



Chapter Thirteen


Balancing Responsiveness, Relevance, and Expertise

*Lessons from the History of Strategic Analysis in the
Canadian Department of National Defence*

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This chapter examines the history of strategic analysis as a professional occupation in the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) from its emergence in the early Cold War up to today.¹ It traces the beginnings and evolution of this capability as a defense research group focused first on force planning and then on supporting policy development.² During this period, the fortunes and nature of defense strategic analysis fluctuated in response to changing perceptions of its relevance to military planners and policy developers. Its role and impact were shaped by the evolving imperatives of professional development, which reflected a growing sense of professionalism amongst the strategic analysts, as well as the changing demands over timelines and methods for the delivery of its analysis, and growing pressure to integrate subjects beyond the bounds of what had traditionally been considered the core expertise of defense strategic analysis. These pressures manifested themselves as debates over relevance, and who should define it. The evolution of an analytical occupation that defined itself as strategic suggests that relevance is a function of the balance between responsiveness to client requirements and the imperative of objective standards of expertise and skills. Relevance should be a function of what the client needs, which may conflict at times with what the client wants, especially in demanding and time-compressed work situations.

This historical case study will show that government analytical organizations—whatever their size or national origin—face recurring challenges over



responsiveness, relevance, and expertise, shaped by the evolving needs of the client and indeed any consumer of analysis, the client's perceptions about the existence or absence of threats in the strategic environment, as well as changes in departmental business models and structures. In response to these challenges, defense strategic analysis has struggled to define and maintain itself as a profession.

The chapter focuses on the changing roles and fortunes of strategic analysis in the department over a sixty-year period. What this history reveals is that strategic analysis in a defense context is most relevant when practitioners can develop and maintain expertise on, and experience in, force planning as well as knowledge of major military developments, blending analysis of classified information with insights from strategic studies scholarship. Further, the chapter demonstrates that the changing requirements and nature of government decision making along with more expansive definitions of what constitutes defense issues tends to create a model of strategic analysis where relevance is measured primarily by responsiveness at the expense of expertise. In the case under study, the client increasingly looked to strategic analysts for their general writing skills and assessments over a wide range of topic areas rather than for their specific expertise in a given subject, a situation exacerbated by colocation with the client and confusion regarding authority and responsibility for career and professional development. This can create tension between the client's perceived needs and the evolving professionalism of the defense strategic analysis organization. Finally, this case study underscores the challenges of developing and maintaining an analytical capability and expertise in any situation, but especially in the contemporary government environment when the main function of the analytical community is the provision of information and assessments at short notice to senior decision makers rather than in-depth analysis.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND FORCE PLANNING, 1947–1974

To understand what makes analysis “strategic” in a defense context, we need to examine the specific origins and the nature of this type of analysis after the Second World War and trace how and why it evolved during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Strategic analysis as a distinct occupation and discrete function in defense planning emerged with the concurrent maturation of the application of science and operational research to military operations and the emergence of Canada on the world stage.³ The Defence Research Board (DRB) was established in 1947 with the responsibility, in the words of the amendment to the National Defence Act, to “advise the Minister on all matters relating to scientific, technical and other research and development which affect national defence” (Goodspeed 1958, 65). For the better

part of its first decade, the DRB focused largely on scientific and technology research such as the work done on armaments at its Valcartier facility in Québec.⁴ The DRB also conducted scientific research in other areas at its various organizations across the country. In 1949, the DRB created the Operational Research Group, based in Ottawa, which used scientific and mathematical methods to provide a quantitative basis for decision making on the use and performance of military resources in operations.⁵ According to George Lindsey, a distinguished operational research scientist who worked for over three decades in DND, many of the early operational research projects “had their origins in informal discussions over problems between OR [Operational Research] scientists and the military staffs, which gradually developed from preliminary musings into a more structured formulation” (Lindsey 1998, 328). This dialogue ensured that requirements for research and analysis came directly from military strategic planners and senior decision makers.

Starting in the 1950s, the DRB’s efforts expanded beyond scientific and technology research, driven largely by the demand from military planners to know not only about technical details of weapons systems but also their meaning for defense priorities and plans. An early example of this demand for broader analysis can be seen in Lindsey’s report, in which he assesses the implications for Canada of the concept of “defence-in-depth” in the event of a major Soviet air attack, which he prepared in the summer of 1952 in response to recommendations from Canadian military planners for extending and consolidating air defense cooperation with the United States (Richter 2002, 40–42). Lindsey’s analysis went beyond a technical evaluation of the Distant Early Warning line to explore the underlying air defense concept as well as the risks and implications for Canadian defense. It is here where we can identify the emergence of a Canadian strategic analysis capability as a distinct function and focus of research at DND. While the DRB continued to produce technological examinations of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and air defense systems, the departmental demand continued to grow for what would today be called strategic analysis.⁶ The combination of rapid technological change and a sense of urgency in responding to the growing Soviet military threat encouraged military planners to increasingly reach out for novel defense research using new analytical methodologies and disciplines (Ayson 2012, 3; Richter 2002, 57–59).

Strategic analysis delivery was decentralized in the 1950s, reflecting the ad hoc growth of demand as well as the mix of civilian defense researchers and military operators delivering it. There was no formal strategic analysis capability in the 1950s, but organizations like the Canadian Army’s Directorate of Military Operations and Plans, the Joint Ballistic Missile Defence Staff and,⁷ after 1959, the Systems Analysis Group carried out studies that sought to understand the implications of military technological developments

for Canadian defense policy and military planning (Richter 2002, chs. 2–3). The analytical products of these civilian and military analysts had much in common. Both civilian and military analysts struggled to comprehend weapons developments and, where possible, to exploit new military capabilities, assessing the implications for defense and looking for ways of improving military effectiveness. Taken as whole, the nexus of real defense problems, combined with a broader analytical perspective and access to classified material, was the catalyst for the emergence of a distinctive Canadian strategic perspective that would coalesce into a recognized capability, strategic analysis.

Early strategic analytical work informed Canadian defense policy development—for example, on nuclear weapons and on concepts of deterrence and stability—while the analysts also helped to formulate wider military strategy and plans. Their work was notable for its quality, often incorporated directly into policy and strategy documents. Historians have also highlighted the work’s originality, framing as it did defense problems from a Canadian defense (strategic military) perspective. The analysis did not simply mirror American strategic thinking on these topics, but rather examined problems and proposed solutions appropriate to Canada’s defense situation (Richter 2002, 60–68).⁸ Robert J. Sutherland’s work stands out in this regard. A civilian analyst who later became the Director of the Operational Research Establishment, Sutherland’s contribution to identifying and articulating foundational strategic concepts like the relationship between mutual deterrence theory and strategic stability made him, in the view of one historian who has read many of the classified studies of the period, “the most innovative strategic theorist in the country” (Richter 2002, 63).⁹ Innovative work undertaken by Sutherland covered topics such as trends in nuclear weapons and strategic concepts as well as considerations affecting ballistic missile defense. Sutherland and his fellow analysts provided their reports directly to military planners, notably the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which remained in the 1950s and 1960s “the focal point of defence policy coordination and advice to the Minister,” but these analysts also had formal and informal discussions with policy makers and were active in formulating policy (Richter 1996, 17). The best example of the influence of Sutherland and his colleagues was the development of the 1964 White Paper which, as Richter points out, was heavily influenced by their analysis. In some cases, their text and conclusions were incorporated verbatim (Richter 2002, 133–37).

A clear indication of the growing importance of strategic analysis to military planning and policy development came in July 1963 with the stand-up of a Directorate of Strategic Studies in direct support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Loomis et al. 1985, 4). The establishment of this new directorate rested on the need “to bring long range strategic and policy analysis and planning together,” functions for which the Chiefs of Staff remained the

authority until 1964 (Loomis et al. 1985, 55–56). In providing support to the Chiefs of Staff, the new directorate was expected to maintain expertise, conduct studies, prepare briefs, and advise the Chiefs of Staff in the following areas: strategic aspects of international affairs, global strategic concepts, NATO strategic concepts, United Nations security concepts, disarmament and arms control, strategic weapons system, and advanced military technology (Loomis 1985, 56). From the beginning, the analytical emphasis was on Canadian defense policy and planning, and on developing a better understanding of the impact of important military trends, including weapons systems and the military plans of allies. While the directorate was staffed by military personnel, it worked closely with DRB analysts, like Sutherland and Lindsey, who worked on multidisciplinary (quantitative and qualitative) approaches to defense problems.¹⁰

The major restructuring of Canada's military headquarters that occurred in the mid-1960s, most notably the stand-up of a single, integrated Canadian Forces Headquarters in 1964, had a major impact on the DRB, especially on its research priorities and on the growing importance of strategic analysis in the department.¹¹ Defense research priorities had been an ongoing source of discontent prior to the establishment of the Canadian Forces Headquarters, exacerbated by service rivalries and competition for scarce resources. The DRB struggled to organize and focus its activities in line with the evolving organizational changes at DND. It responded to the newly integrated headquarters by reorganizing its research establishments as it sought to maintain access to both military planners and policy decision makers (Jakubow 2014, 25–27).¹² The most important change in terms of strategic analysis delivery was the creation in 1967 of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Research. From 1967 until 1974, this team, under Robert Sutherland, was the focal point for strategic analysis and strategic studies in DND. Its work continued in the strategic analysis tradition established in the 1950s and early 1960s of producing a combination of strategic studies on weapons development and defense postures of friend and foe alike as well as providing analytical assistance to improve departmental force planning.

The mounting departmental demand for this type of analysis led the defense research community to expand its recruitment to include “entrants with degrees in economics, history, and political science.”¹³ The increased requirement for candidates from humanities and social science programs corresponded, in many ways, to the rising interest in strategic studies outside of government and the growth in the number of academic centers and think tanks specializing in this subject in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom (Betts 1997).¹⁴ This meant that, as the demand for strategic analysis grew within DND, a pool of university-trained strategic studies graduates existed to take up work in the government.¹⁵ Between 1963 and 1974, the scientists recruited to the DRB thus provided considerable support to the

military, supplying analysis and advice as part of the policy development and military planning processes.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE POLICY, 1974–1987

Organizational changes at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), introduced after 1972, altered the relationship between strategic analysis, military planning, and defense policy development. A Management Review Group was established as part of the 1971 White Paper review process, which included an examination of the efficiency and responsiveness of defense research and science. A key recommendation was the creation of an Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Policy who took over responsibility for defense policy development from the senior military staff (GOC, DND 1971, 42–43; Turner 2012, 61–62). The Management Review Group also recommended that strategic studies and defense planning, in addition to policy development, be included in the new Policy organization in order to, in the words of the Group's Report, "utilize the full potential of strategic studies and planning in the formulation of defence policy" (quoted in Bland 1998, 219). It is interesting to note that the Management Review Group argued for a different type of strategic studies than those produced to date. In the Group's view, strategic analysis should become more politically sensitive. Previous studies carried out by the department under the auspices of the Defence Research Board, the Management Review Group argued, focused too much on external military developments and not enough on "presenting to the Minister and the Government alternative policies and objectives, taking into account all relevant factors, only some of which may be military ones" (Bland 1998, 220). The Group argued that studies should analyze factors such as cost, social development, and regional benefit as well as policy implications, in short, a mix of different types of analysis rather than objective, and abstract, capability assessments. The reasoning behind this recommendation originated with the recent dispute between the Minister of National Defence Donald Macdonald and the senior military leadership over the development of the 1971 White Paper, which led to the unprecedented move of having the new defense policy statement developed by the minister's special assistant (Loomis et al. 1985, 86). In making this recommendation, the Management Review Group essentially wanted governmental defense analysis to become more politically aware.

This perspective would repeatedly affect the evolution of strategic analysis in DND after 1974. It also represented the ever-present friction between the evolving demands of the government as client and the professional determinants of objective analysis and expertise. There is often tension between democratically elected politicians, who naturally wish to steer a country's

defense priorities in the direction articulated in their party's political platforms, and departmental experts (both civilian and military) whose professional judgements can run counter to the policy preferences of their political masters. Nevertheless, the broader concept of what should be examined in departmental strategic studies, introduced by the Management Review Group, gradually led to an expanded range of subjects covered by strategic analysts, which had the ancillary effect of sowing confusion about the purpose, focus, and professionalism of defense strategic analysis.

In response to the White Paper and the Management Review Group's recommendations, George Lindsey led a review to explore areas where the Defence Research Board could extend its research activities in support of defense as well as other government work. In a wide-ranging paper, he and his coauthors described the growing and "frequent need of strategic studies in the international field and of certain other long term analysis of foreign affairs." The paper argued that, despite the availability of strategic studies experts in universities and institutes, the classified and sensitive nature of the topic required internal expertise; the "considerable period of uninterrupted study that is usually necessary for a substantial piece of research" called for dedicated analysts. It was a cogent argument, and a successful one (Lindsey 1972).

The Management Review Group's recommendation to place strategic studies and policy development together in the same organization was not implemented until 1974 with the creation of a Directorate of Strategic Analysis (D Strat A) nested within the Policy Group, but staffed by defense researchers, who individually belonged to the recently renamed Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (Bland 1987, 142–43; Jakubow 2014, 25, 32). Staffing D Strat A with defense research strategic analysts was a logical step because the Policy Group had absorbed the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) at the same time, and it was expected that this new Policy organization would require research similar to what had been done by the strategic analysts to date. It was also a testament to the efforts of Lindsey and others to retain a professional strategic analytical capability in the face of pressures to dilute its expertise in military and defense issues.¹⁶ Similarly, the fact that the ORAE also became part of the Policy organization in 1974 mitigated the challenge of balancing the needs of defense research career management and the expectations that strategic analysis would be responsive to policy needs.

With time, however, as the Policy Group's work became more and more oriented toward policy and international security analysis, supporting the Minister, and managing the interface with other government departments, D Strat A's program of work followed suit. Policy's requirements for research and analysis changed and these new priorities were increasingly at odds with the expectations that ORAE had for the type of work that should be done by

its strategic analysts. In the 1970s George Lindsey, for example, characterized the “ideal” strategic analysis problem set as “Who is the enemy? How strong are his forces? How are they equipped? How is he likely to attack us?” (1979). In sum, strategic analysis should provide military planners with analyses of military threats. In contrast, D Strat A requirements moved the civilian strategic analysts away from these force planning questions, weakening what had traditionally been a close relationship with military planners. It would be two decades before a direct relationship between military planning and strategic analysis was restored.

From its inception in 1974 to the end of the Cold War, D Strat A delivered analytical products that directly fed into defense policy formulation. The thrust of much of this work remained, at least initially, similar to the strategic studies that had emerged in the 1950s and flourished in the 1960s under the tutelage of Sutherland and Lindsey. Increasingly, however, there were new analytical demands reflecting both the unique concerns of D Strat A’s policy patron and important global security developments in the 1970s such as the rise of international terrorism. Classified and unclassified studies were conducted inter alia on the effects of nuclear weapons, arms control and disarmament, sea lines of communication, the strategic military balance, verification techniques, defense postures, strategic planning, terrorism, and Soviet naval expansion.¹⁷ When the Director of Strategic Analysis, Dr. Kenneth Calder, participated in a high-level government peace initiative—the Trudeau Global Peace Initiative—the analysts working in D Strat A provided analytical support. Similar to the efforts of Sutherland in the 1960s, strategic analysts continued to play an important role in directly supporting the development of defense policy statements. For example, the 1987 White Paper was developed largely by the strategic analysts working in D Strat A (Jakubow 2014, 52). While this practice dated back to the 1960s, the trend toward more policy-oriented analytical support accelerated after 1987.

TOWARD SECURITY STUDIES AND POLICY ANALYSIS, 1987–2008

Hew Strachan has argued that while strategy “has gained in breadth,” it “has forfeited conceptual clarity” (2007, 106).¹⁸ The consequences of strategy becoming increasingly abstract were evident in the debates surrounding how to best use strategic analysis. After 1987 and through to 2008, the delivery and meaning of strategic analysis within the Policy Group underwent some dramatic changes. Increasingly, senior management treated the strategic analysts as a pool of general regional experts that could be drawn upon to better support the day-to-day work of policy implementation, including engagement with other departments and foreign defence organizations (Finan 2014;

Friesen and Lombardi 2012, 8–9; Jakubow 2014, 69–70). Policy management also viewed collocation as a means to more directly shape the analysts' research program. More generally, the emerging challenges of the post–Cold War defense and security environment and changes to the academic study of security were raising questions about the traditional focus of the strategic analysts, which seemed, to some observers, to be too closely tied to the military concerns of the East–West confrontation of the Cold War years.

Defense research strategic analysts considered collocation with the Policy Group a mixed blessing, particularly the need to be responsive and responsible to policy requirements while still being held accountable to defense research standards and metrics for promotion and career progression. Some strategic analysts at the time believed that working in Policy increased the relevance and impact of their research and analysis, while others expressed concern about the growing constraints on their ability to maintain a long-term research program.¹⁹ Their main concern was, in particular, the analytical integrity of their work and their ability to maintain expertise, which they judged to be essential to underpin advice and analysis, irrespective of how that advice was delivered.

Through the 1990s, the strategic analysts in the Policy Group made important contributions to policy development, notably in writing parts of formal departmental policy documents such as the 1992 Defence Policy Statement as well as the 1994 White Paper.²⁰ At the same time, they became more focused on regional security issues in response to the range of ethnic and sectarian conflicts of the post–Cold War period. This focus on regional security broadened the range of defense concerns to include geopolitical, environmental, and socioeconomic issues often at the expense of analyzing strategic military trends. In effect, the analysis was shifting toward a broader security studies focus and away from the centrality of military developments. As Richard Betts explains, strategic analysis or strategic studies sits between military analysis with its specific focus on military technology, military organization, tactics, and how these combine to produce operational effects, and the wider-ranging field of security studies, which in theory encompasses all things, natural and human-made, that affect the security and safety of the state (Betts 1997, 8–9). Personnel cuts in the number of analysts in the mid-1990s accelerated this trend toward broader security studies and regional analysis, as analysts were now expected to cover a greater number of subject areas and disciplines (Lindsey 1998, 334).

This close alignment with policy analysis and development consequently limited the ability of the strategic analysts to directly support force planning. In the early 1990s, force planners reached out to the defense research community to meet their strategic analysis needs.²¹ At the same time, the force planners drew on the strategic assessments that D Strat A produced for use by the Policy Group. These assessments were, and remained, global surveys

of regional security developments and general defense trends, which military planners deemed insufficient to meet their force development requirements.²² This was not surprising since these assessments were produced for the Policy Group as statements of the Department's view of the international security environment, and also to balance the views of other government departments. Subsequently, military planners supplemented these D Strat A products with their own military assessment, which focused on the military implications of the strategic assessments.²³ The military's increasing demands for strategic analysis led, in the 1990s, to new client-funded hiring of ORAE strategic analysts who were distributed to strategic and force planning organizations—joint and service—across the department. Demand for strategic analysis in support of planning efforts across the environments grew as the military grappled with the level and type of analysis required by capability-based planning.

By the turn of the century, the divergent expectations of clients, notably the different requirements of policy developers and force planners, had eroded any agreement of what constituted appropriate defense strategic analysis. The evolving professional development standards of defense research completed the division. These new requirements, including more demanding publication standards and concrete evidence of expertise (and the maintenance, impact, and recognition of that expertise) introduced in 2002 heightened the disagreements that existed over the suitable balance between long-term programs of research delivered as major papers and the requirement to respond to immediate demands for analysis and assessment, with summary papers, speeches, and briefing notes. At its root, the problem stemmed from the ongoing challenge of developing and maintaining expertise while responding to the daily demands for short-term policy or force planning analysis. The defense research professional development model emphasized the former at the expense of the latter. Defense research strategic analysts had long sought to balance the requirements of supporting the day-to-day demands of the client and the need to maintain their subject matter expertise but the more exacting measures of professional development introduced by defense research exacerbated the problem. There was, moreover, no agreement on who was best positioned to define the appropriate balance.

BREAKING WITH THE DEFENSE RESEARCH MODEL OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, 2008

This discord came to a head in 2008, when the Policy Group concluded that the defense research model was no longer able to meet its analytical needs, which were primarily policy analysis oriented and short-term. As a result, the Policy Group's management gave up the defense research strategic analysts

and changed the mandate of D Strat A, which was now defined as the “provision of concise and timely policy/strategic analysis.” The leadership directed that D Strat A products would range “from briefing and speaking notes to presentation decks and short papers.” A number of trends that had been converging since 1974 thus culminated in the 2008 decision to revise D Strat A’s mandate and human resources model. Three stand out: defense research career and professional development standards that measured professional impact and recognition as a function of impact on the client as well as objective levels of research and expertise; increasing expectations by the Policy Group for quicker turnaround and more policy-oriented analysis, a trend that had been underway for some time; and a growing demand from military clients for strategic analysis to support force development and capability-based planning.

LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF DEFENSE SCIENCE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

What does this history reveal about the meaning of strategic analysis and its role within DND? It suggests that the fortunes of strategic analysis since its emergence in the early Cold War years have fluctuated as a result of the changing analytical requirements of the client (both at the governmental and departmental levels) and of the evolving demands that occurred concurrent with an emerging professional identity centered on defining strategic analysis as a research occupation. As clients required analysts to assess a broad range of issues, and deliver them faster and in short form, the Defence Research organization enforced stricter professional standards that defined relevance against objective criteria for what constituted credible, quality evidence-based empirical analysis. The client’s imperative to expand what constituted strategic types of analysis, driven by evolving definitions of defense and security, conflicted with the imperatives of the professional definition which required bounding the meaning of strategic to shape definitions of expertise, promote education and training standards, and measure professional development. Achieving an appropriate balance between client and professional requirements became the defining feature of the evolution of defense strategic analysis, as played out in the Policy Group and in a host of embedded force planning positions.

This chapter also suggests that strategic analysis was most relevant and influential when it could draw on expertise in weapon systems, force structures, and doctrine together with the analytical tools provided by strategic studies and military history, and was colocated with force planning military partners to ensure that its analysis was practical and actioned (Friesen et al. 2011; Friesen and Lombardi 2012; Gellner 1978). The strategic analyst’s

toolkit also required a thorough appreciation of specific Canadian defense conditions and needs, which stemmed largely from geography and history as well as actual military developments in the world.²⁴ Past experience also highlighted another important tool of the strategic analyst: familiarity with and expertise in the methodology for analyzing and formulating policy and strategy. It was this core expertise which distinguished strategic analysts from other analysts and scientists during the Cold War.

Arguably, one lesson from the past is that a shared understanding of a baseline expertise is critical for the maintenance of strategic analysis as a profession. The concept of strategy remains essential to define what is “strategic” about strategic analysis and how it had been practiced in DND for many years. The word *strategy* is now so ubiquitous as to be meaningless unless rooted in a firm context (Freedman 2013). Strategy can be best understood in a defense context as a conceptual bridge between policy aims and military actions (the purposeful use or threat of force; Gray 2014).²⁵ The origins of the word are military, from the Greek *strategia* or function of a general (*strategos*), which is derived from *stratos* (an army) and *ago* (to lead). Generals, in the Greek sense, produced *stratagems*—plans or tricks—a definition which suggests the blend of the science and the art that characterizes strategy-making. In the Department of National Defence, this policy-military context defines the meaning of strategy and, by extension, informs the concept of strategic analysis. The modifier “strategic” also carries some abstract assumptions and characteristics that shape the understanding of its use in the defense context. When analysis is described as strategic, *hierarchical* and *temporal* characteristics are also implied. Analysis used to support decisions at the strategic level or long-range planning is considered “strategic.” In essence, this historical survey demonstrates that effective defense strategic analysis requires a combination of professional study and experience of, or exposure to, military and defense planning issues. Its success as a professional occupation, in sum, is determined by its ability to give meaning to “strategic” as well as “analysis.”

Professions are also defined by the possession of specific and specialized knowledge and skills, a recognized and approved body of learning derived from research, education, and training.²⁶ In the case of strategic analysis, can it be bounded by the hierarchical and temporal conditions alone, or is there a body of knowledge exclusive to strategic analysis in general, or defense strategic analysis in particular? And can that body be defined by the client’s requirements? We argue that if strategic analysis is to be considered a profession, whether niche or otherwise, with standards and development imperatives, the core body of knowledge and skills is a critical and defining feature. Deriving one’s income from or being skilled in the performance of a particular assigned task can make one an expert and relevant; it is certainly to be valued. But being a professional has traditionally had a broader meaning.

This historical account of the evolution of strategic analysis within DND reveals that there was a gradual expansion of the remit of the strategic analysts to incorporate economic, social, and policy analysis as well as a range of regional security studies into their analysis, reflecting the redefinition of defense to security as well as broader trends in the consumption of analysis amongst government officials and academics. This trend away from specialist analytical expertise toward general knowledge paralleled the shift that was taking place across the broader public service with the introduction of new thinking on public management. Senior government officials were increasingly expected to be excellent managers, excellence being defined in reference to business practises from the private sector rather than the more traditional expectation that senior public servants would provide expert advice based on knowledge acquired over long years of departmental experience (Axworthy and Burch 2010, 26; Savoie 2003, 136–68; 2013, 30–33, 239–45). Similarly, the busy workloads of senior government managers and the growing demands of interdepartmental obligations had the twin effect of reducing the amount of time that could be devoted to reading detailed specialist studies while increasing the range of briefing material that had to be prepared for the variety of issues discussed in interdepartmental meetings. In short, as government executives became generalists dealing with a diverse range of issues, both within their departments and interdepartmentally, their analytical requirements changed. Diminished too was their ability to provide the quality control function. Some government analytical positions followed a similar path, moving away from the specific depth of technical and subject matter expertise toward a more generalist approach able to respond to the broader needs of their management.

This trend was evident in defense. As the strategic analytical capability was drawn closer into directly supporting the work of the Policy Group, there was a corresponding decline in the expertise necessary to directly support military planning. By the 1990s, D Strat A's products, such as the *Strategic Assessment*, were geared principally to Policy Group requirements rather than those of military force planners (Johnston and Roi 2003). Over time, force planners secured their own strategic analysis capability from defense research to support their own force planning processes. Military expertise was the core requirement. Despite the fact that the largest single group of strategic analysts worked in D Strat A, the Policy Group's ability to shape military planning diminished over time as its analytical focus became tied more closely to short assessments rooted in regional studies and policy analysis and development.

Further, this historical overview demonstrates that colocation within the Policy Group was assumed to have made the strategic analysts de facto responsive to client needs, even as career and professional development imperatives were reshaping their work programs. As their client created a mod-

el where relevance was increasingly measured by responsiveness rather than core expertise or research outcomes, the defense research organization was implementing more robust professional standards that emphasized the importance of core expertise and dedicated research. These conflicting measurements over analysis, relevance, and responsiveness between the client and the parent organization, which was charged with upholding quality and professional development standards, were critical to understanding the choices made by both parties with regard to analytical requirements and the acceptable trade-offs between timeliness and depth of analysis implicit in those decisions. The strategic analysts posted to support policy development found it challenging to meet their professional and career development requirements. In a case where analytical quality and relevance were defined differently by the defense research organization and the client and where those differences contradicted each other, a break was, perhaps, inevitable. Eventually, two separate groups emerged, each using different measures of performance and professional development. This fracture raises questions as to how far the need to compete in the “market-place of ideas” can go before fundamental elements of how the profession is defined become strained.

Irrespective of the split, this historical account underscores both the continued importance of expertise-based strategic analysis to policy formulation and force planning, but also how that requirement is in tension with the need to maintain that expertise. The challenges of developing and maintaining a strategic analysis capability should not be underestimated in light of the contemporary expectations that analysts are best employed in providing information and assessments at short notice to senior civilian and military decision makers. The first, and perhaps greatest, challenge is to define what constitutes core expertise. Is it driven by the client, or by the professional strategic analyst? How broadly can that expertise be defined or stretched before identification as a strategic analyst becomes meaningless? Equally important, who should validate the quality and credibility of the analysis? In theory, clients are in the best position to identify their analytical demands based on the need to support their bureaucratic or political leaders. That said, clients are not always in a position to validate the content of reports or the quality of the analysis.

Furthermore, in the absence of formal policy and strategy development processes that would, in principle, identify and prioritize strategic research and analysis requirements, what determines the means of balancing the imperatives of delivery with the requirements of professional development? Short-fuse demands and limited time constrain the nature and scope of strategic analytical development. Generating and sustaining any analytical capability requires dedicated time for professional development and opportunities for deep research and major projects, even if results are delivered in a short format like briefing notes. The defense research professional development

and career progression system is designed to promote these requirements, the achievement of which can often come at the expense of some short-term client needs. Given the time pressures faced by many clients, it can be very difficult to convince them that their long-term interests will be better served by deeply researched, evidence-based analysis. Objective measures and occupational standards are necessary, however, for strategic analysis to succeed as a distinct and useful profession. Moreover, expanding the meaning of strategic analysis too far risks degrading the significance, or even the necessity, of defining analysts as strategic. Finally, the “tyranny of the inbox and managing today’s crises” risks not only the credibility and sustainability of a strategic analysis capability, but also the very policy development and force planning processes for which this capability had been created to support in the first place.²⁷ In the end, strategic analysis, and indeed all types of analysis, risk irrelevance without a clear policy and strategy-driven purpose.

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NOTES

1. The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of the Government of Canada, or any of its departments and agencies.
2. Force planning is used in this chapter to refer to the planning associated with both the creation and maintenance of military capabilities for today and for tomorrow. In effect, it covers both the process of force posture planning and force development. For the American definition of force planning, see Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, November 8, 2010 (amended through to June 15, 2014), 100–101.
3. The following historical account of the evolution of the strategic analysis capability in the Department of National Defence has benefited from Roman Jakobow's recent report on the topic (2014).
4. For the early history of Valcartier, see Goodspeed 1958, 111–33.
5. On the work of the Operational Research Group during the early years of the Cold War, see Goodspeed 1958, 162–74; Lindsey 1998.
6. On the emergence of a distinct Canadian strategic thinking capability at DND in the 1950s, see Lindsey 1983; Richter 1996, 2002, 41 et passim.
7. In the 1960s, the Joint Ballistic Missile Defence Staff became responsible to the Chiefs of Staff for examining the implications of space developments and satellite systems (Richter 2002, note 15, 178).
8. During this same period, the Defence Research Board continued to produce technical and scientific research on nuclear technology, but this was overshadowed by strategic studies on nuclear strategy and deterrence.
9. For additional sources on Sutherland's impact, see Lee and Bellamy 1987; Buteux 1994; Richter 1997; and Tasseron 2003; Lovegrove 2010.
10. This was the Systems Analysis Group whose purpose was to provide an integrated approach to analyzing and evaluating major defense systems and examining interservice problems. This team consisted of a Director, eight defense scientists and three military officers (one from each of the services).
11. The Glassco Commission was named for J. Grant Glassco who was mandated by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to propose changes to the civil service based on contemporary business practices. For the Glassco Commission's impact on defense science, see Turner 2012.
12. Part of the reorganization included removing non-research functions from the Defence Research Board's mandate.
13. In 1967, the Operational Research Establishment became the Defence Research and Analysis Establishment, which lasted until 1974 when the name was changed again to the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment. On the new recruitment focus, see Lindsey 1998, 333.
14. For other accounts of the rise of strategic studies in academia and in think tanks, see Freedman 1981; Gray 1982; Kaplan 1983; Steiner 1991; and Ayson 2012. See also chapter 12 by Donald E. Abelson in this volume.
15. The transition to humanities and social science in strategic analysis was gradual in the 1960s and 1970s. Physical scientists continued to dominate the ranks of the strategic analyst community working at DND well into the 1970s. When Dr. James Finan, a future director of Strategic Analysis, joined the Operational Research Establishment as a strategic analyst in October 1973, his boss at the time was a physicist. Into the late 1980s, there were also ongoing

tensions between quantitative strategic analysts and those with a more qualitative approach. Personal correspondence between the authors and Dr. James Finan, April 2, 2014.

16. *NDHQ Restructuring Directive 5/72: Implementation Plan*, September 18, 1972.

17. For list of topics analyzed by D Strat A, see Jakubow 2014, 32–35 and 39–43.

18. Others call it a subject, suggesting the expansion of the use of the term (see Luttwak 2003, xi).

19. Based on recollections of defense scientists drawn from Finan 2014; Friesen and Lombardi 2012, 8–9; Jakubow 2014, 71.

20. Based on recollections of defense scientists drawn from Finan 2014; Friesen and Lombardi 2012, 8–9; Jakubow 2014, 71.

21. Based on the recollections of Dr. Scot Robertson, the strategic analyst who organized this outreach in the early 1990s. Conversation with the authors, April 16, 2014.

22. Robertson, conversation with the authors, April 16, 2014; see also Letter of Understanding between DG Pol Plan and DG Strategic Plans, 1999. File in the possession of the authors.

23. Letter of Understanding between DG Pol Plan and DG Strategic Plans, 1999. File in the possession of the authors.

24. As a model on how to appraise Canada's defense situation, the gold standard remains Stacey 1940; see also the insightful analysis by Sutherland (1962). For an account of how Stacey came to write this path breaking study, see Sarty 2012.

25. As discussed in a Special Edition of *Infinity Journal* (March 2014). On a similar theme, see Paret 1986, 3; Guillot 2003; and Yarger 2006, 67.

26. For the development of definitions of professionalism and professions, see Perkin 1990. Samuel P. Huntington (1981) provides a useful summary, defining the key elements of professionalism as an agreed-upon body of knowledge, a relationship with society based on the responsible and accountable application and use of this knowledge, and a corporate sense as a body of professionals.

27. The phrasing comes from Flournoy and Brimley 2006, 81.