



Requirements of a Strategic Readiness System

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Abstract

As part of the post-transformation effort to re-vitalize doctrine and direction at the Canadian Forces (CF) strategic level, the Strategic Joint Staff developed a CF Readiness Framework which will provide the Chief of Defence Staff and senior management in the Department of National Defence with the tools to understand and to manage CF operational readiness. This leads initially to a two-step process in determining the requirements for a strategic level system. The first is to gather an appreciation of the existing reporting systems – Land, Maritime, Aerospace, Operational Support and Military Personnel. The second is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of those systems and thereby develop broad requirements for a strategic readiness management system.

The existing Force Generator reporting systems do what they are meant to do, that is, simply report a Commander's assessment of whether or not his units are ready to do their assigned Defence Tasks. Unfortunately, the approaches used differ to the point that detailed comparison of the existing systems is not practicable. The second step in the process provided a number of key assessments that would drive development of a system to support three objectives:

- Making decisions for current operations;
- Reviewing standing readiness levels of current forces against the demands of today's world, that is, that the Capability Statements are still current and correctly structured; and
- Using predictive data to look ahead for the major risks approaching.

Résumé

Dans le cadre de l'effort post-transformation visant à revitaliser la doctrine et la direction au niveau stratégique des Forces canadiennes (FC), l'État-major interarmées stratégique a développé un cadre de disponibilité opérationnelle des FC qui fournira au Chef d'état-major de la Défense et à la haute direction du ministère de la Défense les outils permettant de comprendre et de gérer la disponibilité opérationnelle des FC. Cela mène initialement à un processus en deux étapes visant à déterminer les exigences d'un système au niveau stratégique. La première étape vise à recueillir une évaluation des systèmes de production de rapports existants – Force terrestre, Force maritime, Aérospatiale, Soutien opérationnel et Personnel militaire. La deuxième étape vise à explorer les forces et les faiblesses de ces systèmes et ainsi développer les exigences générales d'un système de gestion de la disponibilité opérationnelle stratégique.

Les systèmes de production de rapports des générateurs de force existants font ce pourquoi ils sont prévus, c'est-à-dire simplement rapporter l'évaluation du commandant concernant l'état de préparation de ses unités à effectuer les tâches de défense qui leur sont assignées. Malheureusement, les approches utilisées diffèrent au point que la comparaison détaillée des systèmes existants n'est pas possible. La seconde étape du processus a fourni plusieurs

évaluations importantes qui entraîneraient le développement d'un système permettant de soutenir trois objectifs :

- Prendre des décisions pour les opérations actuelles;
- Examiner les niveaux de disponibilité opérationnelle permanente des forces actuelles par rapport aux demandes du monde d'aujourd'hui, c'est-à-dire vérifier si les énoncés de capacités demeurent à jour et s'ils sont structurés correctement;
- Utiliser des données prévisionnelles afin d'anticiper l'approche de risques majeurs.

Executive summary

Requirements of a Strategic Readiness System:

**Allan Cooper; Jamie Fraser; Einar Housken; John Price; Paul Tulk; DRDC
CORA CR 2009-007; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; December 2009.**

Background: In 2008, the Strategic Joint Staff Director Strategic Readiness (SJS DSR) initiated research into the viability of a strategic level Canadian Forces (CF) Integrated Managed Readiness System (IMRS). The IMRS would consist of two related components: a CF Readiness Directive which provides the strategic readiness lexicon, standards and management process; and an automated tool to support the collection, collation and presentation of readiness information. SJS DSR requested the assistance of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) to conduct a study of extant CF readiness systems and requirements as a first step towards developing a concept of operations for the automated tool component of an IMRS.

Approach: The first step in the study was to conduct a review of the existing Force Generator (FG) readiness systems. The strengths and weakness of each were examined and commonalities between the systems were highlighted. The second stage of the analysis was to interview various senior leaders within DND/CF, to gather their perceived requirements for a strategic readiness management system. The data collected in these two phases was then used to develop broad requirements for a future IMRS.

Results: The extant FG readiness systems do what they are meant to do; that is, simply report a Commander's assessment of whether or not his/her units are ready to do their assigned Defence Tasks. The data is not present to allow any serious look into the components of that assessment. Even if it were, the approaches differ to the point that meaningful comparison across the systems is not practicable. Additionally, the readiness of units not assigned to Defence Tasks is not reported.

Based on this assessment and interviews conducted with senior leaders within the Department, the following conclusions were reached with regards to IMRS requirements.

1. The requirements demand more than a classic current readiness system. This does not mean however, more detailed data, but rather a smarter system that covers all of the CF.
2. Different purposes require different data from different originators. In effect, the demand is for two reporting streams, one from Formations for current readiness and one from the national level for future risks.
3. Reporting only the present tactical-level readiness of units is inadequate. The system needs to incorporate broader capabilities and predictive information.
4. While methods of measuring readiness may differ, the standards used must be universal. The processes for gauging readiness must be of a quality that withstands critical scrutiny.

5. “Keep it simple,” by using something like a layered “stoplight” report for current readiness that includes a Commander’s assessment and is submitted at most quarterly. Equally, do not create a major staff process in the handling and evaluation of the reports.
6. The overall system should include: a hierarchy of flexible Defence Tasks that are regarded as “military advice”; Capability Statements that are not limited to one Environment and incorporate the appropriate “enablers”; and reporting of all elements of the CF, including designated national stocks, in relation to assigned Statements and readiness levels.
7. The core elements of a report should continue to be Personnel, Equipment and Training. Personnel and Equipment should be based on availability to deploy and serviceability, respectively. A Commander’s assessment should be added. Further investigation should be conducted into how Logistic Support could also be incorporated.

Sommaire

Requirements of a Strategic Readiness System:

**Allan Cooper; Jamie Fraser; Einar Housken; John Price; Paul Tulk; DRDC
CORA CR 2009-007; R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO; Décembre 2009.**

Contexte : En 2008, le Directeur – État de préparation stratégique – auprès de l'État-major interarmées stratégique (DEPS EMIS) a lancé une recherche concernant la viabilité d'un Système intégré de gestion de l'état de préparation (SIGEP) des Forces canadiennes (FC) au niveau stratégique. Le SIGEP comprendrait deux composantes liées : une directive sur l'État de préparation des FC qui fournirait le lexique, les normes et le processus de gestion concernant l'état de préparation stratégique; et un outil automatisé qui soutiendrait la collecte, le regroupement et la présentation des renseignements concernant l'état de préparation. Le DEPS EMIS a demandé l'aide de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) afin de réaliser une étude sur les systèmes et les besoins en matière de disponibilité opérationnelle des FC existants en tant que première étape vers le développement d'un concept des opérations pour la composante d'outil automatisé d'un SIGEP.

Approche : La première étape de l'étude consistait à effectuer un examen des systèmes d'état de préparation des générateurs de force (GF) existants. Les forces et les faiblesses de chacun ont été examinées et les points communs entre les systèmes ont été mis en évidence. La deuxième étape de l'analyse consistait à interroger divers hauts responsables du MDN et des FC, afin de recueillir leurs besoins perçus en matière de système de gestion de l'état de préparation stratégique. Les données recueillies lors de ces deux étapes ont servi à élaborer les exigences générales d'un futur SIGEP.

Résultats : Les systèmes d'état de préparation des GF existants font ce pourquoi ils sont prévus, c'est-à-dire simplement rapporter l'évaluation du commandant concernant l'état de préparation de ses unités à effectuer les tâches de défense qui leur sont assignées. Les données permettant d'examiner sérieusement les composantes de cette évaluation ne sont pas présentes. Même si elles l'étaient, les approches diffèrent à tel point que des comparaisons significatives des systèmes ne sont pas possibles. En outre, l'état de préparation des unités qui ne sont pas affectées à des tâches de défense n'est pas indiqué.

En se basant sur cette évaluation et sur les entrevues effectuées auprès des hauts responsables du Ministère, les conclusions suivantes ont été atteintes en ce qui concerne les besoins en matière de SIGEP.

1. Les besoins demandent plus qu'un système classique de données à jour sur l'état de préparation. Cela ne signifie pas, cependant, davantage de données détaillées, mais plutôt un système plus intelligent qui couvre toutes les FC.
2. Différents objectifs requièrent différentes données provenant de différentes origines. En fait, la demande consiste en deux flux de rapports, l'un provenant des formations pour l'état de préparation actuelle et l'autre provenant du niveau national pour les risques futurs.

3. Des rapports qui présentent uniquement l'état de préparation actuel au niveau tactique des unités sont insuffisants. Le système doit incorporer des capacités plus larges et des renseignements prévisionnels.
4. Alors que les méthodes de mesure de l'état de préparation peuvent différer, les normes utilisées doivent être universelles. Les processus permettant de jauger l'état de préparation doivent être d'une qualité qui résiste à un examen minutieux.
5. Rechercher la simplicité, en utilisant un rapport de type échelonné pour l'état de préparation actuel qui inclut une évaluation du commandant et qui est soumis au plus tous les trois mois. De même, il faut éviter de créer un imposant processus d'état-major pour la gestion et l'évaluation des rapports.
6. Le système global devrait inclure une hiérarchie de tâches de défense souples qui sont considérées comme des « conseils militaires », des énoncés de capacités qui ne se limitent pas à une armée en particulier et qui intègrent les « outils habilitants » appropriés et des rapports concernant tous les éléments des FC, y compris les stocks nationaux désignés, par rapport aux déclarations assignées et aux niveaux de disponibilité opérationnelle.
7. Les éléments essentiels d'un rapport devraient toujours être les suivants : Personnel, Équipement et Formation. Les éléments Personnel et Équipement devraient être basés sur la disponibilité à déployer et l'aptitude au service, respectivement. Une évaluation du commandant devrait être ajoutée. On devrait examiner en profondeur la façon dont le Soutien logistique pourrait être incorporé.

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1 Introduction

As part of the post-transformation effort to re-vitalize doctrine and direction at the Canadian Forces (CF) strategic level, the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) developed a CF Readiness Framework to provide the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and senior management in the Department of National Defence (DND) with the tools to understand and to manage CF operational readiness. This framework explains the procedures for determining, assessing, reporting and adjusting CF readiness, and eventually it will lead to improvements in planning CF deployments and the long-term management of CF readiness. This will be done in a four-step effort – determination of requirements, analysis of those requirements, development of a concept of operations and finally, development of an implementation strategy.

A key point in the SJS approach to this task is that the framework will use the existing readiness reporting systems as a basis, rather than design a new, independent system. Thus, the first step of the four-step process, determining the requirements for a strategic level system, divides in turn into two parts. The first part is to gather an appreciation of the existing reporting systems – Land, Maritime, Aerospace, Operational Support and Military Personnel. The second is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of those systems and thereby develop broad requirements for a strategic readiness management system.

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is in support of the SJS initiative, and the Calian Ltd. was contracted to assist DRDC in carrying out the first step in the four-step process. A team of five retired CF officers were assigned by Calian to conduct the work from August to December 2008. This report constitutes the completion of both a factual summary of the existing reporting systems and an assessment of the requirements for a strategic readiness management system.

2 Existing Systems

During August and September 2008, the Calian team worked independently to research five existing readiness reporting systems – Maritime, Land, Aerospace, Operational Support and Military Personnel. An interim report was presented at the end of September 2008 to DRDC and SJS Director Strategic Readiness. The five reports on these systems are attached here in Annexes B through F.

3 Requirements for a Strategic System

The second part of the study was to assess the broad requirements for a strategic reporting system. This was done in the form of a comparison of the five systems from Part I and interviews with senior officers and their staffs in Ottawa. These interviewees included the “owners” of the five existing systems, the Operational Commands, the Strategic Joint Staff and the CDS.

3.1 What is the Problem?

The starting point for this part of the study was identification of the basic question – ‘What is the problem that is meant to be solved?’ Is it that the CDS is not getting information in a form that is useful, perhaps a matter of varying formats or different evaluation standards between systems, or is it a larger problem of not getting the actual information he needs, perhaps because what is being reported is the wrong information or elements are missing?

3.1.1 Comparison of the Five Existing Systems

A first step in answering that broad question was to compare the five existing systems that had been separately studied to determine their common points and differences. Some results of that comparison are captured in a commonality matrix (Annex A). This matrix and Part I of the study reveal the following.

- All five systems report on the basis of the Defence Tasks. Thus, the reporting is focused on High Readiness entities and much of the Canadian Forces is not covered.
- Military Personnel differs from the others in that it uses a series of properly strategic reports that primarily look at personnel matters across the CF. Maritime, Aerospace and Operational Support use essentially tactical level reports focused on the readiness of units at that level. The Land readiness system could perhaps be classified as being at the operational level in that it looks out several years for the production of tactical units.
- There is no common standard for readiness levels. More importantly, there is no common standard for evaluation of readiness. Maritime reports rest heavily on statistical inputs; Aerospace is close to resting on an approach of “the more flying time, the higher the readiness”; and Land and Operational Support use qualitative assessments of “ready” or “not ready” without including supporting data in the report.
- In terms of presentation, Operational Support and Maritime use a “stoplight” system; the Land system is essentially a plan with supporting comments; Aerospace uses a combination of statistical and narrative reporting; and Military Personnel uses a number of independent statistical reports.
- The periodicity of reports varies from “as it changes” to weekly, monthly and then quarterly.

The result of this comparison is an assessment that the current systems do what they are meant to do, that is, simply report a Commander’s assessment of whether or not his units are ready to do their assigned Defence Tasks. The data is not present to allow any serious look into the components of that assessment. Even if it were, the approaches differ to the point that

meaningful comparison is not practicable. Finally, the readiness of units not assigned to Defence Tasks is not reported.

3.2 Assessment of Interviews

As already mentioned, the team conducted a number of interviews in Ottawa during October and November 2008. While a good number of issues were identified across all interviews, it was not surprising to find a high degree of commonality in those brought forward by the Joint Staff, and a similar congruence among those of the Environments.

3.2.1 ECS Focus

Environments at the National Defence Head Quarters level, in most part, do not concern themselves with current readiness reporting. Their focus is on the forces of tomorrow. They leave the day to day operation and readiness reporting to their Formations. One Environmental Chief of Staff (ECS) captured this idea in terms of only needing to know what could become issues of import; that is, managing by exception.

3.2.2 Defence Tasks

One of the keys discovered for unlocking the shackles of the current situation is the idea that Defence Tasks should not be “set in stone” for an indefinite number of years. Instead, it is suggested the Government sets a defence strategy and the Department then develops statements of the capabilities required to carry out the strategy. In effect, Defence Tasks become statements of military advice. While this advice would obviously not change frequently, it could be adjusted periodically as the demands of potential operations in the world change.

3.2.3 Capability Statements

Once a degree of flexibility is introduced into the concept of Defence Tasks, then these tasks can be profitably rewritten in terms of capabilities rather than specific lists of ships, aircraft, battalions and so on. Thus, the current task for a naval task group would become something more like “a maritime-centred force able to proceed to the other side of the world, be sustained, defend itself and project power”. The greatest advantage of this approach is that it is broad enough to incorporate not just maritime or maritime air assets, but also all of the “strategic enablers” that underlie such a capability – forward logistic entities, staging bases, strategic communications, airlift, intelligence and so on. In the same manner, the infrastructure and schools that are the foundation of operational forces can also be tied to the readiness output. Thus, those entities that are crucial but previously unstated in terms of readiness can now be incorporated and their costs linked to operational capability. Equally, limitations to achieving a capability such as school capacity can be identified and reported. Implicit in this approach of capability statements is that the statements would come from the Force Employers or Joint Staff but it would be up to the Force Generators to decide what resources are needed to meet the capability ordered. Since the Capability Statements would now cross Environmental bounds, an office of primary interest would have to be assigned for each Statement to corral its diverse components. In this way, what

was a tactical-level system divided along Environmental lines can become a joint operational-level system.

3.2.4 The Future and Managing Risks

The current readiness systems are tactical-level snapshots. They start becoming out of date as soon as they are published. They may tell you what you have today in High Readiness forces but not what you will have tomorrow. Thus, a truly strategic system is a higher level system that worries about the big risks, that is, it looks into the future to see the risks coming in time to take action to mitigate them to an acceptable level. Today, the types of risks that might be considered are personnel trends, major equipment programmes and confluences of major tasks like Task Force Afghanistan and the Vancouver Olympics. Thus, this is not a simple extension of a current readiness system into the future, but a full shift in focus to the major factors that are expected to affect the production of the operational capabilities. Some of this information may be relatively easy to produce in such areas as equipment usage rates or time to regenerate after an operation, but much of it will not come from automated systems since it will require recognition of a confluence of events or political factors beyond the scope of DND. The CDS will need to specify the type of information he is looking for to attune staffs to this different reporting stream. For such a predictive system, it is assessed that about three years is a realistic timeframe for adjusting readiness; any greater time is likely to be not readiness but force development. Once identified, the risks are going to have to be defined in terms of quantified data so that they can be mitigated to an acceptable level. Finally, by looking into the future in this way, a reporting system is no longer a solely military concern; its results will be of equal value and concern to the Deputy Minister of Defence.

3.2.5 Availability

Reporting based on the establishment levels of a unit for its personnel and equipment is of little value since that is axiomatically not the actual state. The manning level of the unit and the number of pieces of equipment in place are equally misleading in a report. For accuracy, the only measures that are effective are the availability of personnel for operations within the unit and the serviceability of the equipment. Thus, a ship may officially be well manned, but if enough people should have to be attached posted to a higher readiness ship that the original ship is now unable to sail, its readiness has obviously dropped significantly. Similarly, an Army unit that has given up equipment and personnel to a deploying task force no longer has the same capability and readiness level as before. It is proposed that a readiness reporting system should be sufficiently comprehensive that such changes are reported.

3.2.6 Standards

For a system to be coherent, it is clear that it must be based on common standards for evaluating readiness. This does not require, however, that everyone use the same methods of evaluation since there are peculiarities to each Environment. What matters is there can be confidence that the standards are actually being attained. Some foreign forces with extensive reporting systems, the results of which figure prominently in personal advancement, have found that the veracity of

reports becomes a concern. This is really a matter of ensuring accountability; transparency in the components of reports at the next higher level of command may be sufficient to the purpose.

3.2.7 Residual Capability

Availability and Standards lead in turn to the question of reporting the CF capability left over after High Readiness forces have been removed from the equation. This is of direct concern in considering forces for domestic operations, but is also of value in bringing forth the impact of Force Employer requirements on units other than those deploying, as illustrated in the Maritime and Land examples suggested under Availability. The question then arises of what standard should be used to gauge the readiness of this residual capability in the CF. Standard or Normal Readiness is the obvious answer, but not as defined in the draft CF Readiness Framework¹ where Standard Readiness is “generally used to indicate the next group of units/assets that will be assigned operational or higher readiness tasks”. Looking across the entire CF, there are many units that will only be required to be at a Standard Readiness, or may be at that level for some months following a period of High Readiness. In other words, Standard Readiness in this broader context stands on its own as a readiness level, and it is inappropriate to define materiel and other requirements for Standard Readiness in terms of a percentage of “the systems necessary to meet the operational capability for which the unit is preparing”. Standard Readiness forces will require Capability Statements for Standard Readiness tasks, such as Domestic Operations.

3.2.8 Use of Information

One of the main concerns expressed by all of the Environments was what the SJS would do with detailed readiness information, especially if the intent was to provide readiness information at the company/squadron/ship level. Would they try to make decisions without consultation and would they try to micromanage the Forces? Even in the present climate, the Environments felt that the SJS was spending more time chasing what the “Corporals” were doing on the ground rather than looking at the strategic picture. The answer is simply that a reporting system that calls for more information will require a degree of faith initially, followed in time by a sense of trust built upon the appropriate use of the information.

3.2.9 Use of “Stoplight” Reporting

A majority of the people interviewed supported the stoplight method of reporting the status of readiness. They felt that there is no need to drill down too deeply into the readiness information as they would not understand the nuances of the information presented. There should, however, be an area where the Commander can provide input to the report; that is, after all the statistics are developed, there is still a role for a Commander’s qualitative assessment of whether or not a unit is truly ready. There were, however, a few individuals who felt that using the stoplight system to indicate readiness was useless because it was too “ambiguous” and therefore, meaningless. They felt that readiness reporting had to be quantified to be of any value. This call for quantified data makes the most sense in terms of looking into the future as part of assessing risks. For current readiness however, a good balance might be to use a stoplight system for reporting on each

¹ The final Interim Directive – CF Readiness, was published in Dec 2008. At the time of this work, the directive was still in draft form.

element of readiness (personnel, equipment, etc) and for the components of those elements at the next level down (trials, ammunition, logistics, unserviceable equipment, etc). This would provide a good degree of information for the most senior levels of the chain of command without getting into counting people and vehicles. Of course, the success of such an approach will depend very much on the quality and comprehensiveness of the Capability Statements that drive the reporting.

3.2.10 Frequency and Process of Reporting

While perhaps obvious on reflection, a key point here is worth stating outright– the process cannot be too cumbersome or people will put minimal effort into the preparation. One ECS presented it as “Too much data and the system becomes onerous to maintain and eventually meaningless,” while another senior officer stated “The greater the fidelity sought, the greater the chance of failure.” Some staffs opined that the reviews and meetings proposed in the draft CF Readiness Framework invoke that worry. Overall, the test for any system will be as much whether the staffs that develop the data see value in it as whether it is useful to senior leaders. Most senior officers also seemed to feel that quarterly reports were sufficiently frequent for their purposes.

3.3 Purposes of the Reporting System

In the course of this study, it became apparent that the type of system being considered is likely more than a classic readiness reporting system. There are three possible uses for the information being produced:

1. Making decisions for current operations,
2. Reviewing standing readiness levels of current forces against the demands of today’s world, that is, that the Capability Statements are still current and correctly structured; and
3. Using a combination of experienced assessments and predictive data to look ahead for the major risks approaching.

The idea of three different purposes and that the data required for the third purpose will, to a large extent, be different from that for the first two, is something to be kept in mind during system design.

3.4 Elements of a Report

3.4.1 Core Elements

The elements of the existing Force Generator readiness reports (Personnel, Equipment and Training) are the standard for such reports and are recommended for continued use for current readiness. The only caveat is that personnel and equipment be considered in terms of availability to deploy for operations and serviceability, respectively.

3.4.2 Commander's Assessment

While the above three elements should be on a statistical foundation, they will not provide a complete picture of readiness. It is certainly possible to carry out the required evolutions specified for a level of readiness and yet not be ready in the sense of such things as teamwork or ability to function under stress. Thus, there is always a role for subjective assessment alongside the objective evaluation. The Commander's assessment of the readiness of his subordinate unit(s) should be a fourth element of a reporting system.

3.4.3 Morale

In the course of the interviews, one other element for reporting was suggested – morale. The countering view was that morale is a factor at the unit level but not at aggregate levels. Even at the unit level, it is difficult to quantify and can be quite variable over even a short time. Thus, it is perhaps best left as one of the factors a Commander would consider for his portion of a report.

3.4.4 Logistic Support

An element that was mentioned by several people during the interviews was logistic support or sustainment. It is one of the “strategic enablers” and would be a key part of a Capability Statement, arguably the central element in knowing the “true” cost of an operational capability. Capturing all the aspects of sustainment however, is not easy. It may seem relatively straight forward from the perspective of a front line unit but becomes increasingly complex as reports ascend the Command chain and additional elements such as usage rates, national stockpiles, re-equipment programmes and so on are added. The British are understood to be developing the concept of the Total Logistics Requirement, to extend from training through deployment to operations so as to be able to assess the logistical aspects of readiness, including stockpile needs or what can be bought within the readiness time limits. The literature also suggests that while this information would be very useful, the British are finding it difficult to compile. Further investigation with the United Kingdom is recommended.

3.4.5 The Future

In contrast, for a report that looks into the future, it is difficult to specify what should be the reporting elements beyond a statement of watching for “significant risks” to the organization. During the interviews, the risks mentioned ranged from population demographics to the rate of usage of equipment in Afghanistan to the national economic situation. What this does suggest, therefore, is that reports of future risks are not likely to be bottom-up, staff-driven efforts but rather the personal products of Commanders with the information and experience to identify such risks.

4 Conclusions

The overarching conclusion of this study is, as expressed by one senior officer, “A machine won’t give us the answer; it will give us elements of a solution. Commanders will give the answer.”

More specifically, the conclusions are:

1. The requirements demand more than a classic current readiness system. This does not mean, however, more detailed data, but rather a smarter system that covers all of the CF;
2. Different purposes require different data from different originators. In effect, the demand is for two reporting streams, one from Formations for current readiness and one from the national level for future risks;
3. Reporting only the present tactical-level readiness of units is inadequate. The system needs to incorporate broader capabilities and predictive information;
4. While methods of measuring readiness will differ, the standards used must be universal. The processes for gauging readiness must be of a quality that withstands critical scrutiny;
5. “Keep it simple,” by using something like a layered “stoplight” report for current readiness that includes a Commander’s assessment and is only submitted quarterly. Equally, do not create a major staff process in the handling and evaluation of the reports;
6. The overall system should include: a hierarchy of flexible Defence Tasks that are regarded as “military advice”; Capability Statements that are not limited to one Environment and incorporate the appropriate “enablers”; and reporting of all elements of the CF, including designated national stocks, in relation to assigned Statements and readiness levels; and
7. The core elements of a report should continue to be Personnel, Equipment and Training. Personnel and Equipment should be based on availability to deploy and serviceability, respectively. A Commander’s assessment should be added. Further investigation should be conducted into how Logistic Support could also be incorporated.

References

Interim Directive – CF Readiness, 18 Dec 2008. 3000-1 SJS DSR.

Annex A Commonality Matrix

Table A- 1: Force Generator Readiness Systems Commonality Matrix.

	Maritime	Land	Air	CANOSCOM	CMP²
What is the basis of the report?	Defence Tasks	Defence Tasks	Defence Tasks	Defence Tasks	Defence Tasks
Does the system report inputs or outputs?	Output	Output	Output	Output	
What is the manner of the assessment?	Stoplight	Graphic projection	Numerical & script	Stoplight	
Are there statistical reports supporting the assessments?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Does the system report units beyond High Readiness?	Yes, the Standard Readiness Task Group	No	Yes, all flying units report to the Air Division	No	
Does the system report personnel on the basis of establishment, manning, or availability for employment?	Availability	Manning	Manning	Neither. The system reports only on support capabilities.	
Does the system report equipment on the basis of establishment or serviceability?	Serviceability	Serviceability	Yes	Neither. The system reports only on support capabilities.	

² CMP does not have a readiness reporting system and thus the above questions are not relevant. CMP depends on numerous statistical reporting outputs to provide him with the status and feedback on personnel management activities. Some reports are a snapshot in time and some project three to five years into the future.

	Maritime	Land	Air	CANOSCOM	CMP
Is collective training assessed objectively, subjectively or both?	Objectively, under the Combat Readiness Reporting system of exercises.	Objectively	Subjectively	Objectively. The stoplight criteria include a requirement to certify training.	
Does the system include space for a commander's assessment or commander's comments?	Assessment	Assessment	Comments	Comments	
Does the system address sustainability?	No	Yes	No	No	
Does the system include data / database that allows for the retrieval and manipulation of data?	No	No	Some	No	
Does the system reflect a "snapshot" in time or does it project readiness to a future point in time?	Snapshot	Snapshot	Snapshot	Snapshot	

Annex B Maritime Command Readiness Reporting

B.1 Introduction

Maritime Command has a well organized, comprehensive basis for readiness assessments. The foundation of this is the policy document CFCD 129 (Naval Readiness and Sustainment Policy) (Draft). This is implemented by operational authorities in the progression laid out in Maritime Command Orders (MARCORDS) 2-12 (Readiness Support Programme - Ships) and the training specified in CFCD 102 (Maritime Command Combat Readiness Requirements). The outputs of these processes are then captured in readiness reporting. This includes CFCD 102 for operational training, MARCORD G-03 (Operational Deficiency Reporting) for materiel, MARLANTORD 59-7/MARPACORD 59-3 for personnel shortages, and other reports such as logistics inspections, audits, and physical fitness testing results. The final step in this loop is the Applications for Reporting and Measurement of Operational Readiness (ARMOR) report forwarded by MARLANT and MARPAC, which brings all of the tactical-level reports together and provides a more complete, higher level assessment.

B.2 CFCD 129 (Naval Readiness and Sustainment Policy)

Born of the budget cuts of the 1990s with the need to reduce activity levels and thereby readiness while preserving essential operational capabilities, Naval Readiness and Sustainment (R&S) Policy has since matured significantly. Originally focused on budgetary measures such as the cost of fuel for days at sea, it has been broadened to consider all of the factors that contribute to producing an ordered operational capability. Drawn together in the draft CFCD 129, R&S Policy is now a mature framework for “balancing the Navy of today with the Navy of the future”. As a policy document, it does not produce minute-by-minute readiness reports; rather, it works by committees and consecutive meetings over the course of the year to produce one particular product, the Ten Year Fleet Plan, directing the readiness level for each unit over that period. The essence of CFCD 129 can be examined in terms of four elements.

B.2.1 Readiness Levels

The R&S Policy establishes the same readiness levels used in joint CF planning (with the exception of Immediate), but particularizes them to naval tasks and requirements, such as the level of readiness required to be assigned as Ready Duty Ship or to conduct at-sea individual training courses.

B.2.2 Readiness Rhythm

The Readiness Rhythm is “the end-to-end process by which units cycle through the four readiness levels”. This rhythm is encapsulated in the Ten Year Fleet Plan. A portion of one version is shown in Figure B-1.




Figure B-1: Example 10 Year Fleet Plan.

B.2.3 Sustainment and Support

While historically the R&S Policy concentrated on short-term readiness to the detriment of sustainment, the balance has now been redressed. Sustainment is now treated in terms of three levels of intensity of operations – low, mid and high – with required durations of assigned tasks for each level. Most usefully for senior staff and commanders, this leads directly to a discussion of the longer term implications of extending or expanding an operation. An example is at Figure B-2.




Figure B-2: MARCOM Operations Capacity.³

With its increased emphasis on sustainment, the R&S Policy now groups the “supporting pillars” as materiel, personnel and training, and specialized capabilities (diving units, schools and Port Security Units). Thus, the Policy includes such tools as a flow chart for the operational training process (Figure B-3) and materiel readiness rhythms for each class of ship (Figure B-4 for Tribal Class).

³ All major warships, including submarines. View chart in six-month blocks in light of “ROTO”-based context.




Figure B-3: Operational Training Process Flow Chart.




Figure B-4: Tribal Class Readiness Rhythm, 60 months.

B.2.4 Readiness Matrix

Finally, these policies for all naval operational units are parsed in a readiness matrix in terms of a Naval Task List, but cross-referenced to the CF Joint Task List.

B.3 MARCORD 2-12 (Readiness Support Programme-Ships)

Flowing directly from CFCD 129's policy is a more specific directive for achieving an ordered readiness level in a ship. As stated in MARCORD 2-12, "The Readiness Support Programme (RSP)... has been developed to combine the requirements that previously dealt with weapons certification, staff inspections, technical readiness, and refresher training into a single programme

to achieve the requirements of the R&S Policy covering all baseline training, inspection, engineering, certification, [Short Work Period], and all [Work Ups] requirements.” Thus, it manages all the steps en route to ‘high readiness’ with specific reporting formats, and provides the basis for a Commander’s confidence that a ship has indeed reached the reported level of readiness.

B.4 CFCD 102 (Maritime Command Combat Readiness Requirements)

CFCD 102 provides specific direction for tactical-level operational training for Maritime Command units; that is, it is primarily a compilation of training serial specifications (purpose, requirements, conduct and assessment) for each combat capability required. Thus, a ship assigned to be ‘high readiness’ should, in the course of its Work Ups, complete all the exercises appropriate to its class to achieve that readiness level. Lower levels of readiness would obviously require fewer serials. It then falls to the ship to repeat serials as appropriate to the given currency periods so as to maintain its readiness level.

CFCD 102 does contain a well-established monthly readiness reporting system for individual units, which provides “some capability” for Commanders to assess the readiness of those units and appreciate what further training might be necessary for an operational task. The utility of this reporting is limited, however, by the fact that while a serial may call for individual training or specific equipment serviceability as prerequisites, the report is concerned only with operational training. Despite the title of Combat Readiness Report, elements of readiness such as manning, equipment readiness and logistical support are not addressed or reported directly.

B.5 Supporting Pillars

While not incorporated in the monthly Combat Readiness Report, there are a number of other reports that do reflect various elements of readiness. Most prominent among these are MARCORD G-03 on equipment deficiencies and MARLANTORD 59-7/MARPACORD 59-3 for personnel shortages. Both orders demand an assessment of the operational impact of the deficiency or shortage. Beyond these reports, the results of other examinations such as audits, logistic inspections or physical fitness testing contribute to an overall picture of the operational readiness of a unit.

B.6 Formation-Level Reporting

The Applications for Reporting and Measurement of Operational Readiness (ARMOR) report submitted by MARLANT and MARPAC on their units is a stoplight (green, yellow and red) depiction of three elements of readiness (personnel, material and operations) with an overall status assessment. Each of the three elements can be broken down into component parts, each again assessed as green, yellow or red. Standards for the assignment of each colour are provided.

Annex C Land Readiness Reporting

References: A. 3350-1 (DFLR) Nov 05 Annex A – Managed Readiness System

B. 3350-1 (DFLR) Nov 05 Annex B – Managed Readiness Plan

C.1 Introduction

This annex describes the processes used by the Army to increase the readiness of its forces in light of past and expected operational and personnel tempo. Contained in two Annexes of the Army's Transformation document, the Managed Readiness System (MRS) and the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) describe the requirements and elements of the system followed by the application of the system to the field force and its operational commitments. The document also describes the various reporting processes.

The readiness processes are tied closely to: the Army's recently completed regeneration period; the development of the three horizon approach to the future army; and the phasing of the Land Force Capability Releases. It is not the intention of this annex to describe those processes, but it must be understood that the readiness systems and processes described are occurring in the Army of Today and its operational commitments, but are designed for the Army of Tomorrow and the Army of the Future.

C.2 Managed Readiness System

The MRS involves the synergy and integration of processes and activities linked to:

- operational demand (high readiness tasks); and
- maintenance of readiness levels in terms of:
 - combat capability;
 - support to deployed troops;
 - rationalization of operational and institutional tasks;
 - synchronization of equipment fielding;
 - mitigation of the manning dilemma;
 - implementation of the configuration of the Army to the Interim Army structure;
 - integration of reserve capabilities: and
 - prioritization of the operational stocks.

The consolidation of the Army's MRS through the integration of readiness processes provides the organizational governance to synchronize all activities and processes. A representation of the MRS cycle is presented below.




Figure C-1: Army Managed Readiness Cycle.

The MRS is comprised of three Phases:

- i. A Support Phase beginning at the end of a high readiness period;
- ii. A High Readiness Training Phase, prior to deployment; and
- iii. A High Readiness Phase which may include an operational deployment.

These Phases are composed of six segments, which are briefly described here as:

- ◆ Segment 1 – Recovery. The period immediately following an operational deployment.
- ◆ Segment 2 – Regeneration/Support. Preparation for possible Segment 3 tasks.
- ◆ Segment 3 – Regeneration/Support. Possible tasking as part of a strategic reserve task.
- ◆ Segment 4 – Training/Support. Organizational stability and training in preparation for high readiness training.
- ◆ Segment 5 – High Readiness Training. Theatre mission specific training.
- ◆ Segment 6 – High Readiness/Operations.

C.2.1 MRS Equipment Distribution

The pressures on equipment for training and operations, coupled with the introduction of new equipment, require a similar approach to the problem as has been described above. The approach is to work through a Whole Fleet Management process which will ensure that the right vehicle system and equipment is in the right place at the right time and in the right configuration to meet both the training and operational requirements. Below is a depiction of the system.

Appendix 2
Annex A
3350-1 (DLFR)
Dated November 2005




Figure C-2: Whole Fleet Management Process

C.2.2 Equipment Stock and Priorities

In priority, the equipment stocks are defined below.

1. Deployment (Op) Stocks. Vehicles and equipment for two Task Forces to be positioned in Montreal, ready for deployment.
2. Army Collective Training Stock. Vehicles and equipment positioned at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) for high readiness training.
3. Army Individual Training Stock. Vehicles and equipment positioned at the Combat Training Centre (CTC) for individual training.
4. Logistic Stocks. A controlled pool of about 10% of Army total vehicle holdings to allow for a steady rotation of the fleets through modifications and upgrades.

5. Unit Stocks. Vehicles and equipment held at unit levels.

C.2.3 Readiness Levels

The deliberate rotation of the 12 Army Task Forces (TF) ensures the high readiness of two TFs at any one time with a strategic reserve (see the MRP below). These readiness levels are achieved through synchronized, integrated and disciplined force generation along with the increase of the training resources to support the designated task-tailored task forces.

C.2.4 Personnel Manning

The Army cannot man all of its units at 100% and is forced to prioritize. Priorities vary with the various segments of the MRS and can fluctuate between 85 and 96%. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff Manning Priorities and the MRP form the basis for these manning decisions.

C.2.5 Force Generation / Employment

Force generation and employment concepts provide the basis for the generation and sustainment of the 12 Task-Tailored Task Forces, based on 750 personnel for the manoeuvre component and 250 for the support component. The concept calls for three types of force employment structures – Light, Medium and Robust. The type of force structure required will be determined by the specific mission requirements. Based on a three year cycle, each TF is assigned an expeditionary operation and, potentially, domestic operations, Strategic reserve, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), Major Air Disaster (MAJAID) and other high readiness tasks.

C.2.6 Strategic Reserve TF

The Strategic Reserve TF is a residual TF based upon a TF Headquarters (HQ), two infantry sub-units, a reconnaissance/surveillance element, an Engineer element, an artillery/mortar element and a small combat service support element. The Strategic Reserve TF will not have all of the capabilities of the expeditionary TF nor will it have Reserve augmentation.

C.2.7 Land Force Service Support

The Land Force Service Support involves the generation and sustainment of adequately resourced, well-prepared support elements for the TFs, but which is capable of generating support units for Brigade-level missions. Consequently, the Army has reorganized the Combat Service Support community with Force Generation Service Battalion structures to support the 12 TFs.

C.2.8 Army Reserve

Integration of the Army Reserve (ARes) into the MRS creates the “One Army” approach to managed readiness. There is a clear operational demand for formed Reserve elements across most

capabilities, so the Army is moving towards an integrated MRS aligning the Army commitments with the ARes activation process, readiness, policies and training.

C.3 Managed Readiness Plan

The MRP is the application of the MRS to the existing force structure and tasks. The time frames are important as the Army ended its regeneration period in 2006 and has entered its force development generated three horizon approach of the Army of Today (0 to 5 years), the Army of Tomorrow (5 to 10 years) and the Future Army (10 to 30 years). A depiction of the MRP (Figure C-3), although not accurate for today, shows how the readiness of the Army is being managed into the future. This plan, of necessity, is constantly being updated according to changing requirements and conditions.




Figure C-3: Army Managed Readiness Plan [2006-2010]

C.3.1 Land Force Capability Releases (LFCR)

As part of the implementation of the Army's Transformation initiatives, the Army adopted a system of Capability Releases (CR) which defines the operating environment for a specific period of time. The details of each CR are in other documents and are not necessary to understand the Readiness processes, but in broad terms:

1. LFCR 1 is complete and included the stand-up of CMTC, Direct Fire restructure and the Command Support.

2. LFCR 2 commenced in August 07 and is due to end August 09. It includes, amongst others, Command Support CR3, CMTC at full operating capacity and Artillery restructure.
3. LFCR 3 will run until August 11 and will include the transition to CF transformation structures.

C.3.2 High Readiness

The Army aims at providing task forces based on its capacity and not the demand. The forces depicted below represent the capabilities of the Army in the 2006 timeframe and have been modified since by the LFCR processes.

International Tasks:

- 1 Brigade HQ and Signal Squadron;
- 2 TFs based on Battalion Groups;
- 1 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation Company;
- 1 TF for Strategic Reserve;
- 1 Company Group for DART; and
- The Army component of the MAJAID.

Domestic Tasks:

- Domestic tasks as per Land Force Area;
- Parachute support group and liaison element (MAJAID);
- Company Group (DART); and
- Strategic Reserve.

C.4 Readiness Reporting

Army reporting of its readiness is in fact done by the MRP. While the Army has access to all of the data provided by the various CF systems of record (PeopleSoft, etc), the MRP describes the synchronized product of all of its capabilities and, in its up to date version (as of September 2008) projects the Army's readiness for its known commitments and its availability for other commitments out to 2013. The plan is sent to all of the Capability Components of the CF, including the SJS. It is important to note that the synchronization is done not only with the elements and formations of the Army as the Force Generators but also with CEFCOM and Canada COM, as the Force Employers, and the other Force Generators in the CF which may be providing elements of an Army task (Afghanistan being a prime example).

The MRP is a very dynamic document and is under almost constant revision. The Army G3 is responsible for the MRP and in this iterative process the plan is reviewed in its entirety every quarter by way of an Army G3 Conference attended by all of the major players. The result of this

conference is an updated version of the MRP (if necessary). The former Quarterly Operational Readiness Report has been discontinued in favour of this process. On a weekly basis, the G33 produces a situational report on the status of the Plan and the SJS is on the distribution list for this report. The G3 staff are conscious of the fact that they need to be able to project into possible choke points in the plan. To this effect, the G3 Staff is negotiating with DRDC to investigate a modeling process which would help to identify possible problem areas.

The MRP is a very complex document and, together with the MRS as the basis of the plan, it must be well understood before any attempts are made to extrapolate conclusions. The cyclical nature of the plan makes this imperative, as a single unit structurally capable of performing a high readiness task, may be at a very low state of readiness depending on its place in the cycle.

Annex D Aerospace Readiness Reporting

D.1 Introduction

Air Command (AIRCOM) readiness is well defined and established from individual members through to crews, units, squadrons and wings. Readiness is based on Defence Tasks assigned to Air Command for the various functions/platforms/aircraft types and varies from immediate response requirements to 180 days to respond. AIRCOM, however; does not have a specific formal readiness reporting system above 1 Canadian Air Division. AIRCOM, as the Strategic Level Air Force headquarters does not monitor daily flying activities, but is nevertheless aware of ongoing operations.

D.2 Defence Tasks

The Air Force produced an Air Force Plan (AFP) for fiscal years 2007 to 2010 in early 2007. The AFP is the Strategic Level resource management tool that provides the Air Force with managerial guidance and outlines the short-term strategic level tasks to be performed by the Air Force. Within the AFP are the detailed Defence Tasks assigned to the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) as extracted from the Defence Plan On-Line. The tasks cover a myriad of operations one would normally expect an air force to perform. Tasks cover such things as Command and Control, Surveillance and Control of Canada's airspace, Support to Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), Support to the Chief of Land Staff (CLS), Search and Rescue, Aid to the Civil Power, Humanitarian Assistance and Aid to Other Government Departments, in addition to the normal support functions for both Air Force and non-air force operations and personnel. In a more detailed review of the Defence Tasks, it is apparent that the Air Force is principally a Force Generator (FG) as compared to a Force Employer (FE) as the Air Force directly employs a minimum amount of resources on pure Air Force tasks.

Within the description of each Defence Task the Readiness Level expected for each task is listed. In addition, the expected Sustainability Level (duration) for each activity and its action plan are listed. In the case of Surveillance and Control of Canadian airspace, readiness is Immediate with indefinite Sustainability and an Action Plan that requires AIRCOM to maintain operational forces and Command and Control elements which can address the task. In the case of support to CMS for Surveillance and Control, readiness is established at 8 hours and sustainability at 14 days on the east and west coasts of Canada. These are but two examples of the forty (some interrelated) listed Defence Tasks that spell out readiness and sustainability requirements for Canada's Aerospace Forces. What is not listed within the Defence Tasks are the amount and type of resources or platforms assigned to achieve the various tasks. What is, however, directly related to Defence Tasks and thus readiness are the Yearly Flying Rates (YFR).

D.2.1 Yearly Flying Rate

The YFR is inseparable from readiness, as air forces measure the vast majority of their activities by flying hours. If flying hours are reduced then operations/training are also reduced and subsequently readiness will decrease. As part of the AFP, a Capability Commitment and

Apportionment matrix is developed. The Capability Plan includes YFR allocation targets for each of the platforms for both FE and FG, and the allocation of this YFR to specific air power users. It is within this matrix that the numbers of weapons systems/platforms are allocated readiness levels. The YFR is developed using the Total Air Resource Management (TARM) process, which allocates prioritized aerospace power, generated in support of Defence Tasks to supported Commanders, through a collaborative and transparent process.

D.3 Total Air Force Management

TARM provides a means to enable effective long-term planning and employment of aerospace capabilities by collecting user requirements, balancing them against capacity (based on personnel and financial constraints, life cycle management and fleet size), prioritizing the list and then allocating suitable resources. TARM's cohesive system of mission prioritization facilitates resolving resource conflicts as non-forecasted missions surface, as well as maintaining the proper balance between hours devoted to Force Generation and Force Employment. The final decision in the event of conflict over requirements rests with the Joint Staff. TARM is a relatively new process, but it appears that it is here to stay as a critical component of the National Aerospace Planning Process and will be developed to allow planning of operations for two to three years.

D.4 Operational Level Readiness Reporting

1 Canadian Air Division (1 Cdn Air Div) is the Air Force's operational level of command. As such, it is responsible for day-to-day operations and coordination of Canada's air effort. 1 Cdn Air Div has established a monthly narrative reporting system called the Capability and Readiness Report (CARR) whereby the Division's Wing Commanders report on the operational readiness of their Wings to meet peace and wartime commitments. It also provides a vehicle to enable Wing Commanders the opportunity to acquaint the Division Commander with issues and trends affecting their individual Wings. Input to the report is obtained from a variety of sources including 1 Cdn Air Div Operational Evaluations, the Wing Self-assessment Programme, exercises and operations. The performance indicators and standards are contained in the Level II business plan and the operational requirements for 1 Cdn Air Div are contained in the Defence Planning Guidance. The CARR's primary content is as follows:

- **Readiness.** A brief assessment of the Wing's overall current operational readiness with particular emphasis on the capability to carry out applicable tasks;
- **Personnel.** To reflect any personnel problems affecting operational readiness;
- **Equipment.** To reflect any equipment problems affecting operational readiness;
- **Training.** To reflect any training problems affecting operational readiness;
- **Service Support.** To reflect any service support problems affecting readiness including logistics, maintenance, and facilities;
- **Command and Control.** To reflect any plans, procedures and doctrinal problems; and
- **Effectiveness.** To reflect an evaluation of effectiveness of the capability of each wing to accomplish its task in war. The assessment is primarily subjective.

The CARRs are consolidated and used to brief Commander 1 Cdn Air Div. Any significant updates/changes are forwarded to the CAS as required.

D.5 Operational Evaluation

1 Can Air Div Orders Volume 7 directs the requirement for and conduct of Operational Evaluations within the Division. The aims of the evaluation process are to ensure that the Division's assigned forces are at the appropriate readiness, have the operational capability to accomplish their assigned tasks and can thus meet both national and international commitments.

The evaluation process is harmonized with the Wing Self-Assessment (WSA) Programme. The Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) process contains three mutually supportive spheres of activity involved with the Air Force Quality and Excellence Framework:

- **Accountability:** Performance measures to quantify the accountability relationship of the tactical to the operational level of the air force. These measurements are made externally through the OPEVAL process and internally through the WSA;
- **Compliance checks:** To confirm compliance with legal obligations to the people through the Government of Canada (Aeronautics Act, environmental protection, Auditor General); and
- **Continuous improvement indicators:** Reporting, dissemination and follow-up of benchmark performances and lessons learned externally through the OPEVAL process and internally through the WSA.

The OPEVAL Programme is directed by Commander's Guidance and the requirements of Defence Planning Guidance (DPG), and is linked to the business plan process. Each defence output is rated according to Readiness, Operations and Effectiveness for the six operational capabilities (Aerospace Control, Air Support to Maritime Component, Air Support to Land Component, Air Mobility, Support to National Interests and Contingency Support) and three support areas (Command and Control, Force Generation and Mandated Programmes). The performance indicators and standards are contained in the Level 2 business plan and the operational requirements for 1 Cdn Air Div are contained in the DPG. For national purposes only alert, national standby and high readiness forces, which are held at a high state of readiness (<30 days) or are preparing for deployment, will be subject to a formal OPEVAL.

All areas evaluated are rated using a five-tier rating system.

1. **OUTSTANDING** Performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. No deviations or deficiencies are noted.
2. **EXCELLENT** Performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed. Few if any deviations are noted.
3. **SATISFACTORY** Performance or operations meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an efficient and competent manner. Resources and programs are

efficiently managed. Minor deviations or deficiencies may exist, but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

4. **MARGINAL** Performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deviations and deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission.
5. **UNSATISFACTORY** Performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

D.6 Personnel Readiness Verification

All units of 1 Cdn Air Div are required to conduct an Annual Personnel Readiness Verification. The verification process requires the annual screening of all personnel to ensure that they have met annual training requirements and individual readiness requirements.

D.7 Air Force Command and Control Information System

The Air Force Command and Control Information System (AFCCIS) is an Air Force wide, Canadian / United States secret computer network and is the principal information system to support Air Force operations. It is an integrated computer-based system of communication networks composed of all hardware, software, communications, documentation, operational concepts, facilities, procedures, support, training, and any other components, automated or non-automated, necessary to support Air Force command, control, and intelligence functions. AFCCIS is hosted on the classified CNet. It has a presence in every major Air Force unit across the country.

AFCCIS provides the situational awareness and information necessary to command assigned forces. The information carried on AFCCIS is essential to prepare plans, co-ordinate operations, administer and supply the assigned forces. One of the functions provided by AFCCIS is to serve as the conduit to exchange information between tactical and operational components, and to provide links to the Strategic Level through the CF command system. AFCCIS is providing the AFCCIS users with a very comprehensive set of capabilities to support the conduct of their daily operations.

D.8 Strategic Reporting

In an interview with the Director Air Force Readiness it was confirmed that Air Command does not have a dedicated readiness reporting system. With access to AFCCIS, the 1 Can Air Div monthly CARR, and oversight of the Division's daily watch keeper reports, CAS has adequate information to provide input to the CDS Ops Briefs as well as to any future planning. It would also appear that Canada's Aerospace forces are completely committed to ongoing operations and any additional requirements could only be accepted at the expense of ongoing operations.

Annex E Canadian Operational Support Command Readiness Reporting System

E.1 Role and Organization

The Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) came into being on 01 February 2006. Its creation represented another step toward the establishment of a single, national level focal point for all operational support. Operational support includes elements of military engineering, health services, military police, logistics (including transport, supply, food services, postal and movements), equipment maintenance (primarily general land equipment), personnel support, resource management, communications and information systems (CIS) support, and command and control for the support organization.

CANOSCOM's mission is to provide operational support to Canadian Forces domestic, continental and expeditionary operations. To fulfil that mission CANOSCOM is assigned the following subordinate formations and units:

- CANOSCOM Headquarters (CANOSCOM HQ);
- Canadian Forces Joint Support Group (CFJSG) including 3 Canadian Support Group, 4 Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit (4 CFMCU), and the Canadian Forces Postal Unit;
- Operational Support Engineer Group (OS Engr Grp) with 1 Engineer Support Unit (ESU);
- OS Military Police Group;
- Canadian Forces Joint Signal Regiment (CFJSR); and,
- Canadian Materiel Support Group (CMSG) including the Canadian Forces Supply Depots, and the Canadian Forces Ammunition Depots. The CMSG also manages the Canadian Forces transportation system.

The following formations and groups are attached under operational control to Commander CANOSCOM to facilitate the fulfillment of his operational mission:

- Canadian Forces Health Services Group for all aspects of health services support to operations;
- 202 Workshop Depot for the maintenance of weapons systems assigned to operations; and
- The Communication Reserve for tasks associated with operational support to Canadian Forces operations, less those high readiness detachments earmarked to support Canada Command Regional Headquarters.

E.2 Readiness-Support Capabilities and Tasks

E.2.1 Policy and Guidance

CANOSCOM's readiness concept is outlined in an annex to CANOSCOM's Concept of Operations (COO) which is posted on CANOSCOM's web page. Because of organizational and doctrinal changes that have occurred during the last several years, the COO is in the process of being revised by the CANOSCOM staff. The updated COO document will include an annex detailing the CANOSCOM Force Generation and Managed Readiness Concept. The information provided in this report has therefore been based, in part, on information in the existing COO that remains valid, and on interviews with the J3 and J5 staff at CANOSCOM HQ.

E.2.2 CANOSCOM Approach to Readiness Reporting

CANOSCOM views readiness in terms of its ability to force generate the necessary support capabilities to ensure the success of CF operations. Therefore, subordinate formations and units do not report on the elements of a capability in great detail - there is no data provided on unit personnel establishments and manning levels or on equipment status, materiel holdings or the state of training across the command. Capabilities are the subject of readiness, not units, sub-units, or formations.

Formation or unit status, and the tasks being carried out at any given time, are factors in readiness reporting only to the extent that they impact on the formation's or unit's ability to force generate the capabilities that CANOSCOM considers necessary to support operations.

E.2.3 Support Capabilities

The support capabilities which form the basis of CANOSCOM readiness reporting incorporate those designated to accomplish High Readiness tasks, and other priority support capabilities designated by Commander (Comd) CANOSCOM. The requirement to provide specific support capabilities may be: directed by a senior authority such as the CDS; the result of contingency planning with Force Employers; or, directed by Comd CANOSCOM. The list of support capabilities will soon be undergoing a major review and validation by the CANOSCOM J5 Branch. This validation will examine whether or not the capabilities meet the operational support requirement, and will generate plans to mitigate any gaps. This validation may result in changes to the Capability Readiness (CAPRED) Report, either in what capabilities are reported or their readiness posture. The following are the present CANOSCOM support capabilities.

Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) Support

CANOSCOM will support the deployment/redeployment of the DART, as well as respond to day-to-day deployed operational support requirements. Included in this is CIS and National Command Control and Information System support from the CFJSR.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Support

CANOSCOM will focus on establishing and supporting the Strategic Lines of Communication (LOC) and performing any support task required to facilitate the execution of NEOs.

Theatre Activation Team (TAT)

Theatre Activation involves the establishment of a CF footprint in a new theatre of operations. A TAT is a mission-specific capability which may comprise a HQ and staff element, a Logistics element, an Engineer element, a CIS element, a Health Services Support element, and an integral service support element.

Rotation Staff Assistance Team (RSAT)

The RSAT will normally be composed of personnel from CEFCOM, with augmentation personnel from CANOSCOM, the Force Generator for the incoming rotation, and Task Force (TF) resources. Its role is to provide advice and to assist in the handover Board of Inquiry, oversee materiel accountability, and provide coordination between the outgoing and incoming TF staffs for support issues.

Mission Closure Team (MCT)

A MCT is a custom-built unit capable of planning, commanding, and conducting the drawdown and de-activation of an existing CF mission. It possesses all necessary skill sets to repatriate CF assets, conduct real-estate remediation, and is capable of assuming national command of the Theatre of Operation.

Intermediate Staging Teams (ISTs)

When required, an IST can be stood up as a general support unit capable of conducting strategic and operational-level sustainment activities for a theatre of operations. Typically situated in a location within tactical airlift range of the supported task force, an IST must be sustainable for as many rotations as the supported task force is deployed.

Domestic Operations (DOMOPS) Support

CANOSCOM resources will be made available to Canada COM and its regional Joint Task Force (JTF) Comds. CANOSCOM can provide the regional JTF Comd with specialized resources, including: augmentation of the support component command HQ and support capability necessary to establish LOCs between the closest Base/Wing and the area of operations; CIS links; as well as a Strategic LOC into a Joint Operations Area from the rest of Canada for the movement and distribution of support resources. Should the length of the LOC necessitate the establishment of a forward staging capability, CANOSCOM will contribute to the establishment of that capability.

Close Protection

The OS Military Police Group will provide Close Protection for senior department personnel.

Executive Deployable Suites (EDS)

The CFJSR will provide communications support to senior department personnel so that they have a communications capability regardless of their location.

E.2.4 Tasks to Subordinate Elements

Tasks

To provide the support capabilities necessary to support CF operations, elements of CANOSCOM and other integrated elements are assigned specific force generation tasks - each task with an associated force package. Taskings do not involve the commitment of complete units and are not limited to specific support capabilities. Rather, CANOSCOM formations and units may be tasked to contribute elements (sub-unit and smaller) to a range of support capabilities. For example: 4 CFMCU, through the CFJSG, might be tasked to provide Movement Control elements to support DART, TAT, MCT and IST operations; the CFJSR may be tasked to provide elements to support DART, NEO, TAT, DOM OPS, and EDS; 1 ESU, through the OS Engr Gp, may be required to provide elements to support DART and MCT; and so forth.

Readiness Levels and Response Times

Support missions or tasks have an assigned readiness level and response time or Notice to Move. These are articulated in orders and directives from higher commander to lower commander with the lower commander responsible for maintaining the required state of readiness.

E.2.5 Training

CANOSCOM has a Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) program, that is outlined in the CANOSCOM COO dated 24 Nov 06. This programme will shortly be revised. The Land Force Doctrine and Training System has a mandate to ensure that members of the CF receive the requisite direction, guidance, and assistance to ensure they attain an appropriate standard of training as directed by the Chief of Land Staff. A new training standard is being developed for Land Based Deployed Operations and will be utilized during the development of a new generic CANOSCOM PDT directive for Operational Support Visits and High Readiness Training.

E.3 Capability Readiness Reporting

E.3.1 Capability Readiness Report (CAPRED)

CANOSCOM monitors the readiness of support capabilities using the CAPRED Report. The CAPRED Report is a virtual, live, interactive web-based readiness reporting system that is accessed through the CANOSCOM Command View portal on TITAN. A CAPRED Aide-Memoire provides direction on how to fill out the CAPRED Report. The present CAPRED Report has been in use since late 2007 and was designed with the assistance of the Joint

Information and Intelligence Fusion Cell. The report will soon be undergoing a revision which may result in changes to design and functionality.

The CAPRED Report serves two purposes: firstly, it reflects the force generation status of CANOSCOM as a whole, and of individual CANOSCOM components, relative to each support capability with provision made for a Commander's assessment; and secondly, it reports on the total number of CANOSCOM personnel, in terms of activity and timeframe, presently deployed or forecast to be deployed in support of ongoing operations.

The main CANOSCOM report is a compilation of the formation/unit reports. On the CANOSCOM Command View portal, there is a main CANOSCOM CAPRED Report page with tabs for each formation and unit. Formations and units report their status using a simple color coded scheme and elaborating text (Figure E-1). When formation and unit reports are entered, the main CANOSCOM report page is automatically updated. The capability to input to the CAPRED Report does not extend below formation/unit level. Formations and units use individual reporting systems to gather readiness data from sub-units.

A sample of the main CANOSCOM CAPRED Report is shown in Figure E-2. Formation and unit report pages are similar in construct except that they report on the specific force generation tasks assigned to them for each support capability. For example, the CFJSG may be required to provide a HQ element, movement detachments, a contracting component etc. for one or more of CANOSCOM's support capabilities. Each of these tasks will be color coded against the relevant support capability on the CFJSG page. A YELLOW or RED designation anywhere in a formation or unit report will automatically change the readiness status of the formation or unit on the main CANOSCOM page. YELLOW and RED status designations require the Commander's comments on restrictions and prompts staff action at CANOSCOM HQ.

E.3.2 Battle Rhythm/ Readiness-Related Staff Activity.

CANOSCOM formations and units are required to update their CAPRED Reports on the CANOSCOM Command View Portal for 1200 hours every Friday. The reports are reviewed by the J3 staff and approved by the J3. On Mondays, the CAPRED is subject to a final review and approval by Comd CANOSCOM. When approved by the Comd, the CAPRED report is made available to staffs at all levels on the Command View portal. There is no specific report on CANOSCOM readiness made to the SJS. There is a link to the CONOSCOM CAPRED Report on the SJS Command View portal.

In addition to the CAPRED report, there are other readiness-related staff activities:

- Situation Reports (SITREP) - The CFJSR and CFJSG send detailed weekly SITREPs to CANOSCOM HQ. The SITREPs deal with unit status, capabilities, problems etc;
- Commander's Weekly Video Conference - This face-to-face meeting with the Comd allows formations and units to seek clarification on readiness issues, situational awareness, and receive direction if required; and
- Commander's Dashboard - The Commander's Dashboard is a comprehensive report on the progress being made in the CANOSCOM campaign plan of which one decisive point is

readiness. It is updated monthly. It serves to confirm that the required levels of readiness have been maintained and that the necessary management structures are in place.

STATUS	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
GREEN	Deployable	Capability (i.e. combat capability of Pers, Trg, Eqpt, Controlled Stores etc) is currently at 85% or greater of Trained Effective Strength and IAW CONPLAN or OPP NTM less Mission Specific Training. Low Risk
YELLOW	Restrictions Deployable with issues to be resolved	Capability (i.e. combat capability of Pers, Trg, Eqpt, Controlled Stores etc) is currently at 70% - 84% of Trained Effective Strength. Issues can be solved with OPP or CONPLAN NTM. Explanation of when status will change and comments on restrictions required. Medium Risk
RED	Not Deployable	Capability (i.e. combat capability of Pers, Trg, Eqpt, Controlled Stores etc) is currently at 69% or less of Trained Effective Strength. Issues cannot be solved with OPP or CONPLAN NTM. Explanation of when status will change and comments on restrictions required High Risk
GREY	Not Applicable	No expected involvement in mission

Figure E-1: Readiness Colour Coding Scheme

CANOSCOM CAPRED GENERAL STATUS							COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT	
CAPABILITIES STATUS	FORCASTED CHANGE DATE OR NTM	CFJSG	CFJSR	OS ENGR GP	OS MP GP	CMSG	CF H SupGp	COMMENTS ON RESTRICTIONS
DART SP								
NEO SP								
TAT								
RSAT								
MCT								
ISB								
DOM OPS SP								
CLOSE PROTECTION								
EDS								

Figure E- 2: Sample CANOSCOM CAPRED Report.

E.4 Conclusion

The CANOSCOM CAPRED reporting system provides a list of support capabilities considered necessary to provide operational support to the CF and details CANOSCOM's ability to force generate the resources necessary to provide those capabilities. It outlines, for Commanders at all levels, any CANOSCOM level operational support restrictions which could impact on operations.

Major reviews are underway which, once completed, will see updated policy guidance on CANOSCOM's Force Generation and Managed Readiness Concept, a validation of support capabilities and associated tasks, and possible changes to the CAPRED Report. The J3 is satisfied with the basic architecture and it can be assumed that CANOSCOM readiness reporting will continue to centre on the ability of its formations and units to force generate support capabilities.

Annex F Military Personnel Readiness Reporting

F.1 Introduction

The Defence Plan (DP) is the CF plan of execution for the current fiscal year and a guide for business planning for the three subsequent years. The DP provides the internal direction and guidance to Senior Advisors that defines how the Report on Plans and Priorities will be implemented, and who is responsible for getting it done. That guidance is articulated as Defence Tasks (DT) and is assigned to Level 1 senior advisors with the appropriate readiness requirement assigned. Most of DTs assigned to Chief Military Personnel (CMP) do not have a readiness level assigned. As such, CMP does not have a traditional unit readiness reporting system.

To manage CF military personnel strategy, planning, personnel production and personnel support, CMP has implemented and is further refining the CF Military Personnel Strategic and Governance Frameworks. These frameworks provide the means for pan-CF alignment of resources and efforts necessary to achieve the DTs. DND/CF strategic military personnel planning informs the Fight of Tomorrow Campaign Plan, that in turn guides lower level strategy development (e.g. CF Retention Strategy) and supporting initiatives. These major initiatives are approved by the Business Planning process and are subject to detailed monitoring and reporting at a variety of levels, up to and including Armed Forces Council (AFC) and Defence Management Committee. At the highest level, the annual DND Report on Plans and Priorities describes, in part, how strategic Military Personnel issues will be dealt with in the year ahead. At the end of each reporting year, the Departmental Performance Report provides a status report to the Government on how well plans and priorities were achieved. Assistant CMP is responsible for managing the Fight of Today and Director General Military Personnel (DGMP) is responsible for managing the Fights of Tomorrow and the Future.

F.2 Defence Tasks

CMP is the functional authority for military personnel management and is the Commander of Military Personnel Command. CMP is also the J1 for the CF. The J1 capability provides situational awareness and assistance to the SJS and Operational Commanders regarding the CF personnel capability. As J1, CMP has the responsibility to provide some elements of force generation. These include:

- DT-Health Services Support to Operations; and
- DT-Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Health Services Personnel.

CMP's other defence tasks deal with personnel generation, a function that is performed by recruiting, developing and sustaining people for the CF. CMP has aligned these tasks according to the integrating functions and pillars of military personnel management that represent the various elements of the personnel cycle and which define CMP's major activities. Each pillar has one or more subordinate Lines of Operations that each has specific effects to be achieved. This conceptual model forms the basis for the development and execution of the strategic campaign

plan to support and integrate tactical, operational and strategic timelines. The integrating functions, pillars and subordinate Lines of Operation are outlined below.

- **Integrating Functions** - *Planning/Coordination/Planning/Research*
 - ◆ DT-Military Management and Governance
 - ◆ DT-Military Employment Structure
 - ◆ DT-Military Personnel Research
- **Pillar** – *Recruit*
 - ◆ DT-Recruitment
 - ◆ DT-Career Management
 - ◆ DT-Transition to Civilian Life
- **Pillar** – *Train and Educate*
 - ◆ DT-Individual Training and Education
- **Pillar** – *Prepare*
 - ◆ DT-Readiness Health Care and Services
 - ◆ DT-Health Services Surveillance and Protection
 - ◆ DT-Spiritual Support
- **Pillar** – *Support*
 - ◆ DT-Morale and Welfare
 - ◆ DT-Compensation
 - ◆ DT-Official Languages, Employment Equity, Human Rights and Diversity
 - ◆ DT-Conflict Management
- **Pillar** – *Honour and Recognize*
 - ◆ DT-Canadian Military Identity
 - ◆ DT-Honour and Recognition

F.3 Management / Data Systems

The CF Military Personnel Management System is the means by which CMP manages the above tasks. It is a very complex system of interrelated and interdependent systems and sub-systems and encompasses over 70 functions. The Military Personnel Management Doctrine Manual (CFJP 1.0) issued in Jun 08 lays out the foundation for the System, provides a blueprint of how things are to be done and is the guide for action in producing the CF military personnel capability. In support of the CF Military Personnel Strategic and Governance Frameworks described above, CMP also depends on reporting outputs and various systems to provide the status and feedback as to how functions, activities and initiatives are actually progressing and how well the DTs are being met. Descriptions of the key data and reporting systems in use by CMP follow.

F.3.1 The Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS)

The Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS), commonly referred to as HRMS, is the only recognized official HR management system for Regular and Reserve Force members. The HRMS has over 180,000 records used by 12,000 users covering seventeen business areas and 220 business processes, ranging from military recruiting, position management, leave reporting, training, military occupational structure, to health and safety, civilian classification, staffing, and staff relations. The Military Individual Training and Education module is a key component of HRMS and is used to actively manage, monitor and report on over \$2 billion of annual expenditure on CF training and education. A significant transformation initiative has been launched to replace the outdated HRMS with a pan-CF integrated personnel management, pay, benefits and pension information system. The Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation project will bring in a new information system that will have expanded integration with other key DND/CF information systems, and with other Governmental information systems. This will result in a comprehensive capability for collecting, monitoring and reporting on all aspects of the CF Military Personnel Management System.

F.3.2 The CF Recruiting Information Management System (CFRIMS)

The CF Recruiting Information Management System (CFRIMS) is a shadow of the HRMS and is used by the recruiting centres to manage new candidates. The recruiting centres build a file on each candidate and once the file is complete, it is closed in CFRIMS and transmitted electronically for entry into HRMS.

F.3.3 The Basic Training List Management System (BTLMS)

The Basic Training List Management System (BTLMS) is the system used by the Recruit Schools. It is presently a stand-alone system, however, there are plans to make it an Enterprise System. It will be web-based allowing the ECS BTL managers to have visibility on training.

F.3.4 The CF Medical Information System (CFMIS)

The Canadian Forces Medical Information System is a new system that is presently being introduced. It will provide the CF with an integrated, enterprise wide, Health Information System consisting of several sub-systems that allow for the collection, provision, and sharing of health information as required by care providers, CF members, and decision-makers at all levels. It is web-based and runs over the existing Departmental Wide Area Network.

F.4 Operational Readiness Reporting

F.4.1 Health Services

DART is a contingency force and is always on 48 hours notice to move (NTM). Standing tasks are given from the CDS to his Level 1's. Consequently, the task for the provision of the medical component to the DART is tasked by CMP to CF Health Services (CFHS) as a standing task. As

for readiness, the DART has two components, personnel and equipment. The personnel readiness is managed through the CF Taskings Plans Operations application of which the CFHS fills the DART Table of Organization & Equipment (TO&E) and those on the TO&E are on 48 hrs NTM. There is no readiness reporting until the DART becomes active. Once the DART becomes active, CEFCOM or Canada COM becomes engaged depending on who leads the mission and the readiness posture of those personnel on the DART is verified again. In addition to CEFCOM or Canada COM, the DART HQ itself (Joint HQ) in Kingston also verifies readiness. Essentially the CFHS has two reporting chains for readiness once the DART becomes active: the JHQ and the appropriate Command.

The equipment for the DART is 100 percent deployable and is managed by the CFHS Central Medical Equipment Depot Detachment Trenton and the embedded CFHS personnel in the DART organization.

Similarly, the operational readiness of other tasked health services elements is reported by the operational commands to which they are assigned.

F.4.2 Personnel Readiness Verification (PRV) Report

The CF has adopted a two-tier screening process to monitor a member's Annual Readiness and Mission-Specific Readiness. The PRV report tracks both tiers of screening, as well as post-deployment reintegration. There are three parts to the report: the Annual Readiness Verification, ECS and Military Occupation Structure Specific Readiness Items, and Departure Assistance Group/Mission Specific Screening.

This report is generated from the HRMS. Access levels and the associated privileges control access to the report.

F.5 Personnel Generation Reporting

F.5.1 Projected Status Report (PSR)

The Personnel Requirement process starts with the development of the authorized strength or Preferred Manning Level (PML), by rank, for each Regular Force occupation in support of the forecast Regular Force Structure. Based on the PMLs, the Projected Status Report (PSR) is developed, which incorporates all known attrition and production data and forecasts the end-Fiscal Year (FY) trained effective strength (TES) to PML status of each occupation by rank.

The PSR is published twice per year. The main data source is HRMS augmented with inputs from, Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) and Director Personnel Generation Requirements (DPGR) forecasts.

F.5.2 Statement of Production Requirement (SPR) Report

The Personnel Requirement process culminates in the annual publication of the Statement of Production Requirements, which identifies the basic production required to bring an occupation's TES to PML in each of the next five FYs.

F.5.3 Strategic Intake Plan (SIP)

The SIP identifies by source program, the necessary intake in order to meet the production for a given year. DPGR uses Annual Military Occupation Review (AMOR) production and intake recommendations as the start point for development of the SIP. AMOR planning is for five years out. The draft SIP defines the CF recruiting and internal selection requirements and is completed by mid-May of each year for the following FY intake.

The Current Strategic Intake Summary 08/09 is an Excel spreadsheet that provides details of Officer and NCM recruiting intake by occupation for FY 08/09.

F.5.4 Future Strategic Intake Summary

The Future Strategic Intake Summary is an Excel spreadsheet that details yearly forecast of Officer and NCM intake by Occupation up to FY 11/12.

F.5.5 Occupation Status List FY 08/09 (Based on Spring 2008 PSR)

The Occupation Status List FY 08/09 is an Excel spreadsheet that provides the status of all occupations in relation to their respective PML forecasted to Mar 09. It provides a percentage forecast of TES versus Trained Effective Establishment for each occupation. It highlights the status of each using a traffic light color system: Green for less than 5% below PML; amber for less than 10% below PML; and red for more than 10% below PML.

F.5.6 Officer/NCM Position Details for 2008

Officer/NCM Position Details are Excel spreadsheets that provide details of all Officer/NCM positions in the CF - position number, effective date, capability component (CC), department ID, section ID, position description, position sub-type, rank, occupation group ID, occupation group description, position type, action reason, occupation group ID generic and occupation group generic description.

F.5.7 Production, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention Analysis (PARRA)

The PARRA report is a departmental level report that is compiled once per month. It presents information in either a graphical or numerical form, with actual month by month data depicted against a modelled prediction for the following areas:

- Force level establishment;

- Recruiting intake;
- Attrition;
- TES; and
- Paid strength.

The main data sources for PARRA include HRMS, occupational analyses and CFRG.

F.5.8 CF Personnel Management Report

The CF Personnel Management Report is a key report generated by CMP. It is in a PowerPoint format, presented monthly at AFC and it provides a snapshot of the personnel situation of the CF. The report is available on the CMP website. The report provides statistical data on: Force Expansion, Personnel Production, Actual CF Growth, CF Personnel Statistics by CCs, Regular Force Demographics, Attrition and Attrition Patterns, Recruiting, Readiness-Physical Fitness, Readiness-Dental Fitness, and Readiness-Medical Fitness. The data to populate these slides comes from various sources: PARRA Database, Director Strategic Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Director Human Resource Information Management, and Deputy Chief of Staff Dental.

F.6 Conclusion

CMP has developed and is further refining CF Military Personnel Strategic and Governance Frameworks that align military personnel policies, programs and initiatives to achieve assigned DTs. The Military Personnel reporting system is built on well-defined processes and procedures, an integrated data collection system and a highly robust management system. The planned replacement of the existing HRMS with a personnel information system that includes pay and pension and that is much better integrated with key DND/CF and Other Government Department information systems, will result in a comprehensive capability for collecting, monitoring and reporting on all aspects of the CF Military Personnel Management System.

A review of military personnel reports indicates that they currently do not provide comprehensive, integrated measurement of how personnel production is functioning as an end-to-end process. DGMP is addressing this issue.

List of abbreviations/acronyms

1 Cdn Air Div	1 Canadian Air Division
AFC	Armed Forces Council
AFCCIS	Air Force Command and Control Information System
AFP	Air Force Plan
AIRCOM	Air Command
AMOR	Annual Military Occupation Review
ARes	Army Reserve
ARMOR	Applications for Reporting and Measurement of Operational Readiness
BTLMS	Basic Training List Management System
Canada COM	Canada Command
CANOSCOM	Canadian Operational Support Command
CAPRED	Capability Readiness
CARR	Capability and Readiness Report
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CC	Capability Component
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
CF	Canadian Forces
CFHS	Canadian Force Health Services
CFJSG	Canadian Force Joint Support Group
CFJSR	Canadian Forces Joint Signals Regiment
CFMCU	Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit
CFMIS	Canadian Forces Medical Information System
CFRG	Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CFRIMS	Canadian Forces Recruiting Information Management System
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CLS	Chief of Land Staff
CMP	Chief Military Personnel

CMS	Chief of Maritime Staff
CMSG	Canadian Materiel Support Group
CMTC	Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre
Comd.	Commander
COO	Concept of Operations
CR	Capability Releases
CTC	Combat Training Centre
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DGMP	Director General Military Personnel
DND	Department of National Defence
DOMOPS	Domestic Operations
DP	Defence Plan
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance
DPGR	Director Personnel Generation Requirements
DRDC	Defence Research & Development Canada
DRDKIM	Director Research and Development Knowledge and Information Management
DT	Defence Tasks
ECS	Environmental Chief of Staff
EDS	Executive Deployable Suites
ESU	Engineer Support Unit
FE	Force Employer, Force Employment
FG	Force Generator, Force Generation
FY	Fiscal Year
HQ	Headquarters
HRMIS / HRMS	Human Resources Management (Information) System
IST	Intermediate Staging Team
LFCR	Land Force Capability Release
LOC	Lines of Communication
MAJAID	Major Air Disaster
MARCORD	Maritime Command Orders
MARLANT	Maritime Atlantic
MARLANTORD	Maritime Atlantic Command Orders

MARPAC	Maritime Pacific
MARPACORD	Maritime Pacific Command Orders
MCT	Mission Closure Team
MRP	Managed Readiness Plan
MRS	Managed Readiness System
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NTM	Notice to Move
OPEVAL	Operational Evaluation
OS	Operational Support
OS Engr Grp	Operational Support Engineer Group
PARRA	Production, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention Analysis
PDT	Pre-deployment Training
PML	Preferred Manning Level
PRV	Personnel Readiness Verification
PSR	Projected Status Report
R&S	Readiness and Sustainment
RSAT	Rotation Staff Assistance Team
SIP	Strategic Intake Plan
SITREP	Situation Report
SJS	Strategic Joint Staff
TARM	Total Air Resource Management
TAT	Theatre Activation Team
TES	Trained Effective Strength
TF	Task Force
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
WSA	Wing Self Assessment
YFR	Yearly Flying Rates

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As part of the post-transformation effort to re-vitalize doctrine and direction at the Canadian Forces (CF) strategic level, the Strategic Joint Staff developed a CF Readiness Framework which will provide the Chief of Defence Staff and senior management in the Department of National Defence with the tools to understand and to manage CF operational readiness. This leads initially to a two-step process in determining the requirements for a strategic level system. The first is to gather an appreciation of the existing reporting systems – Land, Maritime, Aerospace, Operational Support and Military Personnel. The second is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of those systems and thereby develop broad requirements for a strategic readiness management system.

The existing Force Generator reporting systems do what they are meant to do, that is, simply report a Commander's assessment of whether or not his units are ready to do their assigned Defence Tasks. Unfortunately, the approaches used differ to the point that detailed comparison of the existing systems is not practicable. The second step in the process provided a number of key assessments that would drive development of a system to support three objectives:
Making decisions for current operations;

Reviewing standing readiness levels of current forces against the demands of today's world, that is, that the Capability Statements are still current and correctly structured; and

Using predictive data to look ahead for the major risks approaching.

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Integrated Managed Readiness; Force Generator Readiness Systems; Readiness Requirements



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