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Military Ethics and the Comprehensive Approach: Some Preliminary Observations¹

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INTRODUCTION

The need to practice a more coherent, holistic, and collaborative approach to the challenges of governance and security operations is becoming ever more recognized both in Canada and elsewhere. Numerous officials in Canada and a number of other states (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, and other NATO allies) are increasingly calling for the adoption of a more “Comprehensive Approach” (CA) to operations. Such an approach would see diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources aligned with those of non-governmental organizations, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and applied in areas of operations as needed. The result would be more effective responses to the security challenges confronted.

Thus far, advocates of the approach have largely focused on the practical benefits it promises – with emphasis placed on its capacity to aid in achieving mission goals in a complex and often multifaceted security environment. Yet, one area that has generally been neglected lies in the realm of military ethics. More precisely, little academic attention has been devoted to the potential opportunities and challenges that militaries may confront as they move to adopt and effectively implement (practice) a more collaborative, comprehensive approach to operations. Such neglect is unfortunate. Many

of the practical challenges inherent in practising a CA often have ethical implications. More importantly, ethical decision-making not only represents a key component of the military profession, but is central to ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of military operations. As such, neglect of the ethical implications which a CA raises may well work to shortchange, if not undermine, the promise of the approach itself.

This chapter explores a number of these issues within the context of the Canadian military experience. Following a brief outline of the basic premises informing the CA, it identifies a number of potential implications that the approach raises for the practice of ethical decision-making – both in general and with reference to military operations. It then concludes with a discussion of those steps required to more fully ensure military practice of a comprehensive approach that is both ethically sound and, at the same time, operationally effective.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: KEY ELEMENTS

The meaning ascribed to the term ‘CA’ varies.² While some see the approach as a means of interacting with a myriad of national and international entities to resolve security challenges, others have used the term primarily to refer to whole-government and/or inter-agency coordination. Still others have loosely employed it to refer to simple coordination mechanisms at the tactical level of operations.³

In general, however, a CA calls for bringing previously separate agencies into closer collaboration in achieving policy objectives. It entails developing a capacity to interact with such organizations and agencies in a cooperative, constructive manner, thus creating a competency that cuts across departments and dispenses with “stove-pipes.” In fact, the idea has roots in the private-sector management theory of re-engineering, and aims at streamlining processes from input to output in order to maximize efficiency and remove overlap and duplication. Such re-engineering seeks to create an end-to-end cross-departmental process, leading to an organization that runs more smoothly and efficiently.⁴

From a Canadian Armed Forces standpoint, such an approach involves:

- The adoption of a ‘team’ approach to develop an integrated campaign plan in order to realize its operational and strategic objectives in full-spectrum operations;

- The willingness to consider second- and third-order effects in its planning process;
- The ability to immediately plug into joint battle space operating systems to cooperate effectively;
- The ability to facilitate the building of inter-agency and multinational interoperability through collaborative planning mechanisms and protocols;
- The ability to connect non-governmental agencies with CAF operational architecture, and to act as a liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission;
- The ability to implement effective communication with joint and other multinational agencies (this would also include the ability to provide an efficient interface between conventional and special forces);
- The capacity to access key information in an efficient timely manner – so as to identify targets for attack and influence as well as determine the joint, inter-agency, multinational, and public resources required in operations; and
- The ability to clearly and effectively communicate mission goals, objectives, and actions to the public and members of the media *as required*.

With all actions based on agreed-upon principles and collaborative, cooperative processes, greater organizational efficiencies could be obtained, and traditional organizational “stovepipes” overcome through enhanced synergies. Information sharing between organizations would potentially be enhanced. Strategic framing of issues and campaign planning could be improved. Furthermore, the approach could well generate a greater degree of organizational awareness, interaction, integration, and coherence when addressing security threats. The overall results would be more effective responses to the security threats and challenges confronted.

THE “PROMISE” OF ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

In fact, the approach has implications for decision-making not only in the security realm but in the field of ethics as well. As Peter Bradley notes, decisions have ethical implications if the choices available to a decision-maker possess the potential to harm or benefit people. Ethical decisions are those that lead to moral outcomes, satisfy the moral and professional obligations owed to stakeholders, and follow

from moral motives rather than self-interest or non-moral influences.⁵ The prospects that decisions having ethical implications will arise during military operations are clearly legion. Therefore, the ethical aspects of decision-making are important. In a world in which the legitimacy of one's actions is often the vital ground for both domestic and international support for policy, and in which decisions arrived at can have life and death consequences⁶ (for both stakeholders and others), ethical behaviour clearly matters. Moreover, ethics and subscription to a code of ethical conduct go to the heart of the military identity – representing, in effect, a key component of military professionalism. As American ethicist and theologian H. Richard Niebuhr notes, “[t]he first question of ethics is not what should I do but rather what is going on?”⁷

In this regard, the very nature of a CA may work to more fully facilitate sound ethical decision-making in a variety of ways. In fact, it may work not only to help ensure more ethical outcomes, but also to create more ethically informed decision-makers. By increasing the capacity of militaries to more effectively interact with a host of other entities in an area of operations, including many individuals and organizations with their own unique skill sets and areas of expertise, a CA would facilitate increased awareness, and potentially better understanding, of both the operating environment and the players within it. Indeed, it would increase the character, amount, and quality of information upon which decisions could be based. As such, effective practice of a CA could raise the capacity of those practising it to gain a richer, more complete picture of “what is going on” – militarily, socially, culturally, economically, and/or politically – in an area of operations.

The fact that decision-making in a CA would often occur in contexts in which decision-makers and their actions would be under increased scrutiny – simply by virtue of the number of organizations and/or other entities involved at various points in the decision-making process – could serve as an additional support to ethical practice. By increasing the potential for the articulation and consideration of a range of ideas and viewpoints, both within the CAF and beyond it (through the involvement of other government departments, NGOs, private volunteer organizations, etc.), courses of action, key goals, and objectives may be more fully vetted, debated, monitored, and more consciously adjusted to ensure that the decisions arrived at and actions taken are not only operationally effective, but more ethically

informed. Beyond this, and assuming that conduct of a CA were to eventually become an integral – and fully institutionalized – component of the policy-making process (i.e. informing not only the application of policy but its formulation as well), this could improve the chances that a number of key ethical issues would be considered and addressed well before any operational deployment took place. In turn, it would reduce the chances for a number of ethical dilemmas and challenges to arise during conduct of the operation or mission itself. At the very least, this would more fully ensure that decision-makers are better prepared to address such challenges if and when they are encountered.

In time, the approach could even play an important role in the ethical education and training of officers – most notably through the cataloguing and use of events from past operations that involve ethical dilemmas and challenges. Once recorded, such incidents could be used as teaching tools through which to convey key ethical issues, principles, and examples of past ethical best practice (i.e. lessons learned). They may even serve as a base upon which to develop scenarios involving key ethical dilemmas for critical discussion and analysis.⁸ The result could well be a greater sensitivity to and appreciation of the ethical problems likely to arise in operations among those involved.

ETHICAL CHALLENGES / ETHICAL DANGERS

Nevertheless, ensuring that a CA in fact meets its full potential is by no means certain. Effective practice of such an approach is not simple. Interaction with a range of players, diverse perspectives, and new and varied sources of information can also complicate the decision-making process – raising as many challenges as it can potentially help address.

Developing the capacity to work with a range of organizations, each with its own culture, mindset, agendas, and goals, is no easy task. Such efforts often confront issues of cultural and professional bias, problems of information sharing, and constraints stemming from resource asymmetries between organizations. Absent effective practices and procedures capable of surmounting obstacles – such as communication between the multitude of players each with its own culture, mandate, and goals – which such an approach encourages, implementing a CA may not only be difficult, but could lead

to ethical confusion or even paralysis as decision-makers wrestle with the often divergent viewpoints and perspectives that its practice can yield. In fact, rather than serving as an aid to ethical decision-making, the CA could result in a disunity of effort that would ultimately be self-defeating.

The ethical issues that can arise in the practice of a CA and the challenges they can raise for decision-makers are too numerous to be fully identified and examined here. No two military operations are identical and the circumstances giving rise to ethical issues are limitless. That said, a number of general examples are noteworthy in highlighting some of the key challenges that may arise. In fact, the very practice and institutionalization of the approach itself would tend to ensure that the issues and challenges these examples raise would likely be encountered by those practising it.

SELECT EXAMPLES

Ethics and Information Sharing

The practice of a CA is strongly premised on the likelihood, importance, and advantages of information sharing between parties. In a world in which security challenges are often multi-dimensional, the capacity to access information and analysis from a variety of sources – many with unique perspectives and areas of expertise – should help ensure more informed decision-making.

Certainly, over-classification of information can raise ethical dilemmas. In a collaborative environment, it can place CA partners at increased risk in the field. In conflict-torn regions such as Afghanistan, for instance, military dissemination of knowledge regarding locals suspected of possessing insurgent ties or taking part in other nefarious practices is often highly restricted. However, such information could well be crucial to civilian partners engaging in efforts to cultivate relations with local tribal leaders.⁹ In such cases, constraints on information sharing may work to deny key players vital knowledge of potential risks and threats, reducing both their capacity to make informed decisions and, potentially, the security of both themselves and those they seek to influence.

Greater information sharing in military operations can nevertheless raise fundamental ethical questions. Military provision of information to NGOs and indigenous groups warning of impending military action or enemy attack offers a case in point. While such actions

might reflect sound ethical practice in certain cases, the possibility of such conduct working to increase the chance of information leaks could clearly produce a less ethically satisfying result.

As but one example, NATO cooperation with Pakistan, a supposed ally in the War on Terror, resulted in information leaks and the promulgation of disinformation in the early days of war against the Taliban. Blamed on low-ranking Taliban sympathizers in the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence, this resulted in numerous tactical challenges, including an incident in which US helicopters were subject to small-arms fire at the Dalbandin air base in Baluchistan.¹⁰ By fighting a war out of Pakistan at the time, a task that required some information sharing with Pakistani authorities, the US found itself in the line of a strange variant of friendly fire. Were such information leaks to result in enemy attack and heavy casualties among soldiers, allies, and key partners, the outcome could well be even more counterproductive both strategically *and* ethically.

In short, rather than always facilitating ethical decision-making, the very character and practice of a CA could see ethical challenges multiply. Indeed, in a decision-making environment featuring multiple players and more agendas, fundamental ethical questions concerning not only what information should be shared, but when and with whom, may increase. Moreover, the capacity of decision-makers to effectively resolve such dilemmas may come under excessive strain.

Ethics of Association

Ethical challenges can also be encountered in a number of instances involving military association with other players. While on the whole encouraged under a CA, close association with certain groups within an area of operations may not only compromise the utility and effectiveness of such groups, but place them at increased risk of harm.

The experience of NGOs with a humanitarian focus bears out this point. While soldiers performing regular patrols in zones of conflict may have sources of information for aid workers on those sectors in which assistance is especially needed or in which specific community complaints have been raised, NGO receipt of such information is not always welcomed. Indeed, reliance on data provided by the military may run counter to NGOs' independence and to their neutrality in conducting their tasks.¹¹ The results may be ethically counterproductive – both for the NGOs themselves and for the local populations they seek to assist. Such associations may taint NGOs' relations

with populations to a point where those in need come to associate all humanitarian aid with armed soldiers and thereby avoid approaching any NGO for assistance for fear of retribution from enemy combatants. They may also increase danger to humanitarian workers themselves – heightening risks that aid workers may be perceived as supporting military operations.¹²

Such possibilities appear well-founded. In Afghanistan, for example, reports indicate that armed insurgents have attacked aid workers despite their neutrality, as a tactic aimed at preventing development and increasing fear on all sides.¹³ In fact, these problems and the rising dangers to NGO personnel resulting from them led to the temporary withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières from Afghanistan in 2004. The group articulated the reason behind the withdrawal when they criticized the American-led coalition force of using “troops to provide relief aid, confusing needed assistance with military and political objectives, [a] policy which blurs the lines between relief and military activity, [and] endanger[s] the lives of aid workers.”¹⁴

Furthermore, such ethical challenges may not be solely confined to interacting with NGOs. Missions where coalition forces assist host nation officials may require military personnel to associate with officials who have less than reputable pasts, or who are accused of engaging in unethical behaviour. This may confront commanders, and individual soldiers, with issues of how to engage such officials to achieve mission objectives while at the same time not rewarding undesirable practices. At times, the course followed has been less than ethically satisfying. US military engagement with warlords in Afghanistan offers a case in point. A United States Senate Armed Services Committee inquiry uncovered evidence of cases where warlords associated with the private military company known as ArmorGroup worked with the Taliban, sold opium, and participated in activities that challenged coalition forces. According to the Committee’s report, “warlords associated with ArmorGroup’s security operations at Shindand engaged in murder, bribery, and anti-coalition activities ... Guards employed by ArmorGroup used drugs, threatened to attack Afghan Ministry of Defense personnel, attempted to leave their posts to seek revenge for an attack on the warlord to whom they were loyal, and knowingly provided sensitive security information to a Taliban-affiliated warlord.”¹⁵

Such experiences underscore the fact that, while a CA is in part premised on the importance of engaging with other organizations to

achieve more effective solutions to security issues, it confronts practitioners with the need to carefully weigh the ethical issues involved in any such engagement. In this regard, issues concerning the potential dangers of such association – both to organizational credibility and to the well-being of personnel – must be assessed against potential military benefits. So, too, must actions that may inadvertently serve to compromise such actors even further (e.g. military distribution of aid to indigenous groups in operational environments in which humanitarian organizations are known to perform a similar function).

Ethics of Employment and Appropriate Tasks

Ethical challenges are also likely to surround questions regarding the employment of military capabilities in operations involving a CA. Typical might be questions arising when choosing between the use of military resources for protecting NGO personnel vice their retention for other operations. However, the use of military capabilities *explicitly designed and intended* for more effective practice of a comprehensive approach may also create ethical challenges. The emerging capability known as Religious Leader Engagement offers a noteworthy case in point. Currently under development by the Canadian Army, RLE involves the use of military chaplains as a means of facilitating dialogue between indigenous faith-based leaders and groups in war-torn societies. Indeed, it promises to contribute to dialogue and relationship-building in societies where issues of religion are a key element of the culture.¹⁶ Moreover, it eschews intelligence-gathering and the conduct of influence activity in support of military operations, largely so as not to taint the enterprise or place participants in harm's way. As such, its very nature reflects an acute sensitivity to the ethics of operating in conflict zones.

Even here, however, the ethical challenges surrounding employment may well be considerable. On the one hand, while the approach rejects both intelligence-gathering and influence activity as legitimate RLE activities, its conduct can easily be misinterpreted or misperceived as such.¹⁷ Indeed, notions of what constitutes influence activity, while perhaps clear to Western militaries, may be far less so among indigenous groups in war-torn societies and failing states. On the other hand, even if misinterpretation is avoided, intentional distortion of RLE's true purpose cannot be ruled out. In societies

ravaged by conflict, for instance, the enemy clearly gets a vote and can often wield considerable influence. In view of this, the ethical challenges confronting commanding officers as well as chaplains charged with the task of RLE can be considerable. Employed improperly or without careful consideration of how such engagement may be perceived, RLE may compromise the noncombatant immunity of chaplains as well as the safety and security of those indigenous religious leaders and groups involved in the enterprise. Rather than being a positive step toward conflict resolution, employment of RLE may make matters worse.

The military is not the only organization that risks raising such ethical issues. At times, civilian bureaucrats employ tactics and equipment mirroring those of the military when operating under a CA. For example, the United States sent its Drug Enforcement Agency's Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Teams to Afghanistan to assist in drug interdiction operations. On cursory examination, these civilian bureaucrats behave and function much like military units, distorting their standing under the Law of Armed Conflict and thus threatening to erode their rights and protections under the LOAC.

MAXIMIZING BENEFITS / MINIMIZING RISK

Certainly, few of the ethical benefits and challenges outlined above – or the many others that could presumably arise – are likely to be exclusive to military operations taking place within a CA context. Missions involving irregular warfare, counter-insurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction are – by their very nature – complex and ethically charged.¹⁸ That said, the strong emphasis which pursuit of such an approach places on regularized and active interactions with a range of groups *does* suggest that such opportunities and challenges are more prone to arise in the context of CA practice than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, the fact that the approach has gained currency among an ever wider range of allied nations and international organizations can only further underline the likelihood of such occurrences.

Accordingly, efforts aimed at maximizing the CA's potential benefits for ethical decision-making and minimizing its dangers and challenges are ever more essential. In this regard, improvement of CA processes, practices, and procedure is imperative. Without a sound decision-making process, the risks of information overload, misinformation,

political gridlock, and decision paralysis may well linger and increase, as will the problems that these obstacles can produce for effective and ethically sound decision-making.

At the same time, further development of the CA must occur *in tandem* with a sound programme of ethical training and education. No decision-making process, however well developed, can fully escape the fact that, ultimately, the ethical character of decisions made depends heavily on the degree of ethical grounding that those utilizing it bring to the table beforehand, as well as their skill and capacity to apply such knowledge when needed. Simply put, general solutions must involve *both* further development of the CA itself and continued ethical training and education of military personnel and their likely partners in CA operations. Both are needed to help ensure that conduct of operations is efficient, effective, *and* ethically sound.

ONGOING INITIATIVES

Notably, efforts in each of these areas are underway. With regard to the CA, recent years have witnessed a flurry of activity aimed not only at endorsement of CA philosophy, but at further development of CA-type processes, practices, and procedures.

For instance, the study *Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations* – a work jointly commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency – has served to underline the need for organizations and agencies to work more regularly across organizational lines when involved in such missions.¹⁹ The creation of mechanisms such as the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force Advisory Board (at DFAIT) and the inter-departmental working group of the Chief of Force Development (within the Department of National Defence) have been similarly useful for CA development – with the former working to ensure greater collaboration and engagement in further conceptual development of the CA and supporting concepts, and the latter advocating greater inter-agency coordination in missions involving crisis-ridden, fragile states.

Training exercises involving inter-agency participation, such as the Maple Guardian series in support of Canada's mission in Afghanistan as well as the Arctic-focused Operation Nanook, have provided the Canadian military – along with their inter-agency partners – with enhanced opportunities for developing the skill sets necessary for

working effectively in an inter-agency context. The most recent edition of the Army Leadership Training Manual stresses the importance of the concept and the need for Army commanders to work toward its effective practice.²⁰ Furthermore, research in areas such as inter-organizational trust-building and trust repair at DRDC Toronto is currently underway to help improve inter-agency collaboration in a CA context.²¹

Meanwhile, the Army Ethics Programme has endeavoured to offer additional guidance for ethical conduct and practise through its capstone doctrinal publication, *Duty with Discernment: CLS Guidance on Ethics in Operations*, with stated goals of “inculcating ethical awareness, reasoning, actions and leadership” in Canada’s soldiers.²² The AEP calls for all Army units to have an Ethics Plan (based on an ethical risk assessment) as well as a Unit Ethics Coordinator, and features enhanced ethics training – including the use of case study scenarios – for enhancing ethical awareness and skills among the troops.

FUTURE INITIATIVES

All such efforts aim to improve ethical decision-making in military operations. Such initiatives are aimed at further development of the CA, promising to help facilitate the creation of an environment more conducive to making ethically informed decisions on the one hand, while the development of ethical codes of conduct and training programs offers the prospect of ensuring a more ethically astute and aware soldier on the other.

Consideration might be given to the development of a more targeted “lessons learned” process – focussing *both* on the functioning of the CA as well as the ethical issues raised during the course of operations taking place within a CA context. As mentioned earlier, such an approach could facilitate the ethical education and training of leaders – serving as a catalogue of ethical dilemmas and challenges encountered in past operations and thus as a means through which to establish standards of best ethical practice. Through such study, participants could well develop greater sensitivity and appreciation of the ethical problems likely to arise in operations.

More proactive command involvement and mentoring in ethics could also yield benefits. Evidence indicates that loyalty to one’s primary group can, at times, override ethical requirements and considerations.²³ Active command engagement with troops on ethical issues

that may arise during the course of their service may provide a potentially useful means of altering such realities.

Beyond this, initiatives aimed at extending the practice of the CA to include policy formulation as well as operations in the field also demand serious consideration. Not only would a more institutionalized and broadly based CA likely improve decision-making generally, but it would improve the prospects for enhanced ethical practice as well. More specifically, it would allow policy-makers and military officers greater opportunity to carefully consider potential ethical issues that could arise well before any operational deployment occurs. This could help to ensure that potential dilemmas may be better anticipated, and some ethical problems avoided entirely.

Finally, efforts must be made to monitor and assess the effectiveness of both the CA and the ethics programmes themselves. Such evaluation processes are important not only to ensure value for money, but more importantly, to see that those whose capabilities they are intended to serve receive the most effective guidance possible in support of their conduct as professionals.

CONCLUSION

Whether the creation of an environment more conducive to sound ethical decision-making will continue to progress is somewhat unclear. While efforts to improve the CA concept and provide ethical training to those charged with its practice are underway, additional research on the topics of the CA, ethics, and military professionalism is clearly indicated.

Efforts to ensure sound ethical reasoning and practice in military operations not only make good strategic sense, but also represent an essential component of the Canadian military profession. So too do initiatives aimed at further developing decision-making approaches that have the potential to facilitate good ethical practice (e.g. the CA). Viewed from this perspective, continued development of a CA is well worth supporting. While by no means a cure-all for the challenges to ensuring better ethical reasoning in military operations, a CA, effectively practised, *can* serve as a critical tool for ensuring that decisions and actions are better informed – an important prerequisite for sound ethical reasoning. Moreover, when combined with solid programmes of training and education in ethics, the impacts may well be mutually reinforcing. If these other aspects are neglected,

however, the approach threatens to create as many problems as it solves, increasing the chances of gridlock, paralysis, and ethical uncertainty. Accordingly, efforts to maximize the potential of the CA and minimize the challenges it can produce are imperative.

NOTES

- 1 The authors wish to thank Lieutenant-Colonels Chris Rankin and Ron Bell of the Land Futures Unit, Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre; Dr Sarah Hill, Department of Military Psychology, Royal Military College of Canada; and Major Steele Lazerte, Canadian Doctrine and Training Centre, for providing useful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
- 2 Literature on the Comprehensive Approach is extensive and growing. Useful discussions of the concept, its problems, and its prospects are available: C. DeConing and K. Friis, “Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach,” *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 243–72; M. Rostek and P. Gizewski, eds., *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011); P. Jakobsen, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress,” *DIIS Report 15* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008); C. Schnaubelt, ed., *Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Strategic and Operational Challenges* (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2011); K. Rintasoski and M. Autti, eds., “Comprehensive Approach: Trends, Challenges, and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management,” based on *Comprehensive Approach Seminar* (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, 17 June 2008); and C. Wendling, *The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective* (Paris: Institut de Recherche Strategique de l’Ecole Militaire, 2010).
- 3 Such variation in usage stems in part from the fact that development of the approach itself represents a work in progress and thus requires considerable dialogue within and between those organizations and agencies involved in its conduct. In general, usage that is broadly focused is often reflected in discussions and in works produced by international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO. In contrast, use within certain national organizations and agencies has been somewhat more restrictive, with some organizations (such as the US military) tending to limit the CA’s meaning to interactions between various national and international agencies, vice organizations and individuals in the public sphere.

- 4 The mid-1990s saw a plethora of “re-engineering” projects in response to the dramatic budget cuts of the time. In Canada’s case, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces undertook a re-engineering project – the Management Command and Control Re-engineering Project – which resulted in scattered “tactical” successes. The experience and knowledge gained from the successes and failures of past re-engineering projects may provide the CAF important experience and information in creating a comprehensive approach.
- 5 P. Bradley, “Just Following Orders Is Not Sufficient,” *Canadian Army Journal* 14, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 45.
- 6 Decisions made in military operations can also fundamentally impact well-being – generating moral trauma, post-traumatic stress, and depression not only in those targeted by decisions but in those making them. See *ibid.*, 45–6.
- 7 H.R. Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy* (Westminster, UK: John Knox Press, 1999), 60.
- 8 In fact, a training course on ethical issues has already been developed by the CAF that takes this general approach (though differing in specifics), with a focus on decision-making within a comprehensive approach. See Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, *Ethics in the CF: Making Tough Choices: Instructors Manual* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006).
- 9 In Afghanistan, such efforts at times took the form of a *shura* (Arabic for *consultation*).
- 10 There are competing accounts of this event. While initial reports cited enemy action, official US reports maintain the helicopter crash was not a result of enemy action. See J. Pomfret, “Taliban Says Its Forces Foiled U.S. Commandos,” *The Washington Post* (21 October 2001), <http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2001/10/21/0014.html>.
- 11 For a more detailed examination of this and related issues, see P. Gizewski, *Ensuring Effective Religious Leader Engagement: Thoughts on Its Place in CF Thinking* (DRDC-Cora LR 2012) 20 September 2012).
- 12 Some efforts have been made to overcome these security and neutrality challenges, namely the establishment of an NGO Safety Office. See H. Yalçinkaya, “The Nongovernmental Organizations–Military Security Collaboration Mechanism: Afghanistan NGO Safety Office,” *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 33 (2013): 489–510.
- 13 For a general discussion of the problem, see N. Banerjee, “Comprehensive Approach and Fragile States; Non-Governmental Organizations Roles in Fragile Situations,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. M. Rostek and P.

- Gizewski (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 54–5.
- 14 Marilyn McHarg and Kevin Coppick note that Médecins Sans Frontières “has found it harder to achieve ... acceptance in countries where Western militaries are present ... MSF claims of independence, no matter how true, are not perceived as such in these situations and are met with skepticism by forces opposed to Western militaries and by the Western military forces themselves. This perceived lack of independence and impartiality is exacerbated when militaries and governments seek integrated approaches, and non-governmental organizations join in and focus their efforts in the regions aligned with these militaries, or participate in state-building initiatives.” See McHarg and Coppick, “We Share the Same Space, Not the Same Purpose: The Comprehensive Approach and Médecins sans Frontières,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century*, ed. Rostek and Gizewski, 69.
 - 15 C. Gall, “Killings Drive Doctor Group to Leave Afghanistan,” *The New York Times* (29 July 2004), <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/29/world/killings-drive-doctor-group-to-leave-afghanistan.html>.
 - 16 Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, *Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan* (28 September 2010), xi, 2, <http://publicintelligence.net/senate-report-on-private-security-contractor-oversight-in-afghanistan/>.
 - 17 For an excellent discussion of the nature of and rationale for Religious Leader Engagement see S.K. Moore, *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013); S.K. Moore and S. Mansoor, “Religious Leader Engagement: An Emerging Aspect of the Comprehensive Approach,” *The Three Swords Magazine* 24 (2013): 60–5.
 - 18 Sergeant Jared Tracy, “Ethical Challenges in Stability Operations,” *Military Review* 89, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 88–94.
 - 19 Government of Canada, *Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, July 2009).
 - 20 B. Bentley and G. Scoppio, *Leading in Comprehensive Operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and the Canadian Defence Academy, September 2012).
 - 21 See for instance M. Thompson, B.A. Adams, and W. Niven, “Trust in Military Teams,” in *The Human Dimensions of Operations – A Personnel Research Perspective*, ed. G. Ivey, K. Sudom, W. Dean, and M. Tremblay (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2014); R. Gill and M.

- Thompson, “Interagency Collaboration and Trust: Insights for the Defence Team,” in *The Defence Team: Military and Civilian Partnership in the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence*, ed. I. Goldenberg and A. Febbraro (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, DRDC SL-2013-101, 2013); M. Thompson and A. Febbraro, “Trust in International Military Missions: Violations of Trust and Strategies for Repair,” in *Trust in Military Teams*, ed. N. Stanton (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 107–26; M. Thompson and R. Gill, “The Role of Trust in Whole of Government Missions,” in *Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies’ Role in Global Stability Operations*, ed. C. Leuprecht, J. Troy, and D. Last (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 225–44.
- 22 Department of National Defence, *Duty with Discernment: CCA Guidance on Ethics in Operations, Strategic Edition* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2013).
 - 23 Captain John Nelson Rickard, “Beyond Training: The Canadian Army and Creating Belief in Ethics Education” (Unpublished PhD dissertation, 2012), 6–7.

