

**ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY -
A SELECTION OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ARTICLES FROM CHINESE JOURNALS**

Prepared and based on translations by Edward J. Barss

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Note on Translation

As most Chinese academic articles have an abstract and title in English, the original English-language title has been retained to aid in finding the original document. However, this approach means that any grammatical errors have been retained. Titles that were not available in English have been translated and marked with an asterisk. In providing summaries, an attempt has been made to keep the original tone of some of the articles, though the language is filtered through the translator's own stylistic choices. For the benefit of readers, notes have been included on several words that do not translate easily into English from Chinese as the meaning differs slightly. To take one example: deterrence in Chinese has a stronger emphasis on coercion than it does in English. Only by understanding this nuance, can some of the arguments in the articles be clearly understood. Lastly, when referring to the Diaoyu Islands, the alternative name (the Senkaku Islands) has not been included as it might lead to unnecessary confusion. This approach is informed by a belief that referring to the islands as the Diaoyu Islands allows readers to enter into the mindset of the authors writing these articles.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Author	1
Note on Translation	1
Glossary	3
Introduction	5
Section One:	
The Relative Decline of the United States	6
Section Two:	
The Role of Nuclear Weapons	32
Section Three:	
Sino-Russian Relations	63

GLOSSARY

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPG	Conventional Prompt Global Strike
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTB	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PAC-3	Patriot Advanced Capability-3
RIC	Russia-India-China
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War Two
WWI	World War One

X37

Boeing X-37

X47B

Northrop Grumman X-47B

INTRODUCTION

This publication consists of a selection of articles from Chinese-language publications in the field of strategic studies. As China's global profile increases, it is undeniably important that that country's perspective of various issues of global significance be taken into account. Doing so nonetheless entails some familiarity with the discussions in which Chinese academics and policy-makers are participating, and that often requires the ability to access writings and speeches in the original language. It has been said that the strongest impediment to understanding Chinese politics and policy-making is the language barrier. This publication is an attempt to help redress that problem.

The selection of articles is organised into three sections that address important contemporary strategic issues: (1) what is the likely impact of the relative decline of the United States on international politics?; (2) what role or roles do Chinese strategists envisage for nuclear weapons?; and (3) what is the nature of current Sino-Russian relations? The author (who also acted as translator) includes a variety of articles drawn from Chinese scholarly publications, both journals and university theses, to provide some insight into each of these questions. The title and source of each article is indicated, and the thesis and main arguments are then introduced and summarised. No attempt has been made to assess the validity of the article's arguments, the evidence offered to support those arguments, or the reasonableness of any accompanying policy recommendations. This approach allows us to read what the Chinese authors themselves are writing, albeit in an expurgated format.

Readers of this publication will quickly discover that many of the debates taking place in academic and policy-circles in the West are similarly taking place in China. With allowance for the general level of constraint within which Chinese debates must take place, the range of opinions and the concepts employed are (perhaps remarkably) familiar, as indeed are some of the conclusions. As a result, the arguments presented appear to be a mixture of eclectic analysis grappling for answers in the current era of uncertainty and support for official policy, although the latter does not invalidate their inclusion – the thinking, the assumptions, and evidence that support Chinese positions are obviously very important. Here again, readers will see similarities with what takes place in the West. Publications were selected based on their relevancy to the topics discussed and their academic rigor. However, the quality and rigor between the publications may vary, especially those published by individual universities. Significantly, none of the publications from which the articles are drawn is available in English-language version and so they are quite possibly frequently overlooked in a literature survey on the issues being addressed in this bibliography.

Section One:

The Relative Decline of the United States

Chen Yingchun [陈迎春]

“The Dilemma and Way-out of the China-US Relation against the Background of the Power Shift” [权力转移背景下中美关系的困境与出路],

Asia and Africa Review, [亚非纵横], No. 2, 2013, pp. 8-15.

Thesis

There are several unstable factors in Chinese-American relations which will lead to conflict unless corrected.

Concepts

Power transition theory hypothesizes that when a rising power surpasses a hegemonic power, conflict is likely. The theory predicts that conflict will occur when the rising power and hegemonic power are equal or similar in strength. Another important variable predicting the likelihood of conflict is the level of satisfaction the rising power has with the current world order. This is a realist theory, which has been criticized as outdated because of the spread of global institutions. Others say that the theory is simply a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Main Arguments

There are several unstable variables in the Chinese-American relationship which include an unstable strategic foundation, US overreach into non-traditional security areas, hostile trade relations, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. The US is concerned with maintaining its hegemonic position in Asia which puts pressure on China leading to an unstable strategic foundation for Chinese-American relations. This pressure is apparent with the US threatening China's core interests by strengthening relations with neighbouring countries containing Chinese naval power, and inserting itself into Chinese issues concerning Tibet, India, and Taiwan. The US also interferes in Chinese domestic politics in non-traditional security areas which include the internet, space, climate change, human rights, terrorism, and ideology. Events such as the withdrawal of Google from the Chinese market, the Wang Lijun incident¹, withdrawal from anti-terrorism cooperation during the 2010-2012, and the US promotion of democracy to China's neighbors, Mongolia and Burma, are evidence of this interference. Chinese trade is also in a disadvantageous position. The US often uses anti-dumping measures to suppress Chinese products but any retaliatory action by China would lead to a mutually detrimental trade war. Furthermore, the TPP is designed to create a new Asia-Pacific trading block that strengthens US power and spreads democracy.

To avoid the instability brought about by the power transition trap China and the US need to respect each other's core interests. Also there needs to be need new thinking to increase global mechanisms for dialogue, crisis warning, and monitoring in Asia. Relations should also move towards a more forgiving relationship. Overall, America should realize that the world is big enough for both powers and China is not a challenge.

¹ The incident mentioned is when a local Police Chief in Sichuan, Wang Lijun, attempted to defect to the United States.

Huang Fengzhi and Pang Aicheng [黄凤志和逢爱成]

“Financial Crisis and Adjustment of the United States Hegemonic Strategy” [金融危机与美国霸权战略的调整],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 99, No. 1, 2012, pp. 43-49.

Thesis

The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis forced the US to readjust its global strategy to focus on the domestic economy, reinforce relationships with foreign partners, and reduce its global military presence.

Main Arguments

The globalization and informationization of the world economy has led to rising powers challenging the US's position as a unipolar power. This has forced the US to take measures to resolve these contradictions. Heretofore the US had been insulated from these problems because of the nature of the US dollar as a reserve currency, which made foreign wars, foreign military bases, and foreign government support cheaper than what it would otherwise be. Over time the US economy exhausted itself through expensive wars. This led to spending that outstripped revenues setting the ground for the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis. The financial crisis forced the US to readjust by putting the economy first, reinforcing alliances and foreign relations, and reducing security expenditures. The US focus on the economy has led to increasing attention on economic inequality, which should continue to be a problem for the foreseeable future. In foreign relations, the US has had to abandon unilateralism for multilateralism and to adopt a realist political stance. The readjust also led to a reduction in troops in Afghanistan and in ballistic missile defence spending as well as the introduction of the nuclear-free world policy. Despite this, the US is still a powerful state and the full effect of the financial crisis on US hegemonic power has yet to be seen.

Jin Canrong and Wang Hao [金灿荣和王浩]

“The Resilience of U.S. Hegemony and Its Future: A Comparative Analysis of Two Post World War II Strategic Adjustments” [衰落-变革-更生：美国霸权的内在韧性与未来走向 – 基于二战后两轮战略调整的比较研究],

Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies [代亚太], No. 6, 2015, pp.1-36.

Thesis

American hegemony has survived because of the US's ability to reform itself, which leads to periodic cycles of decline, reform, and regeneration.

Main Arguments

America has already completed one cycle of decline, reform, and regeneration which corresponds with the periods of 1969-1974, 1969-1981, and the 1970's and 1980's respectively. There are a large number of similarities between American decline in the late 60s and 2008. During both periods of decline the US faced financial difficulty, exhaustion from war, significant social unrest, and changes in the structure of the international economic system and international environment. During the first period of reform the

US quickly made internal and external corrections (leaving the Vietnam War and fighting the economic crisis), an external relations adjustment (improved relations with China, advocating for human rights), and internal economic and social reforms (pluralism, affirmative action, supply side economics, monetarism). America is dealing with its current decline by using a similar process. The US has made internal and external corrections (halted the financial crisis, focused on multilateralism, scaled down the war on terrorism, introduced the smart power concept), external relations adjustments (the “Pivot to Asia” strategy, improved alliance relations, developed new global partners, the TPP agreement), and internal economic and social reform (focus on restoring manufacturing, increased free trade and international investment, health care reform).

Obamas current attempts to reform are only partially effective. Economic reforms have been a success, as financial regulations have stabilized the markets, and shale and natural gas have been of great benefit to the US. On the other hand, there has only been limited success in improving manufacturing or foreign investment, and trade deals need more public support. Social reforms have slowed because of Republican political resistance. In foreign affairs, the Asian Pivot has had some success, but it has not contained China and the increased US military presence in the region has exacerbated security issues. Furthermore, continuing crises in the Middle East and Europe have divided American attention making the Pivot strategy more costly.

The future reform and revival of US power is complicated by two new factors: political polarization and the multipolarization of the international order. Current complications come from strategic mistakes the US made at the end of the Cold War. The US mistakenly believed its efforts against the Soviet Union directly led to its collapse. The US then became overconfident in its ideological position and wasted an opportunity to reform, leading to inequality, polarization, financial bubbles, instability, and the spread of terrorism. Future reform efforts will require fixing the mistakes of the Cold War. While there are ongoing problems, it is still too early to tell if America is declining.

Li Junjiu and Li Xiao [李俊久和李晓]

“Assessing Current U.S. Hegemonic Position and Strategic Measures of Newly Emerging Great Powers” [美国的霸权地位评估与新兴大国的应对],
World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 1, 2014, pp. 114-141.

Thesis

America is not a declining power and will not be replaced by rising powers because of the self-reinforcing nature of US power.

Main Arguments

Old theories of power explain American hegemony because they rely on concepts of power coming from territorial dominance, military strength, and economic success. They ignore the shifting nature of power in its current forms. US hegemonic power rests on three pillars: sticky power (manufacturing, trade, finance), sharp power (military), and soft power (knowledge production, cultural influence, and systemic/conceptual qualities). Sticky power reinforces sharp power by providing resources to fund military expenditures: sharp power reinforces sticky power by providing security for market expansion and trade: soft power reduces the need and costs of military power. Moreover, the US-made

international system allows for the systemic separation of powers by burden sharing between allies and other countries. The international system also forces other countries to take responsibility for their role in the system as they rise, while the US maintains veto authority over international institutions. Rising powers should realize they are not in a stable position. They overlook the quality of their economic growth and the burdens of traditional culture. Moreover, rising powers have risen within the US-led international system and benefit from it, but they are not strong enough to break out of it.

Policy Recommendations

Rising powers must work within the current international system to change it for their benefit, not attempt to create a separate system to replace it or topple it. Over-confidence will only lead to conflict, strategic mistakes, and American opposition. China should accept its position as the second strongest power. However, China should be clear as to its responsibilities to other countries, and whether it is content to improve its position relative to the US. The essence of this is to not seek dominance nor accept it. For example, US calls to re-evaluate the yuan are part of a strategy to reduce Chinese power by inducing an economic bubble; therefore it is important that China retain independent monetary policy. A similar currency re-evaluation strategy was successfully used against Japan in the 1980's. The next steps for China will be to turn soft power and sticky power into demonstrable power. That power will come from responsibility. Therefore, China should improve its knowledge production, spread Chinese cultural ideas, and work to advance representation for developing countries internationally.

Li Xiuying and Shi Chunlin [李秀英和史春林]

“The Impact of the US Island Chain Blockage on China’s Access to the Seas” 美国岛链封锁机器对我国海上安全的影响,

World Regional Studies [世界地理研究], Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2013, pp. 1-9.

Thesis

The US has continued its Cold War strategy of containment through the use of the island chain strategy to control, monitor, and block China’s naval power.

Main Arguments

The US island chain strategy originated during the Cold War and was directed at containing Communism in Asia, but has continued into the present and is now aimed at containing China’s rise. The US uses three island chains to strengthen its military position so as to control sea lanes, straits, and islands, and by doing so the US threatens Chinese security. The first chain includes Japan, the Aleutian Islands, the Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain includes Japan, the Ogasawara Islands, Iwo Jima, Mariana Islands, Yap Islands, Palau Islands, and the Halmahera Island. The third ring includes the Hawaiian Islands, the Aleutian Islands, and the Oceanic Archipelago.

The US has a large number of bases in the first and second island chains aimed at maintaining its containment strategy. Also, the US has constructed sub-surface, air, and surface monitoring systems which are maintained by patrols, satellites, and various listening posts such as those in the Bohai and Yellow Seas. The US uses and has inserted itself into China’s territorial conflicts over islands, particularly the Spratly Islands. The US is penetrating economically and militarily into China’s territorial conflicts in

the South China Sea. They are trying to internationalize these conflicts and are using military training exercises and naval patrols to gain an advantage.

The US containment strategy has effectively confined China, blocking its access to the ocean. The US has weakened and restricted China's naval operational space especially for nuclear submarines. Furthermore, the first island chain gives the US an advantageous position to threaten China's developed areas. The island chains also aid the US in preventing an interventionist policy by Beijing against the province of Taiwan. Economically, the island chains strategy restricts China from expanding outside its own territory limiting the development of new Chinese ports. The Chinese navy is followed, monitored, and challenged by Japan and the US. China can manage this containment strategy during peacetime because of the protections afforded by international law. However during wartime, the US can easily blockade supplies to China cutting off Chinese access to oil.

Policy Recommendations

The focal point of Chinese policy for responding to the island containment strategy starts with solving the Taiwan problem. Once Taiwan is reclaimed, the US will have to retreat to the second island chain and then China's overall strategic posture will improve. Therefore, China should continue to resist Taiwanese independence and further develop its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Another potential major breakthrough point is the South China Sea, despite the US and Japan exacerbating territorial disputes in the area. China should oppose international talks, multi-party ownership, non-party intervention, and oppose international organizations that challenge China's claims to islands in the South China Sea. Still, China should try and peacefully resolve the situation. In the meantime, China should try to obtain de-facto control over its territorial claims in the South China Sea², deter hostile nations with shows of force, and use political influence with neighbouring countries to improve its position. China should also try to control the Diaoyu Islands and oppose Japan's unwise policy of expanding its economic influence.

To strengthen China's position, China should expand the number of naval missions in key straights and island areas to do geographic surveillance, use UNCLOS to protect its island rights, and oppose militarization or unilateral actions by outside powers. Another important objective for China should be to obtain a port in the Indian Ocean, which could be in Myanmar or Pakistan. International cooperation should be strengthened by maintaining good relations with neighbours in order to reduce the influence of great powers. At the same time, China should improve US-Chinese naval cooperation to reduce tension, build trust, and fight common threats. In the long term, China will need to continue to develop its near sea naval capability, respond to direct threats, and expand its blue-water naval capabilities. China will also need to develop greater long range weapons to protect China's carrier which augments China's power projection. China will have to move from a passive to an active strategy, as it begins to depend increasingly on the seas for economics and security.

² This is also commonly referred to as the 9-Dash Line.

Li Xudong [李旭东]

“America’s Geostrategic Stratiform Frame Towards China and China’s Choice for its Rising”

[美国对话地缘战略层次架构及中国崛起的选择]

World Regional Studies [世界地理研究], Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 27-33.

Thesis

America is using a layered strategy to contain China, while seeking to avoid pushing China too hard to avert a conflict.

Main Arguments

America’s strategy for managing relations with China is to put pressure on and cooperate with Beijing. The most successful aspect of that strategy is its layered containment of China. The first layer of US containment is the US partnership with its allies, Japan and Australia. The second layer is building relations with countries in South-East Asia and India, which is important as a naval staging area and a transit corridor for Middle Eastern oil to China. The second layer is not as developed as the first and will need more time to stabilize. The third layer is Central Asia and Mongolia, which is a geopolitically important area because of its economic and security related value. The US wants to avoid any one country dominating the area. While US penetration into the third layer is increasing, due to limited objectives the third containment layer will decrease in geostrategic importance for America’s geopolitical strategy towards China in the long term.

The main objectives of American security strategy are to preserve its hegemony, prevent terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the US is declining in power due to economic problems and is becoming isolationist. Moreover, due to the constraint of American strategic security objectives, the US is willing to accept China’s rise as long as it is able to develop peacefully, keep its commitments, and work with the US on global issues. However, Americans have a tendency towards Aristotelian thinking and look at the world in terms of moral absolutes. Therefore, the US often categorizes countries as allies, democracies, developing countries, or rogue states. The US is also worried that by treating China as a threat and applying pressure, it will create a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to confrontation. The US is still concerned about a lack of clarity in Chinese strategy, despite China’s efforts to adjust its foreign policy by promoting mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. Moreover, China intends to reform the international system not harm it.

Policy Recommendations

China should be brave enough to develop its power without fear and perfect the development of its power to avoid suspicion. A strong China will nonetheless arouse criticism and fear abroad. Regardless, China should advance itself to rally the people of the country, demonstrate the power of its ideology, establish itself as a model for economic development, improve China’s voice on the international stage, maintain international stability, and establish order in East Asia. China should also commit to adjusting how it develops to take in other countries’ concerns. This will reduce the associated costs of strengthening China’s position and weaken the US commitment to containment. China should also avoid intervening in too many places and risk making enemies; instead it should stay quiet and bide its time.

Current US containment strategy exacerbates tensions in China's eastern and southern regions, while the Western and Northern areas are stable. Therefore China should focus on its eastern and southern regions, particularly on its naval defences there. China should also use its people, culture, and businesses to cultivate relationships with Japan and Australia. Finally, China should develop power from the standpoint of policy development and not emotions or a sense of 'victimization'. America is fearful of an emotional or victimized Chinese mentality. Therefore, it will be easier to deal with American containment from a policy mentality.

Liu Shiqiang [刘世强]

"Hegemonic Dependence and the Logic in the Declining Ascendance of Leading Powers" [霸权依赖与领导国家权势衰落的逻辑],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 5, 2012, pp.21-41.

Thesis

Hegemonic decline is caused by overreliance on the international system it creates to solve internal conflicts, leading to over-extension and reform.

Main Arguments

Hegemonic decline is caused by a cycle of hegemonic establishment, over-reliance on the hegemonic system, changes in posture, and finally a decline in power. Any country once established as a hegemon will set up a system to benefit itself. This is done by turning its superior power into influence. The goal of this is to achieve respect, to create a favourable policy environment in a favorable international environment, to generate global public goods, and to draw rental income from the system. Once the hegemon achieves these goals, it will no longer improve the system but take from it. The hegemon relies on its past accomplishments leading to an overreliance on the system. Eventually as economic production slows and the benefits its society receives decline, the hegemon will rely on the international system to resolve domestic conflicts. Other countries will oblige the hegemon because they also receive benefits from the system, recognize the hegemon's material superiority, and have internalized the values of the system.

The more reliant the hegemon is on the international system, the more it will move away from a strategy of building strength and towards a strategy of maintaining control. Thus the hegemon switches roles from a producer to a consumer, changing its material advantage into a rules-based advantage. Now the desire for reform changes into a desire for conservatism. Finally, the hegemon will lose competency and become focused on the loss of the equilibrium within the system. However, the need to satisfy domestic constituencies which rely on the international system will lead to a desire for reform. Reform opens up an opportunity for other countries and rising powers to reform the system, possibly leading to an existential struggle for control.

Liu Weidong [刘卫东] – [“The US Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy” 美国对中日两国的再平衡战略论析], *World Politics and Economic* [《世界经济与政治》], No. 10, 2014, pp. 81- 97.

Thesis

A key objective of the Asian Pivot Strategy is balancing Japan and China against each other to preserve America’s superior position.

Main Arguments

The Asian Pivot strategy is designed to rebalance US interests internationally towards the Asia-Pacific. It is primarily focused on Asia with a secondary focus on the Pacific. Other goals include preserving US regional leadership by using international law and multilateralism, to maintain the current order within Asia. The two most important countries for America’s strategy are Japan and China. Currently, the US remains guarded towards China, but is not looking to completely oppose it which would be detrimental to its interests. The US is looking to use Japan as a partner, but the military normalization of Japan may be detrimental to the US, as it could draw the US into conflict. America’s decline in power is also complicating its rebalancing strategy, as it requires more from its allies to do more while still maintaining its dominance. Therefore the US is using Japan to balance against China, while seeking good relations with both.

This balancing strategy has military, economic, and political components. In the military sphere, the US has increased support for Japan, coordinated policy efforts with Japan to pressure China, aided Japan in developing its independent power, improved Chinese-US military-to-military contact, and tried to avoid direct Chinese-Japanese military incidents. Economically, the US is pushing for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement requires Japan as a signatory to be successful. The TPP is not directly aimed against China, but there are many obstacles within the agreement that currently keep China out. Politically, the US will not pick sides in the existing territorial dispute between Japan and China. However, the US is pressuring Japan on the problematic acknowledgement of its own history and it reluctantly supports China’s New Great Power Relations concept.

This US policy is nuanced and is not for or against any one country, but is aimed at maintaining a balance which benefits American interests. In doing so, China and Japan are forced to compete for US favor, since bilateral resolution of Sino-Japanese disputes is difficult. Furthermore, the US reduces its risk and expenses by balancing each country against the other. Some unstable elements threaten this balancing including differences between the US and Japan, the significant challenges for the US, and China’s evolving strategy which could improve relations with Japan.

Ma Chao [马超]

“The Mongolia-USA Relationship and its Influence to China’s Security: Based on the Perspective of ‘Geopolitical Pivot Country’” [蒙美关系及其对中国国家安全的影响- 基于‘地缘政治支轴国’的视角],

World Regional Studies [界地理研究], Vol. 19, No. 3, Sep. 2010, pp.36-41.

Thesis

Positive Mongolian-American relations are a severe threat to China’s long term security because of Mongolia’s role as a ‘geostrategic pivot country’.

Concepts

A geostrategic pivot country has four characteristics. First, it is located in a sensitive geographic position with the potential to influence the actions of larger geopolitical players. . Second, the pivot country can block or permit other countries access to a region or a resource. Third, it can act as a buffer state for a region or country. Fourth, it can influence the politics and culture of neighboring geopolitical players. The countries that this concept applies to are not fixed in time and they change depending on world circumstances. The concept was originated by Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Main Arguments

Mongolia could become a serious threat to Chinese security because of its unique geographic position as a buffer state between Russia and China, cultural ties to inner-Mongolia and Tibet, and possible role as a democratic bridgehead. America has improved its economic support for, military relations with, and promoted democracy in, Mongolia. The goal of these actions is to drive a wedge between Russia and China, encourage democracy, and encircle China. This aligns with overall American goals for influencing pivot countries, which are to spread Western style democracy, gain political and economic benefits, expand American influence, and protect the US’s hegemonic position. Chinese security is threatened by improved relations between the US and Mongolia, as Mongolia is located near major Chinese cities and industries, and provides a superior position for an invasion of China. Moreover, Mongolia’s relationship with separatist movements in China, including those in inner-Mongolia, Tibet, and Taiwan, represent a threat to China’s internal security and ethnic harmony. A clear indication of this threat would be if Mongolia joined NATO, which would lead to the complete geographic encirclement of China. Preventing Mongolia from joining NATO or the US obtaining military bases there would stop the US from further pressuring China politically, threatening China’s borders, and spreading internal chaos.

Ma Fangfang [马方方]

*** “Current American Nuclear Strategic Trajectory and Its Influence on Global Security”** [当前美国核战略的发展趋势及其对国际安全影响],

Journal of University of International Relations [国际关系学院学报], No. 3, 2008, pp. 41-46.

Thesis

The focus of America’s nuclear strategy, on maintaining an absolute advantage in nuclear weapons technology, will lead to greater instability in the international system.

Main Arguments

The ultimate goal of US nuclear strategy is to reinforce America's hegemonic status and safeguard its security, while allowing it to threaten any country at will. Nuclear strategy is a core component of America's defence strategy because of the global nature of its security commitments, the limited ability of countering nuclear weapons with conventional weapons, the suppressive effect of nuclear weapons on conflict, and the inability of other countries to use nuclear weapons because of resource constraints. The focal points of this strategy are to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), deter strong 3rd World countries, and improve missile defence research and capabilities. Essentially, US nuclear strategy will allow the US to act without restraint on the international stage.

However, US nuclear strategy will create instabilities in global security as it upsets the current strategic balance and reduces incentives for the US to curtail its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, it will increase the spread of WMD's and ballistic missiles by heightening the perception of threat from the US by other countries. The US also opposes countries obtaining nuclear weapons based on their political system but will overlook allies' desires for nuclear weapons which is contrary to global arms reduction regimes. This approach will expand post-Cold War nuclear crises because it promotes a double standard regarding nuclear proliferation. The strategy also has some positive impacts on global security as it supports international nuclear arms controls and improves the deterrence value of nuclear weapons.

Pan Yaling [潘亚玲]

"Coping with Hegemonic Decline: Prospects of America's Mid- and Long-term Strategy" [应对霸权衰落: 美国中长期战略前瞻],

The Chinese Journal of American Studies [美国研究], No. 2, 2013, pp. 45-60.

Thesis

For the US to reverse or at least prolong its decline, it needs to focus on the domestic recognition of its decline, improve the economy, and rebalance globally and locally.

Main Arguments

The decline of America and the rise of new powers have put the international system into a state of transition. US decline has been hastened by mistakes it made after the end of the Cold War which squandered America's unilateral moment. Though there are some who disagree that the US is in decline, even they recognize that the US will decline sooner or later, and that emphasizing China or India's problems does not solve the US's issues. The US is facing a strategic choice between eliminating threats to its hegemony, extending its decline in order to find an opportunity to recover, or peacefully transition its international leadership to another hegemon. However, the US has difficulty determining its long term strategic goal and is facing an indeterminate and uncertain decline. To move towards strategic coherence, Americans will need to recognize that America is declining, focus on the economy, and maintain a global balancing strategy.

Acceptance of American decline by the public and elites will help with long term determination of US strategy. This is because US strategy requires an accurate determination of various forms of power

including hard, soft, and technical power, material, relational, and oppositional power, and world leadership power. Second, the US needs to efficiently spend its resources and construct an international economic support network. To do this, the US will need to strengthen its alliance network structure, its global hegemonic structure, and use different ethnicities within the US to act as a bridge for international relationships. Third, the US needs to continue its rebalancing strategy and focus on acting in a pragmatic manner. This is because the US needs to manage its decline through balancing interests arising from the geopolitical environment, the global agenda and order, and the US domestic economy.

There are still a number of favourable conditions in the international environment which benefit America's hegemonic position. In the short term, the American position is superior to any challengers, and small and middle powers will still be willing to support the US. Furthermore, as the global system changes, the current US position will make it easier to make changes in the international system favourable to American interests. The US has a great ability to rejuvenate itself, which may allow it to reverse its decline. However, the US faces challenges as well, including internal polarization and conflicts which hamper America's ability to recover. Further, the US has no experience with hegemonic decline. Even if there was a clear strategy there would still be conflicts over how to implement it. . Finally, US tendency towards unilateralism and the difficulty it will have keeping promises while declining could lead to overextension and hinder reform.

Peng Fenglin and Shi Penghai [彭凤玲和史澎海]

“The US Peaceful Evolution Strategy and the Middle East ‘Color Revolution’,” [美国和平演变战略与中东‘颜色革命’],

Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University (Social Sciences) [西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）], Vol. 34, No. 127, Sep. 2014, pp. 113-118.

Thesis

The US is relying on the Cold War strategy of peaceful transition to maintain its hegemonic position in the Middle East.

Main Arguments

Peaceful transition is a weapon of US foreign policy originally aimed at Socialist countries during the Cold War. Peaceful transition refers to the political transition towards democracy as exemplified by the Colour Revolutions. The US is using this strategy to further its influence in the Middle East and elsewhere, leading to instability in countries such as Syria and Ukraine. In order to stave off its decline, the US wants to gain control over the Middle East and its resources. Of course, there are internal factors in these countries that lead to political transition, however the US is a significant outside element. Internal factors that influenced the Colour Revolutions include: surface level democracy with dictator or family control, reduction of living standards, corruption and inequality, regional and tribal conflicts, leaders compromising the political system to maintain power, and expansion of new political organization and opposition.

The US role in the Colour Revolutions has been to influence democratic leaders and elites in order to lay the groundwork for change. The US also uses aid as an enticement, forcing leaders to accept opposition and democratic organizations that can be directed to organize anti-government activities. The US also

inculcates a democratic worldview in leaders and elites and uses cultural and educational exchanges to transmit values to government opposition forces. Furthermore, to provide the legitimacy for revolution, the US supports local religious groups. The US also uses modern communications to transmit messages that positively impact the psychological atmosphere for revolution. Finally, the US helps countries that successfully complete their revolution with economic and diplomatic aid.

Policy Recommendations

The Colour Revolutions have alarmed Chinese interested in maintaining party unity within China. Therefore this phenomenon should be combatted through several policy actions. China should continue to follow its own political path, develop the economy and living standards, fight corruption to win the people's trust, resolve ethnic/minority group issues, strengthen party organization, and guard against foreign influences and separatism.

Qu Caiyun [屈彩云]

“Japan-U.S. - Australia-India Strategic Cooperation: Current Situation and Chinese Strategy”

[论‘日美澳印’战略合作：现状、意图、前景、影响及中国的应对],

Journal of Strategy and Decision Making [战略决策研究], No. 2, 2016, pp. 3-29.

Thesis

Strengthened cooperation between Japan, America, India, and Australia has had a destabilizing effect on China and the region.

Main Arguments

Cooperation between Japan, America, India, and Australia is still strong, despite the fact that the four party strategic talks have not resumed. All four countries have improved bilateral relations as well as economic and security cooperation. Moreover, two of the trilateral relationships (Japan-America-Australia and Japan-America-India) have improved cooperation, though they often insert themselves into regional conflicts increasing tensions. The strongest relationship among the four countries is the US and Australia, while the weakest is Australia and India.

Each country has strategic reasons for cooperating with the others. US decline has accelerated its reliance on allies and, therefore, the US is using these relationships to maintain its hegemonic position and contain China. Japan's goals are to oppose China, become a great power in Asia by breaking out of its post-World War II constitutional constraints, and draw the US more deeply into the region. Australia is interested in becoming a middle power country, improve its integration into Asia, and balance against China. India's goals are to become a great power by focusing on building an Asia security framework, balancing against China, and taking advantage of America's military power. The future of strategic cooperation for the four countries will continue in a positive direction: Japan will actively work to improve cooperation between four countries, bilateral ties should deepen, the two trilateral relationships will strengthen, the America-Australia-India trilateral relationship will improve, and each country will seek to formally announce alliance intentions in bilateral relationships. However, a full alliance of all four countries in the near future is unlikely.

Cooperation between these four countries has had a deep effect on China leading to the creation of the 'China threat theory' which damages its image and relations with neighbours. The four countries have also created foreign policy obstacles for China by furthering Japanese opposition to China and supporting Vietnamese and Filipino claims in the South China Sea. Repeated interference in these issues has raised tensions in the region and created difficulties for Chinese foreign relations. Further, these four countries pressure China economically through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and improved trade relations with one another, although the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Australia and China has alleviated some of that pressure. The four countries have also supported Japanese military expansion, leading to increased military competition in the region and disintegration of the balance of forces in East Asia. Lastly, these four countries have engaged in Cold War tactics by encircling China through increased military organization raising tensions in China's periphery.

Policy Recommendations

China should focus on strengthening US-Chinese relations, while separating its foreign relations policy with the US from its foreign policy towards neighbouring countries. China can improve cooperation with Australia, especially since there are no outstanding conflicts with the country. With regard to Sino-Indian relations, China should increase high level talks and improve economic relations in order to build trust and guard its West-South flank. China should calm Sino-Japanese relations by improving people-to-people contacts and crisis management communications. China should also improve cooperation and talks with at least two of the other four countries.

Chinese border relations should be settled through engaging in international talks on the East China and South China Seas. Further, China should actively promote Asian economic agreements and constructive frameworks to solidify the region and avoid the four countries from becoming more powerful. To thoroughly diminish the four countries' influence, China should also focus on creating its own cooperation frameworks which could involve the Silk Road Economic Belt, ASEAN, or Central Asian countries.

Ruan Jianping [阮建平]

"The Adjustments of U.S. Policies towards China under Economic and Security Rebalance" [经济与安全“再平衡”下的美国对华政策调整], *Northeast Asia Forum* [东北亚论坛], Vol. 93, No. 1, 2011 Summer, pp. 60-67.

Thesis

To recover from the 2008 Financial Crisis and the Second Gulf War, the US has had to rebalance its economic and security policy towards China, reduce trade imbalances and to improve its force position in Asia.

Main Arguments

American decline accelerated after the 2008 Financial Crisis and the Second Gulf War. Further, states capabilities to handle crises have been constrained by the globalization of the economy and strength of non-state actors. These setbacks have led to the US adopting an economic and security rebalancing strategy in Asia that is aimed at China in particular. The goal of the economic rebalancing strategy is to

reduce the US trade imbalance with China by increasing protectionism, making the Renminbi (RMB) more competitive, and improving Chinese consumption levels. However, even a re-adjustment of the RMB will not solve the trade imbalance as it does not address American domestic policies or the global nature of the labour market. With regard to security, rebalancing consists of maintaining the current security order by improving the America's military force posture in Asia and strengthening its security alliances. In the long term, continued Chinese economic contact will reduce political and economic friction with America.

Policy Recommendations

The Chinese response towards this US strategy should be to change its focus from investment and exports to consumption in addition to investment and exports. China should also remove American pressure by improving its own social welfare, economic security, internal market openness, manufacturing, and technical innovation. To hedge against US influence, China should also diversify exports and improve the RMB's global influence. With regard to security, China should improve its self-defence capabilities while also improving relations with neighboring countries through economic cooperation. Doing so would reduce the perception of China as a threat. Lastly, China should use its global responsibilities as an opportunity to improve cooperation with the US so that the US does not view China as an enemy.

Song Guoyou [宋国友]

“The Economic Logic of America's Decline” [美国霸权衰落的经济逻辑],
Chinese Journal of American Studies [美国研究], No. 1, 2015, pp. 54- 65.

Thesis

American hegemony is declining due to economic weakness caused by more feeble political institutions, Chinese economic success, an unbalanced domestic economy, and an inability to form global economic alliances.

Main Arguments

American hegemony is dependent on supremacy in the world economy. Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, the US economy began to face serious problems including an imbalance in the domestic economy, a decline in the effectiveness of political institutions, a weak ability to form global economic alliances, and a rising China constraining American economic power. With American economic power declining and a new economic order taking shape, a gradual global power transition is taking place that will better balance the world economy.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the US instituted reforms that led to a slow recovery, but the domestic economic imbalance has not yet been effectively addressed as savings rates have started trending downward again and the manufacturing industry has not fully recovered. The economic recovery has largely depended on private consumption and domestic fiscal spending, which does not address the more fundamental problems of structural economic adjustment. Some experts believe that the US will be able to rejuvenate itself through new technology and innovation. However, that outlook is doubtful as the US has not changed its manufacturing industry to create a new industrial structure to

replace it and new technologies, such as shale energy products and information technology, still carry a lot of risk and uncertainty. Last but not least, the high level of government debt constrains foreign and defence spending leading to an ineffective foreign policy.

In addition to the economic imbalance, the US is also facing domestic political problems including increased vested interests, lobbyist influence, and political polarization which increases the long term costs for democratic institutions and reforms. Vote seeking behavior leads to overspending on vested interests, while financial and business interests influence the government to avoid taxes leading to unresponsive democratic institutions. Unresponsive democratic institutions then lead to difficulties in paying government expenses and reduced effectiveness of economic policies. In addition to domestic economic and political problems, the international environment is also changing to the detriment of the US. America's position as a global hegemon is dependent upon its economic power as the US benefited economically from various wars, formed economic and political alliances with strategic allies, and used security threats to advance its power and economic policy. However, as the international system focuses on peace and development, the oppositional and security elements of the international order that helped strengthen American power have disappeared.

China's economic power is changing the international economic structure and challenging American economic interests. China can turn its economic power into political power giving it legitimacy and influence over new economic mechanisms. For example, China is using its economic power to create the Asian Infrastructure Bank and the New Development Bank. Unlike during the Cold War, the US cannot lock out China from its hegemonic economic structure, as vested interests in the US are concerned with maintaining trade relations with China. Moreover, European and other American allies are primarily concerned with assessing relations with China from an economic perspective and not concerned with preserving American hegemony. Therefore, unless China starts a war that changes the international environment, America has no ability to pressure its allies into creating a multilateral trade alliance opposing China. China does not consider America its adversary nor does it rely on America for security and it is a major beneficiary of the international economic system. Therefore, China has little reason to challenge America other than to reform parts of the international economic system. In the short term, American economic superiority will continue, but over time US decline will bring a large amount of uncertainty. The critical issue for other countries is not how to deal with a post-American order but how to actively deal with a declining America's influence.

Wang Sen [王森]

“From Backstage to Center: American Policy on the South China Sea in the Intensification of Sino-US Maritime Competition” [从幕后走向中央-中美海权竞争激化背景下的美国南海政策],

Asia Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs [亚太安全与海洋研究], No. 2, 2016, pp. 41-53.

Thesis

To maintain its hegemonic position, US policy in the South China Sea has become more aggressive which will continue to lead to China-US hostility but not to armed conflict.

Main Arguments

US power in Asia and its role as the hegemon is dependent on its naval assets, which aid US economic and military interests. Thus, when China began to focus on naval power in 2012 after publishing an outline on the development of its maritime economic power, the US felt threatened. The US position in the South China Sea is primarily focused on protecting its status and power. This position has shifted due to the geopolitical importance of the region, concerns for freedom of navigation, and the expansion of China which threatens America's allies and reputation. The US policy change started with the standoff between China and Vietnam over the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil drilling platform in 2014, and has become more active since. The overall strategy is now to protect freedom of navigation, deter threats and conflict, and support international laws and norms. US actions in the South China Seas include strengthening its alliances, emphasizing the necessity of US force for Asian security, increasing military exercises in the South China Sea, and making difficulties for China by supporting arbitration and legal challenges to the 9-Dash Line of control which demarcates Chinese territory in the South China Sea.

However, there are several factors restraining US action in the South China Sea, which include the inability of the US to focus on only one regional issue, a reduced defence budget, lack of full support from US allies, logistical problems that hinder power projection, and the need to balance US-Chinese relations. These factors however are starting to weaken which will allow the US to intensify its involvement in the South China Sea. Despite distractions from the Middle East and Europe, the US focus on China has not abated. Moreover, the overall defence budget reduction does not imply that specific force reduction will be necessary in the South China Sea. Further, the perceived Chinese threat is improving cooperation with between the US and its allies, while the US is advancing a strategy to overcoming its logistical challenges. Lastly, the US still does not recognize Chinese efforts to make the global system more equitable despite their bilateral cooperation. Going forward, the situation in the South China Sea will lead to a high level of uncertainty but no conflict, as the US is attempting to deter China and actively supporting regional powers but not entering into these disputes formally.

Wang Weiwei [王巍巍]

“Logic of Hegemony Alliance: Understanding the U.S. Behavior in the Game Between China and Japan” [霸权的联盟逻辑：理解中日博弈中的美国行为], *Northeast Asia Forum* [东北亚论坛], No. 2, 2014, pp. 88-95.

Thesis

A hegemonic power's actions is determined by its identity within the world system, which means that it will use regional conflicts to create an alliance system, insert itself into conflicts between partners and rivals, and enter into a pre-emptive conflict with latent rivals to curtail challenges to its power and reassure allies.

Main Arguments

A hegemonic power must establish alliances and spread the benefits of its international system to others to maintain control because of the anarchic nature of the world system. A hegemon will also promote friction between regional and rising powers to make them easier to manipulate. The promotion of friction is beneficial to a hegemon as it incentivizes the formation of an alliance network,

which strengthens regional institutional structures to reduce conflict. Still, a hegemonic power will also want to encourage hegemonic challengers to prolong regional friction and eventually will pre-emptively attack the challenger to reassure other countries' belief in its power and maintain the international order.

There are five characteristics which will determine whether a country is more likely to be a hegemonic challenger or ally. This includes the number of territorial disputes with neighbors, a 10 year increase in defence expenditures over annual growth rate, a nuclear second-strike capability, an independent military, and the foundation to act as a world or regional power. Currently, China has territorial disputes with eight countries, it has had an average military spending increase of 17.4% per year over the period of 2003-2012, it has a nuclear second-strike capability, its military is mostly independent, and it has the potential to be a world power. Based on this, China is a latent hegemonic challenger.

Applying this theoretical framework to America's role in regional tensions between China and Japan, there is some evidence for the argument that a hegemon's systemic role determines its actions. First, the US is using the threat of China as a way to strengthen and build its alliance with Japan. This is consistent with hegemonic powers using regional conflict to promote alliances. Second, the US position is under its treaty obligations to Japan the US will defend the Diaoyu islands from attack, but the US also maintains an ambiguous position on the ownership of the islands This allows the US to both restrain and encourage its ally, while encouraging both Japan and China to seek its favor in the dispute. This is consistent with hegemonic powers inserting itself into regional conflict between allies and rivals. Third, there is no evidence that the US will launch or be forced into a pre-emptive war with a latent rival. Currently, the US is trying to avoid its allies dragging it into an 'irrational' war. Overall, US actions have led to the US-Japanese alliance acting as a destabilizing influence in the region, the 'freezing' of Japanese-Chinese relations, and have fueled conflict in the region.

Policy Recommendations

For China to remove constraints on its actions and make a breakthrough in its conflicts with Japan, China should strengthen its military position and alliances with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia. Further, China should maintain high level talks with the US to avoid Japan forcing the US into conflict.

Xu Bu [徐步]

“War Features of the United States and Its Impact” [关于美国的战争特性及其影响], *Northeast Asia Forum* [东北亚论坛], Vol. 114, No. 1, 2014, pp. 28-38.

Thesis

The US has waged frequent wars in order to preserve its position, stop a European or Asian hegemonic challenger from rising, and to maintain its interests in third world countries.

Main Arguments

War is a tool of US hegemony, which has significantly benefitted US development. The foundational causes for the use of war by the US are its desire to maintain its position as a hegemon, prevent

European or Asian hegemonic challengers from expanding their power, and to maintain its interests in third world countries. In addition, there are two structural influences that explain the US belligerency: economics and conservative principles. Wars often benefit the US economically in the short term. In the long term, influence is more complicated and uncertain. Nevertheless, there are fewer economic benefits from war as the US has become the guarantor of the international system and more destructive weapons have been developed. Conservatism is also a stimulus for US wars as the ideology can direct public opinion due to its moral language. Further, conservatism often labels opponents as evil or anti-freedom and looks down on non-Western countries, making it easier to justify the use of force. It consists of a Hobbesian world view, as opposed to a more multipolar or multilateral conception of politics.

In addition to structural conditions, there are a number of proximate causes for the US desire to wage war. The risks of war for the US are small because it has no true rival. Further, domestic political pressure and the need to be seen doing something while pleasing the populace make it easy for politicians to support wars. American exceptionalism theory and the desire to spread American style democracy also justify US wars. Moreover, the US Congress also has difficulty in restraining the wars initiated by the US president. Another proximate cause is the Right and extreme Conservative use of patriotism and meddling in order to reduce the voices of the American people and promote war. Other proximate causes include the need to preserve US resources around the globe, deterring and containing core countries by threatening fringe states, and using volunteer soldiers.

Xiao He [肖河]

“Typology of Relations Between Hegemons and Other Great Powers” [霸权国与其他主要大国关系研究- 以二战后史为例],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 3, 2016, pp.44-73.

Thesis

The decision of non-hegemons or other great powers to follow or achieve parity with a hegemon in the areas of security, economics, and politics will determine the type and stability of its relationship with the hegemon.

Main Arguments

The failure of the current Chinese ‘new great power relations’ policy is due to the lack of categorization of relations between great powers and hegemon, and an overemphasis on the principle of mutual respect. The ‘new great power relations’ concept stands on three principles: mutual respect, no opposition or conflict, and mutual benefits. Mutual respect refers to the recognition of core interests. The US believes by recognizing China’s core interests it will weaken its position. This leads to a cycle of tense relations between the US and China, resolution of issues through dialogue, and then old attitudes immediately reasserting themselves, which undermines relations over time. Popular scholarly thinking emphasizes mutual respect, believing that once it is achieved conflict and resistance in relations will be reduced. However, this thinking is forward looking and not based within a historical framework. Moreover, regarding the characteristics of ‘new great power relations’, there are debates as to whether Cold War US-Soviet relations fits the concept as some describe them as similar to the English to US hegemonic transition and others as completely adversarial but not conflictual. Furthermore, all of this

discourse is based in power transition theory and therefore is more concerned with avoiding conflict than emphasizing bilateral cooperation. This creates confusion as to how the policy is to be interpreted; leading many to think that it is aimed at suppressing strategic competition. This confusion and lack of historical recognition has led to China mirroring post- World War Two (WWII) Soviet policy by pressuring the US to share power and to recognize China's new status, while pushing for force modernization to achieve parity with the US.

In order to more concretely operationalize the 'new great power relations' policy, a more nuanced categorization of great power relations is needed. Non-hegemonic powers can either try to achieve parity with a hegemon or follow a hegemon's lead. This strategy can be observed in the non-hegemonic power's choice to use a following or parity strategy in the political, security, and economic spheres. A political following strategy means accepting hegemonic leadership, recognizing the political order, and the positive influence of the hegemon, while a political parity strategy will reject hegemonic leadership, promote an independent political structure, and attempt to establish its own sphere of influence. An economic following strategy means accepting the hegemon's economic system and rules, recognizing its economic leadership, and positively using the economic goods provided by the hegemon, while an economic parity strategy will reject the economic order and try to make a separate market structure. A security following strategy will accept the global security order, allow for burden sharing, recognize hegemonic contributions, view military forces as a supplementary protective measure, give some its security obligations to the hegemon, and not pursue a free riding approach. A security parity strategy will not accept or trust security provided by the hegemon, will designate the hegemon as a security threat, will not support global security burden sharing, will develop a balancing or non-supplementary military force, and will aim for force parity.

Based on this framework a hegemon can have 12 types of relationships with non-hegemonic powers: **enemy** (Soviet-US relations), **rivalry** (Pre-WWI UK-German relations), **dependant rivalry** (Pre-WWII Japanese-US relations), **alienation** (Post-WWII US-Brazil relations), **approach** (Post-Chinese economic opening China-US relations), **traditional alliance** (Pre-WWII UK-Japanese relations), **unstable follow** (US-Pakistan relations or 1989-91 Soviet Union-US relations), **protectorate** (Cold War US relations with most African or Asian allies), **cooperation** (Post-Cold War US-India relations), **partner** (Pre-WWII US-UK relations), **dependant follow** (Post-WWII Japanese-US relations), and **community** (Current US-UK-France-German relations).

There are three theoretical implications that can be observed from this framework. First, when non-hegemonic powers follow a hegemon in all three categories relations are the most stable. Second, if non-hegemonic powers do not follow in at least two categories it is impossible to have good relations, with security having the most destabilizing effect on relations. Third, if a non-hegemon only partially follows economically it will lead to friction in the long term; therefore the least stable combination is a political-security parity strategy with an economic partial follow strategy. The examination of other great power relationships with hegemons reveals four categories of behavior: **special relationship** (US-UK), **parity enemies** (US-Soviet Union), **unequal allies** (US-Japan), and **merging style rejuvenation** (US-Germany). The most stable of which is merging style rejuvenation (US-Germany), where Germany followed a policy of no free-riding in its security commitments and had an economy that supported itself. However, in an asymmetric relationship (Japan-US) it can be seen that without an equal economic relationship there will be instability leading to political friction, regardless of political and security relations.

Policy Recommendations

Challenging hegemonic powers brings no benefit and results in the weakening the challenger. Furthermore, the peaceful hegemonic transition between the UK and the US was predicated on a following strategy. China should therefore pursue a following strategy even if it has an advantage in both hard and soft power.

Yan Jiansheng [严建生]

“The End of American Hegemony and Chinese Policy” [美国霸权终结及中国的应对],
Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) [武汉大学学报 (哲学社会科学版)],
Vol. 60, No. 2, March 2007, pp. 189-194.

Thesis

The post-Cold War environment is not conducive to hegemonic powers, leading to their decline and eventual removal.

Main Arguments

The origins of American hegemony started with the end of WWII. The US was able to establish itself as a hegemon because of its large economy, superior military, nuclear capabilities, the establishment of an international system conducive to its interests, material superiority during the Cold War, and early dominance of the UN. This power was further perpetuated by multi-national corporations and foreign military bases. Currently, US economic power is diminishing due to the costs associated with its role as the ‘world’s policeman’.

As US economic power declines, so will its hegemony which is unlikely to recover. Multilateralism is at odds with US demands on the international system which means that US dominated system is unlikely to return. Moreover, nuclear deterrence has rendered great power wars and threats ineffective. The US is also disadvantaged by globalization, which forces America to increase its reliance on other countries and reduces its ability to expend resources on its military. The decline of the US will lead to a post-hegemonic world order based on a global institutional system. The characteristics of this system include mutual recognition of international law, an indifference to political power which will reduce interventionism, use of the international system as the main vehicle for international action, and a more equitable representation for each country based on their current power levels.

Policy Recommendations

China should support the development of this post-hegemonic world by focusing its foreign policy on influencing the international system. This will require improving China’s power to ensure fair treatment within the international system, improving its great power relations to influence the direction of the international system, and a proactive foreign policy to reform the international system.

Yang Guanghai and Zhang Jun [杨光和海张军]

“Probability Analysis of East Asia Power Transition” [东亚权利转移的可能性探析],
Journal of Strategy and Decision Making [战略决策研究], No. 2, 2015, pp. 16-30.

Thesis

The transition of power between the US and China in East Asia is likely to be peaceful, with only a small chance for armed conflict.

Main Arguments

The transition of power between a hegemon and a rising power can be peaceful or violent. In determining whether there will be a peaceful transition of power between the US and China in East Asia there are eight factors to consider. These factors include: the international power structure, the characteristics of the period, the rising power's attitude, the hegemon's attitude, the nuclear situation, each country's particular characteristics, the geopolitical situation, and the influence of soft power. Using these variables, the possibility for a peaceful or violent transition of power can be assessed. The current international power structure is multipolar and not fully hegemonic, which leads to balancing behavior, meaning taking action to counter threats, by countries to prevent war. With regard to the characteristics of the period, the time of great power struggles through war is over. Any actions of war or containment are not consistent with rational thinking in this period. Furthermore, globalization has made the world more interdependent and increased the value of soft power. Regarding the rising power's attitude, China as a rising power is actively participating in the international system, establishing new power relations, and attempting to positively reform the international system. As can be seen, China is interested in peace and satisfied with the current international system.

The hegemon's attitude, that is to say America's attitude towards China, is two sided: the US is looking for increased contact, but is also seeking to contain China. Consequently, it is unclear whether the US will aid or harm a peaceful transition. Regarding nuclear weapons, mutual assured destruction through a robust second-strike capability has significantly reduced the chance for a great power war. As for country characteristics, China is defined as a country of peace and stability. The geopolitical situation contains threats based on the position, power, offensive ability, and offensive intention of each country. The positioning of the US and China is relatively close in the Pacific Ocean which will produce conflict. More specifically, as long as the US opposes Chinese rights in the Diaoyu Islands, Spratly Islands, and Taiwan, conflict and tension will remain. With regard to soft power, Chinese soft power is growing and may be all that is necessary to fully complete a power transition in East Asia. Overall, most elements, except for the ambiguity of America's attitude and the geopolitical situation, show that a peaceful transition of power between the US and China in East Asia is likely.

Yang Hui [杨辉]

“America’s Strategic Shift to the Asia Pacific and New Trilateral Strategic Relations between the United States, China, and India” [美国战略东移与美、中、印新战略三角关系], *Journal of Strategy and Decision Making* [战略决策研究], No. 3, 2015, pp. 28-42.

Thesis

America’s Pivot to Asia has complicated relations between India and China, while strengthening US-Indian relations, leading to increased instability in the region.

Main Arguments

The Asian geopolitical structure has been forced to shift its structure and tighten alliances because the recent global financial crisis has fractured global power and rising powers are challenging the existing world order. As a response to this, the US has focused strategic attention on Asia, which despite calls to the contrary is directed at China. All recent US economic, military, and foreign policy actions directly involve core Chinese interests. The US is using the concept of freedom of navigation to insert itself into island disputes between China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan which has emboldened these countries, breaking the peace in the East and South China Seas. Likewise, the US is extremely suspicious of China’s Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) concept and is actively working to develop a way to counter that strategy.

US-Indian relations are a key relationship for the Asian Pivot, as the US wants to use India to balance against China. India is cooperating with the US because it wants to improve relations and its manufacturing base, as well as balance against China and Chinese influence in Pakistan. However, India is strongly independent in its foreign policy and does not want to be used as a tool. Therefore, it is also cooperating in military matters with Russia and European countries. While India has developed its relationship with the US in a number of areas, it differs with the US on global and regional issues, as well as on free trade and intellectual property. Since one of India’s main goals is developing its economy, it has to cooperate with China. In fact, India and China are very similar on issues of trade, weapons control, and Iran. However, India’s foreign policy is Janus faced, so Indian cooperation with the US can be seen as a way to get leverage on China. Still, because of India’s increasing economic and military strength, it is no longer satisfied being only a South Asia/Indian Ocean power and is looking to expand. This, combined with the US Asian Pivot, has complicated Chinese relations with India.

Policy Recommendations

Japan is exerting a great amount of political pressure on China, which means that managing relations with India is much more important than before. Due to territorial, historical, ideological, and strategic differences with India, Beijing’s relations with India should be seen as something to manage rather than as something to be solved. Therefore, China should focus on managing differences and avoiding conflict by clearly stating its core interests. It should also look at global issues that China and India can cooperate on, such as reforming the international system, international finance reform, climate change, terrorism, and problems in the Middle East. It is also important that China have no major issues with India in the South or East China seas. With regard to the US, in the long term it will not change its stance towards China and will either be attempting to contain or balance against it. Therefore China should look to

cooperate more on security and economic issues and increase strategic talks to build trust and reduce suspicion.

Yu Yingli [于迎丽]

“Forces and Obstacles of US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in the Background of US Alliance System Networking and Asia-Pacific Rebalancing” [美日韩三边合作的动力与阻碍：以美国同盟体系网络化和‘亚太再平衡’为战略背景], *Journal of Strategy and Decision Making* [战略决策研究], No. 4, 2015, pp. 17-35.

Thesis

The US Pivot to Asia has strengthened the US-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) trilateral alliance by giving it clearer goals and promoting cooperation on a broader range of issues; however, there are still obstacles to future cooperation due to strategic mismatch, particularly with regards to the ROK.

Main Arguments

China has two general misconceptions about the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship: the first is an overestimation of the level of cooperation and the second is an exaggeration of the differences between the Japan and the ROK as well as the prospect that these relations will not improve. Similarly, there are currently two views as to the goals of trilateral cooperation. The first is that the alliance is publicly aimed against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), while it is privately working to contain China. The second view is that it is part of an American global plan to strengthen its global alliance structure. Current trilateral cooperation has several characteristics which include: institutionalization and normalization of cooperation through military cooperation and high-level meetings, the US as the primary internal driver for cooperation, and the DPRK as the primary external driver for cooperation.

The trilateral alliance is currently moving from a hub and spoke system to a networked system. American goals for this new strategy is to discourage regional hegemons, improve local stability, and more thoroughly control change in Asia. Previously, trilateral cooperation lagged due to tensions between Japan and the ROK over territorial issues and historical animosity, a strategic mismatch between US and ROK intentions for strengthening Pacific and Indian Ocean commerce, and anti-US sentiment in the ROK. However, the Asian pivot has strengthened cooperation by emphasizing military relations and better ROK-US relations, the latter of which is more important. This came about because of a higher threat perception of the DPRK following its nuclear tests, ROK desire to improve relations with the US, and a reduction of the defence burden on the ROK. The ROK still has reservations about this policy, including the belief that the increased US focus on South East Asia and the Indian Ocean will detract from its efforts in North East Asia, the policy will send mixed signals to the DPRK, and it will hamper the ROK’s attempts to strengthen relations with China.

The future of the alliance is facing four obstacles: unstable Japanese-ROK relations, over-reliance on American resources during a time of US decline, unclear goals and threat perception, and the destabilizing influence of China. With regard to the unclear sense of threat, the alliance has three possible threats coming from China, the DPRK, and terrorism, however none has fully materialized. Until external pressure sharpens, there will be internal divisions about the urgency and conceptual nature of these threats. China also exerts an unstable influence on trilateral cooperation. The US views China as

both a possible rival and a global partner which creates tension between these two policy goals. The ROK also balances between maintaining good relations with China and the US, but it has difficulties in situations where it must make a choice between the two. Japan views its relationship with the US as the key one in the alliance. Therefore Japan views improved ROK relations as merely an outward growth of this relationship rather than an integral part of it.

Zhang Jianxin [张建新]

“Post-Western International System and the Rise of the East” [后西方国际体系与东方的兴起],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 5, 2012, pp. 4-20.

Thesis

The Western international system is declining in power and over time it will be replaced by an Eastern International system.

Main Arguments

The Western international system has been the center of international relations since the 1600s, however following the end of the 20th Century this system has been in decline. The characteristics of the Western System include cyclical hegemony, dependence on unequal power and economic distribution, and an emphasis on control and competition. For example, before WWII world powers could either become dominant by taking power from others or by controlling non-Western areas. Before the 2008 Financial Crisis, there had been debate about whether the world would stay unipolar or become more multipolar; however the financial crisis discredited the theory of enduring unipolarity. Newly rising countries signal the complete transformation of the international systems character and the move towards a post-Western system.

The rise of non-Western countries signal the return of Eastern countries to the center of world politics, just as the rise of Western countries signalled the rise of a Western system. The decline of hegemonic power and the collective failure of Western countries has created the conditions for this transition. American power has declined to the point where it can no longer exert as much pressure as before. In the long term, America will lose its hegemonic position. The problems within the European Union have also broken another bastion of Western power. What is more, now that the international system has spread to encompass the globe, challenges to this system come from within as a product of its unstable nature.

Currently the international system is in a transitory state and will move towards a non-hegemonic world order due to market restraints, an increase in strong states, and greater power sharing between strong states. Countries of the Global South are no longer powerless on the international stage, however they are still not unified enough to assert themselves. China is already a world leader in many respects, as it possesses both hard and soft power. Russia is looking to recover its lost position and due to its strong resource base will likely be another pole of power. India's economy is giving it power; however its lack of influence beyond its borders will make it difficult for it to become another pole. Once the transition is made there will be a renewed focus on traditional power and non-intervention as championed by Russia and China. The post-Western system will not be anti-Western but peaceful as countries still need

resources from the global capitalist system. The world system will remain peaceful as it will give political space and benefits for every country. Moreover, the new powers will be mutually reliant and will peacefully transform the system without war.

Zhao Hua [赵华]

“Domestic Strategic Debate about America’s Decline in the USA” [美国国内的霸权衰退战略辩论], *Journal of Strategy and Decision Making* [战略决策研究], No. 6, 2015, pp. 36-62.

Thesis

American hegemony is not in decline because it possesses a superior ability for scientific and technical innovation, which provides the basis for a strong economy.

Main Arguments

From the 1950’s onwards theories of American decline have been triggered by economic problems, military overextension, the rise of rival powers, the loss of soft power, and strategic surprises. However, the most salient and prevalent theory of decline is linked to economic problems which provide the basis for military power, technology, and innovation. The foundation of an economy is a country’s demographic structure and education system which feed into the development of technology and innovation. From technology development and innovation, further investment is made in physical and human capital, thereby creating economic power. Therefore, to test whether US power is declining, the US’s economic performance after the recent financial crisis was examined.

After examining several different datasets from the IMF, World Bank, and the US government, it was found that the US economy did not fall behind other great powers in growth (excluding China and India), nor did the external deficit cause problems. The US avoided its external deficit problem and maintained an economic and innovative edge because there was no new bubble in the housing market, new resource development stimulated growth, the financial industry revitalised itself quickly, and the manufacturing sector reversed its decline. The American approaches to knowledge innovation, systemic innovation, and policy reform are strong self-correcting mechanisms that allow the US to maintain its strong economy and thereby its hegemonic position.

Section Two:
The Role Nuclear of Nuclear Weapons

Ai Shuzhou [艾书周]

“Ethical Reflections on the Tactical Nuclear Weapons” [对战术核武器的几点伦理思考], *College of Humanity and Social Science, National University of Defense Technology* [国防科学技术大学人文与社会科学学院], No. 1, 2011, pp. 545-546.

Thesis

The use of tactical nuclear weapons should follow the principles of no first use, use in a just war, and use in a controlled situation.

Main Arguments

The development of tactical nuclear weapons raises questions about their impact on strategic deterrence theory and the ethical use of these types of nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons are smaller in yield, ranging from several kilotons to several tens of kilotons. The ethics of nuclear weapons has three principles: the prohibition on use, the prohibition on proliferation, and the necessity of their eventual destruction. A similarly comprehensive and systematic framework regarding the ethical restriction of tactical nuclear weapons has yet to emerge.

There are three possible scenarios for the development and use of tactical nuclear weapons. The first is to avoid restrictions of traditional nuclear weapons and use the weapon to threaten another country, which is not ethical. The second scenario is to develop tactical nuclear weapons for self-defence, which is ethical. The third scenario is to develop tactical nuclear weapons for national interests and to disrupt the regional balance of forces, which is not ethical.

Fewer tactical nuclear weapons are needed to threaten a country compared to traditional nuclear weapons. However, tactical nuclear weapon use is undesirable because of their destructive power, the possibility for escalation, and their effect on eroding the norm against the use of nuclear weapons. The use of tactical nuclear weapons should follow three ethical principles. The first is that there should be no first use of tactical nuclear weapons. A second principle is that tactical nuclear weapons can be used in a just war, which would include opposing an invasion, safeguarding or emancipating a people, and a UN Security Council sanctioned action to defend a country. The third principle for the use of tactical nuclear weapons is when the consequences can be controlled. That refers to a situation where there would be no possible escalation beyond tactical nuclear weapons.

Bo Zhongli, Wang Mei, and Zhou Lini [傅中力, 王姝, 和周黎妮]

“Comparison between Space Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence” [太空威慑与核威慑比较研究], *National Defence Science and Technology* [国防科技], Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, pp. 51-54.

Thesis

Space deterrence and nuclear deterrence are mutually supporting approaches, despite their differences.

Main Arguments

During the Cold War, space deterrence was an important part of nuclear deterrence, however after the Cold War it became an independent deterrence force. Space deterrence started during the late 1950's with the development of satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles. This led to the development of nuclear anti-satellite weaponry and anti-missile weapons which linked nuclear and space deterrence together. Following the prohibition on basing nuclear weapons in orbit, space based deterrence and nuclear deterrence were again decoupled. Afterwards, space developed into a separate conflict domain that included anti-satellite weaponry and space based support systems for regular military actions.

Space based deterrence and nuclear deterrence are similar in a number of ways. First, the development of both weapon types requires a high level of technology and investment to be effective deterrents. For example, the capability to launch weapons into space does not necessarily mean a country has a space based deterrent capable of defending against an anti-satellite attack. Second, both space and nuclear weapon systems favour the attacker during a war. Third, both systems have a critical point of no return, where retaliation following an attack will escalate rapidly. A space focused attack would affect the amount of orbital debris and multi-national space projects, and would eliminate a large number of economic and military space-reliant technologies.

There are also a number of differences between the two technologies. The foundations of each technology are different with regard to their backup capabilities and the number of participating countries or groups manufacturing each technology. Also, the area of operational use for these systems is different, as nuclear weapons can be used to threaten any enemy while space deterrence only works against countries that are militarily reliant on space technology. . Lastly, the risk of punishment and the retaliatory measures expected after an attack using space weapons is much smaller than for a similar attack using nuclear weapons.

Policy Recommendations

The analysis above provides several important guiding points for China's space deterrence system. First, space technology is the foundation for space deterrence capability and determines the level of confidence in the deterrent value of space weaponry. Second, nuclear deterrence and space deterrence are mutually supporting. Space deterrence systems can determine an enemy's nuclear capabilities, the location of their missiles in flight, and assist in targeting. Space weapons systems can also be used to attack an enemy's nuclear weapons system. Third, space deterrence is an independent part of a strategic deterrence capabilities which includes nuclear, space, and internet capabilities.

Chen Mufu and Yang Zhizhen [陈睦富和杨值珍]

* **"Chinese Peripheral Countries Nuclear Posture and their Effect on Chinese Security and Policy"** [中国周边核态势对中国安全的影响及对策],

Journal of Xianning College [咸宁学院学报], Vol. 27, No.5, Oct. 2007, pp. 42-44.

Thesis

The nuclear posture of countries on China's periphery exerts a negative influence on China's security situation, thereby increasing the number of threats China faces.

Main Arguments

After the end of the Cold War, nuclear threats to China have grown, and it is now the one country facing the most serious nuclear threats in the world. A number of nuclear-armed states - Russia, Pakistan, India, the DPRK, and the US -- all are found on China's borders. In fact, while the US has publicly removed its nuclear weapons from the ROK, they are likely privately hiding some weapons in Osan and Gunsan. Countries bordering China also possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons, particularly the ROK and Japan. Additionally, the mechanisms to prevent nuclear proliferation have weakened considerably. For example, both Vietnam and Indonesia are developing nuclear power which could lead to the military use of such technology. Lastly, the possibility of tensions between nuclear countries in regional hotspots such as Kashmir or the DPRK is high.

The presence of nuclear-armed states on China's borders has worsened the traditional and non-traditional threats China faces. First, China's nuclear deterrent has been weakened by India and Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, China's ability to protect its territory has become more difficult as territorial conflicts with India, Japan, the ROK, and several Southeast Asian countries continue. Third, China's ability to reunify [with Taiwan] has worsened as any attempt to use force to suppress Taiwanese independence could lead to a limited nuclear war, which would be unacceptable. Further, there is the possibility of Tibetan separatists obtaining nuclear weapons putting China's ability to stabilize its Western region in danger. China's non-traditional security threats have also worsened which could lead to Taiwanese, Falungong, or Eastern Turkistan terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction, threatening Chinese unity. Therefore, nuclear proliferation negatively affects Chinese unity. Another possible security threat stemming from the spread nuclear material and technology is a nuclear accident which could easily lead to an East Asian 'Chernobyl'.

Policy Recommendations

Nuclear proliferation is not in China's interest, nor in the common interest of humanity. Therefore, China should take action to prevent proliferation, including joining the US in opposing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Should the nuclear crisis on the Korea Peninsula not be resolved in an effective manner, it could lead to Japan, the ROK, and even Taiwan developing weapons of mass destruction. China should hasten the development of anti-nuclear proliferation mechanisms as well as promote the formulation of rules and monitoring for nuclear related issues. It is also in China's interest to improve defence cooperation with bordering states by improving military transparency and promoting mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality, and cooperation. Lastly, China should enhance its nuclear policy and strategy. Although China follows a policy of no first use and a policy of not using nuclear weapons as a threat this has not eliminated concerns of border countries over Beijing's approach to nuclear weapons. Therefore, openly stating the conditions under which China would use nuclear weapons should be considered in order to put the international community at ease as it is still unclear whether in the case of a territorial dispute or crisis with Taiwan what China's policy would be. Lastly, merely possessing nuclear weapons is not sufficient for avoiding war, there must also be the desire to use these weapons in order to avoid a nuclear war.

Fang Baihua and He Zhaohua [方柏华和何韶华]

*"Analytical Eclecticism and the Problem of Nuclear Weapons" [分析折中主义与核武器问题研究],

Journal of Zhejiang Party School of C.P.C. [中共浙江省委党校学报] Vol. 168, No. 2, 2016, pp. 63-69.

Thesis

No one theoretical perspective is able to satisfactorily explain why a country would use or acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore by analyzing the commonalities of and differences between each perspective, *analytical eclecticism* can generate new thinking on these problems.

Main Arguments

The problem of nuclear weapons has been approached from the perspectives of structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism's perspective on anti-nuclear norms. However, due to the complicated, changeable, and uncertain nature of nuclear issues no one perspective is sufficient. Therefore, *analytical eclecticism* is a framework that is suitable for analyzing nuclear issues. *Analytical eclecticism* takes empirical studies and multiple theoretical explanations and puts them together to find common points of connection to generate new thinking. The approach has several characteristics which include moving beyond paradigmatic boundaries, as well as the concern over the linkages between the causal mechanisms and processes. It promotes the construction of a theory that corresponds accurately with real events.

The problem of acquiring nuclear weapons is not a traditional security problem, but it is not an entirely non-traditional security problem either. From the perspective of structural realism, obtaining nuclear weapons is rational since in an anarchical system nuclear weapons guarantee survival and provide a shortcut to gaining power. Similarly, from the perspective of neorealism, a country facing a crisis or threat might pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, many countries that pursue nuclear weapons face no threat and many countries that do face a threat do not pursue nuclear weapons capability. Therefore, pursuing power or facing a crisis cannot solely explain the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, neoliberalism predicts that anti-nuclear proliferation treaties and mechanisms can effectively constrain the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, while these mechanisms can make obtaining nuclear weapons more difficult, there is little evidence that those mechanisms are why countries do not acquire nuclear weapons. Lastly, using constructivism, it can be seen that the international community recognizes the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even if anti-nuclear norms explain why countries do not use nuclear weapons, it does not explain why they shun their acquisition as well. Looking at all these perspectives, one can see that one simple theoretical vantage point is insufficient in explaining the problem of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Similarly, the problem of using nuclear weapons can be considered. Realism would prescribe that nuclear weapons be used during a security crisis as a necessary measure; however it ignores international constraints and the effect of public opinion. Moreover, realism only considers the cost of using nuclear weapons when there is mutual deterrence or escalating threats, ignoring moral, legal, and cultural considerations in favor of an analysis based on power. Institutionalism recognizes the constraining influence of organizations and law, but when faced with a problem like the DPRK it cannot explain the underlying reasons for its behavior towards nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would have prevented the DPRK from testing a hydrogen bomb in 2016 in response to its perception of the US as a threat. Constructivism emphasizes culture and worldview; therefore, in the case of the Korean nuclear crisis constructivists would recommend strengthening international understanding and respect to solve the crisis. However, this overlooks the material elements of the issue, ignoring the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the national interests involved. Overall, looking at the problems of using and acquiring nuclear weapons from multiple theoretical perspectives shows the inability of one perspective to accurately explain the phenomenon.

Hong Yuan and Rong Yu [洪源和荣予]

“The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy: From Anti-Nuclear Deterrence to Limited Deterrence” [从反核威慑战略到最低核威慑战略：中国核战略演进之路], *Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies* [当代亚太], No. 3, 2009, pp.120-132.

Thesis

China’s nuclear strategy is the result of historical processes which can be characterized by a shift from an anti-deterrence/coercion strategy to a minimum deterrence strategy, though even these concepts do not fully capture the essence of China’s nuclear strategy.³

Main Arguments

Examining the history of China’s nuclear strategy and development, it be seen that China’s strategy has moved from anti-nuclear deterrence/coercion to minimum deterrence. However, only by removing the constraints of nuclear strategic theory can China’s nuclear strategy be properly understood. Although many scholars see China’s small nuclear arsenal as evidence of its minimum deterrence strategy, its size does not necessarily reflect the standard needed to inflict unbearable losses. Some scholars also believe China has a limited nuclear war strategy or that it has a graduated strategy for different types of nuclear threats and will further develop its nuclear program to include the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite some military scholars promoting these theories, these are not official policy statements. Moreover, these theories are divorced from reality, as China would have to reform its nuclear program, strategic deployment, and mission objectives before they could be operational. However, there is no evidence of this. Lastly, some scholars have put forth that China has an anti-nuclear coercion strategy, which is premised on the idea that the greatest nuclear threat comes from the threat of use of such weapons and not their use in an actual nuclear attack. The foundation of this theory rests on the power of the nuclear taboo (the norm of not using nuclear weapons), which explains some aspects of China’s nuclear policy but does not explain past instances where China has prepared for nuclear war. Further, the nuclear taboo is a historically conditioned phenomenon and advances in technology have blurred the distinction between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. Besides, basing a defensive nuclear strategy solely on the logic of the nuclear taboo is dangerous.

Due to the long term nuclear threat to China, China developed an anti-nuclear deterrence/coercion policy which changed to a policy of minimum deterrence in 1985 as the international situation changed.

³ Deterrence does not translate exactly from English to Chinese. It holds a meaning closer to coercion so when the phrase ‘minimum deterrence’ is translated into Chinese it sounds more aggressive than it would in English.

During the long period of its anti-nuclear deterrence/coercion policy, China prepared for large scale nuclear war. Moreover, the material legacies and ideological foundation of that period form the basis of China's current nuclear policy. A characteristic of China's early nuclear strategy is that China would immediately retaliate following a nuclear attack because of technological limitations. Specifically, the liquid rocket engine in Chinese missiles at that point required longer preparation time for launch and had a weak survivability rate. Following an easing of world tensions, China shifted its nuclear strategy to one of minimum deterrence. The meaning of minimum deterrence however is slightly muddled as there is no exact definition of minimum deterrence, what this means is there is no standard for a minimum deterrence policy. Moreover, deterrence must respond to technological and military changes in the international environment. Furthermore, China's minimum deterrence strategy is also affected by the influence of past policies.

China's nuclear strategy is focused on defence, because an offensive strategy would not receive the people's support needed for a difficult war. Therefore China, unlike the former Soviet Union or the US, never needed an arsenal for mutual assured destruction, but instead used the no first use policy as the foundation of nuclear strategic doctrine. A remnant of this is still present today in the high level of survivability of China's second-strike capabilities. This is the legacy of the 'Great Wall Engineering' policy from 1979 to 1995 which produced offensive, defensive, reserve, survivable, and multiple models of strategic guided missile positions. According to official media reports, China's missile positions can respond to a nuclear attack within ten minutes and can survive for up to a month underground and still launch. As to why China did not make a nuclear strike an option of last resort during a conventional war, China wanted to demonstrate confidence in its military. The logic is that if China maintains that it is not afraid of a nuclear war, then it definitely should not be afraid of a conventional war.

Li Bin⁴ [李彬]

"The Difference in the Chinese and American Understandings about 'Nuclear Deterrence'" [中美对 '核威慑' 理解的差异],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 2, 2014, pp. 4-18.

Thesis

Chinese scholars believe that there is no clear distinction between deterrence and compellence, and that the meaning of these two concepts is contingent upon which perspective or analytical method is used.

Main Arguments

There is a gap in understanding between American and Chinese experts regarding basic nuclear strategy terminology which reflects a fundamental difference in the two countries' strategic cultures. This is particularly true when it comes to the understanding of nuclear deterrence and nuclear compellence.⁵

⁴ More of Li Bin's work can be found on the website for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [accessed on 17 January 2017 at <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/604>]

⁵ Deterrence when translated into Chinese has a meaning closer to coercion. Moreover, the military meaning of the word 'deterrence' (*weishe* 威慑) in Chinese is to defeat an enemy without fighting, which does not differentiate a deterring or compelling action.

Before a nuclear weapon is used, it can produce two psychological effects: one is a coercive effect and the other is a symbolic political effect. The coercive effect can be to either to stop an opponent from doing something they otherwise would (deterrence) or force an opponent to do something they would not want to do (compellence). However, the case that nuclear coercion is effective lacks evidence as extraneous factors cannot be ruled out; therefore this article is confined to examining the mechanisms and logic of this concept.

American scholars consider deterrence much easier to accomplish than compellence, as deterrence preserves a situation, while compellence changes a situation. However, Chinese scholars do not believe that the two can be clearly distinguished, as the agent who plans to change a situation shifts the origin of compellence. Moreover, classic examples illustrating nuclear coercion are on a very large scale, whereas regular international conflict tends to be on a small scale leaving uncertainty whether nuclear weapons have the same impact in those situations. In a small conflict, the determination of compellence depends on the method and perspective. For example, the US perspective holds that when China attacked the Quemoy or Kinmen Islands during the Second Taiwan Straights Crisis in 1958, the US effort to force China to stop trying to change the situation can be categorized as deterrence. From the Chinese perspective, the attack on Quemoy was a continuation of a conflict between the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist Party of China, and therefore America's threat of nuclear force or 'nuclear blackmail' as it was called was an act of compellence. The determination of compellence and deterrence therefore changes and is dependent on whether the analytical method adopts a static, dynamic, correlative or explanatory perspective. Another example of this confusion would be when one country attacks another with conventional weapons and the other country responds in kind. Following this, the attacking country responds with a nuclear threat to coerce the other country into stopping their conventional attack. Looking at this example from only the second step, the attacking country would be considered to be engaging in nuclear deterrence, but looking at it from both steps it is considered nuclear compellence. Furthermore, in the case of extended nuclear deterrence or a 'nuclear umbrella,' the difference between deterrence and compellence is again unclear. Should a country under nuclear protection attack another country provoking retaliation, the extended nuclear deterrence acts as both compellence and deterrence.

In the past, Chinese scholars explained China's strategic nuclear policy as 'anti-deterrence'. This meant not surrendering to coercion and maintaining the minimum retaliatory capability to reduce the possibility of nuclear compellence. By uncoupling nuclear policy from conventional conflict, restricting the size and type of nuclear capabilities, and promising no first use of nuclear weapons, China has given up its compellence capability. The US under the theory of the stability-instability paradox - that a stable nuclear deterrence situation encourages small scale conventional conflict - has changed its strategy from massive retaliation towards limited nuclear war. Moreover, there is a debate in the US as to whether a nuclear strategy's only goal should be to deter a nuclear attack as that policy would not reassure allies such as Japan. Further, should the US place nuclear weapons in East Asia, it is likely that they will be used for compellence purposes. There is also still some interest from America, Pakistan, and Japan in a flexible response strategy, and should that policy become fact the possibility for compellence and security dilemmas will increase.

A compellence policy is difficult to enact and therefore requires larger numbers of nuclear weapons. Thus the larger a country's nuclear capability the more likely that the country has compellence policies. There are three criteria for judging whether a country has a compellence policy: whether the nuclear policy is connected with a conventional conflict or not, whether the policy is beneficial for responding to the escalation of a conventional conflict or not, and the size of the country's nuclear capability. A

country with a restricted number of conditions that trigger the use of nuclear weapons will likely have all of these conditions not connected with a conventional attack, whereas a country with a large number of triggering conditions will have a larger number of scenarios where nuclear escalation is linked with conventional attack. The first country will have almost no ability to compel, whereas the second will likely have the ability to compel. However the reputational costs of not using nuclear weapons under declared triggering conditions is high; therefore it is better to not state these conditions explicitly. The greater the uncertainty of the policy, the more room there is to couple nuclear use with conventional conflict, increasing the strategic value of compellence. Should the policy be that nuclear weapons are a weapon of last resort, then nuclear weapons are unlikely to be tied to small scale conflict and their ability to compel is minor. Therefore, as both China and India have a publicly stated policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, they cannot rely on nuclear compellence unless they publicly relinquish this position.

Li Bin [李彬]

“Identifying China’s Nuclear Strategy” [中国核战略辨析],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 9, 2006, pp. 16-22.

Thesis

China’s approach to nuclear weapons is an anti-coercion strategy aimed at preventing threats instead of a minimum deterrence strategy aimed at nuclear attack.

Main Arguments

Chinese scholars are still debating how to describe China’s nuclear strategy: some want to characterize it as ‘defensive’; others see it as a minimum deterrence strategy; others argue it is an anti-coercion nuclear strategy. Moreover, some Chinese scholars believe it is a nuclear deterrent strategy while others oppose that description. Nuclear policy has three levels: nuclear doctrine (when to use nuclear weapons), nuclear strategy (foundational goals and needs), and nuclear development and deployment strategy. Nuclear weapons themselves can be used either like conventional weapons or as a deterrent. Deterrence can either make a country stop what it is doing or force a country to do something it would not otherwise do, also known as nuclear deterrence or nuclear compellence respectively. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence can either be through punishment or denial.

Despite compatibility between a minimum deterrence strategy and China’s promise not to first use nuclear weapons, minimum deterrence theory cannot explain the no first use policy. A minimum deterrence theorist would find it difficult to respond when asked if China would respond with nuclear weapons if it lost a conventional conflict. However, an anti-coercion nuclear doctrine would not have China use nuclear weapons if it lost a conventional war. Mao Zedong believed that pressure from society prevented the possible offensive use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, by having a no first use policy China does not give up any benefits and it avoids misunderstandings and escalation. Further, the existence of the nuclear taboo on the use of nuclear weapons makes it difficult for nuclear-armed countries to use them in a conventional war. Besides, the threat to use nuclear weapons is not usually credible. Within the last ten years it has become apparent that even if nuclear-armed countries were to lose a conventional conflict, they would not use nuclear weapons. Similarly, an anti-coercion nuclear doctrine believes that the realistic use of nuclear weapons is for influence. In examining all of this, it can

be seen that China's nuclear doctrine is primarily a defensive posture aimed at opposing nuclear coercion.

China's actual strategy is anti-coercive and not based on a minimum deterrence. If China had a minimum deterrence strategy, the size of its nuclear arsenal would not meet McNamara's Criterion⁶ for unacceptable damage. China's small arsenal can be better explained by the limits of China's economy and the overly high standards of McNamara's Criterion. However an anti-coercive nuclear strategy also explains the small size of China's nuclear arsenal, as there is no connection between the size of a nuclear arsenal and its psychological effect. The key to the psychological effect of nuclear weapons is how they are deployed. The size of the arsenal is also affected by other factors including "technology laddering", namely that China deploys several nuclear weapons at each new stage of technological development to demonstrate its progress. China's nuclear weapons also need to be responsive to nuclear coercion; therefore China's nuclear weapons must be survivable so they can take out an opponent's nuclear arms after an attack. Furthermore, China's no first use policy means that it needs its second-strike capability. This explains why China's nuclear modernization is focused on strategic reserve missiles. China's nuclear response strategy is unlike the US or Russia's, as it does not have a strategic warning system, therefore it does not pursue launch on warning. Instead, what is important is that China has a second-strike capability that will deter adversaries. The timing of the response will not make much of a difference.

Policy Recommendations

China has several nuclear policy related problems. If China reunifies the country and prevents Taiwanese independence, America may fight and lose. Based on history and the normative power of the nuclear taboo, the US is unlikely to use its nuclear weapons. Should China continue to be afraid of American nuclear power, then it will not matter whether the US threatens China with nuclear weapons or not as the deterrence effect will be the same. However, if China relies on its possession of nuclear weapons and anticipates America will not intervene, it will be committing a serious mistake. China's second policy problem is how to respond to America's missile defence system. America's missile defence system can render Chinese second-strike capability obsolete. However, the power of the nuclear taboo in preventing a nuclear first strike is likely to stop America from launching a first attack. That does not mean that America will not engage in threats; therefore, China will have to develop technologies to remove the US missile defence system as an obstacle to deterring nuclear threats. China's third policy problem is that much of its strategy rests on the nuclear taboo. Therefore China should fight any threats to that norm such as low yield nuclear devices.

Li Bin and Xiao Tiefeng [李彬和肖铁峰] –

* **"Seriously examining the use of Nuclear Weapons"** [重审核武器的作用],
Foreign Affairs Review [外交评论], No. 3, 2010, pp. 3-9.

Thesis

The main cause of nuclear proliferation is the expanded utility of nuclear weapons as symbols or to engage in *passive-coercion* of other nations.

⁶ McNamara's criterion states that the standard for unacceptable damage is the destruction of one third of the population and half of the industrial capacity of the enemy country.

Main Arguments

Despite progress in nuclear arms control, the utility of nuclear weapons has not decreased. From the perspective of policymakers, nuclear weapons are used as a retaliatory measure in the case of a nuclear attack. To avoid that unlikely scenario, strategic stability theory states that a retaliatory nuclear force capable of achieving mutually assured destruction is sufficient. However, there is no evidence that nuclear deterrence has any effect on stopping a nuclear attack or that any nuclear attack is probable. Countries will not use nuclear weapons offensively because of the nuclear taboo, namely the norm of no use of nuclear weapons. This makes it difficult to believe that retaliation with nuclear weapons would stop a nuclear attack. By the time a nuclear weapon is used offensively, the nuclear taboo will be broken, thereby removing the constraint on the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear deterrence would have little effect on the decision to use nuclear weapons offensively in the first place. However, in the case of an existential conventional military attack there is a definite possibility that nuclear weapons would be used as a method of last resort.

Nuclear weapons can also be used in a passive-coercive manner. A basic part of coercion is the obfuscation of nuclear strategy and the conditions under which a nuclear weapon would be used. However, to strengthen deterrence it would be in the interest of a country such as the US to clearly state the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons to demonstrate the seriousness of those conditions. But in order to give extra policy space for possible use of these weapons, and to avoid a credibility problem, the US obfuscates its nuclear strategy. This obfuscation is a classic passive coercive method to make an adversary uncertain and retreat from confrontation. A country that feels passively threatened in this manner will experience a feeling of serious insecurity or will envy the power of the nuclear country, causing them to develop their own nuclear weapons. This is the basic reason for nuclear proliferation. However, if countries were to promise no first use of nuclear weapons then the motivation for nuclear proliferation would significantly decrease. As long as this obfuscation is upheld, however, other countries will mistakenly believe that nuclear weapons are more useful than they are.

The other important use of nuclear weapons is as a symbol. The US believes in relying upon strategic stability to deal with China and Russia, but in reality this approach is motivated by a desire to maintain a leadership position. If the US were only concerned with strategic stability then it would only need to maintain nuclear submarines and several hundred nuclear warheads, instead of 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons (which actually may be closer to 5,113 nuclear warheads). The US capability is much larger than Russia's and exceeds other nuclear powers. Therefore, if the US or Russia were only concerned with security and not maintaining their stockpiles as symbols of power, both countries would have significantly smaller nuclear arsenals. The same goes for the DPRK which wants expanded geopolitical influence or Iran which wants to improve national pride. The other symbolic use of nuclear weapons is as a nuclear umbrella or shield. The American nuclear umbrella is only extended to allied countries that are weak. However, an alliance requires mutual efforts and reciprocal benefits, and therefore the use of a nuclear umbrella is not used reciprocally but to emphasize the subservient nature of the relationship. For example, America's uses its nuclear umbrella to reinforce its leadership position over countries like Japan or Australia which do not face a nuclear threat.

Li Jingwen [李静文]

**Nuclear Weapons and Chinese-US relations [核武器与中美关系],*
M.A. Thesis, Qingdao University, 2007.

Thesis

US-Chinese nuclear relations have improved in the post-Cold War international environment, but are still weak due to US anti-ballistic missile systems and the American fear of China.

Main Arguments

During the post-Cold War period, America's defence strategy shifted to a focus on terrorism, democracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and missile threats from rogue nations. As well, China was believed by some to be a security threat to the United States during the mid-90s because they believed China was improving its rocket reliability as well as its guidance and fairing technology. However, it is well known that China has developed only a limited nuclear weapons capability for self-defence purposes. Furthermore, American intelligence places China as having roughly over 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles with a full nuclear arsenal that does not exceed 200 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. This is compared to the at least over 6,000 nuclear missiles and 20 year advantage in missile technology that the United States has over China. Moreover, China is a country that is opposed to nuclear proliferation and promises not to first use nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is apparent that promoters of this theory are merely spreading the China threat theory to damage Chinese-US relations and stir up anti-Chinese sentiment. Later, the 2002 US Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review Report gave further credence to the US perception of China as a latent adversary. This heightened the US military's focus on China. Further, the US put pressure on China by threatening the use of nuclear weapons should China intervene militarily in the Taiwan problem. These moves caused fear within China and worsened relations with the US, forcing China to take defensive measures to guarantee its nuclear effectiveness.

Missile defence systems have a dual offensive and defensive purpose, therefore the US placement of these systems in East Asia is aimed at both defending against China and opposing it. First, the US has added Taiwan to its theatre missile defence system, which violates Chinese sovereignty, supports Taiwanese independence, threatens Chinese security, and breaks the peaceful cause of unification. Second, bringing Japan into the theatre missile defence system advances its military expansion and spreads Japanese militarism, thereby threatening China's security. The missile system will worsen problems in the Diaoyu Islands dispute and encourages military intervention into China's internal politics with respect to the Taiwan problem. Despite this amounting to a serious threat to national security, China has stressed its limited nuclear capability and its policy of non-participation in nuclear arms races. This, along with China's participation in nuclear anti-proliferation efforts, has had a stabilizing effect on Chinese-US relations.

Post-Cold War US-Chinese nuclear relations are relatively stable, as the gradual reduction of Cold War thinking and the changing international environment has helped to improve bilateral relations. The US and China have also cooperated on issues such as the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula. However, this stability is weak as Americans still view China's nuclear capabilities with apprehension. Therefore, the development of future Chinese-US nuclear relations heavily relies on the US perception of China. In addition to American apprehension, the US anti-ballistic missile system is a threat to China's

minimum deterrence nuclear policy. The most important element for improving relations is looking at the full state of the relationship and its effect on world peace so that both countries can live with their differences and gain mutual benefits.

Liu Ping and Wang Zhongchun [刘平和王仲春]

“On the Global Nuclear Posture in the Post- Cold War Era” [试论冷战后的世界核态势], *World Politics and Economics*, [世界经济与政治], No. 5, 2007, pp. 6-13.

Thesis

The nuclear security situation around the world has gotten worse since the end of the Cold War, leading to greater uncertainty which requires strong anti-nuclear proliferation measures.

Main Arguments

Despite the end of the Cold War, the nuclear situation around the world has gotten worse. The immediate period following the Cold War from 1991 to 1998 was a positive period for the world nuclear situation with the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTB), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty- II (START-II). However, the nuclear security situation worsened after Pakistan's, India's, and the DPRK's nuclear weapons tests. This demonstrated that humanity did not properly use the opportunity at the end of the Cold War to fully control and eliminate nuclear arms. The situation is now uncertain, as the DPRK's nuclear test represents a serious challenge to halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

At present the global nuclear security situation is complicated and unstable. The United States is disrupting the balance between US and Russian nuclear arsenals by seeking absolute nuclear superiority. The US has also taken several steps to strengthen its nuclear superiority including not ratifying the CTB, unilaterally removing itself from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), responding to anti-nuclear proliferation with unilateralism, and frequently using nuclear weapons to threaten other countries. As the conflict between Russia and the US has subsided, world nuclear security has moved from maintaining a balance between big powers towards stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and dealing with terrorism. America and Russia have also emphasized in their nuclear strategies the principle of pre-emptive attack lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Further, the US, Russia, the UK, and France while each reducing their nuclear arsenals have also started to modernize their nuclear weapons. Last, anti-nuclear proliferation mechanisms are facing serious challenges and with the appearance of new nuclear countries regional tensions are rising.

Policy Recommendations

China's policy towards a worsening world nuclear security situation should be to actively promote a peaceful and a positive foreign policy environment. To improve China's image as a peaceful power, China will need to encourage transparency and responsibility among nuclear countries. To this end, in 2006 China released its first defence white paper outlining its nuclear strategy. This strategy emphasized China's policies of no first use of nuclear weapons, no use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country, no use of nuclear weapons to threaten other countries, and active intentions to ban and eliminate all nuclear weapons.

China's nuclear weapons are useful in that they support China's position as a great power, act as a deterrent against other nuclear states, and help guarantee sovereignty. Therefore, China should actively deal with changes in the development of nuclear armament around the world as new developments affect China's ability to guard against surprise and pose challenges to China's nuclear arsenal. Lastly, China should guard against the spread of nuclear weapons by supporting Russian and American efforts to reduce their arsenals, more actively engage in nuclear arms control discussion, and support American efforts against nuclear extremism.

Luo Ping [骆平]

***China's Nuclear Strategy: An Analysis of Traditional Security Culture and Realistic Interests**

[中国核战略：传统战略文化与现实利益之分析]

M.A. Thesis, Huazhongshifan University [华中师范大学], 2008.

Thesis

China's current strategic nuclear culture is a product of traditional Chinese strategic culture and Marxist-Leninism, which has led to the formulation of a strategic nuclear policy in line with national interests.

Main Arguments

Strategic culture is often dictated by changes in political structures, but is typically relatively stable over time. The foundation of China's traditional strategic culture is 'harmony', which recognizes that a society should be based on peace and cooperation. From this ideological foundation, the two concepts of 'upholding peace' and 'careful battle' came to represent China's naïve materialist ideological thinking towards warfare.⁷ The concept of 'upholding peace' tended to be idealistic and in China's feudal society emphasized hegemonic supremacy. 'Careful battle' or more accurately 'carefully executing battle strategy', viewed peace and war as antagonistically unified, as war's ultimate goal has always been to end war. The concept emphasises that war should be waged cautiously, and the highest principle should be to defeat an enemy without fighting. These two strategic concepts have led to a strategic culture that emphasizes defence and a moderate offensive character.

China's current strategic nuclear doctrine is a product of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the concepts of 'upholding peace' and 'careful battle'. First, China's ultimate goal for developing nuclear weapons is to eliminate all nuclear weapons and create world peace. This reflects the peaceful character of the Chinese people and a historic emphasis on defence, which has led China to develop its active defense policy to avoid the threat of nuclear war. These goals have also caused China to not manufacture nuclear weapons on a large scale and promise a no first use of nuclear weapons policy. Second, there is agreement between the no first use policy and the principle of 'defeating an enemy without fighting' or 'careful battle'. Western experts often describe China's nuclear strategy as one of minimum nuclear deterrence, but this description is at odds with China's no first use of nuclear weapons policy which has

⁷ The concept 'upholding peace' (*shanghe* 尚和) is elaborated on as advocating for peace, promoting fraternal love and not attacking (*chongshangheping*, *tichang* 'jianai' 'feigong' 崇尚和平、提倡兼爱'非功').

not changed since China acquired nuclear weapons.⁸ However, the principle of defeating an enemy without fighting emphasizes coercion through a demonstration of force and through possessing force for use in retribution to deter an action. It is with the latter that China's defensive strategy is aligned. The no first use policy is also beneficial in demonstrating China's confidence in its conventional forces, upholding the nuclear taboo, avoiding conflicts with other nuclear powers, allowing China to focus on developing the economy, and giving China greater moral standing in the international community. Third, China's limited but effective nuclear force development is in alignment with the 'cautious battle' principle of preparing for a ready enemy. Since the end of the Cold War, China's highest priority has been developing an effective deterrence capability to counter America's 'offensively and defensively integrated' nuclear strategy. Lastly, China's nuclear strategy follows the positive influence of Mao Zedong, who believed that only a small nuclear deterrence force would be effective.

China's current nuclear strategy is in agreement with China's national interests as it aligns with the character of a socialist society, China's peaceful rise strategy, and is sufficient for dealing with the current international situation. China's priority is the development of its domestic economy; therefore any wasting of resources on foreign expansion or aggressive wars takes away from the people. Further, China's nuclear strategy is defensive and poses no threat to any other country. Any other nuclear deterrence strategy that was graduated or symmetrical would damage national defence by creating an arms race. With regard to the problem of anti-ballistic missile systems, China does not want these systems to become a negative influence on global strategic stability and does not believe that they can solve the underlying security issues where they are deployed. Regarding the issue of Taiwan, Taiwanese independence is a threat to regional stability and China will not hesitate to use force against separatists and foreign interventionists. However, China's focus is on a war under high technology conditions and not a nuclear war. Therefore, the decision of whether a war over Taiwan becomes nuclear is not up to China, but to other countries.

Policy Recommendations

China needs to actively manage nuclear relations with the US, as the US global anti-ballistic missile system has had an enormous influence on China's nuclear second-strike capabilities. The anti-ballistic missile system undermines strategy stability between the US and China, creating an imbalance in nuclear forces. Therefore, China should improve the effectiveness of its second-strike capability by enhancing the survivability and penetration power of its arsenal. China needs to maintain its conventional forces for offensive purposes and its nuclear capabilities for defensive purposes to guarantee its core interests and its peaceful rise. China's nuclear weapons do not threaten any country and naturally do not threaten the US. Nuclear cooperation between China and America can improve by building trust and by America abandoning its Cold War thinking. China should also carefully deal with nuclear proliferation, as the origin of this problem stems from a natural opposition to hegemony and coercive politics. Therefore, China should support international equality and the international community's efforts to stop nuclear weapons from going to separatists, extremists, and terrorists.

⁸ There might be some confusion as to the explanation here, but I believe the author is confusing the definition of deterrence with coercion.

Sun Xiangli [孙向丽]

* **“Chinese Arms Control New Challenges and New Agenda”** [中国军控的新挑战与新议程, *Foreign Affairs Review* [外交评论], No. 3, 2010, pp. 10-21.

Thesis

China's nuclear policy is under pressure because of higher levels of offensive nuclear capabilities, as well as the gap between Chinese, US, and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Main Arguments

There should be a more careful consideration of the imbalance in nuclear armament. A fully balanced disarmament plan has to fulfill three criteria: the US and Russia need to reject a nuclearized strategy and adopt a minimum deterrence strategy; the development of strategic anti-ballistic missile systems should be opposed; and there needs to be a harmonization between nuclear and anti-nuclear proliferation, and anti-terrorism policy to diminish the desire for nuclear weapons. These criteria will not be met with the America's current leadership as the US continues to maintain nuclear strategic principles focused on nuclear war, supports a continuation of President George W. Bush's 'new triad' concept, and continues to put nuclear weapons at the center of global security. The policies are detrimental because they support the development of anti-ballistic missile systems, reflect a war-focused nuclear strategic culture, and ignore the harmonization of nuclear policy and anti-nuclear proliferation policy.

China is now facing pressure on its minimum deterrence and nuclear disarmament policies. The first pressure is from the development of foreign defensive and offensive nuclear capabilities. Due to America's continued policy of supporting a possible first nuclear strike, China's policy of minimum deterrence is under threat. Therefore China needs to enhance its nuclear capabilities and anti-missile measures to maintain an effective deterrent. The second pressure comes from the current imbalance in global disarmament. Due to China's minimum deterrence policy, the small-scale nature of its deterrent, and Russia and America's large nuclear arsenals, the pressure to disarm has an unequally negative effect on China. Moreover, China's policy of keeping the absolute numbers of its nuclear weapons a secret as part of its minimum deterrence strategy and increased calls for transparency are in conflict. This leads some countries to believe that China is more of a threat than it truly is.

Policy Recommendations

China should support several nuclear disarmament policies. China should call for nuclear powers to change their nuclear strategic culture and give up the precept of winning a nuclear war. Additionally, China should oppose the development of global anti-ballistic missile systems to maintain strategic stability. China should also urge the US and Russia to continue its nuclear disarmament process and support inspections. China should also encourage the US and Russia to improve their nuclear material and arsenal security. Another policy China should support is calling on nuclear countries to give up a first use nuclear policy and promise to not use nuclear weapons under any circumstance. Further, when conditions are mature, nuclear countries should enter into a multilateral nuclear disarmament process and discuss how to remove the risk of nuclear accidents and reduce nuclear stockpile size. China should also actively engage in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as well as support monitoring mechanisms. China should call on the international community to resolve regional security issues and oppose nuclear proliferation in order to remove the dominant motives for

the development of nuclear weapons. It should also continue to maintain its strategic nuclear culture and actively promote this culture to other countries. Finally, China should call on other countries to maintain the strategic nuclear balance and limit nuclear threats.

Sun Xiangli [孙向丽]

“China’s Nuclear Strategy: Nature and Characteristics” [中国核战略性质与特点分析], *World Politics and Economics* [世界经济与政治], No. 9, 2006, pp. 23- 28.

Thesis

China’s nuclear policy is based on three principles: no first use of nuclear weapons, maintaining a limited but capable arsenal, and supporting nuclear disarmament.

Main Arguments

A number of Western countries bemoan the lack of transparency in China’s nuclear policy. The mistrust of China’s nuclear policy stems from the country’s growing military power, the lack of academic articles discussing this policy, and the large number of news articles that discuss the issue with muddled terminology. The West believes that China’s nuclear policy advances with its technical development and, that following improved economic and political conditions, China’s nuclear policy will change. This analysis is superficial and incorrect. Nuclear deterrence can either be minimum deterrence, that is maintaining a second-strike capability to deter a conventional military invasion or a nuclear attack, or a war based deterrence, that is maintaining a nuclear advantage against an opponent in the event of a nuclear war. China, the UK, and France could be considered to have a minimum deterrence policy, while the US and Russia can be considered to have a war based deterrence policy. However, unlike the UK and France, China’s policy is only aimed at deterring a nuclear attack. Furthermore, China only maintains a limited nuclear arsenal as its understanding of an unbearable loss is different from other countries.

The primary characteristics of China’s nuclear policy are that it promotes no first use of nuclear weapons, maintains a limited but effective nuclear capability, and supports nuclear disarmament. China’s no first use policy is a purely defensive policy aimed at preventing a nuclear war. That means China would not participate in a first strike scenario nor would it use nuclear weapons as a last resort in a conventional conflict. The policy is also beneficial for encouraging global nuclear disarmament and anti-nuclear proliferation, as well as avoiding conflict and showing confidence in China’s conventional military capabilities. As for its limited nuclear capability, China believes in a lower threshold for unbearable loss than the West and only develops its nuclear capabilities to deal with issues such as anti-ballistic missile systems and precision strike technologies. Furthermore, China stresses the overall viability of its nuclear weapons with regard to their security, reliability, destructive force, and penetrative capacity. In China, nuclear development is guided by this strategy and it has maintained a limited capability policy despite improved economic conditions since the 1980’s. Concerning nuclear disarmament, China’s supports global nuclear arms control. However, it does not need to directly participate in nuclear arms control actions due to its small nuclear arsenal.

Wang Chen and Wang Wei [王晨和王蔚]

“Analysis on China and United States Nuclear-free Concepts” [中美‘零核’概念评析],
Journal of Social Sciences [社会科学], No. 8, 2011, pp. 28-37.

Thesis

The differences between China and America’s nuclear-free concepts do not sufficiently explain the difference in their international impact.

Main Arguments

China has consistently maintained a policy of opposing the use of nuclear weapons and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide. China believes that the first step in achieving these policies is for nuclear and non-nuclear countries to guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used. China’s conception of what it means when it describes eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide, its nuclear-free concept, is reflected in its strategic thinking, development, and use of nuclear weapons. China’s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons is based on a conception of nuclear weapons as defensive weapons meant to counter nuclear threats. China’s development of nuclear weapons is based on not participating in arms races or manufacturing large quantities of nuclear arms. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, China intends to use nuclear weapons only in response to an attack and ordinarily does not target its weapons at any country. China’s ultimate goal is to create a world without nuclear weapons, therefore it promises no first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or regions. China’s no first use policy is beneficial for maintaining stable relations with nuclear countries, resolving the security dilemma between nuclear countries, and lowering the probability of a nuclear war.

Unlike China, US policy on nuclear weapons has shifted many times. Currently, the Obama administration’s nuclear-free concept is an attempt to improve America’s image and its moral standing. Furthermore, in a nuclear free world the US will have an overwhelming advantage due to the large size of its conventional forces. A reduction in the US nuclear arsenal also decreases the economic cost and safety risks associated with the having a large nuclear arsenal. Anti-nuclear proliferation efforts have become a priority as the threat of nuclear war has diminished and the possibility of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation has increased. The effect of America embracing a nuclear-free concept has strengthened anti-nuclear proliferation efforts internationally.

Chinese and American similarities in their nuclear-free concepts start with their desire for a world free of nuclear weapons. Both countries also have promised not to use nuclear weapons under certain conditions and they both have taken steps to host a world summit on the issue. However, China and America have different policies regarding the use of nuclear weapons. China will not first use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, whereas the US has only promised not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and non-nuclear countries. Moreover, China aims to have other nuclear countries make similar promises to not first use nuclear weapons, whereas the US wants to avoid nuclear terrorism. Finally, the point at which each country formulated their nuclear free concept was different as China has had this concept since 1963 and the US since 2009. The different responses to each country’s counter proliferation policies cannot be accounted for by the difference between each country’s nuclear free concepts, but rather from America’s global position and influence.

Wen Jialiang and Zhao Haixing [文佳亮和赵海星]

***“New type Nuclear Weapons- Ethical Trap or Ethical Opportunity?”** [新型核武-伦理困境抑或伦理出路?],

Journal of Liaoning Administration College [辽宁行政学院学报], Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, pp. 203-204.

Thesis

New types of nuclear weapons have created a new ethical dilemma regarding their use.

Main Arguments

The basis of nuclear ethics was constructed during the hegemonic confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, newer types of nuclear weapons are smaller, more adaptable, and more specialized than traditional nuclear weapons. These weapons include neutron bombs, shock wave bombs, nuclear bunker busters, electromagnetic pulse bombs, and liquid metallic hydrogen anti-matter bombs. These weapons have the potential to circumvent treaty obligations, by conventionalizing nuclear weapons or nuclearizing conventional weapons, avoiding the traditional restraints on the development of nuclear weapons. The use of these new types of nuclear weapons has the potential to erode the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.

Traditional nuclear weapons prevent nations from pursuing ‘politics by other means’, otherwise known as war, because of their immense destructive potential. Furthermore, traditional nuclear weapons do not allow the discrimination of targets as their destructive potential exceeds military needs. Although, new types of nuclear weapons do not have the same destructive power as traditional nuclear weapons, they are still triggered by nuclear fusion. Therefore since they are still nuclear weapons, the ethics regarding the use of nuclear weapons still apply. Technology does not constrain the use of new nuclear weapons, but rather the ethics does. However, from the perspective of ethical opportunists, military ethics is a merely a method that stronger powers use to constrain the weak. Banning the use of nuclear weapons is rational from the perspective of a larger power who wants to uphold the status quo. However, for a smaller nation it may be in their interest to acquire nuclear weapons and there is little that military ethics can do to stop them.

Superficially, it appears that new types of nuclear weapons were made in an attempt to circumnavigate the ethical dilemma posed by using traditional nuclear weapons. However, the appearance of new types of nuclear weapons is not a sign of an existing ethical dilemma in the use of traditional nuclear weapons but instead create a completely new ethical dilemma for the use of nuclear weapons by switching the place of offense and defence. Moreover, the appearance of new types of nuclear weapons stems from the difficulty in using traditional weapons because of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. This puts military ethics in a dilemma, which unfortunately will not be resolved until there are greater restrictions on nuclear weapons use from an enlightened populace.

Wu Riqiang [吴日强]

“Just War Nuclear Taboo and Nuclear Weapon Free World” [正义战争、核禁忌与无核武器世界],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 10, 2009, pp. 51-58.

Thesis

To halt the deterioration of the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the possession of nuclear weapons should be upheld.

Main Arguments

This article attempts to analyze the problem of nuclear disarmament from the perspective of morality using concepts such as the just war theory and the nuclear taboo. Just war theory's most important principles are discrimination, that is distinguishing between civilian and military targets, and proportionality, that is making sure that a military action's positive effects outweigh its negative effects. The destructive nature of nuclear weapons means that they violate both these principles in just war theory which thus leads to the nuclear taboo. With regard the origin of the nuclear taboo, its root cause is the effect of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons on society's psychology. All other causes such as accidents of history stem from this effect. The nuclear taboo can be divided into three separate levels: the use of nuclear weapons, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the possession of nuclear weapons. The elements that lead to the deterioration or strengthening of this norm are the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, the violation of the proportionality and discrimination principles, and the unjust use of nuclear weapons.

The taboo on the use of nuclear weapons can be weakened through innovations such as tactical nuclear weapons, neutron bombs, nuclear earth penetrating weapons, peaceful nuclear explosions, and a limited nuclear war. Different from the use of nuclear weapons, the threat of use is not universally condemned and under certain conditions is accepted. An important point to note is that the threat of using nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are not exactly the same. The threat of using nuclear weapons includes nuclear blackmail to coerce a party, whereas nuclear deterrence can be divided into massive retaliation, limited deterrence, and minimum deterrence. With regard to possessing nuclear weapons, there is a global structure in place to enforce this principle with the NPT. At the moment, there is no universally accepted moral standard concerning the ownership of nuclear weapons. Generally, owning nuclear weapons is not recognized as immoral, but rather as crucial for maintaining global security.

The moral framework for the use, threat of use, and possession of nuclear weapons exists on a range from the recognition of the immorality of using nuclear weapons to a full rejection of nuclear weapons. The progression from a recognition of nuclear weapons immorality to the rejection of nuclear weapons go in this order: acknowledgment of the unjustness of using nuclear weapons, a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, a reduction of the use of nuclear weapons, a taboo on making nuclear threats, comprehensive nuclear disarmament, a taboo on possession of nuclear weapons and finally a nuclear free world. This framework only includes moral considerations and therefore removes power struggles and rational calculation as factors. Putting this moral framework in place and applying it to the post-Cold War world we can see that the advancement of the global order and the absence of nuclear threats

have moved the world closer to reducing the use of nuclear weapons. China is farther along in this framework and closer to a position of having a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons as a threat. This is logical, as China's nuclear arsenal is small, it has a no first use policy for nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons are seen as a tool of last resort.

Policy Recommendations

There should be an elimination of the high threat readiness for the use of nuclear weapons, which means that early warning launch strategies should be eliminated. Further, the time for retaliation should be extended from minutes to a week, nuclear missiles should be separated from boosters, and nuclear submarines should go on strategic patrols. The logic behind this is that the threat of nuclear war among great powers is close to zero. Therefore these warning systems are not necessary, especially because they lead to more accidents and a higher risk of missile launch. Nuclear powers should also declare that they will only use nuclear weapons in response to an attack. That means not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in the case of a chemical or biological attack, a conventional military attack, for demonstrating power, peaceful explosion, blackmail, for anti-terror activities, and in a nuclear war. These types of actions erode the taboo on the non-use of nuclear weapons and lower the threshold for use.

All nuclear countries should declare a no first use policy under all conditions. China adheres to this policy, which from the perspective of rational calculation, national interest, or power is suspicious, but from a perspective of morality makes sense. China's policy strengthens the nuclear taboo and stabilizes the non-use of nuclear weapons internationally. Countries should also not target nuclear weapons against any other country.

Wang Zhijun and Zhang Yaowen [王志军和张耀文]

"Research on the Nuclear Strategic Stability of Sino-America" [中美核战略稳定问题研究], *Academic Exploration* [学术探索], No. 10, Oct. 2016, pp.44-58.

Thesis

The lack of strategic stability between China and the US is due to several negative influences including a lack of trust, negative attitudes, military force imbalances, and American nuclear policy.

Main Arguments

America's conception of strategic stability is outdated, empty, and hostile towards China. Moreover, American policies for strategic stability are without substance, unclear, and are based on outmoded concepts borrowed from the Cold War. Previously, the US nuclear strategy towards the Soviet Union focused on defence, containment, deterrence, and retaliation. Whereas the US nuclear strategy towards China emphasizes deterrence and actual combat which makes nuclear relations with China more sensitive and complicated than those during the Cold War. Moreover, these policies are based on the premise of maintaining the current imbalance of nuclear power between the US and China, by preventing China from improving its nuclear position and preserving the US advantage. The US has superiority in the size and technical capabilities of their nuclear arsenal but maintain an attitude of suspicion towards China's nuclear policies. There needs to be a new American conception of strategic

stability that is beneficial to both American and Chinese interests. Nuclear stability requires global cooperation and common effort in multiple fields and countries as the world nuclear situation has become more complicated. Both sides should understand that using nuclear weapons under any situation is extremely dangerous therefore there should be no first use of nuclear weapons. Further, to avoid accidents, the sensitivity of triggers that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons should be reduced. Confidence in each country's second-strike capabilities also needs to be preserved.

There are still a number of conflicts and differences that impact Chinese –American views of strategic stability. The foundational conflict between both countries is societal and ideological. However, there also exists the problem of the US perception of China as an adversary rather than as a competitor. Another problem is the mutual respect of core interests, as the US does not fully respect China's government, sovereignty, territory, or unity and demonstrates this through its interference and intervention openly and in secret. Strategic balance and reciprocity is another problem, as the strategic starting point for each country is not equal. For example, the US practices strategic entrapment by demanding China restrains its allies to uphold its promises to the US, while the US will not change its security policies without agreement from American allies. Similarly the US demands China take responsibility for North Korea while not taking responsibility for the provocation of its own allies. Finally, the US vilifies and excludes China through such means as the TPP, the institutionalization of military installations directed against China such as the expansion of the THAAD or PAC-3, and isolating and belittling China. Overall, this mutual distrust leads to a Tacitus trap where any policy or action will be viewed in a negative light.⁹

China and the US also have a number of differences with regards to nuclear weapons. China believes that nuclear weapons should be eliminated, whereas the US will only give up its nuclear weapons if there are no other nuclear weapons in the world. With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, China's view is that there should be a small but first-rate nuclear arsenal, whereas the US wants to maintain overwhelming superiority in its arsenal. The US also will not promise the non-use of nuclear weapons and is suspicious of China's no first use policy. China also believes that the US extension of its nuclear umbrella to its allies has de-facto created nuclear states and is a form of covert proliferation. Finally, there are differences between the US and China over the development of conventional weapons which affect nuclear issues. As the US views China's anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities as threatening, it has deployed anti-ballistic missile systems, launchers, nuclear weapons, and other systems to counter and spy on China. China is also concerned about US X37, X47B, and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities, which are viewed as a threat to strategic stability.

Chinese-American strategic stability is dependent on the actions of the US, as China is a defensive and relatively weaker power. America therefore should peacefully maintain its leadership position without falling prey to the Thucydides trap.¹⁰ The US also needs to eliminate its enmity and prejudice for China, as well as its belief in absolute security. Finally, the US needs to stop viewing itself in an idealized matter and let its words match its actions.

⁹ From my understanding, the Tacitus trap means that if a government is without credibility, all of its actions good and bad will be viewed in a negative light. I cannot say whether the phrase is properly attributed to Publius Cornelius Tacitus (AD 56-120), however the concept seems to have widespread use in the Chinese media.

¹⁰ This refers to power transition theory and the high possibility of war between a declining hegemon and a rising power. It comes from the oft-cited passage in Thucydides' classic study, *The Peloponnesian War*, that stated "[t]he war was caused by the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this created in Sparta."

Policy Recommendations

In order to achieve strategic stability China and the US should actualize the principles of trust, peace, equality, vitality, and oneness. China and the US should also work to resolve their differences. The US should promise no first of use nuclear weapons and neither country should pursue strategic balance by increasing the size of their nuclear arsenal. The two countries should work on reaching common understandings and develop strategic fora for dialogue on military matters. However, both countries should also maintain strategic deterrence, while rejecting the threat of using a nuclear weapon as a form of deterrence. With regard to anti-ballistic missile systems, both sides should increase transparency, respect that military power needs to be improved to maintain stability, and agree on a baseline understanding of escalation protocol. With regard to the development of strategic deterrence for conventional weapons, there should be focus on the blurring of boundaries between nuclear and conventional weapons and openness regarding responses to new weapon types. Finally, neither the US nor its allies should interfere in China's sovereignty, political process, or unity. However, China should be clear on what conditions will trigger the use of nuclear force that would break the no first use policy.

Yang Jingchun [杨景春]

“China's Measures to Prevent Nuclear War in the Past and Future” [中国防范核战争措施的历史回顾与前瞻],

Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences) [中国石油大学学报 (社会科学版)], Vol. 27, No. 1, Feb. 2011, pp. 66-70.

Thesis

China has been threatened by nuclear weapons a number of times, but has avoided these threats by not giving into fear, not fighting a war when it was not prepared, and by developing its own nuclear weapons.

Main Arguments

China is opposed to any nuclear war or nuclear arms race and wants to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. China's limited nuclear arsenal is only for defence, as China has come close to a nuclear war several times. The first instance was the British plan to use nuclear weapons to protect Hong Kong and Myanmar in the early 1960's. During the Eisenhower administration, America also threatened China several times with nuclear weapons. The US stationed nuclear tipped missiles in Taiwan from 1958 until 1974, later moving them to the Philippines. China nonetheless avoided American threats by building its own nuclear device in 1964, much to the apprehension of Americans. The Soviet Union also had plans for a surprise nuclear attack against China in 1969. To prevent this attack China mobilized its military and, with US support, this forced the Soviet Union to stand down. China guarded against nuclear blackmail and nuclear attack by not showing a fear of nuclear weapons, not fighting when unprepared, and developing its own nuclear weapons.

The threat of nuclear war still exists today. There are several reasons for this. The first is that the US still believes that a limited nuclear war is possible and could be used to force an opponent to surrender. Second, the spread of nuclear technology has increased the risk of nuclear war, and China's ability to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to places like Japan, the ROK, Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, or

Taiwan is limited. Third, the miniaturization of nuclear weapons will reduce the threshold for starting a nuclear war. Fourth, the open knowledge of nuclear weapons has spurred countries to obtain their own nuclear arsenals.

Yang Zhu [杨竹]

****Nuclear Strategy, International Relations, and China's Nuclear Strategy*** [核战略与国际关系及中国核战略].

M.A. Thesis, Dongbei Shifan University, 2008.

Thesis

China's nuclear policy has been beneficial in improving its international standing but still faces challenges due to American influence.

Main Arguments

Nuclear strategy in China is designed to protect the nation from hegemonic threats. It started after both the US and the Soviet Union threatened China during the 1950s and 60s, but it was not until 1966 with the testing of a medium range missile that the country fully obtained nuclear capabilities. Then, to operationalize its no first use of nuclear weapons policy, China developed intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1980 and submersible nuclear capabilities in 1982.

The development of nuclear weapons removed threats to national security, improved China's world position, and was the foundation for a peaceful international environment for China. China developed its nuclear weapons program in line with its economic capabilities, ensuring that national defence was based on economic development. China's nuclear strategy also has been beneficial in improving foreign relations through the no first use policy. Further, the no-use policy demonstrates China's confidence in its conventional forces, the defensive nature of China's nuclear strategy, eliminates misunderstandings with non-nuclear nations, and slows nuclear proliferation by removing the element of threat in China's relationships with non-nuclear nations. However, this policy is not passive, but active and energetic.

The challenge for China's nuclear policy now comes from the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. DPRK efforts to develop nuclear weapons are creating challenges for Chinese security interests due to the close relationship between the two countries. The DPRK's development of nuclear weapons is a response to American threats, political and economic difficulties, and other military threats. The DPRK poses no threat to the US, but due to America's alliance relations with Japan and the ROK it has intervened in the situation. Because of the influence of the US, China has also been drawn into the Korean Peninsula crisis, forcing it to spend more resources in East Asia. For as long as the Korean nuclear crisis continues, America will have the opportunity to improve its force posture in Asia, to improve military relations with Japan, to improve its relations with Taiwan, and it also gives Japan an excuse to participate in a theatre missile defence. All of this worsens China's security environment. Chinese-US relations will need to be improved to help resolve the Korean nuclear problem and the Taiwan problem.

Xia Liping [夏立平]

“On the Structure and Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy” [论中国核战略的演进与构成], *Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies* [当代亚太], No. 4, 2010, pp. 113-127.

Thesis

China’s nuclear policy has moved from a counter-nuclear blackmail policy to one of minimum deterrence, the foundations of which rest on reputational, utilization, development, deployment, and disarmament policy objectives.

Main Arguments

From its inception to today, China’s nuclear policy has moved from countering nuclear blackmail to minimum deterrence. The counter-nuclear blackmail strategy is based on having a small number of nuclear weapons but no second strike capability. This strategy is aimed at deterring nuclear threats from super powers and is focused on a conventional war scenario. China’s counter-nuclear blackmail strategy relies upon the influence of the nuclear taboo, is focused on a war that can be won with conventional weapons, and is a strategy of active defence. From 1985 onward however, this strategy slowly shifted to one of minimum deterrence. The change in strategy occurred because of the advancement of China’s strategic nuclear capabilities, the acceptance of nuclear deterrence thinking, and a reduction in conventional forces. The minimum deterrence strategy is based on having a minimum level second-strike capability. For example, as Taiwan is an important but not vital interest of the US, the US would be unwilling to risk a retaliatory nuclear attack over the island.

China’s nuclear strategy is based on five policy elements: reputational policy, development policy, deployment policy, use policy, and disarmament policy. China’s reputational policy is built on its no first use of nuclear weapons and self defence policies. China’s no first use policy takes into consideration that people are the ultimate victors in a war; that nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes only; that this position gives China moral standing internationally; and that China’s ultimate policy goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons. China’s development policy is based around the idea China’s security is determined by foreign nations possessing a peaceful foreign policy. Therefore China is resolute in its desire to limit the development of nuclear weapons. This means not relying on large numbers of nuclear weapons and not engaging in nuclear arms races, but developing a small yet effective nuclear force. China’s deployment policy aims to maintain its second-strike capability. China currently can respond to a nuclear strike within ten minutes and can maintain its second-strike capability for up to one month following an attack. China’s use policy goal is to avert suffering a nuclear attack and preserve defence capabilities. Due to the possibility of an entanglement with American military over Taiwan, China needs to develop a deterrent capable of preventing American intervention in Taiwan.

China’s disarmament policy has three goals: removing the use of nuclear weapons and reducing nuclear arsenals; reducing the nuclear arsenals of America and Russia; and making the no first use of nuclear weapons principle the basis of nuclear disarmament. The goal of removing the use of nuclear weapons and reducing nuclear arsenals is not concerned with restricting nuclear testing, but rather building no first use treaties, eradicating nuclear blackmail, and eliminating nuclear weapons. China is also opposed to global missile defence as it harms strategic balance and stability and has a negative impact on the disarmament process. Despite suspicion from American experts that China’s no first use policy is not

authentic; China is committed to this policy. The argument that China is not serious about this policy is simply an excuse that allows America to reject implementing a no first use policy of its own.

Xia Min [夏旻]

“The Essence of Wearing Away the Rock with Water in The Art of War and Nuclear Strategy Culture of China” [“孙子兵法” - 的柔武本质与中国核战略文化],

Journal of Binzhou University [滨州学院学报], Vol. 26, No. 6, Oct. 2010, pp. 108-110.

Thesis

China’s strategic nuclear culture and policy is influenced by Sun Tzu’s concept of ‘soft force’ or defensive military strategy.

Main Arguments

Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* has had a significant impact on China’s strategic culture. *The Art of War*’s philosophy emphasises ‘soft force’ or what can be better understood as a defensive strategy. This type of strategy encourages avoiding the enemy, hiding ones capacity, and biding time.

Sun Tzu’s military maxim of ‘defeating the enemy without fighting’ requires a powerful force in order to effectively coerce an enemy. Due to China’s peace loving nature, it will not now nor ever execute a coercive strategy. However, that does not mean China will give up coercive force. Therefore China views its strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent force to suppress a nuclear war.¹¹ China’s development of nuclear weapons was never for the purposes of winning a nuclear war, but to stop its enemies using nuclear weapons and to preserve world peace. Nuclear weapons cannot be easily used but instead are meant to be possessed for the purposes of psychological coercion, as a blackmail tool of hegemonic countries, and as the pillar guaranteeing Chinese sovereignty. China will not start a nuclear war; it will not use its enemy’s methods to deal with its enemies but will justly retaliate in response to a nuclear attack. This aligns with Sun Tzu’s maxim that the first attacker cannot win, but those who wait for the enemy can win. Sun Tzu’s defensive philosophy believes that the best method of avoiding defeat where one cannot win is to have a defensive fighting posture. This principle reflects China’s nuclear strategy as it has always maintained a defensive nuclear posture.

China’s strategic doctrine is also an extension of China’s active defense strategy. China’s active defense strategy puts the use of military force as a measure of last resort. It also emphasizes protecting sovereignty, security, and development interests through the use of multiple methods and strategies to resolve crises, dampen conflicts, and avoid war. This strategy also means not using hegemonic ideology, not encroaching on other countries’ territory in any form, but also not being fearful of war or protecting territorial integrity. China’s nuclear strategy has continually revolved around self-defence, and is based on the principles of no first use of nuclear weapons, no nuclear threats against non-nuclear countries, and the aim to completely eliminate nuclear weapons.

¹¹ Again, the confusion here is due to the problem of the word deterrence having a meaning closer to coerce in Chinese.

Xia Min [夏旻]

“Chinese Nuclear Strategic Culture and Confucian Military Thought” [中国核战略文化与儒家军事思想],

Journal of Naval University of Engineering [海军工程大学学报(综合版)], Vol. 10, No. 4, Dec. 2013, pp.13-16.

Thesis

The Confucian tenets of opposing war, focusing on a people's disposition to war, and emphasizing the interconnectedness of political, economic, and military policies are apparent in China's strategic nuclear policies of no first use of nuclear weapons, opposing aggressive nuclear war, and the balancing of economic and military development.

Main Arguments

China's nuclear strategic doctrine is an amalgam of Communist and Confucian thought. Confucianism has several principles which apply to military thinking. Confucianism strongly opposes war, as an ideal government and society would not have war or conflict. However, Confucianism also believes that a just war is a tool to be used for preserving the societal order. It also strongly focuses on the role of the people's support for a war as a factor in its success or failure. Although wars are decided by multiple factors including politics, economics, and military actions, each element is based upon the unity of the people. Even the material needs of a war are decided by people who manufacture and create these materials, and a material disadvantage can be overcome through the unity of the people. Finally, Confucianism also emphasizes that politics, military affairs, and the economy are mutually supporting and inseparable. Therefore, to increase a country's military strength, its economic and domestic policies should be improved.

China's strategic nuclear doctrine preserves Confucian military thinking in several aspects, such as the opposition towards hegemony and support for peace. It also opposes nuclear war. This is a continuation of Confucius's opposition to war and the Chinese Communist Party's policy of using nuclear weapons as a defensive tool to resist foreign incursion, maintain sovereignty, and preserve territorial integrity. As a reflection of this philosophy, China promises not to first use nuclear weapons and not to engage in nuclear threats against any non-nuclear powers. Current thinking also places the people at the center of all wartime actions. That means trusting in the will of the people, even when facing the threat of war or material disadvantage. Finally, China's strategic nuclear doctrine recognizes the importance of mutually supporting nature of military, economic, and political policies. Economic development provides the technology, physical capital, human capital, and other material resources that make nuclear policy development possible. However, military investment must be kept to a level low enough to ensure a balance between economic and military development. Consequently, nuclear capability should develop in line with economic progress, as more is not necessarily better.

Zhang Cheng [章成]

***“The Problem of Nuclear Deterrence from the Perspective of International Law: Value Judgements and Systemic Improvement”** [国际法视角下的核威慑问题：价值评判与制度完善],
Seeker [求索], No. 3, 2014, pp. 162-166.

Thesis

The international legal framework should be perfected by emphasizing that nuclear-armed countries have international responsibilities and by improving the United Nations legal role in this issue.

Main Arguments

In this article international law is used to analyze the effects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear deterrence theory. Optimistic international legal perspectives on nuclear deterrence view it as a force for stability and peace. Most countries try to avoid a nuclear war because of the catastrophic destruction it would cause. Therefore, nuclear deterrence fulfills its intended purpose, which is promoting peace and stability in international society. However, nuclear deterrence also has downsides as a pessimistic international legal perspective shows. America, Russia, the UK, and France as well as other nuclear powers believe that due to a lack of prohibition in treaty law or customary international law, nuclear deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons is acceptable under conditions such as self-defence and retaliation. However, from the perspective of soft law, UN decisions have broadly restrained the realistic use of nuclear weapons.

There is a lack of evidence that nuclear deterrence is an effective method for strategic competition. Although some Western scholars attribute the peace during the Cold War to the influence of nuclear deterrence, there have been similar periods in history where war was not present that were not caused by nuclear weapons. It is not possible therefore to attribute the resulting peace and stability of the Cold War to nuclear deterrence alone instead of other factors, therefore the usefulness of deterrence in this regard is suspect. A nuclear deterrence policy also does not consider the full effect of its application. Should nuclear deterrence fail, then a country must decide whether to escalate or de-escalate. A country may choose to escalate simply because of the reputational harm de-escalation would do. Lastly, the frequent reliance on a nuclear deterrence policy promotes the spread of nuclear weapons, as the threat of nuclear attack will increase a country's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.

In perfecting the international legal system with regards to nuclear deterrence there are two steps that should be taken. First, nuclear-armed countries should uphold international law and their moral responsibility for nuclear disarmament and solving problems related to nuclear weapons. It should be recognized that not all countries have the same responsibility, as American and Russian nuclear policies directly impact the global nuclear security environment. Nuclear countries should actively work together to reach common understandings on nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and other issues, as well as work on common nuclear security issues such as those in the DPRK and Iran. Second, the UN regulatory scope and functions should be improved by placing clear stipulations on the use of nuclear deterrence. The UN should play an active role in nuclear deterrence, as it can create mechanisms for resolving nuclear disputes, lead legal organizations under its administration, urge countries to act, promote an international legal framework, and push for monitoring and punishment regimes.

Policy Recommendations

China should take a more active role on nuclear issues in the future, as well as promote international legal discussions and treaties dealing with nuclear issues. China should also encourage the US and Russia to improve their counter-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, China should emphasize its international responsibility while at the same time respecting each country's nuclear security policy and their sensitivities.

Zhang Jiegen [章节根]

“The Stability of Nuclear Strategy of India and Pakistan and Its Influence on China” [印巴核战略稳定及其对中国的影响],

Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济研究], No. 4, 2014, pp.21-34.

Thesis

Strategic instability between India and Pakistan is a negative influence on China's security environment, requiring careful diplomacy from China to maintain stability.

Main Arguments

Chinese scholars have insufficiently studied the problem of Indian-Pakistan nuclear deterrence policy, regional stability, and its effect on China. Deterrence can be achieved through either making your adversary believe they will lose or they will suffer irreparable damage should they attack. The three conditions of strategic nuclear stability include: removing temptations to launch a first strike during a crisis, no rapid competition for improved quality or quantity of nuclear arms, and the ability for each side to constrain an opponent's capability to coerce policy changes through deterrence.

Comparing India and Pakistan's strategic relationship to that of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War a number of observations can be made. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had warning systems and critical communication mechanisms. India and Pakistan on the other hand have no critical communication mechanisms and the flight time of nuclear weapons between the two countries is short enough to provide little warning. While the US and the Soviet Union never engaged in direct conflict, India and Pakistan have had three wars since 1947 and have an ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir. Despite ideological differences the US and the Soviet Union had rational policies. However, India and Pakistan's ideological differences are largely religious which makes it difficult to engage in rational policy making. Lastly, the American and the Soviet nuclear arsenals guaranteed effective deterrence, but India and Pakistan's second-strike nuclear capabilities are questionable which undermines the effectiveness of deterrence. Currently, India and Pakistan are in a stability-instability paradox, where each side is confident that the other will not escalate, therefore making it feasible for each side to engage in small scale conflict. However, neither country has enough experience to prevent escalation. This inexperience has led to thirteen direct and indirect nuclear threats from both countries during the 2001-2002 Kashmir Crisis.

India and Pakistan's strategic relationship is weak due to their ongoing territorial dispute, lack of effective communication channels, India's offensive conventional force posture, and the changing regional power balance. The strategic instability in South Asia is connected to China in three ways

including its effect of regional stability, Sino-India and Sino-Pakistan security relations, and the possibility of China being drawn into a South Asian nuclear arms race. China's security environment is exacerbated by this instability as it can lead to direct conflict between India and Pakistan, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. China is also trying to maintain positive bilateral relations with both countries which would leave China in a difficult position should conflict arise. Lastly, China would be drawn into a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India, as India also views China as a target of its nuclear deterrence.

Policy Recommendations

China's nuclear policy towards South Asia should enhance strategic stability between India and Pakistan and not focus on South Asian nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This does not mean balancing against India's nuclear weapons development or searching for a stable level of nuclear capabilities between both countries. Instead it means providing Pakistan with all the necessary assistance China can under international law to prevent Pakistan's nuclear capabilities from falling too far behind India's. Even if China is criticized for proliferating nuclear weapons to Pakistan, China and Pakistan's positive relations should continue. At the same time China should develop civilian nuclear cooperation with India. China needs to avoid the perception of being considered a hegemonic actor in South Asia. Therefore, China should continue its policy focus on restraint with India, support for Pakistan's economy, and anti-terrorism efforts. Furthermore, China should prevent Pakistan from supporting cross-border terrorist incursions into Kashmir to avoid an Indian pretext for conflict. Lastly, China will need to actively involve itself in South Asian multilateral security discussions and promote dialogue between the US, India, and Pakistan. Political differences between the US and Pakistan on counter-terrorism issues are growing wider. Furthermore, America's current influence in South Asia is skewed towards India. Therefore, China should utilize its positive relations with Pakistan and India to promote a four party security dialogue.

Zhang Tuosheng [张沱生]

"North Korea Nuclear Issue and China Policy" [朝核问题与中国的政策],
Journal of International Security Studies [国际安全研究], No. 5, 2013, pp. 52-61.

Thesis

As the Korean nuclear crisis worsens, China needs to move towards a more flexible policy and overcome the inherent conflict within current policy of stabilizing the Korean peninsula and denuclearizing it.

Main Arguments

The DPRK's security situation has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War and its loss of support from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the primary motivation for the DPRK in obtaining nuclear weapons is for self-protection and dignity. More specifically, its motivation for obtaining nuclear weapons is to deter American military threats, to balance against the ROK, and its past successes in developing nuclear weapons related technologies. After the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, military confrontation between the DPRK and America, Japan, and the ROK reached a new high point creating new challenges for Chinese security.

In the near term, there are a number of negative elements in this situation including: minor military incidents between North Korea and the US, the ROK, and Japan; the temporary suspension of the Six Party Talks; a loss of initiative in North-South dialogue following the DPRK's leadership transition; and the strengthening of the military alliance between the US, Japan, and the ROK which includes the development of an East Asian anti-ballistic missile system. These negative elements complicate Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. In the medium term, assuming that the DPRK advances its nuclear weapon technology, this will bring even more negative elements into the crisis. These negative elements include: the prolonging of international sanctions; worsening North-South relations; no hope for improvement of relations between the US, Japan, and the DPRK; greater isolation of the DPRK due to adjustments in Russian and Chinese foreign policy positions; increased American presence in East Asia including the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in the ROK; no possibility of economic development; worsening nuclear security; and the increased proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course, one other possibility is that China ends up increasing tensions with the US and Japan by stabilizing the DPRK's government.

It may appear hypocritical of China to oppose North Korean nuclear development, when China developed nuclear weapons under similar pressures from the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the conditions under which nuclear development occurred in China and North Korea are fundamentally different. First, there were no international anti-nuclear proliferation mechanisms when China developed its nuclear weapons. Moreover, China has already shown that these mechanisms are beneficial for China and the world. Second, China is a large country and it had the capability of shouldering the pressure and results of its nuclearization, while the DPRK does not have the same capabilities. Third, the DPRK's excuse that the US will invade should they give up their nuclear ambitions does not make sense, as the status of Russia and China as large powers opposed to such a development make the situation wholly different from Iraq or Libya. Fourth, after the end of the Cold War, the DPRK has been politically isolated and its military first policy will only worsen its security and economic situation.

Policy Recommendations

China's policy to resolve the situation through the Six Party Talks has been unsuccessful. Previous policy had been insufficient because China was too focused on acting as a mediator between the DPRK and the US, and was not active enough in attempting to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, there is a conflict between maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and working towards denuclearization. Therefore, China should move away from its special relationship with North Korea and towards a normal relationship. China should also alternate between putting stability first and denuclearization first, as denuclearization is a prerequisite for stability. However, China should also maintain and improve the use of its leverage over the DPRK. Besides the Six Party Talks, China should also promote different discussion on this issue, including three party talks with other stakeholders. China should also prepare economically, political, and militarily for a sudden crisis as well as strengthen its crisis and conflict management mechanisms. Lastly, China should improve cooperation with the US and reach a common understanding while it searches to establish a new type of great power relations.

Section Three:
Sino-Russian Relations

Bi Song [毕松]

“Negative Political Elements Affecting Chinese Russian Relations” [影响中俄关系发展的消极政治因素],

Journal of Changchun Education Institute [长春教育学院学报], Vol. 30, No. 11, 2014, pp. 6-7.

Thesis

In the long term, the Sino-Russian relationship will face obstacles because of the negative influences coming from the relative power imbalance, shifting policy positions, and the US.

Main Arguments

Sino-Russian relations have passed through several stages to reach its current high point. However, simply because relations are good now does not mean there are no negative influences that will affect the relationship in the long-term. As the identity of a nation changes so will its interests. Russia, for example, has moved to a Eurasian conception of national identity which places a higher focus on Asian and Chinese relations. Therefore, in the long-term it is important to observe shifts in national interest that may negatively affect the Sino-Russian relationship.

China and Russia have at times viewed each other as a latent competitor and prepared themselves for conflict. Currently, China's rapid rise and Russia's decline has created security concerns in Russia. In an anarchical system a rising country will need greater space for its markets, resources, and people. Thus, Russia views the imbalance between its sparse population in Siberia and the Russian Far East and China's relatively large population as a weakness. However, Russia also realizes that it needs China to further develop its Far East. Similarly, tensions between China and Russia are high over issues involving Central Asian resources. This is due to the fact that economic power can be transformed into political power. From this geopolitical viewpoint, it is apparent how the 'China threat theory' in Russia has appeared.

Another negative influence that could affect Sino-Russian relations is the unsteady nature of Russian policy such as the changes in foreign policy between Putin and Medvedev. While no changes affecting the Sino-Russian relationship have occurred yet, once the Putin era comes to a close there could be a definite policy shift. Lastly, one of the strongest constraints on Sino-Russian relations is the influence of the US. The US relationships with Russia and with China are more important than the Sino-Russian relationship. For China, the US is needed for solving problems in Asia and for trade. For Russia, the US is able to constrain Russia's international geopolitical influence, which gives the US leverage over Russia. Therefore, neither country can offer the same level of support to each other that the US can offer by itself. This means the Russia-China relationship will always be the least important of the three relationships, constraining further development.

Hu Bing, Su Xiao, and Wang Shuchun [湖冰, 苏晓, 和王树春]

“Analysis on SIPRI Policy Paper ‘China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia: Hope, Frustration, and Uncertainty’” [《中俄能源关系和安全关系中的希望、挫折和不确定性》研究报告评析],

Journal of Strategy and Decision Making [战略决策研究], No.5, 2012, pp. 7-13.

Thesis

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) policy paper entitled “China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia: Hope, Frustration, and Uncertainty (October 2011),” wrongly perceives military and economic cooperation as the basis of China and Russia’s strategic partnership, instead of strategic interests.

Main Arguments

The SIPRI paper’s thesis is that China and Russia are ‘convenient partners’ that lack a similar worldview and will be unable to expand their strategic partnership. It argues that military and resource cooperation between Russia and China will continue to deteriorate. As this paper could encourage the spread of the perception of China as a threat in Russia, it is worthwhile to examine the logic of its arguments. The SIPRI paper mistakenly asserts that the foundation of Sino-Russian cooperation is based on military and economic interests, rather than strategic interests. This mistake comes from the difference between Western and Chinese scholar’s views of what strategic interests mean. Chinese scholars believe strategic interests relate to shared long term, multilevel, and multifaceted interests, whereas Western scholars and the scholars in this paper, place a higher emphasis on traditional security and the potential for a military alliance. This is the fundamental reason why the paper sees the Sino-Russian partnership as convenient and overemphasizes military and energy cooperation. In fact, it is multi-layered strategic political interests that drive military and economic cooperation between China and Russia, rather than vice-versa.

The SIPRI paper states that the Sino-Russian partnership’s weakness is that it is based on pragmatism and the influence of the US while lacking mutual trust or ideological understanding. However, the paper is not grounded in realist analysis; otherwise the authors would see that it is primarily the influence of the US that determines whether or not Sino-Russian relations grow closer or farther apart. The paper also presents little evidence to support the idea that military cooperation is deteriorating as it overemphasizes the impact of the sharing of military technology. In fact, it is difficult to tell which factors may actually determine military cooperation. Similarly, the SIPRI paper believes that Sino-Russian resource cooperation is limited. However, the authors ignore that Sino-Russian resource cooperation is mainly in oil and natural gas, where there is both willingness and ability to solve many temporary problems. Moreover, the fluctuation of economic relations does not affect the strategic interests that have led to the partnership. The basis for the Sino-Russian partnership is strategic conditions, global and domestic politics, and cooperation in regional stabilization. Therefore the Sino-Russian strategic partnership should be viewed from a long term and dynamic perspective as the primary elements influencing the relationship are structural. As long as there is broad strategic level support, shared benefits will stabilize China and Russia’s strategic partnership.

Huo Menglin [霍孟林]

***“A Geopolitical Perspective on the Future Development of Sino-Russian Relations and the influence of Central Asia”** [地缘视角下中俄关系未来发展的中亚因素], *Journal of Socialist Theory Guide* [理论导刊], No. 2, 2015, pp. 109-112.

Thesis

There are new opportunities for Sino-Russian relations to develop further due to mutually aligning security and economic interests in Central Asia.

Main Arguments

Russia and China both want to stabilize their border regions and develop economically, and the Central Asian region plays an important role in achieving those goals. Although, Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia are not the same, there is no fundamental conflict between the two. Moreover, there are a number of areas for cooperation where Russian and China can improve their relations.

Russia views Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence. Therefore, Russia aims to reassert itself as a leader in the region. Russia is also concerned with gaining access to energy resources, safeguarding its security, and balancing against US and Chinese influence in Central Asia. China also views Central Asia as an important for its security and wants to use the region to stabilize the political and societal conflicts in China's Western provinces. Furthermore, to fulfill the ambitions of becoming a great naval power, China needs to stabilize its security situation in its interior. China is interested in ensuring energy security by reducing its dependence on oil and natural gas travelling through the Malaccan Strait, and reducing the concentration of economic development along the East Coast that is vulnerable in the event of a war. Finally, Central Asia is a staging ground for extremism, separatism, and terrorism which China opposes.

Policy Recommendations

Russian and Chinese interests are directly threatened by American actions in Central Asia. Therefore, strategic cooperation needs to be increased to resist the US threat. Russia is looking to integrate the region to improve economic growth, while China is looking for mutual investment and resource sharing. This will naturally produce competition and possibly conflict. For that reason, China and Russia should integrate their trade with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), promote Central Asian economic integration, and the Silk Road Economic Belt project. Regarding security, China and Russia need to harmonize their efforts to combat extremism, terrorism, and thereby promote Central Asian stability. China supports the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a positive effort, just as Russia should fully support the SCO as a stabilizing force in the region. Finally, China's Silk Road Economic Belt project should become a new platform for Sino-Russian cooperation. It can integrate Russian and Chinese efforts to economically develop Central Asia as well as link Asia with Europe.

Hu Renxia and Zhao Hongpo [胡仁霞和赵红波]

“Russia’s Asia Pacific Strategy: Interests and the Prospects of Cooperation”, [俄罗斯亚太战略的利益、合作方向与前景],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 103, No. 5, 2012, pp.80-87.

Thesis

Russia is focusing on increasing its economic and political power in the Asia-Pacific by improving its cooperation with countries in energy, transportation, agriculture, and finances.

Main Arguments

Russia is involving itself in the Asia-Pacific region to develop the economy of the Russian Far East, protecting its territorial integrity, and increase its influence throughout the region. The direction Russia is taking in its policy starts from these considerations, but the steps it takes to pursue these goals requires cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries. The first goal for Russia is to reduce instability in its energy export markets by diversifying the countries to which it exports. Second, Russia needs to increase its transportation infrastructure to connect the Asian and European sides of the country, harness its underlying geographic advantages, and strengthen the economy in the Far East and Siberia. Third, after a dramatic growth in Russia’s grain production, Russia plans to further develop its market position in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, Russia needs to improve cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries to globalize its financial system in order to insulate itself from shifts in US currency rates which are highly destabilizing due to the high level of energy exports.

Russia still faces a number of challenges in executing this strategy. First, the difference in the level of development of its national economy compared with many Asian-Pacific countries will constrain Russia’s ability to integrate into the region. Second, Russia is conflicted about its cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries, as cooperation can bring economic benefits but also dependency and security issues arising from high numbers of foreign labourers entering its sparsely populated east. Finally, Russia distrusts regional great powers which makes it difficult to develop these relationships.

Policy Recommendations

Russia’s interest in Asia offer opportunities that China ought to exploit. First, it should actively encourage Sino-Russian economic cooperation along the border to promote Chinese economic growth. Second, China should strengthen energy resource cooperation with Russia to improve energy security. Finally, China should emphasize financial cooperation with Russia in order to further globalize the Renminbi.

Li Jingyu and Xu Hua [李靖宇和徐华]

“Coordination of the Co-development Strategy of the Border Area between China and Russia”

[中俄两国边境区域合作开发战略对接论证],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 19, No. 6, Nov. 2010, pp. 15-26.

Thesis

While there is political impetus to develop the Sino-Russian border region, there are still a number of obstacles to implementing this policy.

Main Arguments

Development of the border area between Russia and China in Northeast Asia is necessary to actualize strategic intentions of both countries. The practical value of linking and developing China’s Northeast and Russia’s Far East and Siberian region lies in improving cross-border and Northeast Asian economic cooperation. Moreover, linking these regions benefits both Russia and China strategically, while revitalizing the regional economy. Tangible benefits of the policy include strengthening Sino-Russian political trust, people to people exchanges, and mutually beneficial arrangements in the allocation of natural resources, production, and talent. However, there are a number of constraints limiting the development of the Sino-Russian cross-border region. Further development in the region’s infrastructure, trade, and economy are needed to improve cooperation. As well, Sino-Russian border trade does not appeal to China, because there is a limited market in Russia for Chinese exports.

Policy Recommendations

There are several steps needed to cooperatively develop the China-Russian border region. First, China and Russia should improve regional infrastructure, cross-border investment, high technology industrialization, and normalize trade. Second, China should make efforts to develop more products and brands that appeal to the Russian market. Third, China should improve its human capital to counter Russian advantages. Fourth, China and Russia should prioritize developing better cultural and people to people contacts.

Li Xing and Niu Yichen [李行和牛义臣] –

“Why Shanghai Cooperation Organization can’t Support China’s Perimeter Security Strategy in the Northwest” [上合组织为何不足以支撑中国西北周边安全战略],

Journal of International Security Studies [国际安全研究], No. 4, 2013, pp. 103-118.

Thesis

Despite the SCO’s role in stabilizing China’s northwestern security, China cannot solely rely on it for security because of the constraints on the SCO’s ability to act and the changing security environment in Central Asia.

Main Arguments

China aims to use the SCO to advance its relations with neighbouring states, attain security and economic objectives, and maintain the SCO as a regional organization aimed at no third party. The SCO has already had a number of successes including: addressing a number of security concerns; introducing a series of treaties to fight terrorism and crime; creating regional security mechanisms; improving military and economic cooperation. However, a lack of executive mechanisms and resources, dissimilar member state interests, and differing levels of member state reliance on the SCO, mean that the potential of the organisation is constrained.

Although, the security situation northwest of China is relatively stable at present, globalization and regionalization have introduced new factors. Overall, there are four main problems for regional security there: internal conflicts, the expansion of foreign influence, transnational criminal activities, and competition between multilateral organizations. These problems in China's northwest lead to heightened territorial security concerns, a greater reliance on good bilateral relations with Russia, and a focus on economic and energy security. Due to these effects, China faces greater uncertainty and risk in its security situation. The most important factor for the region's security is the Sino-Russian relationship, as negative developments Sino-Russian relations have a multiplier effect. Despite, Sino-Russian relations heading in a positive direction, there still needs to be a greater mutual understanding between the two countries. Chinese relations with Central Asian countries are more complicated and there are multiple viewpoints on why these countries both distrust and want to cooperate with China. However, some experts believe that Chinese problems with Central Asian countries stems from Russian influence and a negative perception of China.

Policy Recommendations

Due to the increased geopolitical importance of China's northwest, Beijing should re-evaluate its strategy. China's strategy for regional security there should maintain four principles to deal with the influence of Central and Western Asia on Chinese security. First, China should maintain its peaceful development strategy to improve foreign relations while securing positive economic conditions for the development of its Western provinces. Second, China should also improve its bilateral relationship with Russia which has the strongest influence on northwestern security. Third, China's relationships with Central Asian nations should be improved, particularly strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as strategic energy relations with Turkmenistan. Fourth, it should enhance multilateral mechanisms for regional conflict resolution and closely monitor geopolitical and internationally influential countries.

Li Yongquan [李永全]

“Moving towards Complete Strategic Cooperation between Russia and China” [走向全面战略合作的中俄关系],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 108, No. 4, 2013, pp. 3-9.

Thesis

Sino-Russian relations have the potential to grow stronger because they are founded on the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefits, and equality.

Main Arguments

China and Russia have constructed a new type of great power relations based on strategic political, economic, and defence interests. The basis of this relationship is founded upon the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefits, and equality. Mutual respect of development choices, culture, values, and the core interests of sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity have strengthened the Sino-Russian relationship. Political relations between both countries have also developed smoothly, although trade relations have ebbed and flowed. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed traditional trade between Russia and China, but both countries have worked to eliminate problems. Economic cooperation, globalization and regionalization have encouraged China and Russia to see such efforts as mutually beneficial. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed historical barriers to the development of Sino-Russian relations. Long term strategic efforts have encouraged Sino-Russian relations to advance to the level of a strategic partnership.

However, Sino-Russian relations are not entirely perfect. Economic relations face a number of constraints including: low competitiveness for Chinese products; Russian fear of Chinese labour; a lack of infrastructure for resource cooperation; and a lack of understanding or need for high technology cooperation. Moreover, the 'China threat theory' is popular in the Russian media. This belief arises from a lack of understanding about China's peaceful intentions, the fear of economic competition, its usefulness as a tool in domestic political battles, and Western disinformation which includes bribing the media. Fortunately, this theory is losing its Russian audience and becoming less prevalent. However, the root cause behind the initial popularity of this theory is a lack of cultural and people to people contacts between Russia and China.

Still, Sino-Russian relations have great potential. Both China and Russia hold a shared view of the need for a fairer and more just multipolar world. It is already apparent that the model of selfish liberalism has no future. China and Russia have also signed a number of trade agreements encompassing resources, military technology, and regional cooperation. Moreover, there is strong mutual interest in cooperatively developing Russia's Far East and China's Northeastern regions. Both countries also want an open, fair, equal, and transparent security framework to stabilize Asia. As well, the two countries are improving the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in order to stabilize Central Asia, fight extremism, and advance trade relations. The world should welcome China and Russia's strategic partnership as its goals are to uphold the world order, not seek hegemony or domination.

Liu Fei [刘霏]

"Russia's Policy of the South China Sea and Its Impact on Chinese Maritime Disputes: Analysis Based on the US Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy" [俄罗斯的南海政策及其对中国海洋争端的影响—基于美国亚太再平衡战略的分析],
Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 123, No. 1, 2016, pp. 87-95.

Thesis

Russia's policy in the South China Sea is aimed at increasing pressure on the US and NATO while simultaneously balancing against challenges from China.

Main Arguments

Russia has adopted a pragmatic policy of selective cooperation in response to America's Asian pivot. In practice, this means strengthening exchanges and contact with China in order to reduce pressure from NATO and the US. At the same time, Russia is increasing contact and influence with other Asian-Pacific countries, such as Japan and Vietnam, in order to balance challenges coming from China. This has had a deep effect on Chinese maritime territorial disputes. Therefore, China needs to create a policy to respond to Russia's influence in the South China Sea.

Russia is working to reduce Chinese power in the South China Sea and further escalate territorial disputes there for the purpose of increasing Russian influence in the region. This is evident in Russia's development of naval power. Russia is improving the strength of its navy to make it a core element of its military power, modernizing naval weapons, and strategically deploying naval assets. The effects of this strategy can be seen in increased Russian naval patrols especially in the South China Sea, exports of naval weaponry, and improved relations with maritime states and organizations in South East Asia such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and ASEAN.

Policy Recommendations

As Russian actions have complicated the situation in the South China Sea, China should nonetheless focus on securing its national interests in the area. It should declare that the South China Sea is a core interest and other countries should not interfere. Furthermore, China should secure a favorable position in global public opinion on the issue of the territorial disputes. With regards to ASEAN, China should improve its alliance relations while dividing individual members on the issues in the South China Sea in order to reduce the ability of member states to proactively take action on the South China Sea dispute. China should also advance regional security measures to reduce tensions, protect navigational security, and improve its de-facto jurisdiction over the South China Sea. By improving China's de-facto control over its territory in the South China Sea China can normalize its patrols and convey its intention to protect its rights in the region. Finally, China should improve its naval power in order to deter its opponents if possible and protect Chinese assets if a war should occur.

Liu Qingcai and Liu Tao [刘请才和刘涛]

“The Development Strategy of Russian Far East Region and Sino-Russian Cooperation under the Background of Western Sanction” [西方制裁背景下俄罗斯远东地区发展战略与中俄区域合作],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 113, No. 3, 2015, pp. 84-93.

Thesis

Western Sanctions on Russia have had a beneficial impact on Sino-Russian economic cooperation.

Main Arguments

The Western sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 and the drop in world oil prices have seriously impaired Russia's economy, compelling it to speed up the development of its Far Eastern provinces and improve Asian economic cooperation. To develop its eastern territories, Russia has created a new

regional development plan which establishes new infrastructure as a key priority. That includes improved roadways, increased port and railway logistical capacity, and expanded airport infrastructure to support population mobility. The ultimate goals of the plan are to eliminate regional economic imbalances, increase the population, raise living standards, develop manufacturing and social infrastructure, encourage financial investment, and expand logistical capacity. Russia is also planning to create 14 advanced economic development zones to speed up economic development.

Another key plank of this development plan is improving cooperation in the Asian region. China is Russia's largest Asian trading partner therefore strengthening Sino-Russian cooperation is a key component of the plan. Sino-Russian energy cooperation has been continually expanding in oil, natural gas, coal, electricity, nuclear power, and other areas. The critical foundation of the Sino-Russian energy partnership is oil and natural gas pipeline development. Another area of cooperation has been in infrastructure projects, including rail, bridges, and ports to increase transportation corridors. Russia also supports China's Silk Road Economic Belt project to create northern sea lanes and both countries are working to build a large port in Zarubino. There is still a great deal of room to improve Sino-Russian bilateral relations. Energy development and infrastructure projects are going to be the biggest focus for long term cooperation. Therefore, Russia's Far East development plan should change the trade focused character of Sino-Russian relations and expand opportunities in investment, finance, energy, machinery, infrastructure, scientific research, technology production, among many other areas.

Liu Ying [刘莹]

“Shared Ideas and Sino-Russia Strategic and Cooperative Partnership: In the Perspective of Constructivism” [共有观念与中俄战略协作伙伴关系-以建构主义理论为视角], *Northeast Asia Forum* [东北亚论坛], Vol. 108, No. 4, 2013, pp. 10-18.

Thesis

The foundations of Sino-Russian relations are based on mutually beneficial political, military, and economic interests, but to further improve strategic cooperation the two countries should focus on shared ideas and identities.

Main Arguments

Currently, the Sino-Russian relationship is based on political trust, military cooperation, and economic benefits; however, cultural relations have not improved and that limits the future development of the relationship. Therefore, to improve bilateral relations China and Russia should constructively develop their shared ideas and identities. As Alexander Wendt's theory of Constructivism is clear, shared ideas shape national identities and interests.

Regarding the rationale for the development of a strategic partnership between Russia and China there are three elements. Internal elements related to mutually beneficial interests based on similar political systems, ideology, geopolitics, strategic position, etc. which strengthen the rationale for cooperation. External elements that shape the relationship, such as the end of tension after the Cold War allowed more room for cooperation to balance against foreign powers. Last, there is an American element which has hastened cooperation in order to oppose the hegemony of the world's only superpower and the numerous conflicts that it has created. There also exists several problems in strategic cooperation that

include: political and official closeness but weak cultural and the economic ties; problems in bilateral trade frameworks and cross-border investment; rightist elements in the Russian government calling for weaker Sino-Russian cooperation; and an incompatibility between the Chinese desire for peaceful foreign relations and a Russian desire for Cold War tactics and a return to its hegemonic status.

Policy Recommendations

Future development of bilateral relations requires several actions. First, China and Russia should strengthen their political and economic reliance on each other to foster a sense of collective interest. Second, China and Russia should also turn the mutual desire for domestic economic development into shared cooperation and responsibilities, in order to reduce international and domestic pressures. Third, both countries should improve dialogue about shared social and national issues. Fourth, treaty relations should be increased and the cost of treaty violations raised to improve mutual trust. Cultural relations are also not strong enough, therefore cultural contacts and cooperation should be increased.

Liu Ying [刘莹]

“The Rationality of SCO's Security Cooperation and Its Transformation” [上海合作组织安全合作的理念基础与转型],

Asia and Africa Review [亚非纵横], No. 2, 2015, pp. 15-26.

Thesis

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will need to adapt to a more global oriented threat environment by means of increased integration, adopting a new security concept, and strengthening Sino-Russian relations.

Main Arguments

The SCO is a multilateral security organization aimed at traditional and non-traditional security threats. The trust between SCO members on security issues is based on the resolution of historical problems, common historical experiences, and the close cooperation between Russia and China that form the core of the organization. The organization also has a number of shared ideas about security cooperation which include: the rejection of a Cold War security paradigm and oppositional tactics, leading the effort against terrorism, and a need for a shared vision of Eurasian security. However, the SCO needs to adapt to the changing security environment. The shift there means that power politics and military arms races are no longer salient factors for security. Therefore the SCO will need to adapt by moving in a new direction.

The SCO will need to incorporate new elements to adapt to the new security environment. First, the ‘spirit of Shanghai’ will have to form an important foundation for the SCO going forward. That means adhering to an equal level of communication and consensus in objectives. It also means fostering mutual assistance, mutual trust, and equality between members. At the same time larger member states will need to ensure they live up to their global responsibilities and agreements. Second, Russia and China will need to develop a closer relationship as it is the driving force behind the organization’s development. Third, China’s new security concept should become a core tenet of the SCO’s security cooperation efforts. This requires a rejection of Cold War thinking, opposition to hegemony and power politics,

breaking through traditional security thinking, strengthening the UN, and deepening security cooperation within the SCO. Fourth, the SCO should use mutual economic advancement to transform the organizations focus from only security cooperation to cooperation in multiple domains. Bilateral and intra-organizational development of economic cooperation will lead to greater military cooperation, thereby improving the overall strategic value of the SCO.

Lü Menghuo [吕梦荻]

“The Sino-Russian Strategic Cooperation of Maritime Security” [中俄海洋安全战略合作探究], M.A. Thesis, The Ocean University of China, 2015.

Thesis

China would benefit by cooperating more closely with Russia to improve its maritime power as both countries face similar geostrategic problems in the maritime realm.

Main Arguments

China and Russia are not strong maritime powers despite their long ocean borders. Both countries face similar challenges in their naval strategic environment including: large interiors and ocean borders both of which can easily suffer harm; need for support and stability in their interiors to protect their naval power; US pressure; access to the ocean is constrained or can be constrained in a crisis; and territorial disputes with Japan. However, despite the similarities, their problems are not completely the same. China’s traditional strategic outlook is defensive, whereas Russia has a traditionally offensive strategic outlook. Currently, China faces naval threats at several conflict points, including in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, both of which are linked together by Japanese-Philippine cooperation. Another conflict point for China is Taiwan which is important for the Chinese navy. However, because of the Taiwan problem the area is geopolitically unfavourable for exercising China’s naval power. As for Russia, its strategic space is constrained by geopolitical problems such as NATO or instabilities in Central Asia and the Middle East, particularly in its Western and Southern periphery. China’s naval development is needed to protect its territorial integrity, link its interior with the ocean, and create favourable conditions for China’s rise. Whereas Russia’s attempts to develop naval power have seen little success due to its large size, poor relations with neighbouring countries, and lack of a strategic focal point.

There are three priorities for Chinese naval cooperation with Russia. First, China should peacefully develop and protect its core interests, without doing one and neglecting the other. Second, China needs to participate in regional security organizations to further its security interests. Regional security organizations supply the same type of public goods a hegemonic power would, which makes Chinese participation useful to reduce American influence, extending awareness of Chinese core interests, and beneficial for maintaining Chinese national interests. Third, China needs to improve strategic cooperation while at the same time maintaining strategic adaptability. Regarding the style of cooperation, China should maintain strategic cooperation with Russia but not ally with it, as doing so would make China hostage to Russian policy problems. China will also need to cooperate with Russia on a bilateral basis and a multilateral basis in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN. Last, China will have to work with Russia in the spirit of finding common ground, as Russia is historically poor in dealing with its neighbours and may have a negative impression of China.

All of the above has dealt with strategic or process issues regarding Sino-Russian naval cooperation, but there are several concrete measures that need to be taken as well. The foundation of Sino-Russian cooperation is maintaining a global strategic balance and advancing each country's national interests; therefore to improve naval security each country should guarantee the other's core interests. China and Russia should also improve maritime economic cooperation by: strengthening oceanic resource exploration and investment; supporting the development of new strategic marine industries; using traditional advantages in marine industries to spur maritime based economic development; cooperating on oceanic science technology research; and improving legal regulations governing bilateral maritime economic cooperation. China and Russia will also have to strengthen sea lane security, especially because of the pressure from hegemonic threats, terrorism, and piracy. Lastly, China and Russia need to improve resource cooperation to build trust and reduce China's dependency on energy resources moving through the Straits of Malacca. China's reliance on that waterway does not meet its security or logistical needs, and therefore China must diversify.

Ma Jianguang, Xu Yuanyuan, Yue Shiguang, and Zhang Liwei [马建光, 徐元元, 岳师光和张礼伟] **"New Strategic Thoughts of Russia on the Far East"** [俄罗斯远东战略 '新思维'-解析新时期的俄罗斯远东战略], *Journal of Strategy and Decision Making* [战略决策研究], No. 2, 2013, pp. 27-32.

Thesis

Russia is pursuing a realist policy to improve economic growth, strengthen its military posture, and to engage in geopolitical issues in the Russian Far East.

Main Arguments

Russia has slowly realized the strategic value of its Far East and has started to increase its development of the region, which has had a profound effect on Russia's relationships with the US and China. Russia's strategy towards the Far East has moved from idealism to realism, which means Russia's foundational goal for this strategy is to protect its security. Russia also intends to make the Far East another engine of Russian economic growth.

The core problem for Russia is that the sparse population and geography of its Far East make it difficult to foster economic growth. However, the Far East is rich in resources, has a developed industrial base, and the location is advantageous for trade with China, Japan, and the ROK. Therefore, Russia has increased its development support and infrastructure spending, and is in the beginning stages of improving the investment environment. However, the Russian Far East's development is dependent on Asia. Therefore, Russia has joined several trade organizations, is actively working to sign new trade agreements, and is promoting its resource exports. Russia has also reorganized its military structure and held largescale military exercises in the region, modernized its weapons, and improved military cooperation. In addition to economic and security issues, Russia also needs to address the complicated geopolitical problems in the region. That means it must also actively engage itself in regional issues such as tensions on the Korea peninsula, protecting territorial integrity such as in the Kurile Islands, and seeking cooperation despite conflict with others by doing such things as participating in American military exercises.

Mao Yan [毛艳]

“Analysis of the Causal Factors behind Sino-Russian Relations Systemic Development” [中俄关系制度化发展的动力机制分析],

Theoretic Observation [理论观察], Vol. 118, No. 4, 2016, pp. 55-57.

Thesis

Sino-Russian relations have become institutionalized because of shared national interests, historical lessons from the Cold War era, and a shared outlook on the benefits of institutionalization and joint security.

Main Arguments

The transformation of Sino-Russian relations from friendly relations to constructive partners to strategic partners followed the improvement of bilateral institutional mechanisms. Under the auspices of the ‘Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China’ and the SCO, Russia and China have developed a common understanding and expanded cooperation especially on resource development and military technology, as well as scientific and cultural exchanges. The reason that this institutional framework for bilateral relations exercises a positive influence is due to a number of causal factors including national interests, history, and shared perspectives.

National interest forms the foundation for the institutionalization of the Sino-Russian relationship. First, Russia and China have an interest in stabilizing relations between each other to offset the negative security situation along their Western and Eastern borders respectively. Moreover, each country wants to avoid war on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia generally. Second, China and Russia both face similar economic challenges as they work to transform their internal economies and raise living standards. Furthermore, each country operates an open market economy and plans to further integrate into the world economy. Finally, China and Russia’s international strategic goals align as both countries do not want an American dominated global order, but rather a peaceful, stable world environment.

Regarding history, previous relations between China and the Soviet Union did not have an institutionalized character leading to misunderstandings and tensions, and eventually turning China and Russia from close allies to adversaries. Understanding this accentuates the importance of institutionalizing mechanisms to avoid conflict. Besides national interest and history, China and Russia are institutionalizing their relationship because of their shared perspectives. Russia and China’s common recognition of the importance of institutionalization and shared security in the post-Cold War era prompted them to normalize their relationship. Institutionalization also brings constraints that allow a bilateral relationship to develop in safe conditions.

Pang Dapeng [庞大鹏]

“Russia’s Eurasian Strategy and its Effect on the Relationship between China and Russia” [俄罗斯的欧亚战略-兼论对中俄关系的影响],

Teaching and Research [教学与研究], No 6, 2014, pp. 69-76.

Thesis

Sino-Russian cooperation on China’s Silk Road Economic Belt policy and in the SCO has been influenced by Russia’s Eurasian strategy aimed at improving Russia’s geopolitical power through regional integration.

Main Arguments

Russia faced an ideological choice between becoming more Western, more like the Soviet Union, or a Eurasian country. It is generally accepted that while Russia is focused on the West it cannot rely on the West. Moreover, becoming Western or returning to the Soviet Union would require losing geopolitical power or becoming a closed society. Furthermore, following the end of the Cold War, Russia began to see itself as a Pacific/Eurasian country. Therefore it makes sense that Russia has chosen to embrace Eurasianism, an active strategy with a multipolar view of the world. An Eurasianist views the construction of super-state organization as the means for achieving status as a pole in a multipolar world. Thus, Russia has begun to behave in an imperialist manner towards Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Economic development is the basis for social stability, but since the 2008 Financial Crisis the economic demands of the Russian people have become more pronounced. Therefore, Putin’s main concern is the health of Russian society, which is the source of his power and the foundation of his Eurasian strategy. Unfortunately, economic development is also an institutional and political issue. Thus differences between Russian elites muddle the direction of Russia’s Eurasian policy.

Russia’s Eurasian policy has had a clear effect on Sino-Russian relations. Relations between Russia and China in the SCO reflect Sino-Russian relations in general. Russia views the SCO as an important part of their international security strategy because it helps improve Russian defence along its Southern border. Doing so has become especially important because of security problems coming from Afghanistan. Russian scholars believe that the SCO should change by strengthening economic cooperation, as well as expanding its membership and security responsibilities. Therefore, Russia has urged China to expand SCO membership because it benefits Russia’s foreign policy, while China resists because it would change the priorities of the organization. Russian scholars, both pro- and anti-SCO, are suspicious of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt policy. Some believe that when the services, products, and financing brought by the policy enter into the Eurasian Union, Sino-Russian conflicts will multiply. Nevertheless, there is still room to develop bilateral relations through cooperation on security issues, particularly because of the withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan.

Qiu Haiyan [邱海燕]

***“Exploring the Vitality of the ‘Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China’”** [试析《中俄睦邻友好合作条约》的生命力, *Journal of Eastern Liaoning University (Social Sciences)* [辽东学院学报(社会科学版)], Vol. 17, No.2 Apr. 2015, pp. 14-19.

Thesis

The strength of “The Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China” is due to mutual economic, political, defence, and cultural interests and its stability rests on a constructive geopolitical environment.

Main Arguments

Sino-Russian relations have advanced not only for the benefit of each country’s mutual interests but also for regional and global development. However, while these relations are strong, it is unrealistic to expect that China and Russia will become allies. Unless the two countries have a common enemy or China becomes much weaker there will be no alliance. Moreover, any ideological alliance formed would only be temporary as it does not reflect realistic interests and would collapse once its common objective was achieved. China and Russia need to respect the wisdom of not conflicting with each other, as that would lead to instability in Northeast Asia and allow other countries like Japan to take advantage.

Cooperation and communication on multiple levels has greatly reduced possible conflicts and provided the rationale for the “Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China”. The foundation of the treaty rests on shared economic, political, cultural, and security interests. Economically both countries are interested in relying on the other to grow their economies in the long term, despite the low level of cooperation currently. Politically Russia and China respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, such as on the issues of Taiwan or Chechnya. This is unlike the US which puts human rights above sovereignty in order to interfere in other countries’ internal politics. Regarding security interests, both countries want to work together to oppose and restrain US Cold War thinking in order to preserve regional stability and balance. Culturally, China and Russia are looking to establish cultural solidarity; China by absorbing Western culture while expelling its negative elements and Russia by regaining a Russian spirit that was lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In addition to sharing mutual interests, China and Russia’s treaty relationship is immune to outside political influence. Regardless of changes in US-Chinese or US-Russian relations, Sino-Russian relations will be a stable pillar that resists American challenges and Cold War oppositional thinking directed at Russia and China. Regarding Japan’s effect on Sino-Russian relations, Russia’s relationship with Japan is stable despite territorial conflicts and the US-Japanese alliance. Moreover, positive relations between Japan and Russia would invalidate the historical lessons from WWII and encourage Japan to become arrogant on the issue of its territorial disputes. Relations between Russia and India are positive, but are unlikely to change despite territorial conflict between India and China. This is because China provides better economic benefits for Russia than India can. In summary, relations between Russia and China are a clearly positive because they are based on equal trust and strategic support.

Titarenko, M., Zhu Xianping, and Zhang Xinyu [季塔连科, 朱显平和张辛雨]

“Security and Stability of Asia-Pacific Region and the Interests of Russia and China” [亚太地区的安全稳定与俄中利益],

Northeast Asia Forum [东北亚论坛], Vol. 104, No. 6, 2012, pp.3-9.

Thesis

Russia’s economic and security goals for developing its Far East provinces and providing stability in the Asia-Pacific benefits Sino-Russian cooperation.

Main Arguments

The US Asian Pivot aims to maintain leadership in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening regional alliances that rely on America’s military/naval power and its anti-ballistic missile systems. The US is also keeping forward deployments aimed at China in the South China Sea, inserting itself on the side of Japan and Southeast Asian countries in territorial disputes, using the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement to counter China, and directing its anti-ballistic missile systems against China and Russia. Although, the US does exert a positive influence on global development, it also seeks to strengthen its hegemonic position, use force to solve global problems, and ignores international law. Therefore China and Russia are both prepared to work with the US on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, but strongly oppose America’s hegemonic actions.

Sino-Russian cooperation in the Asia-Pacific already has a solid foundation and both sides are interested in continuing to support regional security mechanisms such as APEC, ASEAN, and ARF, as well as international organizations dedicated toward a more equal world political and economic order such as BRICS, SCO, and RIC. Russia is interested in strengthening cooperation with China, the ROK, and Japan on the issues of resources, transportation, oil, and natural gas. Russia will also continue to support APEC in improving trade, investment, regional integration, food security, innovation, transportation systems, and other projects. Furthermore, Russia will seek to advance its economic integration into the region and rely on China for to aid in its economic development goals.

Economic cooperation is the foremost concern of Russia and China’s bilateral relationship. Russia plans to utilize Asian resource demands to modernize its Far East region, however that region’s development is strategically complicated. Russian policy requires a large amount of investment to succeed. Moreover, Russia requires active cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries to gain that investment. It plans to cooperate with investor countries to develop natural resources and transportation and logistics infrastructure. Currently, its energy exports to Japan, China, the ROK, and the US are a small percentage of their overall energy exports. Russia plans to expand energy exports and improve pipeline transportation to entice Asian-Pacific investment. With regard to infrastructure, China attaches importance to the modernization of its Northeast industrial area, therefore it makes sense to link Russia’s Far East development with China’s Northeast. China’s industrial center needs to have closer connection to transport routes as Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Hulunbuir have no direct ports. Russian ports and railways would be able to accommodate China’s needs.

Wan Qingsong and Wang Shuchun [万青松和王树春]

“Implications of the Eurasian Union for China” [试论普京欧亚新战略对中国的影响],
Journal of Strategy and Decision Making [战略决策研究], No. 5, 2013, pp.3-15.

Thesis

In the short term, the positive effects of the Eurasian Union in the areas of security, economics, and regional political relations outweigh its negative effects on China's.

Main Arguments

The establishment by Russia of the Eurasian Union is aimed at improving its position in the world by developing a power center equal to China, the US, or Europe. Russia plans to do this by taking advantage of the turmoil caused by the 2008 Financial Crisis. Furthermore, the establishment of the Eurasian Union provides: mutual political and economic benefits for members; a 'superpower' coalition of countries; equal and open economic opportunities; and improved economic development among member countries. Regarding the Eurasian Union's effect on China, there are both positive and negative effects. The Eurasian Union has strengthened Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, improved cooperation with Central Asia, and provided a mechanism for security and stability in the region.

Moreover, China views the benefits of regional integration as outweighing the costs, as it presents opportunities for future development. The Eurasian Union will improve Chinese security by stabilizing countries along its Western border, where China is already facing geopolitical challenges. Conversely, the Eurasian Union has had a profound influence on Chinese-Central Asian trade relations but has created new difficulties for Sino-Russian relations and for the development of the SCO. As the Eurasian Union has an exclusive customs arrangement, any trade issues China has with one member of the Eurasian Union will affect its relations with all members as the Eurasian Union. As well, the increasing gap in power between Russia and China has created challenges for Sino-Russian relations. Russia's weakness and China's strength, means it is likely that one reason for the development of the Eurasian Union was to reduce this gap with China. The Eurasian Union will also be a barrier for the economic integration of members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, possibly leading to direct conflicts between the two organizations. These conflicts limit the future development of Sino-Russian relations. Still, in the short term the positive effects for China of the Eurasian Union will outweigh any negative effects.

Wang Lijiu [王郦久]

***“Several Points on Further Deepening Sino-Russian Relations”** [对进一步深化中俄关系的几点思考],
Peace and Development [和平与发展], No. 3, 2013, pp.1-11.

Thesis

The Sino-Russian bilateral relationship can be strengthened in the areas of economics, administration, and global issues.

Main Arguments

Sino-Russian relations have become stable and prosperous due to the mutual recognition and guidance by each country's leadership, the development of latent potential, and steady progress over time. In fact, the Sino-Russian relationship is much stronger than the Sino-US relationship, even though China's relationship with the US is more important. This is because the Sino-Russian relationship is based on stable political and economic cooperation, whereas the Sino-US relationship lacks political stability or shared values.

In the area of security, Sino-Russian cooperation has three levels. The first level is mutual guarantees of security, the next level is cooperation in military technology, and the last is on the protection of regional and global security issues. The first level is based on a shared understanding of principles, while the second is based on the practical need for weapons technology that cannot be obtained from the West. The third level is important for responding to regional threats such as the DPRK or stronger US military cooperation with Japan and the ROK. This can be seen in joint military and anti-terrorism exercises.

There are several areas where Russia and China can improve cooperation. Administrative cooperation can be improved by increasing party level, departmental, and legislative exchanges. Economic cooperation can be improved as bilateral direct investment is low, financial cooperation is lagging, and the potential for regional economic cooperation remains unfulfilled. Improvements can also be made in addressing global problems such as upholding UN principles and laws, advancing world multipolarity, making the world system fairer, and maintaining Central Asian stability. Russia and China can solve a number of these global issues through active resistance to the threat from America and its allies, such as Japan, and through the constructive development of a more cooperative global economic system.

Wang Tao [王涛]

“On Relationship between China and Russia under Background of Northeast Asia Cooperation”

[东北亚合作背景下的中俄关系],

Journal of Heze University [菏泽学院学报], Vol. 36, No. 3, June 2014, pp.45-50.

Thesis

Sino-Russian relations are crucial for the stability of Northeast Asia and are, therefore, improving bilateral cooperation benefits China and Russia as well as the region.

Main Arguments

The northeast Asian political situation has become much more complicated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, Japan's attempts to become a normal country, and the US Asian Pivot. Despite a number of differences between countries in the region, the overall situation is relatively stable with cooperation in the areas of economics, politics, and security. However, the possibility for war has increased with the strengthening of the American alliance in East Asia and heightened military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The strengthening of Sino-Russian relations will aid in resisting US global ambitions and benefits each country's core interests. However, because of the major changes in the international environment, both countries will be required to seize development opportunities to further improve Sino-Russian relations.

Russia needs to cooperate with China, as the US is putting pressure on Russia's strategic interests in Asia and Central Asia. For China, the increasingly complicated geopolitical environment in East Asia is threatening its core interests. These threats to China's core interests include American containment, territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian countries, and the Taiwan problem. Russia and China both have to contend with US hegemony, therefore it is beneficial for both countries to cooperate to preserve national interests, world peace and stability, and push for reforms to the world economic system. Moreover, the strategic partnership between Russia and China stabilizes Northeast Asia. This is demonstrably true when looking at efforts to deal with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as joint military anti-terrorism exercises. However, Sino-Russian trade relations are weak. The bilateral trade framework is lopsided and does not fit the technological and economic development needs for each country. Russia also sees China's economy, large population, and military as a threat. Russia and China are competing in Central Asia for resources and influence, though Russia and China are using the SCO to search for solutions to these problems.

Policy Recommendations

China and Russia need to take several steps to further deepen their relationship so they can further stabilize Northeast Asia and the world. China and Russia should deepen their strategic partnership by protecting each other's territorial sovereignty and core interests. This would build trust, increase cultural contacts, and improve military relations. Improving military cooperation requires greater collaboration on military research and development, as well as continuing joint military exercises. China should also work to improve trade relations with Russia by improving cooperation on science and technology, energy resources, and labour mobility. Finally, China and Russia should use the SCO as a platform to transform bilateral conflicts in Central Asia into mutually beneficial arrangements.

Xie Chao [谢超]

"Will China Form Alliances? Russian Interests and Prospects of a Sino-Russian Alliance" [与中国结盟吗? —俄罗斯国家利益与中俄结盟概率],

Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies [当代亚太], No. 4, 2016, pp. 44-69.

Thesis

In the absence of external security threats, Russia or China will not form an alliance in the next ten year period.

Main Arguments

Professor Zhang Wenmu believes that China should look at its national interests to decide whether it should ally with Russia and that the main objective of a Sino-Russian alliance should be to preserve the Yalta peace framework and resist American containment. However, a Sino-Russian alliance is an idea that would change the international order, which makes an alliance with Russia an offensive strategy rather than a defensive one. This would provoke a strong response from the international community. Moreover, outside of America and its allies, there is no country or group of countries that a Sino-Russian alliance would need to deal with. On the other hand, Professor Yan Xuetong believes that the basis for a Sino-Russian alliance does not exist because both the nuclear taboo and Russia's military strength

means that Moscow has no need for foreign military support. Moreover, while the common security threats both countries face have set the conditions for an alliance, any discussion of such an arrangement is confined to academic circles.

The strategies of great powers change as the international system changes, and many are questioning whether China's rise means that it should adjust its policy of not allying with others. However, unlike the fast development of economic power, the ability to turn economic power into military power is much slower. The next ten years will be an opportunity for the development of Chinese military and economic power. Moreover, in that time China should be able to surpass America economically. As for the Sino-Russian relationship, no matter whether or not it is facing a third power, a shift towards an alliance would be a major change. The necessity for an alliance however is slight without a foreign security threat or a strategic surprise.

Looking at the current international environment, the impetus for an alliance is on Russia. Russian foreign policy is pragmatic with an emphasis on Europe and America. That means that despite improvements in Sino-Russian relations, the chance of a formal alliance is small. While the locus of international power is shifting to East Asia, Russia is unlikely to shift the centre of its strategic foreign policy to East Asia within the next ten years. Moreover, an alliance between Russia and China would decrease the ability for each country to negotiate with Europe and America for technology and capital. Furthermore, Russia is already capable of handling its security threats so it does not need to expand its current alliance strategy. After the next ten years however, there is a higher likelihood of a shift in the international system and an alliance between Russia and China is more likely.

Policy Recommendations

China has more strategic options than just allying with Russia to face US pressure. China should re-examine its policy of not forming an alliance and research different alliance structures and possible opponents. This policy should be in place in case of a major shift in the international order or a major security incident within the next ten years. Moreover, after the ten year period China should use this examination in order to take advantage of opportunities that develop in the international environment and pursue a pro-active policy.

Yang Lei [杨雷]

“US-Russian Relation and China Diplomacy” [美俄关系与中国外交],
Journal of Strategy and Decision Making [战略决策研究], No. 5, 2015, pp. 17-32.

Thesis

China has had a moderating and positive influence on the US-Russian relationship.

Main Arguments

The US-Russian relationship is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, following events in Ukraine. China has now become an important factor influencing the US-Russian relationship. Russia's current difficulties can be improved by strengthening Sino-Russian relations.

Russian-American problems have been caused by Cold War thinking and systemic opposition. Relations are particularly bad in the areas of security and nuclear weapons policy. For example, Russia has increased its strategic nuclear capabilities raising tensions with the US. Other issues that contribute to the deterioration of US-Russian relations include international legal and organizational reform, energy security, and geopolitical tensions arising from US pressure on Russia's geopolitical space. Bad relations between Russia and the US have affected the course of global politics; therefore, rising powers like China need to be proactive in order to guarantee peaceful international development.

The foundation of Chinese relations with Russia and America is the Chinese concept of 'new great power relations'. Similarities between China's relationship with Russia and America are that they are oriented towards producing mutual benefit, reducing tensions, and China's current disinterest in allying with either country. Points of difference between Chinese relations with Russia and with America are that US and Russian power is much stronger compared to China. Moreover, the Sino-Russian partnership has had a much longer history than Chinese relations with the US. Furthermore, the foundational emphasis is different for each relationship. Sino-Russian relations are founded on mutual benefit, while Sino-US relations are based on containing confrontation. China's rise has galvanized closer relations between both the US and Russia as they view China as an adversary. However, that does not mean China's influence is the deciding factor for improved relations between the US and Russia. Regardless, China's 'new great power relations' concept has stabilized relations between all three countries, as China's desire for constructing a harmonious world has reduced Cold War thinking. China is currently in a positive position in the US-Russia-China trilateral relationship, though it should be careful about going forward.

Yang Lei [杨雷]

"The Interactive Rules of the Triangular Relations among China, Russia and Japan" [中俄日三角关系的互动规律],

Pacific Journal [太平洋学报], Vol. 22, No. 9, September 2014, pp. 48-57.

Thesis

Integration in East Asia is blocked because of the dynamics of the trilateral relationship between China, Russia, and Japan.

Main Arguments

Recent instability in Sino-Japanese relations has affected a change in Russo-Japanese and Sino-Russian relations. Looking at the relationships from a trilateral perspective, any change in one relationship will directly effect change in the other two precisely because of the difficulty in anticipating the effects of that change. Currently, Russia and Japan are actively looking to solve their territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands. At the same time, China and Russia have further strengthened their strategic partnership, though China cannot support Russia's territorial claims in the Kuriles due to previous treaty commitments with Japan. While Russia is using competition between Japan, the ROK, and China to advance its own economic interests in the Russian Far East, it nonetheless aims to balance China and Japan's power because of the former's strength. However, Russia's policy will be short lived because of Russia's perception of threat from the US-Japanese alliance. Russia is also concerned about the long term threat from Japan, which is a strong motivation for strategic cooperation with China.

There are a number of general observations that can be made regarding the trilateral relationship between Russia, China, and Japan. These observations are: Japan's ability to assert itself is constrained; each country is relatively independent; no alliance relationship exists between any two countries; the Japan-US relationship causes Russia and China to be influenced by the US; the state of affairs between the three countries determines the state of the region; the power relationship between all three countries has dramatically changed over time; and territorial conflicts between the three countries have led to war and mistrust between the people of each country. Furthermore it can be seen that an alliance between any two of the other countries will be threatening to the third, therefore each country remains guarded. The relationship can be described as having two strong sides (China, Russia) and one weak side (Japan), due to the Japan's difficult position which has caused it to seek an alliance with the US. Lastly, it can be seen that Sino-Russian cooperation is multifaceted, due to the global and regional problems both countries deal with.

The future development of the trilateral relationship is likely to develop in three directions. First, Japan will find it difficult to change the structure of the trilateral relationship. Furthermore, the ability of Russia and Japan to solve their territorial disputes will be limited due to a lack of mutual trust, calculating behavior making it difficult for there to be meaningful progress, the high military and economic value of the Kurile Islands, and Prime Minister Abe's conservative politics that will make it difficult for Japan to make concessions. Second, the two strong sides and one weak side structure of the relationship will persist in the long term because of the US using Japan to counter China and Russia. Third and finally, the constraints of the trilateral relationship will obstruct regional cooperation.

Policy Recommendations

China's only option is to improve its strategic partnership with Russia. The China-Russia-Japan relationship can be considered a subset of the China-US-Russia trilateral relationship which affects global politics on a larger scale. Difficulties between Russia and the US because of Ukraine have forced Japan to follow US policy. Furthermore, the actions of the US force Russia and China to oppose them, therefore it is a natural choice for China's to strengthen relations with Russia.

Zhang Wenmu [张文本]

"Russia's Rise and Fall and Its Implications for China" [俄罗斯国家兴衰规律及其对中国的影响],

World Politics and Economics [世界经济与政治], No. 3, 2010, pp. 14-29.

Thesis

Russia's geographically based expansionary power extends from west to east, just as China's power extends from east to west, therefore in times of Russian weakness the four Central Asian countries of the SCO and Mongolia form a buffer but in times of Russian strength they pressure China.

Main Arguments

By examining Russian history and geopolitics, several conclusions can be drawn about the rules of Russian geographic ability to expand. The historical contraction of Russian territory has for the most part

been caused by Russia leaving its political heartland, Moscow. Russia has three territorial expansion baselines. The first is from the Baltic Sea in the East to the Ural Mountains in the West to the Caucasus in the South. This is the smallest contraction that Russia can territorial make and is the heart of its political power, the place where no other country can interfere. The second is from the East of the Urals to the West of Eastern Siberia. This is a defensible baseline. The third is baseline is Eastern Siberia, which is the farthest from the political-economic center and the least stable area. Eastern Siberia's is dependent on Russia's deterrence power for its stability. Historical decline and loss always starts from the third baseline, which is similar to Tibet and Xinjiang for China. This means Russia's ability to maintain strategic focus is not sustainable in the third baseline. This is the same reason why China could not sustain offense in the 1962 Chinese-Indian War of Self-Defence¹² and had to follow the principle of waging a fast war with fast results.

Russia's ability to expand is constrained by its massive territory. That is why the full extent of Russia's expansion capacity is roughly the size of its territory. The goal of most Russian territorial expansion has been to acquire a warm water port, though over Russia's history it has not been successful. Looking at history the vast majority of Russian expansion has been tentative, though when Russia has seriously engaged in war the result is usually retreat or disaster. In general, Russian expansion faces a Sisyphean paradox: to avoid foreign attack and redress its weakness, Russia must expand; but the more it expands the more enemies it has and more power is consumed, leading once again to the beginning of the cycle.

At the advent of industrial civilization, China began to face new security challenges. From the South came Western countries and from the north came Russia, putting pressure on China from the 19th Century until the 1940s. Similar to Russia, China could secure its first baseline of territory; however this led to China splitting into several smaller countries during that period. The independence of Mongolia posed the greatest security threat to China, as it threatened Beijing and China's northeast. This later allowed Stalin to guarantee the security of the Siberian railway and was able to put Xinjiang and China's northeast under its control, possibly threatening to liberate both regions and give them independence. The reason for Stalin granting Mongolian independence was because China's ability to project its power geographically decreased from east to west, just as Russia's decreased from west to east. Therefore, when Russia is strong, the territory between Russia and China puts pressure on China, but when Russia is weak Central Asian countries like Mongolia will retreat, leaving a buffer zone. During the time of good relations between China and the Soviet Union and at the end of the Cold War, all of the current Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed a buffer zone.

Zhao Huasheng [赵华胜]

***“Assessing Sino-Russian-American Strategic Convergence in Central Asia [浅评中俄美三大战略在中亚的共处],**

International Review [国际观察], No. 1, 2014, pp. 96-109.

Thesis

Although US, Chinese, and Russian policies in Central Asia create competition, these countries are more likely to cooperate due to mutual interests.

¹² This is my direct translation of the Chinese name for the Sino-Indian war.

Main Arguments

The Russian, American, and Chinese policies for Central Asia are Russia's Eurasian Union, America's new Silk Road strategy, and China's Silk Road Economic Belt policy. The Eurasian Union is Russia's attempt to economically and politically reintegrate countries of the former Soviet Union which is a long term goal. America's New Silk Road initiative is aimed at improving Afghanistan by linking South Asia and Central Asia into a common market. The policy involves reducing barriers to trade and linking transportation and energy from South Asia to Central Asia. China's Silk Road Economic Belt is intended to connect member countries of the SCO in trade, transportation, currency, people, and policy. For Russia and China, the strategic value of Central Asia is as an extension of their existing policies, while the US's interests are linked to its involvement in the Afghanistan war. Common characteristics to each of these policies are that they are all focused on the Central Asian region and economic development there. However, there are more differences than similarities between the countries' policies. These differences include the regions covered and policy directions. Moreover, unlike the other two policies, the Eurasian Union started much earlier but still has a long way to go until it is complete.

Although there exists competition between the US, China, and Russia in Central Asia, they can peacefully coexist and achieve a limited level of cooperation. First, the functional and institutional natures of these policies are staggered and are advanced along different levels of interest. Second, each policy is only concerned with economic cooperation which removes a justification for opposition by the other two. For example, although some Russian's believe that the Silk Road Economic Belt is an obstacle to Russia's policy in the region, China has no reason or need to oppose Russia as it would hurt both countries. Moreover, China's policy is not solely focused on Central Asia, nor is it aimed at creating a free trade zone. Third, these three countries want to avoid conflict with one another, therefore they reduce competition out of self-interest. In the short term, Russia's Eurasian Union position is the most advantageous, however in the long term China's Silk Road Economic Belt policy will gradually surpass it. In conclusion, each country is likely to cooperate in the region with the other two because cooperation is mutually beneficial, it reduces obstacles to advancing each policy, and such an approach is beneficial for regional stability and development.