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Civil-Military Relationships in Canada: NGOs, the Media, and Local Publics

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Abstract

Increasingly, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have had to enter into relationships with different sectors of civilian society due to the new style of conflict in the post-Cold War era. This new era brings with it new realities and new considerations for the CAF: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are proliferating exponentially; the role of the media is becoming more complex in this new context; and civilians (i.e., local populations) themselves may at times be the very enemy that the military faces. This report will address the history of civil-military relationships, with particular attention paid to NGOs and their history of involvement with the CAF land forces. To compile this report, over 90 books, articles, and websites were consulted. The report indicates that civil-military relationships have not been optimal. However, it is acknowledged that the CAF has made significant improvements, particularly in their relationship with transnational NGOs. Following this review, suggestions are made for future attempts at civil-military cooperation.

Résumé

De plus en plus, les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont à établir des rapports avec différents secteurs de la société civile en raison du nouveau type de conflits qui prévaut dans l'après-guerre froide. Cette nouvelle dynamique comporte des situations et des facteurs nouveaux pour les FC : le nombre d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) croît de manière exponentielle, le rôle des médias devient plus complexe dans ce contexte et les civils (c'est-à-dire les populations locales) parfois peuvent être eux-mêmes l'ennemi auquel les forces militaires font face. Le présent rapport aborde l'historique des relations civilo-militaires en portant une attention particulière aux ONG et à leur collaboration passée avec les forces terrestres des FC. Afin de produire le rapport, nous avons parcouru plus de 90 ouvrages, articles et sites Web. Le rapport révèle que les relations civilo-militaires n'ont certes pas été optimales. On reconnaît toutefois que les FC ont réalisé des améliorations importantes, particulièrement au chapitre des relations avec les ONG transnationales. Après cet examen, nous formulons des suggestions en vue de tentatives futures de coopération civilo-militaire.

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Executive summary

Civil-Military Relationships in Canada: NGOs, the Media, and Local Publics:

Laura C. Ball; Angela R. Febraro; DRDC Toronto TR 2013-014; Defence R&D Canada, Toronto Research Centre; March 2013.

This report was designed to provide a historical context for the Public (P) aspect of the concept of Joint-Interagency-Multinational-Public (JIMP). While “public” is admittedly a broad-based and shifting concept, for the purposes of this report it was defined as including three major categories: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and local civilians (i.e., Canadians and local populations or “publics” in theatres of operations). Each of these was explored in the context of their relationship with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which, taken together, encompass “civil-military relationships in Canada” as referred to in this report.

To compile this report, over 90 books, articles, and websites were collected. However, not all were selected for use due to varying degrees of relevance and quality. Every attempt was made to find sources that directly related to the CAF. In addition, the sources were restricted to those that dealt with the military’s involvement with the public in the post-Cold War era, which was determined to be circa 1989¹ for the purposes of this report. The end of the Cold War was deemed to be a significant historical moment, as most sources agree that warfare fundamentally changed at that time. No longer was war between defined parties, such as superpowers jostling for military advantage. In their stead, regional and non-state conflicts were allowed to flourish, opening the doors for greater contact between civilians and the military. Thus, this historically oriented report has focused on much more recent history out of necessity and desire to be relevant to the current realities faced by the CAF.

It must be understood, when reading this report, that every effort was made to tease apart the relationships that the CAF has with various aspects of the public, despite the fact that these relationships are overlapping and that each has a significant impact on the other. So, while the report makes broad distinctions between these relationships, in reality they represent a complex network that cannot be so easily separated. This should be taken into consideration when forming suggestions for future developments in these areas.

In general, the report indicates that the relationship between the CAF and the public aspect of JIMP, as a whole, is not optimal. This is explored on a number of fronts, including the experiences of the CAF with the public in Canada and abroad. However, it is acknowledged that the CAF has made significant improvements, particularly in its relationship with transnational NGOs. As an example, the military has initiated a partnership with CARE Canada (a branch of CARE International) to help train CAF personnel for involvement in humanitarian aid missions.

This report puts forward the suggestion that the CAF must aim for more cooperation with NGOs, in particular. This cooperation could be achieved in a number of ways, including the creation of

¹ Some would argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 represented the real end to the Cold War. However, for the sake of inclusiveness, the earlier date was chosen.

joint conferences or participation in joint training exercises. It is recognized that these interactions will require a significant commitment on the part of NGOs as well. In the end, it is suggested that the CAF continue to take steps towards true civil-military cooperation.

Sommaire

Civil-Military Relationships in Canada: NGOs, the Media, and Local Publics:

Laura C. Ball; Angela R. Febraro; DRDC Toronto TR 2013-014; R & D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; January 2013.

Le présent rapport visait à préciser le contexte historique de l'aspect public du concept interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP). Bien que le terme « public » soit à vrai dire plutôt générique, dans le présent rapport, il englobe trois catégories principales : les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), les médias et les civils de l'endroit (soit les Canadiens et les populations locales ou les « publics » qui se trouvent dans les théâtres d'opérations). Nous avons examiné chacun de ces éléments sur le plan de leur relation avec les Forces canadiennes (FC) et, de concert, ils représentent les « relations civilo-militaires au Canada » mentionnées dans le rapport.

Afin de produire le rapport, nous avons parcouru plus de 90 ouvrages, articles et sites Web. Ces sources d'information n'ont toutefois pas toutes été retenues en raison des divers degrés d'utilité et de qualité dont elles faisaient preuve. Nous avons travaillé d'arrache-pied afin de trouver des renseignements qui se rapportent directement aux FC. De plus, les sources d'information retenues étaient celles qui abordaient la participation des forces militaires avec le public dans l'après-guerre froide, qui a été fixée à environ 1989² aux fins du présent rapport. On a estimé que la fin de la guerre froide constituait une époque importante sur le plan historique, car la plupart des sources conviennent que la conduite de la guerre a changé rapidement à ce moment. En effet, les guerres ne se faisaient plus entre deux protagonistes particuliers, par exemple des superpuissances qui s'affrontent pour jouir d'un avantage militaire. Les conflits régionaux et non étatiques ont plutôt prospéré, ouvrant de cette façon la voie à des contacts plus importants entre les civils et les militaires. Ainsi, le présent rapport, qui est de nature historique, se concentre sur l'histoire beaucoup plus récente, en raison de la nécessité et de la volonté de traiter des situations avec lesquelles les FC doivent composer.

Précisons que, dans le présent rapport, nous avons tout tenté afin de démêler les relations entre les FC et diverses composantes du public, même si ces relations se chevauchent et ont une incidence importante les unes sur les autres. Ainsi, bien que le rapport établisse des distinctions générales entre ces relations, celles-ci représentent en fait un réseau complexe qui est plutôt inextricable. Il convient peut-être de tenir compte de ce point pour formuler des suggestions en vue de développements futurs à cet égard.

En général, le rapport précise que la relation entre les FC et le volet public du concept IIMP, dans l'ensemble, n'est pas optimale. On se penche sur ce point en fonction de plusieurs aspects, notamment les expériences que les FC ont eues avec le public au Canada et à l'étranger. Toutefois, on reconnaît que les FC ont réalisé des progrès considérables, particulièrement au chapitre des relations avec les ONG transnationales. À titre d'exemple, mentionnons que les

² Certaines personnes avancent que l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique en 1991 représente la véritable fin de la guerre froide. Toutefois, dans un but d'inclusivité, nous avons retenu la date antérieure précisée.

forces militaires ont établi un partenariat avec CARE Canada (qui fait partie de CARE International) afin d'aider à entraîner le personnel des FC en vue d'une participation aux missions d'aide humanitaire.

Le présent rapport avance que les FC doivent avant tout viser une coopération plus importante avec les ONG. Cette coopération pourrait se faire de différentes façons, notamment par l'organisation de conférences conjointes ou par la participation à des exercices d'entraînement conjoints. On reconnaît que ces interactions exigent également un engagement considérable de la part des ONG. En fin de compte, on recommande aux FC de continuer à progresser vers la mise en place d'une véritable coopération civilo-militaire.

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1 Introduction

The post-Cold War era (1989/1991³ – present) has seen a dramatic shift in the nature of conflict and military action (Francois, 1995; Iribarnegaray, 2002; Landon & Hayes, n.d.). Prior to 1991, many in the international community did not lend the services of their militaries for the purposes of humanitarian aid.⁴ However, in 1991 this trend changed drastically following the mission in Northern Iraq (Francois, 1995). This is when the international community recognized the new frontier in conflict—complex humanitarian emergencies—which has been one of the primary responsibilities of military forces since then (ibid.). Complex humanitarian emergencies are marked by rapid changes in missions and objectives, shifting and enigmatic rules of engagement (ROEs), and an “enemy” that attacks its fellow civilians (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006). In response to such emergencies, militaries are increasingly expected to take on new and diverse responsibilities, including the supervision of ceasefires, demining projects, the return of refugees, the design and supervision of social reforms (administrative or otherwise), economic reconstruction, and the verification of human rights (Iribarnegaray, 2002). An additional frontier became apparent in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York: terrorism (Wilner, 2005), with resulting counterinsurgency doctrine and operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these issues—complex humanitarian emergencies and terrorism—required militaries around the world in the post-Cold War era to become more proficient in dealing with civilians in order to attain their objectives.

This report will outline the history of military involvement in this new era in conflict, with particular attention to the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) army component. As an aspect of the larger Joint-Interagency-Multinational-Public (JIMP) applied research project conducted by Defence R&D Canada (DRDC), Toronto Research Centre, this report will focus on that aspect of the “P” in JIMP (i.e., the “Public” aspect) that focuses on civil-military relationships and especially on the CAF’s involvement with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the course of charting this history, several theoretical issues will also be elucidated including: the nature of the “P” in JIMP; the differences between NGOs and international organizations (IOs); and the differences between civil-military cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. Suggestions for the future of civil-military relations will also be made based on conclusions drawn from the historically informed review. These suggestions will have particular reference to future JIMP-related projects that examine the “P” aspect. The goal of these suggestions will be to move the Canadian military closer to the objective of effective civil-military cooperation.

³ This date changes depending on the source. In the winter of 1989, George Bush Sr. and Mikhail Gorbachev declared an end to the decades-long conflict; that same year saw the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the winter of 1991, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved, thus ending any possibility of continued conflict between, for instance, the two superpowers.

⁴ Some exceptions included limited peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Biafra, and Sudan (Francois, 1995). However, the United Nations (UN) has since 1948 engaged in peacekeeping, which has sometimes had humanitarian goals (United Nations, 2009).

1.1 The JIMP Project

The JIMP applied research project, entitled *JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander* (12og), was inspired by the increasingly complex security environment in which the CAF and other militaries must now operate. This environment includes a broad range of actors and organizations, such as various government agencies or departments and an array of non-governmental agencies. As the CAF seeks to become more JIMP-capable, it strives to maximize its ability to work effectively with each of the individual components of JIMP (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). A suggested definition of JIMP is that it refers to “a framework of Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public actors who collaborate and cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives” (Simms, 2008, p. 14).

This report addresses key objectives of the DRDC Toronto applied research project on *JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain* in that it aims to provide conceptual clarification and historical perspective on the “P” aspect of JIMP. The “P”, or “Public,” aspect of JIMP deals with any situation where the CAF may need to come into contact with the Public. It is difficult to define Public in this context, because (as is discussed below) it is a shifting concept. Broadly, it refers to civilians (e.g., Canadians or local populations that the CAF comes into contact with in theatre), and civilian-run organizations, such as NGOs, IOs, and the media (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; see also Simms, 2008). Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek (2007) have provided the following definition of the “P” in JIMP:

Public – involving a variety of elements including: domestic and international publics, including host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms recruited to support the government. (p. 57)

However, when one looks specifically at each of these components of the Public aspect of JIMP, the picture becomes less clear, and the concept seems to shift. For example, local civilians used to be those that lived in the area where conflict was occurring. This is still true, for the most part, but quite often the enemies now faced by the military are civilians who are part of no formalized army; thus, it can be difficult to distinguish between local populations and enemies for a variety of reasons. For example, a suicide bomber may be difficult to distinguish from other (non-enemy) civilians until it is too late: “Terrorist strikes are, for the most part secret affairs – the event itself is not usually expected and is only made visible after the event has taken place” (Wilner, 2005, p. 10). A less dramatic example is the status of certain humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, or Médecins sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders (MSF/DWB). While all of these organizations could be considered NGOs, or more specifically international or transnational NGOs, they could also be considered IOs because of their international scope. On the other hand, IOs are most often associated with intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Such organizations, which consist of sovereign member states, denote organizations established by governments through treaties for the pursuit of common aims. However, such intergovernmental organizations could also be seen as falling within the “Interagency” (or “I”) aspect of JIMP (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). Overall, there is considerable ambiguity in the literature as to how best to define such organizations (e.g., Abiew, 2003; Eyre, 1998; Gordenker & Weiss, 1996). There are many complex considerations

that must be taken into account when categorizing, for instance, humanitarian organizations (see Eyre, 1998; Weiss & Gordenker, 1996). However, in the interests of simplicity, and for the purposes of this report, all such humanitarian organizations will be referred to under the NGO heading, and as falling within the “P” aspect of JIMP.

1.2 Humanitarian Issues and JIMP

The military has traditionally been most concerned with the notion of the public⁵ during humanitarian interventions, as three major components of the public (NGOs, the media, the local population) collide in this forum. Part of the following discussion will address why the military is being asked to do this work, what they are being asked to do, and the appropriateness of using the military for humanitarian work. This topic has already engendered much debate from the academic, military, and humanitarian communities and probably will continue to do so for some time to come.

1.3 Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

The spaces in which the military often finds itself having to work alongside humanitarian organizations, the media, and the local populace are called *complex humanitarian emergencies* (Byman, 2001; Harris & Dombrowski, 2002; Siegel, 2002; Teagle, 1996). These situations are defined by the following five characteristics:

[1] deterioration or complete collapse of central government authority; [2] ethnic or religious conflict and widespread human rights abuses; [3] episodic food insecurity, frequently deteriorating into mass starvation; [4] macroeconomic collapse involving hyperinflation, massive unemployment and net decreases in GNP [Gross National Product]; and [5] mass population movements of displaced people and refugees escaping conflict or searching for food. (Natsios, 1996, p. 67)

Complex humanitarian emergencies usually occur in so-called failed states or developing countries (Francois, 1995; Natsios, 1996). Examples of such countries include Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, and Rwanda.

1.4 Canadian and International Participation

Different nations have differing views on whether or not it is of value for their military to participate in humanitarian emergencies. Some in the international community, including the United States (US), still seem to be evaluating whether these efforts are necessary or valuable, and whether they should continue to have their military participate in humanitarian emergencies, while “some Western militaries, such as those of Canada and the Netherlands, focus largely on humanitarian operations” (Byman, 2001, p. 110). However, the UN is committed to this type of intervention and has recently released a new handbook for officers engaging in civil-military coordination in the field (United Nations, 2008).

⁵ Hereafter in this report, “public” will be non-capitalized.

The CAF has also been committed to supporting humanitarian interventions, as Byman (2001) suggested above. Under the 3D—defence, diplomacy, and development—policy, for example, three units were developed that deal with civilians through humanitarian work:

1. *Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*. CIMIC operations are not new; the Canadian military has been engaging in them since World War II (Longhurst, 2006/2007). Traditionally, CIMIC has been considered as part of the “hearts and minds” component of conflict (Ankerson, 2002; Mockaitis, 2004; Schreiber, 2001/2002). This would involve winning the good will of the local populations in order, for instance, to gain crucial intelligence (Mockaitis, 2004; Schreiber, 2001/2002). It was generally thought to be a secondary duty (Longhurst, 2005). However, the perception of its role has begun to change. In 1999, the CAF released the *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* doctrine, based on the CAF’s experiences in the Balkans. This new document signalled an attempt at a more comprehensive and consistent approach to CIMIC (Peabody, 2005, 2006). In 2000, it was recognized that reservists, given their links with the civilian world, may be an invaluable asset to CIMIC operations in peace support operations (PSOs), making liaisons easier (Longhurst, 2005, 2006/2007; Pollick, 2000). The role of CIMIC operations has expanded to become a primary duty for CIMIC officers and includes coordinating humanitarian assistance, conducting community improvement projects (CIP), reforming civil administration, and dealing with economic, cultural, or public affairs (Longhurst, 2005, 2006/2007). Therefore, CIMIC operators are the primary link between the military and all aspects of the public (Longhurst, 2005, 2006/2007; Winslow, 2002).⁶ CIMIC cells (or similar structures) have been or are now active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Afghanistan (Longhurst, 2006/2007; Peabody, 2005, 2006).

2. *Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)*. The DART program was created in 1996 when it became clear to the Canadian government that some humanitarian emergencies required fast and effective aid (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). Developed in coordination with the NGO community, DART personnel (who are military personnel) are trained to provide assistance within 48 hours of a natural disaster or complex humanitarian emergency (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; Williams, 1998). Each team is made up of “medical personnel, engineers, a transport and signals unit, and an infantry platoon for security” (Cooper, 2005, p. 8). The first formalized DART team was deployed in Zaire in 1996 (Cooper, 2005). The DART program is an example of how the CAF can work with NGOs (i.e., in a coordinated fashion) to provide assistance to those in immediate need.

3. *Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)*. The first Canadian PRTs emerged in 2003 in Afghanistan, and were developed to be a realization of Canada’s 3D policy (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; Peabody, 2006; Stapleton, 2007). The Canadian PRT construct was, at least in part, influenced by the previous CAF-led Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan, but the PRT construct in general has been used by several countries, for instance, in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs include military personnel but also some government aid and governance officials. For instance, the Canadian version of the PRT includes members of the CAF, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Corrections Canada (Baker,

⁶ In contrast to JIMP, however, CIMIC has traditionally and historically conveyed a more military-centric approach to civil-military relations (see Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). In addition, Public Affairs (PA) also plays a role in civil-military or public-military relations (e.g., media operations, community relations, etc.).

2007; Capstick, 2007; Peabody, 2006). The duties of PRTs include “security, governance and development” (Capstick, 2007, p. 17). Some members of NGOs feel that the multi-pronged approach, represented by the PRTs, encourages a “blurring of lines” between the military and aid communities (Capstick, 2007; Hatting, 2004; Peabody, 2006; Sedra, 2004). For this reason, PRTs represent a hotly debated topic within the international civil-military literature (Peabody, 2006; Sedra, 2004).

Although effective cooperation between the military and NGOs (or other civilian publics) seems to be a worthy goal, the civil-military relationship may be seen as one marked by coordination at best (Ankerson, 2004). Although many definitions of cooperation and coordination exist, coordination has been defined by Ankerson (2004), for instance, as a working relationship that exists in a hierarchical fashion, in which one entity within the relationship holds more power than the other.⁷ In the civil-military context, it is often the military that holds the balance of power due to its greater access to resources (ibid.). Cooperation, on the other hand, according to Ankerson (2004), is a relationship that is expressed as a collaboration between equal partners. In the chapters that follow, three elements of the public aspect of JIMP (NGOs, the media, and local populations) will be examined in conjunction with the CAF (primarily although not exclusively the land force or army) within the context of three relationships: (1) the NGO-military relationship, (2) the media-military relationship, and (3) the local civilian population-military relationship.

⁷ On the other hand, members of NGOs may argue that they possess relatively greater *moral power*, owing to their *neutrality* (the latter concept will be discussed further in Chapter 2 of this report).

2 NGO-Military Relationship

The relationship between NGOs and the military is a complex one that operates across multiple domains with multiple factors governing those interactions.⁸ Altogether, the NGO-military relationship has not been an entirely positive one; it has at times been filled with distrust, tension, and reluctance on both sides. Yet, the two parties are often forced together in this “unhappy marriage” (Siegel, 2002, p. 28) due to the realities of complex humanitarian emergencies. This section will address why this relationship must exist, how it operates, and why the relationship has been at times dominated by tension (see also Holton, Febbraro, Barnes, Filardo, Fraser, & Spiece, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011).

In bygone eras, wars were typically about great powers and the positioning of military might. However, after the Cold War, the landscape shifted: “The decline in superpower rivalry allowed regional conflicts and state disruptions to flare up amid reordering of the geopolitical power structure” (LeBlanc, 2007, p. 3). In addition, a rise in nationalism expressed along ethnic lines and in religious extremism have contributed to the overall picture (LeBlanc, 2007). The nature of this new style of warfare was marked by a dramatic increase in the number of humanitarian crises⁹ and victims in need of relief aid, thus providing the space for intensified NGO-military interaction (LeBlanc, 2007; Studer, 2001). Not only has the military responded to this situation by increasing its humanitarian operations, but NGOs have also adapted; since the 1980s, they have multiplied exponentially, thereby increasing the likelihood of contact with the military (Gordenker & Weiss, 1996; LeBlanc, 2007; Natsios, 1996; Stein, 2001; Williams, 1998; Winslow, 2002). Other factors that have contributed to increased exposure between the two parties include reforms in the armed forces of many countries to include peace support operations and the expanding role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has broadened its scope beyond peacekeeping to peace building and peace enforcing (Studer, 2001; see also Weiss, 1997).

Despite increased contact, the NGO-military relationship has been described as uncomfortable for both parties. According to Winslow (2002), there are five primary sources of tension in this partnership: (1) organizational structure and culture, (2) tasks and ways of accomplishing them, (3) definitions of success and time frames, (4) abilities to exert influence and control information, and (5) control of resources. Each will be discussed in turn (see also Miller, 1999; Miller & Moskos, 1995).

⁸ In this report, NGOs encompass relief and humanitarian aid organizations as well as development organizations, and the military refers mainly to the military of Canada and its allies. Although relationships between relief/humanitarian aid workers and the military tend to be easier than relationships between development workers and the military, tensions may exist in any of these relationships.

⁹ The UN notes that there have been 63 peacekeeping missions since 1945; however, only 18 of these began before the end of the Cold War. At the time of this writing, the UN reported that they had 16 active missions (United Nations, 2009).

2.1 Organizational Structure and Culture

Generally speaking, NGOs and the military differ on numerous fundamental levels in terms of their organizational structure and culture. From a structural standpoint, militaries are organized hierarchically, and decision making tends to be centralized. This corresponds to a *hierarchical culture* (Scheltinga, Rietjens, de Boer, & Wilderom, 2005). On the other hand, NGOs tend to have a diffuse, flattened hierarchy, and decision-making tends to be consensus-based and decentralized¹⁰ (Williams, 1998; Winslow, 2002). This corresponds to a *clan culture* (Scheltinga, et al., 2005). As humanitarian work and principles involve collaboration, participative decision making, and consensus building, and as these are not generally aligned with military structure and culture, such differences between militaries and NGOs have led, in part, to a belief on the part of relief workers, for instance, that military personnel are unfit for humanitarian work. Further, relief workers are skeptical of the “blurring of lines” between the two parties that humanitarian operations encourage. In effect, relief workers feel that the purpose of a military is to prepare for and engage in war, and that NGOs are often required to clean up after the crises caused by military intervention (Miller, 1999). In addition, relief workers tend to be wary of the new role being adopted by the military; they are painfully aware of past abuses¹¹, and many are not ready to accept that a long-term change has occurred. They also feel that the military’s insistence on bearing arms and wearing combat gear while engaging in humanitarian work betrays an immense distrust of the very public they are supposed to be working with and for (Miller, 1999). Military personnel, on the other hand, tend to feel that relief workers are dismissive of authority, are “hotheaded and undisciplined” (Dallaire, 2003, p. 299), and are only interested in opportunities for media attention (Dallaire, 2003; Miller, 1999; Pollick, 2000; Winslow, 2002).

There are also large differences in the composition of NGOs and military organizations. The military tends to consist of young men, typically 19–22 years old, and their peace operations units tend to be largely uniraical. In stark contrast to this, NGO and UN field staffs tend to be women, ranging in age between their 20s and 40s, and tend to have diverse ethnic backgrounds (Miller, 1999; Williams, 1998; Winslow, 2002). These “demographic differences may help to perpetuate a distance between the two populations” (Miller, 1999, p. 192). Such demographic differences may affect the way NGOs and militaries interact with one another and the local population. For instance, Miller and Moskos (1995) showed that military units that were mixed race and mixed gender held more humanitarian attitudes towards the local population than did all-male uniraical units, which adopted a more aggressive stance towards locals (see also Winslow, 2002).

2.2 Tasks and Ways of Accomplishing Them

NGOs and the military may agree that humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects need to occur, but their definitions of how these should happen are not entirely commensurate. Winslow (2002) has illustrated the subtleties behind the actions of these two groups.

Militaries are typically involved in *quick impact projects* (QIP), which are (re)construction projects designed to aid the community: “In Bosnia, the Canadians rebuilt a hospital wing, set up

¹⁰ This is, of course, an over-generalization, as NGOs differ widely in their practices and configurations, and militaries differ across nation and time. Generally, the larger the organization, the more hierarchical it becomes. Nevertheless, NGOs do not reach the sense of order that the military achieves.

¹¹ Miller’s (1999) article was written within the context of relief workers’ experiences with the US army.

a dental clinic, built a woodshed for a school, cut and delivered wood to the elderly, etc.” (Winslow, 2002, p. 8). QIPs are designed to be completed quickly and efficiently and are an attempt to win the “hearts and minds,” or trust and confidence, of the local population as well as to gain crucial intelligence (Longhurst, 2006/2007).¹² NGOs engage in the same types of projects, although less so in an attempt to gain information (Winslow, 2002). They are less likely to create boundaries between themselves and the local population and often incorporate the community’s own cultural practices into the projects. These projects are often long-term, as the relief workers rely on community participation. Thus, in this respect, the major difference between NGOs and the military might be summed up as the military does its projects *for* the community, while NGOs do the projects *with* the community (Winslow, 2002).

2.3 Definitions of Success and Time Frames

The issues at hand here are the length of rotation in the field and project completion goals. The latter issue has already been alluded to in the previous section. In short, militaries tend to establish short-term goals and definitions of success (e.g., civil security, which may be established in a matter of hours, days, or months), which are often associated with tour and mission timelines, whereas NGOs tend to define success in terms of long-term social and economic development, which typically takes years or decades to take hold. The military considers a project a success if it was able to finish the project quickly with an efficient use of resources, and if it was able to gain some intelligence through its interactions with the community (Winslow, 2002). NGOs, on the other hand, are often focused on longer-term social and economic development goals, as they are attempting to teach the community to become more sustainable and self-sufficient. Therefore, the members of the community are seen by NGOs as consultants, contractors, and co-constructors, and this approach is linked to at least two additional important NGO goals: “Community involvement in reconstruction not only fosters responsibility for that community, it can ultimately lead to community ownership of the process thereby facilitating a smooth transition to autonomy” (Iribarnegaray, 2002, p. 14). This is not the type of project that tends to make efficient use of time and resources in the short-term; however, in the long-term it may become an efficient approach as the community becomes increasingly self-sufficient.

An additional factor that influences the time frame in which projects are carried out is the length of time spent in the field: the average soldier has a rotation of six to nine months, whereas relief workers often provide their services for at least 12 months and sometimes much longer (as mentioned, development work may continue for years or decades). Further, the length of a soldier’s rotation can have negative effects on the ability to communicate with NGO staff and members. It also determines the scope of the projects to which military personnel can commit: short-term is the only viable option. Also, since the CIMIC operators in the CAF are drawn mainly from the reserves, time is of the essence. In the context of Afghanistan, for instance, the training and deployment time was approximately 18 months from start to finish (Longhurst, 2006/2007). However, this extensive time commitment likely deterred some from joining: “There are currently a high percentage of trained CIMIC operators who are unable to leave their civilian

¹² Gathering of intelligence is such an important task for CIMIC that CIMIC operators in the CAF report that 40% of their time is allocated specifically to this task. According to CIMIC personnel, an additional 50% is devoted to QIPs and humanitarian assistance that would win the hearts and minds of the community in order to gain information from them (Longhurst, 2006/2007).

employment for periods greater than a year as this has negative implications upon seniority and pension plans” (Longhurst, 2006/2007, p. 64). Because of this, Major Graham Longhurst (2006/2007) put forward the idea that training times needed to be shortened, and that a uniform rotation policy needed to be put in place in order to ensure that reservists would be able to continue to serve the CIMIC function of the Canadian military (see also Williams, 1998).¹³

2.4 Abilities to Exert Influence and Control Information

For both the military and members of NGOs, the media is of utmost importance. While this topic will be discussed in greater detail in the media-military relationship section, it will be given some attention here in relation to NGOs.

As Dana Eyre (1998) noted, “to understand an NGO, one must understand the three major influences specific to that organization: its funding stream, its organizational mandate, and its pattern of political and media involvement” (p. 16). Having already discussed organizational mandate and culture, funding and involvement in politics and the media still remain. NGOs have now become major players in the international political sphere, and many have representatives at the UN (Eyre, 1998). In addition, their ability to attract media attention is important: it often determines the funds available to them to conduct relief work. However, the pursuit of media attention can also become a source of tension between NGOs and the military, as the military often finds this to be “irritating” and “distasteful” (Pollick, 2000, p. 60). The military also sees the competitiveness that it breeds between NGOs: “In reality, this often comes down to competition for media coverage: the group with the best TV and press coverage tends to get better financing” (Pollick, 2000, p. 60). In this vein, Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (2003) recalled his time leading the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR):

I also wanted to meet with the unruly gaggle of NGOs and aid agencies who were fetching up in increasing numbers in Nairobi, and who presented themselves as knowing better than anyone else how to solve the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. While a few of the more reputable agencies, notably the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières, continued to carry their enormous burdens quietly, others seemed caught up in assessment missions and photo opportunities. (p. 415)

Clearly, funds are of paramount importance for NGOs. By accepting money from private donors, NGOs can remain independent and neutral—values that they highly prize—and, at least in theory, unaffected by international politics. Accordingly, NGOs may remain accountable to no one except their board of directors and sometimes to their contributors.¹⁴ But where do their funds come from? Gordenker and Weiss (1996) provided an analysis of many of the major NGOs and showed that at least 90% of their funds stem from the governments of wealthy nations. Also, as they explain, these funds do not come without strings: “all NGOs and foundation donors operate under some governmental, donor-imposed or doctrinal restrictions” (p. 32). This raises an

¹³ Since June 2012, the Canadian government and all provinces and territories have passed job protection legislation for Reservists, including protections regarding pensions and job security. In general, the legislation provides protection for Reservists who require leave from their civilian jobs for military training or deployment. However, the specific job protections differ across jurisdictions.

¹⁴ A notable exception to this rule is the ICRC, which is accountable to the UN (Benthall, 1993). The mandate of the ICRC stems from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which are enforced by the UNSC.

interesting question: if NGOs prize their neutrality and independence above anything else—often citing this as a reason for non-cooperation with the military—then how can they accept the majority of their funding from governments, which are necessarily political? Further to that, how can NGOs claim that militaries represent hegemonic Western ideals, when NGOs accept money from the very same governments that these militaries answer to? Are they not, then, simply two sides of the same coin, so to speak? While other factors certainly affect the ability of these two parties to work together, funding realities may provide a common ground with which to begin communication towards that end.

Also at issue here is the problem of information sharing. As indicated earlier, relief workers are often in the field much longer than are military personnel and thus may be better able to form relationships with the local community. Furthermore, organizational cultural differences also contribute to NGOs having an advantage in befriending the community. A consequence is that they are often privy to a great deal of information that could be useful to the military. However, due to their principle of neutrality, NGOs are often unwilling to betray the confidences of the community members and share that information with the military. On the other hand, this does not mean that NGOs are not willing to use such information to further their own purposes. In Rwanda, Dallaire (2003) commented that “The NGOs for the most part treated UNAMIR as if it was one of the belligerents, and handed their excellent information over to the international news media, not to us” (p. 173). He also blamed some of the UN troops’ lack of preparedness on the inability of NGOs to communicate with the UN. The success of a mission often depends on such information. Obviously, this is an extremely problematic and contentious issue for both sides. Further, both militaries and NGOs may have concerns (e.g., security concerns) in regard to information sharing (Winslow, 2002). For instance, militaries may be concerned that sharing information with NGOs or others may compromise their mission, while NGOs may be concerned that sharing information with the military may compromise their neutrality and their relationship with the local community and as a result, their physical safety (Winslow, 2002).

2.5 Control of Resources

While the issue of funds is relevant to the control of resources, the more important issue is that of material resources, such as vehicles, aircraft, and weaponry. This is a double-edged sword, with NGOs falling on either side. On the one hand, for NGOs, military involvement can help facilitate the transportation of refugees, medical aid, relief, and food supplies. Military presence may also mean protection and a general “atmosphere of security” (Dallaire, 2003). In fact, this last aspect is so crucial that NGOs have been known to call for increased military intervention for the purposes of obtaining protection (Miller, 1999). On the other hand, some NGOs have resisted military services and protection as it may appear to members of the local population that their neutrality and independence have been compromised, thus placing NGO members at greater (physical) risk.

As suggested by the discussion above, the NGO-military relationship is one that has been marked at times by profound tension, distrust, and misunderstanding. This is not to say, however, that steps are not being taken in order to resolve these issues. In fact, the CAF is doing just that. For instance, since 1996, the CAF has been fostering a professional relationship with the NGO CARE, one of the largest of the transnational NGOs (Benthall, 1993; CARE Canada, 2009; CARE International, 2009). CARE, which has a Canadian chapter, works with the CAF in order to help train their incoming CIMIC operators. In addition, the CAF has been actively searching for military personnel and reservists with diverse occupations, ethnic backgrounds, and language

fluency. These actions are all being taken in an effort to improve the CAF's ability to create positive relationships with local civilian populations. This will be discussed in greater detail in the final section, but is mentioned here as it also has relevance for the NGO-military relationship.

There have been, however, mixed feelings about the actions taken by the CAF and similar actions taken by other militaries in regard to the NGO-military relationship. CAF members, for example, have tended to feel positively about their interactions with CARE during their training and often express the desire for more such collaborative training possibilities. These may include having relief workers come together with the military for joint exercises, and having joint conferences where each group can speak to and learn from the other. Other governmental departments (OGDs) have also seemed to support this notion. Further, in the US, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has suggested that relief workers engaging in agricultural work could benefit from military training in demining procedures, as many areas would require this skill (Miller, 1999). Members of NGOs, on the other hand, have tended to be skeptical of the value of these partnerships, fearing that they may compromise their independence and neutrality. However, as Janice Stein (2001) has argued, the issue of NGOs remaining neutral may be outdated. The geopolitical landscape has changed so much that it is no longer ethical to remain neutral: "Neutrality is appropriate in a neutral environment, but the environments of complex emergencies are generally predatory rather than neutral" (Stein, 2001, p. 33).

Indeed, in recent years, there have been several encouraging developments in terms of providing opportunities for the CAF and NGOs to better understand each other and to foster positive relationships. For instance, since 2011, the CAF has been holding a series of "Civil-Military Seminars" that bring together members of the NGO community (particularly those belonging to the Policy Action Group on Emergency Response, or PAGER¹⁵) and the CAF. The objective of these joint training seminars has been to provide an opportunity for PAGER NGOs and CAF members to improve their ability to interact with one another in the context of future NGO activities/CAF missions outside of Canada, as well as to establish and reinforce professional networks and relationships between NGOs, IOs, OGDs, and CAF personnel. Results of systematic survey research (Thompson, Febbraro, & Holton, 2012) have shown that these seminars have been successful in achieving these goals; both CAF and NGO participants have viewed these seminars as positive avenues for improving mutual understanding and for facilitating professional networks. Moreover, both the civilian and military groups indicated that participation in the seminar had changed the way in which they thought about the other group and believed that the seminar would affect the way that they interacted with other groups in future missions. All of these results are quite encouraging in that the seminar was only two days in duration (for further details, see Thompson et al., 2012).

Nonetheless, despite such successes, there remain continuing challenges in the NGO-military relationship. Given that the current reality is that some sort of cooperation, coordination, or collaboration must take place between the military and NGOs, both in Canada and in the field,

¹⁵ PAGER is an informal, flexible, and responsive forum of operational Canadian humanitarian agencies whose mandate involves responding to humanitarian emergencies worldwide. Its membership includes representatives from NGOs, IOs, CIDA, and DFAIT. PAGER was created to fill a perceived gap between operational realities and policy making and to promote greater information sharing and co-ordination between agencies concerned with humanitarian action. PAGER is the only forum to provide this interface in Canada.

strategies for effective interaction, such as joint training opportunities, will be required. Further suggestions for effective cooperation, coordination, or collaboration will be outlined in the Conclusion.

3 Media-Military Relationship

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the media plays an integral but increasingly complex role in the contemporary security environment. For instance, since the media controls the messages that are put forward to the public¹⁶, NGOs and the military must both consider the role of the media in shaping public perceptions (Cooper, 2005; Eriksson, 2000; Pollick, 2000). On the other hand, NGOs, in particular, have expressed that one of the positive outcomes to military interventions in humanitarian emergencies is that their own work receives an increase in media attention (Miller, 1999; Winslow, 2002). There are varying reports on how adept NGOs are at using the media to get their messages across; however, there appears to be no argument that they do make better use of this resource than does the military (Eyre, 1998; Teagle, 1996). Pär Eriksson (2000) has put forward the suggestion that the NGO-media relationship is closely related to funding: the more media attention an issue gets, the more funding becomes available for relief efforts, resulting in a greater ability for NGOs to continue to operate. As would be expected, Pär Eriksson found that when the media increased their focus on a particular humanitarian emergency, more NGOs flocked to the area (Pollick, 2000; see also Winslow, 2002). In fact, some military personnel have been critical of certain NGOs' apparent preference to share valuable information with the media rather than the military, or have argued that some NGOs appear to be engaging in humanitarian work mostly for the photo opportunities (Dallaire, 2003; Pollick, 2000; Winslow, 2002). Regardless, it seems certain that the media plays an important role in the interactions between NGOs and the military. However, this is not the extent of the media's importance. The present chapter is an exploration of the role of the media in terms of its relationship with the military (the focus here), its effects on the NGO-military relationship, and its influence on the military's relationship with populations in Canada or in theatre.

For instance, the media is considered to have a direct influence on the general public, policy makers, and on soldiers themselves (Maloney, 2001; Miller & Moskos, 1995; Roseneder, 2006; Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006; Teagle, 1996). The media has the ability to determine what national and international stories the public hears, thus directing public attention and possibly influencing popular opinion. As Nigel Hannaford (2001), a reporter for the *Calgary Herald*, wrote: "It's the media's job to tell the public how things are" (p. 213). This process also influences national policy. For instance, Maloney (2001) suggests that "In the main, government decision-makers are more concerned about what various pundits think and say publicly about their policies than whether the policies are in fact good for Canada in the long term" (p. 47). Further, as Andrew F. Cooper (2005) has pointed out, judgments as to where the CAF should be deployed are, in part, directed by public opinion and the media. Peggy Teagle (1996) described how this process works in the following way:

the media enables us to be direct witnesses. On the one hand this leads to more pressure on governments to do something about these situations, even though their resources are dwindling. On the other hand there is the danger of creating a culture of indifference, with people shutting themselves off in the face of a surfeit of information and graphic depictions of devastation and gross violations of human dignity. (p. 3)

¹⁶ Within the military, Psychological Operations (PsyOps) also play a role in conveying messages to the public.

Michael Ignatieff (2000) has shared a similar opinion. He has also argued that the media not only influences public opinion on where the military needs to be deployed but also where it should continue to be deployed (see also Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006). This is especially true for humanitarian interventions, as “wars waged in the name of values invariably turn out to be more controversial than wars waged for interests” (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 72). If this is the case, then the discourse that the media constructs is of paramount importance to the military.

That being said, the media-military relationship in Canada has been strained and complicated over the last decade. Canada does not view itself to be a particularly militaristic nation, so defence issues, until relatively recently, have not usually been in the public forefront (Hannaford, 2001). However, the Somalia inquiry, beginning in 1993, and more recently the mission in Afghanistan have pushed the military into the national consciousness (Hannaford, 2001). As a result of this, there was a two-fold effect: military personnel were asked for greater transparency by the media, and the military began to see the need for positive images to be displayed in the media on an on-going basis (Hannaford, 2001). The media-military relationship has become an essential ingredient in the contemporary security environment even though some military officials are wary of it, fearing the possibility of negative coverage (Winslow, 2002). However, not all CAF officials are apprehensive of this relationship. Dallaire (2003) has stated that the media is now as useful to military aims as any force that can be deployed: “The media was the weapon I used to strike the conscience of the world and try to prod the international community into action. I would even risk the lives of my UNMOs [UN Military Observers] to ensure the stories got out every day” (p. 333). This clearly speaks to his view on the importance of the media to any humanitarian mission in which the military may be involved.

Dallaire’s (2000) comments beg the question: How does the media play on the conscience of a nation? This is mainly done through imagery and storytelling. The images that the media presents to the public have direct consequences for the discourse surrounding a conflict or humanitarian emergency. On the one hand, they can influence the viewers’ emotions, and, on the other hand, they can set up unrealistic expectations or promote negative stereotypes (Benthall, 1993). As Benthall (1993) has stated,

An image has a lot of power. It conveys information and excites emotions. It provokes response and it can leave a lasting impression. But the power of images can be damaging if they are handled insensitively. They can generalise, over-simplify and distort. They can reinforce stereotypes. They can deny people their dignity. (p. 181)

Benthall (1993) has shown that the images portrayed in the media (for instance, of a local population in a conflict zone or experiencing a humanitarian crisis) may be an expression of asymmetry in power relations. In his view, not only do such images portray the subject (the “Other”) in distinctly colonialized ways, but news broadcasters also tend to construct their story in such a way as to appeal to a male audience. Benthall (1993) shows that news programs often begin with masculinized stories intended to draw in male viewers. He describes the narratives told in the media as being akin to folk tales, often featuring such characters as the princess or damsel in distress, the villain, and the hero. In the end, the princess is always grateful to the hero for saving her from her unfortunate situation. While we can expect much of our fictional television to be formulated in this way, Benthall (1993) states that we may find it surprising that factual programs, such as the news, could be construed in the same way.

The images and media discourse also affect the expectations of the soldiers who will eventually be deployed (Miller & Moskos, 1995; Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006). Miller and Moskos (1995) investigated, through a series of interviews with US military personnel in Somalia, how soldiers adjust to being sent on humanitarian aid missions. Miller and Moskos found that soldiers see the images of starving children portrayed by the media and become convinced of the need for outside intervention. In fact, some soldiers even enlist due to this perceived need. They also develop a sense of confidence in their ability to help the situation through relief efforts. Unfortunately, these expectations are not often met in theatre, and soldiers tend to feel disillusioned once they arrive (Miller & Moskos, 1995). The impression gained by soldiers from the media is perhaps unsurprising given the proliferation of images that tend to “picture helpless, passive victims and heroic saviours” (Benthall, 1993, p. 177). Some have criticized this practice as colonialist at worst and patronizing to the victims at best (Benthall, 1993).

The precarious nature of the relationship between the military and the media can be illustrated through a short case study: the conflict in Kosovo. This North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led campaign was marked by an extraordinary amount of communication and media coverage. This had a definite downside for the military. With regards to public support from NATO and its allied countries, Ignatieff (2000) stated that

Journalists reported what it was like for an ordinary Serbian family to be bombed. Thanks to television, we saw stunned survivors of our own bombs and that made it more difficult to conserve a state of righteous abstraction towards what they were going through. (p. 139)

The images and the discourse that the media presented to their audiences at home guided the public’s beliefs and attitudes about the war. However, a loss in public support for the war was not the only effect of the intensive media coverage: “This state of relative transparency made it possible for both sides to anticipate each other’s next move. In Belgrade, everyone who had satellite TV watched CNN and Sky News for days before downtown Belgrade was struck” (Ignatieff, p. 139). Being able to anticipate the moves of the “other side” in a conflict is useful but becomes less so when the other side can also anticipate yours. The security issues resulting from increased media attention in theatre are a definite concern (Ignatieff, 2000; Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006). However, this does not mean that members of the media are able to negotiate this terrain unscathed themselves. Ignatieff (2000) has suggested that when the media are present and active players, they necessarily become combatants themselves:

Western journalists in Belgrade were faced with difficult choices: if they went on Serb-organized tours of NATO attack sites and reported what was presented to them as true, they risked being dupes of the Serbian regime; if they refused, they risked deportation, or what was worse, losing the pictures to their competitors. (p. 193)

It is clear that members of the Western media may well find themselves being exploited and manipulated in conflict situations, as both sides in a conflict have a stake in what the media portrays: “NATO attempted to manipulate the press into believing that alliance cohesion was being maintained and that the bombing was working. The Serbian regime attempted to use the Western media to erode domestic political support” (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 194). For both sides in the Kosovo conflict, the media was an important mediator between those involved and the general public back home in NATO and allied nations. It should be noted, however, that it is not only the

Western media being affected. Captain Kevin Barry (2004) has also noted that during peace operations, part of the Canadian Information Operations (Info Ops) mandate is to get the local media to conduct their reporting in such a way that is consistent with Western standards of journalism, especially through the removal of ethnic bias in their language and overall reporting (Barry, 2004).

It is clear that the media-military relationship is dialectical in nature: while each party may share certain assumptions, the relationship is filled with tension due to their contrasting positions. However, each party can influence the other, resulting in some sort of tangible change: the media can influence the deployment and actions of the military, and the military (like NGOs) can use the media to gain funds and public support (Benthall, 1993; Cooper, 2005; Dallaire, 2003; Ignatieff, 2000; Maloney, 2001; Teagle, 1996). It is crucial that the military recognize the dynamic quality of this complex relationship in order to thrive in this new era of conflict that Ignatieff (2000) calls the *virtual war*.¹⁷

¹⁷ As technology has developed to the point that it enables Western forces to engage in relatively casualty-free conflict, warfare is increasingly being defined by and conducted through the media. In the age of virtual war, casualties can now be defined in terms of public support, cohesion between allied nations, and funding, all of which are subject to media influence (Ignatieff, 2000).

4 Local Civilian Population-Military Relationship

The Canadian civilian population-military relationship has already been addressed, to some degree, in the preceding two sections. This section will further elaborate on this relationship and will also explore the relationship between the military and local civilian populations in conflict zones.

4.1 Canadian Civilian Population

The importance of Canadian civilians has already been discussed in the previous sections, through their participation in NGOs in Canada or abroad and through the media's ability to sway public opinion in Canada. However, Canadian civilians may interact with the military in a variety of alternative ways: through politics and policy-making as well as through the defence scientists and students employed by the Department of National Defence for research purposes. However, two additional areas of Canadian civilian involvement warrant further exploration.

Within the CAF structure, civilians may enlist in the reserves specifically for the opportunity to take part in CIMIC operations. In August 2000, the CAF enacted an initiative that recognized the reserves as being uniquely situated to train individuals to become CIMIC operators, as "reservists may have an inherent ability to interact with civilians" (Longhurst, 2005, p. 33; see also Miller, 1999; Pollick, 2000). Longhurst (2006/2007) stated that the best CIMIC operators come from diverse backgrounds and already have successful civilian careers. Thus, "they are motivated by what CIMIC does, what it represents, and the experience they will accrue" (Longhurst, 2006/2007, p. 64). The belief here then is that these individuals will be better suited to work with other civilian organizations in theatre as well as local populations because they may enlist specifically for that purpose. In addition, their lives as civilians and their training in the reserves give these individuals a unique duality in perspective that enables them to act as effective liaisons between the military and these two groups (Miller, 1999; Pollick, 2000). They may also possess certain skills that regular military personnel often lack, such as experience with diverse languages or cultures (Millard & Ronald, 2008; Pollick, 2000). In addition to the issues of skill and expertise, gender may also be a factor when interacting with local populations in theatre. For instance, some suggest that female civilians may be of greater value in these situations as they are more likely to be able to encourage local women to take part in reconstruction efforts (Iribarnegaray, 2002). As indicated earlier, however, there is one issue with the CAF relying on reservists to enroll as CIMIC operators: since they often have successful civilian careers, they may be less likely to volunteer for the required six-month rotation than are regular force members.

Civilians may also assist the military through contract work. For example, civilian contractors may be hired to assist with quick impact projects (QIPs) (Baker, 2007; see also Siegel, 2001). As mentioned earlier, QIPs are small-scale ventures that are designed to win the *hearts and minds*, or trust and confidence, of local civilian populations (Baker, 2007). In post-conflict scenarios, PRTs, which are usually staffed in part by civilians (e.g., members of CIDA or DFAIT), often engage in supporting development and reconstruction projects as a part of overall PSOs. These QIPs are designed to help with the stabilization and recovery process; however, they often provide additional benefits to the military: intelligence, acceptance of the military, and opposition to the

military's enemies (Baker, 2007). QIPs can take the form of social projects (e.g., in education or public health) or infrastructure projects (e.g., the provision of water or electricity, or the repair of buildings). We will address these in greater detail when discussing local civilian populations in conflict zones. However, for the moment, it is sufficient to note that Canadian civilians often lend their expertise to these projects.

Civilians may also deploy in a military support capacity. Thus, they may not be assisting a local populace, but rather they may be assisting in the functioning of the military itself. This may include contracting private security firms to aid in police work in theatre or contracting out to certain corporations to assist with certain products (Hills, 2001; LeBlanc, 2007; Natsios, 1995; Spearin, 2003, 2008). For example, the US army has enlisted the services of such corporations as the General Electric Company to provide electrical generators and other electrical services (Spearin, 2003). In addition, the US army has contracted others to build transportation vehicles, construct prisoner of war camps, conduct demining operations, provide simulation training, consult on strategy, and destroy enemy munitions, among other things (Spearin, 2003). In fact, Spearin (2003) notes that the privatization of many military functions has been a growing trend. He hypothesizes that the increase in private sector involvement in non-core support tasks may be related, in part, to the decrease in recruitment rates. While this literature may be specific to the US Army, a similar trend has been observed in the Canadian context, as CIDA has also been known to contract out certain programs, such as awarding security support contracts to RCMP officers (Capstick, 2007).

4.2 Local Civilian Populations in Conflict Zones

In past eras, militaries often faced each other on the battlefield, which contained a clear and defined enemy. In the post-Cold War era, the opposing forces are often less clear (MacVicar, n.d.). Civilians themselves have sometimes become the enemy, which has made military operations considerably more complex. It is difficult to determine who is a potential belligerent and who is a potential victim. Interviews with senior CAF commanders in peace support operations (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006) indicated that these situations can create difficult moral and ethical issues for CAF members. In some cases, rules of engagement (ROE) may not always be fully adapted to the current realities of international missions: for instance, some commanders indicated that they were unable to stop brutal killings or beatings because their orders stated that they were to protect their own forces but said nothing about the local civilian population. In these cases, civilians were left to the mercy of the insurgents, despite the desire to help on the part of the military (see also Cornish, 2007).

Dallaire (2003) has recounted other complexities in dealing with the local public. He watched as resources were distributed to Rwandan civilians, only to see these resources later co-opted by belligerents who were happy to supply their own forces and leave their fellow citizens without food or medical supplies. “[A]s far as I could see, there was no way to stop it except by making the issue part of the ceasefire negotiations” (Dallaire, 2003, p. 299). In addition, invisibility of insurgent actions has been a problem for the military. As mentioned earlier, terrorist strikes are, for the most part, secret affairs—unexpected and only made visible after the fact (Wilner, 2005, p. 10). The nature of this unconventional warfare has led to, perhaps, an overly draconian approach to counter-insurgency. As Janice Stein (2001) has pointed out, the military can

sometimes be seen as taking civilians hostage just as the belligerents they are trying to combat have done:

In the internecine struggle for dominance in Somalia and Sierra Leone, and even more so in the openly genocidal landscapes of Rwanda and Burundi, strategies of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare sought political control over civilian populations, inflicted costs on those populations, at times forced their movements *en masse* and, in some cases, systematically killed large numbers for political or military ends. Civilian casualties are not counted as “collateral damage” but as measures of strategic gain. (Stein, 2001, p. 21)

In addition, some have noted that militaries often discourage or actively curtail humanitarian efforts (Cornish, 2007; Stein, 2001). Individual members of the military may have the best of intentions (Dallaire 2003; Miller & Moskos, 1999; Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006). However, at a strategic level, militaries may not be blameless in the mistreatment of local civilian populations (Cornish, 2007; Stein, 2001). Whether these incidents are the result of mistakes or purposeful action, they are likely to breed mistrust amongst the local community.

One strategy for combating mistrust amongst civilians is for the military to engage in reconstruction and development projects (see also Gill, Febbraro, & Thompson, 2010; and Gill, Thompson, Febbraro, & Barnes, 2011). Short-term, small-scale QIPs may help win over the hearts and minds of locals or engender their trust and confidence in the military, leading to improved civil-military relations (Baker, 2007; Sedra, 2004). Deanna Iribarnegaray (2002) has argued that the long-term success of these projects depends on community involvement as consultants, planners, and co-reconstructors. By embracing community input, the military can be sure that these QIPs fit the needs of a specific community, have cultural relevance, and engender a sense of ownership and autonomy (Iribarnegaray, 2002; see also Gill et al., 2010, 2011; Longhurst 2006/2007; Millard & Ronald, 2008). As an added benefit to improved civilian-military relationships, the military may gain something of great value to their own operations through such projects: intelligence about enemy combatants, and other crucial information (Baker, 2007; Eriksson, 2000; Longhurst 2006/2007). In fact, the local population is one of the primary sources of intelligence (Baker, 2007). Information on insurgents is especially important in the post-Cold War era as it helps the military become more effective in their counter-insurgency measures. Longhurst presents a model showing how intelligence and information gathering and community improvement projects are integrated and impact on one another (Longhurst 2005, 2006/2007). Some have suggested that a measure of the effectiveness of a QIP is the amount of intelligence received during and after its completion (Baker, 2007). However, from the military’s perspective, it is still debatable as to whether or not these QIPs accomplish their objectives in the most effective manner. Nonetheless, this aspect of the local civilian-military relationship remains a crucial one for any military that is active in this era of unconventional warfare.

5 Conclusion

The relationship between the military and the public is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. The concept of the “public” is shifting and diffuse and is characterized by a complex inter-weaving of elements, each one affecting the other. Accordingly, the CAF must work to accept and understand the reality and nature of its interactions with the public in this new era of unconventional warfare. Without acceptance and understanding, true cooperation between the military and the public cannot be achieved.

Despite tensions that may still exist between the military and various civilian publics, the CAF appears to be making positive steps towards ameliorating these issues. The CAF is poised to make significant changes in the manner in which it interacts with civilians at home and in the field by

- creating CIMIC, DART, and PRT structures;
- looking to Canadian citizens with diverse backgrounds to staff their CIMIC cells;
- building a professional relationship with CARE Canada and other NGOs/IOs; and
- acknowledging the importance of and working with the media.

However, whether true or false, the perception among many NGOs that, for the military, the primary purposes of humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects are to win the “hearts and minds” of civilians and to gain crucial intelligence, will likely remain a point of tension. While drawing conclusions on this point is beyond the scope of this paper, it must be recognized that at least the NGO-military relationship will continue to be strained as long as there is little or no movement on this front. Both sides of this partnership seem to agree that the military is not trained primarily for humanitarian work and that the military’s efforts in this arena are coloured by what it is trained for: the application of force (see Winslow, 2002). Accordingly, humanitarian projects are done to serve this end. Some feel that, perhaps, the military should cease and desist and leave these projects to relief workers. Others are more optimistic and suggest that, with training and some adjustment to the new geopolitical realities, the military will be more than able to engage in these projects, not only for the impact of these projects on their own operations but also for the value that they bring to the community (for a more detailed discussion of these and related issues regarding “humanitarian space,” see Meharg, 2007; Peabody, 2006; Sedra, 2004).

The relationship between the military and the public can be improved in a number of ways. Greater cooperation with the media and improved transparency are often cited as ways to encourage more positive relations between the military and the media and between the military and Canadian citizens or local populations. The partnership between the military and NGOs, on the other hand, is slightly more complex. Since this relationship is still relatively new, many possibilities may exist for improvements; however, relatively few have been tried or thoroughly researched to date. Suggestions such as collaborative training opportunities, joint exercises, and joint conferences seem to merit further exploration at this stage. Certainly, any possibility that may bring about better cooperation between the two parties is worth investigating. NGOs may no longer have the option of remaining independent and neutral, and the military may need to rely on the expertise of NGOs in order to more effectively carry out their operations. Thus, this

relationship is a crucial one in theatre and must be developed with more positive interactions in mind.

Indeed, effective civil-military cooperation is still considered a desirable end goal, even as the current NGO-military relationship, or the military relationship with the public more generally, may be seen as one marked by coordination at best, given differences in power and resources that tend to favour the military over civilian entities (Ankerson, 2004; see also Holton et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2010, 2011). Nevertheless, researchers who have examined, for example, the NGO-military relationship (e.g., Winslow, 2002) have identified the importance of common goals or interdependence for effective collaboration—that is, common or superordinate goals in the broadest sense, such as doing good for humankind (see also Aronson, Bridgeman, & Geffner, 1978; Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998). On a more mundane level, NGOs and the military might have more in common than might appear at first glance: they both tend to have a “can-do” attitude, and they both often work in dangerous and austere conditions (Winslow, 2002). These similarities may provide an important basis or common ground for building communication, coordination, or even cooperation (see Thomson et al., 2010, 2011).

Thus far, the CAF seems to be making an earnest attempt at adapting to the new realities that they face. The CAF seems to be taking steps in this direction, such as embracing a relationship with CARE, creating a more positive relationship with the media, and engaging the NGO world through joint training opportunities such as the Civil-Military Seminar. Indeed, much has been achieved in a relatively short span of time. However, now is the time for the CAF to continue to examine even more closely their interactions with these various aspects of the public and to continue to commit to a course of action aimed at true civil-military cooperation.

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List of abbreviations/acronyms

3D	Defence-Diplomacy-Development
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation/coordination
CIP	Community improvement project
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DLCD	Director of Land Concepts and Designs
DRDC	Defence R&D Canada
GNP	Gross national product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International organization
JIMP	Joint-Interagency-Multinational-Public
MSF/DWB	Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGD	Other governmental department
PA	Public Affairs
PAGER	Policy Action Group on Emergency Response
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSO	Peace support operation
Psy Ops	Psychological Operations
PVO	Public volunteer organization
QIP	Quick impact project
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
ROE	Rules of engagement
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Increasingly, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has had to enter into relationships with different sectors of civilian society due to the new style of conflict in the post-Cold War era. This new era brings with it new realities and new considerations for the CAF: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are proliferating exponentially; the role of the media is becoming more complex in this new context; and civilians (i.e., local populations) themselves may at times be the very enemy that the military faces. This report will address the history of civil-military relationships, with particular attention paid to NGOs and their history of involvement with the CAF land forces. To compile this report, over 90 books, articles, and websites were consulted. The report indicates that civil-military relationships have not been optimal. However, it is acknowledged that the CAF has made significant improvements, particularly in their relationship with transnational NGOs. Following this review, suggestions are made for future attempts at civil-military cooperation.

De plus en plus, les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont à établir des rapports avec différents secteurs de la société civile en raison du nouveau type de conflits qui prévaut dans l'après-guerre froide. Cette nouvelle dynamique comporte des situations et des facteurs nouveaux pour les FC : le nombre d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) croît de manière exponentielle, le rôle des médias devient plus complexe dans ce contexte et les civils (c'est-à-dire les populations locales) parfois peuvent être eux-mêmes l'ennemi auquel les forces militaires font face. Le présent rapport aborde l'historique des relations civilo-militaires en portant une attention particulière aux ONG et à leur collaboration passée avec les forces terrestres des FC. Afin de produire le rapport, nous avons parcouru plus de 90 ouvrages, articles et sites Web. Le rapport révèle que les relations civilo-militaires n'ont certes pas été optimales. On reconnaît toutefois que les FC ont réalisé des améliorations importantes, particulièrement au chapitre des relations avec les ONG transnationales. Après cet examen, nous formulons des suggestions en vue de tentatives futures de coopération civilo-militaire.

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Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); civil-military relationships; Joint-Interagency-Multinational-Public (JIMP); non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

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