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Effects of Strategic-Level Interagency Training

The National Security Program's Exercise STRATEGIC WARRIOR

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Defence R&D Canada
Technical Memorandum
DRDC Toronto TM 2013-021
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In conducting the research described in this report, the investigators adhered to the policies and procedures set out in the "Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans," National Council on Ethics in Human Research, Ottawa, 1998, as issued jointly by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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Abstract

The current research assessed the training evaluations of senior Canadian Forces (CF), international military, and Canadian civilian Government Partners who participated in Exercise (EX) STRATEGIC WARRIOR 12, a strategic-level operational planning exercise that is part of the 10-month National Security Program at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. Fifteen student volunteers (4 Civilian, 9 CF, 2 Other Military) completed an initial demographic survey. Twenty-four volunteers (6 Civilian, 10 CF, 8 Other Military) completed a post-EX survey designed to capture students' assessments of various aspects of the STRATEGIC WARRIOR training exercise. Descriptive analyses revealed that, in general, both civilian and military participants felt that the exercise was valuable and that the team processes related to the EX within their syndicates were successful. Most civilians felt that the EX took into account important aspects of the mandates, processes, and approaches of their home organizations. However, only half of the civilians felt that the EX prepared them for future roles in developing a strategic response to a complex conflict environment. Future research should explore additional methodologies for assessing the value of interagency training: for instance, through a comparison of student and subject-matter expert assessments, longitudinal research comparing training assessments to operational processes and outcomes during comprehensive missions, and, where possible, the development of objective measures of performance and operational effectiveness.

Résumé

La présente recherche porte sur les évaluations de l'entraînement d'anciens membres des Forces canadiennes (FC), de militaires internationaux et de partenaires civils du gouvernement du Canada ayant participé à l'exercice *Strategic Warrior* 2012, un exercice de planification opérationnelle de niveau stratégique faisant partie du Programme de sécurité nationale de dix mois qui se donne au Collège des Forces armées canadiennes, à Toronto. Quinze stagiaires (quatre civils, neuf membres des FC et deux autres militaires) ont répondu à un premier sondage démographique. Vingt-quatre volontaires (six civils, dix membres des FC et huit autres militaires) ont rempli le sondage postérieur à l'exercice visant à consigner l'évaluation des stagiaires sur divers aspects de l'exercice d'entraînement *Strategic Warrior*. Des analyses descriptives révèlent que, de façon générale, les participants civils et militaires ont trouvé l'exercice intéressant et que les processus de groupe liés à l'exercice étaient réussis. La plupart des civils ont eu l'impression que l'exercice tenait compte d'importants aspects des mandats, des processus et des approches de leur organisation d'appartenance. Toutefois, seulement la moitié des civils ont eu le sentiment que l'exercice les avait préparés à d'éventuels rôles d'élaboration d'une intervention stratégique à un conflit complexe. La recherche future doit explorer des méthodes supplémentaires d'évaluer la valeur de l'entraînement interorganismes, notamment par l'entremise d'une comparaison d'évaluations de stagiaires et de spécialistes en la matière, d'une recherche longitudinale comparant des évaluations de l'entraînement aux processus et aux résultats opérationnels au cours de missions exhaustives et, si possible, l'élaboration de mesures objectives de rendement et d'efficacité opérationnelle.

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Executive summary

Strategic-Level Interagency Training for the Comprehensive Approach to Operations: The National Security Program's Exercise STRATEGIC WARRIOR

Megan. M. Thompson; Kelly A. Piasentin; Angela R. Febbraro; Tara Holton; Ritu Gill; Dan Eustace; DRDC Toronto TM 2013-021; Defence R&D Canada

Background: Despite calls for interagency training opportunities as an important way to ensure better coordination within comprehensive missions, few such opportunities exist. Moreover, to date there have been even fewer systematic assessments of the benefits of such training for comprehensive operations.

Objective: The current research assessed the training evaluations of senior Canadian Forces (CF), international military and Canadian civilian Government Partners who participated in Exercise (EX) STRATEGIC WARRIOR 12, a strategic-level operational planning exercise that is part of the 10-month National Security Program (NSP) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto.

Participants and Procedure: Fifteen student volunteers (4 Civilian, 9 CF, 2 Other Military) volunteered to complete an initial survey that assessed basic demographic data (e.g., type of home organization), and previous experience with, as well as training and education related to the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to operations. Twenty-four volunteers (6 Civilian, 10 CF, 8 Other Military) completed a post-EX survey that was distributed on the final day of the exercise and was designed to capture students' assessments of various aspects of the STRATEGIC WARRIOR training exercise.

Results: Most of the 15 participants who completed the initial survey felt that they had a good understanding of CA going into the EX and most had previously participated in some form of campaign planning process at the strategic level, although there was little indication that participants had participated in fully joined up military-civilian training prior to the NSP.

With respect to the post-EX results:

- (a) Most participants felt that they were adequately prepared for the EX; however, there was some desire for more information on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and/or United Nations (UN) planning and decision-making processes.
- (b) Most participants "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that (i) overall, the EX was successful, (ii) information sharing during the EX was adequate, (iii) situational awareness was achieved, and (iv) the right tools and resources were available to develop a strategic response.
- (c) While most participants felt that the scenario was "rich, detailed, complex, and/or realistic," feedback also indicated that the role play aspects were not as well developed and more background information would be required to make these elements more useful.

- (d) Significantly, the majority of participants felt that the EX prepared them for future roles as senior leaders in a strategic, comprehensive context. For example, participants indicated feeling more prepared as a result of taking part in the EX because it gave them a better understanding of the complexities and key considerations made at the strategic level, the various chains of command, and the dynamics between NATO and the UN. Still, almost half of the civilians indicated that the EX had prepared them for future roles in developing a strategic-level response to a complex conflict.
- (e) At the same time, most participants felt that the NSP provided the right sort of intellectual preparation for the EX. For example, participants noted that the NSP taught them to develop an analytical/critical approach and to analyze factors at the strategic level, and that the knowledge gained from the NSP was applied during the EX.
- (f) With respect to EX improvements, common themes included refining the deliverables, distributing a list of common acronyms, providing more information on NATO/UN structures, roles, and processes at the beginning of the EX, and making better use of the senior mentors.

Conclusions and Significance: The benefits of this study are twofold. First, designed with the input of a NSP staff officer, the current research provided the NSP course instructors with detailed student assessments in order to evaluate exercise objectives systematically and to make changes to the structure and content of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR. In addition, this research also provided empirical evidence concerning the belief that interagency training venues are among the best means of overcoming the many challenges inherent in the CA to operations. Overall, the results demonstrated that, despite the complexities of planning and executing interagency training, students value the experience. In general, civilian and military NSP students were quite positive in terms of the value of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR itself, how the EX was conducted, and the quality of the team processes that occurred in their syndicates during the EX. Importantly, civilian and military respondents were quite positive concerning the EX as preparation for their future roles in strategic-level CA planning in that the experience provided them with a better understanding of the complexities and key considerations related to such missions, and a better understanding of the various chains of commands.

Second, the research contributes to a greater understanding of the key social and organizational issues that affect collaboration in a comprehensive environment. Specifically, our research program to date has underscored the value of interagency training in a variety of contexts including pre-deployment mission-specific training (e.g., EX MAPLE GUARDIAN), and more general educational contexts such as the Civil-Military Seminar (a two-day information exchange and training seminar originally organized by the Formation Operations Center of Excellence, CFB Kingston). Such systematic feedback is crucial to improve the ability of decision-makers to address issues based on input from the people who do the jobs, to improve planning and training for these contexts, and thus to enhance the probability of mission success.

Next Steps: Future research should explore additional measures that can be developed to assess the value of interagency training: for instance, through a comparison of student and subject-matter expert assessments, longitudinal research comparing training assessments to operational

processes and outcomes during comprehensive missions, and, where possible, the development of objective measures of performance and operational effectiveness.

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Sommaire

Entraînement interorganismes de niveau stratégique pour une approche exhaustive à l'égard des opérations : l'exercice *Strategic Warrior* du Programme de sécurité nationale

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Contexte : Malgré les appels lancés en fonction de possibilités d'entraînement interorganismes comme moyen d'assurer une meilleure coordination des missions exhaustives, les possibilités sont rares. Il y a même eu, jusqu'ici, encore moins d'évaluations systématiques des avantages que procure cet entraînement pour les opérations exhaustives.

Objectif : La présente recherche porte sur les évaluations de l'entraînement d'anciens membres des Forces canadiennes (FC), de militaires internationaux et de partenaires civils du gouvernement du Canada ayant participé à l'exercice *Strategic Warrior* 2012, un exercice de planification opérationnelle de niveau stratégique faisant partie du Programme de sécurité nationale de dix mois qui se donne au Collège des Forces armées canadiennes, à Toronto.

Participants et procédure : Quinze stagiaires (quatre civils, neuf membres des FC et deux autres militaires) se sont portés volontaires pour répondre à un premier sondage qui évaluait des données démographiques de base (p. ex., le type d'organisation d'appartenance) et des expériences antérieures de même que l'entraînement et l'éducation ayant trait à l'approche exhaustive à l'égard des opérations. Vingt-quatre volontaires (six civils, dix membres des FC et huit autres militaires) ont rempli un sondage postérieur à l'exercice qui leur a été remis le dernier jour de l'exercice et qui visait à consigner leur évaluation de divers aspects de l'exercice d'entraînement *Strategic Warrior*.

Résultats : La plupart des quinze participants ayant rempli le sondage initial ont eu le sentiment d'avoir bien compris l'approche exhaustive à l'égard de l'exercice et avaient déjà participé à une forme ou l'autre de processus de planification de campagne au niveau stratégique, bien qu'il y avait peu d'indications que les participants avaient déjà participé à un entraînement civilo-militaire entièrement interarmées avant l'exercice du PSN.

Concernant les résultats postérieurs à l'exercice :

- (a) la plupart des participants estiment avoir été adéquatement préparés pour l'exercice. Toutefois, certains auraient souhaité avoir plus de renseignements sur la planification et les processus décisionnels de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et/ou de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU);
- (b) la plupart des participants « ont convenu » ou « fortement convenu » que : (i) dans l'ensemble, l'exercice a été une réussite; (ii) l'échange de l'information pendant l'exercice a été adéquat; (iii) la connaissance de la situation a été atteinte; (iv) les ressources et les outils appropriés étaient disponibles pour élaborer une intervention stratégique;

- (c) même si la plupart des participants ont eu le sentiment que le scénario était « riche, détaillé, complexe et/ou réaliste », des commentaires ont également révélé que les aspects des jeux de rôle n'étaient pas suffisamment élaborés et que de plus amples renseignements généraux auraient été nécessaires pour que ces éléments soient plus utiles;
- (d) en général, la majorité des participants estiment que l'exercice les a préparés à jouer leur futur rôle de chef dans un contexte exhaustif et stratégique. À titre d'exemple, les participants estiment être mieux préparés parce que l'exercice leur a offert une meilleure compréhension des complexités et des considérations clés prises au niveau stratégique, des diverses chaînes de commandement et de la dynamique entre l'OTAN et l'ONU;
- (e) en même temps, la plupart des participants estiment que le PSN offre le type approprié de préparation intellectuelle pour l'exercice. À titre d'exemple, les participants ont noté que le PSN leur a enseigné à élaborer une démarche analytique/critique, à analyser des facteurs au niveau stratégique et que les connaissances acquises du PSN étaient appliquées pendant l'exercice;
- (f) concernant les améliorations de l'exercice, des thèmes communs comprenaient la précision des produits livrables, la distribution d'une liste d'acronymes communs, la fourniture de plus de renseignements sur les structures de l'OTAN/l'ONU, les rôles et les processus au début de l'exercice et une meilleure utilisation des mentors supérieurs.

Conclusions et importance : Les avantages de cette étude comportent deux volets. Premièrement, conçue avec la participation d'un officier d'état-major du PSN, la recherche actuelle offre aux instructeurs du cours de PSN des évaluations détaillées sur les stagiaires afin d'évaluer systématiquement les objectifs de l'exercice et d'apporter des changements à la structure et au contenu de l'exercice *Strategic Warrior*. Cette recherche fournit également une preuve empirique concernant la croyance que l'entraînement interorganismes compte parmi les meilleurs moyens de surmonter les nombreux enjeux inhérents à l'approche exhaustive à l'égard des opérations. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats montrent que, malgré la complexité de la planification et de l'exécution de l'entraînement interorganismes, les stagiaires ont beaucoup apprécié l'expérience. De façon générale, les stagiaires civils et militaires du PSN ont été plutôt positifs à l'égard de l'exercice *Strategic Warrior* lui-même, de la façon dont l'exercice a été mené et de la qualité du travail d'équipe réalisé pendant l'exercice. Les répondants civils et militaires se sont dits plutôt positifs concernant l'exercice comme élément préparatoire à leurs rôles futurs à l'égard de la planification d'une approche exhaustive de niveau stratégique, du fait que l'expérience leur a fourni une meilleure compréhension des complexités et des considérations clés liées à de telles missions ainsi qu'une meilleure compréhension des diverses chaînes de commandement.

Deuxièmement, la recherche favorise une meilleure compréhension des questions sociales et organisationnelles clés qui affectent la collaboration dans un environnement exhaustif. De façon plus précise, notre programme de recherche a souligné, jusqu'ici, l'importance de l'entraînement interorganismes dans toute une gamme de contextes, y compris l'entraînement préalable au déploiement propre à une mission (p. ex., l'exercice *Maple Guardian*) et dans des contextes éducatifs plus généraux comme le Séminaire civilo-militaire. Ce genre de commentaire systématique est essentiel pour améliorer la capacité des décideurs à traiter les problèmes fondés

sur les renseignements des gens qui font le travail, pour améliorer la planification et l'entraînement de ces contextes et pour améliorer la probabilité qu'une mission réussisse.

Prochaines étapes : La recherche future doit explorer des méthodes supplémentaires d'évaluer la valeur de l'entraînement interorganismes, notamment par l'entremise d'une comparaison d'évaluations de stagiaires et de spécialistes en la matière, d'une recherche longitudinale comparant des évaluations de l'entraînement aux processus et aux résultats opérationnels au cours de missions exhaustives et, si possible, l'élaboration de mesures objectives de rendement et d'efficacité opérationnelle.

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Table of contents

Abstract	i
Résumé	i
Executive summary	iii
Sommaire	vii
Table of contents	xi
List of tables	xii
Acknowledgements	xiii
1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Joint Training	1
1.3 Strategic-Level Interagency Training: Exercise STRATEGIC WARRIOR	2
1.4 Study Objectives.....	3
2 Method.....	4
2.1 Participants and Procedure	4
3 Results	5
3.1 Survey I	5
3.1.1 Prior CA Experience, Education, and Training	5
3.1.2 Pre-EX Understanding of Comprehensive Approach.....	5
3.2 Survey II: Post-EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR Evaluations.....	6
3.2.1 Preparation for EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR	6
3.2.2 Assessments of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR Experience.....	7
3.2.3 Home Organization Reflected in EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR	9
3.2.4 Improved Understanding of UN/NATO	9
3.2.5 Changes in Understanding of CA Concept.....	10
3.2.6 Overall Effectiveness of the EX Scenario	11
3.2.7 Preparation for Future Roles.....	13
3.2.8 NSP as Intellectual Preparation for the EX	14
3.2.9 Recommendations for Improving EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR.....	15
4 Discussion and Conclusions	17
4.1 Significance	19
References	20
Annex A Information Sheet—Information Sheet	23
Annex B EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR SURVEY I.....	24
Annex C EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR SURVEY II	26
List of acronyms.....	30

List of tables

Table 1: Participants' definitions of CA, by group.	5
Table 2: Level of preparedness for the EX, by group.	6
Table 3: Most useful EX preparation, by group.	7
Table 4: Additional preparation that would have been beneficial, by group.	7
Table 5: Participant assessments of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, by group.	8
Table 6: Extent to which the EX took into account participants' home organization, by group. ...	9
Table 7: Extent to which the EX provided a better understanding of UN and NATO, by group. ...	9
Table 8: Did understanding of CA change as a result of the EX, by group.	10
Table 9: Participants' comments on the usefulness of the EX scenario, by group.	12
Table 10: Participants' comments on whether the EX prepared them for future roles, by group.	13
Table 11: Participants' comments on NSP providing intellectual preparation for the EX, by group.	14
Table 12: Participants' recommendations for improvements to future EX STRATEGIC WARRIORS, by group.	15

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The development, coordination, and application of an integrated Whole of Government (WoG) response to meet national strategic-level objectives (i.e., the Comprehensive Approach [CA] to operations) first surfaced within Canada in the Liberal Government's *International Policy Statement* (Government of Canada, 2005). Since then, the approach has been reaffirmed at the national level. For instance, it was a key recommendation in the *Manley Report* (Government of Canada, 2008) that reviewed progress and sought to address issues that were arising midway during the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. Within the Canadian Forces (CF), the CA has been referred to as an important enabler of current and future operations, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex mission environment (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). Achieving a truly CA involves an increased emphasis on coordination and collaboration among the diverse agencies that form the constituent parts of a WoG/CA approach than has previously been the norm in international missions.

Perhaps it is not surprising then that a number of challenges to smooth and effective CA missions has been documented in countries (including Canada) that have adopted such an integrated approach. For instance, at the organizational level, conflicting political agendas (or at least incompatible objectives); organizational structure disparities (hierarchical and centralized vs. flat and decentralized); incompatible financial, knowledge management, and communication systems; little or no corporate memory; few formal lessons learned mechanisms; poor funding and personnel shortfalls; and "competition for resources and agency profile" (Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 13) can all undermine mission effectiveness in comprehensive operations (see also deConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006; Winslow, 2002). At the individual level, a common sentiment from military personnel is that the civilians with whom they work are often disorganized and cannot make timely decisions, while some civilians have expressed that militaries tend to 'take over' in the mission area, ignoring civilian input and expecting civilians to adopt military procedures and planning. Civilians also voice concerns that the military undertakes aspects of the mission in which it has no expertise, with civilians often remaining suspicious of the military's true motives (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown & Flear, 2011a; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown & Flear, 2011b).

Indeed, the extent to which these factors have contributed to increased tensions between civilian and military personnel has led some CA researchers to conclude that "[b]y all accounts the consensus ... at the policy level often bears little relationship to the messy reality of coordination efforts and practices" (Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 26; see also Rietjens, 2008), and that consistent and effective collaboration in CA missions remains an elusive goal (Patrick & Brown, 2007). Given the impact of these various challenges upon operational and mission success, there is a clear need to better understand the factors that might enhance collaboration efforts among military personnel and civilian Government Partners (GPs) who will be called to work together within CA missions.

1.2 Joint Training

The CA literature has suggested that joint training opportunities are one important way to ensure better coordination in comprehensive missions (e.g., Jenny, 2001; Mockaitis, 2004; Spence,

2002). Joint training is hypothesized to encourage information sharing and the development of a shared understanding of the cultures, norms, priorities, and constraints of the various agencies that will be required to work together before hitting the high risk and stress of operations. Despite these calls, relatively few opportunities exist for training of this kind for CA civilian players and the military as such training involves considerable resources in terms of planning, execution, and logistics (Thompson, Febraro, & Blais, 2011). To date, there have been even fewer systematic assessments of participants' perceptions of interagency training for comprehensive operations.

Our research efforts in the past two years have, in part, begun to address this knowledge gap. For example, our previous research assessed the impact of the joint training opportunity afforded by the CF-led Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN (EX MG) from the perspective of civilian government agency participants (Thompson et al., 2011). Although the month-long exercise was primarily designed as the final confirmation exercise for Canadian Battle Groups about to deploy on Operation (OP) ATHENA in Afghanistan, increasingly WoG partners were invited to participate in EX MG in order to facilitate collaboration among members of Canadian WoG teams that would soon be working together in Afghanistan. Results of this initial study underscored the value of such training for the civilian participants in that it provided an opportunity to meet and get to know their military counterparts prior to deploying, and it provided some introduction to military procedures, chains of command, and acronyms prior to landing in theatre.

A subsequent study explored the perceptions of training effectiveness among members of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), GPs, and the CF who participated in the inaugural Civil-Military Seminar that was coordinated and hosted by the Formation Operations Centre of Excellence at the Canadian Army Command and Staff College in Kingston, Ontario. One goal of this seminar was to establish an education and training opportunity for these groups to interact in a meaningful way (Thompson, Febraro, & Holton, 2012). As such, the two-day seminar consisted of a first day of briefings and discussions by representatives from each participating organization and a second day devoted to a hypothetical crisis response exercise. Although participants noted some areas for improvement, results across these studies suggested that both military and civilian participants generally found these events to be beneficial in terms of developing a greater understanding of the roles and responsibilities, terminologies, and objectives of the other WoG players, and in terms of facilitating collaboration between WoG teams in future CA missions (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2012).

1.3 Strategic-Level Interagency Training: Exercise STRATEGIC WARRIOR

The EX MG and the Civil-Military Seminar studies explored WoG collaboration at the tactical/operational level. The present study builds on this previous work by exploring military and civilian participant perceptions of the training effectiveness of a strategic-level operational planning exercise conducted during the 10-month National Security Program (NSP) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), Toronto. The NSP develops executive leadership skills in a senior cadre of students, specifically CF and International Officers of the colonel or naval captain rank and senior public servants from a variety of GPs including (but not limited to) the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Importantly for the present research, one of the goals of the NSP is “to develop participants' capacity to design comprehensive national and multinational campaign plans to generate strategic effects in complex security environments” (CFC, 2013, p. 1-4/9). To this end, NSP students participate in a series of three WoG strategic planning exercises. The second of these planning exercises, Exercise (EX)

STRATEGIC WARRIOR, has the specific objective of providing students with an opportunity to apply the concepts of campaigning to a complex Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) operating environment. Thus, EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR offers a unique opportunity to assess aspects of strategic-level WoG planning for CA missions.

1.4 Study Objectives

The current study was designed to capture and document civilian and military participants' perceptions of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR in terms of the opportunities afforded for information sharing, planning, coordination, and collaboration. As an in-depth systematic assessment of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR has not previously been undertaken at CFC (Eustace, personal communication, 2012), the current study contained both quantitative and open-ended survey questions that integrated our previously developed survey questions with questions of specific relevance to NSP staff. Thus, the results of this study are intended to inform NSP course evaluation and development in terms of the training value of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, particularly with respect to information sharing, planning, coordination, and collaboration. More broadly, the study can provide information that may be used to provide feedback concerning other strategic-level training for WoG missions that involve the CF and non-military (government and other civilian) actors. Finally, this research provides additional information to our overall research program investigating the effectiveness of interagency training as preparation for WoG/CA missions.

2 Method

2.1 Participants and Procedure

Participants in this study were 26 of the 29 NSP students¹ who participated in EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, which took place on June 4–8, 2012, at CFC in Toronto, Ontario. Fifteen students (4 Civilian², 9 CF, 2 Other Military) volunteered to complete an initial survey and 24 volunteers (6 Civilian, 10 CF, 8 Other Military) completed a post-EX survey.

Approximately one week prior to the EX, one of the study's investigators, Major Dan Eustace (a staff officer at CFC), invited students of the EX to volunteer to complete a short paper-and-pencil survey (Survey I) that was developed by the Defence Research and Development Canada - Toronto (DRDC Toronto) research team in consultation with Major Eustace. Prior to participating in the study, all individuals were assured that their participation was entirely voluntary, that their responses would remain confidential, that only authorized researchers would have access to the data, and that only group results would be presented (see Annex A for the participant Information Sheet). Survey I took approximately 5 minutes to complete and included demographic questions as well as questions that inquired about participants' previous WoG experiences (e.g., training/education and deployments), understanding of CA, and experience in strategic planning (see Annex B for Survey I).

On the final day of the EX, the students were invited to complete a second paper-and-pencil survey (Survey II) that was developed by the DRDC Toronto research team in consultation with Major Eustace. Survey II inquired about participants' experiences at the EX in terms of the opportunities afforded for information sharing, planning, coordination, and collaboration (see Annex C for Survey II). Given the small number of respondents, an anonymous survey and an unsigned consent procedure was used for both surveys.

¹ Two participants who completed the initial survey did not complete the post-EX survey and 11 participants who completed the post-EX survey did not complete the initial survey.

² Due to the very small sample size, the home organization information is not presented to protect the anonymity of civilian participants.

3 Results

3.1 Survey I

3.1.1 Prior CA Experience, Education, and Training

Five of the 15 respondents had previously deployed on a prior CA mission or assignment, and 9 of the 15 respondents (3 Civilian, 5 CF, 1 Other Military) had received some prior WoG training/education (most had one or two prior CA training/education experiences).

While some previous CA education and training was evident, there was little evidence of interagency training (i.e., military and civilians taking the same courses) for the students. One CF member had participated in the Canadian Securities Studies Programme (CFC), and another in the Defence Resource Management Course (National Defense University of Malaysia). One civilian had participated in Disaster Assistance Response Team training (CFB Kingston) and another in Hostile Environment Training (Peace Support Training Centre, CFB Kingston), and one other military member had undertaken International Security Assistance Force deployment training.

Seven of the 15 respondents (2 Civilian, 3 CF, 2 Other Military) indicated that they had previously participated in a campaign planning process (apart from CFC exercises) at the strategic level: for example, national planning with other government departments; international exercises (e.g., NATO); a command and staffing program in the United States; NATO and European Union operations (e.g., OP ATHENA and Bosnia).

3.1.2 Pre-EX Understanding of Comprehensive Approach

Four of the 15 respondents (1 Civilian, 3 CF) rated their level of understanding of the CA concept as “adequate,” 4 respondents (2 CF, 2 Other Military) rated their understanding of CA as “good,” and 7 respondents (3 Civilian, 4 CF) rated their understanding as “very good.” As Table 1 shows, CA definitions were largely similar across the self-reported levels of understanding, although those who indicated a “good” or a “very good” understanding of CA tended to include the coordination, integration, or synchronization of the various government department activities as part of the definition of CA.

Table 1: Participants’ definitions of CA, by group.

Participants who rated their understanding as ‘Adequate’ (4 of 15 respondents)
<u>Civilian</u> : Canada - multiple government departments & agencies contribute on an endeavour outside the country. NATO - multinational, multiple gov't depts. & agencies contribute to an endeavour
<u>CF</u> : An approach that integrates government's response to stimulating development, campaign design and planning ...
<u>CF</u> : An approach that is multidepartmental and includes NGOs and multinational-National organizations. The approach includes consideration of all aspects including culture, etc.
<u>CF</u> : It is similar to WoG approach but does not have a central control of a gov't but does try and maximize PME to achieve an outcome.
Participants who rated their understanding as ‘Good’ (4 of 15 respondents)
<u>CF</u> : To work together in a comprehensive way. Collaboration with other departments.
<u>CF</u> : An approach that looks to integrate and/or coordinate mandates from different organizations (gov't/provincial/NGO) into a coordinated effort.

<u>Other Military</u> : CA to Ops is the synchronized application of all government's means nationally and internationally to achieve desired effects politically, economically, and societally [sic]..
<u>Other Military</u> : An approach that covers A to Z, that looks at all aspects of National Power and works as an Interagency Team.
Participants who rated their understanding as 'Very Good' (7 of 15 respondents)
<u>Civilian</u> : The coordinated application of national, international, and NGO capabilities towards a common purpose of improving human conditions.
<u>Civilian</u> : In line with the original sort of the term from the '08 Summit Declaration to adapt "a comprehensive approach" (i.e. not one approach, not 'capitalized' - more in line with the longer standing idea of (UN) multidimensional operations (or problems): those for which the ends, objectives (or other sp. assigned tasks) require more than one 'line of operation' or one type of actor - in the case of NATO, specifically that the objectives cannot be achieved solely through military tasks. Somehow (probably when the military planners got a hold of it) this became 'the comprehensive approach' to ops and then "The Comprehensive Approach" as if there is one agreed, established and developed design to conducting such operations (there is not). And even within NATO, each gov't has different ways of organizing themselves for this and every op is different.
<u>Civilian</u> : WoG+: Government (multiple departments and levels fed/prov/municipal/aboriginal) and non-government (NGOs, CSOs, private sector, etc.) working together in a coordinated, possibly integrated way to prepare and/or respond to a problem/situation. Also, int'l and national aspects too (e.g., UN, NATO, etc.)
<u>CF</u> : CA is an approach that integrates the military, government agencies, humanitarian organizations, and the rule of law in execution of operations to achieve national or international objectives.
<u>CF</u> : Employing the full range of a nation's (or organization's - NATO) instruments of power, military and non-military, in the conduct of operations.
<u>CF</u> : It is to bring all "whole of government" players together to synchronize efforts to avoid duplication etc. for an operation; using the same priorities.
<u>CF</u> : The ability of synchronizing the instruments of national power in order to achieve the desired government end state

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

3.2 Survey II: Post-EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR Evaluations

3.2.1 Preparation for EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR

As Table 2 shows, most civilian participants indicated that they felt “somewhat” prepared for the EX, while the majority of CF participants indicated that they felt “somewhat” or “mostly” prepared, with three indicating that they felt “a little” prepared for the EX. The majority of members of other militaries (7 of 8) rated themselves as “mostly” prepared for the exercise.

Table 2: Level of preparedness for the EX, by group.

	1 Not at all	2 A little	3 Somewhat	4 Mostly	5 Completely
Civilian (<i>n</i> = 6)	1 (16.7%)	-	4 (66.7%)	1 (16.7%)	-
CF (<i>n</i> = 10)	-	3 (30%)	3 (30%)	4 (40%)	-
Other Military (<i>n</i> = 8)	-	-	1 (12.5%)	7 (87.5%)	-
Total (<i>N</i> = 24)	1 (4.2%)	3 (12.5%)	8 (33.3%)	12 (50%)	-

As Table 3 shows, the majority of respondents in the Civilian (4), CF (5), and Other Military (4) groups indicated that the most useful forms of preparation for the EX were the reading package and/or documentation (e.g., handouts and information on DND Learn). Military participants (2

CF, 3 Other Military) also indicated that the lectures were useful as well. Beyond this, individual military respondents commented on the usefulness of the strategy formulation exercises (1 CF), discussions on campaign design (1 Other Military), prior exercises (1 CF), subject matter expert (SME) meetings (1 Other Military), and the pre-brief (1 CF).

Table 3: Most useful EX preparation, by group.

	Civilian	CF	Other Military
Reading package/documentation	4	5	4
Lectures	-	2	3
Strategy formulation exercise	-	1	-
Discussions on campaign design	-	-	1
Prior exercises	-	1	-
SME meetings	-	-	1
Pre-brief	-	1	-

Thirteen participants (2 Civilian, 7 CF, 4 Other Military) commented that they would have benefited from having more information (e.g., briefings, lectures, or presentations) on NATO and/or UN planning and decision-making processes prior to the EX (see Table 4). The remaining suggestions for additional preparation were spread among a variety of options including learning objectives/expected outcomes of the EX (1 Civilian, 2 CF, 1 Other Military), more information on campaign design (2 Civilian, 1 CF, 1 Other Military), and more information on how NATO and UN structures/processes interrelate (1 Civilian, 1 CF, 1 Other Military).

Table 4: Additional preparation that would have been beneficial, by group.

	Civilian	CF	Other Military
UN/NATO planning/decision making processes	2	7	4
Learning objectives/expected outcomes of the EX	1	2	1
Campaign design	2	1	1
How NATO and UN structures/processes interrelate	1	1	1
Where students fit into the EX (role playing)	-	2	-
Work process for the EX	1	1	-
CA to operations	-	1	-
Relationship between strategy formulation and campaign planning	-	1	-

3.2.2 Assessments of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR Experience

As Table 5 shows, across groups, most participants tended to indicate “agreement” or “strong agreement” to most of the statements (a) that the EX was successful overall, (b) that information sharing was adequate, (c) that situational awareness was achieved, and (d) that the right tools and resources were available to develop a strategic response.

Moreover, across groups, Civilian, CF, and Other Military participants either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that their syndicate communicated well, developed a common and unified approach to strategic planning, and exchanged ideas freely. They also “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the information provided in the functional SME meetings was helpful.

One departure from the overall positive pattern of results was that all civilian and most CF participants indicated that they were relatively less clear concerning their roles and responsibilities during the EX.

Table 5: Participant assessments of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, by group.

	Civilian (n = 6)					CF (n = 10)					Other Military (n = 8)				
	D	SD	SA	A	StA	D	SD	SA	A	StA	D	SD	SA	A	StA
From my perspective, the EX was successful.	-	-	1	5	-	-	2	1	5	2	-	-	-	6	2
My role and responsibilities in the EX were clear.	1	2	3	-	-	1	2	4	3	-	-	-	4	2	2
Information sharing during the EX was adequate.	-	1	2	3	-	1	2	1	6	-	-	-	1	5	2
Shared situational awareness was achieved during the EX.	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	4	5	1	-	-	1	5	2
The right tools/resources to develop a strategic response to the EX problem were provided (e.g., readings, DND Learn, SME mentors, etc.).	-	1	1	4	-	1	1	-	7	1	-	-	1	5	2
My syndicate communicated well.	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	4	6	-	-	-	2	6
My syndicate exchanged ideas freely.	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	3	7	-	-	-	2	6
My syndicate was able to develop a common and unified approach to strategic planning.	-	-	-	4	2	-	-	1	4	5	-	-	-	2	6
The information provided during the functional SME meetings was helpful.	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	8	1	-	-	-	5	3
Total	1	4	10	25	14	3	7	13	45	23	-	-	7	34	31

D = Disagree; SD = Slightly Disagree; SA = Slightly Agree; A = Agree; StA = Strongly Agree.
 No participant indicated "Strongly Disagree" to any of these statements.

3.2.3 Home Organization Reflected in EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR

A further seven questions assessed the degree to which the EX took into account the respondent's home organization approach to (a) planning, (b) procedures, (c) goals and objectives, (d) values, (e) mandates or roles, (f) communication styles, and (g) terminology.

As Table 6 shows, although the "somewhat" and "mostly" categories were most often used by the three groups across this set of questions, civilian respondents were more likely to select "somewhat" whereas military personnel were more likely to select "mostly" in response to these questions.

Table 6: Extent to which the EX took into account participants' home organization, by group.

	Civilian (n = 6)					CF (n = 10)					Other Military (n = 8)				
	N	AL	S	M	C	N	AL	S	M	C	N	AL	S	M	C
Planning	1	-	4	1	-	1	-	1	7	1	-	-	3	4	1
Procedures	2	-	4	-	-	1	-	2	6	1	-	-	3	4	1
Goals/objectives	-	-	2	3	1	-	1	1	6	2	-	-	2	5	1
Values	-	-	2	1	3	-	1	1	6	2	-	-	2	4	2
Mandates or roles	1	-	1	3	1	-	-	4	6	-	-	-	1	4	2
Communication style	-	1	2	3	-	-	1	4	5	-	-	-	1	6	1
Terminology	1	2	3	-	-	-	1	2	7	-	-	-	1	7	
Total	5	3	18	11	5	2	4	15	43	6	-	-	13	34	8

N = Not at all; AL = A little; S = Somewhat; M = Mostly; C = Completely.

3.2.4 Improved Understanding of UN/NATO

As Table 7 shows, most civilian participants indicated that the EX provided a "somewhat" better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, resources, and constraints of the UN ($n = 4$) and NATO ($n = 4$), while members of other militaries were more likely to indicate that the EX provided them with a "mostly" better understanding of the UN ($n = 4$) and NATO ($n = 8$), although their responses were more distributed across "a little" ($n = 1$) and "somewhat" ($n = 3$) for the UN. Interestingly, there was a greater dispersion across response options for members of the CF, with the largest proportion indicating that the EX provided "a little" or "somewhat" better understanding. However, these lower ratings may well be due to their greater knowledge of these organizations prior to the EX.

Table 7: Extent to which the EX provided a better understanding of UN and NATO, by group.

	Civilian (n = 6)					CF (n = 10) ^a					Other Military (n = 8)				
	N	AL	S	M	C	N	AL	S	M	C	N	AL	S	M	C
UN	-	2	4	-	-	2	3	2	2	1	-	1	3	4	-
NATO	-	1	4	1	-	-	2	3	2	2	-	-	-	8	-
Total	-	3	8	1	-	2	5	5	2	3	-	1	3	12	-

N = Not at all; AL = A little; S = Somewhat; M = Mostly; C = Completely.

^aNote that one CF participant did not respond to the NATO question.

3.2.5 Changes in Understanding of CA Concept

As Table 8 shows, ten participants (4 Civilian, 2 CF, 4 Other Military) indicated that their understanding of the CA to operations improved, whereas 6 participants (1 Civilian, 3 CF, 2 Other Military) indicated that their understanding did not change. The remaining 8 participants (1 Civilian, 5 CF, 2 Other Military) reported mixed feedback, indicating, for example, that their understanding improved “very little” or “somewhat.”

For participants reporting an improvement in their understanding of the CA to operations, specific aspects or areas of improvement included (a) political considerations ($n = 1$), (b) roles and responsibilities ($n = 1$), (c) the application of CA to operations ($n = 2$), (d) the different doctrinal approaches of different organizations (i.e., NATO, UN, etc.) ($n = 1$), and (e) the complex relationships among theatre actors ($n = 1$).

Table 8: Did understanding of CA change as a result of the EX, by group.

Civilian	Response
Not really.	Mixed
No. It is not entirely clear whether CA aims to integrate UN & NATO objectives or merely take them into account. What about other actors? NGOs, CSOs etc.	No
Reinforced knowledge level.	Yes
Yes, better awareness of role – responsibilities.	Yes
Yes, Especially in regards to the different doctrinal approaches of different organizations (i.e. NATO, UN, etc.).	Yes
Yes, previously vague concepts were made clearer, better understanding of complex relationships among in theatre factors.	Yes
CF	
I have extensive prior knowledge and have edited a publication on CA and the military.	Mixed
It was difficult at the beginning to bring together NATO & UN objectives but the EX facilitated this learning through the scenario.	Mixed
Not really. At the international level, interests and compromises have to be considered and made.	Mixed
Somewhat, in that it is very similar to combining many government departments in a Canadian context.	Mixed
Very little - more explanation.	Mixed
No, but the importance of the CA was reinforced.	No
No, this exercise did nothing to improve my level of understanding, which was already high.	No
No, we were well prepared during the year when it comes down to the CA. We were not military centric.	No
Understanding yes. Mechanisms to execute CA are apparently non-existent. Recognize we are trying to plan something that in reality only evolves.	Yes
Yes, I now have a better understanding of the CA and how it is applied.	Yes
Other Military	
Not really.	Mixed
Not really.	Mixed
No, having an occasion to be posted in NATO I had enough knowledge on CA that was confirmed during the exercise.	No
No.	No

Helped with the understanding of political considerations.	Yes
My understanding of the CA to ops has increased considerably.	Yes
My understanding was enhanced further by the EX.	Yes
Yes, the CA approach takes into account the entire environment, their perspectives, interest, and caveats along with the civilian and civilian agency perspective.	Yes

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

3.2.6 Overall Effectiveness of the EX Scenario

Just over half of the participants commented that the scenario used in the EX was useful in that it was rich, detailed, complex, and/or realistic (4 Civilian, 5 CF, 4 Other Military). Of these 13 participants, four noted, however, that the nature of the EX did not facilitate role play, and two commented that the roles were not necessary for meeting the deliverables. The remaining participants indicated that they did not feel immersed in their role as a NATO or UN representative due to either the lack of understanding of the different organizations ($n = 1$), the structure of the EX ($n = 1$), and/or the deliverable requirements ($n = 2$). These comments were similar across the three groups (see Table 9).

Table 9: Participants' comments on the usefulness of the EX scenario, by group.

Civilian
Good scenario with necessary level of complexity.
I did not feel like a real UN rep because I did not have enough understanding of their values, aims etc. I'm still not sure I understand how the UN operates/plans in such an enviro. While I learned things, I think I could have learned more if the EX was restructured. The scenario was realistic through [though?] with its complexity.
Scenario was rich and complex - although not much "staying in the role" occurred.
Would have liked more lead up presentations on UN and NATO relations or interaction. Needed better exposure to campaign design or use strategic formulation model.
Yes, by way of overall discussion. Utility of role playing was limited.
Yes, very rich, was somewhat immersed in my role, but mostly was collaborating as an equal team member.
CF
A very rich, detailed exercise scenario that provided a solid basis for the exercise. It was not sufficient to provide a sense of immersion in my Tx Role.
Did not feel that UN members got to "stay" in their roles due to deliverable requirements, etc.
I did not find the EX useful. I was a leader without a SME. Much of the Ex for first 3 days was confusing which took away from the EX.
No, there was significant confusion and contradiction associated with the EX role of the CMTF. The EX scenario placed a focus on producing "deliverables" at the expense of learning, especially as this was the first exposure to these deliverables, and many aspects of the process to produce these were unclear.
Scenario was complex and allowed students to look at a diversity of issues, but did not really allow for role playing.
Scenario was useful; it provided a realistic & complex setting that challenged participants. I felt I was not totally immersed as I was not sure what my title meant - "NATO lead".
The scenario did not really facilitate role play and frankly, it was not necessary for all roles identified to be acted out.
Very useful. Complexity and the background was interesting.
Yes, it really helped me to understand how NATO looks at requests for assistance.
Yes, the scenario was rich. However, explanations on the expected products came too late.
Other Military
Absolutely, we were provided with enough and really complete documentation so we could effectively understand the concept as well as our roles.
Complexity at the end helped in learning.
Scenario is very useful in order to prepare possible future tasks/missions/operations with respect to globalization, complexity, and new phenomenon in the current world order.
Scenario was excellent.
Yes, as a NATO representative I found it very useful. it contained all required information.
Yes, because of complexity and developing ambiguity between organizations and levels. I felt immersed to a limited extent, because roles were not important in the syndicate's working process.
Yes, the EX scenario was useful. I am more immersed as a NATO representative.
Yes, the scenario driver was good, complex, and provided something that is definitely not experienced by all nations.

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

3.2.7 Preparation for Future Roles

As Table 10 shows, 17 participants (3 Civilians, 6 CF, 8 Other Military) felt that the EX prepared them for future roles as senior leaders in a strategic, comprehensive context. For example, these participants indicated feeling more prepared as a result of taking part in the EX because it gave them a better understanding of the complexities and key considerations made at the strategic level, of the various chains of command, and of the dynamics between NATO and the UN. Only one participant (CF) felt that the EX did not prepare him/her for the future. This participant commented that “the approach was not geared to achieving this.” The other 6 participants (3 Civilian, 3 CF) provided mixed feedback, indicating that the EX prepared them “somewhat” or “to a limited extent.” It is worth underscoring, however, that only 50% (i.e., 3 of the 6) of the civilians responded affirmatively to this statement.

Table 10: Participants’ comments on whether the EX prepared them for future roles, by group.

Civilian
Helped to build on knowledge, would like additional on campaigning from a foundational perspective.
In some way yes, because it prepares you to make decisions in short time frames with limited info.
More prepared yes, but exercise details were often not what actually occurs, and the differences should be spelled out.
Somewhat - still thought it to be very a military approach - less comprehensive - due to a NATO approach vs. UN.
Yes, broadened appreciation of comprehensive assessments and situations.
Yes, helped focus attention and decision making at a higher, strategic level.
CF
Admittedly working through the confusion, a better appreciation of some of the uncertainty was gained.
I assess that it has assisted in the preparation, but it has not prepared me to fill the role.
No, the approach was not geared to achieving this.
Very little. Only benefit was in discussing ideas with SMEs.
Yes, better understand the strategic viewpoint for NATO operations.
Yes, I better understand the complexities at the strategic level. I also have a better understanding of the various chain of command involved.
Yes, in that the complexity and "newness" of the environment (comprehensive planning & ops) will become more important, but does still today remain confused!
Yes, it was helpful.
Yes, the overall campaign design process was particularly beneficial and kept me thinking at the strategic level.
Other Military
Yes, because of the complexity and ambiguity of the scenarios, we were facing.
Yes, highlighted a number of key considerations required at the strategic level.
Yes, I did. We learn very good scenario situation which might become reality in our future role.
Yes, it gave me a feel for complex issues and the dynamics between the NATO & UN.
Yes, it gave me the opportunity for seeing the background of all aspects connected to the "thinking" process in preparation of Allied documentation.
Yes, it gives me a vast knowledge how to go about the process in going through a comprehensive approach.
Yes, it really has provided me another level on my understanding on CA.

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

3.2.8 NSP as Intellectual Preparation for the EX

Participants were asked to specify whether the NSP itself provided the right sort of intellectual preparation for the EX. Seventeen of the 23 participants who responded (2 Civilian, 7 CF, 8 Other Military) commented that the NSP did provide the right intellectual preparation. For example, participants noted that the NSP taught them to develop an analytical/critical approach and to analyze factors at the strategic level, and that the knowledge gained from the NSP was applied during the EX. One participant (CF) felt that the NSP did not provide the right sort of intellectual preparation for the EX. This participant commented that the “leap from [a] strategic formulation model to campaign design [is] not well understood.” Also, six participants (4 Civilian, 2 CF)—in particular, the majority of civilian participants—provided mixed reviews, noting, for instance, that more information on NATO and UN structures, campaign design/planning, and/or the comprehensive approach would have been beneficial. Comments broken down by group reinforce these findings (see Table 11).

Table 11: Participants’ comments on NSP providing intellectual preparation for the EX, by group.

Civilian
Could have had more exposure earlier on to NATO and UN structures - relationships and developing campaign design.
In most cases, but lacked the UN/NATO roles knowledge and campaign design background.
While we learned about strategy formulation and the link between strategy/operation/tactics we didn't spend much time on campaign design. We studied campaigning in terms of case studies but not models to develop campaigns.
Yes, however more detailed explanation of a standard model/approach (admittedly as a spring board for alternatives) needs to be incorporated - other war colleges produce graduates that can "recite" a standard - a useful starting point.
Yes, strat modeling and overall focus of NSP greatly helped.
Yes, courses provided good background readings and discussion.
CF
Intellectual - Yes. Practical and feasible on TAC Exercise and campaign planning - No.
No. Leap from strategic formulation model to campaign design not well understood.
On the whole yes, we have become comprehensive approach acolytes!
Yes it was. I feel that a lot of courses were used throughout this exercise.
Yes, although more info on the comprehensive approach would have been beneficial.
Yes, as we were thinking at the strategic level to begin with.
Yes, in making considerations and in analyzing factors at the strategic level.
Yes, the NSP did.
Yes, the whole year prepared us well.
Yes.
Other Military
Yes it did. we've got many lectures in preparing of that EX.

Yes, because of concentration on strategic level.
Yes, it did.
Yes, senior Mentors and SME will always keep us on track and provide an added experienced perspective.
Yes, the process that I learned in NSP will surely be helpful in my intellectual capacity.
Yes, the whole spectrum of briefings and seminars we had occasion to listen & participate with gives a good basis.
Yes.
Absolutely, all year we are taught to develop an analytical/critical approach.

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

3.2.9 Recommendations for Improving EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR

Table 12 summarizes the recommendations for improving the EX in the future that were provided by participants. Common themes across the three groups involved refining the deliverables (2 CF, 1 Other Military), distributing a list of common acronyms (1 CF), providing more information on NATO/UN structures, roles, and processes at the beginning of the EX (1 Civilian, 1 CF, 2 Other Military), and making better use of the senior mentors, that is, have SMEs make presentations/briefings at the beginning of the EX (3 Civilians, 2 CF).

Table12: Participants' recommendations for improvements to future EX STRATEGIC WARRIORS, by group.

Civilian
Clarity of roles - responsibilities up front. Who were we, when presenting.
Detailed in AAR, but an addition would be to look at NSP graduates to volunteer to work in exercise cells to provide high level strategic point of view that is sometimes lacking.
More upfront time with SMEs. More time to learn scenarios and to understand organizational roles played within it. Revise the reading package to better explain EX purpose & objectives & clarify expectations.
Scenario is great. SMEs were great. EX needs some more up front briefs on context and NATO/UN Structures and roles.
SME briefings on day 1.
SMEs need to brief at start. Sample products be provided.
CF
A better determination of realistic deliverables in the time frames given.
As briefed in the 3 up and 3 down and as said above.
As per our course feedback.
Contained in debrief - add JAG SME.
Front-end load NATO/UN "101" briefings at the beginning of the exercise all included the process that occurs in aiming for NAC approval and the tasking of forces.
Improve explanation of the processes. Improve explanations of the learning objectives. Improve use of senior mentors before the exercise. Refine the deliverables.
List of abbreviations. Have mentors review deliverables before start to ensure all are "ready from same page."
Presentations by SME at the beginning will facilitate the process.

SME, Senior mentors and college staffs have to better Synchronize their various input and roles.
This should not be seen as a conventional exercise such as that you would find in standard military training. The aim is to enhance learning at the strategic conceptual level. A case study approach similar to the EX regarding Georgia/Russian conflict in the first term would be MUCH more effective.
Other Military
Generally excellent in scenario, preparation, and execution. Need improvement on synchronization and coordination of the staff.
In my opinion I was lacking a clear vision what we were to achieve (in terms of deliverables). It would be put more stress on role playing within syndicates (we were given the roles but in fact we did not exercise those roles assigned).
Need more time up front to understand NATO/UN processes before rushing into deliverables.
Include international SMEs.
It could be put more attention to deliver some lectures on the decision making process in both NATO and UN to ease work during the exercise.
Need for comprehensive approach doctrine of UN-NATO collaboration without undermined one of those organizations functions and capabilities.
Provide more emphasis and direction with regards to role playing within the syndicates
Some lectures prior to the exercise would avoid gaps we found.

Note. All statements are verbatim entries from the comments section of the questionnaire.

4 Discussion and Conclusions

The objective of this study was to document civilian and military NSP students' assessments of the training value of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, a strategic-level CA operational planning exercise. Fifteen students provided information concerning prior experience with CA missions, training and education, and their level of understanding of CA. They also provided written definitions of CA. Twenty-four students completed the Post-EX survey that was designed to assess (i) perceptions of collaboration during the EX, (ii) assessments of the training value of the EX, and (iii) perceptions concerning the NSP more generally.

Results showed that at least some of the civilian and military participants had some prior experience with CA, either in operations or training and educational settings. It is of note, however, that there was little evidence of *interagency* training or education. This is important as this means that the CA exercises in the NSP represent among the first opportunities for true interagency training for those individuals who are moving into the senior levels of the civilian government and the military in Canada. Decision-makers will need to decide whether this practical introduction to working in a WoG team at this relatively late stage in their careers is optimal to support operational effectiveness and CA mission success. It may well be that interagency missions would benefit from opportunities to train together earlier in one's career, especially as CA is expected to be the norm on many complex missions in the future security environment.

That said, all civilian and military respondents rated their understanding of CA as at least "adequate," and the majority (7 of 15) rated their understanding of CA as "very good." Review of the definitions provided for CA indicated that those individuals who listed their understanding of CA as "good" or "very good" included notions of interagency or whole of government coordination and integration in their definitions. The definitions of those who indicated an "adequate" level of understanding, on the other hand, tended to refer to multiple agencies but were not as likely to refer to coordination or integration of these agencies or working toward a common strategic objective. It is also of note that three of the four civilian respondents rated their understanding of CA as "very good." While good news concerning students' perceived understanding of CA, these results are perhaps not surprising in that one of the objectives of the NSP is very much directed toward interagency and CA issues. Further, this EX and the accompanying questions assessing CA understanding were completed relatively late in the academic term. Nonetheless, these results do speak to the success of the NSP in terms of this training objective.

The majority of civilian and military respondents felt at least "somewhat" prepared for the EX. They rated the most useful form of preparation as the reading package and documentation. However, 13 of the 24 post-EX respondents, including seven of the CF members, indicated that they would have benefited from having more information on NATO and/or UN planning and decision-making processes prior to the EX. Civilians indicated that more specific learning objectives and EX outcomes and more information on campaign design would also have been useful preparation.

Both military and civilian respondents rated the team processes in their syndicate groups as being good during the EX itself, indicating that their syndicates communicated well, shared information

freely, and were able to develop a common and unified approach to the strategic plan developed in the EX. Although certainly a positive outcome, it is of note that these individuals had been together for many months as the student cadre of the NSP and had already had considerable opportunities for team development and relationship building throughout the course. It therefore remains an empirical question as to whether the results would have been as positive for a stand-alone CA training exercise of this nature or indeed within the context of an interagency operation. Still, our previous research in EX MG and the Civil-Military Seminar produced similarly positive ratings, and, in these cases, civilian and military respondents had not previously met. Results also indicated that most participants considered the EX to be a success and that they had access to the right tools and resources to develop a strategic plan. It is of note, however, that all civilian and most CF members indicated some uncertainty as to their roles and responsibilities during the EX, suggesting an area for improvement in future iterations of this EX.

As noted in the Introduction, one consistent comment from civilian partners is that CA missions tend to be dominated by the military and that important aspects of civilian government agencies and departments are not valued, taken into account, or reflected in CA operations. The current data revealed that, in the case of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, both military and civilian respondents tended to agree that the EX took into account their home organization's approach to planning, procedures, goals and objectives, values, mandates or roles, communication styles, and terminology. Note, however, that the civilian respondents tended to be somewhat less positive in these assessments as compared to the military respondents.

Civilian respondents tended to indicate that their understanding of CA had developed as a result of participation in the EX, for instance, with respect to clarification of concepts and to a better understanding of the various organizations. On the other hand, many of the CF respondents felt that their prior education and training was good preparation, and, while the EX allowed for reinforcement and practice of CA concepts, it did not improve their prior level of understanding of CA. This may well be because CA is a concept which many members of the CF, especially those at the more senior levels, have been exposed to in other courses.

In general, all participants felt that participation in the EX was beneficial. In particular, 17 of the 24 respondents, although only three of the six civilian respondents (i.e., only 50%), felt that the EX had prepared them for future roles as senior leaders in a strategic, comprehensive context. Those who felt that the exercise was successful in this respect indicated that it gave them a better understanding of key considerations and strategic-level complexities and of the various chains of command.

Although only a few respondents provided suggestions for improvement for future iterations of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR, comments did include refining the deliverables, distributing a list of acronyms, and making better use of the senior mentors. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that both civilian and military respondents also indicated that they felt they would have benefited from having more information on NATO and/or UN planning and decision-making processes prior to the EX. Civilian respondents indicated that more specific learning objectives and EX outcomes and more information on campaign design would also have been useful preparation.

While a useful start to understanding this area, a limitation is that this research focused exclusively on the self-reports of NSP students. While self-reports may accurately reflect actual understanding and perception levels, certainly there are times when self-reports can be suspect

(see Schwarz, 1999), although this is less often the case when an anonymous questionnaire approach is used (Mabe & West, 1982) as was the case in this research. On the other hand, this research is the first systematic evidence of any kind regarding the value of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR and addresses the area that was the focus of interest to NSP staff. Nonetheless, future research should explore additional measures that can be developed to assess the value of interagency training, for instance, through a comparison of student and SME assessments, longitudinal research comparing training assessments to operational processes and outcomes during comprehensive missions, and, where possible, development of objective measures of performance and operational effectiveness.

4.1 Significance

The benefits of this study are twofold. First, designed with the input of an NSP staff officer, the course-specific feedback provided detailed student assessments of aspects of the EX that might be improved and may inform decisions concerning the future of EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR. More broadly, the research contributes to a greater understanding of the key social and organizational issues that affect collaboration in a comprehensive environment. Specifically, our research program to date has underscored the value of interagency training in a variety of contexts including pre-deployment mission training (e.g., EX MG) and in more general educational contexts such as the Civil-Military Seminar. Such research is crucial in order to improve the ability of decision-makers to address issues based on systematic feedback from the people who do the jobs, to improve planning and training for these contexts, and thus to enhance the probability of mission success.

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Annex A Information Sheet—Information Sheet

PLEASE READ THIS PAGE CAREFULLY. FEEL FREE TO KEEP THIS GENERAL INFORMATION SHEET.

Background	Defence R&D Canada - Toronto (DRDC Toronto) is a human sciences laboratory within DRDC, an agency within DND. The following questions support two research projects whose overall objectives are to understand the key social and organizational issues that affect working within the comprehensive approach to operations (e.g., involving the Canadian Forces and governmental partners). One aspect of these two projects is to explore the impact of integrated training opportunities, such as Exercise Strategic Warrior.	
Benefits include improving the ability of decision makers to address specific training-related issues based on systematic feedback from the people who do the jobs, and to improve education and training for comprehensive missions.	
The Questions	...ask you to consider a few questions concerning your background and experience (Survey I). On the final day of the Exercise, we then ask questions directly related to your training experience in the Strategic Warrior Exercise (Survey II). Some of these questions ask for a rating and then provide space for comments related to specific questions. We expect that Survey I will take about 5 minutes to complete and Survey II will take about 10 minutes to complete. By completing these surveys you are indicating your consent to participate in this study. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. People may have differing views and we are interested in what your experiences are.	
Your Rights as a Participant:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Your answers are confidential and your participation is completely voluntary. 2. Only authorized researchers will have access to the data and only group results will be presented. 3. You may skip individual questions and can end your participation at any time. 4. Your answers will be assigned a unique identification number. 5. The Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) is required by law to screen data to ensure that individual identities are not disclosed prior to releasing any information request filed under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act. 	
Potential Risks:	There are no known risks associated with this study beyond minor eyestrain. However, participation in this study, or indeed any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC.	
Who can I contact with questions or comments?	The Co-Investigator/s will be present at Exercise Strategic Warrior to answer your questions. You may also contact the project managers (listed below) at any time during or subsequent to the Exercise.	
DRDC Toronto Project Managers	Dr. Megan M. Thompson, PhD Interagency Trust Project Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca 416-635-2040 Principal Investigator	Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, PhD JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain Project Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca 416-635-2000 Ext. 3120 Co-Investigator
DRDC Human Research Ethics Review	This research has been reviewed, approved and given the ethics protocol number 2012-007, Amendment #3, by the DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee, HREC-CEESH-TORONTO@drdc-rddc.gc.ca. The research has been coordinated by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA) Social Science Research Review Board, in accordance with CANFORGEN 198/08. The Coordination number is 1106/12-N.	

WE APPRECIATE YOUR INPUT AND ASK THAT YOU BE AS HONEST AS POSSIBLE SO THAT OUR INFORMATION ACCURATELY REFLECTS YOUR BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE.

Annex B EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR SURVEY I

Please create your 10 digit PIN:

1st 3 letters of mother's maiden name: ____, Your birth year: _____, 1st 3 letters of town where you were born: ____

1. Gender: Male Female

2. Age: _____

3. I am currently working for:

a Government Partner (GP) the Canadian Forces (CF) Other (please specify):

4. Please indicate if you have previously worked for any of the following (check all that apply):

5. GP Non Governmental Organization (NGO) International Organization (I/O) CF
Other Military

6. I have previously deployed on an overseas mission 0 1 2 3+ times

7. Prior to the National Security Programme (NSP), how many times have you participated in WoG training/education? _____

8. Please list and describe the type(s) of WoG training/education you have participated in prior to the NSP:

9. Did you participate in Exercise Strategic Power? Yes No

10. What is your definition of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to operations?

11. How would you rate your level of understanding of the CA to operations?

Poor Adequate Good Very Good Excellent

12. What type of planning methodology do you expect to use in a CA environment? Please check one or add your comments:

Strategic Formulation Model?

Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (or other national equivalent)?

Other? Please describe briefly.

13. How much experience do you have in Strategic Planning within a CA environment? ____ months
____ years

14. Have you previously participated in a campaign planning process or equivalent at the strategic level (apart from Canadian Forces exercises)? Yes No

If yes, please describe briefly.

15. How many times have you previously deployed in a CA mission? _____

**Thank you very much for your participation. Please return your completed survey to
Major D. Eustace.**

Annex C EX STRATEGIC WARRIOR SURVEY II

Your PIN:

1st 3 letters of mother's maiden name: ____, Your birth year: _____, 1st 3 letters of town where you were born: ____

Syndicate: A B C Appointment in EX: (a) UN NATO (b) Civilian Military

Functional Group: UN NATO Public Diplomacy/STRATCOMM
 Human Affairs/Social and Economic Development Governance and Political Engagement

1. Did you feel adequately prepared for this Exercise? Not at all A little Somewhat Mostly Completely

2. What did you find useful as preparation?

3. What would you have liked to have seen included as part of your preparation?

4. Please rate your agreement with the following statements as they related to your experiences at Exercise (EX) Strategic Warrior. Please provide additional comments where possible.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Comments
From my perspective, the EX was successful.	O	O	O	O	O	O	
My role and responsibilities in the EX were clear.	O	O	O	O	O	O	

Information sharing during the EX was adequate.	<input type="radio"/>						
Shared situational awareness was achieved during the EX.	<input type="radio"/>						
The right tools/resources to develop a strategic response to the EX problem were provided (e.g., readings, DND Learn, SME mentors, etc.).	<input type="radio"/>						
My syndicate communicated well.	<input type="radio"/>						
My syndicate exchanged ideas freely.	<input type="radio"/>						
My syndicate was able to develop a common and unified approach to strategic planning.	<input type="radio"/>						
The information provided during the functional SME meetings was helpful.	<input type="radio"/>						

5. Do you feel that this EX took into account your home organization's approach to...

	Not at all	A Little	Somewhat	Mostly	Completely	Comments
Planning?	<input type="radio"/>					
Procedures?	<input type="radio"/>					
Goals and objectives?	<input type="radio"/>					
Values?	<input type="radio"/>					
Mandates or roles?	<input type="radio"/>					
Communication style?	<input type="radio"/>					
Terminology?	<input type="radio"/>					

6. Did this EX provide you with a better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, resources, and constraints of...

	Not at all	A Little	Somewhat	Mostly	Completely	Comments
UN organizations?	<input type="radio"/>					
NATO organizations?	<input type="radio"/>					

7. How would you rate your level of understanding of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to operations?

Poor Adequate Good Very Good Excellent

8. Has your understanding of the CA to operations changed as a result of your participation in this EX? Please explain.

9. Was the EX Scenario useful? Please describe why or why not. In your response please be sure to indicate the extent to which you felt “immersed” in your EX role as a UN or NATO representative.

10. Did you feel the EX prepared you for your future role as a senior leader in a strategic, comprehensive context? Please describe why or why not.

11. Did the NSP itself provide the right sort of intellectual preparation for the EX? Please explain.

12. Do you have any recommendations for improving the EX in the future? Please specify.

13. Do you have any recommendations that might facilitate collaboration in the future comprehensive context (e.g., training, education, policy)? Please specify.

Thank you very much for your participation.

List of acronyms

ARP	Applied Research Project
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CF	Canadian Forces
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DLCD	Director of Land Concepts and Designs
DRDC	Defence R&D Canada
DRDC Toronto	Defence R&D Canada - Toronto
EX	Exercise
EX MG	EXERCISE MAPLE GUARDIAN
GP	Government Partner
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	National Security Program
OP	Operation
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SME	Subject Matter Expert
UN	United Nations
WoG	Whole of Government

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<p>4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used)</p> <p>Thompson, M. M., Piasentin, K. A., Febbraro, A. R., Holton, T., Gill, R., Eustace, D.</p>		
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The current research assessed the training evaluations of senior Canadian Forces (CF), international military, and Canadian civilian Government Partners who participated in Exercise (EX) STRATEGIC WARRIOR 12, a strategic-level operational planning exercise that is part of the 10-month National Security Program at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. Fifteen students (4 Civilian, 9 CF, 2 Other Military) completed an initial demographic survey. Twenty-four volunteers (6 Civilian, 10 CF, 8 Other Military) completed a post-EX survey designed to capture students' assessments of various aspects of the STRATEGIC WARRIOR training exercise. Descriptive analyses revealed that, in general, both civilian and military participants felt that the exercise was valuable and that the team processes related to the EX within their syndicates were successful. Most civilians felt that the EX took into account important aspects of the mandates, processes, and approaches of their home organizations. However, only half of the civilians felt that the EX prepared them for future roles in developing a strategic response to a complex conflict environment. Future research should explore additional methodologies for assessing the value of interagency training: for instance, through a comparison of student and subject-matter expert assessments, longitudinal research comparing training assessments to operational processes and outcomes during comprehensive missions, and, where possible, the development of objective measures of performance and operational effectiveness.

La présente recherche porte sur les évaluations de l'entraînement d'anciens membres des Forces canadiennes (FC), de militaires internationaux et de partenaires civils du gouvernement du Canada ayant participé à l'exercice *Strategic Warrior* 2012, un exercice de planification opérationnelle de niveau stratégique faisant partie du Programme de sécurité nationale de dix mois qui se donne au Collège des Forces armées canadiennes, à Toronto. Quinze stagiaires (quatre civils, neuf membres des FC et deux autres militaires) ont répondu à un premier sondage démographique. Vingt-quatre volontaires (six civils, dix membres des FC et huit autres militaires) ont rempli le sondage postérieur à l'exercice visant à consigner l'évaluation des stagiaires sur divers aspects de l'exercice d'entraînement *Strategic Warrior*. Des analyses descriptives révèlent que, de façon générale, les participants civils et militaires ont trouvé l'exercice intéressant et que les processus de groupe liés à l'exercice étaient réussis. La plupart des civils ont eu l'impression que l'exercice tenait compte d'importants aspects des mandats, des processus et des approches de leur organisation d'appartenance. Toutefois, seulement la moitié des civils ont eu le sentiment que l'exercice les avait préparés à d'éventuels rôles d'élaboration d'une intervention stratégique à un conflit complexe. La recherche future doit explorer des méthodes supplémentaires d'évaluer la valeur de l'entraînement interorganismes, notamment par l'entremise d'une comparaison d'évaluations de stagiaires et de spécialistes en la matière, d'une recherche longitudinale comparant des évaluations de l'entraînement aux processus et aux résultats opérationnels au cours de missions exhaustives et, si possible, l'élaboration de mesures objectives de rendement et d'efficacité opérationnelle.

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Whole of Government; Comprehensive Approach; JIMP; interagency training; Exercise Strategic Warrior

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