considered central to Australia’s security and prosperity. Moreover, the diversification of challenges to regional maritime security and the rising strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific implies that Australia’s national interest is increasingly linked to its neighbours’ security, justifying proactive and significant engagement with regional partners and allies. As a result, the diversification of challenges to maritime security and the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region have strongly influenced its national security and maritime strategies, and MSCB is now crucial to Australia’s defence strategy.

5.1 Australia’s Rationale

The 2016 Defence White Paper clearly demonstrates the preponderance of the maritime domain for Australian policy-makers and strategists. The White Paper identifies three strategic defence interests, all related to the maritime environment. While “a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication” constitutes Australia’s first and foremost strategic interest, regional security and stability come closely after. Indeed, “a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and South Pacific (comprising Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island Countries),” and “a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order” are the second and third strategic interests driving Australia’s defence strategy. To ensure a secure region, Australia aims to contribute militarily to the security of South East Asia and directly support its closest neighbours to build and strengthen their security and defence capabilities. Considering the insular nature of these countries and the significance of their maritime domain both in absolute terms and from a strategic perspective, MSCB constitutes a key means through which Australia intends to advance and protect its strategic interests.

MSCB is not new to Australia’s defence strategy. The country’s security has always been closely linked to the stability of South East Asia and the Pacific Islands. As a regional power and a close ally of the U.S., Australia has played a central role in promoting security and stability in the Southern portion of the Indo-Pacific region. Since the 1960s, the Department of Defence’s Defence Engagement Program has sought to reinforce the capacity of international partners, increase Australia’s capacity to cooperate with partners, and build partnerships at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Through defence

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115 Ibid.
117 Id., 68.
118 Ibid.
engagement, Australia has provided training, advising, equipment, and infrastructure to its neighbours (especially Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste), in addition to engaging in diplomatic efforts and participating in multinational exercises.\(^\text{119}\) This support to partner states has cut across environments, but a significant portion of this assistance has been directed toward the maritime sector due to its significance.

Australia’s most noteworthy engagement in terms of MSCB has certainly been the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which was replaced in 2014 by the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This program has been at the core of Australia’s South Pacific strategy since the 1980s. Following the signature of UNCLOS in 1982, the Australian government put in place the Pacific Patrol Boat Program to help regional partners improve their capacity to patrol and monitor activities in their exclusive economic zone. Between 1987 and 1997, the program provided 22 small, lightly armed patrol boats manufactured in Australia to South Pacific countries for maritime surveillance, search and rescue, emergency relief, and to support local police, military forces, as well as fisheries authorities. Through the same initiative, Australia also provided maintenance support, as well as continued training and advising through the deployment of military personnel. The program was renewed several times; in 2002, the government announced that it would maintain the program through 2027 for an estimated cost of $350 million.\(^\text{120}\) Then, in 2007–2008, the Department of Defence funded refit work to extend the planned life of some of the boats. In 2014, the government of Australia launched the Pacific Maritime Security Program, with at its core a renewed patrol boat program of $1.88 billion that will provide 19 new patrol vessels to 12 countries (all located in the South Pacific region), in addition to covering training, personnel costs, and maintenance through the boats’ lifespan.\(^\text{121}\) The construction of the new boats started in April 2017 and is expected to be completed by 2023.\(^\text{122}\)

It is safe to say that defence engagement and MSCB have traditionally been important components of the Australian national defence strategy and have been openly serving the defence and promotion of the country’s national interest. The 2016 Defence White Paper not only confirms this commitment to regional security and stability, but also proposes to expand it in light of an increasingly challenging maritime security environment. Such funding will directly target the Pacific Maritime Security Program, increasing the number of foreign military officers trained in Australia, ramping up training, advising, and mentoring activities provided by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) abroad, and allowing for more joint exercises to take place, all that in addition to the new patrol boat program.\(^\text{123}\) Such engagement also involves developing the skills and expertise of ADF members and public servants at home in order to maximize program delivery abroad.


\(^{123}\) Australia, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 118–119.
All in all, maritime security capacity building has been a central element of Australia’s defence engagement strategy. It is portrayed as a direct way to advance the country’s strategic interests in its immediate vicinity, contributing to Australian security and prosperity. Defence engagement with neighbouring countries shapes regional security, contributes to stability in the South Pacific, and helps the ADF to project force and influence. Furthermore, it signals the intentions of Australia to play a leadership role in the region, at a time when the involvement of regional and major powers, including Japan, China, and the U.S is on the rise. On the home front, the defence engagement strategy, and especially the patrol boat program, present not only a way to boost Australia’s image, but also provide jobs and contribute to the national ship building industry. One last point worth noting is that the Government of Australia and the ADF clearly show on paper and in public discourse how defence engagement and capacity building are key to security and prosperity. It makes for an easier sell when the domestic benefits of investing abroad are clearly presented to the general public and foreign counterparts. Australia positions itself as a resolute and strategic partner of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and in the maritime domain. Finally, considering the similarities between Canada and Australia, the Australian defence engagement strategy in the maritime sector offers interesting insights for the CAF and the Canadian government more broadly, which will be discussed in the next section.

124 Pasandideh, “Australia Launches New Pacific Patrol Boat Program.”
Conclusion: Implications for the RCN

Considering the evolving maritime security environment and the importance given to partner capacity building by the U.S. and Australia—one an ally and the other a close partner—MSCB is likely to continue to grow in importance in the coming years. New challenges to security at sea and change in the relative distribution of power in the international system call for new ways to project power and influence to maintain the current rules-based international order, at sea and beyond. To that end, and alongside Canadian allies and partners, the RCN likely will be called increasingly to provide assistance and engage in MSCB with partner countries in regions of interest. Indeed, SSE identifies partner capacity building as a core mission of the CAF, and as a way to directly contribute to Canada’s international engagement and leadership.

While there is not yet a clear Canadian approach to MSCB, references to capacity building and global partnership have increased in Canadian policy and strategic documents over the last 10 years. The 2015 Global Partnership Strategy and, more recently, SSE’s Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement identify capacity building as a key defence engagement tool to advance government priorities and exercise leadership abroad. In the maritime realm specifically, the number of references to MSCB has increased since the early 2000s. Indeed, while Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020, published in 2001, does not once mention capacity building, the RCN Strategic Plan includes capacity building in the mission and the vision of the organization.125 In parallel, Leadmark 2050 proposes to develop capabilities such as enhanced naval boarding parties that can be leveraged for capacity building. Other examples include bilateral exercises with Latin American countries, using the future Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels to do onboard training with partner states, and developing maritime security sector reform (MSSR) teams that could “leverage Canada’s expertise in maritime domain awareness and interdiction operations to help future partners build their maritime security capacity.”126

Considering the limited capacities of the RCN and the CAF, MSCB is a promising way through which Canada can promote its strategic interests and exert influence abroad. Indeed, due to its limited footprint, MSCB is often less demanding in terms of resources than other types of missions. Capacity building programs and initiatives can be modulated as a function of available resources and capabilities, keeping in mind that well-tailored initiatives and strong commitment are more likely to yield positive results. Furthermore, MSCB presents significant potential with respect to burden sharing. By reinforcing the capacities of countries in regions prioritized by the Government of Canada, MSCB can reduce the eventual need for the RCN to deploy platforms and personnel over time by enabling Canada’s regional partners to do so themselves. Furthermore, considering the importance given by the U.S. to capacity building, engaging in MSCB in close coordination with the U.S. represents a clear way for Canada to demonstrate will and commitment to address common strategic challenges. In sum, MSCB presents significant potential to advance Canada’s strategic interests abroad. It also offers an interesting way to prevent and address instability in regions of interest, potentially reducing the need to undertake combat missions and contributing to Canadian leadership in the world.

The RCN already engages in MSCB activities, but it does so in an *ad hoc* manner and without a clearly articulated vision when it comes to explaining how it promotes Canada’s interests abroad. Lessons from the U.S. and Australia could be useful to better justify and tailor these activities based on Canadian interests and partner requirements, to ensure that they benefit from enough resources and support at home, and to maximize their impact abroad. Successful MSCB endeavours require first and foremost clear strategic objectives. Canada’s Defence Policy states that reinforcing partner capacity directly advances Canadian security and prosperity by contributing to a rules-based international order, enhanced collective defence, and global stability. Second, while MSCB can be perceived as a benign endeavor in comparison to more resource-intensive activities on the conflict spectrum, assuring the sustainability of these capacity-building initiatives requires a realistic and pragmatic perspective on what can be achieved. The success of MSCB is about finding the right partner and providing the right type of assistance, based on matching interests and resources.

A good understanding of what MSCB is, its goals, objectives, and potential pitfalls, will facilitate the design, planning, and implementation of capacity building programs in line with Canadian interests. The next steps of this project will provide an overview of MSCB activities implemented by the CAF since 2011, and will identify potential expertise and comparative advantages developed by the RCN and other components of the CAF in the reinforcement of the security capacities in the maritime sector of Canada’s partners. These findings will contribute to the body of evidence available to the RCN as it continues to develop a comprehensive and pragmatic approach to MSCB.
References


Canadian Coast Guard, *Canadian Coast Guard Capacity Building Workshop Minutes*. Unpublished.


## List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Canadian Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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This Scientific Report discusses maritime security capacity building (MSCB) and its implications for the Royal Canadian Navy, as well as the Canadian Armed Forces. The objective of this project is to develop a Canadian perspective on MSCB based on Canada’s strategic interests and foreign policy priorities in the maritime domain and beyond. This Report defines MSCB and discusses its prevalence since the 2000s, especially with regard to two of Canada’s closest partners, the United States and Australia. The analysis is based on lessons learned from previous capacity-building experiences in different countries, in land and at sea. This Scientific Report first provides an overview of the current conceptual discussion surrounding MSCB, how it relates to broader debates about partner capacity building, and how lessons learned ashore can be applied at sea. Second, the Report addresses the recent evolution of the maritime security environment, and the increased prevalence of capacity building activities at sea as a result. Based on this assessment, the report then analyses the place and the role of MSCB in the most recent naval strategies of the United States and Australia. It also looks at recent programs implemented by both navies to reinforce the maritime security sector of traditional and more recent partners, and the rationale for these investments.

Ce rapport scientifique étudie le renforcement des capacités de sécurité maritime (RCSM) et ses implications pour la Marine royale canadienne et les Forces armées canadiennes. L’objectif de ce projet est de développer une perspective canadienne sur le RCSM, basée sur les intérêts stratégiques et les priorités en matière de politique étrangère du Canada dans et au-delà du domaine maritime. Ce rapport définit le RCSM et explore sa prévalence depuis le début des années 2000, en particulier en ce qui a trait à deux des plus proches partenaires du Canada, les États-Unis et l’Australie. L’analyse est basée les leçons tirées d’efforts précédents de développement des capacités, tant en mer qu’à terre. La première section du rapport présente un état de la discussion conceptuelle sur le RCSM, la manière dont celle-ci se rapporte aux débats plus larges concernant le développement des capacités d’États partenaires, et comment les leçons apprises à terre peuvent être transposées dans le domaine maritime. La seconde section porte sur l’évolution récente de l’environnement stratégique maritime et la montée des activités de développement des capacités maritimes d’État tiers. Basé sur cet examen, le rapport analyse la place et le rôle du RCSM dans les plus récentes stratégies navales des États-Unis et de l’Australie. Le rapport présente également de récentes activités de RCSM mises en œuvre par les marines de ces deux États afin de renforçer le secteur de la sécurité maritime de partenaires traditionnels et émergents, de même que les fondements de ces investissements.