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[CN]Chapter 9

[CT]Canadian Involvement in the Middle East¹

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Historically, the Middle East has not ranked high as a Canadian foreign policy priority. In fact, throughout the Cold War, involvement in the region was moderate at best – with the majority of military involvement largely focused on peacekeeping. In this regard, not only did Canada play an instrumental role in Suez in 1956 – the United Nation’s (UN) first peacekeeping mission, but was a willing and active contributor of military forces to all six such missions involving Israel and the Arab states.

Continuing and growing turmoil in the region since the Cold War’s end nonetheless witnessed a rise in Canada’s military involvement within the region – and a marked expansion of such involvement to include combat operations. Not only has this included a peacekeeping role in missions such as Operation GLADIUS (the UN disengagement and observer force on the border between Israel and Syria), Operation CALUMET (the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula) and with the US security coordinator to build capacity in the Palestinian Authority Canadian forces known as Operation PROTEUS, but participation also in allied air campaigns against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War (1991), Libya (2011), sea-based counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf (Operation ARTEMIS),² and most recently, with Canada’s operations against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq (Operation IMPACT). Beyond this, Canada’s recently concluded military involvement in Afghanistan (2002–2014) stands as the longest combat mission that the Canadian forces have performed to date.

The shape of future Canadian military involvement in the region is more uncertain. Particularly at the time of this writing, the severity of the threat posed by Islamic State (IS) was

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not fully clear. It was not on the radar, so to speak. However, recent developments both at home and abroad suggest that Canada's highly active military role in the Middle East may still eschew certain forms of intervention and favour others. Faced with declining defence budgets, war-weariness on the parts of the government and Canadian public, and a growing focus on trade and foreign investment as central planks of Canadian foreign relations, the continuation of significant Canadian military involvement in the region may strike some as unlikely. And the fact that Canadian – and indeed North American – dependence on Middle Eastern oil is on the wane suggests that the region has less geo-political consequence.³ In short, both domestic constraints and changing international realities suggest that future Canadian military presence in the Middle East may be marginal, with little to do with what is actually happening on the ground, focused rather on maintaining relationships with allied states. The nature of Canada's and the West's response to IS suggests support for this reasoning. Significant numbers of combat troops on the ground have not been an option; rather, air strikes and special operations forces have been the tool of choice.

Yet while such forces may indeed prompt some lessening of Canada's *current* appetite for involvement in the region, any claim that possibilities for future Canadian military involvement are at an end, or that such involvement will likely be marginal would be premature. Indeed, this overstates the declining significance of the region to the West. It understates Canada's willingness to undertake commitments abroad – at times even in the face of seeming constraints on defence decision making and Canada's military capabilities. And it ignores the fact that military commitments need not be large to deliver significant benefits. In fact, elaborating these points suggests that while the Middle East may not stand out as a priority for

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future Canadian military involvement – the region *is no less likely* to represent the focus of Canadian military operations than will many other regions of the world.

[H1]The Middle East: Down but Not Out

While the Middle East has long been viewed as a region crucial to Western strategic interests, signs that it may be becoming less so have been on the rise. In areas such as trade and commerce, energy, and security, a number of developments indicate that the region may well fade somewhat as a major location of Western interest and involvement in the years ahead.

With regard to trade and commerce, opportunities within the region have generally been marginal, and show few signs of substantial improvement in the years ahead. Perhaps most notably, the importance of the region in terms of future opportunities for Western trade and commerce pales in comparison to those available in Asia and Latin America not to mention with the European Union (EU).⁴ On the energy front, recent discoveries of new oil resources in the Mediterranean and other regions – along with growing energy independence in North America as a result of new extraction technologies – indicate a marked decrease in global market reliance on Middle Eastern oil in future.⁵ Moreover, political stability within the region remains a concern. In this regard, growing challenges from regional powers and *rogue states* elsewhere (such as Russia, North Korea, or China), and a rise in extremism in Africa, not only suggest some relative decline in the region's threat potential vis-à-vis the West, but the need to focus attention elsewhere. So too does a growing shift in the focus of Muslim wars from anti-West to intra-Muslim conflicts.

Signs that such considerations are having some impact on Western thinking are already evident. US policies drastically scaling back troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the Obama administration's recent announcement of its intention to focus greater attention on the

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Asia – Pacific region in its future foreign relations are perhaps most noteworthy. And other nations – including Canada – have indicated an intent to pursue a similar course as well.⁶

Yet while suggestive, any claim that Western interests or military involvement in the region will fade *any time soon* would not be fully convincing. In fact, any such assertion is premature. Not only would this tend to exaggerate the region's decline but also the extent to which it will continue to generate significant impacts beyond it – including in Western Europe and North America. Recent events, including the Canadian announcement of Operation IMPACT (the deployment of forces against IS in Iraq) in September 2014, bear this out.

In the case of energy, while new finds and extraction technologies may have the *long-term* potential to rival or even sideline the key position of the Middle East as the major supplier of oil, their capacity to threaten the dominance of the region as a source of *high-quality* oil and gas in the *near term* remains marginal. Indeed, notwithstanding such developments, exports of Middle Eastern oil continue to exceed by far those of current as well as potential competitors both in quality and quantity and are likely to do so over the next decade. Nor are available supplies from elsewhere even remotely capable of meeting the growing energy demands of Asian and other booming economies.⁷ Beyond this, the economic and environmental viability of exploration and new extraction methods are far from assured. In the case of fracking, not only is the process technology intensive but runs serious environmental and ecological risks – risks that generate considerable public opposition and political controversy.⁸ Moreover, demand for oil-based products beyond just gas and heating oil remain. Plastics, in particular, will ensure some demand for oil in the coming decades even as new sources of energy capture come online. In short, with new sources of supply still unclear, near-term challenges to Middle East dominance as a crucial source of oil and gas for Western and rising economies in the developing world

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remain more latent than real. Accordingly, the significance of the region as a reliable (i.e., proven) energy source will continue to remain substantial for some time to come.

Meanwhile, the region is as unstable as ever. Old crises associated with the problem of fragile nation-states, and Israeli-Arab conflicts persist. And new dangers continue to emerge. With the Arab Spring giving way to an Arab Winter, instabilities have not only re-emerged but deepened – threatening a breakup in the so-called regional order. Authoritarianism is on a steady march. Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya are on the verge of collapse, monarchies in the Persian Gulf are ever-more repressive, and the Egyptian revolution has ended in military rule following a *coup d'état* against the Islamist government. Beyond this, prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace are ever-more remote.

These conflicts, most of them occurring by proxy, provide breeding grounds for radicalization and terrorism. Religious radicalism is of particular concern, as groups such as IS in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, Islamist militias in Libya, al Qaeda militants in Yemen and the Shia uprising in Bahrain pose growing threats to existing regimes as well as regional and even international stability.

In the case of IS – not only is the organization's regional influence growing but its presence in Western nations is as well. Arguably more dangerous than other extremist Islamist groups, IS is expansionist, highly motivated, well resourced, and well equipped to seize and hold territory. Moreover, its anti-Israeli and anti-Western ideology is well-known. Indeed, while the immediate agenda of IS aims at the elimination of Persian *Shia* influence in the Arab world, its stated long-term goal is the destruction of Israel and the fall of US Arab allies. So much so, that it has elicited a strong Western – as well as regional – response. Indeed, while a significant ground combat role has been avoided, such a response has included special operations forces

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and warplanes. . H. Christian Breede's chapter in this volume offers some insight in to the possible rationale surrounding the military means chosen. .

Beyond this lie lingering issues concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – with the recent use of chemical weapons in Syria, lingering state fragility in nuclear-armed Pakistan and Iran's nuclear ambitions all raising regional and international concerns over the future integrity of existing non-proliferation arrangements, as well as longer-term worries over prospects of a regional arms race, turmoil, and even war. Indeed, while progress in limiting Iran's nuclear program is undoubtedly possible, prospects for a successful and enduring agreement are not assured.¹⁰

The prospects for instability and conflict are legion, and potential impacts could be considerable – both within the region and elsewhere. In this regard, territory under IS control not only ensures greater local influence but offers new sanctuaries for training and the financing of operatives with an international agenda. The tide of Salafi purist extremism in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq (surrounding Saudi Arabia and sheikdoms) threatens Persian Gulf monarchies – and with them an area responsible for roughly 60 per cent of international oil exports. Meanwhile, perceptions of Iranian nuclear ambitions continue to raise dangers of an arms race, a regional war, and the loss of blood and treasure that any such war would involve.

The potential dangers to Western interests – including those of North America – could be significant. Not only could such dangers take the form of a disruption of energy flows due to inter- and intrastate regional conflict, but threats to nationals as well as to Western bases and intelligence assets within the region. Beyond this lie prospects of a flow of refugees, the infiltration of radical groups and ideologies into Western societies, and the possibility of armed attacks on Western soil (as witnessed in Ottawa 22 October 2014, in Paris 7 January 2015, and in

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Copenhagen 14 February 2015). Accordingly, both the need and the incentive for future Western involvement within the Middle East either in response to armed conflict or as a means of stabilizing the region and thereby reducing or preventing its occurrence remains considerable.

[H1]Canadian Military Involvement: The “Decade of Darkness” Revisited?

Given past practice, Canadian support for such operations is not out of character. As a strong advocate and defender of a predictable, rules-based international order, a faithful ally both within NATO and to Israel, and as a nation with a strong commitment to human rights and human security, Canada would undoubtedly retain some interest in the promotion of peace and stability throughout the region – on strategic and humanitarian grounds. In fact, Canadian military involvement within the region has been heavily predicated on such rationales – and has included Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) participation in a range of operations aimed at their realization (such as peacekeeping, stability and reconstruction, capacity building, anti-terrorism and combat operations).¹¹

Canada is a strong supporter of the Middle East peace process, an active participant in the multilateral process and a significant contributor to assistance programs in the region. Under Operation PROTEUS for instance, Canadian forces assist in capacity-building efforts in aid of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) under Task Force Jerusalem, a mission that helps the PASF develop logistics capabilities; supports the construction of security infrastructure for the Palestinian Authority; and facilitates co-operation between the Palestinian Authority and the Canadian government on issues that are not usually of military interest, such as borders and crossings, and movement and access.¹² Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) train and professionalize Palestinian police forces as part of PROTEUS and the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS).¹³ And under Operation

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ARTEMIS, the Royal Canadian Navy has engaged with twenty-nine other countries since 2001 in counterterrorism operations aimed at securing the Middle East's maritime environment by patrolling the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.¹⁴ In September 2014, Canada engaged with its allies as part of the Middle East Stabilization Force (MESF) with Operation IMPACT. This mission involves an air task force of six CF-188 multi-role fighter jets, two CP-140 Aurora surveillance planes, and a CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueller. The mission also includes special operations forces serving as advisors in Iraq along with a service-support systems in Kuwait for the Air Task Force. All told, some six hundred soldiers are serving in Kuwait, Iraq and in the skies over Syria as part of this mission.¹⁵

Still, the extent to which Canada would in fact have the will and the capacity to actively engage in future military missions within the region is another matter. After more than a decade of combat operations in Afghanistan, and in the wake of a global economic recession Ottawa's appetite for expeditionary operations is not strong. Nor – some might contend – is it likely that the Canadian public would offer any significant support for missions within this or in fact any other region in the near future.

Indeed, recent commentary suggests that Canada's military operation in Afghanistan has not only resulted in public disillusionment regarding the utility of the operation itself, but quite possibly in foreign intervention more generally. In essence, Afghanistan may well have ensured the creation of Canada's own version of the US "Vietnam syndrome," whereby Ottawa avoids any major military undertaking abroad altogether (barring any major military attacks on Canada or its allies). From this standpoint, while future Canadian governments might well offer diplomatic and *rhetorical* support for ongoing and future Western interventions, providing

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concrete contributions to military operations in the Middle East, beyond a handful of aircraft and advisors, may well be a bridge too far.

To be sure, such arguments and realities cannot be ignored, particularly in the current context. In this regard, not only is mission fatigue evident among political leaders and the public but in defence circles as well – with a number of Canadian military leaders expressing the need for a strategic pause given the high pace and tempo of operations over the past decade. Growing fiscal restraint has also been apparent, with some commentators claiming that the impacts of current government cuts to defence equal – if not exceed – those which occurred in the early to mid-1990s during the CAF’s so-called decade of darkness.¹⁶ As H. Christian Breede notes in this volume, the fiscal perfect storm of economic growth and budget surpluses has passed.

Yet the extent to which such factors serve to constrain military deployments should not be exaggerated. Public opinion generally has a limited impact on foreign policy decision making. This is especially so when a government enjoys a solid 38 to 41 per cent popular support and majority status. In fact, foreign- and defence-policy issues have rarely been decisive factors in Canadian electoral politics. Notably, if social fatigue was truly a major concern in decisions regarding Canadian military operations abroad, it is unlikely that Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan would have been extended beyond 2009. Yet circumstances surrounding passage of the motion in Parliament show little evidence of the government’s willingness to abort the mission or, for that matter, of a united “no” vote from opposition parties. However, recent evidence suggests¹⁷ that Canadians in general, and the Conservative government in particular, did in fact tire of the war eventually.

In short, and notwithstanding public opinion, general fatigue, or party politics, domestic political considerations may take a back seat in favour of international commitments when it

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comes to Canada's decisions on international operations – a fact made abundantly clear by Canada's actions following its stated decision to forgo participation in the US-led military operations in Iraq. Indeed, as Benjamin Zyla and Joel Sokolsky note

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in spite of Chrétien's "no," Canada indirectly supported the US by sending thirty-one exchange officers to serve with American and British ground forces....

Canadian ships sailed to the Persian Gulf in support of enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq. Ironically, despite Ottawa's loud protestations that it was unwilling to join the "coalition of willing," Canada made a larger contribution than some who did join.¹⁸

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Nor is there much evidence indicating that the challenges encountered in past missions serve to deter Ottawa's willingness to undertake future military operations. Notably, Canada's participation in Afghanistan occurred despite considerable evidence from CAF experiences in the Balkans and from the US-led intervention in Iraq that nation building was no easy task. Subsequent Canadian participation in NATO's Libya operation and the US-led coalition against IS occurred despite the challenges of Afghanistan.

As for the constraining effect of declining budgets, evidence is weak. While fiscal austerity has undoubtedly impacted the level (and quality) of capabilities available for missions undertaken in the past, there is little evidence indicating that tight budgets have significantly constrained governments from committing Canadian forces to participate in such missions when such commitments were viewed as necessary. Indeed, available data actually indicate a negative correlation between major military operations undertaken by Canada and the size of Canada's

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defence budget (as a percentage of gross domestic product [GDP]) – with the bulk of Canadian operations occurring during the CAFs “decade of darkness” (the very period in which defence budgets were at their lowest). As Christian Leuprecht and Joel Sokolsky argue in this volume, not only did Canada contribute more troops and resources to missions during this period than a number of other NATO countries, but it devoted more resources to military missions abroad than it had in earlier periods when defence budgets were more favourable.

Admittedly, it may still be argued that such contributions were generally modest in terms of sheer numbers of forces involved. Yet judging the significance of military contributions based on numbers alone can be unwise. Not only does such a view undermine the precise nature and quality of support provided, but says little concerning the specific objectives of the missions themselves. In this regard, contributions aimed at host-nation capacity building so as to reduce prospects of conflict occurring may be highly effective yet relatively modest in comparison to those devoted to combat operations employed in a losing cause.

In short, and notwithstanding the fact that such forces will undoubtedly condition future Canadian military operations, they are unlikely to fully determine their location, their conduct or their importance. In the final analysis, while public opinion, past challenges, and cost considerations may play some role in determining the extent to which the CAF will be used abroad, it is likely that Canada’s willingness to undertake future military operations – not only in the Middle East but elsewhere – will be determined primarily by the specifics of the situations encountered as well as the context in which they arise. As always, fiscal realities may curtail the extent of involvement, but not necessarily involvement itself.

To the extent that this is the case, the prospects for future Canadian participation in military operations in the Middle East cannot be discounted. At the very least, Canadian

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participation in military operations within the region would appear *no less* likely than CAF participation in expeditionary operations elsewhere. And the fact that the region continues to be a source of concern internationally can only heighten such possibilities.

[H1]Canada's Future Involvement: Some Possibilities

In fact, as it currently stands, ongoing trends indicate that prospects for instability and armed conflict in the Middle East will remain substantial. A civil war in Bahrain, a takeover of power in Pakistan by Wahhabi extremists,¹⁹ or a failure to constrain Iran's nuclear capability suggest just some of the possibilities. And in view of the fact that the security and economic implications of the region both for the West as well as other nations continue to be inextricably linked, the potential for Western military involvement in the region will likely remain alive for some time to come.

Given Canada's standing as a faithful ally to the United States, NATO, and to Israel, as well as its commitment to human security and a stable, rules-based international order, Western involvement in the region could well include Canada. The fact that Canada's economic interests in the region are growing (most notably in the Gulf States) only heightens such possibilities.²⁰

The precise purpose and form of future Canadian military operations within the region remains unclear; however, given current and near future realities, a continuation of missions akin to those currently underway is likely. To this end, Canada would focus on offering military contributions to peacekeeping and peacemaking/building operations within the region. It will continue to play a supporting role in capacity-building efforts (such as military training, support for developing better governance in whole of government-type operations, and stabilization and reconstruction). And it will also be on call to offer humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in

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the event that the wide range of demographic, environmental, and social pressures, which will continue to plague the region, lead to humanitarian crisis.²¹

Notable as well is the prospect that future missions may well be more complex than those undertaken during earlier periods – particularly in light of ongoing changes in the political, social and economic character of the region and the expanded range of actors and issues that such missions will have to take into account (such as the rise in number and importance of non-state actors). They will require an ability to effectively practice a more comprehensive approach to operations.²² And, they may also require that military interventions undertaken are more robust. Indeed, given existing threats within the region, they may well involve the possibility for *some* armed combat, but likely not on the scale witnessed in Afghanistan.

To the extent that Ottawa has the ability to choose its role, involvement in combat operations will likely remain strictly limited. Far better – and less costly – will be to engage in efforts geared toward easing tensions within the region and strengthening governance and civil society than to engage in armed conflict. However, should major armed conflict occur once again – and key Canadian allies are involved – it is possible that Canada may be compelled to contribute in a combat capacity. As noted, potential scenarios leading to such conflict are plentiful and Western stakes in the region remain high. In such a case, while the preferred – and indeed likely – Canadian contribution may be relatively modest in size and duration, particularly when compared to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the significance of the region, the logic of armed conflict, and Canada’s role as ally may make a combat role hard to avoid.²³

[H1]Conclusion

Accurately predicting the future course of events is clearly difficult, if not impossible.

Nevertheless, careful examination of past history and ongoing trends does allow one to make

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some reasonably educated generalizations concerning the broad contours of future developments. In the case of the Middle East and Canada's future military role, examination of the region itself as well as Canada's past record of expeditionary operations yields several observations.

First, while certain trends suggest that the strategic importance of the Middle East to the West may indeed be lessening, such decline must not be exaggerated. Notwithstanding recent developments in the fields of energy exploration and extraction technologies, the region is likely to retain its importance as a proven and reliable source of high-quality oil for the near future. This, along with its status as home to key Western allies and its continued potential to generate instability and armed conflict – within the region itself and elsewhere – will continue to ensure its place as an important security concern for some time to come. Accordingly, not only are future Western security operations within the region possible, they are also likely.

Second, the extent to which Canada will lend its military forces to support such efforts in future is admittedly unclear. Yet as we have argued, any suggestion that participation in future military operations in the Middle East will *not* occur is not convincing. Not only does such a claim fly in the face of clear and varied Canadian military contributions to the region in the past, but also to the fact that Canada maintains recurring and current missions in the Golan Heights, the Sinai, and Palestine. Beyond this, it ignores the fact that conditions within the region continue to require concerted efforts aimed at fostering peace and stability among its inhabitants. Viewed from this perspective, the region *is no less likely* to prompt Canadian interest and participation in military operations than many others.

Third and finally, fiscal realities, lessons derived from past military missions and general war-weariness within the nation itself may well work to constrain somewhat the size and character of any future Canadian military operations within the region – particularly in the near

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term and particularly in terms of ground combat. Yet such factors are unlikely to prevent the conduct of such operations should the Canadian government judge them as necessary. Perhaps most importantly, such forces would not necessarily preclude Canada from making an effective, meaningful contribution to peace and stability in what will doubtless continue to be a significant and still highly volatile region in the years ahead.

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[H1]Notes

1. For the purposes of this chapter the term is used in a broad sense to cover those nations associated with the “Greater” or “New” Middle East. Defined as the region stretching from Pakistan-Afghanistan to North Africa, the term *Greater Middle East* reflects the notable degree of homogeneity in politics and history present within the region itself – a fact that works to ensure that developments in one area have clear and often significant impacts elsewhere.

2. See National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Current Operations,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/index.page>

3. Notably, Canada has moved from an oil-importing country to an exporting one and therefore does not rely on Middle East markets for energy provisions. According to Gordon Laxer for instance, “Canada produces 3.23 million barrels/day of oil and consumes 1.8 million barrels daily.” Gordon Laxer, “Superpower, Middle Power or Satellite? Canadian Energy and Environmental Policy,” in *Canada’s Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, eds. Nick Hynek and David Bosold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 157.

4. In fact, Canada, like the United States, has already shifted the focus of its foreign policy and trade from Africa and the Middle East to Asia and South America. See Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Canada, last modified 11 September 2015, accessed 13 August 2014, “Global Markets Action Plan,” www.international.gc.ca/global-markets-marches-mondiaux/index.aspx?lang=eng.

5. According to Edward L. Morse, global head of commodities research at Citi, the shale revolution in oil and gas promises “a paradigm shift in thinking about hydrocarbons.” Indeed, he notes that US adoption of such technologies has resulted in a 60 per cent increase in oil

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production since 2008, climbing from 3 million barrels a day to more than 8 million barrels a day, and that the United States will exceed its old record of 10 million barrels a day in a couple of years. By that point, Morse argues that the United States will overtake Russia and Saudi Arabia to become the world's largest oil producer. See Edward L. Morse, "Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next Shale," *Foreign Affairs*, 93, no. 3, (May–June 2014): 3–7.

6. As an example, see James Manicom, "Canada's Role in the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Prospects for Cooperation," *Asia Policy* 18, (2014): 111–30.

7. Beyond this lies the fact that excessive reliance on particular energy suppliers often carries risks – a fact underlined in the recent Russia-NATO conflict over Ukraine and Europe's growing sense of vulnerability to energy coercion given its dependence on Russian oil and gas.

8. See Fred Krupp, "Don't Just Drill Baby – Drill Carefully: How to Make Fracking Safer for the Environment," *Foreign Affairs*, 93, no. 3. (May–June 2014): 15– 20.

9. Thus far, IS recruits for the civil war in Syria have been considerable – exceeding by far those joining the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s. The number of jihadists from Europe and North America is estimated at 3,000 and 100 respectively. Also operating in Iraq, IS has 10,000 fighters of whom 500 are from the United Kingdom. Like the Afghan case, the return of these lonely veterans to their European home countries is likely to raise a host of security issues.

10. For a balanced examination of the key issues, see Robert Einhorn, "Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Former American Negotiator Outlines the Battleground Issues," *Brookings Review*, August 2015, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/08/iran-nuclear-deal-battleground-issues-einhorn>

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11. Notably, some view recent Canadian security policy – both within this region and elsewhere – as reflective of a more realist, hard-power orientation; a fact owing much to the 11 September 2001 terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center and events surrounding it. According to Patrick James for instance, such events have worked to generate a fundamental shift in Canada’s security orientation – in effect moving Ottawa away from a predominantly liberal-internationalist security stance emphasizing soft power toward one far more firmly grounded in hard-nosed *realpolitik* and national interest. Once considered a “peacekeeping nation” Canada post 9/11 has become a country far more willing and able to use force and engage in armed combat in pursuit of its goals. Such assertions gain support not only given Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan but also in its growing commitment to a range of border security and continental defence initiatives with the United States, its steady upgrading of the military capability of the Canadian Forces, its increasingly assertive stance on Arctic sovereignty and security, and its active involvement with other NATO allies in the bombing and eventual overthrow of the Gadhafi regime in Libya. See Patrick James, *Canada and Conflict*, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press; 2012).

12. For a complete description see National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation PROTEUS,” last modified 27 November 2014, accessed 12 August 2014,

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-proteus.page>.

13. One can see the description of those operations on the RCMP and the National Defence websites. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Current Operations,” last modified 17 July 2015, accessed 12 August 2014, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/missions-curr-cour-eng.htm>; and National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation PROTEUS,” last modified 27

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November 2014, accessed 12 August 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-proteus.page>.

14. See National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation ARTEMIS,” last modified 21 May 2015, accessed 12 August 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-artemis.page>, and “Operation PROTEUS,” last modified 27 November 2014, accessed 12 August 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-proteus.page>.

15. See National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation IMPACT,” last modified 24 August 2015, accessed 28 October 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page>.

16. According to Michael Byers, while the Liberal government under Jean Chrétien reduced defence spending to 1.2 per cent of GDP following the Cold War’s end, current defence spending under the Harper government stands at 1 per cent of GDP – a level roughly equivalent to that of Belgium, Latvia, and Slovakia. See Michael Byers, “The Harper Plan for Unilateral Canadian Disarmament,” *National Post*, 8 July 2014, <http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/07/08/michael-byers-the-harper-plan-for-unilateral-canadian-disarmament/>.

17. H.C. Breede, “Defining Success: Canada in Afghanistan 2006–2014,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 44, no.4 (2014): 483–501.

18. Benjamin Zyla and Joel J. Sokolsky, “Canada in the Atlantic Alliance in the post–Cold War Era: More NATO than NATO,” in *Canada’s Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, eds. Nick Hynek and David Bosold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 244.

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19. For example, Ahmad Rasheed, a leading expert on Pakistan, maintains that short of difficult, necessary, and quick changes in the army, Pakistan may well slip into chaos in the years ahead. See Ahmad Rasheed, review of *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*, by Carlotta Gall, *New York Review of Books*, 5 June 2014, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jun/05/pakistan-worse-than-we-knew/>.

20. Bessma Momani, Pdraig Landy, and Agata Antkiewicz, “Canada’s Economic Interests in the Middle East,” Canadian-Arab Institute, policy brief, April 2013, <http://www.canadianarabinstitute.org/publications/policy-briefs/canadas-economic-interests-middle-east/>.

21. Other contributors to this book emphasize that Canadian participation in humanitarian operations may well be a growing trend. As Rachel Lea Heide maintains, humanitarian operations will be a significant part of future CAF international engagements. In this regard, both predictable and unforeseeable forces (such as climate change, resource scarcity, unstable geography) and social disasters (such as intrastate clashes, demographic pressures, and the failure of urban structures) may work to trigger Canadian responses.

22. For a survey of Canadian thought on the comprehensive approach, see Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, eds., *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspective on the Comprehensive Approach*, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011).

23. Canada’s recent mission against Islamic State (IS) offers a particularly salient case in point. The mission also illustrates that war fatigue on the part of the Canadian public may be less enduring than often assumed. In an exclusive *Global News/Ipsos Reid* poll, 73 per cent of respondents said they strongly (31 per cent) or somewhat (41 per cent) agree that “everything possible” needs to be done to stop IS from establishing its self-declared caliphate – and that

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includes putting Canadian boots on the ground. See Nick Logan, “Majority of Canadians Support Use of Troops to Stop ISIS: Poll,” *Global News*, 31 December 2014,

[http://globalnews.ca/news/1750470/majority-of-canadians-support-use-of-troops-to-stop-isis-](http://globalnews.ca/news/1750470/majority-of-canadians-support-use-of-troops-to-stop-isis-poll/)

[poll/](http://globalnews.ca/news/1750470/majority-of-canadians-support-use-of-troops-to-stop-isis-poll/). Other polls report that a majority of Canadians not only favoured extending the mission but

widening it to Syria should circumstances warrant. See, Nick Logan, “Majority of Canadians

Favour Extending Anti-ISIS Mission: Poll,” *Global News*, 23 March 2015,

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