Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

An Initial Rapid Evidence Assessment and Analysis Plan Examining Local Authority Action Plans and Programming Elements

Manus Ranstorp
Linus Gustafsson
Peder Hyllengren
Filip Ahlin
Swedish Defence University, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)

Prepared By:
Swedish Defence University, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)
Drottning Kristinas väg 37
Box 27805, 115 93 Stockholm (Sweden)
Contractor's Document Number: 2016-09-16 SEDU/CATS
Technical Authority: Simona Verga, Operational Research Analyst (Security)

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

An Initial Rapid Evidence Assessment and Analysis Plan Examining Local Authority Action Plans and Programming Elements

Magnus Ranstorp, Linus Gustafsson, Peder Hyllengren & Filip Ahlin

Content

Introduction

This study provides an overview of different elements of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programing in a northern European context. It is designed to provide the basic elements of key features of CVE programs as a source of guidance and inspiration for development of initiatives in Canadian cities. It highlights essential issues to address and points to consider for different agencies and stakeholders when thinking about developing CVE programs and provides an overview of the essential questions alongside prevention projects and approaches that can serve as inspiration in designing local action plans.

In many ways one can liken this paper to designing a CVE house where there are basic frames and rooms which can be designed according to strategic vision, resources and multiagency cooperation at the local level. This study raises important questions and provides inspirational examples and lessons learned within each of these so-called CVE basic building blocks. These lessons learned and inspirational examples are by no means exhaustive but should provide guidance in the development of CVE programs and constituent elements. It provides a synthesis of the most important programs, approaches and challenges/opportunities.

Over the past decade much effort has been made to understand, prevent and counter radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. Policymakers, officials and civil society have in various ways made attempts to stop people from joining extremist groups and committing criminal acts. Academics are still struggling to understand the processes of radicalization, de-radicalization and disengagement, and all levels of factors relating to these phenomena.

The aim of this initial rapid evidence assessment (REA) on preventing and countering violent extremism is to provide knowledge from a northern European perspective on initiatives, best practices, "lessons learned", evaluations and current academic research on what we know of effective prevention, CVE policies and initiatives. This paper can also be seen as a catalogue of different practices of preventing and countering violent extremism.

There are some basic starting points to consider for CVE programming efforts. First of all, preventing violent extremism can have cost-effective benefits – both in economic terms and human capital. The strategic aim is to build resilience to polarization that occurs either through a shock event or polarization that occurs over a long-term.[1] Secondly, law enforcement and intelligence and security services cannot prevent and counter violent extremism alone. It is essential to layer the defense with integrated prevention measures alongside law enforcement, judicial and intelligence efforts. Thirdly, since there are various

---

[1]Omand, Sir David (2010), *Securing the State*. Oxford University Press

pathways into violent extremism, all measures at the individual level need to be tailor-made and context-specific. In addition, a multi-agency collaboration and (cross-sectoral) public-private-civil society cooperation is needed on all levels of engagement in order to affect those risk factors, or 'push and pull' factors, recognized in the research of violent extremism. This should be applied both in the short and long term. Fourthly, it is essential to engage local communities and positive forces against violent extremists through various local political and societal efforts. It is important to push down efforts on a local level and create both a coordinating multi-agency unit for individual assessments and monitoring of processes and measures. Additionally, this work should be conducted within the framework of an overall strategy or action plan to prevent and counter violent extremism.

A systematic review of the scholarly literature on radicalization and interventions to prevent extremism, conducted by Christmann, concludes that "the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited."[2] Nevertheless, there is an existing valuable knowledge-base[3] in which researchers, practitioners and policy-makers could learn from. As is the case in general crime prevention, if there is a lack of sufficient "evidence", a point of departure in creating strategies and action plans is to make use of the existing knowledge-base.[4] One specific area where there is little or no evidence-base is the evaluation or effectiveness of CVE projects. Most initiatives are newly formulated and are consequently embryonic in nature as evaluation monitoring are built-in and in progress.

Even though terrorism and violent extremism is on the top of the political and media agenda in the West and framed as a serious threat to national security, it is important to state that a vast majority of terrorist attacks originates in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East – not in North America or Europe.[5] There has also been a critique of Western centric counter-terrorism strategies which do not "focus on the public, the extremist ideologies and narratives driving the terrorist threat that continue to grow."[6]

However, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to conflict zones and joining terrorist organizations makes it even more complex to tailor and develop effective measures since there are so many aspects, levels, and factors to consider on the macro-, meso and micro-levels. The perceived threat from violent extremism and terrorism has resulted in policies and initiatives which aim to prevent and counter it on numerous levels.

---

[2] Christmann, Kris (2012) *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence*, Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, p 4

[3] Bouhana, Noémie & Wikstrom, Per-Olof H. (2011) *Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A rapid evidence assessment guided by Situational Action Theory*, UK Home Office

[4] Wikström, Per-Olof H., *Doing Without Knowing: Common Pitfalls in Crime Prevention*, Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 21, 2007, p. 62

[5] Institute for Economics and Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2015*, p5See Global Terrorism Index. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf

[6] Gunaratna, Rohan (2015) 'Communities Defeat Terrorism: Post-9/11 Community Engagement Strategies', *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 27

Nevertheless, many of these measures are still rather new, and the effects they aim to deliver are in many cases too early to evaluate.

There are many organizations, initiatives, and projects in Europe that aim to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism, supporting disengagement and dealing with de-radicalization. In addition, there are initiatives from national and local government agencies and civil society organizations that are broader, e.g. empowering communities, establishing democracy projects, developing 'critical thinking' initiatives etc. These general prevention initiatives are often at the base of the so-called 'prevention triangle.'

Even though these "democracy promoting" measures may affect some of the risk factors in radicalization leading to violence, the focus here lay on those projects that aim to prevent and counter radicalization and violent extremism more specifically. These are referred to measures focusing on at-risk groups and on an individual level. In practice, an array of long and short term measures in a multilayered fashion are probably necessary to affect different risk factors – ranging from direct individual interventions to broader policies on democracy and human rights.

It is important to bear in mind that, as argued by Bjørgo; "individuals involved in terrorism often come from a diversity of social backgrounds and have undergone rather different processes of violent radicalization."[7] As a result of this diversity, there are several different theories and models of radicalization and different processes leading to violent extremism and terrorism.[8] These theories and models are based on different levels of analysis, objects, time, space, and contexts. They also derive from different academic perspectives such as sociology, psychology, criminology, political science etc.[9] Since there is a multitude of factors leading individuals and groups to violent extremism, a comprehensive approach is necessary when applying and transforming academic research into policy.[10]

As pointed out by Githens-Mazer, radicalization can depend on multiple causes that lead to the same outcome and, at the same time, the same causes can lead to different outcomes which make pinpointing causation very difficult.[11] In terms of radicalization processes it is important to recognize that they do not always follow a linear pattern but can be compressed in time and space. Future research on radicalization will likely not find a single and coherent theory of radicalization since human behavior and beliefs are not only

---

[7] Bjørgo, Tore (2011) *Dreams and disillusionment: engagement in and disengagement from militant extremist groups*, Crime, Law & Social Change, 55:277-285

[8] See e.g. Borum, Randy (2011), *Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories*, Journal of Strategic Security, No. 4, 7-36,

[9] Christmann, Kris (2012) *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence*, Youth Justice Board for England and Wales

[10] Bakker, Edwin (2012) *The OSCE's efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: A comprehensive approach addressing root causes?*, Security and Human Rights, No. 2,

[11] Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2010), *Rethinking the Causual Concept of Radicalization*, Committee of Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series

complex but also vary between individuals and different contexts, time, and spaces. Nevertheless, it is still important and relevant for academia to find knowledge and evidence on these processes, and for professionals to make use of existing validated knowledge on the 'problem' and existing practices and methods. In many ways, one can liken the multiplicity of factors behind radicalization into violent extremism to a 'kaleidescope' of factors influencing the push- and pull-factors: from individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, identity issues while the radicalization engine is small group dynamics, charismatic leadership and the role of social media.[12]

Preventing and combating violent extremism is delicate and difficult and have to be conducted with an emphasis on transparency, democracy and human rights. As it is necessary to have a "target group", it is important not to target entire communities and be aware of the risks of creating a construction of 'suspect communities', polarization, marginalization, exclusion or stigmatization.[13] An overreaction of response may have a counter-productive effect and radicalize even more people.[14] It can also lead to reciprocal radicalization. Nevertheless, building resilience to counter violent extremism is "supported by theory, research findings, practical knowledge, and policy successes."[15]

When building community resilience against extremism, actors may need to attend to issues such as community collaboration and sociocultural contexts.[16] The phenomenon of having NGOs, and not only governments, to prevent violent extremism is debated and sometimes criticized, and is by some researchers called 'civilianisation of security' and 'government-at-a-distance'.[17] However, communities can assist in reintegration and "encourage a choice other than capture, victory or death".[18] Civil society organizations may also be a more trustworthy actor and partner in prevention than governmental institutions. As such, it is important to emphasize that government and local authorities' efforts only go so far; civil society organizations are also essential to involve to create a multilayered response.

---

[12] EU RAN (2016), Issue Paper *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf

[13] Vermeulen, Floris (2014), *Suspect Communities – Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London*, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:286-306; see also Hoque, Ashraf (2015), *Muslim Men in Luton, UK: 'Eat First, Talk Later,* South Asia Research, Vol 35(1): 81-102, 2015

[14] De Graaf, Beatrice & Malkki, Leena (2010), *Killing it Softly? Explaining the Early Demise of Left-Wing Terrorism in the Netherlands*, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22:4, 623-640,

[15] Weine, Stevan (2013*), Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism*, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 81-89,

[16] Weine, Steven, Henderson, Schuyler, Shanfield, Stephen, Legha, Rupinder & Post, Jerrold (2013), *Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism*, Democracy and Security, Vol. 9, Issue 4,

[17] Sliwinski, Krzysztof Feliks (2012), *Counter-terrorism – a comprehensive approach. Social mobilization and 'civilianisation' of security: the case of the United Kingdom*, European Security, 22:3, 288-306,

[18] Stohl, Michael (2008), *Networks, terrorists and criminals: the implications for community policing*, Crime, Law & Social Change, 50:59-72

In general, there are some differences in approaches of preventing violent extremism in the West. Peter Neumann exemplifies two ideal types of approaches; the 'Anglo-Saxon' and the 'European'. The Anglo-Saxon approach "aims to deal with behavioral radicalization, especially acts of terrorism and violence" while the European "aims to confront cognitive and behavioral radicalization, but places more emphasis on the former."[19] Of course, Neumann is making a generalization of the approaches and in practice it is necessary with both 'repressive' means together with what is sometimes called as 'soft' measures in order to prevent, counter, prosecute, sentence, rehabilitate, and re-integrate (de-radicalization and/or disengagement). It is important to have holistic thinking how the individual measures create a collective effect.

---

[19] Neumann, Peter R (2013), *The trouble with radicalization,* International Affairs, 89:4, 873-893

1. Assessing the "problem"

In the absence of empirically validated cause-to-effect relationships that would explain the behavior of a broad category of radicalized individuals, it is very difficult, or almost impossible, to develop effective measures to counter it. The main ambition is to find those indirect and direct risk factors that might have an impact on individuals and groups in pulling or pushing them into violent radicalization. It is therefore necessary to answer these questions:

1. What is the extent of radical extremist milieus locally and what do we know about the individuals vulnerable to radicalization? These questions include: age, sex, income, education, psychopathic personality, PTSD, family dynamics, parental discipline, ethnicity, discrimination, crime, drug abuse/alcoholism, geographical 'hot-spots', internet/social media engagement, political or ideological activities, identity seeking, fascination of violence, motivation, frustration, kinship and friendship.
2. Are there networks, groups, organizations or friendship circles active in violent extremism? What is the relationship with territorial criminal gang activities?
3. Is the 'problem' new or old? Is there an established extremist milieu?
4. Are there any key external factors? Such as recruiters, ideological leaders, reaction to the outside world such as the war in Syria or other 'focusing events'.

To frame the problem and find key factors on the individual and community level it is necessary to conduct deep interviews with a range of actors; e.g. schools/teachers, social workers, community leaders and religious leaders, community police officers, youth clubs, security service officers/analysts, members of violent extremist groups and their friends and relatives, in order to get a 'full spectrum' of potential underlying/contributing factors – a helicopter situational picture of what is going on within the local community. Examining finding signs of violent radicalization, one study concludes that "those best positioned to notice early signs of individuals considering acts of violent extremism might be those individuals' friends: perhaps more so than school counselors, clergy or family members."[20] Understanding the dynamics of communities, positive resources in neighborhoods and local challenges is a prerequisite for local prevention efforts.

Regarding multi-agency approaches, European lessons learnt show that "[c]lear rules and guidelines about (confidential) information sharing are essential to the approach and information sharing agreements will be valuable in this process."[21]

---

[20] Williams, Michael J., Horgan, John G., & Evans, William P (2016), *The critical role of friends in networks for countering violent extremism: toward a theory of vicarious help-seeking*, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism *and Political Aggression*, 2016, Vol. 8, No. 1, 45-65. See also Gielen (2015)

[21] Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Creating Counter Violent Extremism infrastructures* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures.pdf

A way of getting more knowledge of the local problem is to make an inventory of adequate empirical research relating to the potential risk factors – what do we know about the local community and those individuals and groups that are of concern? What does the mosaic of communities look like; how do they interact and how do they differ from each other? Where are the friction points and what scope for collaboration exists on extremism issues? How are criminal structures interlocking with extremist elements and how does this impact the dynamics of insecurity on local level in neighborhoods?

Having identified the problem and potential factors causing the problem, a further step is to create a shared perspective of the problems among the local authority agencies on the local level. If there is no knowledge of the specific/overall problems and potential opportunities, it will be very difficult to establish a coherent toolbox of measures. A key question to consider locally is which actors need to be trained and educated in situational awareness and prevention methods. As the specific problems and issues may change, the assessments need to be updated and shared continuously. A further step is to inform the public of how and why there are problems and issues in the local community, making them aware of it and also enable them to react. Informing the public may also help in challenging rumors and disinformation about the problems. Consequently it is important to think through the communication strategy how political leaders and civil servants talk about the issues to avoid inflating the issues and to engage the public and civil society in a positive way.

For example, in Copenhagen it was stressed by an Expert Group appointed by the city's mayor that a co-ordination unit prepares instructions for cases of concern about radicalization, so frontline personnel and others with contact with youths could find out what they should be aware of.[22] Such instructions may also serve the purpose of ensuring uniform treatment of citizens, minimizing the risk of them becoming victims of prejudice and suspicion.

---

[22] Köbenhavsn Kommune (2015) *Færre radikaliserede gennem en effektiv og sammenhængende indsats* http://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/F%C3%A6rre%20radikaliserede%20gennem%20en%20effektiv%20og%20sammenh%C3%A6ngende%20indsats_0.pdf

2. An overall strategy and action plan with a multi-actor approach

Based on the assessment, strategies and action plans to prevent and counter violent extremism can be established – both on a national and local level. The aim of the strategy/action plan is to provide clear mandate and responsibility for individual agency involvement; to provide helicopter perspective of all collective prevention efforts and to provide a clear and coherent framework with allocated tasks and goals that can be individually evaluated.

It can also be seen as a concrete toolbox of measures reaching people 'at risk' and those who are already involved in violent extremism. It will probably be more effective if both politicians and officials together with civil society organizations collaborate on common visions which enable essential buy-in for prevention efforts. Strategies and action plans may also connect to other forms of policies such as city-wide safety plans, crime prevention strategies, social policies, and other actions already implemented which may also affect some of the identified risk factors.[23] Some issues to bear in mind when constructing strategies and actions plans:

- The strategic ambition is to have long-term measures.
- Encourage political involvement, community engagement, and empowerment.
- Promote tolerance and democratic values to create a general resilience.
- Create and support opportunities for youths to have an impact and say in the political decision-making processes.
- Inform the public how to legally react to injustices in the world and make sure there are alternative channels for action (approved humanitarian support, etc)
- Adopt a gender perspective in order to account for differences and similarities between men/boys and women/girls.
- Involve families and not just the individual of concern.
- Address honor-related issues and parenting skills.
- Promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue.
- Support civil society organizations that can affect different factors or levels of the problems.[24]
- Try to avoid creating new organizations, rather use existing structures in municipality.
- Dissociate violent and extremist behavior (cognitive and behavioral dimensions).
- Overall policies to decrease polarization, xenophobia, racism, stigmatization, exclusion, prejudice, dehumanization, marginalization and discrimination (ethnic, cultural, religious).

---

[23] The Nordic Council of Ministers have initiated the concept of Nordic Safe Cities which involves 22 cities in Nordic region that formulate overarching plan for cities which embeds the issue of preventing violent extremism.

[24] Certa og Trygfonden (2016) *Motstandskraft mod radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme – et eksplorativt studie af modstandskraft I udvalgte danske lokalmiljoer*

Preventing and countering violent extremism is not an issue for one single agency or organization. Without having a multi-actor approach in responding to the issues it will be more difficult to reach the target groups and individuals of concern, and address the identified risk factors. Stakeholders can be professionals from schools, youth centers, social services, community police, sport clubs, political parties, and even health services, but also those who are operating a hotline, personnel in exit programs and other first line practitioners. Lessons learned from across different local programs within cities in northern Europe show that "one organization should chair and coordinate the process and have final responsibility over the program and outcome."[25]

These actors need to have situational awareness and knowledge about the objectives of the strategy and action plan. Trust between all actors is key for success; processes and decisions should be transparent. It is also important to work-out legal limits and possibilities for information-sharing between agencies. In addition, from a law enforcement and intelligence perspective, trust is needed in order to get flow of police intelligence and information on delinquency and potential criminal behavior. Since there is a need for a multi-actor approach the comprehensive framework of actions needs to be coordinated. Some issues to consider:

- Is there a need of a local, regional or national CVE coordinator and point of contact?
- Are there existing multiagency bodies that could be used and what would be necessary for the process of assessing individuals?
- What agencies or actors should be part of the multiagency structure?
- How do you inform about individual cases through an "info house" structure?
- What is the role of housing associations or private sector in prevention?
- Are there cases where government bodies should step aside and let civil society organizations have the lead?
- Who should take the lead in a CVE multiagency forum with all relevant stake-holders?
- How to share sensitive information on individuals? Especially between intelligence, police and social service.

As mentioned before, there are some recommendations from research, institutions and organizations dealing with CVE/PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) and counter-terrorism. Regarding the development of community-oriented approaches to counterterrorism, a report from OSCE[26] highlights the following potential benefits:

- Anchoring policing into respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- Improving public perceptions of, and interaction with, the police;

---

[25] Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Creating Counter Violent Extremism infrastructures,* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures.pdf
[26] OSCE (2014), *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach*

- Improving communication with the public on counterterrorism;
- Increasing public vigilance and resilience;
- Enhancing police understanding of communities as a basis to better engage and co-operate with them;
- Helping to identify and address community safety issues and grievances;
- Facilitating timely identification and referral of critical situations; and
- Improving relations between the police and individuals and groups that have been hard to reach or not yet engaged with.

As stated before, CVE is delicate and there are risks of stigmatizing groups in society. The above report also states some thoughtful risks in applying community-policing approaches in preventing terrorism:

- Over-reliance on community policing;
- Stigmatizing particular communities through selective engagement;
- Securitizing their relationship with communities;
- Using community policing to "spy" on communities;
- Risks to individuals engaging with the police; and
- Unintentionally giving the appearance that the police support particular individuals or groups, which could either undermine the legitimacy of those in a position to exercise a positive influence within the community or alienate other community members or communities.

Lastly, the OSCE report also stresses the need for careful planning and preparation community-policing approaches in preventing terrorism:

- Embed international human rights standards at all levels and increase police accountability for their actions against terrorism in order to increase transparency and avoid human rights violations such as discriminatory profiling;
- Anticipate and mitigate the risks involved in applying a community-policing approach;
- Ensure that there is a clear distinction between counterterrorism operations and community police work and also ensure that there is effective co-ordination between these operations;
- Clarify policies and standard operating procedures for the involvement of community police officers in efforts to prevent terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, including information-sharing, recording and reporting protocols;
- Provide adequate training for community police officers on their expected roles in preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that may lead to terrorism;

- Develop regular, proactive and two-way communication with the public on the threat of terrorism – neither exaggerating nor minimizing it – and the roles of the police and the public in countering terrorism;
- Be prepared for timely and appropriate communication with the public and the media in the event of a specific counterterrorism activity or a terrorist incident;
- Clarify the parameters of, and provide guidance for, regular, transparent, inclusive and reciprocal police engagement with communities and specific groups;
- Tailor their communication and engagement activities on the basis of an accurate understanding of the specificities of different communities and groups, including internal dynamics, concerns with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism, and attitudes vis-à-vis the police; and
- Evaluate the impact of community-policing efforts to prevent terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, while maintaining a medium– to long-term commitment and resources.

One way to address the problem is to use the Communities That Cares (CTC)-program. The CTC-program has a holistic approach, aiming to help communities prevent problems before they develop. The overarching goal is to promote healthy behaviors for all children and youths. The CTC-program is therefore not an explicit CVE-program but using the CTC-program will hopefully prevent youngsters from joining violent extremism environments.

The program begins with a youth survey to identify a community's risks and strengths. Based on the data, CTC helps communities and implement prevention programs and policies. The process includes five phases:

1. The community lays the groundwork by asses how ready it is to begin the process, identifies key community leaders and invites stakeholders to get involved.
2. The community forms a board or a work within existing structures. After identification of board members the members write a vision statement, learn about prevention, organizes workgroups and develop a timeline.
3. A community profile is developed where risks, strengths and existing recourses is identified that can meet the problems addressed in the survey.
4. In this phase a Community Action Plan is made. The goal of the plan is to reduce risks and strengthen protection, define measurable outcomes and select tested and effective policies – provided by the program.
5. In the final phase the community implements the selected programs and policies, evaluates them, and makes adjustments.[27]

An evaluation of the program finds that youths from CTC communities were 25-33% less likely to have health and behavior problems compared to control communities.[28] The program is being implemented in Sweden's third largest city, Malmö.

---

[27] Communities that cares (CTC). *How it works.*

A similar approach is found in the role played by housing associations in providing close-knit connection to residents and in providing positive social programs for residents, especially delinquent youths living on housing estates. For example, the Lejebo Housing Association in Mjölnerparken provides lighter maintenance opportunities for 10-14 year olds; homework café, a car and bicycle workshop where residents can take their cars/bikes for repair for free and a space for youth meetings. This provide invaluable channels for building trust and act as an early sensor for local authorities dealing with violent extremism cases and in times of crisis and polarization.

---

[28] Communities that cares (CTC). *Research & Results*

2.1 VINK-project

In 2009, the VINK (Knowledge – Integration – Copenhagen) project was established in Copenhagen as an independent initiative by the municipalities of Copenhagen. The aim of the initiative is to offer advice to municipal workers who are in contact with young people who are subject to radicalization. VINK is primarily a resource for teachers, social workers who work closely with young people, consultants with a focus on labor and employment and other staff working with young people aged 14 to 20 years.[29] The center's work is done primarily by telephone, support for mentors, evidence-based consultation, theme days and providing forums for dialogue. It has been integrated within the SSP (schools, social services and police) framework to provide support through well-developed tools for conflict resolution, cultural understanding and expertise on warning signals during a radicalization process.[30]

SSP is locally based co-operation between School, Social Services and the Police and in Copenhagen it also involves representatives from the Culture and Administration and the Employment and Integration Administration. "The goals of SSP is to prevent juvenile crime targeting children and teenagers between the ages 10 and 18 and to reduce the number of 18-25 year olds who commit serious crimes (SSP)."[31] In Copenhagen there are 14 SSP Coordinating Committees and 16 local SSP boards, the latter involving social workers, school teachers, street worker, youth club, etc. In total the SSP framework involves 400+ professionals.

Ten experts are linked to the VINK center, and they possess significant experience and well-developed evidence-based methods of intervention in their work with marginalized and vulnerable youths who are at risk of extremism. These experts have the task of creating awareness in terms of training and advice on how to effectively handle specific cases. The uniqueness of VINK as a resource pool is that it has the intention to build on already established relationships that exist between field workers and individuals in question. It can also lead to three-way dialogues with the individual or occur in the background between field workers and youth who are at risk.

VINK helps with counseling and the opportunity for outreach through meetings and dialogue with experts and professionals in similar position to share experiences and knowledge regarding effective measures. This creates an opportunity to contextualize what radicalization is and what it is not, and a nuanced understanding if and how action should be taken in a particular case.

---

[29] Köbenhavns Kommune *Counselling on radicalization:* http://www.kk.dk/vink
[30] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015) *Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism på lokal nivå.* Försvarshögskolan
[31] Presentation by Copenhagen Police, School, *Social Service and Police cooperating in Crime Prevention*.

The comprehensive recommendations[32] against radicalization that were published by the Copenhagen City's Expert Group, and will also form the basis of a new overall strategy and action plan for the city of Copenhagen's anti-radicalization efforts. In sum, the recommendations were distributed across five main areas:

- *Strengthened co-ordination and overview*
    - New unit for co-ordination and overview across authorities
    - Information strategy for efforts to prevent radicalization
- *Efforts at the preventive level*
    - Promoting fellow-citizenship
    - Collaboration with local associations and players
    - Strengthening the critical sense of children and young citizens through social media
- *Efforts at the anticipatory level*
    - Binding collaboration on transition between systems
    - Support of parents and relatives
    - Strengthened efforts regarding marginalized young citizens
    - Skill development of healthcare staff
    - Strengthened collaboration with housing associations
    - Strengthened knowledge-sharing with relevant towns
    - Focus on families affected by violence and on refugee families suffering from traumas
    - Strengthened contact with radicalized environments
- *Efforts at the intervention level*
    - Initiatives aimed at marginalized citizens who are radicalized or vulnerable to radicalization and those who have returned from conflict zones
- *Increased level of knowledge and analysis*
    - Increased level of knowledge and analysis

In September 2015, the recommendations were adopted by the city council in Copenhagen and CAD $4,5 million were allocated in order to implement them over a four-year period. Further, the suggested organizational structure in Copenhagen for preventing radicalization is presented below.[33]

---

[32] City of Copenhagen (2015), *Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort*
https://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-
files/Recommendations%20of%20the%20Expert%20Group%20-%20Municipality%20of%20Copenh...pdf
[33] Ibid.

Table 1. *The Copenhagen Model.*

Major forum

Steering comittee

Secreteriat

Co-ordination unit for anti-radicalization Assessment, ordering, following up

Prison and probation service	Mentor/parental coaches/EKP/VINK/Police	Administration, specific initiatives
Regional psychiatry	Home visits VINK/Police	Exit strategies EKP/VINK/SSP

Clarification of abbreviations in the organizational chart:
EKP: Social services administration's unit for crime prevention.
VINK: Copenhagen's knowledge and advisory unit for preventing radicalization.
SSP: Schools, Social Services and the Police.

Building alliances and partnerships with key actors in civil society can potentially be useful in preventive work, in part since it can improve cohesion in local areas. The most relevant questions and issues to explore are:

- Provide a community forum for local actors and associations that support collaboration, trust and relationships between partners.
- Provide information to residents of local communities, including vulnerable neighborhoods, with advice on opportunities concerning participation in activities.
- Give advice to local associations so they are clear on their ability to reach young people, including strengthening their knowledge of youth motivation.
- How to build trust and confidence for intervention? Dialogue is important and building trust takes time. Long-term thinking is necessary and not just from a security perspective. How can this best be achieved?

- The role and support from representatives from minority communities and civil society. How to work constructively together with such representatives in an effective way?
- Relevant risks to consider include: stigmatization, counter-productive efforts, lack of trust towards authorities, allocation of resources in relation to other social problems, and social unrest.

Key members within civil society can be in a unique position to engage in targeted dialogues with individuals at risk and to promote confidence and security for better treatment of individual cases involving radicalized young citizens. There exist several good examples and inspiring models of how civil society can counter violent extremism. This can be done through, for example, initiatives led- and governed by women, strengthening youth initiatives or through innovative ways through the use of popular and local culture and by crafting and deploying specific messages to counter the narrative of extremism and extremist organizations.

As most structured de-radicalization measures are led by the government and focus on rehabilitating convicted perpetrators, civil society plays a critical role here as a source of support but also as a function to address long-term preventive measures to counter extremism. NGOs at the grass root level that include parents, women, teachers, mentors, coaches and religious leaders in this work, can be essential components in preventing and discovering different forms of violent extremism. Instead of communicating the mission to counter a problem, the communication from civil society may be to promote the well-being of its target group and members.

2.2 Other European local action plans

In Oslo, a decentralized model is used, called SaLTO, This crime-prevention program is led by the police but the hub in the program is 15 coordinators, one for each district.[34] 42 measures has been developed, all of them connected to SaLTO:s goals, strategies and the identified problems – where violent extremism is one of them. [35] The CVE-program contains six measures:

1. An action plan for countering violent extremism, where Oslo municipality is responsible and the plan is anchored at the Justice department.
2. A reference group. The group contains 20 members from the police, different municipality actors, security police etc. The group should contribute with coordination, development and information.
3. Material about violent extremisms has been provided to actors in schools, social workers, politicians etc.

---

[34] Politiet & Oslo kommune. *Handlingsprogram 2016-2019*, p7
[35] Ibid, p 12

4. Education for students.
5. Collaboration between religious groups, the police and other actors. Contacts between the police and religious groups are essential in the CVE-program.
6. Routine for radicalized individuals and foreign fighters. The Reference Group is responsible for the evaluation of the routines.[36]

In Germany there is a comprehensive nation-wide state funded program to prevent and counter right-wing extremism. Live Democracy! is a federal program that funds civic engagement and democratic practice at the local, regional and federal level. The available funding for this program is €50,5 million with projects funded for maximum of five years. The federal program supports 217 local and municipal authorities throughout Germany to establish "partnerships for democracy" which brings together decision-makers and civil society to work on concrete local problems. In every federal state ("Länder", there are Federal State Democracy Centres that work on developing concepts and strategies to promote democracy and diversity. In addition, these 16 Federal Democracy Centres coordinate the counseling and support services to individuals seeking help through mobile counseling teams, victim support and disengagement/exit counseling.[37]

At another level, Live Democracy! program supports 28 important NGO's promoting democracy and countering right-wing extremism in becoming more professional with more nation-wide impact. The overall program also promotes 60 pilot projects dealing with group-related hate crimes (antisemitism, islamophobia, anti-gypsyism, homophobia and transphobia) as well as 46 pilot projects on ways to counter three forms of extremism.

The German approach is unprecedented within the EU with a strong emphasis on promoting democratic values and use of NGO's as the principal vehicle to fight and prevent right-wing extremism. The strong independence of federal states makes a uniform national approach very difficult.

---

[36] Ibid, p 17
[37] Bundesprogramm. *About "Live Democracy"!* https://www.demokratie-leben.de/en/bundesprogramm/ueber-demokratie-leben.html

3. First-Line Professionals

Practitioners working in the field and who meet 'at risk' individuals, those engaged in violent extremism, and those who wish to disengage and leave violent extremist groups - all need knowledge on violent extremism, its causes, and potential counter measures. An organization called 'info house', can be a function to collect and share knowledge – both together with academia and first responders. Experiences from Sweden show that there is great demand for knowledge on radicalization processes and effective tools regarding prevention from frontline workers. However, as mentioned earlier, there are no 'clear-cut' measures to prevent violent extremism based on evidence-based research.[38]

There are, however, some key points to consider for first-line professionals:

- Training in signals/indicators of violent radicalization and symbols used by extremist groups needs to be developed and shared to frontline workers.
- CoPPRa training for police officers (and perhaps develop CoPPRa for social media).
- Teachers need to be empowered with skills and education regarding radicalization and violent extremism (elementary and secondary schools).
- Psychological and communicative approaches when talking to victims and relatives.
- Dealing with traumatized individuals, conflict-management and how to deal with difficult youth issues
- Development of train-the-trainer models and programs.
- Education and training on digital literacy and responsible behavior on the internet and social media.

3.1 Swedish handbook for social workers

Social workers are one of those practitioners that first meet individuals face-to-face who are in the risk zone of being radicalized. Therefore, the Swedish National board of Health and Welfare has produced a handbook which aims to support social workers on this issue.

The book advices the practitioners to use existing structures and not create new ones.[39] Further, specific knowledge about behavior and indicators are crucial. Without this knowledge, the social worker is unlikely able to discover a youngster in the risk zone of radicalization – until it is already too late. This kind of knowledge can be divided in two categories. Firstly, there is a need for local knowledge: violent groups and individuals, where these problematic milieus are and the specific locations where individuals can become radicalized. Second, knowledge about symbols, clothes, behaviors and mode of action by the extremist groups. Mapping out social and geographic areas on local level is an

---

[38] These are reflections from the authors.
[39] Jönsson, Ann (2016) *Våldsbejakande extremism – Stöd för socialtjänstens arbete med barn och unga vuxna*, Socialtjänsten, p12

important tool. This situational awareness should be produced together with other actors in the local area, such as the police and representatives from the schools.[40]

It is not uncommon that parents feel ashamed about the fact that their child is becoming radicalized and worries about the consequences if they contact the authorities. Often a main worry is that their children may be taken into care. Therefore, it is important that the parents (or other relatives) feel secure when they approaching the social worker. Information on how to access different languages from the social services and the use of translators are two ways to reduce this uncertainty.[41] Experiences also show that younger brother or sisters sometimes are willing to follow their older sibling into the same radical pathway. It is therefore important that the social worker assess the entire family and assess the risks of siblings when they conduct home visits.[42] These myths about authorities and consequences over action needs to be taken into account.

The social worker needs to have specialized knowledge about the radicalization process –at least how to spot the signs and differentiate it from other risky behavior. The hand book points out some of the signs, especially when several coincide which prompts the social worker to examine the case more fully. The signs of radicalizations in this handbook are divided in four categories, each with their own subcategories:

- Interests, appearance and use of symbols
    - Sympathies with, ore seeking after, violent extremism material at the Internet
    - Uses violent extremism symbols
    - Draw back from school, leisure etc.

- Friends and social network
    - New friends and social network
    - Associate with individuals connected to violent extremism
    - Associate in groups known to the use of violence or other criminal activities

- Activities
    - Participation in demonstrations or violent clashes with other violent groups
    - The use of threat and violence
    - Committing hate crime

- Approach and statements
    - Intolerance against other people views

---

[40] Ibid, p21
[41] Ibid, p24
[42] Ibid, p26

- o   Confrontational language – us vs. them
- o   Conspiracy theories
- o   Hateful rhetoric
- o   Legitimation of violence
- o   Threat of violence to achieve political goals.[43]

The interventions aimed at helping individuals to stop this behavior and leave these destructive environments are very much in line with interventions that will be presented further on in this report. Therefore, they will not be explicitly presented here.

Several different competency models have also been developed for effective community-policing in prevention work such as the Kordaczuk-Was model. These seven competencies are 1) values; 2) relations; 3) experience; 4) knowledge; 5) skills/abilities; 6) strength and 7) supervision/resources.[44] These traits are further expanded into subthemes which aims to provide guidance as to effective community policing competencies.

Neighborhood policing models in the United Kingdom have shown several positive outcomes such as increased public satisfaction with the police, decreased fear of crime, reductions in the level of crime and anti-social behavior or disorder, increased community engagement, increasing public 'ownership' of local crime problems and willingness to play a role in problem solving; and changing police officers' levels of engagement.[45]

---

[43] Ibid, p 30

[44] M. Kordaczuk-Was, *Social determinants of police prevention actions. Sociological study* (PhD thesis).

[45] Andrew Staniforth, *Preventing Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (Oxford University Press, 2014.

3.2 Nordic community policing

In Norway, the police are trained in empowerment conversations that are to be used towards people at risk of radicalization. The aim of such conversations is to "safeguard everyone's interests and arrive at good solutions, especially for the child/young person, but also for the parents."[46] The method has previously been used in the police's prevention work to steer individuals away from crime. The technique is to be tested towards signs of radicalization as well. According to Norwegian experiences for such dialogue to succeed, it is important not to be biased in the conversation and the Norwegian police offer the following advice:

> "Try to stick to the topic and avoid the focus shifting. If the child/young person repeatedly tries to shift the focus, you should deal with this head on and clarify why the child is not sticking to the topic. Listening is an important part of the conversation. It is important to demonstrate that you are hearing what is being said by listening actively, which involves things such as nodding and saying small words such as 'yes', 'okay', etc. At the same time, the child must have an opportunity to take his or her time finding his or her own words to express what they want to say. Often it is precisely these children/young people who are not used to being listened to, and who also do not find it easy to express their thoughts and feelings in words."[47]

The Norwegian police have developed a step-by-step guide to police conversation intervention which focus on different phases of conversations when child and parent are together and separately.[48]

The Danish approach to handle returnees from conflict zones, especially Syria and Iraq, has been that the Danish Security Service (PET) facilitates, support and coordinate such activities. This is conducted in collaboration with police, social services, prison and probation service, and the psychiatric system to re-integrate the returnees' ties to the Danish society when there is not enough sufficient evidence to prosecute. The purpose is to reduce the potential risk they may constitute to society due to increased capabilities, motives and traumas when they return. Specifically, they consist of two coordinated activities aiming to reduce such risks.

- Disengagement-talks initiated by PET or specially trained police officers
- Capacity building and advising critical aftercare centers at municipal level, including specific cases

---

[46] Radicalisation awareness network. *A guide to police empower* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-search/rc_0024_a_guide_to_police_empower_en.htm
[47] Ibid.
[48] Politiet, "A Guide to Police Conversation Intervention: A dialogue promoting responsibility and positive change", (The National Police Directorate, 2011).

These activities are generally situated in the national police districts (called 'info houses') and are supported by the municipalities.[49]

In addition, PET has developed a Dialogue Forum to discuss extremism-related discussions to develop trust with society actors and religious leaders that hold controversial positions or roles. Organized by the 10-man strong Prevention Department within PET, this forum involves 64 invited participants and are organized around themes such as: prevention of extremism; prevention of pathways into juvenile crime; methods in recruitment into extremism; foreign policy issues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria; why youths are attracted to foreign fighter conflicts; online radicalization; differences between freedom fighters and terrorism; hate crimes; and exit strategies from extremist milieus.[50]

3.3 UK channel process

The United Kingdom is one of the European states that have made most advanced efforts in PVE and CVE. The initiatives range from both the Cabinet Offices and government agencies to local government and civil society organizations. Within the UK counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) the government has established the Prevent strategy which has three specific objectives:

- Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization that we need to address.[51]

As a part of the UK's efforts in PVE/CVE, the Channel program aims to protect vulnerable people by (i) identifying individuals at risk; (ii) assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and (iii) developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.[52] Within the framework, there are Channel panels from local authority, and the panels may also include representatives from NHS, social workers, schools, youth offending services, prison and probation etc.[53] Below is a model of the Channel processes from identification to delivery of support.

---

[49] Radicalisation awareness network. *Disengagement and criteria.* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-search/rc_0019_disengagement_and_critica_en.htm

[50] Cowi. *Evaluation of Danish prevention programs.* http://uibm.dk/publikationer/evaluering-af-indsatsen-for-at-forebygge-ekstremisme-og-radikalisering

[51] HM Government, (2015) *Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism.* Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels

[52] HM Government, (2015) *Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism.* Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels

[53] Ibid

Figure 1. *The Channel process.*[54]

The United Kingdom Department for Communities and Local Government has conducted a rapid evidence assessment of preventing support for violent extremism through community interventions. The findings show that most successful interventions to prevent support for violent extremism in the name of religion are:

In terms of young people:
• Interventions to capacity build/empower delivered via outreach/other mechanisms and multi-agency working.
• Interventions to challenge ideology that focus on theology and use education/training delivered through outreach peripatetic work.
• Outreach/peripatetic work with young people is particularly necessary in terms of success in relation to any focus.

---

[54] 'HM Government, (2015) *Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism.* Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels, p 6

In terms of women:
- Interventions to challenge ideology that focus on theology and are delivered via outreach/peripatetic means.
- Interventions that focus on theology, using debate and discussion and are delivered via outreach/peripatetic mechanisms.
- Outreach/peripatetic work with women is particularly necessary in terms of success in relation to any focus.

In terms of community:
- Interventions to capacity build/empower delivered via outreach/peripatetic mechanisms.[55]

In respect to the 'Prevent' part of UK's CONTEST strategy it is vital to make use of 'lessons learned' around different initiatives, and also look at the critiques. Thomas finds four key criticisms (of the UK Prevent) that might be relevant to take in consideration when programming a PVE/CVE structure:

> [i] that PVE has had an unhelpful and broad monocultural focus on Muslims; [ii] that it has been a vehicle for a significant growth in state surveillance of Muslim communities; [iii] that PVE in the way it has been designed and implemented is contradictory to other key governmental priorities such as community cohesion; and [iv] that the problematic design of PVE has left progress hobbled by intragovernmental tensions at both national and local levels.[56]

As also pointed out by Thomas, the successes of anti-racist projects "were situations where youth workers were skilled and confident enough to explore young peoples' attitudes and prejudices openly and robustly, emphasizing the positives of their lives and communities as well as challenging those prejudices through searching for dialogue."[57]

As mentioned before, there are a range of projects and initiatives in the UK to prevent and counter violent extremism. One of the organizations is the interventions consultancy *The Unity Initiative* which aims to:

> dismantling reactionary absolutism, tackling violent extremism and promoting pluralism through the use of a pioneering, legitimate and unique methodology which combines sanctioned counter-narratives, behavioral and linguistic

---

[55] Department for Communities and Local Government (*2010*), *Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence*, p. 8
[56] Thomas, Paul (2010),*'Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism* Programme, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Political Studies Association, vol. 12, p. 443
[57] Thomas, Paul (2009), Between Two Stools? *The Government's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Agenda,* The Political Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2, April-June

sciences as well as providing supportive mechanisms to vulnerable individuals and communities.[58]

The domain of work includes front-line staff training programs (prison, probation, police, offender rehabilitation, and community interventions). The deliverables are:

- Risk Assessment and minimizing strategies
- Vulnerability Assessment training
- Islam Misconceptions
- Role of Gender in Extremism
- Ideological training for Imams/schools/community leaders
- Muslim Mothers.[59]

3.4 European initiatives

On the European level, the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) has a 'train-the-trainer' program developed in 2014 and 2015, focusing on awareness training for first-line practitioners.[60] Another EU funded project is *Improving Security by Democratic Participation* (ISDEP), which equips front line practitioners in the sectors of education, prison and probation, law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations. ISDEP's objectives are:

- Raise awareness of the various forms of radicalization that exist within EU Member States and the drivers that lead to radicalization;
- Equip front line staff and practitioners to identify and respond to all forms of radicalization;
- Enhance engagement with civil society to strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities against all forms of radicalization;
- Strengthen practitioners to promote positive narratives which can counter and delegitimize extremist narratives;
- Create safe spaces to address grievances perceived by communities;
- Develop support mechanisms to enable practitioners to improve engagement at grass roots level;
- Enable practitioners to build knowledge on how to counter the phenomenon of radicalization by promoting critical thinking;

---

[58] Radicalisation awareness network *The Unity Initiative* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-search/rc_0095_the_unity_initiative_en.htm
[59] Ibid
[60] Radicalisation awareness network, *Apporaches and Practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

- Devise and introduce a range of training resources which form a flexible, joined up strategy to tackle violent extremism capable of introduction into all EU member states;
- Achieve meaningful engagement with key stakeholders in participating EU member states in order to share good practice in anti-radicalization and counter radicalization; and
- Sustain effective engagement with key stakeholders to increase resilience in communities and reduce the threat of international and domestic terrorism.[61]

The ISDEP training course has been developed by organisations from the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Bulgaria, Belgium, and the Czech Republic. In 2014, more than seventy "lead trainers" from eight countries in Europe participated in the courses.[62]

For law enforcement, the European Union has funded the CoPPRa project (Community policing and prevention of radicalization) that started in Belgium in 2010, but now includes a range of EU law enforcement agencies. The activities include:

1. The creation of a practical, user friendly tool (pocket guide) to support frontline police officers in detecting signs of radicalization at an early stage;
2. The development of a common curriculum for training first line police officers in how to use the tool in their daily work;
3. The identification and exchange of good practices on how to stop the spread of radicalization in close partnership with other local partners.

The objectives for the prolonged CoPPRa project involved updating CoPPRa tools, organizing 'train-the-trainer' programs, and creating an E-learning module. 15 member states, and Europol and CEPOL are involved in the project and there are 130 trainers in 26 EU Member States.[63]

The sequel to CoPPRa is the Dutch-led SEPPRA (Awareness for Firstline Professionals on the Prevention of Radicalization) which left out community policing and good practices and included training on Islam and jihadism and Internet and social media. It also expanded the target group to include all frontline professionals.

Another organization working on CVE is the RecoRa Institute which "aims to empower street-level workers to build effective solutions to factors that can make individuals vulnerable to what is often called the "radicalization process"."[64] The institute has nine main tools:

---

[61] *Improving Security By Democratic Participation* (ISDEP), http://www.isdep.eu/content/472/objectives
[62] Kana, Rozila & Dore, Rupert, (Winter 2014/15) *Countering Radicalisation Across Europé – The Pioneering ISDEP Project,* Journal for Deradicalization
[63] CoPPRa *About*, http://www.coppra.eu/about.php
[64] *RecoRa. About*, http://www.recora.eu/about/

1. The use of a tool for recognizing radicalization to support the development of a local shared narrative designed to underpin collaborative partnerships;
2. The use of new tools for managing outcomes both at the level of action planning and within the design and assessment of specific projects;
3. A partnership approach to safeguarding individuals;
4. A specific tool to assist front line staff recognize signs of radicalization and make professional judgments of when and how to intervene (There are specific tools for specific sectors);
5. Tools to assist in the assessment and intervention planning for convicted terrorists and extremist offenders;
6. Content analysis that enables ideological based violence underpinned by Global Jihadist and right wing extremist narratives, to be integrated into wider violence reduction policies and practice;
7. Tailor made programs for specific professionals (e.g, Prison and Probation staff, youth workers, et al);
8. A series of off-the-shelf training manuals for our two day courses; and
9. A team of experienced Fellows who can provide facilitation and support in the development of policy and practice in this area.[65]

In the Czech Republic, there is a project, proDEM, which aims to empower first-line practitioners in prevention and intervention. The target audiences are police, municipal officers, teachers, journalists, youth workers, religious leaders, among others. The focus is right-wing extremism at the local level, and is based on "the exchange of experiences, sharing good practice and on the discussion about the possibilities of procedures for dealing with this issue."[66]

In Slovakia, there is Fundament Civic Association, which conducts research for government and municipalities, and later help in preparing actions plans for first-line professionals. The objective is to "represent the interests of social organizations, communities and private persons, to find alternative solutions of the economic and social problems as well as their application in concrete cases."[67] A special focus has been on the situation of Roma people.

In Slovenia, the Association for Nonviolent Communication that was founded in 1996 has methods of violence prevention and guidelines. The NGO have a broader perspective and involve different types of violence. The organization has three main objectives:

• To reduce society's tolerance to violence,

---

[65] *Ibid* http://www.recora.eu/about/
[66] 'proDem', *Eruditio Publica*, http://www.eruditiopublica.com/en/projekty_2/mezinarodni-en/
[67] Radicalisation awareness network, *Approaches and practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

- Help those who commit violence to change their behavior,
- Help those who experience violence.[68]

The Zurich based GRUNDKRAFT have several training programs, e.g. Teachers Empowered, Leaders Empowered, and Youth Workers Empowered.[69] The Teachers Empowered program serves as prevention of extremism through support to educators "in building the necessary skills to build sustainable relationships and community in the classroom and the school as a whole."[70]

The Dutch National Police has also developed a training program for police officers to boost the professional capacity to manage the polarization in society. The so-called Pharresia polarization management approach seeks to promote and target the middle ground, avoid talk about identities and avoid what is right and wrong. This polarization management model is instituted to manage external and internal polarization in the police and in society. It is designed to raise awareness about the role police can play in fueling polarization or acting as a scapegoat.[71]

---

[68] *Association for nonviolent communication*, http://www.drustvo-dnk.si/predstavitev-eng.html
[69] *GRUNDKRAFT*, http://www.grundkraft.net/en/Programs
[70] Radicalisation awareness network, *Approaches and practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf
[71] Bart Bransma (2016), *Police and Polarisation*: An Initial Guide, Pharresia,

4. Education sector and training

Providing support in the educational sector is hugely challenging for a multitude of reasons. Educational institutions have a duty of care and responsibility to flag and intervene in cases of deviant pupils who exhibit extremist behavior. Staff are also confronted with pupils' often "polarized opinions and conspiracies about collective identities and global politics."[72]

One example of ways to tackle these types of educational challenges is Copenhagen Municipality Action Plan (August 2015) that focus on educating pupils in democracy and citizenship issues which includes workshops on identity, discrimination, exclusion and belonging. It also focuses on developing critical thinking skills for pupils navigating social media and the Internet. Another way is the so-called *Samtalskompassen,* operated by the Swedish National CVE Coordinator, developed for educators and first-line practitioners as a guide to understand radicalization and violent extremism and to hold difficult conversations with youths at risk of radicalization.[73]

Internationally, UNESCO has taken a lead role in providing the tools for educators challenging extremism. UNESCO's Teachers' Guide for Countering Violent Extremism is designed "to promote the importance of education and critical thinking, handle demonstrations of intolerance and racism that can lead to violent extremism, and create an enabling environment for dialogue and exchange on the issues." This teacher's guide provides guidance on how to handle difficult discussions around extremism and associated sensitive issues. Some of the key messages it reinforces are 'solidarity', 'respect for diversity', 'human rights', 'learning to live together' and 'young people's engagement.'[74]

UNESCO is also in the process of creating a digital educational platform that would deliver "state-of-the art digital educational resources incorporating lessons learned from the Holocaust, modern atrocities, and current threats" to educators which can help counter violent extremist recruitment particularly in communities where youths are at greatest risk of radicalization.

The EU RAN Working Group on Education issued a 24-point manifesto in 2015 which provided concrete advice for educators; schools, partner agencies and government. Among the promising interventions for educators was: invest in training; advice on holding difficult conversations; offer alternatives; build educator-networks and hotlines; discover online (with pupils); use testimonials of victims or formers; develop a clear vision on how to deal with radicalization and extremism in the school; innovate within the curriculum to have built-in elements of critical thinking, democratic values, conflict resolution etc. as part of

---

[72] Stijn Sieckelinck & Liam Stephens (2016), *Education*, unpublished EU RAN CoE paper
[73] Samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism. *Samtalskompassen.* http://samtalskompassen.samordnarenmotextremism.se/oversikt/;
[74] UNESCO (2016). *Teachers Guide for Countering Violent Extremism* (http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002446/244676e.pdf

existing courses and activities; enable educators to receive training on holding difficult conversations, online processes and radicalization awareness; etc.[75]

As concluded by the Dutch research project 'Ideals Adrift', that "i) the development of ideals is an essential part of adolescence, and ii) this development needs a powerful pedagogical environment to prevent ideals from 'going adrift'. However, it is this necessary mentoring of adolescents in the process of identity formation – against the backdrop of the temptations of extremism – that turns out to be extremely difficult for educators."[76]

Besides prevention of violent extremism in educational settings, there are also other various forms of training provided for front-line practitioners. For example, the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) has several projects focusing on training of first-line practitioners. The Operation Bachelor and Operation Graduate aim at engaging the education sector. The deliverables are scenario exercises concerning:

• extremist leaflets found on campus;
• extremist student society created on campus, raised student tensions as a result of hate crimes;
• extremist speakers visiting the university and a student who is suspected of viewing terrorist material online.[77]

To prevent violent radicalization at an early stage, the project 'Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation (STRESAVIORA) has created an instrument called 'BOUNCE Resilience Tools'. The project has been funded by the European Commission's ISEC program. A development of the project, STRESAVIORA II, has been granted funding (2016-2017) and aims to:

• The broad-scale implementation of the developed BOUNCE resilience tools on a local level with a trainer implementation and support system for tailor-made support through Train the Trainer education for trainers working with young people;
• The development of a resilience trainer network among EU member states, facilitating the exchange of experiences and good practices;
• The study of the evaluation of short, medium and long term effects of the use of resilience trainings to prevent radicalization leading to violent extremism.[78]

---

[75] Radicalisation awareness network. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/ran-press-release-manifesto-of-educators-on-radicalisation_en.pdf

[76] Stijn Sieckelinck &. Micha de Winter (2015), *Formers & families: Transitional journeys in and out of extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands* NCTV, October 2015

[77] Radicalisation awareness network, *Approaches and practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

[78] Bounce Resilience Tools *The Project BOUNCE enters a new phase*, http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/en/project-bounce-enters-new-phase

There are several projects that have produced movies to show different cases of radicalization and violent extremism. One of those is *Pathways* which focuses on two characters being drawn into extremism.[79] Another one is *Convictions*, which is about a man's life before ending up in prison for planning to commit a terrorist attack in Bristol.[80]

In many EU states there is a concern and reluctance for schools to work in the prevention area as projects are framed as prevention of radicalization projects. Often there is significant myths that the Prevent program is actually designed to spy on students rather than safeguarding risks of youths being vulnerable to radicalization and grooming. This needs to be effectively countered; otherwise there is a danger that these myths remain and become counterproductive for prevention initiatives.

Youth-based projects are another alternative to direct engagements in schools. For example, the Danish youth-to-youth dialogue is an initiative where youths facilitate dialogues with other youths between the ages of 12-30 years about family relations, personal development, social control, cultural and honor-related conflicts, participation in society, rights and responsibilities, antisocial behavior, discrimination and binary thinking, intolerance and extremism.

---

[79] Radicalisation awareness network, *Approaches and practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf
[80] *Conviction*, http://www.convictionfilm.co.uk/

5. Mentoring

Several initiatives include mentoring, even though there is a lack of research regarding the efficacy of mentoring in relation to disengagement and de-radicalization from violent extremism.[81] Mentors can be part of the CVE infrastructure in many ways – both regarding 'at risk' individuals but also those already active in violent extremist groups. The role of the mentors is to guide and be a positive force, a role model, motivating the individual to be a 'good' citizen. The mentor can be a sports coach, a community police office, a youth worker, a parent and a religious leader etc. – someone the individual can trust. A mentor can be used both pre- and post-violent radicalization. Key questions to consider:

- How are mentors recruited?
- What are the best qualifications and necessary skillsets to be an effective mentor?
- How are mentors trained in general?
- In particular, how are mentors (and field workers) trained to enable them to take ideological discussions with radicalized individuals?
- How are they supported during their work?

Mentoring can play an important part in preventive work directed toward individuals at risk, and for those who want to leave a destructive lifestyle. Research on evaluations of mentoring programs has some flaws and it is difficult to draw conclusions about causation and impact of mentoring on reoffending. In a systematic review, based on 18 evaluations of the existing research regarding mentorship for young people, showed the result of recidivism in crimes decrease by between four and ten percent.[82] So far, evaluations have been of varying quality and show very different results.

In some Danish CVE initiatives, focus has primarily been on developing mentorship programs in order to support professionals working to prevent terrorism. The main purpose of this is to communicate knowledge about methods to those who are in direct contact with young people aged 14 to 20 years. For instance, in Aarhus, Denmark, a structure exists that includes 21 mentors (2014) and access to psychological support. Channeled through the city's Info House, individuals at risk are assigned a mentor. The extent to which an assigned mentor works with an individual varies from case to case and depends on how much effort that is required. In general, a mentor aims to guide and support an individual during his/her re-integration process into society. The Info House in Aarhus also offers guidance to relatives and others close to the individual at risk. On the individual level,

---

[81] Spalek, Basia & Davies, Lynn, 'Mentoring in relation to violent extremism: a study of role, purpose, and outcomes, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 35:5, May 2012

[82] Brottsförebyggande rådet (2008) *Mentorskaps inverkan på återfall i brott: En systematisk forskningsgenomgång*. Rapport 2008:7,

participation in society, "life-skills" and a meaningful view of the world are considered as key strengths for an individual who is at risk of radicalization.[83]

5.1 Danish strategy

In Copenhagen, the mentor's primary role is to act as a link between the individual at risk and other authorities. Moreover, the mentor has a social and cognitive role in promoting a better understanding of society, life choices and responsibility for their own professional and social development. There is also a campaign aimed at parents who need support to handle radicalization at home by providing psychological support to parents. In some cases, the campaign is focused on parents who have a son or daughter who have left for a conflict zone.[84] These specially trained mentors are both youngsters who have demonstrated individual personality and leadership strengths as well as parents who have an identifiable skillset in reaching difficult youngsters.

In Denmark the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing have developed a comprehensive method manual for its mentoring program, parent-coaching and support network for relatives and friends (to extremists).[85] The method of this manual is based on Life Psychology (developed by Aarhus Professor Preben Bertelsen); Solution-Focused methods focusing on relationship-building; and Balanced Risk Assessment tools inspired by Signs of Safety (developed by Andrew Turnell and Steve Edwards).

This Life Psychology Approach provides practical methods to handle conflictual situations and provide psychological reflection tools as a guide for dialogue with extremists. It provides methods how to conduct meetings with parents and friends of extremists as well as practical guidance to mentors and mentees throughout their relationship. Similarly, it provides detailed guidance on parent coaching and concrete methods how to deal with youths attracted to extremism. This method manual represents the cumulative knowledge of the Danish prevention efforts at a practical level and can be used by practitioners directly across local contexts.

5.2 STREET

Another program that involves mentors is the south London-based "Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers" (STREET). The program was studied by the Center of Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, back in 2011.

STREET was launched in 2006 and aims to connect with youngsters at risk of involvement in antisocial behavior, gang violence or violent extremism. This is made via tailored

---

[83] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015)
[84] Ibid.
[85] Udlaendinge-Integrations og Boligministeriet (2016). *Mentorindsats, foraeldrecoaching og pårorendenetvaerk.* Styrelsen for Intermational Rekruttering og Integration,

programs to each individual. STREET has gained interest from the media for their successful work with young people at risk for jihadist radicalization[86], claiming zero percent recidivism from its interventions.[87]

Street has a holistic approach, with different interventions depending on the youngster's individual needs. The program can encompass a wide range of interventions, from emotional well-being support to theological guidance. The aim is to help the person to reconnect and find a way back in to the society, instead of staying marginalized and find a belonging in a criminal or Islamist extremism group.[88] This is done by challenging the individual's choice of using violence; improving the individual's self-belief; creating a safe space where the person can debate the problems and issues bothering them; and unlock "social capital" via education and vocational training.[89]

According to STREET, one the greatest success is the program's credibility – which they mean are proven by the fact that many youngsters connect to the program via self-referral and not from statutory bodies. The organization is rooted in the local community and the staff often has personal experience regarding issues similar to the youngsters in the programs. Alyas Karmani, co-director says that:

> "Our strapline is "for you from people like you". /…/ Because we are embedded in the community, we can understand the lived reality, the changing situation, and conditions on the ground. /…/ We have a credible and competent group of young workers and mentors. /…/ They understand their (the youngsters) worldview and in many cases have also been affected by the same issues as them, This allow us to access areas other agencies might consider difficult to reach."[90]

Another key of the program is its operational independence. Although STREET works closely with authorities, they still have a high level of independence. This helps the program to maintain credibility among the young people as an organization that can be trusted and not "a part of the system".[91] For example, according to STREET, cases notes and details of an individual presenting himself directly to the program would not necessarily be shared with authorities unless it's necessary. This was cemented after several years of engagement and careful relationship building between STREET and the authorities.[92]

---

[86] Barclay, Jack (2011). STREET: Barclay, Jack (2011). STREET: A Case Study in Government-Community Partership and Direct Intervention to Counter Violent Extremism, p 1
[87] Ibid, p 11
[88] Ibid, p 3
[89] Ibid, p 4
[90] Ibid, p 4
[91] Ibid, p 5
[92] Ibid, p 6

The interventions are formed by a risk assessment that profiles the individual's background and vulnerabilities – and a strategy is tailored to them. The framework of the strategy includes five core influence factors: emotional well-being, social exclusion and estrangement, perceived grievance and injustice, foreign policy and religious extremism ideology. These factors are subdivided in to 66 sub-factors that determine risk related to each of the five factors.

Examples of sub-factors are age, degree of religious indoctrination and mental health. The framework also includes resilience factors that can be countered against the influence factors. The resilience factors are: emotional, social, persecution, geopolitical and theological resilience. Through the framework, STREET develops a schematic related to push-and pull factors – which allows them to develop an individual intervention program focused on strengthening the resilience factors.[93]

As mentioned earlier, the study of the STREET program also contains some practice lessons, made by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. The first one is the background of the mentors and other people involved in the program. They are members of the local community and have been active in preventing violence and extremism before the founding of STREET. By this, they can counter claims from extremist groups arguing that STREET is a government "front organization".[94] The second lesson has been described above and is the programs operational independence. The third one is the strong community position that STREET has – based in the heart of the community.

This suggests that the best community partner is one that´s rooted in the area, not an organization from the outside.[95] Fourth, is the detailed knowledge and understanding about Islam among the staff. They have Islamic, Salafist education and can therefore refute the extremist's ideas on a high theological level. The fifth lesson is the methodological frame work, tailored made for each individual. Sixth, is the holistic approach, were STAFF have a full-spectrum to address the issue of why an individual becomes radicalized. And the last lesson is that the staff and mentors involved in the program are all trained in youth work, teaching and counseling.[96]

Mentorship programs are important tool in most prevention program given the intensity and longevity of contact with extremist youths. As such, mentors are pivotal providing the ingredients of monitoring change and empowering personal change in the extremist.

---

[93] Ibid, p 7-8
[94] Ibid, p 11
[95] Ibid, p 12
[96] Ibid, p 12-13

6. Hotline/helpline

A telephone hotline is a function that can help friends, relatives and professionals get in contact with relevant actors within the community and provide assistance in individual cases. Hotlines, or support lines/help lines, are operated by different actors, such as municipalities, civil societies or government agencies.

For the operator managing the hotline it is important to have situational awareness regarding worries and issues of the public. Some operators need to be bilingual (e.g. Arabic). Some questions to consider:

- It is necessary to have a national hotline or just local ones?
- Should it be possible to call anonymously?
- Should it be possible to have a chat room?
- Will suspicions of crime be reported to police and security service?
- Which structures should be connected to the hotline?

In her study, Gielen finds that "[a] telephone line for families of individuals at risk (C1) and radicals (C2) connects parents to additional forms of family support to increase protective factors (M2) and provides information on early warning signals so that parents can better detect radicalisation (M3), to prevent radicalisation (O1) and travel (O2)."[97]

For instance, such hotlines have been used to prevent violent extremism in various European countries for some years. As early as 2001, the Muslim Youth Helpline was established in the UK. The hotline takes a broad approach since it started with the aim of countering identity conflicts among British Muslims. Clients can be anonymous and receive counseling, often when they do not feel they get enough support from conservative parents or local religious leaders.

In the Netherlands, the hotline Hulplijn radicalization[98], became operational in January 2015. The Dutch-Moroccan diaspora were active in the process, and like many other projects it is operated by unpaid staff. The head of the Dutch hotline, Chakib Lamnadi, illustrates what a case might look like by mentioning how a mother calls because she is worried that her 13-year-old daughter wants to join the IS. Another case involved a father who called in after his son had been missing for two days and the father suspected his son had traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the IS. Around 20 people work in the organization to provide psychological support and advice to parents and relatives of people who in various ways are linked to violent Islamist extremism. Most of the callers belong to the Dutch-

---

[97]Gielen, Amy-Jane (2015), *Supporting families of foreign fighters. A realistic approach for measuring the effectiveness*, Journal for Deradicalization, Nr. 2, p. 41
[98] Hupllijnradicalisering http://hulplijnradicalisering.nl/nl/Home

Moroccan diaspora - which also represents about 70 percent of the violent Islamist environment in the Netherlands.[99]

In Germany, measures have been taken at both the federal level and state levels. Since July 2010, a national hotline (HATIF) exist, which is operated by the German Federal domestic intelligence service, BfV. HATIFS's approach is broad and includes, among other things, to provide client support with government contacts, protection against threats from family and others in the environment, to assist in education, livelihood and financial support. Criticism against the hotline is based on whether an intelligence service is the most suitable actor to engage in this type of role.[100]

In January 2012, a parallel hotline operated by BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) was established as the result of collaboration between Muslim institutions and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, BMI. Since 2013, the hotline has received about 1,500 calls. According to the Manager, Florian Endres, about 100 of the calls originate from teachers seeking information on radicalization and how teachers can deal with individuals who become radicalized. Around 80% of the cases are related to individuals heading for the conflict in Syria – both before, during, and after the trip.[101]

A hotline often described as successful is the Hayat ('life') project run by Zentrum Demokratische Kultur, an umbrella organization that also includes EXIT Deutschland. Hayat is a helpline linked to a national family counseling program in a larger project that also contains two regional programs in Bremen and Bochum.

The helpline is described as a way for individuals to establish contact, and the first conversation may sometimes have the character of emergency advice. Then the work continues in the form of background research, analysis and advice. However, defector activities targeting radical Islamists are still relatively unusual. According to their Berlin office, it is common for concerned parents to contact them because their children have changed in a radical Islamic direction. The program they offer consists of advice to parents and close relatives, primarily to ensure that they do not feel lost and alone. They support them on an emotional level and give them advice about what to do and how to talk with their children.

They underline that the parents seldom become experts on Islam and have difficulty arguing with their children on theological grounds, and that the point is instead to enable

---

[99] De Visser, Nadette (2015). *Who to Call When Your Kid Wages Jihad*, The Daily Beast, , http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/13/who-to-call-when-your-kid-wages-jihad.html
[100] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015), p 188
[101] Ibid, p 189

parents to understand what they have to argue against. They try to coach the parents to ask and be curious instead of being judgmental. [102]

In the Dutch capital of Amsterdam, the city operates a hotline and counseling center where anxious relatives can turn to for help. The aim is to reach the people who started to radicalize and in time to stop the actual process. Once contact has been made, each case is analyzed individually regarding what measures is possible. Part of the work involves creating greater awareness and to motivate the individual to be open to receive support. The results of the work show that it has been successful in cases where individuals have accepted assistance, but not in the cases people have felt like "patients" and had difficulty opening up to support. A local conclusion from this is that during the first contact, it is important to focus on building trust and then add efforts gradually against radicalization. [103]

There are also NGOs in the Netherlands and Belgium run by members of the Moroccan Diaspora. In Belgium, they have established a hotline called "Les parents concernés" and the initiative is operated by parents of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, who use their experience and provide support to other parents in similar situations. [104]

In November 2015, the Swedish Red Cross started a hotline focused on violent extremism. [105] The hotline is funded by the government through the National Coordinator Protecting Democracy against Violent Extremism, but staffed and run by an NGO, a structure that has been recommended in previous reports. According to the National Coordinator, the reason for giving the assignment to an NGO is that people calling the support line might find the NGO more reliable and trustworthy than any local or central governmental agency or authority. The Red Cross and its staff also have previous experience with support calls and treatment of trauma, and torture victim support. The criteria for recruitment of the staff was experience with people in crisis, multilingual, international experience, and being able to conduct rapid response to crisis situations.

The aim of the hotline is to prevent the occurrence of violent extremism and support the people who are in the vicinity of a person involved in violent extremism. The support line is an activity aiming at families, friends, municipalities and organizations, so they know where to turn for information, advice and support on issues concerning violent extremism. People calling to the support line can be remitted to e.g. the social services in a municipality, a school, psychiatry, or the local CVE coordinator. Marketing campaigns have helped reach information to citizens in different languages and more than a thousand orders of information brochures have been made by different actors in society. Several

[102] Ibid, p 190
[103] Ranstorp & Hyllengren (2013), Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism i tredje land. Försvarshögskolan. *p 177*
[104] Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkaanse Nederlanders http://smn.nl/
[105] Swedish Red Cross. *Nationell stödtelfon om våldsbejakande extremism.* http://www.redcross.se/kontakt/valdsbejakande-extremism/

municipalities have also added contact information to the support line on their websites. The National CVE Coordinator has also marketed the support line during visits and lectures in a majority of Sweden's municipalities. The majority of cases handled are in respect to violent Islamist extremism, and the number of calls increases when there have been terrorist attacks in Europe.[106] The hotline is open on weekdays from 9 am – 3 pm and the staff speaks Swedish, English, Arabic, and Kurdish. People calling the support line can give information anonymously.

In September 2016, data from Swedish hotline was presented, and it showed that during the first 10 months they received 260 phone calls. An additional 100 calls had been missed. Among the 260 calls, around one fourth came from the hotline's target group – anxious relatives or friends. The other calls primarily came from teachers, principals and others wanting more information regarding radicalization for instance. Even if the hotline was open for calls regarding all types of extremism, the overwhelming majority concerned Islamist extremism. No calls were regarded as "acute" in the meaning that someone was just about to travel to a conflict zone or break any law. Further, the communication between the hotline and local municipalities has been lacking.

Recently, five cities (the three largest and two smaller) where asked how many referrals they had received from the hotline. One of the smaller cities reported they had received "less than four" calls, the others reported they had received none.[107] Such disappointing results indicate that the communication structure between a hotline on the national level to local municipalities needs to be taken seriously when setting up such programs. It also starkly demonstrates that any hotline need active and sensitive marketing through appropriate community channels.

The Swedish hotline was partially modelled on the Austrian Extremism Information Centre established in December 2014 and operated by bOJA – Federal Network for Open Youth Work. This Extremism Information Centre is staffed by 6 a person multi-professional team operating in 5 languages (German, English, Turkish, Arabic and Farsi).[108] This hotline provides advice and referral to family counselling, open youth work, labour market services and offer face-to-face counselling. It is only open between 10am and 3pm on weekdays. In the first six months over 500 calls registered with almost 80 from relatives/friends and over 40 face-to-face counselling sessions.[109]

---

[106] National CVE Coordinator (2016)
http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/9487d7450731411784443305a41a54ae/verksamhetsrapport---en-nationell-samordnare-for-att-varna-demokratin-mot-valdsbejakande-extremism
[107] Bengtsson, Ninna & Fahlander Marit (2016). *Svagt resultat för stödtelefon mot våldsbejakande extremism*, Svenska Dagbladet. http://www.svd.se/tekniska-problem-hos-roda-korsets-stodtelefon
[108]Familienberatung. *Beratungsstelle Extremismus - Beratung, Prävention, Intervention*
http://www.beratungsstelleextremismus.at
[109] Presentation by Austrian Extremism Information Centre.

7. Family support

Parental and family support can be important part of the de-radicalization, disengagement and reintegration processes as shown by recent Quilliam Foundation study.[110] There are often psychosocial problems at the heart of reasons why youngsters are feeling vulnerable such as absence of father figures and other reasons. Families are also the protective factor in being able to detect change in their children. As one study concluded: "A 'window of opportunity' exists at the beginning of the radicalization process: during this phase, the youngster speaks openly on the new ideas that have been put into his or her head, and is proud of them and tries to convince all his or her friends. This is exactly the time when the parents have to be in possession of everything needed to stop this change from happening."[111] Families and relatives might also need the psychological support to handle the fact that their relative have, for example, travelled to Syria. Families and relatives can be seen as both victims and actors that can prevent and combat violent extremism.

- How do you overcome fears about prosecution of family members (or taking children into state custody) which may deter families from seeking help?
- Is it possible to establish an unofficial network of parents so that they can listen to each other's stories and process their sorrow or worries?
- Is there a need for programs to help parents with parenting skills and empowerment?
- Provide training targeting socially disadvantaged parents and relevant relatives with a focus on strengthening parenting, skills in everyday life, as well as greater awareness of the rights, obligations and norms of society.
- Setting up parents' networks, where, for instance, parents of young people who have traveled to areas of conflict can meet regularly to discuss and support each other in relation to their situation.
- How to include mentors who can support parents and close relatives of young people at risk of radicalization or youth in extremist circles?
- Do you mix together parents whose sons/daughters are still in Syria with those parents whose children have died or are in custody?

Previous research concerning crime in general has shown that preventive actions that involve the family of the person at risk have better possibilities of being successful.[112] Prevention should focus on several levels at the same time when several problem behaviors have common risk factors. Therefore, preventive work on the structural level needs to be pursued in parallel with measures geared toward the individual, the local environment, and the contexts. However, in reality this is not always possible. In part, since families can sometimes be a driving force into radicalization, which makes it very difficult, if not

---

[110] Nikita Malik and Jonathan Russell, *Families in Violent Extremism: Challenges and Opprotunities* (Quilliam Foundation, 2016)
[111] "Supporting families confronted with violent radicalization", Record of the three seminar meetings September 2015-January 2016 (King Baudouin Foundation, 2016): p.36.
[112] The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2009)

impossible, to involve an individual's parents. An alternative road to take in such cases may instead be to focus on other adults in the person's environment – for instance in schools, recreation centers, sports clubs or cultural associations.[113]

When seeking support from families, and also from of mentors and psychological assistance, various challenges exist. For instance, will they be able to take the ideological discussion? How can cultural barriers and stigma be bridged in terms of psychological assistance? Concerning family support, it might be effectual to involve the whole family through home visits since siblings can be affected – this is a fine balance to handle without the risk of stigmatization.[114] When it comes to family networks, it is important to consider the different backgrounds and situations. How is the family network affected when some of their relatives are in Iraq or Syria with the family not knowing if the person is still alive or has died? Also, when some radicalized individuals are men and others are teenage girls – how does that affect families?

Previous research by Gielen[115] indicates that family support can be provided in the following stages:[116]

- In its earliest stages, it can be provided to parents of individuals at risk, by creating a positive family environment where they can discuss extremist ideas with their child and provide positive alternatives.
- If radical or extremist ideas lead to travel to a conflict zone abroad, such as Syria or Iraq, foreign fighters quite often remain in touch with their families back home. Family support can then be aimed at maintaining contact with their children or relatives and in creating a positive environment for a child to return home.
- If extremist views turn into violence and ultimately imprisonment, families can be supported during prison or afterwards in the re-integration and re-habilitation process.
- If practitioners are able to create and sustain a relationship with families of foreign fighters it will be easier to establish contact with individual upon his/her return. Gielen describes this of particular importance, as families are also important for de-radicalization and disengagement work.
- Other family members and relatives could form an at-risk group of travelling to Syria and they need to be aware of early warning signals to prevent travel of other family members or peers. Providing family support can work as a powerful narrative for foreign fighters to come home.

---

[113] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015)
[114] Ibid.
[115] Gielen, Amy-Jane (2014). *Syrië-strijders: liever families ondersteunen dan paspoort afnemen. Antiradicalisering in België, Denemarken en Duitsland* Tijdschrift voor Sociale Vraagstukken, nr. 1, pp. 20-23
[116] Gielen, Amy-Jane (2015). *Supporting families of foreign fighters. A realistic approach for measuring the effectiveness*. Journal for deradicalization. http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/10

Regarding program design for supporting families of foreign fighters, Gielen has proposed a hypothesis[117] based on the factors C (context), M (mechanisms) and O (outcome). Each factor contains numerous variables to consider and form different C-M-O configurations in order to create tailor-made approaches based on the situation at hand. For instance, the context factor describes various contextual aspects and includes 26 variables such as parenting style and the practitioners' background.

Mechanisms describe different programs and consist of seven variables such as telephone hotline and providing parents with counter-narratives. Finally, outcome deals with the consequences of the program and consist of five variables such as prevention of travel or rehabilitation for convicted extremists or returned foreign fighters. Naturally, this is only a hypothesis for program design to support families and it needs to be empirically tested. However, it provides a starting point for practitioners and researchers to advance from.

Further, the EU RAN network recommendation of good practices highlights the importance of practitioners working together with families when possible when an individual is at risk of becoming a foreign fighter. This is important as "family members can provide key forms of support to, or have a positive influence on, the (potential) foreign fighter and, in many cases, can help with prevention or rehabilitation, reintegration and, to a lesser extent, de-radicalisation."[118]

However, it is also stressed by RAN that families can also be risk factors since some families have influenced or promoted such ideologies and choices.

Actors should bear in mind potential challenges when working with families who may be fearful of sharing information or worry about stigmatization of involvement in an intervention. Where possible, it is important to proactively encourage the recipient's family and other networks not to reject or stigmatize their relative.

In the city of Copenhagen, the previously mentioned Expert Group presented three recommendations regarding dealing with families:[119]

- Courses targeted at socially vulnerable parents and relevant relatives with a focus on strengthening parental roles and skills in everyday life, and greater knowledge of rights, duties and norms in society.
- Parental networks where parents of young citizens who have left the country for conflict zones can meet regularly for support with regard to their situation.

---

[117] Ibid.
[118] Radicalisation awareness network. *The RAN Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention - Outreach, Rehabilitation and Reintegration.* https://www.icct.nl/download/file/RAN-Declaration-Good-Practices-for-Engagement-with-Foreign-Fighters.pdf
[119] City of Copenhagen (2015). *Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort*

- Expansion of the work with parental coaches who can support parents and near relatives of young citizens threatened by radicalization or who are in extremist environments.

As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing have developed a comprehensive method manual (2016) for its mentoring program, parent-coaching and support network for relatives and friends (to extremists) which provide practical step-by-step guidance how to establish and run parent coaching and networks. This could be applicable and translated into other contexts.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Hedayah have identified lessons learned in the role of families in preventing and countering violent extremism. Specifically, they identified several programming options involving families (involving building parental and community support). This involves options across parental support, community support, in schools, CVE communication and rehabilitation and reintegration.[120]

---

[120] GCTF & Hedayah, *The Role of Families in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Findings, Recommendations and Programming Options*

8. A Gender Perspective

There are many similarities why women join violent extremist organizations with the motives and causes that male extremists have – but there are also differences.[121] In addition, some initiatives to prevent and counter extremism have a gender perspective and a separate focus on girls and women. One of the reasons for women's enhanced role is, according to Briggs and Silverman that "they tend to have a strong influence over their sons and as primary care providers often spend more time with their children than their fathers."[122]

In Germany, there is an Expert Center looking at right-wing extremism from a gender-perspective, which "trains kindergarten teachers, youth clubs, community centers, journalists and scientific associations of social work and education departments on how to implement a gender-sensitive approach and in order to help them to implement "democratic principles" for their institutions."[123] Activities include:

> […] briefing members of state parliament on their approach to neo-Nazi women in their parliaments, training of educators to work with children who are being brought up in neo-Nazi families, organizing political salons and supporting local initiatives that challenge gender stereotypes and encourage girls and women to become leaders in pro-democracy work in the region.[124]

8.1 Mothers Schools

In 2008, Women Without Borders launched a platform called Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) with headquarter in Vienna, Austria. SAVE runs several campaigns, such as 'Mothers for Change!', 'Mothers MOVE!', 'The Women's Dialogue', and 'SAVE Witness'. The aim is to provide "women with the tools for critical debate to challenge extremist thinking and to develop alternative strategies for combating the growth of global terrorism."[125] Through its 'Mother School', SAVE is empowering women and offers mothers to learn how to deal with radicalization.

Partly based on the Austrian mother schools experience, four municipalities in Sweden are now working to begin training for mothers as a way to counter violent extremism. The training targets mothers, primarily in segregated areas, who are concerned that their child is

---

[121] Hoyle, Carolyn, Bradford, Alexandra & Frenett, Ross, 'Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS', *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 2015

[122] Briggs Obe, Rachel & Silverman, Tanya, 'Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Responding to the Threat', *Institute for Strategic* Dialogue, 2014, p. 44

[123] Radicalisation awareness network (2016). *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

[124] Amadeu Antonio Stiftung *Gender and the Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism*, http://www.gender-und-rechtsextremismus.de/service/english/

[125] Women Without Borders, *SAVE, http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/*

vulnerable to extremism. The mother's course is led by youth therapists and aims at building the mothers self-esteem and courage, as well as equipping them with tools to enable them to guide their children away from extremism. Another aim is to teach mothers to recognize signs of radicalization, but also about communication, developmental psychology and parenting in general. Mothers are often best positioned to see signs of radicalization, and training mothers can be important for successful prevention. Another aim is to provide the mothers with a platform where they can discuss freely, without guilt and shame with other parents who share similar problems and experiences. Apart from guidance, the forum can also become an entry point to other functions in society mothers can turn to for help.[126]

The Mothers School program originally started in Vienna in 2002 as a response to 9/11. The initiative began by researchers interviewing 1000 mothers and three components emerged from the results: 1) mothers were not part of the preventive work, (2) they had a lack of trust towards government, and (3) they lacked tools for dealing with the problem (their children becoming radicalized). Following this, the Mother Schools concept was developed and it has, for instance, been used in Nigeria and Indonesia as well. So far Austria has been the only European country that has used the concept, Sweden is soon to be the second country and Belgium has also shown considerable interest.

The program design in Sweden has been set up in the following way. Four Swedish cities have been appointed to test the concept and it will be run by the social services locally. A psychiatrist working for the National CVE Coordinator has trained the local professionals at the social services and these individuals have, in turn, trained others in their organization. By its reach into segregated areas, the social services will be recruiting mothers for the program, in some municipalities together with mosques, in others with NGOs.

The Mother's School program is run and funded by the Swedish government. In each municipality, two professionals from the social services will lead each group that will consist of 5-10 mothers. The groups will meet once a week for three months for a total of 10 sessions. Each session will focus primarily on one topic and among the topics are the following: communication, developmental psychology, self-confidence, radicalization, change of behavior, and how to talk about difficult issues in a constructive way. The recruitment process is underway and the sessions will start in the beginning of 2017. During the three-month process of sessions, the local professionals will be tutored by the psychiatrist from the national CVE Coordinator.[127]

---

[126] Åkerman, Erika (2016). *Mammor ska utbildas om extremism*:
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6507054
[127] Personal communication with the psychiatrist at the National CVE coordinator.

In the London Borough of Ealing, the Action Community Forum (ACF) runs Muslimah Matters which "aims to engage with Ealing's Muslim communities particularly women and girls in a range of activities which challenge and prevent extremism, support vulnerable individuals, and address grievances."[128] Through support groups, training and workshops, the project encourages "women to negotiate topics that impact them and their communities focusing on every day subjects that can draw out current extremism issues without stigma or particularising certain communities."[129]

In their study of gender and ISIS, Saltman and Smith recommend that there are few initiatives that take gender into respect in CVE, and that "there is a great need for developing counter-narratives that are aimed at females and cater to gender nuances."[130] In addition, Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett argue that "counter-narratives need to be developed and targeted at a female audience."[131] It is important to state that there is also a lack of "understanding around gender dynamics within de-radicalization".[132]

---

[128] Action forum. *Muslimah Matters*, http://actonforum.org/projects/160-muslimah-matters
[129] Ibid
[130] Saltman, Erin Marie & Smith, Melanie, ''Till Martydrom Do Us Part' – Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue* and *ICSR*, 2015, p. 70
[131] Hoyle, Carolyn, Bradford, Alexandra & Frenett, Ross, 'Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS', *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 2015, p. 38f
[132] Saltman, Erin Marie & Smith, Melanie, ''Till Martydrom Do Us Part' – Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue* and *ICSR*, 2015, p. 71

9. Health sector

In the United Kingdom, the statutory duty to safeguard individuals has meant that the health care sector plays an important role in prevention of violent extremism. The Prevent program has developed Work to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) which uses video-clips, facilitator workbook and script in their trainings. Since 2011, over 350,000 NHS staff have been WRAP trained by a network of 10,000 Home Office accredited WRAP facilitators.

Rehabilitation programs can support in treatment for e.g. PTSD, trauma, and other mental disorders. Trifier Training and Radar Consultancy have training for health practitioners focusing on 'potentially violent loners' in the care sector.[133] In the UK, the *Derbyshire Healthcare Foundation NHS Trust* offers "specialist intervention for people presenting via the Channel group based within Derbyshire." This includes trauma management and psychological intervention.[134] A question to consider is what training for health care staff is available about the issue of violent extremism and especially foreign fighters in relation to post conflict trauma.

Health care professionals are regularly in contact with citizens, in clinics as well as in private homes. Since most staff are not trained on signs of concern about radicalization in their contact with patients, this is an unused potential for discovering early warning signs of radicalization. In London for instance, frontline healthcare staff have taken part in awareness training so they can discover signs of concern about radicalization just as they can notice other signs of ill-being.

In an effort to involve the health care sector in preventive work, a network structure for cooperation has been established between the police, social services, and psychiatry (PSP). The aim of the project is to reduce potential radicalization among individuals at risk with psychiatric and/or mental diagnosis. A two-day training course has been set up for key members of the PSP-network to raise awareness of radicalization as well as to give them knowledge of radicalization as a social, psychological and political phenomenon. The course also aims at giving the participants knowledge of the Danish national strategy and methods in preventing radicalization in general as well as among mentally vulnerable people. It also aims at giving the participants knowledge of the standard-operating-procedures when confronted with a concern of possible radicalization.[135]

---

[133] Radicalisation awareness network.*Approaches and practices* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

[134] Ibid

[135] Radcalisation awareness network *PSP-network (PSP= Police, Social Services and Psychiatry)*. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-search/rc_0085_psp-network_psp__police_s_en.htm

In Copenhagen, the Expert Group recommended that the city should prepare an overall plan to develop the skills of health care staff, so they are better able to discover signs of concern about radicalization. This should be done by integrating such concern about radicalization in:

- Existing (in-service) training of healthcare staff with contact with children and young citizens in Copenhagen, initially the staff of the city of Copenhagen, and in time the staff of the Capital Region, which is responsible for healthcare in the Greater Copenhagen area.
- Guidelines for signs of concern among children and young citizens with a focus on radicalization.[136]

In order to do so, it was recommended that the city of Copenhagen draw lessons from existing courses and in-service training of healthcare staff in the city, which have contact with children and young citizens, can be expanded with instructions regarding signs of concern about radicalization.

This should include practical guidance in how staff can send information further in the system, so concerns can be dealt with by normal procedures. The possibility of expanding the instruction to include healthcare staff from the Capital Region should also be studied. In practice, healthcare staff focuses on signs of concern regarding ill-being among small children. Focus on signs of concern about radicalization is therefore an expansion of the existing signs that healthcare staff are trained to discover. This skill development must not change the existing practice and rules for sending information further, which must continue in accordance with the guidelines that healthcare staff has today.

The Expert Group further recommends that the City of Copenhagen studies the possibility of targeting special information about signs of concern about radicalization to relevant healthcare staff with wide contact with young citizens and families. This can be done by e.g. updating existing guidelines about signs of concern among children and young citizens, or by preparing new action guidelines. In this connection, the possibility of incorporating signs of concern about radicalization in the city of Copenhagen's existing action guidelines, "When you are concerned about a child or young person", and in that way disseminated to healthcare staff, should also be studied.

The target group for a broad initiative in connection with existing courses and in-service training is relevant healthcare staff with contact with children and young citizens, primarily from the city of Copenhagen. This can be e.g. doctors, health visitors, psychiatric staff and

---

[136] City of Copenhagen, (2015) *Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort*

nurses. The focus shall primarily be on healthcare staffs who deal with citizens up to 40 years of age. The target group for a specific initiative can be healthcare staff and nurses.[137]

The EU-funded project SAFIRE produced a report entitled *Observable Indicators of Possible Radicalisation* which focused on identifying risk factors. This guidance provides 21 indicators under five specific themes (In group-out-group differentiation; identity and identity-seeking; pro-violence social interactions, including distancing from friends and family; change in persona; and association with extremist groups.)[138]

Other forms of risk assessment tools, such as Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2) and the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ exist and efforts have been made to transfer this knowledge into the health sector.[139] VERA-2 provides a risk assessment tool that examines across a matrix: attitudes and beliefs (ideology); context and intent (affiliations, actions); history and capability; and commitment and motivation. This model is used by the Dutch Custodial Agency in determining whether to disperse or house together suspects/inmates and in determining de-radicalization/disengagement strategies.

In 2016 the RAN Health and social care working group presented comprehensive guidelines[140] for involving health services in preventive work. The following steps are included in the handbook:

1) Map the relevant agencies and start networking, 2) Invest in the relationships and develop the multi-agency structure, 3) Be able to share information and assess together, 4) Appoint a case owner and intervene, and 5) Evaluate and follow-up.

Each step is in turn divided into different sub-sections with more detailed and practical guidelines. The first step 'Map the relevant agencies and start networking' include the following guiding principles: a) Go as local as possible, b) Involve a wide range of organizations, c) Avoid stigmatizing and labelling by setting up a more general structure, d) Build on existing multi-agency structures, e) Involve communities, and f) Start networking and take the time to learn and develop.

The second step 'Invest in the relationships and develop the multi-agency structure' is built around the following principles: a) Come together on a regular basis, b) Involve organizations/partners at all levels, c) Embed multi-agency cooperation in job roles and

---

[137] Ibid.

[138] SAFIRE. *Focus documents* http://www.safire-project-results.eu/focus.html

[139] Kiran M. Sarma, "Understanding Terrorism: Research of relevance to Health and Social Care Professionals", unpublished EU RAN CoE paper (April 2016).

[140] Radicalisation awareness network. *How to set up a multi-agency structure that includes the health and social care sectors*? http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk_en.pdf

functions, d) Create a partnership, not a legal entity, e) Appoint a coordinator avoiding hierarchical structures and politics, f) Invest in shared ownership over the multi-agency project, g) Have clarity of roles, h) Work with permanent members (safeguarding hub) and ad hoc/guest members, i) Be flexible and transparent, j) Good coordination at the governmental/administrative level, and k) Apply a training component.

The third step 'Be able to share information and assess together' include the following guiding principles: a) Clear rules and guidelines on information sharing, b) Reciprocity is key, c) Include experts where needed, and d) Invest in training and assessment tools. Additionally, six principles for sharing information within the health sector are proposed in the following order:

1. Recognizing, analyzing and verifying concerns.

2. Speaking with clients about these concerns.

3. Consulting with colleagues or national experts.

4. Consulting with managers.

5. Risk assessments by specialists.

6. Sharing information with the appropriate partners (e.g. social care, education or law enforcement.

The fourth step 'Appoint a case owner and intervene' is based on the following guiding principles: a) Appoint a case owner, b) Joint interventions, c) Be able to respond in 24 hours, and d) Monitor the implementation of the action plan.

The fifth and final step Evaluate and follow-up include the following guiding principles: a) Explain results, b) Share more positive stories instead of negative stories and keep partners engaged and motivated, c) Share lessons based on experiences: get the word out, d) Stress the shared benefits, and e) Make the (local) media aware of their responsibility.

The guidelines are explained more thoroughly and detailed in the document and as a whole, they present a good overview of the different aspects from a healthcare perspective, and constitute a starting point for involving such sectors.

10. Disengagement and individual support

Research on disengagement from violent extremism and terrorism is theoretically underdeveloped.[141] There is also "insufficient insight in what motives people to de-radicalize".[142] As Horgan puts it: "we simply know too little about what happens for the individual terrorist to leave terrorism behind."[143] This makes it difficult as "any rehabilitation effort must be based on a clear understanding of what drives people to terrorism in the first place."[144]

There is, however, some research on this issue. According to a study conducted by The Swedish Institute for Future Studies, the disengagement process starts in one out of the two following ways. Either the individual feels disillusionment about one or many dimensions in their extremist environment, or the individual wishes a life more connected to institutions/activities outside their extremist environment – which makes a continued participation in the extremist group impossible. The disengagement is then realized via social and practical factors.[145] There is therefore need for a link between the individual and the society, where the society embeds the person in the existing social institutions. So, the society must be there, at the other end, when an individual wants to disengage[146]. For this to function, the report offers some findings and guidelines:

- An evaluation regarding the person's situation, conditions, needs and motivation for disengagement needs to be made for the intervention to work.
- There is a different between a willing to disengage and actually doing it. Interventions aiming at the first can´t automatically be used for the second.
- It is hard for an outside actor to get a person to leave an extremism environment. It can rather be contra productive. Instead, the intervention should start from the eventual hesitation or uncertainty that the individual already possess.
- To involve "exit-members" in an intervention can be a success. Especially in the part of the process where the personnel need to appear legitimate. However, the "exit-members" often needs training and knowledge.
- Individuals often develop a willingness to disengage at the transition to adulthood.
- It is uncommon that the reasons for disengagement are ideological. Rather, they are often related to social or practical issues.
- Ideological change, for example de-radicalization, is not unimportant – but has a tendency to occur later on in the disengagement process.

---

[141] Altier, Mary Beth, Thoroughgood, Christan N., & Horgan, John G., 'Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 51, no. 5 647-661, 2014

[142] Dechesne, Mark, 'Deradicalization: 'Not soft, but strategic', *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 55:287-292, 2011

[143] Horgan, John (2005) *The Psychology of Terrorism*, Routledge, p. 140

[144] Stern, Jessica, 'Mind Over Martyr', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, issue 1, Jan/Feb 2010

[145] Carlsson, Christoffer (2016), *Att lämna våldsbejakande extremism – en kunskapsöversikt, page 127*

[146] Ibid, page 128

- Disengagement is most likely to succeed when a person's willing to leave is met by social and practical factors – such as education, employment, family life, social networks or other activities.
- Interventions should therefore focus on changing the individual's social and practical needs, rather than the ideological ones.
- Governmental actors have a role to play when it comes to practical factors, such as employment, economic help with depths and so forth. But social factors (relationships to parents, friends and partners etc.) are just as important – although it is harder for governmental actors to influence them.
- An evaluation perspective should be incorporated early on in the intervention process so that the possible effects can be measured.[147]

Another useful study is the The Swedish Council for Crime Preventions (Brottsförebygande rådet – BRÅ) report about disengagement from criminal gangs. Although, there are differences between criminal gangs and violent extremism environments, there are also similarities. BRÅ identifies three aspects that are common among the Swedish disengagement programs for criminal gangs. First, the programs map the individual needs. Second, a contact person is chosen – and he or she offers the individual counselling, practical support and help with new social networks. Third, the contact person arranges contact between the individual and the authorities/ other actors. Notably the contact person also offers protection from the individuals' earlier criminal gang.[148]

It is not clear if that is needed when it comes to extremist environment, but one can imagine that there will be some cases. It is therefore worth considering when creating an intervention program. To sum up, the report findings for a successful intervention are social and motivating counselling via the contact person, new social networks and education and employment.[149]

There are several initiatives in Europe that, in various ways, aim to help individuals to leave extremist groups. There are also several de-radicalization programs in detention facilities, such as in Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq.[150] There are obvious limitations and differences between the European programs and the programs in the Middle East and South East Asia. The South East Asian programs tend to focus more on ideology and theology, while the European approach generally is focusing on behavioral disengagement. The cornerstone of the Saudi program is psychological

---

[147] Carlsson (2016), page 132-133
[148] Bogestam, Nadja & Patel, Emma (2016). "Stöd till avhoppare från kriminella grupperingar – en nationell kartläggning. Page, 10
[149] Bogestam & Patel (2016), page 15
[150] Kruglanski, Arie W., Gelfland, Michele J., Bélanger, Jocelyn J., Sheveland, Anna, Hetiarachchi, Malkanthi & Gunaratna, Rohan, ' The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism', *Advances in Political Psychology*, vol. 35, suppl. 1, 2014

therapy and religious reeducation.[151] But there are also commonalities such as employing go-betweens and emphasis on trust building.[152] The common view is that terrorists can be changed.[153] Case studies by Horgan and Braddock finds several different activities regarding disengagement and de-radicalization:

1. Disengagement from terrorism and related activities (direct operational activity);
2. Disengagement from radical movements and associated politics (indirect activities, including subversion);
3. Accepting and serving reduced sentences for crimes committed;
4. Providing intelligence and/or serving as a witness in court, which may or may not result in delivering testimony that may see the subsequent imprisonment of former comrades;
5. Meeting victims as part of reconciliation and restorative justice initiatives;
6. Distancing themselves publicly from terrorism and extremist activity as well as symbolic figures associated with these;
7. Taking part in activities aimed at reducing recruitment and radicalization to extremist groups as well as taking part in activities aimed at encouraging disengagement for those currently involved (e.g., counter-radicalization efforts).[154]

Observations from disengagements from terrorist organizations show several factors in leaving terrorism, such as "ideological reasons, tactical disagreements, moral considerations, doubts about the rationale and future of armed struggle, and the strain of life in the underground".[155]

A multidisciplinary review of research from criminology, sociology, and psychology on disengagement shows several push and pull factors for disengagement (Table 2). However, it is important to state that, as Horgan puts it; you still "need to accept the dynamic processes influencing individual behavior regarding any stage, role or function of the terrorist group."

---

[151] Leary, Kimberlyn, 'Engaging Extremists: Diplomacy Through Deradicalization', *Harvard Kennedy School Review*, Vol. 9:113-117, 2009
[152] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, 'Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36:99-115, 2013
[153] Horgan, John & Braddock, Kurt, 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22:267-291, 2010
[154] Horgan, John & Braddock, Kurt, 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22:267-291, 2010
[155] Kassimeris, George, 'Why Greek Terrorists Give Up: Analyzing Individual Exit from the Revolutionary Organization 17 November', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34:556-571, 2011

Table 2. *Factors for terrorist disengagement, push factors pull factors.*[156]

Push factors	Pull factors
Unmet expectations	Competing loyalties
Disillusionment with strategy/actions of terrorist group	Positive interactions with moderates
Disillusionment with personnel	Employment/educational demands or opportunities
Difficulty adapting to clandestine lifestyle	Desire to marry/establish a family or family demands
Inability to cope with physiological/psychological effects of violence	Financial incentives
Loss of faith in ideology	Amnesty
Burnout	

In his study on disengagement of former militants of the Basque ethno-nationalist terrorist organization ETA, Reinares states that "disengagement from a terrorist group or organization would commonly be affected by three main types of factors: structural, organizational, and personal."[157] Another study of disengagement from ETA concludes that "the consolidation of democracy, together with pragmatic and emotional considerations, as well as others relating to the search for and reinforcement of social and group identities are key factors in the decision to leave terrorism behind."[158] A study of disengagement from Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC) shows the "interplay of individual-, organizational-, and societal-level processes in incentivizing and obstructing disengagement from politically motivated violence."[159]

The terrorists' motivation also changes over time, which could be of advantage in de-radicalization and disengagement interventions.[160] In the case of disengagement from the Red Army Faction (RAF), factors contributing where successful police efforts, lack of

---

[156] Altier, Mary Beth, Thoroughgood, Christan N., & Horgan, John G., 'Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 51, no. 5 647-661, 2014

[157] Reinares, Fernando, 'Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23:5, 780-803, 2011

[158] Alonso, Rogelio, 'Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34:9, 696-716, 2011

[159] Ferguson, Neil, Burgess, Mark & Hollywood, Ian, 'Leaving Violence Behind: Disengaging from Politically Motivated Violence in Northern Ireland', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 36, Issue 2, 199-214, April 2015

[160] Stern, Jessica, 'Mind Over Martyr', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, issue 1, Jan/Feb 2010

public support and recruits, and suffering from serious inter-organizational strife.[161] There are also recommendations of what de-radicalization programs should do:[162]

Table 3. *What de-radicalization programs should do.*

Provide information on the power of the group over the individual	Point out irrational character of used justifications
Take care that 'detectors' know where they can go to	Create contact with people who can provide positive influence
Support reduced feelings of deprivation	Stimulate social creativity
Stimulate the effectiveness of the own group	Present other groups with clear ideology
Prevention of isolation	Point out costs of group membership
Present alternative groups	Take away feelings of a 'glass ceiling'
Openly acclaim doubters	Signaling and pass on of signals
Questioning violence as a means	

One of Europe's most well-known disengagement and de-radicalization programs is EXIT Deutschland. The organization conducts work on developing methods, but also helping individuals in leaving extremist organizations. According to themselves, over 500 individuals have gone through their program since the year 2000, with recidivism of about three percent. The cornerstone of the work is the establishment of the principles of equality and mutual respect.

Exit Deutschland also attempts to provide safety and security for the dropouts, and include psychologists in their practice. An overall goal is also to provide information to the public about issues regarding right-wing extremism.[163] In Germany, there are also networks of exit institutions focusing on disengagement from right-wing extremism.[164] The German Violence Prevention Network e.g. aims "to identify radicalization as early as possible and classify degrees of radicalization" and "seeks to adopt appropriate (preventive) measures to reverse radicalization processes and to initiate a process of de-radicalization."[165]

As mentioned before, there is also a counseling program for radical Salafists and their relatives in Germany called Hayat, which was established in 2011. A partner with Hayat is

---

[161] Moghadam, Assaf, 'Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:156-181, 2012

[162] Young, Holly F., Rooze, Magda & Holsappel, Jorien, 'Translating Conceptualizations Into Practical Suggestions: What the Literature on Radicalization Can Offer to Practitioners', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 21.2, 212-225, May 2012 (framework matrix based on Doosie and de Wolf, 2010)

[163] *Exit Deutschland*, http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/

[164] *Nordverbund Ausstieg Rechts*, http://www.nordverbund-ausstieg.de/; *Ausstiegsarbeit in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern*, http://www.jump-mv.de/; See also *Verein zur Förderung akzeptierender Jugendarbeit* in Bremen, http://vaja-bremen.de/

[165] *Violence Prevention Network* (Germany), http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/en/

the German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs, which is also operating the national hotline. The goals of Hayat are:

- Try everything possible to make them voluntarily refrain from traveling abroad;
- If they are already abroad: try to stop them from active combat and make them return; and
- Assist persons to return and integrate to a safe social environment that respects universal human rights.[166]

Among many European states there are several organizations and projects dealing with different kinds of disengagement and assistance to offenders, victims, and relatives to those who are victims of crimes and extremism. The Finnish Aggredi program which aims to reduce violent recidivism among 18–39 year-old offenders convicted or suspected of street violence is one project that seems effective. An evaluation of the project finds that "the results are promising for the complier group (those who successfully completed the program): 25% of them were convicted of a violent crime during the follow-up. In contrast, those participants who dropped off the program had a very high level of recidivism, as two thirds of them were convicted of a new violent crime."[167]

An evaluation of the mentoring program in the West Midlands region in the UK concludes: "Indeed, mentors working specifically with Al Qaeda extremists drew attention to the unique nature of the ideological component, where Al Qaeda mentors were seen to need very specific knowledge of all branches of Islam and all levels of *jihad*."[168] However, mentors might also assist individuals in the disillusionment process. As Bjørgo states: "Disillusionment about what initially attracted them into the movement – whether that was political goals, a search for friendship or a sense of belonging and purpose – is one of the main factors leading towards a process of leaving the militant movement or group."[169]

In her study on themes and approaches regarding exit from violent extremism, Dalgaard-Nielsen concludes that:

> It is argued that an external intervention should stay close to the potential exiter's own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and

---

[166] *Hayat Deutschland*, http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/?c=goals
[167] Aaltonen, Mikko (2014) *The Effectiveness of an intervention aiming to reduce street violence: Evaluation of HelsinkiMissio's Aggredi-program* (Executive summary, draft version, 12.6.2014), *National Research Institute of Legal Policy*, http://www.helsinkimissio.fi/sites/default/files/custom/Aggredi_executive_summary.pdf?_ga=1.85901145.1714523290.1457015097
[168] Spalek, Basia & Davies, Lynn, 'Mentoring in relation to violent extremism: a study of role, purpose, and outcomes, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 35:5, May 2012
[169] Bjørgo, Tore, 'Dreams and disillusionment: engagement in and disengagement from militant extremist groups', *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 55:277-285, 2011

consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly.[170]

10.1 Exit programs

The content of exit programs varies from cognitive aspects and behavioral change to helping people reintegrating into society and leaving a former destructive lifestyle.

- Who should run the program, and where? Who is qualified to work there?
- Disengagement (help with leaving a group and issues of belonging and identity).
- De-radicalization (changing behavior and extremist ideas, training in critical thinking, anger and trauma management, motivational interviews).
- Reintegration (help with employment, education and social skills, housing, rehabilitation).

In these three steps in the process, families can play a key role together with counselors empowering the individuals. Former extremists may have an effective role in assisting these processes. It is important to have a communication plan to inform the public that it is not a question of 'helping terrorists'. In addition, some formers might need security arrangement because of threats.

Broadly, defectors can be divided into two categories: those who leave a violent environment or group and those who leave a violent ideology.[171] The primary purpose of an exit program is that people should not use violence or threats of violence. In the long run, to leave an environment or group may eventually mean that the distance to the violent ideology also becomes larger.

Without motivation it is difficult to get a person to abandon a criminal lifestyle and Swedish research show that "the majority of young people who are sentenced to social sanctions, closed juvenile or correctional penalties relapse into new crimes." As mentioned before, research also shows that there are different methods and approaches for exit programs. Some programs use amnesty or early release. Several programs have activities designed to change a person's values through psychological counseling and religious discussions. Such advice and conversations can serve as support in an individual's rehabilitation process and get the person to reflect on their actions and ideas.[172]

In efforts to help people who want to leave the criminal groups, both government and civil society organizations can play important roles. There are both advantages and

---

[170] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, 'Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36:99-115, 2013

[171] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015) *Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism i tredjeland.* Försvarshögskolan.

[172] Ibid.

disadvantages in locating exit programs among government agencies and NGOs. The state is in many cases extremists' or gang members' foremost enemy and there might be a lack of trust in authorities. In such situations, if the organization that reaches out is a public authority it may be ineffective and a very difficult task. At the same time, the state has possibly more resources and also the ability to take actions, such as protective measures, a civil society organization is not able to. However, an NGO lacks the brand as an authority and therefore may have greater credibility in this work. Nevertheless, it appears often to be that associations and NGOs have greater limitations concerning resources in terms of personnel and financial assets.[173]

A Swedish exit program, called Exit, has since its launch in 1998 helped some 700 former neo-Nazis and others, more or less organized extreme right, back into society. Government grants awarded Exit from 2002 to 2010 amounted to SEK 17,4 million (about CAD $2,8 million). Exit's activities consist of three functions:

- Client Support and counselling - different forms of therapy sessions for shorter or longer periods, and if necessary transfer to other forms of care. Clients are also offered emergency housing to escape threats and harassment.
- Social support - initiatives that provide support for the individual's integration into society, such as assistance in contacts with the authorities and everyday social functions.
- Consultative support - counselling and guidance to a range of stakeholders, mainly to school staff and personnel in the social services, but also to health professionals and staff in prisons, police, defense and so on.

Some of the staff at Exit have previously been active in the white power movement. Bjørgo and Horgan highlight several examples regarding the important role defectors play thanks to their personal experience of being involved in a violent extremist group, and also to have credibility in their conversations with people at risk or who are in the environment.[174] There are, however, both in Sweden and internationally, a lack of defectors from violent extremist Islamist groups who are willing to work with prevention in comparison with defectors from violent right-wing extremist groups or criminal gangs.

In her study of EXIT in Sweden, Christensen argues that "[t]he main reason for personal change […] is that an individual's engagement in a social practice alters his/her bases for reflection, allowing an alternative sense of identity to emerge"[175], and that "[t]he reformulation of the individual's past involved in this process […] is a requirement for their extremist experiences to become useable knowledge in an organization like EXIT aimed at

---

[173] Ibid.

[174] Bjørgo & Horgan (2009) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*

[175] Christensen, Tina Wilchen, 'How extremist experiences become valuable knowledge in EXIT programmes', *Journal for Deradicalisation*, Summer/15, Nr. 3, p. 92

helping other leave what they have come to view as a destructive and anti-democratic lifestyle."[176]

Another Swedish exit program, located at the National Criminal Investigation Department, has developed a guide for success with defectors from criminal gangs with different factors to be taken into account. The Police authority sets out a number of support measures that may be relevant in exit programs:[177]

- Sheltered housing
- Time to recover and regular coaching
- Financial assistance
- Diagnosis
- Substance abuse support
- Psychological help
- Accommodation support
- Activities during the period of protected residence
- Family perspective
- Protected identity
- Support during ongoing police investigation
- Removal of gang tattoos
- Employment
- Relocation of household
- Housing in the long term
- Social establishment at the new resort.

Another de-radicalization project is an EU-funded three-year pilot project in Denmark in the Integration Ministry's cohesion and prevention of radicalization. The project is in close collaboration with the PET, Copenhagen and Aarhus municipality and the East Jutland Police District. The total budget for the implementation of this project is just over one million euros, which the EU supports with an approximately €750 000 and the Integration Ministry and PET €100 000. The main project expenditures are method development in terms of exit programs and also mentoring, and staff resources.[178]

As mentioned before, in Aarhus there already is a framework for preventing and countering violent extremism. The section chief in SSP in Aarhus, Toke Agerschou, describes the work as two types of services. The first is advice and individual counseling to potential foreign fighters and returning foreign fighters. The other is service through guidance and counseling to families.

---

[176] Ibid, p. 92
[177] Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren (2015)
[178] Brief paper on 'Denmark's deradicalisation efforts':
https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8A7278CB-EFAD-43CC-B6E4-EE81B8E13C6D/0/factsheetderadicalisation.pdf

The entrance to the exit program is the Info House which conducts an initial risk assessment and referral of an individual. Respectively authoritative bodies must approve the intervention, and the client has to make a written consent. The Info House presents the relevant cases to a task force which consists of representatives from the police, the Department of Children and Young People, and the Department of Social Affairs and Employment. The relevant initiatives for interventions are later tailor-made and the individual gets a contact person from the Info House.

The components of the exit process consist of counseling of the individual, and family members if necessary and a psychologist might be part of the process. As mentioned before, a mentor is included in the process whose task is to assist the individual back in to society. Other components include assisting with employment or education, housing, "life psychology" sessions with a psychologist, support from the individual's network (relatives, friends etc.), collaboration with the security service, prison and probation and medical care.[179] According to Agerschou, "[t]he exit candidate's need for the anchoring of faith or political conviction may be part of the considerations when assigning a mentor."[180]

In October 2015, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism published a three-nation study based on 60 in-depth interviews with former radicals and their families as it examined the role of family and upbringing in radicalization and de-radicalization.[181] This study made five major recommendations: 1) make parents and school partners in authoritative coalitions to provide peer support and moral guidance; 2) engage with identity quest; 3) start education on radicalism at school to raise awareness among students; 4) offer radical youth and their families professional support to cope and exist; and 5) support alternative agency.

[179] Agerschou, Toke, 'Preventing Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus', *Journal for Deradicalization*, Winter 2014/15, Nr. 1
[180] Ibid, p 16
[181] NCTV (2015), *Formers & Families – Transitional journeys in and out of extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands*

11. Prison and Probation

Prison and probation services should be involved in the overall CVE architecture and be connected to various exit programs. Some questions and issues to consider:

- How to arrange dialogue between victims and offenders?
- How are extremist inmates (leaders and foot soldiers) housed? Together with general population of inmates or separately? It is important to make sure staff is aware of the inmates' violent extremist activities so that they will not be able to radicalize or recruit individuals inside of prison.
- What training program is available for Prison and Probation staff?
- Is there a mentorship program available and are the same mentors used during prison and in rehabilitation?
- What are the components of rehabilitation programs?

Prison and Probation Services can play an important role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of convicted violent extremists. Research on de-radicalization and disengagement in correctional facilities also shows that it is crucial that there are designed intervention strategies in the programs.[182] However, some of the programs are run by NGOs and not by the prison and probation services.

In Sweden, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service have recently highlighted concerns with radicalization in prisons. Currently, it is described as a minor problem[183], but it is expected to grow and an issue its staff will need knowledge and training to address. Although the current situation is not perceived as a problem it is important to consider what kind of preventive measures that are being used in prisons and juvenile detention centers where extremism can occur.

It is also important to focus on the coordination of efforts during a prison term, afterwards and rehabilitation. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service have also been commissioned by the government to identify methods and approaches to strengthen the fight against violent extremism within the authority. The recommendations and conclusion of the

---

[182] Jones, Clarke R. & Morales, Resurrecion S., 'Integration versus Segregation: A Prelminiary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:211-228, 2012

[183] Pirttisalo, Jani (2015. *Kriminalvården: Inga radikala religiösa grupperingar i fängelser. Svenska Dagbladet.* http://www.svd.se/kriminalvarden-inga-radikala-religiosa-grupperingar-i-fangelser

assignment are that the issues should be coordinated and prioritized within the authority, training of staff, and inter-religious cooperation i.e.[184]

An important factor that has been highlighted recently concerns binding collaboration between authorities when individuals on suspicion of radicalization transfer from one system to another, e.g. from prison and probation to social services. Among the Copenhagen City's Expert Group's recommendations were that the municipality should strengthen its efforts about radicalized prisoners through:[185]

- Better co-ordination with the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the police about radicalized citizens after their release from custody.
- Anticipatory efforts in collaboration with the Danish Prison and Probation Service with screening of risk factors and preparation of action plans for joint initiatives towards citizens at risk of radicalization. Increased focus on supporting radicalized citizens in the period after their release.
- Contact to the state about possible changes in legal policy to make early release of a prisoner conditional on his or her collaboration with the public authorities, e.g. by taking part in exit or mentor programs and/or that there is a mental assessment.

The Danish Violence Prevention Network (VPN) has conducted an education manual on de-radicalization and CVE in prisons. The Network is developed out of a treatment program in Danish prisons which in 2013 involved criminal gang members. At present, the VPN is working with people that are radical or at risk of radicalization.[186] VPN in Germany have a long record of countering neo-Nazism but in respect to the foreign fighter situation now also focuses on violent Islamist extremism. Combining pedagogical training modules and civic education with anti-violence training, VPN aims to counsel individuals during and after imprisonment – with families also included.[187]

The Aggredi program is financed by RAY (Finland's Slot Machine Association). Aggredi focuses on the offenders of street violence. The aim of the program is to create a system based on partnership and collaboration that enables a fast and efficient intervention in the lives of young adults that have drifted to problems due to violence. The aim is to break away destructive patterns and to make way for new opportunities and behavioral patterns within the target group.[188]

---

[184] 'Våldsbejakande extremism i Kriminalvården' (Ju2015/05232/KRIM), https://www.kriminalvarden.se/globalassets/publikationer/kartlaggningar-och-utvarderingar/valdsbejakande-extremism-i-kriminalvarden.pdf
[185] Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort (2015).
[186] *Violence Prevention Network* http://www.violence-prevention-network.dk/#!om-os/citr
[187] Gielen, Amy-Jane (2015)*,'Supporting families of foreign fighters. A realistic approach for measuring the effectiveness'*, Journal for Deradicalization, , Nr. 2
[188] Helsingfors mission. *Aggredi* http://www.helsinkimissio.fi/aggredi/

The programs target group consists of 18 to 39 year-old offenders that have committed serious violent crimes and already have a strong experience or fear of getting into vicious circles of violence. The crimes that define the clientele are: assaults, homicides, robberies and attempts of the above. Aggredi also works with clients planning to commit school or mass killings. One aim of the program is to create a system that can find these socially isolated persons who are planning school or mass killings in time. The program does not deal with sex crimes and domestic violence.

The divisions of the client work in Aggredi are 1) impulsive violence, 2) instrumental violence and/or financial gain-seeking violence, 3) violence linked to organized crime, 4) violence planned or carried out by socially isolated persons and 5) fantasy-based violence (threaten to commit school or mass killings).

Aggredi has created and developed a system for bringing hard-to-reach and poorly motivated clients to the realm of the interactive support services and the therapeutic working methods. The activities in the Aggredi are based on a strong partnership with the authorities. The partners function as "filters", and their purpose is to direct clients who fit the target group to the program. Clients to the Aggredi are mainly directed by police, probation services and prisons in Helsinki and Southern Finland. Aggredi also co-operates with the government authorities such as Ministry of the Interior/Department of internal affairs, Ministry of Justice, and the Criminal Sanctions Agency.[189]

In Germany, the Violence Prevention Network (VPN) is an NGO that delivers de-radicalization program in German prisons focusing on education of responsibility in which it seeks to give inmates stable and respectful relationships (instead of short-term pedagogic measures), personal independence, gaining insights, learning how to translate emotional impulses into language, sense of personal responsibility and civic education.

Working through a group setting of eight participants (reinforcement through peers), trainers use Verantwortungspädagogik and anti-violence and competency training AKT which facilitates inmates learning of specific competencies using biography work, political education and anti –violence methods.[190] This program is built on 4 months of individual training; 4-6 months of group training together with 6-12 months of coaching after release. Between the period 2001-2015, VPN have had over a 1,000 participants in the prison program.[191]

The key success criteria as defined by VPN is: willingness to change; stamina; communication design; recognition of contradictions/inconsistencies; self-revelation;

---

[189] Ibid.
[190] Violence prevention network. http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/
[191] Information provided by Violence Prevention network, June 2016.

development of tolerance of ambiguity; creation of substitute social interaction; disengagement from extremist scene; self-responsibility and reliability.

The Dutch experience with terrorist offenders emphasizes the distinction of different categories of prisoners: leaders which are highly ideological and have considerable influence over others and are hard to disengage; followers and criminal opportunists. As such it is crucial to have tailor-made responses and in risk assessments.

The EU RAN CoE Working Group on Prison & Probation has developed general and specific guidelines for prison and probation practitioners.[192] These guidelines provide useful overview of risk assessment and management strategies in dealing with terrorist offenders and violent extremists. Two drivers are identified as key for why inmates become violent extremists: overcrowding and charismatic leadership.[193]

Based on a survey of prison policies in 15 countries, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), have studied the role prisons can play in radicalizing people – and in reforming them. The report shows that prisons provide an environment where radical and religiously framed ideologies can flourish, especially in overcrowded and under-staffed institutions which create conditions that makes detection hard and allows extremism recruiters to operate freely. Further, the study emphasizes that religious conversation is not the same as radicalization. It is therefore important that the personnel are well educated and that the prison invests in specialized resources, such as translators and prison imams.

However, an imam should not be seen as a cure for radicalized individuals and it is important that their independence and credibility is protected.[194] Some of the studied countries have developed successful de-radicalization and disengagements programs, and these programs share some features. They combine ideological and/or religious re-education with vocational training. They involve credible interlocutors who can relate to the prisoners needs. They also focus on the prisoner's life outside the gates, providing them with means for a new beginning and establishing new social networks away from their old, extremism ones. However, as with much of the CVE-programs, it is hard to measure the success of these programs and they are most likely to succeed when the political momentum is not with the insurgents and other conditions are conducive.[195]

What is important lesson is to provide continuity of mentorship when an inmate passes through the system from when he enters into delinquency, criminality and then through the prison and probation system. Having the same mentor is key to success, establishing trust and in making sure no one slips through the system.

---

[192] Safire. *Focus Documents* http://www.safire-project-results.eu/focus.html
[193] Andrew Silke and Tinka M. Veldhuis, "Prison and Probation", RAN CoE unpublished paper (April 2016).
[194] Neumann et al (2010). *Prison and terrorism,* page 1-2
[195] Ibid, p 3-4

12. Counter Messaging & Counter Narratives

Violent extremist ideologies are attractive to some individuals and together with other factors, such as adventure and thrill-seeking. This can be countered by providing alternative, or 'true', narratives of ideologies, organizations or events.

- Is it useful to explore and use prevention through presence and measures on the internet and social media?
- What is the goal and who is the target group for alternative narratives or counter-narrative initiatives?
- Different actors can contribute to facts and narratives (former extremists, theologians, religious scholars and spiritual leaders, victims of extremist violence, entire communities). How could this be integrated locally?
- Is it possible to use social media footprints in other ways (as a discussion point for families and social workers)?

The role of propaganda for takfiri-jihadists[196] is an important auxiliary tool which greatly amplify the violence and fear factor, spread their ideological vision globally, provide a virtual meeting point between leaders, members, supporters and potential recruits.[197]

Understanding the master narrative from ideological perspective is complex. Research have identified thirteen key master narrative elements that integrates multiple story forms and archetypes.[198] A central theme in takfiri-jihadi messaging is that real or imaginary injustices committed against Muslims, are continually taken advantage of by extremists to strengthen their core narrative that "the West is directly at war with Islam". They deliberately frame subjects such as Jyllandsposten's controversies about the cartoon affair about Islam's prophet Muhammed as a Western attack on their religion and use them in turn as justification for using violence. EU RAN CoE Working Group on Communication & Narratives have divided different elements of narratives into five categories:

- Feeding grievances-exclusion; strong sense of injustice; feeling of humiliation; rigid binary thinking; conspiracy theories; sense of victimhood
- Feeding marginalization-discrimination; limited social mobility; poor education; unemployment; criminality
- Political narratives –mainly 'West is at war with Islam'. Also ban on veil; Cartoon crises; Islamophobia
- Claiming ideological and religious legitimacy-apocalyptic prophesy; violent interpretation of Jihad; sense that Islam is under siege and desire to protect *ummah*; view that West is immoral secularism

---

[196] Shiraz Maher (2016), *Salafi-Jihadism – The History of an Idea*
[197] Rudiger Lohlker (2013), *Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations*
[198] Jeffrey R. Halverson et.al (2013). *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*

- Feeding culture and identity crises-cultural marginalization; lack of belonging to either home or parents' society; reinforces religious solidarity with Muslims around the world

Another study by Brookings suggests that there are several themes in ISIS messaging: urgency; agency; authenticity; and victory.[199] The Quilliam Foundation argues that it is necessary to effectively counter the different elements of salafi-jihadi ideology across eight different intertwined dimensions such as literalism; governance based on literalism; opposition to shirk (polytheism): al-wala' wa-l-bara' (loyalty and disavowal); takfir (excommunication); jihad; istishhad (martyrdom) and absolute moral certitude that actions are divinely mandated.[200]

Beyond the specific religious dimensions there are different types of narratives used by violent extremists: political narrative; social-heroic narrative and economic narrative.[201] These categories require different response options and messengers depending on the central core message. There are several forms of countering the narrative of violent extremists and they differ according to focus and orientation as well as who is most suitable to deliver them. This can be best illustrated through this EU RAN/Institute for Strategic Dialogue chart:

What	Why	How	Who
Alternative narratives	Undercut VE narratives	Positive story about freedom and democracy	Civil society Government
Counter narratives	Deconstruct, discredit and demystify VE	Challenge VE through theology, humour, expose hypocrisy & lies	Civil society
Gov't strategic comms	Explaining gov't policy	Refuting misinformation, post-attack messages	Government

It is important to differentiate between CVE-specific measures and CVE-relevant in devising counter-messaging initiatives. CVE-specific initiatives tackle explicitly violent extremism whereas CVE-relevant address violent extremism root causes such as alienation, discrimination and identity-related issues.

---

[199] Alberto M. Fernandez (2015), "Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propganda networks",
[200] Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq (2016), "Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing
[201] Sara Zeiger (2016), *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia*

In order to devise a counter-narrative it is necessary to conduct audience analysis to determine appropriate message(s) and the "most effective language, messenger, tone and format to achieve the behavioral change desired"[202] and dissemination strategy.[203]

There are a multitude of smaller projects that seek to provide relatively simple messages to dissuade youths from joining ISIL. For example, Waano (guidance in Somali), is a project run by an Islamic association in one of Stockholm's suburbs that aims to develop methods in order to raise awareness and educate about violent extremism by parental training and producing counter-narratives through films. It is funded by the Swedish Inheritance Fund, and so far, they have produced two films (about five minutes each) where young Swedish Muslims have spoken out against extremism and travelling to conflict zones. However, they found it very difficult to attract people locally willing to participate in the films so all but one individual appearing have been actors.

As pointed out by Demant and Graaf:

> The government should facilitate strategies, in close cooperation with organizations that represent the broader constituency that the radicals tap into, to confront those legends with "neutralizers" or "counternarratives" and to isolate the "entrepreneurs of violence."[204]

The C4C project, which is supported by the European Commission, aims to "spread the stories of the victims to the general public and to specific target groups, by collecting, categorizing and giving e-collaborative tools and additional resources for the practical use of these narratives".[205] In Italy, the Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo (AIVITER), uses stories from victims of terrorism, survivors, family members, in training modules in the educational system.[206] Within the EU RAN, there is also a 'working group voice of victims of terrorism'. As pointed out by Horgan:

> The objective should be to publicize the negative consequences of terrorism, challenge its legitimacy through the appropriate channels, and encourage a displacement of activity that would otherwise result in greater involvement in a terrorist movement. In addition, such a strategy could prove immensely

---

[202] Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq (2016), "Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing p.7.
[203] Tanya Silverman, Christopher J. Stewart, Zahed Amanullah and Jonathan Birdwell, (2016) "The Impact of Counter-Narratives
[204] Demant, Froukje & De Graaf, Beatrice (2010), 'How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:408-428,
[205] 'The Terrorism Survivors Storytelling', *C4C Project*, http://www.c4c-project.org/c4c/index.php/en/c4c-project/presentation
[206] *Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo*, http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it/

valuable in reducing the perceived sense of effectiveness of terrorism for already involved members.[207]

There are also a number of smaller projects within EU that provide inspirational case-studies and examples: #NotAnotherBrother; short counter-narrative film Negotiate; #NousSommesUnis (in response to Paris attacks in November)[208]; Radical Middle Way; Against Violent Extremism (AVE); EXIT Deutschland; Deconstruct Program (STREET); Bold Creative[209]; Abdallah-X, Extreme Dialogue, Counter Extremism Project, FAST among others. Few of these have been appropriately evaluated for effectiveness.

The Danish Security & Intelligence Service (PET) is spearheading a national alliance against online radicalization between 2016-2018 in which it is gathering major stakeholders from government, local authorities and civil society to develop concrete projects and messaging campaigns geared towards preventing and protecting youths from turning to violent extremism.[210] This project provides an important avenue for civil society and government collaboration in strengthening trust and working on concrete projects together.

France began an online public information campaign called "Stop Djihadism" after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015. This website contained videos showing the brutality of ISIL and contain "sections about understanding the terrorist threat, learning about the state's actions against it, decoding jihadist propaganda and mobilizing together."[211] There is considerable debate whether this online campaign is effective or desirable.

The issue of social media and how it is utilized in efforts to prevent violent extremism is important. Social workers often use social media profiles as a tool for engagement with specific cases where they use these profiles as a 'conversation starter' with extremists and their families. This requires further training material for social workers working in this domain. This issue was raised during the Nordic Safe Cities conference on social media held in Stockholm in September 2016.

---

[207] Horgan, John (2008), 'From Profiles to *Pathways* and Roots to *Routes*: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 618, no.

[208] Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq (2016), "Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing

[209] Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, (2013) "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism", Institute for Strategic Dialogue

[210] Udlaendinge-Integrations og Boligministeriet (2016). *Mentorindsats, foraeldrecoaching og pårorendenetvaerk.* Styrelsen for Intermational Rekruttering og Integration, http://uibm.dk/arbejdsomrader/demokrati/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme-og-radikalisering/den-tidlige-forebyggelsesindsats

[211] Stav Ziv, "France launches online offensive to prevent jihadist recruitment", *Newsweek,* January 29, 2015. The site can be found here: http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/

13. Evaluation

For several reasons there is a need to evaluate PVE/CVE programs, including disengagement programs.[212] However, it is very difficult to evaluate such programs since there are many different parameters affecting the 'objects' in different levels and that measures are often long-term. To be able to create evidence-based interventions you still need to evaluate all measures and later calibrate the interventions. Researchers might assist in adjusting and fine-tuning methodologies and practices but also in accumulating more knowledge on the causes and risk factors. This has to be conducted by professionals with knowledge in evaluation techniques, methods and theories. After evaluation, the strategy and action plan can be reassessed and updated to further calibrate the effectiveness of preventing and countering violent extremism. To be able to evaluate and calibrate new measures, the work has to be documented and registered.

- If measures are put in place, is there scope for evaluation? What appropriate bodies could be involved (academic institutions, professional evaluators)?
- How often should measures be evaluated?
- What is a successful intervention?

An evaluation of the effects of the existing initiatives can throw light on which efforts should continue and possibly be used more widely, and which efforts should be wound down or which cannot be transferred to other contexts. It was recommended by the expert group that the Danish government should evaluate the effects of existing prevention initiatives, including:

- Developing methods for measuring the effects;
- Analyzing challenges in various parts of the country and determining whether experiences can be used elsewhere, e.g. analysis of citizens who have travelled to conflict zones;
- Integrating the evaluation results in new initiatives; and
- Informing about and using existing research.[213]

In the municipality of Aarhus, preventive work has taken place on many fronts since 2010. Approximately 375 referrals to the local info house have taken place.[214] Recent developments regarding radicalization have made the city adapt and to a degree refocus from early prevention; however, they continue to handle the foreign fighters' issue. Also, following the attacks on the Swedish artist Lars Vilks and a synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015 by Omar Hussein, an in individual who was just released from prison, increased attention has instead been paid towards so-called 'gang' crossovers. That is

---

[212] Horgan, John (2009), 'Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement', Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New York,
[213] Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort (2015)
[214] Personal communication with Aarhus police 2016-04-01

individuals who alternate between extremist groups and criminal gangs, or sometimes groups involved in both forms of activity. Also, the increase of refugees has also contributed to increased challenges. So far and like many other CVE initiatives, no thorough evaluation has been made of the city's efforts. However, later this year Aarhus in cooperation with researchers from the University of Leeds in the UK are set to evaluate their work so far.[215]

Evaluations of VINK show that end users are positive about the activities and appreciate the special skills that contributed to field workers' activities. In 2010, its knowledge activities included 1100 participants. VINK has also set up special courses through the Metropolitan University College in Denmark to create knowledge and understanding regarding how to reach out to young people who have developed an identity of resistance, cultural resistance, and subversive ideological attitudes. The individuals who fall within these categories are very difficult to reach and therefore require innovative approaches and measures.[216] The Copenhagen Anti-Radicalization Action Plan has built-in recommendations for evaluation of individual measures.

The German family-counselling project Hayat started in 2012, and has as of September 1, 2016, been counselling 290 cases[217]. Of these cases, 190 contacted Hayat directly, and 100 were directed to Hayat via the national radicalization hotline at the BAMF (Ministry for Migration and Refugee Affairs). In 69 of the 290 cases, there has been security related aspects involved, and 20 cases are no longer security relevant due to counselling.[218] In total, they consider 137 cases closed, 96 cases still active and 57 inactive (but not yet closed).

A study of national CVE programs in Germany also found that "only four percent of the funds deployed went to immediate pedagogical work aiming to de-radicalize vulnerable or dangerous youths."[219]

A Bartlett and Miller study also points out the "measurement paradox" that "evaluating of prevention work is essential, extremely difficult, and cannot always be widely published. Because evaluating prevention work requires measuring a non-event, there is a risk of declining public support for successful prevention efforts."[220] However, after evaluation, adjustments of the measures can be made in a more efficient way to affect some of the identified risk factors leading to violence. Getting more knowledge on the risk factors may

---

[215] Ibid.
[216] *Målrettet inklusion skaber aktivt medborgerskab Evaluering af Københavns Kommunes VINK program* (MHT Consult, april 2011).
[217] Personal communication with Hayat counselling staff 2016-09-13
[218] Ibid.
[219] Weilnböck, Harald & Baer, Silke (2012), *Hate Crime Prevention and Deradicalisation in Environments Vulnerable to Extremism: Community Work with a Fairs Skills Approach and We-Amongst-Ourselves Group*,
[220] Bartlett, Jamie & Miller, Carl, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Measurement Paradoxes and Pitfalls', *Canadian Diversity*, October 1, 2012

also decrease the risk of being counter-productive and fueling extremism.[221] It is important to state that empirical research on risk and resilience regarding violent extremism is limited.[222]

Further research is also needed to better understand non-radicalisation.[223] As Dalgaard-Nielsen points out: "Although a number of countries have been running exit programs for several years, independent documentation of whether and how they work is scarce. There is no proven template for success that Western governments could seek to emulate."[224] Besides evidence-based theory-building, there is a need to collect experiences, lessons learnt and thoughts from people working with PVE and CVE – are there hints of 'what works?'

There are several evaluation mechanisms, such as outcome evaluation, pragmatic evaluation, theory-driven evaluation, realistic evaluation that take into account different mechanisms or outcomes of the measures. The issue of evaluation is still embryonic as many of the CVE programs are beginning to take seriously evaluation tools and build them into local programs. Here there can be a fruitful exchange between practitioners and academics as it allows scholars to conduct fieldwork safely.

In their literature review on methodology used in evaluation effects of preventive and de-radicalisation interventions between 1990 until 2014, Feddes and Gallucci find that "[…] hardly any [16 out of 135 samples, authors' note] empirically based evidence of preventive or de-radicalisation interventions exist."[225] They recommend using empirically-based evaluation research from the field of criminology with multi-method and theory-based approaches in future evaluations of interventions.[226] A way of evaluating the potential effects of specific measures is to conduct surveys and polls, and have focus groups before, during, and after the implementation of initiatives.[227]

IMPACT Europe is an EU-funded project consisting of 14 European partners between 2014-2018 focusing on evaluation methods and an online knowledge base on radicalization.

---

[221] See for example Stevens, David, 'Reasons to be Fearful, One, Two, Three: The 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Agenda, *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Vol 13: 165-188, 2011
[222] Aly, Anne & Saul Karnovsky, Elisabeth Taylor, 'Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention', *Studies in Conflict and Terorism*, 37: 369-385, 2014
[223] Cragin, Kim R., 'Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:2, 337-353
[224] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, 'Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36:99-115, 2013
[225] 'A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions', Feddes, Allard & Gallucci, Marcello, *Journal for De-radicalisation*, Winter 15/16, Nr. 5, p. 17
[226] 'A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions', Feddes, Allard & Gallucci, Marcello, *Journal for De-radicalisation*, Winter 15/16, Nr. 5
[227] 'Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism', *Global Counterterrorism Forum*,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/GCTF%20CVE%20Good%20Practices_1.pdf

Specifically IMPACT EUROPE is developing a toolkit of evaluation methodology for practitioners to conduct robust evaluations; a database of evaluation results to allow practitioners tools to analyze results over time, best practice. In addition, it allows practitioners training for users of the evaluation toolkit. Most importantly, IMPACT provides practitioners for methods for designing, planning, implementing and evaluating interventions.[228]

IMPACT identified a number of lessons in evaluation. Firstly, the necessity to differentiate between prevention and de-radicalization goals. Secondly, the discrepancy between behavioral and attitudinal objectives. Thirdly, short-term intervention goals sometimes hinder long-term effectiveness. Fourthly, intervention may yield unintended outcomes that may be counterproductive. IMPACT emphasize that these lessons learned are present across different phases of the CVE project life cycle and their evaluation design and mechanisms take into account these lessons.[229]

---

[228] Discussions with IMPACT partners and access to IMPACT database.
[229] Ibid.

14. Concluding remarks

This study has provided an overview of different CVE programming elements locally within select cities and projects within Europe. They are designed to serve as inspiration in the development of local projects within a Canadian context. Elements may be emulated according to local context and resources. Accordingly, key questions have been provided as a useful guide for local authorities and key stakeholders. These questions are not exhaustive but designed to provide guidance to practitioners and planners of prevention programs and initiatives.

It is important to emphasize that gathering key stakeholders into a formal process is key to discuss resources and needs and that it is this *process* of consultation that is invaluable to arrive at the exact formal structure needed to handle multiagency cases involving an individual's radicalization and involvement in violent extremism. It will determine who to involve and resolve the boundaries of information-sharing between different agencies. It is important to use existing structures and resources. The process itself is valuable to give guidance and direction as well as leadership and clear delineation of responsibility and cooperation.

A second issue is to find mechanisms for consultation with stakeholders outside local government or agencies such as civil society representatives and faith communities. This issue is important but sensitive. It requires that the issue of radicalization and violent extremism is embedded alongside other non-security related concerns. Building long-term trust with communities is an essential ingredient for building partnerships on the issue of violent extremism as well as management of polarization between communities. How this is accomplished requires sensitivity and creativity. The EU RAN CoE Collection of Practices provides almost 100 projects that are mainly led by civil society actors that can serve as inspiration across different sectors. European Forum for Urban Security is another network that may provide important new initiatives. The Nordic Council of Ministers have also articulated a broader vision around Nordic Safe Cities that provide a more holistic strategy where tackling and preventing extremism is one part of the solution.

Lastly the issue of effective measures of prevention of violent extremism is a high priority for many local authorities. Unfortunately, this is still difficult terrain as many of the prevention projects have not been properly evaluated by external evaluators. Many projects have now begun to integrate evaluation but it is too early to say how effective some of the projects have been to date. This absence of evaluation does not mean that local authorities do not invest in local prevention approaches but there is recognition that it is important to conduct proper, external evaluations for the future. The progress made by IMPACT Europe is one important step towards integrating evaluation designs from the start of the projects.

References

Aaltonen, Mikko (2014) The Effectiveness of an intervention aiming to reduce street violence: Evaluation of HelsinkiMissio's Aggredi-program (Executive summary, draft version, 12.6.2014), National Research Institute of Legal Policy, http://www.helsinkimissio.fi/sites/default/files/custom/Aggredi_executive_summary.pdf?_ga=1.85901145.1714523290.1457015097

Agerschou, Toke, 'Preventing Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus', Journal for Deradicalization, Winter 2014/15, Nr. 1

Aly, Anne & Saul Karnovsky, Elisabeth Taylor, 'Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention', Studies in Conflict and Terorism, 37: 369-385, 2014

Alonso, Rogelio, 'Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:9, 696-716, 2011

Altier, Mary Beth, Thoroughgood, Christan N., & Horgan, John G., 'Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 51, no. 5, 647-661, 2014

Bakker, Edwin, 'The OSCE's efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: A comprehensive approach addressing root causes?', Security and Human Rights, No. 2, 2012

Barclay, Jack. "STREET: A Case Study in Government-Community Partership and Direct Intervention to Counter Violent Extremism". Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

Bart Bransma "Police and Polarisation: An Initial Guide". Pharresia, 2016

Bartlett, Jamie & Miller, Carl, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Measurement Paradoxes and Pitfalls', Canadian Diversity, October 1, 2012

Bjørgo, Tore, 'Dreams and disillusionment: engagement in and disengagement from militant extremist groups', Crime, Law & Social Change, 55:277-285, 2011

Bogestam, Nadja & Patel, Emma. "Stöd till avhoppare från kriminella gruppering – en nationell kartläggning. Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 2016

Borum, Randy, 'Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories', Journal of Strategic Security, No. 4, 7-36, 2011

Bouhana, Noémie & Wikstrom, Per-Olof H. (2011) Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A rapid evidence assessment guided by Situational Action Theory, UK Home Office

Briggs Obe, Rachel & Silverman, Tanya, 'Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Responding to the Threat', Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014

Briggs, Rachel & Sebastian Feve. "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism". Institute for Strategic Dialogue , 2013

Brottsförebyggande rådet (2008) Mentorskaps inverkan på återfall i brott: En systematisk forskningsgenomgång. Rapport 2008

Carlsson, Christoffer. "Att lämna våldsbejakande extremism – en kunskapsöversikt". Institutet för framtidsstudier, 2016

Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels', HM Government, 2015

Christmann, Kris (2012) Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence, Youth Justice Board for England and Wales

City of Copenhagen (2015), "Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort" https://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-

files/Recommendations%20of%20the%20Expert%20Group%20-%20Municipality%20of%20Copenh...pdf

Christensen, Tina Wilchen, 'How extremist experiences become valuable knowledge in EXIT programmes', Journal for Deradicalisation, Summer/15, Nr. 3, p. 92

Counselling on radicalization: http://www.kk.dk/vink

Cragin, Kim R., 'Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization', Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:2, 337-353

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, 'Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:99-115, 2013

De Graaf, Beatrice & Malkki, Leena, 'Killing it Softly? Explaining the Early Demise of Left-Wing Terrorism in the Netherlands', Terrorism and Political Violence, 22:4, 623-640, 2010

Dechesne, Mark, 'Deradicalization: 'Not soft, but strategic'', Crime, Law & Social Change, 55:287-292, 2011

Demant, Froukje & De Graaf, Beatrice, 'How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:408-428, 2010

Ferguson, Neil, Burgess, Mark & Hollywood, Ian, 'Leaving Violence Behind: Disengaging from Politically Motivated Violence in Northern Ireland', Political Psychology, Vol. 36, Issue 2, 199-214, April 2015

Fernandez, Alberto M. "Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propganda networks". Brooking Instiute, 2015

Feddes, Allard & Gallucci, Marcello. "A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions", Journal for De-radicalisation, Winter 15/16, Nr. 5

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, "Rethinking the Causual Concept of Radicalisation", Committee of Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series (January 2010).

Gielen, Amy-Jane. "Supporting families of foreign fighters. A realistic approach for measuring the effectiveness." Journal for Deradicalization, Nr. 2, p. 41. (2015),

Gielen, Amy-Jane. Syrië-strijders: liever families ondersteunen dan paspoort afnemen. Antiradicalisering in België, Denemarken en Duitsland" Tijdschrift voor Sociale Vraagstukken, nr. 1, pp. 20-23, 2014

GCTF & Hedayah, "The Role of Families in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Findings, Recommendations and Programming Options"

Gunaratna, Rohan, 'Communities Deafeat Terrorism: Post-9/11 Community Engagement Strategies', UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 27, October 2011

Halversson, Jeffery R et.al. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. Palgrave, 2013

Hobfoll, Stevan E., Hall, Brian J., Canetti-Nisim, Daphna, Galea, Sandro, Johnson, Robert J., & Palmieri, Patrick A. 'Refining our Understanding of Traumatic Growth in the Face of Terrorism: Moving from Meaning Cognitions to Doing what is Meaningful', Applied Psychology, Vol. 56, Issue 3, 345-366, July 2007

Horgan, John (2005) The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge

Horgan, John & Braddock, Kurt, 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs', Terrorism and Political Violence, 22:267-291, 2010

Horgan, John, 'From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 618, no. 1, July 2008

Horgan, John, 'Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement', Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New York, February 2009

Hoyle, Carolyn, Bradford, Alexandra & Frenett, Ross, 'Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS', Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015

Jones, Clarke R. & Morales, Resurrecion S., 'Integration versus Segregation: A Prelminiary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:211-228, 2012

Justitiedepartementet. "Våldsbejakande extremism i Kriminalvården". 2015 https://www.kriminalvarden.se/globalassets/publikationer/kartlaggningar-och-utvarderingar/valdsbejakande-extremism-i-kriminalvarden.pdf

Jönsson, Ann ."Våldsbejakande extremism – Stöd för socialtjänstens arbete med barn och unga vuxna". 2016

Kana, Rozila & Dore, Rupert, "Countering Radicalisation Across Europé – The Pioneering ISDEP Project, Journal for Deradicalization." Winter 2014/15

Kassimeris, George, 'Why Greek Terrorists Give Up: Analyzing Individual Exit from the Revolutionary Organization 17 November', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:556-571, 2011

King Baudouin Foundation "Supporting families confronted with violent radicalization", Record of the three seminar meetings September 2015-January 2016.

Kruglanski, Arie W., Gelfland, Michele J., Bélanger, Jocelyn J., Sheveland, Anna, Hetiarachchi, Malkanthi & Gunaratna, Rohan, ' The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism', Advances in Political Psychology, vol. 35, suppl. 1, 2014

Köbenhavsn Kommune,"Færre radikaliserede gennem en effektiv og sammenhængende indsats" http://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/F%C3%A6rre%20radikaliserede%20gennem%20en%20effektiv%20og%20sammenh%C3%A6ngende%20indsats_0.pdf 2015

Leary, Kimberlyn, 'Engaging Extremists: Diplomacy Through Deradicalization', Harvard Kennedy School Review, Vol. 9:113-117, 2009

Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort (2015).
https://www.kk.dk/sites/default/files/uploaded-
files/Recommendations%20of%20the%20Expert%20Group%20-
%20Municipality%20of%20Copenh...pdf

Lohlker, Rudiger. Online Discourses and Representations. Vienna University Press, 2013

Lynch, Orla, "Victims", unpublished paper by EU RAN CoE (April 2016).

Maher, Shiraz. "Salafi-Jihadism – The History of an Idea". Hurst, 2016

Moghadam, Assaf, 'Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction', Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 35:156-181, 2012

Målrettet inklusion skaber aktivt medborgerskab Evaluering af Københavns Kommunes
VINK program (MHT Consult, april 2011).

Nikita Malik and Jonathan Russell, "Families in Violent Extremism: Challenges and
Opprotunities" Quilliam Foundation, 2016

Neumann, Peter R., 'The trouble with radicalization', International Affairs, 89:4, 873-893,
2013

Neumann, Peter R et al. "Prisons and terrorism – radicalisation and de-radicalisation in 15
countries. ICSR, 2010

Omand, David," Securing the state". Hurst, London, 2010

OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that
Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach (February 2014).

Pemberton, A. & Eck-Aarten, P.V. "De-radicalisation and victimization: An introduction"
in Lynch O. & Argomaniz, The Victimisation Experience and the Radicalisation Process –
Understanding of the Perpetrator Victim Complex in the Case of Terrorism and Political
Violence (2016).

Politiet & Oslo kommune. *"Handlingsprogram 2016-2019"*.

https://www.oslo.kommune.no/getfile.php/Innhold/Politikk%20og%20administrasjon/Prosj
ekter/SaLTo%20handlingsprogram%202016-2019.pdf

'Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review
of the Evidence', Department for Communities and Local Government, March 2010

'RAN Collection – Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism',
European Union Radicalisation Awareness Network. 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-
practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

Ranstorp & Hyllengren, Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism i tredje land (May
2013)
https://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/2013/F
%C3%B6rebyggande%20av%20v%C3%A5ldsbejakande%20extremism%20i%20tredje%2
0land.pdf

Ranstorp, Gustafsson, & Hyllengren, Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism på lokal
nivå (2015)

Reinares, Fernando, 'Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on
Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA', Terrorism and Political
Violence, 23:5, 780-803, 2011

Saltman, Erin Marie & Smith, Melanie, ''Till Martydrom Do Us Part' – Gender and the
ISIS Phenomenon, Institute for Strategic Dialogue and ICSR, 2015

Sarma, Kiran M. "Understanding Terrorism: Research of relevance to Health and Social
Care Professionals", unpublished EU RAN CoE paper (April 2016).

Sieckelinck, Stijn & Stephens, Liam, "Education", unpublished EU RAN CoE paper
(2016).

Sieckelinck, Stijn & Prof.dr. Micha de Winter (eds.), Formers & families: Transitional
journeys in and out of extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands
(NCTV, October 2015).

Silke, Andrew and Veldhuis, Tinka "Prison and Probation", RAN CoE unpublished paper (April 2016).

Sliwinski, Krzysztof Feliks, 'Counter-terrorism – a comprehensive approach. Social mobilization and 'civilianisation' of security: the case of the United Kingdom', European Security, 22:3, 288-306, 2012

Spalek, Basia & Davies, Lynn, 'Mentoring in relation to violent extremism: a study of role, purpose, and outcomes, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35:5, May 2012

Stern, Jessica, 'Mind Over Martyr', Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, issue 1, Jan/Feb 2010

Stevens, David, 'Reasons to be Fearful, One, Two, Three: The 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Agenda, British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol 13: 165-188, 2011

Stohl, Michael, 'Networks, terrorists and criminals: the implications for community policing', Crime, Law & Social Change, 50:59-72, 2008

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2009)

Thomas, Paul, 'Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme', The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Political Studies Association, vol. 12, 2010

UNESCO's Teachers' Guide for Countering Violent Extremism (2016). http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002446/244676e.pdf

Vermeulen, Floris, 'Suspect Communities – Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London', Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:286-306, 2014; see also Hoque, Ashraf, 'Muslim Men in Luton, UK: 'Eat First, Talk Later', South Asia Research, Vol 35(1): 81-102, 2015

Weilnböck, Harald & Baer, Silke, Hate Crime Prevention and Deradicalisation in Environments Vulnerable to Extremism: Community Work with a Fairs Skills Approach and We-Amongst-Ourselves Group, Berlin: 2012

Weine, Steven, 'Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism', Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 81-89, 2013

Weine, Steven, Henderson, Schuyler, Shanfield, Stephen, Legha, Rupinder & Post, Jerrold, 'Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism', Democracy and Security, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 2013

Wikström, Per-Olof H., 'Doing Without Knowing: Common Pitfalls in Crime Prevention', Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 21, 2007

Williams, Michael J., Horgan, John G., & Evans, William P (2016), " The critical role of friends in networks for countering violent extremism: toward a theory of vicarious help-seeking," Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism *and Political Aggression*, 2016, Vol. 8, No. 1, 45-65. See also Gielen (2015)

Young, Holly F., Rooze, Magda & Holsappel, Jorien, 'Translating Conceptualizations Into Practical Suggestions: What the Literature on Radicalization Can Offer to Practitioners', Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 21.2, 212-225, May 2012 (framework matrix based on Doosie and de Wolf, 2010)

Ziv, Stav"France launches online offensive to prevent jihadist recruitment", Newsweek, January 29, 2015. The site can be found here: http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/

Websites

Action Community Forum. "Muslimah Matters."
http://actonforum.org/projects/160-muslimah-matters

Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo,
http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it/

Bounce Resilience Tools. 'The Project BOUNCE enters a new phase!'
http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/en/project-bounce-enters-new-phase

Bengtsson, Ninna & Fahlander Marit "Svagt resultat för stödtelefon mot våldsbejakande extremism." Svenska Dagbladet. 2016-08-30
http://www.svd.se/tekniska-problem-hos-roda-korsets-stodtelefon

Bundesprogramm. "About "Live Democracy"!"
https://www.demokratie-leben.de/en/bundesprogramm/ueber-demokratie-leben.html

C4C Project. "The Terrorism Survivors Storytelling'

http://www.c4c-project.org/c4c/index.php/en/c4c-project/presentation

Communities that cares (CTC).
http://www.communitiesthatcare.net/

Conviction. 'Welcome".http://www.convictionfilm.co.uk/

Counternarration for Counterterrorism Project. 'The Terrorism Survivors Storytelling'
http://www.koinetwork.org/projects/c4c.htm

De Visser, Nadette. *"Who to Call When Your Kid Wages Jihad"*. The Daily Beast, 2015-01-13
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/13/who-to-call-when-your-kid-wages-jihad.html

Društivo Za Nenasilno Komunikaijcio – association for nonviolent communication. "About the association For Nonviolent Communication".
http://www.drustvo-dnk.si/predstavitev-eng.html

Familienberatung. "Beratungsstelle Extremismus - Beratung, Prävention, Intervention"
http://www.beratungsstelleextremismus.at

European commission. "A guide to police empowerment conversations." Radicalisation awareness network".

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-search/rc_0024_a_guide_to_police_empower_en.htm

European commission."Approaches and practises." Radicalisation awareness network",
2016 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-
approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

European commission." Creating Counter Violent Extremism infrastructure".
Radicalisation Awareness Networkhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-
practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures.pdf

European commission. "Disengagement and criteria." Radicalisation awareness network".
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-
search/rc_0019_disengagement_and_critica_en.htm

European commission."EU education ministers called upon to take action to support
teachers preventing radicalization". Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015-03-15
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/ran-press-release-manifesto-of-
educators-on-radicalisation_en.pdf

European commission. "Improving Security By Democratic Participation". ISDEP
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/projects/home_2011_isec_ag_rad_2147_en.htm

European commission. "Improving Security By Democratic Participation".
http://www.coppra.eu/about.php

European commission. "Issue Paper The Root Causes of Violent Extremism".
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-
causes_jan2016_en.pdf

European Commission. "The unity initiative." Radicalisation awareness network".
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/ran-
search/rc_0095_the_unity_initiative_en.htm

Exit Deutschland. "We Provide Ways Out of Extremism".
http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/

Exit Onlus. "Our mission".
http://www.exitonlus.it/?page_id=13&lang=en

Fachstelle Gender und Rechtsextremismund. 'Gender and the Prevention of Right-Wing
Extremism".
http://www.gender-und-rechtsextremismus.de/service/english/

FBI." Countering violent extremism."
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/countering-violent-extremism

Grundkraft. "Programs".
http://www.grundkraft.net/en/Programs

Hayat Deutschland. "Goals".
http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/?c=goals

Help For Victims. "Foundation for Peace – Survivors´ Assistance Network".
https://www.helpforvictims.co.uk/content/G129.htm

Helsinki Missio Helsingforsmission. "Aggredi."
http://www.helsinkimissio.fi/aggredi/

Hulplijn Radicalization. 'Home". 2016

http://hulplijnradicalisering.nl/nl/Home

Institute for Economics and Peace. "Global Terrorism Index 2015*"*, p5See Global Terrorism Index. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf

Nationella samordnaren för att värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism. "Översikt".
http://samtalskompassen.samordnarenmotextremism.se/oversikt/

Nordverbund Ausstieg Rechts, "Herzlich willkommen beim Nordverbund Ausstieg Rechts".
http://www.nordverbund-ausstieg.de/

Omagh Support & Self Help Group. "Welcome".
http://www.omaghbomb.co.uk/

Omagh Support and Self Help Group "Omagh Support and Self Help Group Guide for Victims and Survivors".
http://www.omaghbomb.co.uk/images/upl_files/000001.pdf

Pirttisalo, Jani. *Kriminalvården: Inga radikala religiösa grupperingar I fängelser.* Svenska Dagbladet. 2015-02-16
http://www.svd.se/kriminalvarden-inga-radikala-religiosa-grupperingar-i-fangelser

'proDem', Eruditio Publica, http://www.eruditiopublica.com/en/projekty_2/mezinarodni-en/

RecoRa, "About The RecoRa Institute".
http://www.recora.eu/about/

Red Cross (Röda korset). "Nationell stödtelefon om våldsbejakande extremism".

http://www.redcross.se/teman/nationell-stodtelefon/

Samenwerkingsverband van Marokokkaanse Nederlanders. "Doelstelling Stichting SMN".
http://smn.nl/

Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators of & Responses to Radicalisation (SAFIRE).
"Focus Documents".
http://www.safire-project-results.eu/focus.html

Swedish radio: Mothers to be educated about extremism. (Mammor ska utbildas om
extremism).
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6507054

Udlaedinge-, Integrations- og Boligeministeriet. "Den tidlige forebyggelsesindsats".
http://uibm.dk/arbejdsomrader/demokrati/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme-og-
radikalisering/den-tidlige-forebyggelsesindsats

Verein zur Förderung akzeptierender Jugendarbeit in Bremen,
http://vaja-bremen.de/

Violence Prevention Network
http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/en/

Violence Prevention Network (Denmark)
http://www.violence-prevention-network.dk/#!om-os/citr

Women Without Borders. "SAVE – Sisters Against Violent Extremism".
http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/

Åkerman, "Mammor ska utbildas om extremism" Sveriges Radio, 2016-09-03
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6507054