



# What They've Said

*Meeting Reports, Commentaries, and Reviews, 1994-2008*

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DRDC CORA

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## **Defence R&D Canada – CORA**

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## **Abstract**

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This Technical Notes contains work done by the author on a variety of subjects between 1994 and 2008 which was not published elsewhere.

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## Table of contents

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Abstract .....	i
Table of contents .....	iii
1....Redefining Security Policies: The Yugoslav Case .....	1
2.... Why Bosnia? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe .....	4
3.... The Invention of Peace .....	6
4.... Chomsky on 9/11 .....	8
5.... Canada’s Secret Commandos .....	10
6.... Global Terrorism: Partnering Against Terror .....	12
7.... Comments on Mark Salter’s “Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession” .....	17
8.... Grand Strategy .....	20
9.... From Homeland to Homegrown: Terrorism in Canada .....	22
10.. The Radical Dawa in Transition .....	24
11 ..NATO in Afghanistan.....	26
12.. Israel’s Strategic Situation .....	28
13.. Global Governance and the Obama Administration .....	30
Bibliography .....	33
Distribution list.....	34

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# 1 Redefining Security Policies: The Yugoslav Case

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On 28-29 March 1994, the Collège militaire royal de St-Jean (CMR St-Jean) and the Centre québécois de relations internationales (CQRI) of Université Laval hosted a conference on “*La redéfinition des politiques de sécurité : le cas yougoslave* [Redefining Security Policy : The Yugoslav Case].” The conference, held at the Manoir St-Castin, Quebec, was attended by 84 people from the private sector, academia and government. National Defence Headquarters had representatives from the Directorate of Strategic Analysis (D Strat A), the Directorate of Public Policy (D Public Pol), the Director General Public Affairs (DGPA) and J3 Peacekeeping (J3 Pk).

Panelists were asked to address, in turn, the international, regional and national dimensions of security, the latter through an examination of Russian, French, American and Canadian foreign and security policies. The length, breadth and quality of the presentations varied widely. Only those presentations of primary interests to the Department are covered in this note.

## **International and Regional Dimensions of Security**

Professor Albert Legault and PhD students J. Fournier and I. Desmartis, all from Université Laval, put forward a theoretical understanding of the United Nations collective security framework using the regime theory literature. They argued that regimes maximize the common good while minimizing the costs to each participant. Empirically, they attempted to show that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement activities can in fact be understood as regimes because they have well-defined—though not necessarily sufficient—principles, norms, rules, procedures and even verification mechanisms, either at the international or regional level (e.g., the European Union, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Their argument, however, was rejected by Professor John Sigler of Carleton University, who argued that what they had developed was in fact a taxonomy and not a theory. He pointed out their neglect of the rich British literature on the subject (i.e., Hedley Bull and his notion of international society) and their heavy reliance on the American regime theory literature. He also would have liked their presentation to factor in issues such as peacebuilding, economics and the role of non-governmental organizations. More importantly, however, was the absence of any discussion of decisionmaking within a regime, which is essential to explain its formation, its current existence and future path. While regime structure was discussed, its main actor, the state, was left out even though it is the element of change in any regime.

Stanislav Kirshbaum of York University in Toronto reviewed the literature on conflict theory and ethnicity. He argued that protracted social conflicts are no more than answers to some basic unmet needs, such as justice. Ethnic conflicts, in other words, are not the result of the ethnic composition of any given community. As for the Yugoslav case, Kirshbaum noted that the United Nations has been forced to change its focus on individual rights for a focus on “national rights.” The prevention of other Yugoslavias depends, in his opinion, on the way by which the international community will redefine and apply the concept of self-determination. In doing so, the United Nations and other international organizations will need to carefully consider the role and importance of ethnicity in conflicts.

Josiane Tercinet of Université Pierre Mendès France in Grenoble discussed the successes of humanitarian assistance as an instrument for conflict management. She reviewed United Nations humanitarian missions conducted without the permission of the receiving countries and pointed to a shift towards a militarization

of these missions (as reflected, for example, in UN Security Council Resolution 770). She argued that there is a clear lack of thinking on the relationship between humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. Although not ideal, she suggested that the two can and should interact. She concluded her presentation by asking for better political assessments of the problems at hand, and urged civilian authorities not to delegate everything to the military.

Charles Kupchan of the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and a former staff member of President Bill Clinton's National Security Council started his presentation by laying out two assumptions: (1) contrary to popular perception the Yugoslav conflict was not waiting to happen: the Yugoslav breakup is the result of irresponsible élites who manipulated public opinion; and (2) the international community was unprepared to deal with that type of conflict. For instance, the CSCE had a mandate to play a role but no capability to do so, whereas NATO had no such mandate but the capability to do so. Before recognition is granted to a political entity asking for it, Kupchan proposed that two conditions be met: (1) the entity must have the means of self defence; and (2) the mechanisms to protect minorities on its territory. The absence of these two conditions is part of the explanation for the current Yugoslav situation. He also suggested that more attention be given to conflict prevention and diplomacy than to crisis and conflict management. He expressed his support for Clinton's policy in the Balkans to preserve multi-ethnic communities, and stressed the importance of current U.S.-French cooperation in attempting to resolve the Yugoslav conflict. With respect to the use of force, however, he criticized the U.S. policy of "all or nothing." He noted that a willingness to adjust to conflicts other than all-out wars is needed.

In his discussion of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), Kupchan highlighted the assumptions behind its creation: (1) Europe's landscape is too fluid and uncertain for NATO's expansion now, but it is important to know what the options are; (2) now is not the time to draw a dividing line by accepting the Visegrad four (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) and/or the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); (3) PfP could serve as a vehicle to integrate new democracies; and (4) PfP is a recognition that Russia can and will project power in the "near abroad" (countries contiguous to Russia formerly part of the Soviet Union). Within PfP, however, Russia would be excepted to discuss with NATO when and how it would use force. This aspect, however, is the least developed of the PfP.

In his assessment of the next ten years, Kupchan suggested three possible courses of action: (1) Russia will return to pose a threat to Europe with NATO continuing in its role as a traditional military alliance; (2) NATO will be progressively and fundamentally transformed into a collective security system encompassing Russia as a security partner of equal weight in Europe; and (3) regional sub-groupings will appear to manage security issues. In his opinion, it is unlikely that the NATO security guarantee will be extended to the Visegrad four or to other counties in Central and Eastern Europe. To Kupchan, the most likely course is the concurrent development of regionalization and pan-Europeanization.

Philippe Chapal of Université Pierre Mendès France discussed UN reforms and the lessons of the Yugoslav crisis. He underscored the international community's lack of "internationalist conscience" to explain the difficulty the United Nations has in establishing its own independent forces. He argued that peacekeeping reforms should focus on conflict prevention and crisis management, areas where the United Nations has failed of late (e.g., Haiti, Angola, etc.).

Jean-François Guilhaudis of Université Pierre Mendès France immediately followed with remarks on European security institutional reforms in the aftermath of the Yugoslav conflict. He considered the Yugoslav conflict as a new factor affecting the reform process that started in 1989-1990. Yugoslavia has illustrated the incapacity of European security institutions in resolving regional conflicts as well as the continuing relevance of NATO. Yugoslavia also demonstrated, he opined, the limits of the Western security system and the necessity of involving Russia if regional problems are to be resolved. Much has been done nonetheless, the Maastricht Treaty being a major accomplishment. The Yugoslav conflict has presented a very good opportunity to reform the Western security system and to push NATO out of area. The Yugoslav conflict, incidentally, has forced Europeans to recognize that good intentions without the means to achieve them are worthless.

### **National Dimensions of Security**

Charles-Philippe David of CMR discussed U.S. foreign policy, his primary area of expertise. He first made the point that there is a continuity between President George H.W. Bush's policies on Yugoslavia and those of President Clinton. He then argued that these policies are based on circumventing the conflict and relinquishing any U.S. involvement to European countries and international organizations. Finally, he argued that the explanation of the circumvention strategy can be found in the lessons of history (e.g., Vietnam, the Gulf War, etc.).

Rémi Hyppia of the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQUAM) focused his talk on Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia post-1991. He divided Russia's policies into phases, the first one being the Atlantic phase ranging from July 1991 to the end of 1992, characterized by events such as the signature of the Charter of Paris. The second phase, starting in early 1993, and still ongoing, is the pragmatic phase. This phase has brought Russia the credibility it desperately wanted in world affairs.

The last two presentations were made by Daniel Colard of the Université de Franche-Comté and Canadian Forces Major General Gaudreau. Colard talked about France's policy in the Balkans. He characterized France as an engaged spectator: engaged because it is on the first line among all of the countries and organizations involved in resolving the Yugoslav conflict, and a spectator because it refuses to wage war. The Yugoslav conflict, he noted, convinced France to act at the European level by proposing Stability Talks, and at the national level by tabling a new White Paper. Major General Gaudreau, finally, reviewed the Canadian policy on, and involvement in, peacekeeping. In particular, he noted the lack of knowledge of the work conducted by Canadian troops in Yugoslavia in European media circles.

### **Comment**

Many of the presentations were too theoretical in substance to engage participants in discussions. Others were so descriptive and general in tone and substance to the point of being pointless. Overall, a very disappointing conference that provided no new insights to the Department.

## 2 Why Bosnia? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe

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On 21 October 1997, Professor Charles Ingrao spoke on Bosnia and ethnic conflict in Central Europe at the invitation of the Austrian Canadian Council, Carleton University's Centre for European Politics and Society, and Carleton University's Institute of Central/East European and Russian Areas Studies. A history professor at Purdue University, Dr. Ingrao has advised the U.S. government, the United Nations, the European Community and the War Crimes Research Office, and is currently the editor of the *Austrian History Yearbook*.

Dr. Ingrao first highlighted that public discussions on Bosnia and ethnic conflict in Central Europe are characterized by a serious lack of ignorance of Central and Eastern European history. This reflects a lack of interest which is compounded by language barriers and the absence of a great power in the region (folks are much more attracted to the history and predicament of great powers). Notwithstanding, there are strategically important reasons—even though they are not obvious—to be interested in what is happening there. One of these reasons is the lessons to be learned for the region's distinctiveness from the Western experience. These include:

- Geopolitics has informed state formation, including the degree of centralization or decentralization of each state. For example, the Turkish empire had to delegate powers to the religious-based local governments in order to exercise effective authority over its large multi-ethnic territories.
- Multi-ethnicity can and does work. Ethnic problems are usually found within bi-ethnic, bilingual, or bi-confessional societies.
- The notion of nation-state or nationhood was imposed by elites upon regions that proved to be incompatible with such a construct. The imposition of this notion was evident in the treaties following the end of the First World War, with the Jewish people particularly suffering as a result (they were seen as a cancerous element preventing many nations of the former Habsburg empire from forming their own state).
- During the Second World War, Hitler redrew borders along ethnic lines that made sense to him. The puppet states that resulted from this effort were never recognized by Western powers at the conclusion of the war. The multi-ethnic model prevailed, strongly supported by Josef Stalin.

Taking these historical lessons into consideration, Ingrao offered a number of alternatives for the end of the Yugoslav conflict, the first one being judged more likely than the others:

- The Dayton Agreement will be fully implemented and finally restored. The Agreement, however, moves further away the Yugoslav people from the multi-ethnic model. Although an element of inter-ethnic understanding remains post-Dayton, it is preferable not to have people think about their ethnic identity.
- Dayton will ultimately fail. Partition will occur for the sake of forming homogeneous ethnic entities.

- War will resume. If it were to happen, the Serbs would loose and the Muslims win, and the region would come to resemble the Palestine/Israel situation of 1948.

### 3 The Invention of Peace

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Michael Howard. *The Invention of Peace*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. 113. \$15.00 (hardcover).

Historian Michael Howard, well known for his classics *The Franco-Prussian War* (1961) and *War in European History* (1976), this time offers us, in the form of this very concise book, his thoughts on the history of peace, from 800 to today. While Sir Michael tells us that his ideas are not new, having been covered at length before, he reassures us that they bear being revisited, a view which I wholeheartedly share.

In his introduction, Howard notes that there is much more to peace than the absence of it, what we would call negative peace. Positive peace, by contrast, implies a modicum of justice and social order, but is much harder to achieve, can be broken over several years, and, indeed, has had a short existence, having been embraced first during Enlightenment. War and peace “starts in the mind of men,” further notes Howard, but between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, war was a function of the “natural or divine order.” How war was legitimized on such ground during that period is the focus of the second chapter.

In the third chapter, Howard turns his attention to the period 1789 to 1918, when peoples and nations reconceptualized war and its legitimacy. With the Napoleonic era took form “organized warfare by land and sea” and wars of liberation against oppressors. States and their leaders, however, would soon increasingly dismiss war as a natural contest between them and, in Europe, assume “joint responsibility” in its avoidance (the Concert of Europe). Three approaches to the preservation of peace however competed against each other: the conservative notion, interested in the status quo; the liberal, interested in changes in favor of socio-economic progress; and the nationalist, which favored the self-determination and the protection of newly formed nations by force if necessary. By 1871, nation states had prevailed. Created by war, the nation-state system, however, did not prove to be a source of stability or social progress either and immensely contributed to the onset of the First World War. This war had a lasting impact on those who fought in it and opened the door to the era of idealists and ideologues, who prevailed until 1989.

In his fourth chapter, Howard thus shows how liberal democracy and communism struggled over their competing visions for peace and world order. Hitler, of course, resisted both approaches and used war as the new order in itself. In the Second World War’s aftermath, liberal democracy and communism resumed their fight, convinced that the elimination of the other would finally ensure a peaceful world order. The advent of nuclear weapons, according to Howard, may not have prevented a third world war; widespread war-weariness could have been sufficient to keep the West and the East from a major confrontation. War by proxies, on the other hand, would likely have occurred, Cold War or not, because of their local or regional nature. The Superpowers simply exacerbated and bankrolled many of them.

The Cold War no longer an issue, Howard concludes his overview with trenchant observations. The new circumstances characterizing the post-Cold War era, such as freedom of communications, globalization,

and the advances of liberal democracy and the market economy, are simply no guarantees for peace. Many groups all over the world, often using religious arguments and the erosion of state authority, have vested interests in maintaining traditional orders and rejecting Western values. What is, therefore, the basis of the new world order? To this question, Howard answers that “American military supremacy [...] provides the unchallengeable basis for the new world order.” Enforcing world order, cautions Howard, remains very difficult. To do so requires a stop to the erosion of state authority (states, argues Howard, remain “the only effective mechanism through which people can govern themselves”) and the “creation of a world community sharing the characteristics that make possible domestic order.”

In the end, Howard recognizes that peace is not necessarily a natural characteristic of mankind. He is hopeful, however, that every period of time will keep a bit of the Enlightenment idea so peace would have a chance.

An essay more than an historical treatise, this book will satisfy many because it is easy to read, historically grounded, and full of interesting insights on war and peace. To the avid and expert reader, however, this is a book lacking in depth and scholarship. Whatever your view is, I contend that it is a very adequate primer, or introductory text, to a very complex subject matter. As such, I recommend it to anyone interested in this enduring question of importance.

## 4 Chomsky on 9/11

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Noam Chomsky, *9-11*, edited by Greg Ruggerio, New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2001, 128 pages. ISBN 1-58322-489-0. US\$8.95

A well-known intellectual spokesperson for the Left, Noam Chomsky has been sought after by the world's print and broadcast media since September 11, 2001. What he said in the interviews he granted and the e-mails he exchanged with reporters in the month following the terrorist attacks has been collected in this little Open Media book. The result is a piece of work that forcefully shows where Chomsky stands on terrorism and 9-11, why he thinks 9-11 happened, and where the blame should be laid for the attacks.

Chomsky acknowledges that the September 11 attacks against the United States represent something new, not because of their scale or the number of fatalities, but because of the target itself: the continental United States. Chomsky notes that for once the gun has been turned against America, which for over a hundred years has used force to extend its reach, conquer areas such as Hawaii and the Philippines, killing hundreds of thousands of people in the process. In fact, Chomsky advances, the United States is the world "leading terrorist state," (pages 23, 40) citing in support of this view the 1986 World Court decision against the United States in the case of the mining of the Nicaraguan waters. In other words, the United States is not an innocent victim (page 35). The September 11 attacks, therefore, would be symptomatic of authority and power problems, particularly among those who are bitter and angry at the role the United States plays in their countries or region.

In support of his argument that the "United States continues international terrorism," Chomsky cites the case of Iraq and the death of half a million children (page 44). The problem with this argument is that the United States has not caused their death, but that Saddam Hussein did by allocating his financial resources to the development of weapons of mass destruction and the maintenance of a repressive police regime rather than funding the areas of government and society that would sustain the well-being of the Iraqi population. The blame for the death of innocent children should squarely fall on Hussein and his acolytes and not on the United States. Hussein has the ability to decide what to do with his government budget; it is pretty clear what he has chosen to do. It is therefore hard for this reviewer to understand why Chomsky has let himself caught in the Iraqi propaganda web.

Chomsky cautions not to use the terms "war against terrorism" lightly, as their use may be construed as propaganda, especially if the targeted people encompass more than the terrorists themselves. He goes even further when arguing that the attacks would be/have been exploited by both sides. On the side of the authorities, the attacks could be or have already been exploited to "accelerate the agenda of militarization, regimentation, reversal of social democratic programs, transfer of wealth to narrow sectors, and undermining democracy [...]" (page 19) through the elimination, for instance, of "public debate and protest." (page 34) After all, as Chomsky says, "there are plenty of bin Ladens on both sides, as usual." He fails to elaborate on this point, however (page 34). But he acknowledges that any reversal of long standing rights would not stand the test of time because of the cultural and institutional barriers in place within the United States itself.

He openly criticizes Israel for seizing this “window of opportunity” created by 9-11 to “crush Palestinians with impunity.” He forgets, however, that there are two sides to the Israeli conflict and that Palestinian terrorism has something to do with the current situation in Israel. Moreover, and quite annoyingly in my opinion, he refuses to blame those who commit acts (on either side) for which they should be held accountable and rather prefers to blame a third party (the United States is the usual culprit). This blaming game is even more disturbing when he writes on the book’s last page that we should stay “on the course of truth and honesty and concern for the human consequences of what one does, or fails to do.” If only he would follow this maxim himself. He also criticizes the mainstream media for supporting the authorities and rallying the population to the cause, I assume, of defeating terrorism. Being on the side of power is just what Chomsky thinks the media does in times of crisis, as if the thousands of journalists and commentators out there all suddenly lose their capacity to judge and critic the events and decisions of the day.

What could the United States do? Chomsky responds that to reduce the probability of other mass-scale terrorist attacks against the United States, the latter should use legal and peaceful means to resolve problems rather than escalating the cycle of violence through the use of extreme violence (page 26). On the other hand, he criticizes the United States for not forcefully intervening in places where minorities were also abused (ie, Kurdistan, Indonesia, etc.). He would thus be useful if Chomsky could elaborate further on the criteria by which an intervention from the United States would be legitimate.

While Chomsky says that he does not “like to generalize,” (page 54), this is exactly what he has done by basing his various arguments on examples taken out of context or by trying to explain something by looking at only one side of the equation. It is unfortunate that an academic with his reputation refrains from looking with some semblance of objectivity at a problem as serious as terrorism. His views are driven by his own ideological biases; he makes no effort to analyze counter-arguments and only uses facts and examples that suit him well, even to the point of selectively omitting the context and root causes of the cases chosen to show his points. His credibility would be better served if he were only to avoid fallacies of omission and assumption. His book, however, is useful in that it lays out a series of arguments that the United States should try to address when selling its policies to the American people and foreigners. But because it is far from being an objective look at 9-11 and its implications, I would not recommend it to laymen.

## 5 Canada's Secret Commandos

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David Pugliese, *Canada's Secret Commandos: The Unauthorized Story of Joint Task Force Two*, Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2002. ISBN 1-895896-18-5. 231 pages. CAN\$21.99

Pugliese's is the first detailed account of Canada's special force unit, Joint Task Force Two (JTF-2). Formed in 1993 as a counterterrorist unit, JTF-2 was ready when, on October 8, 2001, the Canadian Minister of National Defence announced that it would deploy to Afghanistan to undertake missions in support of the war against terrorism. Although it had taken part in a dozen missions abroad before (for instance in Albania, Bosnia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Haiti, Peru, and Zaire), Afghanistan would mark the unit's first major deployment as part of a fighting coalition. Although details of its accomplishments in Afghanistan are sketchy (40 JTF-2 soldiers arrived in Kandahar in December 2001 to help eliminate lingering pockets of resistance in the region), it is believed that JTF-2's one-year deployment was very successful and effectively battle hardened the unit.

Activated in April 1993, JTF-2, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (LCol) Ray Romses, who had just commanded the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI), ran its first recruit course in August 1992, and selected soldiers primarily from the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the PPCLI as initial members of the secretive unit (sailors and airmen would be added later to round out the unit's capabilities). In March 1993, LCol Romses (he would soon be promoted to Colonel) declared JTF-2 ready to assume its functions from the federal police's Special Emergency Response Team (SERT). Once activated, it was placed under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and received its orders from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS).

JTF-2 was initially equipped with the MP-5 submachine gun and provided with two (later increased to three) CH-135 Twin Huey helicopters from the 450<sup>th</sup> Tactical Helicopter Squadron. In 1994, the CDS approved an increase of personnel (two captains, five sergeants, and 40 other ranks) and expanded the unit's mission beyond counterterrorism to include long-range reconnaissance behind enemy lines and sniping missions. This same year, Colonel Romses was replaced by LCol J.R. Gaston Côté. In 1996, JTF-2 added more soldiers, now reaching well over 100, and added close protection of VIPs and foreign training to its mandate. Over the next 12 months, its Twin Hueys would be retired and replaced by newer CH-146 Griffons from 427<sup>th</sup> Tactical Helicopter Squadron. In 1997, LCol Côté was replaced by Colonel Barry MacLoed, who would command the unit until 2000. At the time of its deployment to Afghanistan, the unit had grown to 300 personnel and plans were afoot to double its strength to 600 within the next five years.

Pugliese does not gloss over the various disciplinary problems encountered by JTF-2 soldiers over the years, and notes in great details that in the first few years of the unit the selection process often did not take into proper account soldiers' past disciplinary problems nor did it include proper psychological assessments. Pugliese also has comprehensive chapters on the weapons and equipment used by JTF-2, the unit's selection process, and other countries' special forces. Given JTF-2's ever enlarging range of responsibilities, resources and reach, Pugliese regrets that there is no oversight or accountability mechanism in place for the unit. Compounded by the secrecy surrounding JTF-2, this lack of oversight may prevent wrongdoings and injustices from being corrected. On the other hand, Pugliese recognizes that JTF-2 is one shining element within a military facing a myriad of problems, from the obsolescence of its equipment to the lack of sufficient strategic lift.

JTF-2 is a relatively new unit compared to its more seasoned counterparts in the United States or the United Kingdom. That Pugliese was able to provide his readers with so much information despite the

secrecy surrounding the unit is quite an accomplishment. While the more relevant operational details of the unit's missions could not be revealed, this book is likely to serve as a primer on Canada's new elite force for years to come. Given the apparent success encountered by JTF-2 in Afghanistan, there are hopes that the government would allow part of that story to be told soon. In the meantime, I recommend Pugliese's book to anyone interested in special forces.

## 6 Global Terrorism: Partnering Against Terror

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### Introduction

On March 20-22, 2006, ASIS International hosted its 24<sup>th</sup> *Annual Government/Industry Conference on Global Terrorism* in Arlington, Virginia. Sponsored by the ASIS Global Terrorism, Political Instability, and International Crime Council, the conference focused on six themes:

- “Public-Private Sector Partnership and avenues for collaboration;”
- “Suicide bombings and their potential as an international threat;”
- “Challenges to transportation security and lessons learned from the Madrid and London bombings;”
- “The media’s influence on the public’s view of terrorism;”
- “The DOD’s [U.S. Department of Defense] response and support to Hurricane Katrina;” and
- “The nature and level of threats against Americans that exist in particular regions of the world.”

The conference was primarily attended by security professionals from the largest U.S. corporations (e.g., ExxonMobil, Northrup Grumman, Raytheon, IBM Corporation) and U.S. government security officials. Canadian participation was limited to the Acting Director of Intelligence at Transport Canada (myself), an Information Liaison officer from the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), the president of Risk Strategies in Delta, British Columbia, the president of Tri Wolf Consulting in Kemptonville, Ontario, a security analyst from Hydro-Québec and a private individual from Toronto. There were also a few representatives from Chile, Panama, Singapore, Spain and the United Nations.

Sessions started promptly at 08:00 am each day. Due to the number of very important persons attending and the sensitivity of the topics discussed, the meeting room was searched for bombs by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) before the start of each day’s first morning session, and Arlington County police officers were posted at each entrance to check for identification before allowing access to the meeting room.

### Session 1: Understanding the Role of DHS in Partnering Against Terrorism Now and in the Future

After the opening remarks and welcome by ASIS officials, the floor was given to Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Responsible for coordinating with the intelligence community and providing guidance on homeland security specific issues, Allen was specifically suited for this task. Prior to joining the DHS, he served as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Chair of the National Intelligence Collection Board, and as a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer.

Allen opened his remarks by alluding to the threat posed by Al Qaida. He noted that although the terrorist group’s top echelons have been severely hit in the global war against terrorism, it remains defiant and committed to targeting the U.S. homeland. Its leaders are still pursuing the establishment of a Caliphate and the overthrowing of regimes inimical to its cause, such as the one reigning in Saudi Arabia. They are doing so through continuous adaptation to their changing circumstances and by being media and internet savvy. Al Qaida, however, is no longer, if it ever was, a monolithic organization with a strong hierarchy. Instead, Allen explained, there are now three components to what is generally referred to as Al Qaida: 1) the Al Qaida central command, which only gives general direction to its followers; 2) Al Qaida-affiliated Sunni Islamist networks, which share its goals and ideological tenets; and 3) small groups or individuals loosely linked to Al Qaida, usually homegrown.

At the helm of the intelligence apparatus at the DHS, Allen sees a variety of threats, many of which are not credible and simple fabrications. Only a small number of routinely reported threats to the DHS are real and credible. In this regard, he argued that lessons should be learned from the British people, who have experienced years of Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist attacks and attacks by Islamist extremists on July 7 and 21, 2005. Their transportation systems did not come to a grinding halt for long; they in fact resume operations as soon as possible after being hit. Stopping operations would have meant giving in to the terrorists. Resilience, he said, is an important factor in our fight against terrorism.

With respect to intelligence at DHS, Allen mentioned that an Office of Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) was established in 2002. When Michael Chertoff took over as Secretary of Homeland Security in February 2005, he rapidly recognized that intelligence was central to all that the DHS was doing, and hence decided to create a position of Chief Intelligence Officer (CIO) reporting directly to him. As CIO, Allen works very closely with the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The close relationship with these two bodies is essential to the DHS if it is to understand, detect and prevent threats to the homeland. In addition to threats, Allen is also concerned with vulnerabilities, thus the DHS emphasis on plans to secure key infrastructures from potential threats. In this regard, he noted the establishment by DHS in 2005 of the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), which is tasked with the development of products tailored to the needs of infrastructure owners and operators and the management of a Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) system. Allen also briefly mentioned the DHS Advisory System, which provides warning information to all citizens and advisories (in the form of bulletins) to state and local authorities and the public sector. In 2005 alone, 35 joint DHS-FBI Bulletins were issued.

Allen concluded his remarks by stating personal views:

- Reaching out to stakeholders at the state and local levels has not gone far enough; for instance, the DHS must improve its links to state fusion centres;
- Because the next terrorist threat could be local in nature, local threat reporting should link to the SAR network. Threat information should flow from this network;
- There is only one DHS officer deployed locally (with the Los Angeles Police intelligence unit). More DHS officers should be deployed locally;
- The various DHS intelligence functions are not yet adequately integrated.

In the Questions & Answers period which followed Allen's remarks, Allen was asked what his solution was to distribute classified threat information locally when most local officials do not possess valid federal security clearances. He responded that the intelligence agencies have made inroads in dealing with this issue, for example by adding unclassified tear lines to their classified reporting, or simply producing more reports at the Unclassified/For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) level. However, any release of classified information must be coordinated, which could affect timeliness and possibly even negate the release being contemplated. Allen admitted that there are still lots of obstacles to sharing intelligence with the private sector; too many compartments are still in existence for instance. In the end, Allen believed that intelligence would be released in light of potentially catastrophic attacks, but conceded that there is a long way to go before all sharing issues are resolved.

Asked to comment on the Information Sharing Advisory Councils (ISAC), created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to facilitate communications with the private sector regarding homeland security concerns, Allen said that they exist by sectors (there is a general council made up of a number of private sector councils, of which there are now 17) and are important to the DHS. He

suggested to private sector representatives that they should try to work with the Councils, for example by reporting suspicious activities, and cautioned them to be less cynical and more energetic in this regard.

## **Session 2: DOD's Role and Lessons Learned in Response to Hurricane Katrina**

Peter Verga, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, followed Charlie Allen with remarks on the role of the U.S. Department of Defense in homeland defence, which he defines as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defence infrastructure against external threat and aggression and other threats as directed by the President.

Within the United States, the Department of Defense conducts maritime interception operations, air patrols over U.S. airspace, and land-based defence of critical infrastructure in support of homeland defence. The Department also is involved in civil support (e.g., support for natural disaster relief or law enforcement) and homeland security activities (e.g., domestic CBRNE<sup>1</sup> consequence management or border security) when required.

Verga noted that the U.S. government has published a *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. With respect to homeland defence, the strategy has two strategic objectives (prevent terror attacks and reduce vulnerabilities) and several critical-mission areas, including indicators & warnings, border security, transportation security and domestic counter-terrorism. Within this context, the Department of Defense is of the view that homeland security is best accomplished by domestic authorities performing domestic security functions. Therefore, the Department works at enhancing capabilities at the lowest level of government and at balancing its ability to defend the nation while adapting to the new domestic security environment. The principles the Department has adopted in this regard are as follow:

- Homeland security is shared among federal, state, local and private entities. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead.
- Homeland defence is the conduct of military operations to protect the United States against external attacks. The Department of Defense has that mission.
- The highest priority in protecting the United States is the defence against the international terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat.
- Domestic counter-terrorism is a law enforcement function. The Department of Defense will support law enforcement in accordance with the *Posse Comitatus Act*.<sup>2</sup>
- Consequence management of a terrorist attack requires a tiered response from local, state and federal agencies. The Department of Defense will provide support when its unique capabilities are required or civilian responders are overwhelmed.
- The protection of critical infrastructure is a civilian responsibility led by the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Defense has been assigned the protection of the defense industrial base (DIB).

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<sup>1</sup> Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive.

<sup>2</sup> "POSSE COMITATUS ACT (18 USC 1385): A Reconstruction Era criminal law proscribing use of Army (later, Air Force) to "execute the laws" except where expressly authorized by Constitution or Congress. Limit on use of military for civilian law enforcement also applies to Navy by regulation. Dec '81 additional laws were enacted (codified 10 USC 371-78) clarifying permissible military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies [...] especially in combating drug smuggling into the United States. Posse Comitatus clarifications emphasize supportive and technical assistance (e.g., use of facilities, vessels, aircraft, intelligence, tech aid, surveillance, etc.) while generally prohibiting direct participation of DoD personnel in law enforcement (e.g., search, seizure, and arrests)." Accessed at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/PosseComitatus.html> on April 25, 2006

On the basis of these principles, the Department of Defense conducts the following types of operations in the United States:

- Routine operations (maritime interdiction; air defence alerts, combat air patrols, force protection).
- Temporary operations (special events; training first responders; support to law enforcement).
- Emergency operations (consequence management for disasters; terrorism; mobility; support; logistics).
- Extraordinary operations (combat air defence; specialized explosive ordnance disposal).

Verga concluded his remarks stating that nation-state threats will continue to be with us for the foreseeable future (in the forms of ballistic missile or proliferation threats for example), but that transnational threats will be the most pressing. The United States, in his opinion, will remain a major terrorist target, along with key allies. Homeland defence will therefore remain an integral part of an active layered defence approach.

### **Session 3: The Media's Impact on the Public's View of Terrorism**

Roger Cressey, President of Good Harbor Consulting LLC, offered his views on the media's impact on the public's view of terrorism. He argued for the necessity to have a very well educated pool of journalists to cover terrorism. If the media is uneducated, he said, they will draw the wrong conclusions. While experts may not always like conclusions drawn by members of the media, these conclusions must still be informed.

He noted the positive attributes generally displayed by members of the media: they are tenacious, good at finding out the facts, and somewhat conscious of security (they may sit on or withheld information so as not to endanger their relations with officials). But, because of the availability of newscasts and blogs<sup>3</sup> on a 24/7 basis, there is a lot of competition among journalists and being "first" is the key driving element of the media today. The media, on the other hand, prefer black and white descriptions and explanations, when in fact on national security issues such as terrorism there are often shades of grey.

Taking NBC as an example,<sup>4</sup> he noted that the network is very careful about corroboration of sources and obviously concerned about slant. But it has shown low tolerance for government stupidities and sheer incompetence.

In conclusion, he advised governments to better understand how to use the media in the "war on ideas." Perception, he said, is too often reality; thus the need for governments to do a better job in shaping perceptions.

### **Session 4: State Department Analysts – Regional Threat Assessments**

Two Foreign Affairs Officer, Mark Wrighte and Chris Kollmar, and one Special Agent, Bart Gorman, from the State Department took the floor to present their assessments of regional threats.

Wrighte, who works for the Diplomatic Security Bureau's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, focused his remarks on Colombia, the Latin American country posing the biggest threat to Americans,

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<sup>3</sup> According to the University of Lethbridge's Faculty of Education, a blog is "an on-line diary or frequently updated personal web page." See <http://www.blogscanada.ca/BlogDefinition.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Cressey is an on-air counter-terrorism analyst for NBC News.

and El Salvador. He discussed the activities of terrorist organizations such as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the ELN (National Liberation Army) and the right-wing paramilitary AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), noting the FARC's increasing level of attacks in urban areas. Kidnapping, he noted, is now the paramount threat in terms of methods used by each of these organizations.

Wrighte made a special mention of El Salvador's MS13 (*Mara Salvatrucha 13*) organization, a very violent group of people extorting, robbing, raping and murdering foreigners and locals alike, both within and outside El Salvador.<sup>5</sup> According to him, MS13 has already shown terrorist tendencies, such as self-protection, surveillance, hierarchy, training, secure communications, etc. On February 9, 2006, MS13 was able to hold a clandestine press conference at San Salvador State University. Contrary to media allegations,<sup>6</sup> there are yet no confirmed connections between MS13 and Al Qaida.

Kollmar followed Wrighte with a presentation on migrant smuggling and terrorism during which he singled out the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay as a particular problem. He noted that Hezbollah and Hamas, among others, had been noted for their presence in the tri-border area and for being involved in illegal migrant smuggling routes.

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<sup>5</sup> MS13 has a presence in Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and the United States. MS13 is America's most dangerous gangs according to several official and unofficial accounts. See, inter alia, "MS13's Growing Threat," *Pittsburg Tribune-Review*, July 10, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> See, inter alia, "Eastie gang linked to al-Qaeda," *Boston Herald*, January 5, 2005, and Jerry Seper, "Al Qaeda seeks ties to local gangs," *The Washington Times*, September 29, 2004.

## 7 Comments on Mark Salter's "Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession"

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### Abstract

This is a short commentary on Mark Salter's article on "Governmentalities of an Airport" which he published in the first issue of *International Political Sociology*. Although this author finds little to disagree with its use of international political sociology concepts and its general conclusions, he catalogs errors that he believed should have been caught as part of the peer review and copy editing process, and highlights one of the authors hidden assumptions.

### Introduction

In his article on "Governmentalities of an Airport," Mark Salter (2006) uses international political sociology (IPS) approaches to dissect and explain the "system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global" (Salter 2007: 49). The particular intersection he selected is the airport, focusing his analysis on Canada's Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport. As a practitioner who recently (2004-2006) worked for Canada's Department of Transport (Transport Canada or TC), I was immediately interested by Salter's article. As a scholarly piece, I find little to disagree with its use of IPS concepts and am comfortable sharing its general conclusions. From my perspective, Salter's description of the airport intersection is in fact quite novel, and I certainly find it to be an interesting and valuable contribution. However, I was left wishing he had spent more time explaining how that particular intersection came to be, and detailing the practical implications of his understanding of this intersection, especially with reference to his empirical case. While I nodded in agreement with his judgments on several occasions, I repeatedly came up with the same question: So what? (for example, in respect of the issue of U.S. remote border posts) I was also slightly irritated by a few errors of fact that should have been caught as part of the peer review and copy editing process, and a number of statements. I briefly review each of these.

### To Be More Precise

The officially recognized titles of two federal organizations, one American and one Canadian, were not properly rendered. The letter "A" in TSA stands for "Administration," not for "Authority" (Salter 2007: 50), and the letter "C" in CBSA stands for "Canada," not Canadian (Salter 2007: 57, 60) While Salter describes correctly the mandate of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) late in the text (2007: 61), he is incorrect when he mentions it first, saying that CATSA "is responsible for prescreening boarding passengers, the maintenance of air-side security, and monitoring cargo" (2007:55). Section 6(1) of the *Canadian Air Transport Authority Act* stipulates that:

"The mandate of the Authority is to take actions, either directly or through a screening contractor, for the effective and efficient screening of persons who access aircraft or restricted areas through screening points, the property in their possession or control and the belongings or baggage that they give to an air carrier for transport. Restricted areas are those established under the *Aeronautics Act* at an aerodrome designated by the regulations or at any other place that the Minister may designate."

CATSA's mandate is about controlling access to the air-side, not maintaining its security as Salter initially contends. CATSA also has no responsibility for monitoring cargo; its responsibility is limited to hold bag screening. Salter should also have specified (2007: 61) that the inspectors who verify CATSA's adherence to the Security Screening Order are TC inspectors.

On three occasions Salter makes reference to the Passenger Protect program (2007: 55, 61, 63) announced by the then Canadian Minister of Transport in August 2005. However, he confuses it with the U.S. No Fly list program and misinterprets its intent. As Salter should have known, the Passenger Protect program is built pursuant to two distinct sections of the *Aeronautics Act*, both enacted with the adoption of the *Public Safety Act, 2002* in May 2004. Section 4.81(1) of the *Aeronautics Act* simply states that the Minister of Transport,

or any officer of the Department of Transport authorized by the Minister for the purposes of this section, may, for the purposes of transportation security, require any air carrier or operator of an aviation reservation system to provide the Minister or officer, as the case may be, within the time and in the manner specified by the Minister or officer, with information set out in the schedule

(a) that is in the air carrier's or operator's control concerning the persons on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight specified by the Minister or officer if the Minister or officer is of the opinion that there is an immediate threat to that flight; or  
(b) that is in the air carrier's or operator's control, or that comes into their control within 30 days after the requirement is imposed on them, concerning any particular person specified by the Minister or officer.

In order to obtain information concerning persons expected to be on board an aircraft, the Minister must give the air carriers a list of their names. This list of persons specified by the Minister has no other purposes than that specified in Section 4.81. Legally speaking, a person who is specified by the Minister on a list of specified persons will not, and cannot, be denied boarding on the sole fact that he/she is listed. To be denied boarding, a separate determination must be made, and an emergency direction issued, by the Minister of Transport, or an officer authorized by the Minister. Section 4.76 stipulates that:

If the Minister is of the opinion that there is an immediate threat to aviation security or to any aircraft or aerodrome or other aviation facility, or to the safety of the public, passengers or crew members, the Minister may direct any person to do, or to refrain from doing, anything that in the opinion of the Minister it is necessary to do or refrain from doing in order to respond to the threat.

The Canadian "list," therefore, is not a "no fly" list, but just a list of specified persons. Denying boarding can only be done on a case by case basis in the form of an emergency direction issued pursuant to Section 4.76. Because an emergency direction is only valid for 72 hours (Section 4.77(1) of the *Aeronautics Act*), no one can be denied boarding on a permanent basis, again negating the notion that there will be a Canadian "no fly" list.

### **Not to Forget**

Salter writes that "the object of screening for CATSA and airport security is a dangerous object, rendering the fact that 'terrorists fly all the time' in Canada invisible to the general public" (2007: 61). While true in a strict sense, it should not be forgotten that Canadian law enforcement and intelligence agencies investigate and conduct surveillance on a number of individuals believed to pose threats to national security (for example, in 2005-06 274 individuals were being investigated by Canadian Security Intelligence Service counterterrorism officers) (Security Intelligence Review Committee 2006: 38). If any

of these agencies would have reasons to believe that an individual under their watch were to pose a threat to civil aviation, they would take, one would assume, the necessary measures to prevent that individual from flying (i.e., making an arrest using their own legislative authorities, or sharing the relevant intelligence with TC, which would then deny boarding pursuant to Section 4.76 of the *Aeronautics Act*—the authority already exists, whether there is a Passenger Protect program in place or not). Not to do so would amount to dereliction of duty. My point here is simply to say that the fact that preboarding screening is limited to dangerous objects does not automatically mean that all dangerous individuals would be let through, all the time, without interference. They could, in fact, be intercepted by law enforcement, or denied boarding, well before reaching preboard screening. Salter further assumes that even if preboard screening for dangerous objects was done right, individuals could still be dangerous, in spite of measures implemented post-9/11 (locked cockpit doors, air protective officers, or marshals, on selected flight, etc.). This determination can only be made on a case-by-case basis.

### **One Contradiction**

Salter early on writes that there is a “complete absence of identity checks at Canadian airports” (2007: 51), but later acknowledges that with respect to domestic flights “airlines vet passengers according to their photo identification and tickets” (2007: 55). The two assertions should have been reconciled.

Notwithstanding these points, Salter’s is a very useful contribution to our understanding of “governmentalities at an airport.” As a practitioner and former TC official, I would have liked him to draw the policy implications flowing from his analysis. That, I assume, he will do at another time and in a different format.

### **References**

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Security Intelligence Review Committee (2007) *SIRC Annual Report 2005-2006: An Operational Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service*. Ottawa, ON: Public Works and Government Services Canada.

## 8 Grand Strategy

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While attending Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government's 2007 Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, Professors Ernest May and Philip Zelikow led a discussion on a new "Grand Strategy" for the United States. Their key points were largely based on the work they are doing for the Bipartisan Policy Center (<http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/>), where May serves as a Senior Advisor.

- May started with two statements: 1) Diplomacy is an instrument of policy; and 2) Strategy is the application of resources for attaining objectives. This said, he made his key argument: excessive partisanship in the United States has created opportunity for Americans to come together in committing to shared purposes in the larger world—to capital P policies (of a Grand Strategy) resembling those of the past. He followed with a detailed discussion of the criteria for capital P policies. Essentially, capital P policies, to have any chance of success, must be policies that are responsive, cross branch, cross party and cross "other."
- Zelikow followed with a discussion focused on his proposed "Grand Strategy" for the United States. He started by noting the "neocon" reversal: initially committed to unilateral regime changes, "neocons" are now going the multilateral way (case in point: the way Rice has reoriented the State Department). Iraq has to be explained as hubris related to Afghanistan and an unusual convergence of circumstances (it was a complex decision, the rationale of which, he said, will only come to light when the archives release the relevant policy documents).
- The Global War on Terrorism has come to define U.S. purpose in the world. But it is not sufficient as the basis for a good foreign policy framework. Democracy as Grand Strategy is also not sufficient; it has failed. Globalization (open world) as Grand Strategy is not likely to succeed either. It is seen in polls as a set of impersonal forces affecting people's sense of community and identity.
- Zelikow's proposal is to base U.S. Grand Strategy on Civilization, the goal being of living in a civilized world where, inter alia, citizens have obligations. The criteria for success would include: 1) respect for the identity of others; 2) limited government ("just" government); 3) cooperative prosperity; 4) mutual security; and 5) stewardship of the earth.
- To sell Civilization as Grand Strategy, Zelikow proposes that the U.S. focus on common interests and local choices; for example, applying the Strategy to 1) energy use; 2) catastrophic terrorism/global crime (U.S. to lead a coalition approach); 3) the "bottom billion" (including a real readiness for peacekeeping). On an issue like Iranian nuclear weapons, Zelikow's Grand Strategy would mean: adopting a tough stance on Iran combined with a bold vision to abolish all nuclear weapons worldwide (necessary because others see nuclear weapons as equalizers to U.S. military preponderance).

No need to say that most participants thought Zelikow's proposal for a U.S. Grand Strategy as utopian and unrealistic, especially under current international conditions. He was particularly criticized by non-Western participants, who argued that such a Grand Strategy can only be implemented by and through the United Nations because the U.S. is lacking the necessary legitimacy to move such a Grand Strategy forward. Many also commented on Zelikow's U.S.-centric approach, which would be a tough sell to the rest of the world, and the fact that his chances to rally Congress and other key players behind such a grand strategy are slim.

Zelikow agreed with the comments and argued that his intent is simply to have the idea of such a Grand Strategy be noticed and discussed. If it get commented on in the right policy journals and platforms, it could gain momentum and eventually become a serious alternative to the recently failed U.S. Grand Strategies.

## 9 From Homeland to Homegrown: Terrorism in Canada

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On 7 December 2007, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) invited *National Post* journalist Stewart Bell to address its staff and selected guests on the international terrorist threat to Canada. Mr. Bell, the author of two best-selling books on the subject,<sup>7</sup> offered the perspective of a journalist working the national security beat. But before dwelling upon the subject, he offered a few comments on his sources of information. Government sources, to his chagrin, are tight lipped. He therefore relies on the *Access to Information Act*, court documents and quasi-judicial hearings to gather a significant portion of his reporting material. While he has communicated with a limited number of alleged and confirmed terrorists, enlarging this pool is a very difficult undertaking, especially because journalists are increasingly targeted by terrorist organizations.<sup>8</sup>

In Canada, those engaged in international terrorist activities do so mostly in support of conflicts being waged abroad. These local activities are varied and include:

- Fund-raising;
- Recruitment;
- Training;
- Rest and recreation;
- Collecting intelligence on Canadian security measures and vulnerabilities;
- Procurement;
- Document acquisition; and
- Propaganda.

While these activities have traditionally involved first generation immigrants and refugees, Mr. Bell notes that a shift is now occurring. As recent terrorist events and arrests indicate, international terrorist causes are now espoused by homegrown terrorists, who include religious converts. Homegrown terrorists are seen as valuable resources for international Islamic extremists who need people to infiltrate targeted countries to carry out terrorist acts, Mr. Bell paraphrased from a CSIS report. This is an important shift which significantly complicates the task of security and intelligence agencies.

This is particularly the case because many homegrown terrorists are not linked to established terrorist groups. They act on their own volition and usually within their country of birth. The internet appears to play an important role in their radicalization, including the willingness to kill Canadians. Other factors assisting with the radicalization of individuals include:

- The influence of family ties;
- The presence of a spiritual leader to justify and sanctify their extremist tendencies;<sup>9</sup>
- Conversion to an extremist version of Islam;
- The perception that Islam is under attack from the Western world; and

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<sup>7</sup> *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World* (Missisauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2004); and *The Martyr's Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist* (Missisauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2005). Mr. Bell can be reached at [sbell@nationalpost.com](mailto:sbell@nationalpost.com).

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Bell himself was told by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that he had been listed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a potential victim of an unfortunate incident.

<sup>9</sup> According to Defence Scientist Patrick Armstrong, Ph.D., this factor is rather important; that's the role of ideology: it takes a generalized grievance and sharpens it, points it in a certain direction, and justifies it. Personal communication to the author, 7 December 2007.

- Propaganda.

According to Mr. Bell, despite the presence of an established terrorist threat in Canada most Canadian seem oblivious to it. Relatively small groups are able to bring to the attention of the media issues that do not significantly affect the rights of Canadians, such as Security Certificates,<sup>10</sup> but if remedied in their favour diminish the security of all Canadians. The number of terrorists still in Canada years after they were initially ordered deported, he noted, is astounding in that regard.

When dealing with the problem of terrorism, security and intelligence agencies work at preventing terrorist acts and saving Canadian lives. It is not because nothing is happening in the public realm that there is no threat to Canada. Just like the British, Mr. Bell concluded, Canadians would be well to also be alert but not alarmed.

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<sup>10</sup> Canada's security certificate provisions (in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*) allow for the detention and removal of foreign nationals posing a security threat. They were recently struck down by the Supreme Court, but allowed to remain on the books for an additional year so as to allow government to bring about the Court's suggested corrections.

## 10 The Radical Dawa in Transition

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On 15 January 2008, the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Ottawa hosted two senior analysts from the General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst*—AIVD) of the Netherlands as part of its Ottawa Roundtable on Security and Intelligence. The two analysts, introduced by Professor Wesley K. Wark and the Dutch Ambassador to Canada, presented the results of their major study of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism as it impacts on Dutch security.<sup>11</sup>

*The Radical Dawa in Transition* is the latest of a series of report on the radical Islam problem in the Netherlands publicly issued by the AIVD. There are one million Muslims in the Netherlands, most of them of Turkish and Moroccan origins, supplemented by pockets of Muslims from Pakistan, Iran and Palestine. Most Muslims are judged moderate, with only a small minority attracted to radical versions of Islam. Radicalism tendencies have been noted mainly within the Moroccan minority.

The aim of the study was to offer an understanding of Islamic radicalism both in its violent and non-violent manifestations, the former because of its connection to terrorism and the latter because of its disruptive impact on society. In October 2007, the study results were communicated to parliament and the public, and translated into English the following month. The key points are:

- Radical Dawa:<sup>12</sup>
  - Manifest itself through the spreading of a radical and ultra-orthodox message
  - Advocate the rejection of democracy and of the Western legal and political order
  - Fundamentally want to reform society
  - Has several European actors: political salafists; Muslim Brotherhood; Hizb ut-Tahrir; Tablighi Jamaat
- Radical Dawa Phases:
  - Phase 1: ideological, financial and logistical support from the Middle East
  - Phase 2: rise of autonomous and locally oriented Muslim radicalism; fragmentation, amateurism, cut and paste ideology and tactics
  - Phase 3: Islamic neoradicalism, new generation of Salafi men, 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Moroccans, most of whom do not speak Arabic
- The Third Phase:
  - Want radicalism to grow into a mass movement, while recognizing that a non-violent approach is required to achieve this objective
  - Changes in methods: radicals are becoming highly autonomous and increasingly professional; focusing on specific ethnic groups; adopting a local message; and using *clandestine*, non-violent, yet undemocratic and disruptive methods
  - Disruptive methods include: provoking tensions between religious and ethnic groups; trying to apply the Sharia; getting a foothold in government and non-governmental organizations by not declaring their ideological beliefs and using false pretenses (an overt moderate message and a covert radical one)
  - Breaking with Jihadism mainly for pragmatic reasons, including to avoiding further harm to the growth of radical Islam; against violence domestically but in support of violent tactics abroad

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<sup>11</sup> *The Radical Dawa in Transition: The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* (The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Dawa, an Arabic term, literally means summons or call.

- Growth of the Radical Dawa:
  - Salafi reading sessions being held all around the Netherlands; they are well attended by 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Moroccans
  - Arabs, Somalis, and Dutch are converting
  - 10 percent of the Muslims in the Netherlands will actually radicalize
  - Radical Dawa is also present in other European countries (e.g., Belgium, Denmark), where converts also reject democracy, secular law, integration into a non-Muslim society, maintaining relations with non-believers, women rights, and freedom of religion
- Current Risks. The Radical Dawa can result in:
  - intolerance and anti-democratic activism;
  - tensions within Muslim communities
  - intimidation (already occurring) of women, homosexuals, liberals and Muslims who do not practice
  - exclusion
  - preventing Muslims from exercising their basic rights
  - a parallel Islamic society

Radicals are careful to stay within the limits of the law. The number of instigators remains small but influential. Any counter-strategy must be centered first on non-judicial measures and avoid stigmatizing the majority of Muslims. The problem posed by the Radical Dawa should not be exaggerated or downplayed. Publicizing the study on Radical Dawa is one of the measures adopted by Dutch authorities. It sends the message to moderate Muslims that the authorities are aware of their problems, including intimidation, and are supporting them in their efforts to reject radicalism.

## 11 NATO in Afghanistan

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On 4 February 2008, the Canadian International Council, in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Poland and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) hosted the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, Radoslaw (Radek) Sikorski, at the Fairmont Chateau Laurier hotel in Ottawa. Mr. Sikorski discussed Poland's role in the NATO mission in Afghanistan and reflected on the importance of NATO in the world's new strategic security environment.

Mr. Sikorski was introduced by Mr. Robert Hage, Director General of the Central, East and South Europe Bureau at DFAIT. Mr. Sikorski was chairman of the Students' Strike Committee during the events in Bydgoszcz in March 1981. Later that year, he sought political refuge in the United Kingdom, where he started his career as a journalist. Between 1986 and 1989, he covered the wars in Afghanistan and Angola, and wrote about his Afghan experience in *Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Heart in Time of War* published in 1990. In 1992, as Deputy Defence Minister, he devoted time and effort to bring about Poland's accession to NATO. From 1998 to 2001, he was an Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Council of the Foundation for Assistance to Poles in the East. Between 2002 and 2005, he was a resident fellow at the American Institute of Enterprise in Washington, D.C., and Executive Director of the New Atlantic Initiative. During the 6<sup>th</sup> term of the Senate (2005-2007), he was a Senator for Bydgoszcz and served as Minister of National Defence. In 2007 (6<sup>th</sup> term of the Sejm), he was elected as a Civic Platform Candidate. Born in Bydgoszcz in 1963, he has a Bachelor's degree and a Master of Arts degree in philosophy, political sciences and economics from Oxford University. He is married to journalist and writer Anne Applebaum, who won the 2004 Pulitzer prize for her book "Gulag: A History." They have two sons, Aleksander and Tadeusz.

Mr. Sikorski opened his remarks by acknowledging Canada's contribution to NATO's mission in Afghanistan and paying tribute to the loss of Canadian soldiers. As someone who has been to Afghanistan on several occasions over the past two decades, first as a journalist and later as a politician, Mr. Sikorski is convinced that without the assistance and involvement of NATO Afghanistan would be in danger of reverting to a perpetual state of conflict.

Poland is committed to doing its part. It has 1,200-strong military contingent in the south and east of Afghanistan, and will soon add an additional 400. And there are no caveats on how Polish forces can or cannot be used. It has also agreed to deploy four combat and four transport helicopters, two of which will be jointly used by Poland and Canada. Poland, Mr. Sikorski added, is also militarily engaged in Iraq (with NATO's training mission), but is planning to remove its last 900 soldiers by October 2008.

Mr. Sikorski emphasized how serious Poland's attitude is about NATO's solidarity and NATO's out-of-area commitments. It is imperative, in his view, to assist Afghanistan in its transition from a failed state to a state which is stable, democratic and economically viable. Poland as such remains obligated to the United Nations, NATO and Afghanistan to prevent terrorists from ever again gaining a foothold in the latter country.

Poland's engagement in Afghanistan is varied and include the use of special operations troops, and assistance to the training of Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, in particular with respect to mine clearing. This engagement is not only justified by the nation's interests, but also by its tradition of working abroad in furthering peace on a variety of UN and other missions. Over the years, Canada has been a trusted partner and has closely worked with Poland to achieve common goals. After the demise of the Soviet Union, for instance, Poland and Canada were among the first countries to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Canada was also a prime mover behind the 1999 enlargement of NATO, which

saw Poland acceding to the organization. As a NATO member, Poland is taking security issues very seriously, and has endeavoured to be a security producer and not a security consumer. Therefore, it is important for Poland to contribute to the transatlantic burden-sharing exercise. In the context of Afghanistan, it is important to Poland that all NATO member states contribute their fair share to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. If burden-sharing is not done inequitably in ISAF, future missions of the kind would suggest that unilateral measures would have a better chance to succeed.

This said, Poland's engagement extends to non-military matters as well. Several Polish NGOs are on the ground in Afghanistan and are the recipients of official Polish aid. The aid is used to strengthen governance, fight corruption, build the judicial system, improve health care, develop alternative crops, and support multinational organizations. Poland is also thinking about creating its own Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) on the basis of its experience working with the Swedish PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif.

While ISAF represents a difficult challenge, NATO must also think of upcoming challenges, of which he noted two: energy security and ballistic missile defence. Both issues represent gaps that NATO must start to address.

Mr. Sikorski concluded his remarks by saying: "Let us stay the course for the sake of our common success."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Media coverage of this event was extensive. See, inter alia, Campbell Clark, "Poland joins Canada in push for help in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, 5 February 2008, pp., A1, A12; and Mike Blanchfield and Becky Rynor, "Poland pledges to back Canada in plea for help," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 5 February 2008, p. A4.

## 12 Israel's Strategic Situation

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On 1 October 2008, the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa invited Shlomo Brom, a Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv<sup>14</sup> and a retired Brigadier General in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF),<sup>15</sup> to discuss Israel's current strategic situation.

Brom opened his remarks by noting the usual sense of gloom people associate with the Middle East. A note of optimism, he opined, was in order. Compared to its situation in 1948, Israel is now on a long and promising road. Then the Arab world was not willing to acquiesce to Israel's existence. The country was seen as a new colonial enterprise, its inhabitants as aliens. This wall of hostility is largely gone. Peace treaties have been signed with Egypt and Jordan, for example. Although peace negotiations with other states (such as Syria) have yet to lead to a similar outcome, today no Arab states would argue that Israel should not exist. They accept the existence of Israel as part of the Middle East; the alternative, war, being much worse. Iran, a non-Arab state, has a different position: it would welcome the disappearance of the Israeli state.

The end of the Cold War contributed much to the disappearance of this wall of hostility. The Soviet Union, which had supported Arab states not accepting the existence of Israel, could no longer support belligerent acts against Israel. The latter's achievements have played a role as well. Its economic development has made the country an essential economic engine in the Middle East, its GDP being higher than any of its neighbours combined. Its conventional military capability gives it a military advantage over any coalition of Arab states; thus forcing Arab states to favour political solutions. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, adopted at the Summit of the Council of Arab States, is a case in point. Its full implementations would lead to the normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world.<sup>16</sup> However, the Initiative received little attention in Israel, which was preoccupied by its conflict with Palestinians.

While optimism is called for, Brom acknowledged the negative aspects of Israel's strategic situation. He first noted that throughout the 1990s no solution could be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, the danger of a strategic war remains a major preoccupation. Because Israel cannot be defeated by conventional military means, some Arab states and Iran are attempting to do so through other means, if that were to prove necessary. Ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs have thus proliferated. The problem is compounded by non-state actors using guerilla warfare and terrorist methods to defeat the Jewish state. The new PGM (precision-guided munition) is the suicide bomber. To eliminate suicide bombers is an extremely difficult endeavour, often causing unacceptable collateral damage. The

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<sup>14</sup> See <http://www.inss.org.il/>. Formerly known as the Jaffee Center.

<sup>15</sup> According to his online biography, "Shlomo Brom, a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, joined the Jaffee Center in 1998 after a long career in the IDF. His most senior post in the IDF was director of the Strategic Planning Division in the Planning Branch of the General Staff. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom participated in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria, and in Middle Eastern regional security talks during the 1990s. He continued to be involved in Track 2 dialogues on these subjects after his retirement from the IDF. In 2000 he was named deputy to the National Security Advisor, returning to JCSS at the end of his post. In 2005-2006 Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom was a member of the Meridor committee established by the Minister of Defense to reexamine the security strategy and doctrine of the State of Israel. His primary areas of research are Israeli-Palestinian relations and national security doctrine. Brom authored *Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of a Peace Treaty with Syria*, and edited *The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000* and *The Middle East Military Balance 2001-2002*. He is co-editor of *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions*." [http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff\\_id=9](http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff_id=9)

<sup>16</sup> The text of the Initiative can be found at <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm>.

ability of non-state actors to strike at Israel, unfortunately, is strengthening because of the weakening of Arab states, Lebanon being an obvious example.

To deal with these dangers, Brom argued that Lebanese-style invasions are not adequate solutions; they simply alienate those whose country is invaded and enlarge the support to non-state actors targeted by Israel. For stronger states, like Syria, conventional deterrence seems to be working. While Israel needs military might to face today's threat, the real solution to its predicament resides in the strengthening of the Arab states. Only with strong states can peace deals be concluded.

With respect to Iran's nuclear quest, Brom conceded that it may not be possible to stop it, but that it would not mark the end of the world. Rather than repeatedly saying that Israel cannot live with a nuclear Iran, Israeli authorities must acknowledge that it may become a fact of life that Israel would accommodate itself to. The situation would likely evolve into one of mutual assured destruction (MAD).<sup>17</sup> However, how can we be sure that Iran is deterrable? That Iran has a different value system does not mean its decisionmakers are irrational. While Iranians value life differently and are willing to sacrifice lives in huge number, it does not mean they are willing to take themselves all off the map in a catastrophic event. A Iran with nuclear weapons, though, will be a lot more aggressive internationally, and more provocative to Israel. It may also lead to increasing proliferation activities throughout the Middle East. Israel, therefore, must carry a big stick while talking softly. This will be hard to do because of domestic politics.

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<sup>17</sup> The former Commander of the U.S. Central Command, retired General John Abizaid, recently asserted as much: "the United States could live with a nuclear-armed Iran through a strategy of cold-war-style deterrence." See "Iran Nukes: Out of Reach," *Newsweek*, Vol. CLII, No. 13, 29 September 2008, p. 8.

## 13 Global Governance and the Obama Administration

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The first speaker [at Brookings 2008 Executive Education course on U.S. National Security Policy Issues] was an avid multilateralist, enamoured with the ability of the United Nations to live up to “its lofty but elusive goals” in large or little-noticed small ways. His presentation, illustrated with historical precedents and suggestive of the foreign policy style an Obama administration would follow, was entirely focused on the practice of global governance and the necessity for states to work together toward common goals. Acknowledging the "skepticism, suspicion, and sometimes bilious opposition" such an approach too often elicit, he took pain to highlight the U.S. historical record of engagement at the multilateral level, and the support such engagement has received, post-World War II, by six Democrat and five Republican presidents (from Franklin Roosevelt to William Clinton). Contrasting with his predecessors, George W. Bush, the outgoing president, was labelled by the speaker as a "radical unilateralist."

Before specifically prescribing how the global governance priorities before an Obama administration should be dealt with, the speaker offered a brief historical survey of what he referred to a the "Great Experiment" of global governance: the thoughts of great thinkers (e.g., Plutarch, Socrates, Cicero, Dante, Francisco de Vitoria, Grotius, Kant) and the actions of leaders (e.g., Alexander III of Macedon, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Wilson, Truman, Hitler, Stalin) or religious movements (e.g., Christianity, Islam) for uniting all people under a single community that is coterminous with humankind (which over time took different forms, including that of a kingdom, ecumenical state, nation, and empire). In doing so, he noted that global governance of a high order has been necessary to keep the peace since 1648: the Peace of Westphalia, the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, the United Nations and the Cold War construct<sup>18</sup> being examples of complex governance systems. The "Euromess" (a complex array of interrelated, complementary and reinforcing political institutions and organizations with NATO and the European at the centre) we have today is an equally complex governance system that binds and strengthens ties among European states in a way that reduces the likelihood of war. The explicit role of the United States in fostering effective international governance, in particular because of its efforts behind the creation of the United Nations and other institutions and international regimes, and to end the Cold War, were equally stressed.

While the speaker acknowledged that progress toward effective global governance has occurred over time, he quickly added this progress is not about to dislodge or eliminate nations as key actors of the international system. However, given the magnitude and complexity of the problems they are and will be facing, nations, he hoped, should "increasingly see it in their interest to form an international system that is far more cohesive, far more empowered by its members, and therefore far more effective than the one we have today." The United States under President Obama is no exception, especially since its 1776 revolution propounded a theory of governance supposedly applicable to all humankind. Its history since has indeed shown that its national interests can be preserved while "promoting universal values." In the post-Cold War era, the serious efforts of George H.W. Bush and his successor William Clinton to strengthening existing institutions and establishing new ones (e.g, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, G-8) were unfortunately seriously derailed under the presidency of George W. Bush, whose unilateralist approach is deemed to have failed and damaged global governance. Everything indicates that President-elect Obama would correct course and re-give preeminence to multilateral approaches, despite the notion that there is much to the argument "that the

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<sup>18</sup> With respect to the control of nuclear weapons, the Cold War provided the impetus to the development of a wide range of agreements that helped keep the peace, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT-1, SALT-2), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

system of global governance is gummed up for reasons that extend well beyond the intransigence of the Bush administration."<sup>19</sup>

The speaker particularly highlighted Obama's major speech in Berlin in July 2008, during which he proclaimed that he is a fellow citizen of the world (an echo to Socrates who was put to death for uttering a similar claim). This big idea that all humanity would benefit from stronger global governance is increasingly put forward as a solution to the current global financial crisis. Shaping global governance in a way that would be compatible with U.S. national interests is, according to the speaker, the biggest task that Obama will face. In fact, Obama will have no other choice but to re-embrace global governance for at least three reasons:

1) The global financial crisis requires no less than an integrated and coordinated international approach to avoid a deep and long-lasting worldwide recession. The global financial regime and its post-World War II institutions, for instance, must be rebuilt, and a bigger emphasis placed on the G-20 group of advanced nations rather than on the G-8 mechanism, which the speaker predicts is doomed to loose its clout.

2) The cloud of nuclear danger is threatening not only the United States but also international security. The number of nuclear-weapon states since the signature of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has increased from five (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) to nine (the original five plus Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Assuming the NPT were to collapse, many more would need to be added to this list (possibly Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina, Libya, Ukraine, South Africa, Turkey, Japan, Syria, Nigeria and Egypt).<sup>20</sup> The NPT is in need of rescuing, and the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons must be aggressively pursued,<sup>21</sup> even though the political and technical difficulties will be extremely hard if not impossible to overcome.<sup>22</sup>

3) Climate change/global warming is a pressing issue requiring concerted international action. According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), at current trends, the temperature is expected to continue to rise until 2030 no matter what is done to reverse this trend.<sup>23</sup> In 2060, the threshold that could bring catastrophic consequences will have been reached. A number of steps must therefore be taken to

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<sup>19</sup> Gideon Rachman, "A bad year for diplomats," in *The World in 2009*, edited by Daniel Franklin (London: The Economist, 2008), pp. 73-74.

<sup>20</sup> With a nuclear Iran looming, several Middle Eastern countries are contemplating acquiring nuclear capabilities. They include: Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. "A Middle East Arms Race," *The Wall Street Journal*, 20-21 December 2008, p. A14. As of this writing, the Bush Administration was negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. See Howard Lafranchi, "Bush Pushes Persian Gulf Nuclear Agreement," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 December 2008. For a detailed analysis, see *Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).

<sup>21</sup> This proposal is pursued in some details in Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6, November/December 2008, and was lately endorsed by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. See their article: "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 January 2008, p. A13. President-elect Obama has already made "the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a 'central element' of America's nuclear policy." See "What to do with a vision of zero," *The Economist*, Vol. 389, No. 8606, 15 November 2008, p. 73.

<sup>22</sup> On these difficulties, see George Perkovich and James M. Acton, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons," *Adelphi Paper* 396 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). For arguments that abolishing nuclear weapons "would make the world less safe," see Michael May, "The Trouble with Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 64, Issue 5, November/December 2008, pp. 20-21.

<sup>23</sup> IPCC conclusions have been subject to increasing criticisms by dissenting scientists, numbering several thousands on record.

avoid reaching this threshold: increase energy efficiency; plant new forests; manage methane emanations; and focus on renewables sources, vehicle efficiency and nuclear power. The US must lead internationally in this area and push for a global climate regime with slogans like "Yes, We Can!" The stakes for the U.S., according to the speaker, are simply going to be too great if it fails, so "Yes, We Must!" To succeed, a new breakthrough in the "Great Experiment" will be necessary.

In concluding his remarks and answering questions, the speaker forcefully advocated for the U.S. to be pro-active in reinforcing and using global governance mechanisms to solve the three most pressing problems facing the United States and the international community. Americans, he asserted, must live the legacy of Socrates as citizens of the world. Reforming the United Nations will be essential in this context, just as ensuring that regional organizations, while imperfect, support it better. This being said, the speaker had to concede that global governance may at times prove ineffective or counter to key U.S. national interests, in which case the United States would reserve the option to resorting to coalitions of the willing or unilateral actions in dealing with future contingencies the UN would be incapable of dealing with.

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