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Scientific Letter

## 2017 Defence Policy Review: Impact on Capability Based Planning

### Introduction

The Government of Canada's new Defence Policy, entitled *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE), was released on 7 June 2017 and represents a key milestone in Canadian defence planning. It provides an updated view of the Canadian defence context and a new set of government defence priorities for the first time since the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) [1] was released in 2006. Issued following the Defence Policy Review (DPR) [2], the SSE lays out a set of eight core missions drawn from the three traditional pillars of Canadian defence: defence of Canada, defence of North America, and engagement in coalition and international operations. The SSE describes a level of ambition for concurrent operations, and a number of key trends in global security. These must be analyzed in order to determine if and how they will be reflected in the Force Development Scenario Set (FDSS) for the upcoming Capability Based Planning (CBP) cycle.

Defence policy is always one of the most important inputs to the Department's CBP-based strategic planning process. It is essential that the guidance and priorities articulated in government policy remain at the forefront throughout the planning process. As the next cycle of CBP is now underway and in the preparatory stage (Phase I), the release of the new Policy is particularly timely. This Scientific Letter will assess the impact of the SSE on the new FDSS, as well as how the content of the SSE is anticipated to affect Phases I and II of the CBP process, by comparing the guidance set out in the CFDS to that in the SSE, considering the impact of the government's stated level of ambition and evaluating the FDSS from the last planning cycle against the new core missions and key trends.

### Core missions, level of ambition, and key trends

While the SSE covers a range of government priorities, including initiatives to support personnel and families, specific capability investments for all services, and long-term funding commitments, the most significant sections from a CBP perspective involve the identification of new core missions, a level of ambition for concurrent operations, and key global trends relevant to defence and security. The CFDS described six core missions, with the stated goal of having the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) prepared to carry out all six missions, potentially simultaneously. The new policy articulates eight core missions and is much more explicit with respect to the level of ambition, providing a target for concurrent activity along with specific resources and durations for many of the deployments described. Figure 1 summarizes the core missions and the stated target for concurrent operations in the SSE.



## CANADIAN ARMED FORCES CORE MISSIONS

At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and the maintenance of international peace and stability. This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to:

- Detect, deter and defend against threats to attacks on Canada;
- Detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, including through NORAD;
- Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability;
- Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners;
- Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad;
- Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad;
- Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and
- Conduct search and rescue operations.

## CONCURRENT OPERATIONS

This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:

- Defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
- Meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
- Meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- Contribute to international peace and stability through:
  - Two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation;
  - One time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
  - Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
  - Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
  - One Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
  - One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support.

*Figure 1: SSE core missions and concurrent operations.*

The SSE outlines three key security trends: the evolving balance of power, the changing nature of conflict, and the rapid evolution of technology. Within each of these areas, the Policy highlights a number of themes which are briefly described below. The alignment of the previous CBP cycle's FDSS with these themes is discussed in the section that follows.

1. **Evolving balance of power:** Particularly with the rise of China as an economic and military power, the global balance of power is shifting.
  - 1.1. *State competition* – Regional disputes and conflicts, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea, continue to effect global stability. As a result of increased power competition, the Policy recommends that Canada maintain advanced capabilities for military deterrence, including in the space and cyber domains.
  - 1.2. *Changing Arctic* – The Arctic is a complex region, with international issues including climate change, global security, and increasingly, trade and commerce. Increased activity will increase safety and security demands in this challenging environment.



- 1.3. *Influence of non-state actors* – This includes both positive influences (e.g., NGOs, municipalities, religious communities) and negative influences (e.g., violent extremists, organized crime, hacker groups).
  - 1.4. *Global governance* – International institutions such as the United Nations must adapt to a changing world in order to ensure that they can continue to enable a cohesive approach to global governance, even in the face of openly non-compliant states such as North Korea.
- 2. Changing nature of conflict:** The last ten years have seen significant changes in the causes, actors, and methods in global conflicts.
- 2.1. *Growing complexity* – Social and environmental factors are having unexpected influences on conflicts around the globe. Economic instability, inequality, and demographic shifts are reshaping societies; migration for these as well as conflict-related reasons have resulted in increased displacement and migration. Climate change will exacerbate some root causes of instability, thus having a significant security impact.
  - 2.2. *Grey zone and hybrid warfare* – Both states and non-state actors are increasingly using unconventional means—diplomatic, informational, cyber, military, and economic—to achieve strategic or operational ends. Detection, attribution, and response present a challenge for Canada and its allies.
  - 2.3. *Linkages between inter- and intra-state conflict* – Intra-state conflicts are increasingly being escalated by the involvement of external state-backed resources.
  - 2.4. *Global terrorism* – This is an increasing and evolving threat, both at home and abroad, complicated by the inefficacy of traditional deterrents when dealing with many extremists who are driven by religion and/or ideology.
  - 2.5. *Weapons proliferation* – The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CBRN and ballistic missile delivery systems), particularly given recent events in North Korea and Syria, remains a concern. In addition, the movement of small arms and light weapons through the illegal arms trade continues to be a factor in regional conflicts.
  - 2.6. *Changing nature of peace operations* – The majority of peacekeepers now operate in conflict zones, bringing new challenges. Canada will continue to contribute to peacekeeping missions by supporting peace process as well as post-conflict peacebuilding and delivering improved training to other nations involved.
- 3. Rapid evolution of technology:** As a result of technological innovations, the future of defence is likely to be vastly different. The SSE anticipates “a greater emphasis on information technologies, data analytics, deep learning, autonomous systems, advancements in the electromagnetic and cyber domains, as well as a range of transformative technologies, from quantum computing to synthetic biology.” Cyber, space, and remotely-piloted systems are also highlighted in the “Adapt” section of the SSE as key capability areas where Canada must keep abreast of technological developments.
- 3.1. *Cyber domain* – The cyber threats of greatest concern are from foreign states, including both cyber-espionage and disruptive cyber-attacks. In addition, adversaries are developing cyber approaches to disruption of military systems (e.g., C4ISR and weapons systems).
  - 3.2. *Space domain* – All military operations rely on space-based assets. While there are risks posed by the congested and competitive nature of space, from a military perspective, space is increasingly contested, meaning that satellites and satellite networks are potential targets and at risk of disruption or attack.



3.3. *Autonomous and remotely-piloted systems* – Of the technologies projected to shape the future of defence, autonomous systems alone are likely to present a direct physical threat. Development of remotely piloted systems is increasing, and while they offer significant potential benefit for Canada both domestically and abroad, their proliferation among potential adversaries will make them a growing threat.

## Impact of SSE on scenario development

The SSE describes the following strategic vision for defence: Strong at home, Secure in North America, Engaged in the world—a minor variation on the three traditional pillars of Canadian defence and the “three roles” in the CFDS. Additionally, the CFDS articulated an approach to achieve “Excellence at Home” (i.e., be aware, deter, respond) and the SSE sets out a similar approach (i.e., anticipate, adapt, act). From a CBP perspective, the vision and approach underpin various aspects of the Policy and thus there is no requirement to give them further consideration in the CBP process.

While the eight core missions in the SSE and the six CFDS missions seem significantly different at first glance, a comparison of the two sets shows that they largely cover the same mission space, as illustrated in Table 1.<sup>1</sup> The changes in the core mission set serve to emphasize the government’s priorities. Search and rescue (SSE8), which was previously covered under the “Daily domestic/continental operations” mission (CFDS1), is now considered a mission in its own right. This is also the case for capacity building, which is the only new core mission not to have been captured in any significant way in the CFDS core missions or the previous FDSS. The major international event and terrorist attack missions have been rolled into “detect, deter, defend” missions SSE1 (Canada) and SSE2 (North America). The addition of an explicit continental mission is likely reflective of the renewed emphasis on NORAD. Major international operations (CFDS5) is now separated into NATO/coalition efforts (SSE3) and peace and stabilization operations (SSE4). Rather than divide the crisis response missions by domestic (CFDS4) or international (CFDS6), they are now divided along the lines of national security (SSE6) and (domestic or international) disaster relief (SSE7).

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<sup>1</sup> Using the colour codes shown, Table 1 also depicts which FDSS scenarios map to the SSE and CFDS linkages. Note that the linkages portrayed in the table reflect the judgement of the authors alone and should not be considered authoritative.



**Table 1: Comparison of core missions in CFDS to SSE and FDSS scenarios.**

Legend	Number	FDSS Scenario	CFDS1 – Daily domestic / continental ops	CFDS2 – Support to major int'l event	CFDS3 – Respond to major terrorist attack	CFDS4 – Assist civil authorities in domestic crisis	CFDS5 – Lead/conduct major int'l operation	CFDS6 – Short-term response to crises elsewhere
	1	Baseline						
	1B	Arctic operations						
	2	Major Int'l Event						
	3	Major Terrorist Event						
	4	Domestic quake / tsunami						
	5A	UN Peacekeeping						
	5B	Peace enforcement						
	5C	Hybrid warfare						
	5D	Warfighting						
6	HADR							
SSE1 – Detect, deter, defend: Canada	X	X	X					
SSE2 – Detect, deter, defend: NA (with US/NORAD)	X	X						
SSE3 – Lead/contribute: NATO / coalition efforts						X	X	
SSE4 – Lead/contribute: Peace ops / stabilization missions						X	X	
SSE5 – Capacity building								
SSE6 – Assistance to civil authorities: National security	X		X				X	
SSE7 – Assistance to civil authorities: Disaster relief (domestic/int'l)				X	X		X	
SSE8 – Search and rescue	X							

In the FDSS, the planning scenarios were directly linked to the six core missions, with the addition of an Arctic scenario to the baseline domestic/continental operations scenario (CFDS1) and the creation of four scenarios representing distinct types of operations for CFDS5. This will not be the case for this CBP cycle, which will use a characterisation framework such as that described by Taylor [3] to select a scenario set that will effectively cover the space of challenge dimensions (mission characteristics such as reach, duration, and threat level) while minimizing the number of scenarios requiring analysis. Using this approach, Taylor [4] has demonstrated that several of the previous force development scenarios could be removed without sacrificing coverage of the challenge space, saving the Joint Capability Planning Team (JCPT) significant time and analysis effort. That being said, the eight core missions must still be represented in the scenario set, even if they will not each be fully analysed by the JCPT. They are an essential part of the capacity analysis, which will ensure that the CAF is capable of operating at the government’s level of ambition for concurrent operations.

Table 2 assesses which of the three key security trends feature significantly in the previous force development scenarios (indicated by an “X”); those that are mentioned in the scenario but do not drive the narrative in any way are excluded. Where appropriate, distinct themes have been identified within a larger trend. The trends and themes outlined in the “Global Context” section of the SSE are indicative both of government priorities as well as factors projected to influence the future operating environment.



**Table 2: Reflection of SSE global trends in the previous FDSS.**

	1 – Baseline	1B – Arctic	2 – Major int'l event	3 – Major terrorist event	4 – Domestic quake / tsunami	5A – Sudan	5B – Somalia	5C – Hybrid warfare	5D – War fighting	6 – Haiti
<b>1 Evolving balance of power</b>										
1.1 State competition										
1.1.1 Regional disputes and conflicts						X		X	X	
1.1.2 Importance of deterrence (e.g., space, cyber)										
1.2 Changing arctic										
1.3 Influence of non-state actors										
1.3.1 Positive: NGOs, industry, cities etc.						X	X			X
1.3.2 Negative: Extremists, organized crime, etc.						X	X	X		X
1.4 Global governance							X	X	X	
<b>2 Changing nature of conflict</b>										
2.1 Growing Complexity										
2.1.1 Social (e.g. economic inequality, demographics)						X	X	X	X	
2.1.2 Increased migration / forced displacement										
2.1.3 Impacts of climate change										X
2.2 Grey zone and hybrid warfare								X		
2.3 Linkages between inter- and intra-state conflict								X		
2.4 Global terrorism			X	X						
2.5 Weapons proliferation										
2.5.1 WMD (CBRN)			X	X				X	X	
2.5.2 Conventional arms trade									X	
2.6 Changing nature of peace operations (conflict zones)							X			
<b>3 Rapid evolution of technology</b>										
3.1 Cyber domain										
3.1.1 Cyber-attacks / espionage	X		X						X	
3.1.2 Threats to military systems (C4ISR, weapons)									X	
3.2 Space (contested environment, satellites as targets)										
3.3 Autonomous and remotely-piloted systems										




While not all trends or themes must necessarily be reflected in the FDSS, their prominence within the SSE with respect to the future security environment makes it important to at least consider their inclusion. Likewise, scenarios that do not incorporate any of the highlighted security trends should by no means be excluded as they may still be reflective of an ongoing requirement for particular capabilities and capacity regardless of future trends. With this in mind, the majority of the SSE trends are already prominent in the FDSS, with the following exceptions:

- *Importance of deterrence*: This is only captured implicitly in the FDSS. In the space and cyber domains, deterrence would likely need to be made part of a baseline scenario since cyber-attacks in particular present a pervasive and persistent threat that requires a strong capability to respond. Conventional deterrence speaks to capabilities and capacity that must be maintained as well as communicated to potential adversaries in order to discourage aggression. This type of deterrence is provided in large part through military alliances such as NORAD and NATO, where Canada is recognized as making a strong and meaningful contribution.
- *Changing Arctic*: While the FDSS incorporates an Arctic scenario, the changing Arctic conditions play only a marginal role in the narrative.
- *Increased migration / forced displacement*: Increasingly, large populations are being either forcibly displaced from their communities, or they leave to escape violence and political or religious persecution. At the same time, migration triggered by intolerable environmental or economic conditions is also on the rise. Increased complexity due to social factors such as political and economic instability and inequality is a factor in several scenarios, but specific challenges introduced by displacement are not captured, and migration is not explicitly mentioned. The effects of migration and displacement on the global security environment are already evident, with recent CAF involvement in the airlift of Syrian refugees as well as NATO naval operations aiming to end the deadly smuggling of asylum-seekers. Migration and displacement may be factors or drivers in a scenario, but they might equally be the primary triggers leading to a crisis such as the collapse of a weak state.
- *Space*: None of the scenarios relate to the competitive and contested space environment; the satellite crash in the Arctic scenario is simply a result of technological failure, although such incidents could become more frequent as space becomes more congested. Satellites as potential targets of anti-satellite weapons or other technologies capable of disrupting space-based services do not feature in the FDSS.
- *Autonomous platforms and remotely-piloted vehicles*: In general, the theme of technological change is largely absent in the FDSS, with the exception of an increased incidence of cyber-attacks. While remotely-piloted vehicles play a role in the warfighting scenario (5D), autonomous platforms are not mentioned in any of the scenarios. Autonomous platforms and remotely-piloted vehicles will not be drivers for conflict in and of themselves, but given technology trends they should feature more prominently in one or more scenario narratives.

## **Implications of the SSE on the proposed updates to the CBP process**

The proposed modifications to Phases I and II of the CBP process are outlined in Figure 2 [3]. The anticipated impacts of the SSE on this process are discussed below.



**Figure 2:** Proposed updated Phases I (Preparation: Step 1) and II (Capability Analysis: Steps 4A and 4B, and Capacity Analysis: Step 4) of the CBP process. From [3].

### SSE impact on Step 1 – Validating the scenario set

As of this writing, a new force development scenario set (FDSS) is being developed in time for the start of a new CBP cycle in 2019. This new set must meet certain criteria in order to be acceptable for use in Phase II. First, the scenario set must be suitably designed and written to be useful for the purpose of capability analysis. Second, the set must reflect a range of possible and plausible CAF operating circumstances and environments. Validation of the scenario set ensures that it meets these necessary criteria and it is fit for the purposes of subsequent analysis.

Validation has several subordinate steps. First, a subset of the new FDSS may need to be selected because of the limited time available for the Phase II analyses. During validation various scientific methods are applied to determine those scenarios which address the most important and highest priority capability areas and are adequate to meet the objectives of CBP. The selected scenarios need to be clearly linked to the core missions and priorities set out in the SSE (see Figure 1). Second, the chosen subset of scenarios are assessed to ensure the content is consistent<sup>2</sup> with and appropriate for the capability analysis. Various war gaming

<sup>2</sup> In this context, “consistent” refers to a storyline whose details are logical and plausible.





techniques are being considered for this step. Given this context, the SSE is not expected to affect how this step is conducted. In other words, the SSE will be an influential input to the development of an FDSS but should not affect how the validation is executed.

### **SSE impact on Step 2 – Force estimation**

As can be seen in Figure 2, force estimation is a critical lead-in to both the capability analysis carried out by the JCPT (Steps 4A and 4B) and to the capability capacity analysis (Step 3). Force Estimation is intended to generate different high-level options for Canada's responses and the associated forces required by the CAF to be successful in the scenarios coming out of Step 1. Estimates of the forces required by the scenarios are needed to inform capacity analysis (conducted in Step 3) and the operational planning process (conducted in Step 4).

It is anticipated that the SSE will significantly facilitate the task of force estimation, as it already includes explicit examples of force packages by setting levels of ambition for the CAF (See Annex A). For example, it states that a "Naval Task Group" is the key measure of RCN capability. These task groups are described in general terms and leave open the possibility that their size and composition can vary. These examples provide a strong baseline for the capability and capacity analyses in subsequent CBP steps. The starting point for these force packages will be a revised set of Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) templates which promote coherence between CFD and SJS work on force posture and readiness.

### **SSE impact on Step 3 – Capacity analysis**

Capacity analysis aims to measure the ability of the CAF to adequately resource missions and tasks when they occur at the same time, i.e., concurrently. Whereas Steps 1 and 2 focus on individual scenarios and the type of forces required to be successful in a scenario *in isolation*, this step assesses whether shortfalls or excesses in the CAF's capacity to deliver capability arise due to mission concurrency.

As mentioned previously, the SSE provides an explicit level of ambition that refers to the level of concurrent activity that the CAF should be able to handle. This constitutes a new and unique<sup>3</sup> input to this step that provides a baseline value for a target capacity level. This will be very useful as a benchmark for capacity analyses in CBP. As much as the capability analysis will be informed by the SSE, it remains for the CBP decision makers to decide how the guidance will be treated. The level of ambition could potentially be used as a planning ceiling, as a minimum, or as a benchmark along a spectrum.

### **SSE impact on Step 4A – Preparation of the analysis plan**

This step seeks to develop a plan for how the chosen set of scenarios will be analysed. This includes deciding which scenarios from the set will be analysed and whether there needs to be any particular emphasis on examining particular capabilities. Step 4A is about designing an analysis plan, and while the new SSE does not change the requirement for this step, clearly its outputs will have to account appropriately for the guidance and priorities within the new policy. It is reasonable that any analysis plan created in this step must reflect the SSE guidance provided in the form of the eight core missions and the associated levels of ambition and concurrent operations. This is because a key strength of the CBP process is that it is transparent and defensible. A capability analysis plan that cannot be clearly linked to the tenets of the SSE would not be credible.

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<sup>3</sup> Previous defence policies did not have such explicit descriptions of the desired force levels applied to missions.



## SSE impact on Step 4B – JCPT analysis

The explicit force levels and level of ambition in the SSE will be a key driver of the JCPT analysis but the general process of the analysis should not have to be altered. The JCPT members will still analyse the planning scenarios for capability requirements as before. As described earlier, the scenarios themselves will be strongly influenced by the Policy and the priorities of the GoC that they represent. Therefore the JCPT analysis will have to keep these priorities in mind during the analysis. The level of ambition provides the JCPT with a clear baseline for both assessing CAF capacity and also for exploring capability options. For example, the Policy explicitly articulates the need for the Navy to generate a Naval Task Group (NTG) as a key measure of the Navy's capabilities and capacity. As well, it provides a specific example of the platform composition of such a force element. However, the exact composition of a NTG does need to be altered according to the requirements of a specific mission and so this provides the space for the JCPT to consider different structures for a NTG and to explore alternative capability and platform mixes. But the explicit example in the Policy provides a solid baseline for comparison.

## Conclusions

The SSE provides strategic planning with content that is familiar and some that is unique, all of which should provide a foundation that will aid both capability and capacity analyses within CBP. It retains the familiar three pillars that define the Canadian strategic defence construct and evolves them into the new eight core missions. This represents a shift in emphasis from the six missions of the CFDS and, arguably, to a more contemporary view of the role of the CAF. In any case, the eight core missions, just like the six CFDS missions expressed as the FDSS before them, represent a reasonable sample of CAF activity across the spectrum of conflict. The capacity building core mission is the sole example in the SSE that has no direct counterpart in the CFDS nor FDSS. SSE describes a number of global security trends, and our analysis revealed that a number of these including deterrence and autonomous platforms were not reflected in the previous FDSS scenario narratives. These trends should be reviewed to determine if and how they should be incorporated into scenarios, either as primary drivers for the narrative or as components of a mission.

The explicit articulation of levels of ambition and concurrent operations provide very useful foundations and metrics for capability analyses that have not been present in previous defence policy documents. This should benefit the execution of the CBP process, as the level of ambition and force packages described in the SSE should prove especially useful in Steps 2, 3, and 4B, while not precluding a full range of capability options. In fact, the specific examples of force package goals need not constrain the capability analysis, but should rather enhance it because they provide a policy-driven example against which to assess other options.

While the CAF's operational challenge space should not be entirely derived from the SSE, the core missions as defined must necessarily be assessed for their impact on how capability and capacity requirements are articulated and evaluated within the CBP process. That being said, there is nothing in the SSE to suggest that fundamental changes to current plans for how to evolve the CBP process are necessary. In other words, the process by which capability analysis is conducted, as reflected in Figure 2, is not expected to be substantially affected by the SSE.

**Prepared by:** Murray Dixon and Elizabeth Inrig (DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis).



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## **Annex A Levels of Ambition Described in the SSE**

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The SSE articulates levels of ambition (LoA) at both an overall CAF level and also at a service level. These are extracted from the SSE and summarized below.

The SSE expresses the LoA at the CAF level as follows.

### **For the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as a whole, be prepared to simultaneously:**

1. Defend Canada – including responding to multiple concurrent domestic emergencies.
2. Meet NORAD obligations.
3. Meet commitments to NATO allies under Article 5.
4. Contribute to international peace and stability through:
  - 2x sustained deployments of 500–1500 personnel in two different Theatres of Ops, including one as lead nation.
  - 1x limited time deployment of ~500–1500 pers. (6–9 months duration).
  - 2x sustained deployments of ~100–500 pers.
  - 2x limited time deployments (6–9 months) of ~100–500 pers.
  - 1x DART deployment with scalable additional support.
  - 1x non-combatant evacuation operation with scalable additional support.

At the service level, the SSE describes a LoA related to force structure:

### **For the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN):**

Fleet structure: the ability to deploy and sustain two Naval Task Groups, each composed of up to 4x combatants and a support ship supplemented, where warranted, by a submarine. Also be able to lead allied or coalition forces for sustained periods anywhere in the world.

Level of ambition: one major international operation plus the capacity for minor operations and/or response to maritime security taskings at home. In addition, maintain routine presence in Canada's three oceans and contribute to operations in support of North American security including the Caribbean.

### **For the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF):**

Eighty eight fighter planes to replace the CF-18 fleet.

Air Task Force: austere or prepared airfield anywhere in the world.

### **For the Canadian Army (CA):**

The force structure is based on the brigade group composed of ~4800 soldiers in eight major units (includes artillery, armour, infantry, engineer, combat service support). Combinations of these units make up "battle groups."