



DRDC Toronto CR 2011-175

**Interagency Trust in the Whole of Government Approach
to Canadian Forces Operations:
Subject Matter Expert Discussions**

by:

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall,
Andrea L. Brown, and Craig Flear

Humansystems® Incorporated

111 Farquhar St.

Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager:

Barb D. Adams

(519) 836 5911 ext: 249

PWGSC Contract No.: Standing Offer W7711-09-8158/001/TOR

Order No. 8155-01

On Behalf of

Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto

1133 Sheppard Avenue West

North York, Ontario, Canada

M3M 3B9

Contract Scientific Authority:

Dr. Megan Thompson

416-635-2000 ext: 2040

March 2011



Author

**Michael H. Thomson
Humansystems® Incorporated**

Approved by

**Dr. Megan Thompson
Contract Scientific Authority**

Approved for Release by:

**Dr. Stergios Stergiopoulos
Acting Chair, Knowledge and Information Management Committee
Acting Chief Scientist**

The scientific or technical validity of this Contractor Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011

Abstract

In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of other government departments (OGDs) in order to achieve a full range of national objectives. The Whole of Government (WoG) approach aims to consolidate the Government of Canada's (GoC) strategic policy regarding international engagements. However, in practice, some WoG partners have limited experience working together and have different organizational cultures, which may hinder effective collaboration in practice. The purpose of this study was 1) to further understand the impact of interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) on collaboration efforts between civil and military actors in a WoG approach to operations, and 2) to generate recommendations for CF education and training regarding interagency collaboration. To this end, a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) were consulted to elicit their first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre, specifically highlighting those instances that signalled trust. Participant recollections revealed a number of organizational factors (e.g., strategy, systems, structure, and staffing) that may impede interorganizational trust in the WoG context. Civilian participants mentioned that they had to establish their credibility working in theatre by consistently delivering high quality input on a timely basis. Interpersonal trust was developed over time. Participants recommended that WoG education and training need to be fully integrated with the participation of both civilian and military agencies.



Résumé

Dans le cadre des opérations en cours (p. ex. celles menées en Afghanistan et en Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à travailler en étroite collaboration avec un certain nombre d'autres ministères en vue de réaliser tout un éventail d'objectifs nationaux. L'approche pangouvernementale vise à unifier la politique stratégique élaborée par le gouvernement du Canada (GC) en vue de s'acquitter de ses engagements sur la scène internationale. Toutefois, dans la pratique, certains partenaires de l'approche pangouvernementale ont rarement eu l'occasion de travailler ensemble et appartiennent à des organisations aux cultures différentes, ce qui peut nuire à l'efficacité de leur collaboration. La présente étude visait à 1) mieux comprendre l'incidence de la confiance entre les organismes (ou entre les organisations) sur les efforts de collaboration entre les acteurs civils et militaires dans le cadre d'une approche pangouvernementale des opérations, et 2) recommander des programmes d'éducation et de formation en matière de collaboration inter-organismes. À cette fin, on a consulté un certain nombre d'experts en la matière (EM) afin qu'ils racontent leurs expériences liées à la collaboration sur le théâtre en mettant l'accent, tout particulièrement, sur les événements qui témoignaient d'un climat de confiance. D'après les souvenirs des participants, certains facteurs organisationnels (p. ex. la stratégie, les systèmes, la structure et la dotation) pourraient nuire à la confiance inter-organisationnelle dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Les participants civils ont indiqué qu'ils avaient dû établir leur crédibilité sur le théâtre en produisant de manière constante un produit de haute qualité dans les délais prescrits. La confiance entre les personnes se gagnait au fil du temps. Les participants ont recommandé d'intégrer l'éducation et la formation sur les activités pangouvernementales avec la participation des organismes civils et militaires.

Executive Summary

Interagency Trust in the Whole of Government Approach to Canadian Forces Operations: Subject Matter Expert Discussions

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, Andrea L. Brown, and Craig Flear; Humansystems® Incorporated

This research was conducted in support of a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto applied research project examining interagency trust. In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of diverse organizations in order to achieve a full range of national objectives. The Whole of Government (WoG) approach aims to consolidate the Government of Canada's (GoC) strategic policy regarding international engagements. This requires the integration and coordination of multiple governmental departments and agencies to more effectively realize Canadian peace and security initiatives in the international sphere. However, some WoG partners have limited experience working together and have different organizational cultures, which may hinder effective collaboration in practice. Previous exploratory research conducted for DRDC Toronto revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological issues facing WoG partners in operations, including trust (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010).

The purpose of this study was 1) to further understand the impact of interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) on collaboration efforts between civil and military actors in a WoG approach to operations, and 2) to generate recommendations for CF education and training regarding interagency collaboration. To this end, a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) representing WoG partners were consulted to elicit their first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre, specifically highlighting those instances that signalled trust. Participants were drawn from Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and the CF. Data was collected from September 27, 2010 to January 7, 2011 using a semi-structured discussion protocol, which guided the discussions around themes pertaining to trust, power, identity, stereotypes and negotiation.

Results showed a number of ways in which individuals representing diverse organizations as boundary spanners and working in a WoG context built trust at the interpersonal level. OGD participant accounts suggest that when they demonstrated their credibility in the field, it won them trust from their CF counterpart. OGD participants said that this was accomplished by consistently delivering with quality input on a timely basis. Interpersonal trust could also be built by following military procedures while on the base (e.g., wearing appropriate clothing for patrols) and communicating succinctly and affably. In general, participants spoke highly of their WoG partners. CF members were described as well-educated and professional by their civilian partners, whereas civilians were described as confident, intelligent and enthusiastic by their CF partners. Though there was some evidence of trust at the interpersonal level, data suggest that there exists a number of interorganizational issues that may act as barriers to full interagency trust. So despite working well with WoG representatives, participants raised organizational factors that may undermine trust.



Interorganizational trust is often grounded in well-established organizational frameworks, i.e., systems, structures, practices, etc. (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998; Wehmeyer, Reimer, & Schneider, 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004). Participant recollections revealed a number of organizational factors (e.g., strategy, systems, structure, and staffing) that may impede interorganizational trust. They identified differences among the various departments in operational planning as a particular challenge to collaboration. Because of the extensive CF process and the greater numbers of CF personnel on the ground to plan in comparison to their WoG partners, personnel representing civilian agencies (primarily DFAIT and CIDA) reported having had a hard time integrating and adding value in a timely manner. Some OGD participants pointed out that they felt as if the CF thought that the OGDs worked too slowly in operations. To counter this, civilian SMEs argued that they worked very hard, given their limited representation in the field. They also recollected that the CF often shared operational plans post hoc, making their contribution immaterial. Another organizational system that may have led to the erosion of trust was the civilian financing mechanism. Participants stated that when expected and relied upon project funds from civilian partners were unavailable, the CF was forced to look for other donors. Fast rotations on the part of the CF also made collaboration with the CF unpredictable. Civilian participants argued that each unique CF command had a different perspective on the WoG approach.

Organizational structures, specifically the number of organizational representatives in the field, may have hindered the growth of interorganizational trust. Civilian participants indicated that their low numbers made it difficult for them to integrate into the complex military system. It was also pointed out that the CF had too few “*boots on the ground*” in Afghanistan to secure areas for development work to occur. One participant from CIDA stated that he felt betrayed because he thought that the CF was not honest about their capacity to secure areas for development in hostile areas of Kandahar, given the number of troops deployed. He thought that a much larger contingency was necessary.

Staffing was also raised as a potential barrier to trust. Civilians argued that the CF thought that they were too young and inexperienced for their role in theatre. Some CF members thought that the civilians that they worked with had the wrong skill sets for the context (e.g., generalists instead of specialists). On the other hand, the civilians thought that the CF had a limited understanding of governance and development issues. Participants emphasized the need to send the right person to operate effectively in a WoG context.

There will always be tensions at the organizational level regarding WoG given the differences in goals, practices, culture and people. However, as one OGD participant said, it works best on the ground because representatives must “*cut the crap and just get right to it.*” And as the research showed, participants were able to build trust at the interpersonal level. Future research should determine the extent to which judgements of trustworthiness are made at the interorganizational level and the interpersonal level, and what strategies can be invoked to re-establish trust when it has been violated.

Participants also recommended that future education and training initiatives for WoG operational contexts should be fully integrated. Lessons learned should be captured, a group of personnel from various governmental departments should be trained with the necessary skills and ready to deploy, and education and training should be relevant and inclusive, ensuring that all perspectives are captured.

Sommaire

Confiance entre organismes dans le cadre de l'approche pangouvernementale adoptée dans le contexte des opérations des Forces canadiennes

**Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, Andrea L. Brown, et
Craig Flear; Humansystems® Incorporated**

Cette recherche a été effectuée à l'appui d'un projet de recherche appliquée mené par Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto sur la confiance entre les organismes. Dans le cadre des opérations en cours (p. ex. celles menées en Afghanistan et en Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à travailler en étroite collaboration avec un certain nombre d'organisations différentes en vue de réaliser tout un éventail d'objectifs nationaux. L'approche pangouvernementale vise à unifier la politique stratégique élaborée par le gouvernement du Canada (GC) en vue de s'acquitter de ses engagements sur la scène internationale. Pour ce faire, il faut intégrer et coordonner les multiples ministères et organismes gouvernementaux de manière à mener avec plus de succès les initiatives canadiennes de paix et de sécurité sur la scène internationale. Cependant, certains partenaires pangouvernementaux ont rarement eu l'occasion de travailler ensemble et appartiennent à des organisations aux cultures différentes, ce qui, dans la pratique, peut nuire à la collaboration. Des travaux de recherches exécutés antérieurement pour le compte de RDDC Toronto ont révélé certains problèmes d'ordre organisationnel, social et psychologique avec lesquels les partenaires pangouvernementaux doivent composer pendant les opérations, notamment en ce qui a trait à la confiance (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010).

Cette étude visait à : 1) mieux comprendre l'incidence de la confiance entre les organismes (ou entre les organisations) sur les efforts de collaboration entre les acteurs civils et militaires dans le cadre d'une approche pangouvernementale des opérations, et 2) recommander des programmes d'éducation et de formation en matière de collaboration inter-organismes. À cette fin, on a consulté un certain nombre d'experts en la matière (EM) afin qu'ils racontent leurs expériences liées à la collaboration sur le théâtre en mettant l'accent, tout particulièrement, sur les événements qui témoignaient d'un climat de confiance. On a interrogé des participants du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC), de Service correctionnel Canada (SCC) et des FC. Les données ont été recueillies du 27 septembre 2010 au 7 janvier 2011 par le biais d'un protocole de discussion semi-structuré, orientant les discussions sur des thèmes liés à la confiance, au pouvoir, à l'identité, aux stéréotypes et à la négociation.

Les résultats ont démontré certains moyens employés par des personnes représentant diverses organisations et veillant à l'expansion de leur organisation, dans un contexte pangouvernemental, pour gagner la confiance sur le plan interpersonnel. Les participants des autres ministères, quant à

eux, ont indiqué qu'il leur fallait démontrer de la crédibilité sur le terrain pour mériter la confiance de leurs homologues des FC. Les participants des autres ministères ont déclaré qu'ils y parvenaient en livrant de façon constante un produit de qualité dans les délais prescrits. Ils pouvaient également s'attirer la confiance des personnes en suivant les procédures militaires lorsqu'ils se trouvaient dans la base (p. ex. porter les vêtements appropriés pour les patrouilles) et communiquer de façon succincte et affable. En général, les participants parlaient en termes élogieux de leurs partenaires de l'équipe pangouvernementale.

Les membres des FC ont été décrits comme des personnes instruites et professionnelles par leurs partenaires civils, tandis que les civils étaient décrits comme sûrs d'eux, intelligents et enthousiastes par leurs partenaires des FC. On a pu constater que la confiance existait au niveau interpersonnel, mais les données indiquent que certains problèmes inter-organisationnels peuvent nuire à l'établissement d'un climat de confiance totale entre les organismes. Alors, bien qu'ils indiquaient avoir eu une bonne relation de travail avec les représentants des autres organismes gouvernementaux, les participants ont relevé des facteurs organisationnels susceptibles de miner la confiance.

La confiance entre les organisations repose souvent sur des cadres organisationnels bien établis, c.-à-d. des systèmes, des structures, des pratiques, etc. (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998; Wehmeyer, Reimer, Page iv *Interagency Collaboration Humansystems® & Schneider*, 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004). D'après les souvenirs des participants, certains facteurs organisationnels (p. ex. stratégie, systèmes, structure et dotation) sont susceptibles de nuire à la confiance entre les organisations. Ils ont signalé que les différences qui existaient entre les divers ministères sur le plan de la planification des opérations rendaient la collaboration difficile. En raison de la vaste envergure du processus des FC et du plus grand nombre de membres des FC sur le terrain pour assurer la planification en comparaison avec leurs partenaires de l'équipe pangouvernementale, les représentants des organismes civils (principalement du MAECI et de l'ACDI) ont indiqué avec eux de la difficulté à s'intégrer et à ajouter de la valeur en temps opportun. Certains participants des autres ministères ont fait remarquer qu'ils avaient l'impression que les FC pensaient que les autres ministères ne travaillaient pas assez vite dans le cadre des opérations. Pour pallier, les EM civils ont ajouté qu'ils travaillaient d'arrache-pied, étant donné qu'ils étaient en nombre limité sur le terrain. Ils ont également relaté que les FC les informaient souvent de leurs plans opérationnels a posteriori, et qu'ainsi leur contribution n'avait plus d'importance. Un autre système organisationnel susceptible d'avoir miné la confiance est le mécanisme de financement des organismes civils. Les participants ont déclaré que lorsque les fonds promis par les partenaires civils n'étaient pas disponibles, les FC étaient forcées de chercher d'autres donateurs. Le rythme rapide des rotations a également rendu imprévisible la collaboration avec les FC. D'après les participants civils, chaque commandement des FC avait une perspective différente de l'approche pangouvernementale.

Les structures organisationnelles, en particulier la quantité de représentants d'organisation sur le terrain, peut avoir nui au raffermissement de la confiance inter-organisationnelle. Les participants civils ont indiqué qu'en raison de leur faible nombre, il était difficile pour eux de s'intégrer dans un système militaire complexe. Certains participants ont souligné que les FC avaient trop peu de personnel sur place en Afghanistan pour sécuriser les secteurs afin de permettre la réalisation des travaux de développement. Un participant de l'ACDI a indiqué qu'il se sentait trahi, car selon lui

les FC avaient manqué d'honnêteté au sujet de leur capacité de sécuriser les secteurs à développer dans les zones hostiles de Kandahar, étant donné le nombre de militaires déployés. Il était d'avis qu'il aura fallu déployer un contingent beaucoup plus important.

La dotation a également été citée comme un obstacle potentiel à la confiance. Les civils ont indiqué que les FC les trouvaient trop jeunes et inexpérimentés pour le rôle qu'ils avaient à jouer sur le théâtre. Certains membres des FC trouvaient que les civils avec qui ils travaillaient n'avaient pas les compétences nécessaires dans le contexte (p. ex. des généralistes au lieu de spécialistes). Par contre, les civils trouvaient que les FC avaient une compréhension limitée des enjeux liés à la gouvernance et au développement. Les participants ont souligné qu'il fallait envoyer la bonne personne afin qu'elle puisse fonctionner efficacement dans un contexte pangouvernemental.

Il existera toujours des tensions au niveau des organisations concernant l'approche pangouvernementale étant donné la diversité des buts, des pratiques, des cultures et des personnes. Toutefois, comme l'a dit un participant d'un autre ministère, l'approche fonctionne mieux sur le terrain, car les représentants doivent « *arrêter de niaiser et se mettre au travail* ». Et, comme la recherche l'a démontré, les participants sont parvenus à se faire confiance sur le plan personnel. Les prochains travaux de recherche devraient déterminer le degré de confiance accordé tant au niveau inter-organisationnel qu'au niveau interpersonnel, et les stratégies auxquelles on pourrait avoir recours afin de ranimer la confiance, lorsque celle-ci a été ébranlée.

Les participants ont également recommandé l'intégration complète d'initiatives d'éducation et de formation sur les opérations menées dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Il faudrait trouver un moyen de consigner les leçons retenues, doter un groupe d'employés de divers ministères des compétences nécessaires et les préparer en vue d'un déploiement. De plus, l'éducation et la formation devraient être pertinentes et inclusives, de manière à englober toutes les perspectives.



This page intentionally left blank

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	1
RÉSUMÉ	2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
SOMMAIRE	5
TABLE OF CONTENTS	9
LIST OF ACRONYMS	13
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 BACKGROUND.....	1
1.2 PROJECT PURPOSE	2
2. METHOD	3
2.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED FEEDBACK DISCUSSION PROTOCOL	3
2.2 PROCEDURE	3
2.2.1 <i>Recruitment</i>	3
2.2.2 <i>Participants</i>	3
2.2.3 <i>Feedback Discussion</i>	4
2.2.4 <i>Data Collection</i>	5
2.2.5 <i>Qualitative Data Analysis</i>	5
2.2.6 <i>Methodological Considerations and Limitations</i>	8
3. RESULTS	11
3.1 INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST	11
3.1.1 <i>Organizational Strategy</i>	12
3.1.2 <i>Organizational Systems</i>	15
3.1.3 <i>Structure</i>	21
3.1.4 <i>Staff and Skills</i>	25
3.2 INTERPERSONAL TRUST	31
3.3 MAKING WoG WORK!	37
3.4 TRAINING AND EDUCATION	38
4. DISCUSSION	41
5. REFERENCES.....	45
DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	47
ANNEX A: INFORMATION LETTER.....	1
ANNEX B: VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM.....	1
ANNEX C: BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FORM.....	1



ANNEX D: DISCUSSION PROTOCOL1

DISCUSSIONS WITH SMES WORKING IN JIMP DOMAIN1

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS1

5.1 I. INTRODUCTION:.....1

5.2 II. CAREER BACKGROUND:2

5.3 III. SETTING THE COLLABORATION CONTEXT:2

5.4 NEGOTIATION PROCESS2

NOW WE'D LIKE YOU TO TAKE US THROUGH THE PROCESS OF COLLABORATION IN YOUR EXAMPLE IN MORE DETAIL.2

1) WHAT KIND OF RAPPORT DID YOU HAVE WITH YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER(S)? WHAT KINDS OF THINGS INFLUENCED THE LEVEL OF RAPPORT THAT YOU HAD WITH YOUR PARTNER?.....2

3) COLLABORATIVE PARTNERS OFTEN RELY ON THE SHARING OF INFORMATION BECAUSE EACH PERSON OFTEN HAS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PART OF "THE PUZZLE". DESCRIBE THE SHARING OF INFORMATION BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER(S). HOW DID YOU AND YOUR PARTNER SHARE INFORMATION, AND/OR WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION DID YOU SHARE?.....3

6) HOW DID YOU ENSURE THAT YOUR ORGANIZATION'S GOALS WERE MET DURING COLLABORATION?.....3

7) WERE YOUR ORGANIZATION'S GOALS ALIGNED WELL WITH YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER'S ORGANIZATION'S GOALS?3

5.5 TRUST.....4

10) COULD YOU COUNT ON YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER(S) TO MEET YOUR NEEDS AND INTERESTS?.4

11) WAS YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER(S) ABLE TO KEEP HIS OR HER WORD DURING YOUR COLLABORATION?4

12) WAS IT CLEAR TO YOU WHAT YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER'S INTENTIONS WERE FOR COLLABORATING WITH YOU?4

5.6 PERCEPTIONS.....4

17) DID YOU GET ANY SENSE OF WHAT YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER'S IMPRESSION OF YOU WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF YOUR COLLABORATION WITH THEM?5

5.7 POWER DIFFERENCES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES5

20) IN MANY COLLABORATIVE SITUATIONS, ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IS KNOWING WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT OR IDENTIFICATION OF THE ROLES OF EACH COLLABORATION PARTY. HOW DID YOU AND YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER WORK OUT WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLETION OF REQUIRED TASKS WHILE YOU WERE COLLABORATING?5

5.8 IDENTITY6

25) DID YOU UNDERSTAND AND RELATE TO YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER'S POSITION?6

26) DID YOU BELIEVE THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD AND RELATED TO YOUR POSITION?6

27) HOW DID YOUR ORGANIZATION'S VALUES AND PRINCIPLES INFLUENCE COLLABORATION?.....6



28) TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU SEE YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER AS RESPECTING THE UNIQUE ABILITIES AND QUALITIES THAT YOU AS AN INDIVIDUAL BROUGHT “TO THE TABLE”?..... 6

29) TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU SEE YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER AS RESPECTING THE UNIQUE ABILITIES AND QUALITIES THAT THE ORGANIZATION THAT YOU REPRESENT BROUGHT “TO THE TABLE”?.. 6

30) WAS YOUR SENSE OF WHAT YOU WERE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH SUPPORTED OR DIMINISHED BY YOUR PARTNER AND HOW DID THIS OCCUR?..... 6

- WHAT IMPACT DID THIS HAVE ON WHAT YOU WERE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH TOGETHER? 6

31) DID YOU EVER FEEL THE NEED TO DISTANCE YOURSELF (I.E., TO ASSERT YOUR DISTINCTIVENESS) FROM YOUR COLLABORATION PARTNER AT EITHER A PERSONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL? IF SO, WHY? 6

32) TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU SEE YOU AND YOUR PARTNER AS WORKING AS A UNIFIED TEAM THAT WAS “ON THE SAME PAGE”? IF THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, HOW DID YOUR VIEWS DIFFER?..... 7

5.9 TRAINING..... 7

5.10 CONCLUSION 7



This page intentionally left blank.

List of Acronyms

Acronym	Description
2IC	Second in Command
3D + C	Defence, Diplomacy, Development + Commerce
ARP	Applied Research Project
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CCOA	Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CO	Commissioned Officers
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
CSC	Corrections Services Canada
DAIP	Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
FCM	Federation of Canadian Municipalities
GoC	Government of Canada
GSP	Government Security Policy
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HREC	Human Research Ethics Committee
IDP	Internationally Displaced Person
IOs	International Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
J3	Operations
J5	Strategic Plans and Policy



JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public
KAF	Kandahar Air Field
MIL	Military
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OF5	Colonel
OGAs	Other Government Agencies
OGDs	Other Government Departments
OPP	Operational Planning Process
PCO	Privy Council Office
PMESIR	Political Military Economic Social and Intelligence Report
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
POLAD	Political Advisor
POLMIL	Political Military
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
PWGSC	Public Works Goods and Services Canada
RoCK	Representative of Canada in Kandahar
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RMC	Royal Military College
SA	Situation Awareness
SMEs	Subject Matter Experts
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WoG	Whole of Government
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UN	United Nations
US	United States

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) is expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse organizations in order to achieve a full range of national objectives. In 2005, the Government of Canada (GoC) initiated a new strategy for international operations. Originally referred to as the 3D + C (Defence, Diplomacy, Development + Commerce) approach to operations, this was later coined the ‘Whole of Government’ (WoG) approach. As such, the government sought to define and apply a coherent strategy and policy regarding future military missions that relies on the integration and coordination of multiple government agencies to more effectively realize Canadian peace and security goals in the international sphere. The WoG partners include the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and of course the CF. In counterinsurgency operations (COIN) like Afghanistan, the CF role will be to enable the other WoG partners, largely by providing security, so that these other government departments (OGDs) can fulfil their particular mission objectives. This role may differ in other kinds of operations (e.g., humanitarian relief efforts).

However, WoG partners traditionally have had limited experience working closely with one another, and this may present a number of challenges to effective collaboration in practice. Indeed, recent research for Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto identified a number of organizational, social and psychological factors that impact collaboration in a WoG approach to operations (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). One of the identified potential barriers to effective collaboration is a lack of interagency trust or interorganizational trust (defined as “the extent to which organizational members have a collectively-held trust orientation toward the partner, which is quite different from saying that organizations trust each other,” Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998, p. 142). Research showed that differences in organizational systems and structures as well as failures to meet expectations negatively impacted the motivation to collaborate as well as the development of trust (Thomson et al., 2010). As WoG partners are mandated by the GoC to work together in operations, understanding the psychological dynamics of trust will augment CF doctrine (Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine, 2009) and efforts to support a truly comprehensive approach to operations across Canadian government departments and agencies.

The current research supports a DRDC Toronto applied research project (ARP) examining interagency trust, and compliments an earlier literature review examining five core themes impacting collaboration, including trust (see Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear, & Brown, 2011). For the current purposes, the interagency domain within Canada consists of five core WoG departments (CF, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, and CSC) who work together in missions such as Afghanistan and Haiti. Obviously, the CF will operate in the context of other missions and the interagency domain can extend to include other Canadian governmental departments. However, we have constrained the interagency domain and the missions for the current work simply to reflect the current operational experience of the subject matter experts.



1.2 Project Purpose

The purpose of this particular study was to further understand the impact of interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) on collaboration efforts between civil and military actors in a WoG approach to operations (most notably Afghanistan). To this end, a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) representing WoG partners (CF, DFAIT, CIDA, CSC, and RCMP) were consulted to elicit from them first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre. Through first-hand accounts, this study sought to identify instances that signalled interorganizational trust as well as interpersonal trust that may have impacted collaboration in the field. From this work, it will be possible to begin informing aspects of CF training and education of interorganizational trust issues and how these impact WoG collaboration in operations, specifically learning to work effectively with individuals representing diverse organizations.

2. Method

2.1 Semi-structured Feedback Discussion Protocol

Based on themes identified in a framework developed in previous research (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010), the current study used a semi-structured discussion protocol (Annex D) to elicit from SMEs first-hand accounts of collaboration between civil and military actors in a WoG operational context. We generated open-ended questions that were designed to tap five primary themes, including negotiation, power, identity, perceptions/stereotypes, and trust. Questions pertaining to trust addressed the four core dimensions (Adams, Bryant, and Webb, 2001), competence (e.g., *to what extent did you see your collaboration partner as competent?*), benevolence (e.g., *to what extent do you feel that your input was valued by your collaboration partner?*), predictability (e.g., *could you count on your collaboration partner to meet your needs and interests?*), and integrity (e.g., *was your collaboration partner able to keep his or her word during your collaboration?*). We also asked SMEs about future training and education that might help them prepare for a WoG context in future operations. The semi-structured approach ensured participants stayed on topic and provided their experience with the relevant themes. However, it was flexible enough to allow for the exploration of other topics that were relevant to the general topics to be covered.

2.2 Procedure

2.2.1 Recruitment

SME participants were identified through the existing professional networks of the Principal Investigator, the Principal DRDC Investigator, Co-Investigators, and participants in the current study¹. Potential participants were contacted by the Principal Investigator to inform them of the study and inquire about their interest in participating. The purpose and nature of the study as well as the SME's potential contribution to it was shared in the initial contact. Potential participants were informed that their participation was wholly voluntary and that it would be in the form of a meeting with trained researchers, that it would take approximately 2 hours, and that the researchers would travel to meet them or do the discussion via telephone or video conference. After participants gave their consent to share their experiences, the Principal Investigator set up a time and place for the discussion. Before each discussion, the Principal Investigator emailed SMEs an Information Letter describing the study and their role in the study (Annex A), a Voluntary Consent Form (see Annex B), and a Biographical Data Form (Annex C).

2.2.2 Participants

Twenty-six participants shared their experiences with effective civilian and military collaboration. Fifty-eight percent of participants were from OGDs, including DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, and CSC. Forty-two percent were from the Canadian Forces. Eighty-five percent were male and 15% female.

¹ Known as the "snowball" technique, after the discussion, participants were asked to recommend anyone that would meet the requirements and be interested in participating.



Ages ranged from 29 to 62 with the average age being 41 years old². Participants were born in Canada (84%), Europe (12%), and Southwest Asia (4%). The majority of the participants had a graduate degree or completed some graduate courses (76%), while others had completed university (16%) or high school (8%). Most of the participants had recent (between 2004 – 2010) operational experiences (e.g., Haiti and Afghanistan) and had collaborated with multiple actors at some point in their career. Participants varied in their background, experience, and frequency of contact with other WoG partners.

2.2.3 Feedback Discussion

Twenty-six feedback discussions were conducted in various locations across Canada, including Kingston, Gagetown, Ottawa, and Toronto, from September 27, 2010 to January 7, 2011. Teleconferences were also conducted when face-to-face meetings were not possible.

Following an introduction of the research team³, each SME was again briefed on the purposes of the study, its relevance and potential benefit to the CF, the nature of their participation (i.e., format of discussion, time commitment, voluntary consent, confidentiality, etc.), and any possible risks. With consent to begin the discussion, the researcher asked permission to audio record the conversation for later transcription, as this would provide a more accurate record of the meeting. Participants were told that no one outside of the research team would have access to the recordings and transcripts, and that everything that they raised during the feedback discussion and used in the report will be anonymous as to source. All SMEs agreed to participate voluntarily.

Following this, the researchers began the SME feedback discussion. Researchers used the semi-structured discussion protocol to advance specific discussion of the SME's experiences in collaborating with diverse actors in an operational setting. Each discussion was guided by an experienced researcher, who encouraged participants to discuss the core themes of interest. When necessary and appropriate, researchers probed for further clarity regarding important themes associated with collaboration. The length of time of these discussions ranged between 29 and 151 minutes. The average length of the SME feedback discussions was 67 minutes.

Once the discussion was completed, researchers debriefed the participants. It was reiterated that the feedback discussion would be transcribed onto a text document, using the recording to guarantee accuracy. Again, participants were assured that researchers would remove any identifying material, such as names and places in order to maintain their anonymity. Participants were informed that they could review the transcripts if they chose for verification⁴. Researchers answered any questions that participants had about the study. Participants were told that following the completion of the research, a summary of the findings could be made available to them if they so desired. In the meantime, however, participants were reminded that they could contact the Principal DRDC Investigator at any time if they had further questions. All consent and biographical data forms were collected by the research team. Lastly, participants were thanked and provided remuneration (\$40), which they could keep for themselves or donate to a charity of their choice. For those who did not

² One participant did not fill out the demographic data form. As such, demographic information was limited to 25 participants.

³ Most discussions were conducted by two members of the research team, one leading the discussion and the other taking notes. However, some discussions were conducted by only one team member.

⁴ Only one participant asked to see their transcript, mainly to provide clarification around points made in the discussion.

participate in a face to face discussion, a cheque was mailed to the participants who chose to receive the remuneration.

2.2.4 Data Collection

With the consent of each participant, SME face-to-face feedback discussions were audio-recorded using a digital voice recorder. Teleconferences used the digital voice recorder with a special phone jack allowing the recording to occur through the phone.

After the discussion, researchers then downloaded the audio file to a computer for transcription. SME feedback discussions were transcribed by the research team verbatim, except for identifying information, such as names and places. Transcription tools included Dragon Naturally Speaking speech to text software⁵, an Infinity foot pedal⁶, and Express Scribe software⁷. Random quality assurance checks comparing the audio file to the transcription were undertaken by a member of the research team by listening to the audio file and simultaneously reading the transcription to ensure accuracy.

It should be noted that capturing the audio data proved to be challenging at times. For example, some participants requested discussions in restaurants. In these cases, external noise (e.g., people talking and music) impacted negatively on the quality of the audio. Although all the audio was successfully captured, it was not possible always capture all of the information, so a few participants had short phrases/words missing in their transcripts. However, given the length and richness of the discussions, these exclusions seem have had minimal impact.

2.2.5 Qualitative Data Analysis

All 26 transcribed discussions were coded based on a conceptual framework developed by Thomson et al. (2010), which includes factors that influence collaboration, the process of collaboration, and the outcomes of collaboration (see Figure 1).

⁵ <http://www.nuance.com/dragon/index.htm>. This software was only used for a few of the transcriptions. The researcher would listen to the audio, speak the dialogue, and Dragon would convert the researcher's speech into text.

⁶ Allows for hands free start, stop, fast forward, and rewind.

⁷ <http://www.nch.com.au/scribe/index.html>. This software was required for the foot pedal. Express Scribe allows playing the audio file in conjunction with typing text. The text was later copied, pasted and reformatted into Word.

PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK OF CF COLLABORATION IN A JIMP OPERATIONAL CONTEXT




Figure 1: Framework of CF Collaboration in a JIMP Context



For the purposes of the current study, special care went into coding passages that signalled interagency trust, defined on the framework as a condition (i.e., mutual trust) for effective collaboration. Passages were coded against organizational frameworks (i.e., systems, structures, etc.) if these appeared to thwart or promote collaboration and signal a lack of interorganizational trust. To the extent possible, passages were also coded against the four dimensions of trust, including competency, predictability, benevolence, and integrity. Other themes were also coded for using a coding scheme based on the framework (see Table 1 for the condensed version).

Table 1: Coding Scheme

Collaboration in a JIMP Context	Variables
Factors Influencing Collaboration	Individual Factors
	Organizational Factors
	External Factors
Process of Collaboration	Conditions for Collaboration
	Motivation for Collaboration
	Collaboration
	Preparation for Collaboration
Outcomes of Collaboration	Cumulative Impact
	Performance
	Personal Relationships
	Collective Understanding
	Satisfaction with Process

In accordance with the framework, the general coding scheme was divided into three main components of collaboration: factors influencing collaboration (which includes organizational factors relevant to interorganizational trust), the process of collaboration, and outcomes of collaboration. The factors influencing collaboration are individual factors (e.g., knowledge, skills/abilities, attitudes/values, and personality), organizational factors (e.g., governance, shared values, strategy, systems, staff/skills, structure, style, and organizational culture), and external factors (e.g., risk, uncertainty, time pressure, mission type, and national culture). The process of collaboration included such factors as conditions for collaboration (e.g., shared goals, shared values, shared power, shared risk, mutual trust, mutual respect, shared identity, stereotypes, and roles/responsibilities), motivation for collaboration (i.e., internally or externally driven), collaboration (e.g., negotiation, communication, and feedback), and preparation for collaboration (i.e., other things that prepared for collaboration not related to training such as previous experience). Outcomes of collaboration contained variables such as the cumulative impact (i.e., direct such as providing aid and indirect such as a message that comes attached to activities), performance (e.g., goal attained), personal relationships, collective understanding (e.g., understanding collaboration partner), and satisfaction with the process (e.g., instrumental, personal, and feelings). All the variables could also be further broken down positively or negatively (e.g.,



trust is positive and distrust is negative). Furthermore, variables also had a definition as well as an example to guide inclusion/exclusion decisions about ambiguous or novel dialogue.

Each transcription was individually analysed using a qualitative software programme called NVivo⁸. A member of the research team read the transcripts and coded the occurrence of each collaboration reference according to the coding scheme. NVivo allows organization and classification of the dialogue in each feedback discussion to the corresponding theme in the coding scheme. NVivo is also able to combine all the occurrences of a particular theme for further analysis. For example, all the dialogue relating to the indirect cumulative impact of the collaboration was available to be viewed together. Moreover, participant numbers were attached to each dialogue to further classify the organization (e.g., DFAIT or CF). Therefore, the research team was able to pinpoint which organizations discussed the indirect cumulative impact of collaboration and how frequently this dialogue occurred.

2.2.6 Methodological Considerations and Limitations

There are a few methodological considerations and limitations that should be noted in the context of the current study. One limitation is that there is little empirical research investigating specifically the impact of interagency trust on collaboration, especially in relation to collaboration between the CF and OGDs/OGAs (Other Government Agencies). Due to this lack of empirical research, this study was largely exploratory in nature. Further empirical research examining interagency trust will be needed to further explore and verify how this is established and maintained in an operational context, and what strategies work to overcome prior trust violations.

The semi-structured SME discussion protocol used in this study allowed the research team to address particular themes that arose in previous research (Thomson et al., 2010). Covering topics of negotiation, power, stereotypes, identity and trust may have been too broad. For the purposes of future research, a more sustained effort to reveal the psychological dynamics of interagency trust may be achieved with a structured discussion protocol that spoke directly to trust issues, including trust violations and strategies for overcoming these and determining the degree to which interorganizational and interpersonal trust influence judgements of trustworthiness in an interagency context of operations.

Another potential limitation of the current study is the time at which SMEs spent in operations. Though WoG partners participated in either Afghanistan or Haiti or both, depending on when and where they were deployed impacted their recollections. It was argued that over the course of the mission in Afghanistan, as more civilians were added to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and WoG organizations adapted to the situation on the ground, collaboration improved. Future research with individuals with the full range of operational experience may be necessary to get a comprehensive perspective with respect to interagency trust development.

It is also important to acknowledge that the SME descriptions of collaboration within this report are generally more negative than positive, and that the descriptions typically focus on the challenges rather than the achievements of collaboration efforts within a WoG context. The process used during discussions was one intended to allow respondents to discuss the issues, challenges and achievements of their efforts in terms of collaborating within a WoG context. In our view, the prominence of the challenges reported by respondents is indicative of the residual frustrations felt

⁸ More information regarding NVivo can be found at http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx.



in working collaboratively with WoG partners and signals a general lack of interorganizational trust. It is important to highlight those institutional challenges to ensure that these can be addressed to maximally increase trust in WoG partners. However, it is also important not to overlook the fact that participants sidestepped these issues at the operational level in theatre and overall reported a high degree of success collaborating in the field. A more direct questionnaire administered to a larger sample in future research might gauge if in general trust existed at both the organizational and personal level and whether trust judgements are more category or person based.



This page intentionally left blank.

3. Results

The following chapter examines subject matter experts' first-hand accounts of WoG collaboration among civil and military actors, specifically highlighting examples of trust within the interagency context. This report documents instances when participants spoke about collaboration counterparts (or about the organization they represent) in a way that signalled trust or a lack of trust.

Within an interagency context, relationships are influenced by trust at the interorganizational level as well as by trust at the interpersonal level. The chapter begins with examples related to interorganizational trust, including SME reflections about their counterpart's organizational strategy, systems (e.g., processes, norms, practices, etc.), structures (e.g., size, hierarchical, etc.), staff and skills (e.g., human resources, education, skills, etc.), and how this impacted collaboration in a WoG approach to operations. These examples show how organizations can influence levels of trust and collaboration through their actions, processes and structures.

Collaboration within the interagency context also relies on trust at the interpersonal level. For instance, in the organizational literature, boundary spanners are recognized as the organizational representatives who have contact with the members of the partnering organization. Indeed, the role of the boundary spanner is to link their organization with the external environment (Langford and Hunsicker, 1996), thereby providing information about the competence and intentions of the organizational system that they represent. As such, boundary spanners are the conduits for personal trust within the interagency context (Sydow, 1998; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009), and their ability to build and maintain trust can be critical to successful collaboration. Participants provided detailed accounts of personal interactions with boundary spanners that show trust evolving as well as instances in which trust was violated. The next section includes some examples describing participant accounts of how to make WoG work in theatre. In order to best learn trust relevant lessons for optimal interagency in the future, the challenges and how those challenges were met and overcome associated with interagency trust are provided.

Finally, this chapter concludes with some suggestions for education and training aimed at promoting trust among the various actors in a WoG approach to operations.

3.1 Interorganizational Trust

In the absence of previous working relationships with boundary spanners (i.e., the organizational representatives), McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) suggest that interorganizational trust (defined as "the extent to which organizational members have a collectively-held trust orientation toward the partner, which is quite different from saying that organizations trust each other," Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998, p. 142) may initially emerge from an established institutional framework that includes common beliefs and values regarding business practices as well as established structures, standards, and procedures. According to McKnight et al. (1998), this institutionally based trust invokes in one the belief that those organizational structures are "in place to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavour" (p. 478). An institutional framework may enhance interorganizational trust because it helps reduce risk and vulnerability by promoting a shared understanding of acceptable practices and norms, thereby reinforcing the requisite predictability necessary for building trust (predictability is a core dimension for developing trust, see Adams, Bryant, & Webb, 2001).

This suggests that trust based on institutional frameworks can be initially fairly robust and static. However, once organizations begin to collaborate and gain greater familiarity with one another, trust will become more dynamic as the governance structures and general practices begin to get played out across various contexts. And given that initial institutional trust is partly conditional on what McKnight et al. (1998) refer to as “situational normality” (i.e., the appearance that things are normal or customary such that interactions will transpire according to expectations), it may become tenuous in situations that are uncertain, high risk, and abnormal, such as the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. Operating in a theatre of war may not be “normal” for some of the WoG partners. Because of the high degree of insecurity in Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar province, business decisions, practices, norms may not fit the situation and as such need to adapt. Because initial institutional trust is partly conditional on the stability of these systems and structures in a situation of normalcy, modifications to these may conjure a sense of uncertainty, preventing interorganizational trust or requiring a greater leap of faith.

SMEs raised a number of institutional challenges when they recollected their experiences working within a WoG context. Issues emanated from differences in organizational strategy, systems, structure, and staff and skills that appeared to signal a lack of trust. The following sections examine these recollections, beginning with examples related to strategy and governance.

3.1.1 Organizational Strategy

Aligning the strategies of WoG partners may be one means by which to facilitate interagency trust. But as the data from this study suggest, this may be a considerable challenge, perhaps especially in an operational context, ultimately preventing successful collaboration among WoG partners. For example, some CF SMEs argued that their civilian counterparts failed to recognize that the mission in Afghanistan was a multinational mission. As such, from their perspective, CF operational planning had to reflect multiple nations’ priorities rather than simply Canadian priorities. As one CF member explained,

“Canada set its six priorities as a nation...these are the things we need to work on...What I often said...is, well we might be delivering six major things, [but] we’re [the CF] still responsible as the multinational folks...to deliver on say thirty things...the whole of government team, civilian part of it, might be focused on these six things, but at our [CF] level, we need to be coordinating and...synchronizing the entire international effort across all of those thirty things...and I sometimes felt that that wasn’t fully understood [by my civilian counterpart]...”

“one erroneous lesson that’s been taken away from our time in Afghanistan by our civilian counterparts is that, you know, these whole-of-government teams, and I firmly believe it’s a misnomer, are, you know, something that you launch from your capital military and the civilians elbow to elbow and they go forward and do great things on an almost bilateral basis in wherever it is they get sent to. Well that works to a certain extent in Kandahar because that’s the way...in the early days, the War of ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]...but in most areas what happens is you go in and you fall under a multinational system...we should absolutely collaborate all the way down to the lowest level, right down to the company level...but we need to do it inside of a, a multinational interagency structure.”

The perceived failure of personnel in OGDs to recognize and to even downplay the “*multinational interagency structure*” was seen as a factor that placed constraints on ensuring that organizational strategies for the war in Afghanistan were aligned and manifested in operations in theatre.

On the other hand, also at the strategic level, one participant from CIDA mentioned that the CF did not seem to fully embrace the Government of Canada’s mission goals and as a consequence did not understand his organization’s goals and how development worked in a non-permissive environment like Afghanistan. He said,

“What was missing, I think, was the military’s total embrace of those [GoC] goals, so they understand what we were doing. But they really thought that we [CIDA] would just go off and do that [development work] ourselves. Well in an environment where...it’s a war...you have to have common goals and commonly accepted, like, approaches right. And I don’t think that was always the case...I’m not placing blame here, but it’s something that’s took a long time to kinda work out in the field. And we did right...But those common goals were absolutely essential. And if more effort had been done kinda up front by everyone here prior to deploying and particularly among the headquarters to fully understand what the common goals were and how we would all go about doing them. That would have made a big difference.”

Thinking back to 2006, one SME participant representing DFAIT mentioned the differences in strategic long-term planning about the mission in Afghanistan, prior to the Manley Report.

“Our departments didn’t take it [strategic long-term planning about the mission in Afghanistan] seriously, and they didn’t apply the resources in the serious manner like DND [Department of National Defence] had...If you were to ever ask, you know ‘Does the Department of Foreign Affairs have a 5 year plan for Afghanistan?’, you’d be laughed out of the building. It doesn’t exist. It’s not the way that we operate...it’s not in the way we think. And so in 2006, had we had a 5 year plan, you know we would have better resourcing...we wouldn’t have manpower issues like we have. We would have done a better and more effective job quicker. But it came in fits from the start. There was always ad hoc responses to internal impulses, which were generally generated by the military...the military would create the policy crisis to get decisions, which then civilians would react to...I worked sort of mostly with the J3 and the J5, and my job was to try to translate what CEFCOM and the field were talking about, to try to stimulate my department to say... ‘Look we need like ten times the amount of people we have in the field, I mean we need to start thinking about long term training, and about creating a contouring of civilians to have J5 training or who have been, you know, on training for 2 or 3 months with the military before going out as a POLAD.’ We had some success in some areas, other places it was complete dismal failure. We deployed a POLAD to, what the hell was it...in five weeks from China to Afghanistan. We didn’t even think she knew how to spell Afghanistan at that time. So there were critical failures from the department who’s expected, or expects itself, to coordinate Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.”

He explained that it was the Manley Report that helped get control of the agenda and corral DND regarding the mission in Afghanistan. As DFAIT’s mandate, he argued, is to coordinate “*Canada’s foreign policies abroad...on behalf of the government. But de facto, in the context of Afghanistan, it was all being run, managed by DND. If it means to say I think that irked a number of very senior civil servants who didn’t like the fact that DND had all the, had all of the nuts.*” He continued to explain that the Manley Report “*essentially provided us with the platform to get the resources, to get the people into the field, to work better,*” and then concluded, “*I will say what we did in*

Afghanistan, by many sections of the department, was seen as an aberration. It was to be tolerated until it's over, and then we go back to the way things were." On the other hand, he argued that,

"CIDA did a better job of assessing... They applied a lot more resources... they hired a lot more people at headquarters. They brought in, you know, ex-military guys to specifically do POLMIL [Political Military] and work on training... and integration and they put more resources in the field earlier on. But they have a much stronger culture of planning, not necessarily military planning, but... results-based management frameworks... because they... as an organization deal with huge amounts of money that require very solid management practices."

He mentioned that the strategy for WoG seemed to be creating alignment among DND, DFAIT and CIDA. However, despite *"agreed coming together about overall objectives,"* there was little overall strategic synchronization and this may be a consequence about how each organization operates. He said that DFAIT's objectives were not *"even written down,"* which *"frustrated the military."* He explained,

"if it was written down, then they... can create a plan for it... So in 2007 and in 2008, there was a tip by the military saying 'Look, we'll give you planners, just tell us what you want to plan.' And you know that was their sort of first thing coming towards us, but we were saying, 'We don't have a plan so fuck off.' You know like, we think you're still trying to screw us over. Even if you're giving us planners, and you're asking us to think of a thing that we haven't really thought about yet... it's frustrating me, so I'm just going to get angry at you."

This initiative was interpreted as a means for the CF to hold on to its power in Afghanistan by *"sticking a mole into an organization,"* i.e., DFAIT. He continued on to say that adhering to common objectives among DFAIT and the CF and following a *"hard, heavy dose of reality and some additional resourcing, we realized that we weren't going to be the planners, and we weren't necessarily going to have all of the decisions, so let's let the planners do the planning, let's give them the information that we want incorporated."* This change of tune, he implied, helped foster a better collaboration environment between DFAIT and the CF. This suggests that recognizing another organization's assets and understanding how to leverage these to meet various operational goals, promotes successful collaboration and builds positive relationships.

Participants also suggested that a change in strategy could have far reaching consequences at the tactical level, which could impact interorganizational trust. For example, once the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) became civilian led, one OGD SME said that the CF wanted to *"pull military resources, assets out,"* which meant that her organization *"had to be very clear that... you can't have Canadian civilians without Canadian military supporting them... we got down to the point where I'd say like 'I want eight people helping to do this and six people...' like it was very, very detailed. But then they would switch out the people that were doing it and give us some of the crap soldiers. They would still meet the criteria of eight but... they would fly in some of their people that they didn't want on the front lines. I guess a natural reaction, because you want your best people and you're still meeting the agreement, but you know you do start to feel kind of screwed."* This example suggests that a failure to align goals among WoG partners and a desire to further the interests of one's own organization over another fosters distrust.

Overall, participants suggest that evolving strategies should be shared among partners in order to work effectively with diverse organizations in a WoG operational context. In fact, this failure to align strategic goals could have far reaching consequences. As one CF SME stated, *"why would*

anyone else work with us, locals or anyone else, if we [WoG] can't even get our own...goals aligned...and point the resources in the same direction?" He continued, *"from a tactical commander's point of view, I have a hard time justifying to the soldiers that you're sending out in harm's way that you're going out to achieve these development, reconstruction goals when you know...our civilian equivalents say that those goals are something else."* The passages documented in this section suggest that a divergence of strategic position and the failure to align goals may erode interagency trust.

3.1.2 Organizational Systems

An organization is largely defined by its systems, i.e., its processes, procedures, norms, and practices, and these are maintained and reinforced when individual members act in accordance with them. As such, collaboration between members from diverse organizations may be hindered if systems differ. SME responses suggest that the differences in organizational systems and the challenges that emerged as a consequence may signal a lack of trust in their WoG partners. Specific differences in organizational systems identified by participants were the operational planning process, funding mechanisms, and CF rotations.

Planning and Decision-Making

Not having other interagency players fully integrated and involved in the CF operational planning process and decision-making appeared to be a critical systems issue that may have eroded interorganizational trust. One CF member described the CF planning process in contrast to civilian agencies. He began,

"Most civilians do issue management. They have a problem, they spin a ball, and they come up with it [the plan]. Not all of them. Some of the larger projects demanded planning horizons and so on...so it's not that they can't plan. But generally speaking they sort of manage things that are right before them... We have sort of two broad ways of planning. One is, you know, the commander gives you sufficient planning guidance and you develop a plan and then check against that. Or the other is the commander has really given you much broader guidance, less specific, and you really have to start from scratch and you bounce the options off the commander and he picks and chooses. Neither one of those environments is one that a civilian...any civilian organization uses very much or very often. And it happens really fast. You know, if the commander says I want this and I want it now, it means now. I mean that means we're working all night and we're going to produce and the next time that he is available we're going to brief him...different dynamic than the civilian community...they don't demand of their people the same way we do...Not worse, just different...They are not accustomed to motivational decision-making, decision-making where lives are very much at risk and at stake. They are not accustomed to that. But brought into it and understanding it, I mean they flourish."

For members of civilian organizations tasked to work collaboratively with the CF, these core differences in planning processes could hinder their ability to work optimally with the CF. Indeed, some of the OGD participants recalled the fast pace of the CF planning process, and how the slow OGD response made the CF frustrated. For example, one DFAIT representative said *"because their [CF] headquarters is able to make decisions faster, I think sometimes they think 'Why on earth can't you guys get it together?'"*

Moreover, OGD participants recollected the limited integration that civilian agencies had in the early stages of the WoG campaign. Considering the early stages of the Afghan campaign (2006)

and operational planning from the civilian side, one SME from DFAIT mentioned that aligning goals and objectives with the CF was a “red herring” because, as he put it, “there was a DND plan, and I think largely the civilian agencies didn’t even, don’t know how to plan and still don’t really know how to plan.” He continued to discuss the collaborative efforts of CIVPOL (civilian police) in 2006,

“When your J3 [Operations] and your J5 [Strategic Plans and Policy] are pumping out plans and aren’t meeting expectations placed upon them by their direct seniors...I think that they expected that we would be able just sort of plug into those processes with credible substance. We, we couldn’t...we didn’t know what the substance was at that time.”

He implied that it would be a challenge for non-CF players to gain credibility without the training for planning that coincides with the sophisticated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and CF Operational Planning Process (OPP). He commented,

“If you don’t know how to do planning...it makes it very hard to come up with plans...the whole platform for our deployment is military. And so you’ve got...thousands of NATO troops who’ve all been trained in NATO processes [i.e., OPP] and then spent years perfecting these skills, and then you invite civilians who may be very intelligent and may have things to say and good ideas, but it’s a square peg in a round hole because they don’t know how to develop the plans and the methodologies and work towards methodologies that are extremely different...We didn’t have the institutional knowledge or enough people who had the institutional knowledge of the military...no one could understand MIL[military]-speak.”

Nonetheless, this individual acknowledged his trust in the CF planning process and criticized the civilian side. He said,

“I’m a firm believer that DND did know what it wanted and did know how to do it. Maybe they weren’t going in the right direction, but they had the resources and they took decisions. I mean, you don’t know how many times I always heard, ‘We just want a decision.’ You know... ‘We have to do something.’ And also these civilian departments always want 100% of the information before you move. Well you know time doesn’t wait. ‘Time waits for no man. We’ve gotta move.’ And so the military was always prepared to wait for us and then incorporate our findings, but at some point they were told by their CO [Commanding Officer] ‘We need a plan,’ and then...they would move on without us because we could never meet their timings.”

Other OGD SMEs echoed this sentiment. After explaining that his input was largely “superficial” because he really had not been consulted early enough in the planning process, another said,

“The PsyOps [Psychological Operations] guys are churning out something and then they all turn to you as the civilian expert and expect you to provide, you know, pearls of wisdom on all things...there are certain points when decisions are taken and once taken, that’s it. You know you move on to the next phase of planning or you execute. They didn’t approach the civilians at the right moments to...say, ‘Okay, you know, we have this’...whether we could or not, it would be disingenuous to show something fait accompli at the end, at the commander’s back brief, say, ‘Here’s the whole plan. Here’s how we’re gonna execute it. Oh, and by the way, Mr. you know, [last name]’... We don’t have anything to offer at this point. And that was kind of 2006.”

Another OGD SME said,

“If you’re there through the process and you make your points known, then by the time...it comes to full volition, there shouldn’t be discord. But when your put in the chair and ‘Oh, by the way, we are gonna to attack this village, you’re going to come up from behind and...program 15 million dollars...let’s just get going,’ of course CIDA is gonna say ‘What the fuck do you think you’re doing? You don’t control my funding. You don’t tell me what to do.’ Now had that plan been developed with CIDA planners and people were informed throughout the process and everybody agreed, would be a completely different discussion...that took a long time for people to understand.”

This sentiment was also expressed by a CF member. He stated,

“some projects that were proposed, some projects that were put forth both by DFAIT and by CF through CIMIC [Civil-Military Cooperation] when they were debated in the whole of government context before approval, basically, I don’t want to sound self-important, but some people who had more experience in terms of project implementation advised that they were going to face certain problems or advised that they were going to face issues of capacity and reliability with the type of intervention that they were going to do. And people decided to just go forward and do it anyway.”

These examples illustrate CF frustration emerging from the inability of OGDs to provide real time input within the pace of the CF planning cycle and OGD frustration arising from the CF’s post hoc elicitation of input. However, the advent of more civilian representation in Afghanistan and duration of the war may have mitigated some of these initial challenges with the planning process. One OGD SME explained how his organizations participation in the CF operational planning process changed over the course of time,

“I think the civilians started saying, ‘Oh these fuckers, they’re hiding information from us.’ to ‘Ah-ha! I told you they were hiding information from us. We now have proof.’ to ‘Okay, we can comment, but my department is not letting me or I don’t have the time or we don’t have the resources.’ to ‘Okay, we now know where we can’t do this for you and we can’t break these things [the OGD planning process], so let’s give you information and then you can write it for us.’ And I think that’s really in nutshell how it worked. We came off our perspective that they were trying to screw us over at every turn of the corner to recognizing that we would never be able to compete with the horsepower to okay as long as we give them the information...we get an opportunity to comment [to] let’s let them write out the plan for us as long as it meets our intent.”

This perspective change, he continued, emerged from an agreement of the Canadian “government objectives” for the Afghan mission outlined in the Manley Report. He argued “things got a lot better.”

There was some indication from civilian participants that the CF operational planning process was very good. Speaking in general, one representing CIDA said “I have tremendous respect for their operational capability. The amount of planning that goes into it. A deep envy, if you will, about the planning cycle,” compared to his organization.

Nevertheless, it seems that the sheer pace and lack of full integration of WoG partners in the CF operational planning process signalled a lack of interorganizational trust. At the early stages of WoG approach to operations, there was also some evidence that not all of the vast information was provided to OGDs from the CF in Afghanistan as a result of “circumstance or choice,” which meant that the CF was always “two or three steps ahead.” Even though many participants argued that considerable determination by personnel from the CF and OGDs on the ground and in Ottawa

had increased and improved the level of civilian integration in Afghanistan over time, these statements imply that it may be difficult to overturn earlier violations of trust. As such, these negative residual effects may continue to hinder the development of interorganizational trust. The participant responses shared above seem to suggest that at least some people within DFAIT distrusted the CF at the early stages of the mission in Afghanistan because DFAIT representatives were not in the planning process from the get go and thought that the CF was keeping information from them. At the same time, the lack of DFAIT planning capacity and limited resources in the field seems to have invoked CF distrust in DFAIT.

A critical aspect of trust in any collaborative situation is understanding and believing in the positive motivations of the other party. There was some suggestion in the discussions that OGD members had some trouble understanding the CF's intentions at the strategic level for humanitarian disaster responses. For example, one OGD said that there has not been "*full visibility on CF planning,*" which is "*something we've raised.*" The impact could result in a loss of trust. As he stated, collaboration could break down "*because if you feel, over a period of time, that you've lost visibility and that you're not being provided in a very forthright manner that visibility as to what CF are planning and thinking, then you begin to develop a distrust...or a sense of what the heck is coming next? What am I gonna have to react to after the fact? And that is not a great way to build trust and build a cooperative working relationship.*" This lack of visibility as well as little consultation with OGDs in humanitarian situations can lead to poor decision-making as one OGD recounts. He said,

"they [CF] need to have full situational awareness as to what all the departments are doing. That's what we try to utilize the Task Force for...the individuals who came needed to speak for their departments and needed to be in a position to provide guidance based...on behalf of the departments...You need to be able to say what was being planned within your respectable organizations...to say what was being planned within your respective organizations so that us...as the coordinating body, we had a full situational awareness of what others were thinking and planning, at the same time others around the table had that full awareness. That'll, that'll allow us for better planning and better decision-making...when I say staying in lanes I mean...everyone needs to respect each other's expertise and abilities and knowledge and mandates."

He cautioned that the CF needs to avoid jumping "*too far, too fast...without full comprehension of other government department actors.*" For example,

"the Canadian Forces, at one point, had determined that they were going to send lumber into Haiti – \$250,000 worth of lumber. This was not communicated to CIDA who would have identified this as not being particularly the best way to do this. But CIDA was left to hold the can, if you will. They were left to try to find partners on the ground who could use it. They were left to pay for the storage...and the materials, in the end, were determined to be inappropriate for the environment because it wasn't treated. So that lumber continues to sit and rot in Port-au-Prince. So it's never been used."

He described the decision-making process for sending lumber, in effect, diminishes the CF's credibility when it comes to providing viable input to humanitarian operational planning:

"a ship was being sent from Canada with relief stocks that wasn't completely full. The CF decided 'I need to fill the ship,' but there was no consultation on what that should look like and, as a result, you get a bad decision...someone was trying to do the right thing. And we hear that shelter is a priority and...what can you do to help shelter? Well you can provide

lumber to frame temporary shelters. But there are ways to do that, to ensure that the shelters live up to international standards...it has been established by credible humanitarian organizations who've been doing this for a long time."

He concluded, *"that's one example where the CF probably fell down."* He suggested *"take[ing] a breath and just do a quick consultation with others."* This suggests that greater consultation with other partners as well as greater integration in operational planning among WoG partners may foster more effective decision-making and increase interorganizational trust.

Financial Structure

Another systemic issue that appeared to prevent the development of interorganizational trust was the failed expectations surrounding project funding mechanisms. For example, one OGD SME said that the CF depended largely on CIDA and DFAIT to provide financial support for WoG deliverables, but this was not always provided. He explained,

"they went in with the expectation that they could rely on CIDA and DFAIT for monetary support in an area that we would jointly agree on. The money never showed up and that was unfortunately circumstance as much as...unwillingness...So in early 2006...budgets weren't being provided, so all of our money got stuck and therefore, you know, we promised money but then we couldn't deliver it for partly reasons beyond our control but also it was new to our department and we didn't know actually [how to] manage money properly at that point, same thing for CIDA...it was an immediate problem that didn't have an immediate solution. That created a lot [of] tension...So a lot of the original bitterness sort of stemmed from that..."

Another OGD SME raised the same issue when he considered whether the CF valued his organization's contribution in theatre. He said,

"I think there was a lot of respect for our strategic input into planning. But I think there was a lot of justified criticism that we didn't extend quickly enough decentralized authorities for project spending, that CIDA...was slow and most things had to go through headquarters to be able to spend money. What we would do in the local context of Afghanistan and southern Afghanistan is to provide large amounts of money to organizations like multilaterals or NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations], whereas what I think the PRT colleagues wanted to see was what we eventually got...was a large responsive fund that we could then program locally and do direct contracting at the PRT."

Failed expectations may be particularly damaging to interorganizational trust, particularly when there is a high degree of interdependence for operational success. One OGD said of his CF counterparts, *"You know in the beginning of the tour, they all...had drunk the Kool-Aid. They had gone through the training. They got...the 3D...beat into them...Then they get into the field with these expectations and then the expectations would not be met [due to a lack of financial support]. Then gradually over the six months...they would tune out. It's not long, you know, we [OGDs] stand you [CF] up. And, you know, we don't normally call the girl back 17 times after being stood up 16 times."*

Given the inability to count on WoG counterparts to provide financial support to projects, the CF was forced to seek out other partnerships with organizations, such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that could provide them with the resources to implement projects. This, however, was eventually remedied on the Canadian side. As was further explained by an OGD SME, *"regulations were bypassed or you know smoothed over, money was made more*

readily accessible, we had more experience from the field. We, you know, created programs that were more reflective of the grim reality of Kandahar...they [CIDA and DFAIT] cough some money over, made this thing accessible and sign-off-able by the field on the civilian side, which was a leap of faith for the civilians, but was an SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] for the military.” As such, civilians were given the authority to sign off on projects and provide funding in the field to augment military operations. Moreover, lowering the bar regarding expectations around OGD support also helped collaboration in the field. As one OGD said, “There’s a lot of diminished expectations by the CF. You have to realize, ‘Okay, they [OGDs] are not gonna do what we [CF] think they can whether we’ve been told by our military trainers that they can do and so with a little bit more of a healthy dose of reality, let’s work together.’” Thus, gaining civilian authority to sign off on projects and lowering overall expectations around OGD support may have helped to repair earlier trust violations.

Rotations

One feature of the CF as a system that may erode interorganizational trust is related to the different length of military rotations (typically 6 – 9 months) in comparison to OGDs (typically 1 year or more), leading to a high turnover of CF personnel. Indeed, civilian participants identified this as a particular challenge to WoG collaboration. They complained that the new CF arrivals often wanted to outperform their predecessors, which meant changing strategies or approaches. As one OGD SME said,

“every General coming in has to show that he has won the war. He has done something completely different than the last General who got it all wrong...that’s a bit of an exaggeration, but not much...we fought like hell to get General [name]’s approach you know ingrained, and he took that a long way. And then the next General came in and basically told us not even to mention the code words he [previous General] was using to describe his mission right. That happens every time, and it is terribly destructive and the military know...this happens and they don’t seem to do anything about it...for civilian departments where were on like a three year timeline to implement our programs, that was very difficult, it was very difficult to, to work around.”

High levels of turnover can have serious impacts on previous agreements and commitments. One OGD said she had to remind new arrivals that,

“there was [a] certain path and agreements and commitments that your predecessors had made with the government...and they were working towards this and they had signed onto it and now you’ve dropped that to come up with your own ideas. Well that doesn’t really bode well for the commitments that we made. You can’t just do what you want to do...you’re not starting over, you’re carrying the torch on from the guys who were here before you and so even if you don’t necessarily agree with what they went with, you have to at least...take it into consideration, because...you could be causing problems if you don’t continue with what was promised.”

It seems that quick CF rotations may discourage the preservation of corporate knowledge that the OGDs require over the long term for sustainable and consistent operational planning. Participant comments suggest that the inability to predict the direction of a successor may weaken interorganizational trust, potentially making collaboration in the field more strained.

3.1.3 Structure

The structure of an organization can also influence how it makes decisions, and even how it collaborates with other parties. For example, the CF is made up of a number of units and formations and is governed by a hierarchical command structure. SME responses suggest that differences in structure between OGDs and the CF may have frustrated interorganizational trust development. Specifically, the differences in personnel number and command authority appear to be the two biggest structure challenges confronting WoG representatives in operations.

Number of Organizational Representatives in the Field

Most participants commented on the sheer number of CF personnel deployed in theatre compared to their civilian counterparts. This imbalance may have invoked inaccurate perceptions about the contributions of OGD participation as they were often accused of working too slow. For example, one CF SME said that the CF Commanders' "*biggest disappointment was that there wasn't enough of them [OGD representatives]. There wasn't enough civilians to deliver on what they [CF Commanders] wanted to deliver or that they [OGDs] were too slow.*" However, this was countered by an OGD who explained, in theatre, "*one civilian has about seven or eight counterparts in headquarters...and so they always think you're working too slow, but they [CF] have seven people being able to do the same job.*" She said that OGDs were very capable, but operating on a "*different timeline,*" which took her CF partners time to understand. Inaccurate perceptions about the competency of other players within the interagency context may have prevented the CF from having a full appreciation of the civilian level of effort and contribution, particularly at the early stages of WoG operations in Afghanistan. As one OGD mentioned,

"we provided a lot of staff time in order to participate in coordination mechanisms. That's not a bad thing. But I think it was always difficult for the CF to appreciate that having a small number of civilians compared to a large number of military CF representatives that for us to coordinate with their mechanisms was a lot more labour-intensive than it is for the bigger entity to collaborate with us. And because they were more numerous and because we didn't want to be left out of a lot of the planning and the strategic thinking, we basically had to assign usually 20-30% of our overall presence in Kandahar post bases to coordinating with the CF and other members of the whole of government team. That was a burden at the very onset...when it came to coordination and being partners on every level of the overall strategic effort in Kandahar was highly labour-intensive for CIDA, and that...it was never really reconciled."

Given the small number of civilians and their overall responsibilities to their own organizations, working within the CF reporting system was said to be "*somewhat cumbersome.*" One OGD SME described this expectation as "*afternoon harassments*" and questioned its value. He said, "*we were being asked for quite onerous narrative reporting into KAF [Kandahar Air Field] to update on everything we were doing...I felt we spent an awful lot of time trying to integrate information from OGD's into reports just because it was being requested, not because that information necessarily added some value.*" Moreover, the reports were altered by military personnel in such a way that the intent was sometimes lost. He explained, "*sometimes it was edited or manipulated in ways that the essence of what the civilian message was or what the intent was in providing...the information was somewhat lost because the people processing information for an upbrief to the General or somebody else weren't fully familiar with the context of the information but when they edited it, it lost its edge.*" He mentioned that adding more civilians to the KAF rectified the situation because, as he concluded, "*it is important to have civilians and military working both informally and formally in partnership so that there are more networks being created so that information is*

being passed in unison up the chain.” This permitted monitoring of the information transmission and provided a source to answer questions concerning the reporting.

The limited number of civilian representatives also made it difficult to complete projects, which may also hinder the development of interorganizational trust. As one OGD participant elucidated, *“I don’t think the 3D ever said that military guys were...going out to do the other two Ds...usually you had military missions and now you’ve got a 3D mission... 1/3,1/3,1/3. But again it’s the size in numbers thing, right? It’s not about 1/3,1/3,1/3, when 1/3 is 3000 people and the other 1/3 is 3 people...the idea was always ‘It’s a 3D mission. We’ll do the defence and security stuff. You do the diplomacy. You do the development.’ That was always the idea. The frustration came from when the big D looked at the smaller Ds... ‘That bridge still isn’t built. These people are still sick’ ...the defence D didn’t think the development D was holding up its own.”*

At the same time, one OGD SME argued that the CF themselves were too few in number to have any lasting impact in Afghanistan. Explaining that the core function of the CF in Afghanistan was to provide “security” to enable development and governance, he stated that this was impossible in Kandahar given the “insufficient number of troops.” In his words,

“the military’s first job...was to solve...the security problem there...what we had at most 2,500 total troops in there, maybe a battle group of 800 out of that, right, for which we were responsible for the whole of Kandahar’s problems, which...we all knew was a joke, because they were all in Panjwai and Zhari except for a CIMIC group that was floating around in some of these other places. They were not up in friggin Nish, Miya Nishin or Maruf. There’s no presence there because...they didn’t have enough troops. So the whole enterprise of Canada there was geared around this, you know, relatively small insufficient number of troops to bring the counter-insurgency out of a clear and into a hole. We never held anything there, really, enduringly.”

The CF, he argued, failed to deliver and wondered if it was either the military planners had “underestimated” or they said “*This is the maximum we can put in here.*” He continued that his NGO partners were unable to work “*if they were dependent on the population for their security*” because “*there weren’t enough boots on the ground*” to protect them from the insurgents. The military’s mistaken belief that CIDA (seen by them as force multipliers) would come in, “*make the poor people feel better out there*” and then “*somehow topple the Taliban...psychotic killers*” was, he inferred, misguided. Most often, the decision to support development programs was based on security issues. He said, when there was little support from CIDA’s perspective (sometimes counter to the CF perspective), it was because “*the Taliban made it too costly an enterprise to do.*” He explained that success was very difficult for CIDA because “*the Taliban or anti-government elements...had to defeat us as well.*” Reflecting on COIN and his previous experience, he thought that the CF should go back to what they are trained to do, i.e., “*clear and hold the place, sustain military presence...do the kinetics...do that stuff that you need to do, and don’t try to friggin morally sway them, you know, all these friggin shuras and these friggin old men come in, 70 year old elders, they have no power anymore.*” Expressing a lack of trust, he said that he felt like he had been “*led down the wrong path...a bit betrayed...that they’re not totally honest with the Canadian public*” about the challenges in Afghanistan. He said, “*as long as you are naive and uninformed, you can go along with all this... ‘We’re gonna clear it. We’re gonna hold it. And then we’re gonna develop it.’ You never got us really solidly in the hold anywhere... [Now] they’re [CF] gonna try and focus more on Dand. Well Dand never had a problem...but you can see it developing as an easier exit and saying ‘Well actually we did something.’ Well you did nothing. The place was...calm prior to your effort.*”

Establishing interorganizational trust in a WoG approach to Afghanistan seems to be a challenge given the very size of representation and the limitations placed on that. The examples described above appear to signal a lack of interorganizational trust. Participant responses show civilians were accused of acting too slowly and failing to deliver by their military counterparts. But in their defence, the civilians argued that they were underrepresented and actually quite competent. On the other hand, one CIDA SME believed that the CF could not provide adequate security to complete development projects because the CF had too few numbers to defeat the insurgents in Afghanistan. For this particular mission, limitations in capacity are, in part, a reflection of the number of personnel, rather than actual competency. This, then, is a good example of systemic issues changing the trust-relevant attributions made about the competency of the organizations working to do their best while inadequately staffed. Attributions made at the interorganizational level (i.e., structural constraints) may ultimately serve to diffuse trust issues in the field at the interpersonal level.

Command Authority

Command structure was also raised as a particular challenge that needed to be managed in theatre, and there was some indication that this issue contributed to a lack of interorganizational trust. Specifically, CF personnel grew frustrated with their WoG counterparts' inability to make a decision without seeking approval from the higher levels of government bureaucracy in Ottawa. As one CF participant explained,

“They try to direct it, try to pull the levers, from 10,000 kilometres away in Ottawa...and for the record that never happened to me militarily...but that wasn't the case for [Senior Civilian] and all of [the] policemen [RCMP] and [the] development folks [CIDA] and the diplomats [DFAIT], etc....constantly getting calls from Deputy Ministers in that office that was next to mine and being, you know, being questioned or told what to do or having...ideas shot down, having to constantly justify what it was [Senior Civilian] was doing. None of which I suffered through.”

In contrast to the CF, OGDs command structure was described as centralized. Another CF SME said,

“They're not, generally speaking, accustomed to mak[ing] decisions and act[ing] the same that we are. There is an element of risk aversion that they have that we don't have. At the same time, you know, once the system is working, it works very well. They just have to be empowered to do it, and authorized, have the fist of the financial scope to actually use their funds, and so on. You just got to get over those hurdles...I was blown away...once people sort of took the shackles off. Blown away by their ability to think and act, you know, on the Whole of Government side. Just blown away. There were some things that they could do far better than us and I was very happy to see it.”

So though OGD counterparts were viewed as competent when given the chance to provide input and make decisions, differences in command structures of the various organizations may have negatively impacted interorganizational trust. Indeed, the need to seek approval and continuously reach back to Ottawa could also lead to trust violations as implied by the CF SME's experiences in the field.

“I could have a meeting where I'm talking about something that perhaps would take them slightly away from what we had been doing before, we would just sort of start to add a bit of this, we need to go this way, everybody would nod around the table, ask a few really pertinent question and so on, they'd go back to their desk and call Ottawa. Guess what the

General is doing. There seems to be this desire to create a maelstrom of issues. You know people...some of it...it's not everybody, but there is a tendency...because a lot of them their lives are reporting... It wasn't necessarily because they were not loyal to the mission or to the General (though they didn't have to be loyal ... because [he] wasn't their boss) but after a lot of convincing and work to get people to understand here's where we are at, it's the right thing to do, I know it is and they feel the heat from Ottawa and so on. You know there's a tendency to want to kind of spy on things and call back to Ottawa. And that is what I found really odd. It's a phenomenon I don't see in the military...you know...the emails and phone calls out to very high levels in government and government bureaucracy. Things that were totally within the purview of the mission to manage, I didn't need permissions, but...you know...lots of people like to be seen to be commenting and stuff. I don't know, it is a very odd environment. It is not what I am accustomed to. For example, I would give some planning guidance 'You need to think about this.' Hasn't gone anywhere, hasn't done anything, hasn't even reported back to me. It's not yet policy, might never be policy. But we are accustomed to doing contingency planning; think about this, think about this, think about this. Civilians get a whiff of 'Hey, we are going to think about moving the civilians from the PRT, from Camp Nathan Smith to somewhere else.' That's the commander doing a plan in case the PRT gets over run, they don't get quite the full picture, they call back to Ottawa 'Here's what the General is doing' and it comes back [as] 'Why [is the CF] thinking about moving the civilians from the PRT?' ... To me it sounds like tattle-tailing sometimes 'Hey guess what's going on here.' Indulging in rumour mongering, right...At first I thought it seemed kind of two-faced that people would do that or that you can't really trust this person...what do I expose to them if they are just going to cause this telephone game to occur? But gradually I got accustomed to it...would just know that some things would come boomeranging back around. But the more the people were involved in the plan and understood what they were doing, the less that occurred."

In this example, then, the CF member had the perception that his behaviour was being monitored, implying a critical lack of trust and misunderstanding on behalf of the other party.

The preceding participant responses suggest that differences in command structure and authority among the various WoG players could present challenges to collaborating, which ultimately could hinder the emergence and maintenance of interorganizational trust. However, some comments suggest that the differences in command authority and the challenges that arose as a result may in part be mitigated by co-location of the various WoG organizations in Ottawa. At present, however, this is not a reality. For example, one OGD SME said,

"why are we in certain buildings all over Ottawa fighting the same fight, instead of putting ourselves together and do things a little bit more efficiently...you know, physical proximity, there was a lot more synergy in the field because of the physical proximity, up until the point information or things left Kandahar, there was a lot of synergy in the field. But as soon as it went into the hands of people in one department who sat in their own office, surrounded by their own people, it got away from where it should be going."

Another OGD participant said,

"the biggest problem with coordinating everything in Afghanistan in Ottawa was that we were in spatially different locations all over town. And you noted this, especially coming back from Afghanistan, where everyone is sitting working together and you're getting to a common sense of purpose and good collaboration based on being physically located in the same space for weeks and weeks on end. It's not so much a training course, but

to have a common physical location where civil military and different OGD representatives who are planning and coordinating and providing operational support to counterparts who are overseas are all in the same place sitting, working together, sharing job taskings along civil military lines. It was very segregated in Ottawa compared to overseas and I think the collaboration in Ottawa especially between CEFCOM [Canadian Expeditionary Force Command] and PCO [Privy Council Office], DFAIT suffered as a result...you don't have to co-locate everybody, but co-locating the people who you want to ... for planning and operational policies and those kinds of things, because it was burdensome to have to drive around as much as we did to attend meetings and to do different things."

These participants raise a very important issue that seems likely to be an excellent means by which to promote long-term trust within the interagency context. Changing organizational structures so that WoG partners are co-located in Ottawa, for example, might enable shared experience and time to learn about the motivation, abilities and interests of other players within the WoG context. This might make a potentially important contribution to the optimal growth of trust and optimal collaboration in the long term.

3.1.4 Staff and Skills

The term "staff" refers to those personnel who make up the organization, and includes the human resource activities that promote the development and reward excellence. Skills, on the other hand, represent the actual abilities of the organization's personnel. Participants spoke frequently about their WoG collaboration partners in ways that signalled interorganizational trust.

In general, participants made a number of positive statements about other organizational representatives. For example, CF officers, in general, were characterized as "very good," professional and disciplined. One OGD SME mentioned how, prior to meeting and collaborating with CF personnel, she viewed them primarily as "warfighters" and thought that they were "narrow minded." Following her time in theatre, she referred to those at the Headquarters (HQ) level as "[b]rilliant people," "problem solvers," "great people," which led to having "a lot of respect for them afterwards." One CF SME said of his OGD counterparts that they were "naïve to the security situation, but very confident in their area of expertise...and the thing that really got me was a genuine desire to try to do the right thing...they want to help...they're there to do a job. I didn't get a sense of...a left versus right kind of thing...I didn't get a sense that guys were all sandal-wearing hippies or something and hated the military...I definitely got a sense that they understood what our role was and that we were required and were needed." These observations suggest that time to interact with other players within the interagency context can be critical to extending beyond inaccurate preconceptions, and to learning about their true abilities.

However, military and civilian participants raised general perceptions about WoG partners that indicated a lack of trust. For example, there was a reported age discrepancy between CF commanders and their civilian equivalents. Similarly, military and civilian participants sometimes questioned the general knowledge and expertise of their WoG counterparts. Leadership, which will be discussed in more detail below, was also another staff and skill issue that seem likely to influence levels of interorganizational trust.

Age and Experience

Age was one variable noted by participants. Specifically, some OGD representatives thought that their CF counterparts perceived them to be too young for their position, and this impacted the overall perception of WoG organizations. As one OGD participant explained,

“civilians are often quite younger than their military counterparts. As a civilian you can become a Director General, which is sort of a ‘One Two star’ equivalent, you know, still in your thirties. But in the military, it’s impossible. You have to be so many years even if you join at 17...so there’s a really, really, really young Lieutenant Colonel is still gonna be in their mid-forties. Whereas, you know, you could easily have a ‘one or two or even three star’ equivalent civilian in their forties. So there’s sometimes...an ageist mentality or in the military it’s a bit of an old boys school club... ‘Maybe I’m not gonna take this person as seriously as I should’ ...I think it’s very hard to encounter...someone who’s just convinced they’re not going to take you seriously because they think you’re too young or...where you’re from or what you represent.”

This age discrepancy might make initial contact difficult. As one OGD mentioned,

“it was a bit awkward at first because I think in the military side a lot of times there’s association between age and rank. And so me being young that was sometimes difficult because they wouldn’t see, they wouldn’t realize, ‘Oh, she’s actually senior,’ they just think ‘She’s young.’ So a few times if they, it would be like ‘Oh...you must report to me’ because here we are with a new rotation come in and they’d be like ‘Oh we want to make you the 2IC [Second in Command],’ like actually ‘No, I co-run this with you,’ so...obviously not with quite that tone.”

One OGD SME provided an example in which he felt slighted because of his age or a perceived lack of seniority. Describing the CF’s desire to build a camp to support the humanitarian relief effort in Haiti, he said,

“the military says, ‘Well, we build camps. We’ve got engineers. This is what we do all over...We come in and we build a camp’...UN [United Nations] doctrine and global humanitarian affairs doctrine...military don’t go build camps because when you build a camp you then own a camp and there’s in fact organizations, the International Organizational Migration, the Red Cross, this is all they do. All they do anywhere in the world is build IDP [Internationally Displaced Person] camps and they do it better than any soldier can, no disrespect intended to any of our soldiers, but a military camp is gonna be different from an IDP camp. ‘Great! Where do the latrines go? Where do the men and women latrines go? Where does the cooking line go?’ You know, all these things...So when they say this, their intention is to go and provide shelter for poor Haitians who have lost everything and because they’ve been to the camps that exist now which are ramshackle, you’re walking in feces that thick and if you’re a Commander or Senior person this is not acceptable, ‘We’re gonna go. We’re gonna fix this.’ Action, right? Which is totally commendable and exactly what you sort of want to do. So when they say they’re gonna do that and then you have to be the only person at the table because everyone else at the table says ‘Sir, yes Sir’, and you say ‘Actually no, and here’s why...’

“But perhaps you’re not really convincing when you’re sitting in the comfort of your soft chair and this guy has just come back with, you know, a boot full of human excrement because that’s what he’s seeing and he doesn’t want to hear that and these people can’t believe that you’re saying no to him because...around commander’s table, you never have somebody say no. That’s not how it works. The only person that says no is the guy higher

than him. And, and, and so yeah I would assume that from that there are people that are saying, 'well okay these guys are being not helpful' and what we ended up doing in that case was just balking it up until we got a retired [foreign] senior level officer who then, who now works for the United Nations who is in Haiti to come and convince our folks of, he said exactly what we had said, 'Here's all the rules. Here's all the norms. Here's why you don't want to do it.' And when he said it they are like, grey beard, you know, older guy, 'Oh, okay that makes total sense'. The exact same lines. I mean, they're not our lines they are just standard things. These are what the international rules of engagement say."

One CF SME believed that the civilian WoG were young, career-centred, ill-prepared, and not aligned with respect to the overarching mission goals. He stated,

"the young representative[s] of DFAIT and CIDA were more career-centric than mission-centric, trying to get their mark into their organization to say how great they were versus the mission...So I think the maturity and the age may have a factor with the individuals during my experience there...they were there for a different purpose than us. So I always kept that in the back of my mind, I knew that this was their entry, first kick at the can in their career process, they did what they thought was right and you can't blame anybody especially when you're in Kandahar right...I thought they were ill prepared, ill equipped, not mentally focused, ready to go to a threat area complex without the support, guidance and training from the department...it was the department went into something blindly."

Levels of experience were another issue raised by participants. For example, one CF member compared multinational OGDs with Canadian OGDs and said that the difference was "capacity" and previous operational experience as an organization. He explained,

"The Foreign Commonwealth Office and same with the U.S. [United States] Department of State and USAID, they actually have personnel that are trained for expeditionary operations and are deployed regularly into different theatres of operation and work hand in hand with military and others on nation building, reconstruction development projects. That I would suggest is a pretty nascent capability right now in the Canadian Context...when you're talking with...a development rep...somewhere in Helmond, that person often has a lot of experience from other missions. So they can...they understand the policies, politics and, you know, the importance of the relationships both with the civilians, you know, local Afghans and...ISAF partners and can put, I guess, maybe a bit of context. And they have more developed lines of operation, if you want to call it that, and better understand of how the military works, how the NGOs work in the field as opposed to you know what happens in London or, or, or Ottawa in our context. You know I would suggest that...a lot of our reps understand what happens here in Ottawa, but there's a big gap between what happens in the field and what happens in Ottawa. And it's so often bridging that gap that becomes a bit difficult."

Some participants argued that greater consideration should be given to who was actually deployed within a WoG context. As one SME from CIDA argued, it is critical to "put more resources to deploy civilians with specific skill sets" and experience in order to maintain "the credibility of the civilian component." He argued that "you have to try to send experienced people in. And that's something we haven't been good at. Most of the [development] officers are very, very junior. Our more senior people with ten to fifteen [years of experience]...don't want to deploy...for us...definitely not a boost to your career and so for a lot of people it's not worth it."

The preceding examples suggest that differences in age and experience may affect interorganizational trust. Comments made by OGD participants suggest that they believe the CF personnel view them as their junior, regardless of their demonstrated competency. However, as mentioned above, at least one CF member shared this view, indicating that he thought that the OGD representatives were often very junior. As we will see in Section 3.2 related to interpersonal trust, OGD representatives reported that they often had to establish their credibility in order to gain the trust of their CF counterparts.

Knowledge and Expertise

Knowledge and expertise was another staff and skills issue that may impact interorganizational trust. Some CF members spoke generally about the lack of requisite knowledge that their counterparts had for WoG operations in Afghanistan. Specifically, one CF member questioned the relevance of a DFAIT foreign service officer for helping with municipal level politics.

“What does a master degree DFAIT policy officer know anything about? How much do they know about municipal level politics in a knock down drag them out kind of stuff that goes on in villages and districts? You know they are trained for the capitals of Europe?”

“I would question why we would need to put a DFAIT, a Foreign Service Officer, in the field at...what’s essentially the municipal level to mentor a district leader and my argument is well what the hell does a Foreign Service Officer know about municipal politics than one of my Captains doesn’t. Really they have the same knowledge base. They’re not trained in that sort of thing. So my complaint was you know okay you fielded these public servants from Ottawa, but they’re not experts, they’re generalists. And in fact their expertise is at the capital, the national capital level. I mean they’re more comfortable in Kabul than they are in Kandahar. So...if you want to have an effect at the municipal level, deploy civilian municipal experts. And before I went overseas I paid a visit to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities [FCM], just like a loose organization, umbrella organization of all the municipalities across Canada, and asked... ‘If I needed an expert on a subject, you know, sanitation, irrigation, agriculture, whatever it happens to be, could you find it for me?’ And of course they can. But there was a real reticence...on my civilian counterpart’s behalf to give up that space and actually, with the exception of a couple of really major projects and actually bringing in somebody who knew what they were talking about...while its commendable that they’re out there, in some ways, they’re the wrong people right. We need real civilian experts and not...public servants...generalists.”

To counter his lack of trust in the Canadian foreign service officers, this CF member established a back-up source prior to deployment in case he had an issue pertaining to municipal politics he needed to understand in theatre. As he reported, he met with representatives from the FCM in order to establish relationships that he could leverage in operations to provide the relevant and necessary expertise. One problem facing WoG approach to Afghanistan was, despite being “well-meaning” and “hardworking,” it was reported that the wrong OGD “skill sets” were deployed. As one CF participant mentioned “what we needed were specialists” as opposed to what they [CF] got, which were “generalists.” This was also raised by an OGD who stated that CIDA is now made up of generalists, when in a place like Afghanistan “you need specialist advice.”

Another CF SME mentioned that the OGD knowledge was not disseminated out to his area of operations because, he claimed, the focus was on the Canadian signature projects. He said,

“they [OGDs] were knowledgeable, but that knowledge rarely...in the time that I was in theatre...ten months the first time and seven and a half months this last time, rarely

equated into progress, measureable progress...it's a little frustrating when you know you try and achieve effects in other areas that are away from these seven signature projects. But that's where, at least from my own personal experience, a lot of the focus of at least the higher levels of the civilian structure were...that's what was reported back to PMO [Prime Minister's Office] and PCO on a more regular basis...however, that doesn't negate the requirement or necessity out in some of the other areas."

On the other hand, civilians thought their military counterparts did not have a strong knowledge about development and governance. For example, one OGD mentioned that CF personnel had a "constrained view of what civilian departments should do" in operations, because "none of the Commanders, none of the Lieutenant Colonels or the Majors, had any experience outside of DND – like none." He continued, "they had no idea what PCO was, how it worked, Afghanistan Task Force, they had no idea how DFAIT worked, or its task force, what it did, you know other departments and agencies like just no understanding whatsoever. No understanding of basic things...of parliamentary democracy like what is CCOA [Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan]? How does it function? Why should we care what CCOA thinks?" As a result, he said that he had to explain "very basic things" about the GoC, "which had a huge impact on the mission." Moreover, he said that the CF's perception of WoG is "What can the rest of government do to support Canadian Forces operations," which is a "huge difference of opinion." This, he continued, led to "an old-fashioned view of how CIDA works...CIDA goes out with the peasants and village and digs wells and stuff like that and...they really, like honestly, they really thought that after they cleared an area that CIDA would drive out in a truck and you know start doing development right and no idea how development works...through implementing partners and...building sustainability and hooking it to a wire."

Another OGD participant provided an example in which the Commander's expectations were not met by CIDA due to a lack of understanding of how the organization and essentially development worked. He explained,

"talking to one of the first battle group commanders who had fought a big battle and then wanted to build a road to connect two regions, he's like... 'CIDA should come in and, and pay to have this whole road done and we should plant Canadian flags up and down the highway.' And it's very hard when you're in the field talking to a Commander who has just lost lots and lots of men...saying 'Well actually, we don't do that. Here are the reasons why...and there's these things called the Parish Principles and Canada's a signatory to them. There's...good principles on government development.' He's like 'I don't give a crap about that...I lost guys! I want this highway to be representative of Canada'...they'd say 'Well, we're doing our part and we're spilling, spilling blood and CIDA's not pulling up its end of the bargain.' And it sounded quite mean, but it was really just based on a poor understanding of what...an aid agency does. I mean an aid agency doesn't go in and, you know, build villages overnight. It's not how it works. It's never how it's works..."

Despite being very enthusiastic to help, the CF was also thought to have little knowledge with respect to humanitarian relief operations. As one OGD SME explained,

"it's...a slow education process. I found in both Afghanistan and Haiti, and I think it's probably changed in Afghanistan now because of the amount of pre-deployment training that happens with civilians, but in Haiti, where you had a group that hadn't done this [humanitarian relief] at all...I spent most of my time either educating or trying to reign in some of the enthusiasm of CF members...when you have 2000 people there in a disaster zone, they all want to do the right thing. They all want to help and...sometimes that help

can go beyond the sort of norms and rules that we signed up for and sometimes you can look like the bad guy...you sort of feel like the jerk.”

Some CF personnel thought that OGD representatives have preconceived ideas about their levels of education and expertise, and this may impact interorganizational trust development. For example, one CF member said,

“When I talked to a couple of them we start ‘Oh I’m married, kids. Where did you go to school?’ They’re wearing the propaganda ring and all that stuff right, you chit chat and then they tell you ‘Oh, well I did a bachelor in economics.’ I said ‘Oh yeah me too, where?’ ‘Huh? Well I did that and then I did a masters in that.’ ‘Oh yeah I did it in this one and then I majored in that one instead.’ ‘Oh, I guess you guys are not just a bunch of drop out high school guys in the army right?’ Yeah, yeah... ‘what do you mean? Think I’m a chump? Sure I’ve got short hair and tattoos but it doesn’t mean I’m not educated in the field of work that you’re in. If you’re working in the rule of law doesn’t mean that I don’t have a bachelor in law, I just chose to join the army instead of going to icky bob law firm in down to make sixty grand a year. Right, don’t, don’t dismiss me because I wear a uniform.’ So once...[they]...realise that you’re not a dumb cat or you got the same degree that they did, or you, you’ve got more education...then they’re like ‘ooo stereotype ooo’...changes a bit.”

Despite pre-existing stereotypes, then, there was some evidence that contact with other partners provides an opportunity to reduce these preconceptions. Indeed, many participants suggested that cross-pollination with other WoG organizations may mitigate the general lack of understanding of their partners’ knowledge and expertise, and the expectations that stem from this. As one OGD participant explained, *“part of the reason why civ-mil relations improved over time [in Afghanistan] was partly to do with the fact that people started getting more used to working with each other because they were on second and third tours so they had already had that experience of having had to work with civilians and so, and us having to work with them [CF]...we’re actually like living in the same camp and, you know, sharing the same risks and the same food and everything. You know, it’s really more integrated... I think one of the things that we had talked about here [CF College] is the need to have more, I guess, exposure in training, joint training together beforehand.”*

Leadership

Participant comments suggest that a failure to embrace the WoG at the highest levels may facilitate conflict, thereby preventing the development interorganizational trust. For example, some OGDs reported that some CF members seemed to find it difficult to understand that they were tasked to support OGD objectives in Afghanistan. One OGD SME reported daily fights with a Major who did not understand *“that they [CF] were there to support us [OGDs].”* She blamed this on the failure from the top of the military hierarchy; namely, the General, who did not understand the role that civilians were playing in theatre. This OGD SME said *“when we started having a General that just wouldn’t back up the civilians...when you are verbalizing, kind of being degrading – Wow! – knocks the crap out of civ-mil relations...it was depressing to watch because we...made huge, huge, huge steps forward...If the leadership doesn’t act like civilians matter, there’s no way in hell a Major or any or the Privates or anybody’s gonna do it.”* She emphasized that understanding needs to trickle down from the top leadership to the ranks and that top CF leaders have greater exposure to OGDs in Ottawa and have more understanding about the relevance of WoG. CF members below the rank of Colonel, she argued, get little exposure and most of that is *“through jokes and comments of how civilians don’t work very hard.”*

Another OGD SME argued that the Commander sets the tone for the levels of authority and respect given to civilians by military personnel. He explained that in one mission the Commander told his troops that the diplomatic representative and humanitarian representatives had the same authority as himself and, as such, troops were to treat these non-military personnel the same as they would treat the Commander. He cautioned, *“If that tone isn’t set, it doesn’t permeate down. It’s much more challenging. You’re fighting more of an uphill battle because you are trying to convince them of what you know to be the case...just because things are happening at the exact right level in Ottawa doesn’t mean at all that it permeates down and so you suddenly find yourself being on the ground kind of being the jerk a little bit and saying, ‘Listen...this is why we are doing it this way, and actually I know what I’m doing.’”*

One OGD SME spoke of the impact that leadership can have on advancing the philosophy of WoG approach to COIN. Where *“the Canadians had kind of abandoned us”* just before she was leaving, she said that she gained tremendous support from the Americans. She explained, *“we’d have a room full of like fifty soldiers from the PRT all different nationalities. And it was...the U.S. Commander that would sit down beside me and say, I’d be the only civilian... ‘If you’re not here to support this woman, you may as well leave the room.’ I never heard that. Like I really, really, really enjoyed working with the Canadians. I thought we made huge steps forward in civ-mil...but they [Americans] had a lot of time for the Canadians. I found it disheartening by the end, because we had taken some pretty big steps back. So a constant battle...it is a constant evolution and it really, really fluctuates based on leadership and you know that particular U.S. Commander was right into it, so his messaging was really clear. So if I asked a U.S. soldier to do anything – bam! – like it would be done.”*

The preceding examples illustrate the importance of leadership buy in and promotion of the true WoG approach. Without it, it is difficult to establish one’s credibility and further interorganizational trust.

3.2 Interpersonal Trust

At the interpersonal level, trust will also be established largely through boundary spanners, i.e., those individuals who have actual contact with members of the partnering organization (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). Boundary spanners are believed to play a defining role in establishing and maintaining interorganizational trust (Sydow, 1998; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). They can exist at the strategic level, and largely determine the kind of relationship organizations will have with one another, and at the operational level. Even when potential partners have negative perceptions of the organization with which they must collaborate, boundary spanners can help establish trust at the interpersonal level by building relationships and demonstrating credibility for themselves and the organization they represent.

In general and despite challenging circumstances within Canadian WoG missions, participants spoke highly of their WoG partners, signalling a degree of interpersonal trust. For example, CF members were described as well-educated and professional by their civilian partners, whereas civilians were described as confident, intelligent and enthusiastic by their CF partners. Many participant accounts also indicated that they worked very hard in theatre at an interpersonal level to make WoG work, despite the challenges at the higher levels in Ottawa and differences in organizational strategies (e.g., common goals), systems (e.g., planning), structure (i.e., number of personnel), and staff (e.g., knowledge and expertise).

As one OGD SME mentioned,

“It’s messy on the ground particularly in a crisis situation when things are happening at a million miles an hour and people are getting two to three hours sleep, but that’s where whole-of-government works its best...where we know the challenges exist are at the headquarters level [i.e., Ottawa], and that’s where they should be...that’s where the big questions about making sure that the various acts are staying in their lanes and understanding the roles and responsibilities. That fighting, if you will, needs to happen at headquarters because on the ground there has to be unity of purpose, we need to know that we can count on each other, that we’re not going to get caught into the stove pipe thinking...that sometimes grinds things to [a halt]... makes things a challenge...at the strategic level. And so it does work, and in my experience, in the four times I’ve deployed...the decisions we’ve taken, it works very well because we understand that we need to cut the crap and just get right to it.”

However, some challenges still remained. And to best learn trust relevant lessons for optimal interagency operations in the future, these are included here in this section. For example, some participants implied that it is imperative that organizations select competent individuals with the appropriate skill sets⁹ to operate in a WoG context. It is critical to ensure that the “right” individuals represent the organization in the field as they are emissaries of their respective organizations. Failing to do so could have lasting impressions, preventing trust development. As one OGD SME explained,

“the NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers] would brand or paint all of the civilians with the same brush. So they had a bad experience with somebody they would be difficult or ornery with all the civilians from that point forward. And I worked with the CIDA colleague who...wasn't particularly good in communicating effectively with the NCOs or the people who were providing her with services. And it made the job for me and for my other colleague to perpetually kind of mend fences and re-establish relationships with our military counterparts and [she] would create another fire and we would have to go put that out and put that out and put that out.

“And so my experience over three years was that there were some people who...by their lack of communication skills on the civilian side usually aggravated some of the problems that were natural that you would have between groups of people who don't necessarily know each other, know each other's intentions very well.”

As a result of the inability to communicate effectively with the military and ensuing negative interactions, his colleague tainted the reputation of the whole civilian unit. Despite attempts at trust repair, the civilian unit was still perceived as “*difficult and problematic*” by the NCOs, individuals who provided logistical support to their operations.

Another OGD SME emphasized the importance of selecting individuals who had the competency required to work in an environment such as Afghanistan, without having prejudices toward the CF. He expounded,

⁹ Having worked in Joint Interagency Multinational Public operating environments, subject matter experts, representing the CF, International Organizations (IOs), and Non-Government Organizations, identified the following competencies that they argue will promote more effective interactions with individuals from different organizations: openness, flexibility, empathy, practicality, good judgement, good listener, diplomacy, strong willed, patient, perseverance, social, and a sense of humour (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011).

“There are people in our society and my organization [CIDA] who detest the military. They shouldn’t be there, but they’re looking for a career move and think that they’re single-handedly going to somehow maintain the state of territory and insulate their ‘development’ from the military...they shouldn’t fucking be there...they ended up being fired by us, sent away after creating all kinds of problems.”

These comments underscore the importance of sending individuals who can work effectively with WoG partners under tough operational conditions.

However, competency and a willingness to work with the CF will not be enough to secure trust with collaboration partners. Although trust can be influenced by the role that one occupies, it was clear from discussions that this does not automatically establish trust. As one OGD SME recalled he did not gain respect because he was “an OF5¹⁰.” He stated, “everyone in the military knows you don’t get respect for the number of bars on your shoulder. You get respect by earning it, you know...” Trust, then, must be earned within the interagency context.

However, there was evidence that one of the issues impacting trust was simply that players did not have extensive information or understanding about other players within the interagency context. As OGD SME comments implied, CF members likely will not know just what to expect from their WoG partners in theatre and this will surely impact trust. For example, one stated, “you walk in the room, they are like ‘Not quite sure what to make of you’...it’s right from the get go.” Another said “the military didn’t really know what to do with civilians. They didn’t know where they fit, because we didn’t have rank. They didn’t know how to treat us...a continual kind of uncertainty issue.” As a consequence, from a civilian perspective, evidence suggested that OGDs had to establish respect and credibility with their CF counterparts in order to win their trust and place at the table.

One OGD SME recollected his initial experience with the CF. He commented,

“I sort of showed up at the boardroom and got a lot of ‘Who the hell is this guy and why is he wearing a blue shirt and khakis?’

“I ended up you know developing excellent relationships...it actually didn’t take much time, but it definitely took time. You needed to prove yourself. And I had...a very senior officer say at one point... ‘Listen. I’ve got to be honest with you, I wasn’t quite sure about having a CIDA guy over here, you know, don’t have a lot of experience, wasn’t sure what to expect, we kinda thought that if you sucked we’d just shut you out,’ because they could right. What am I gonna do, right? ‘But you seem like you’re okay, we like you.’ So that’s good. So you made a good impression and because of that you were able to do your job. But if I had gone in or if a different person had gone in and made a bad impression or had gone [in] and said, ‘You guys are idiots. You’re...blowing stuff up’...they [CF] would have said ‘Alright. That’s it, you’re done.’”

He underscores the criticality of establishing credibility in order to develop working relationships with the CF. As such, behaviours such as attempting to “pull rank” would be harmful to successful collaboration. One OGD SME recalled one of her colleagues pulling rank and stated this was “not very good for relationship building.” Recognizing the unique contributions that other players could make, regardless of their rank or status, is a better way to promote good collaboration.

¹⁰ Signifies a Colonel.

According to one OGD SME, establishing credibility with CF partners required “*work[ing] like crazy*” and “*deliver[ing] quickly*,” maintaining a sense of humour, and listening well to understand their needs and interests. She shared the following,

“I think at first yeah it was ‘Who is this young person’ ...because my counterpart was twenty years my senior, very experienced military person, obviously as a Colonel. And so at first, it was just like ‘Are they kidding, like are they not taking this serious to send some capable civilians in?’ But that, that was overcome very, very quickly...just being able to deliver... deliver, deliver, deliver every single time...coming up with different ideas and compromising...listening to them...humour and...joking...but being able to switch very quickly between having a good time and being ridiculously serious...being able to try and be friends and create that space, but at the same time you cannot give an inch. If you give an inch, they will walk all over you.”

She also spoke of the need to be honest and have a good rapport with her CF counterparts.

“[b]eing able to talk very, very frankly and...create a confidence...with some of these decisions that are being made, you know some of it you wouldn’t tell anyone else like ‘Listen this is where our pressures really are and we can’t friggin’ move on this you know,’ like being very, very frank with them so that we could really figure things out as much as we could between us. And so I knew when I had a good rapport that they were telling me things that they would have only discussed with the commander, they would not even have told some of their senior staff...when I actually started getting more and more information than the RoCK [Representative of Canada in Kandahar]...because you, you’ve gotta get that in order to prep him, that’s when I know I’ve got a good rapport.

“I’m gonna tell you when something’s coming down. You’re gonna be able to trust me when I’m coming to you. I’m gonna deliver. Like all the things I needed from them like don’t surprise me, don’t surprise my boss, I needed to give to them. And so we had sort of, I think, that understanding. And even if something really nasty was coming at us that they couldn’t actually tell us...they would still walk by my office and be like ‘Shits gonna hit the fan. I honestly can’t tell you right now, but just get ready’ ...it’s just that trust in making sure you’re not screwing anybody over...make sure that neither of us were taken off guard...If we didn’t talk, there was something wrong ...”

A few participants indicated that providing quality input also established credibility, but this input had to be direct, rather than long winded. One OGD SME stated be direct and “*deliver quickly*” with “*quality input*” to ensure that you are not “*dismissed*.” She said that she had colleagues who would “*paint out this...entire novel and then they’d [CF] lost complete interest*.” Moreover, she thought that her military partners trusted her because she had a strong knowledge of Afghanistan, the mission, and a “*good relationship with the Afghans as well*.” She said that she had been in Afghanistan for a while and had worked on the file from headquarters for a few years prior to deployment. Indeed, another OGD SME said that quality input could be derived by “*knowing your files*” and this enhanced one’s credibility. He said know your files, know when and when not to make “*interventions*,” and ensure these interventions are both “*reasonable*” and “*intelligent*.” He cautioned “*only speak up if you have something important to say and not following that rule...they just cut you off at the knees... (e.g., ‘Shut the fuck up!’)*.”

Communicating confidently was also believed to be a way of establishing credibility with the CF. As one OGD SME said, “*what I find with the CF, if you’ve communicated in a way where you don’t feel very confident or you don’t feel very, like you’re gonna be very forthright about it, you’re*

gonna get walked over. And I've seen that with some of the people we've deployed with the CF in places who really let the uniform frankly intimidate them and I, I've always been clear that you can't, that can't be the case."

It was also necessary to have the requisite knowledge of the military. Failing that, one easily could be misled. For example, one OGD SME recollected, *"we'd think we'd be saying the same thing, but then as soon as we started implementing, we'd realize they have a totally different plan and we actually weren't far enough ahead of them and they would start doing stuff we didn't like."* She argued that this arose because of her failure to fully appreciate how CF personnel could be employed to particular operations and are tasked by their organization. She said *"we would reach agreement and I'd be like 'Alright, I think we've held our ground.' It was in the implementation that they would be able to redefine or pull out something and say, 'Yeah, but it actually means this.'" Without the appropriate knowledge, it was difficult for her to predict what her counterparts would do (a potential prerequisite for trust). Moreover, she implied that the CF did not really care about her organization's interests, because she thought the general attitude was *"If you can't figure it out, I don't have to tell you."**

For the civilian actors, establishing credibility was vital to developing trust with their CF counterparts in a WoG context. Indeed, participants argued that the CF will be good about accepting you, *"but that credibility, you had to establish it first."* One described the trust he had gained through his *"street credibility."* *"I was known and people recognized me or people knew people who had worked with me, that helped me a lot in terms of relating with new people in different rotations."* Hence, participant self-reflections suggest that OGDs did fairly well to establish their credibility with CF partners. But as one participant explained, *"you lost time because you had to establish your credibility in the zone operation."* He argued this could be accomplished prior to operations in pre-deployment training.

CF participants, on the other hand, provided a few examples of their civilian partners losing credibility. For example, one CF SME described a confrontational exchange with an OGD representative. The particular individual, described as *"obnoxious"* and *"power hungry,"* started interactions by questioning the CF's role:

"Why is the army talking to the district leadership, that should be one of my guys' and it's like 'Hey, whoa, you've been here two days, don't critique how we're doing it. How about you educate yourself on... why we're doing what we're doing and then make recommendations to adjust it left or right. Don't just start throwing it in the air and say that everything's screwed up, the mission is failing because we're all messed up.' We're like come on now, check fire, you know. So the guy was talking out of the, you know, out of terms and was condescending towards his own people, his own department personnel, barking and ordering... We don't even do that in the army. We see that in the movies, but we don't live like 'Hey you do that.' In the army, you get harassment complaints left, right, and centre... because that's harassment."

He continued,

"he just didn't have the leadership skills. Didn't portray himself as a professional, wasn't even shaving himself in the morning, you know. Like, you're the leader of that OGD department, be punctual, on time. If there's a conference at eight, show up five minutes early, you don't show up five minutes late with a coffee and your bagel... come on man! Like, do you do that in Ottawa? If you do, you guys are messed up because nobody should be bringing their breakfast at a conference in the morning... People right away discredit

him or labelled him as an ass...the follow on stories I heard was that he had difficulty rebuilding trust because he...flatly destroyed it in his first couple days.”

The failure of the civilian to conform to professional standards seemed to have indicated to the CF personnel that he was not trustworthy. Another CF SME shared his experiences with civilians in operations. Specifically, he said that they were unprepared when it came to patrols, often considering or wearing inappropriate dress. He said,

“there was RCMP in Kabul that wanted to come to Kandahar to stay and then do some work in Spin Boldak as part of this report [for] Canada Border Services...the team was based out of Kabul, where I guess the security culture was very different, and they called down to Kandahar in fact specifically the PRT and said ‘So we’re coming next week. We want to come down and go see Spin Boldak. We want to visit the border. We want to talk to a couple people there you know. What’s the dress?’ and we said, ‘Well what do you mean what’s the dress?’ ‘Well you know...can you wear jeans or is it khakis?’ like, ‘No that’s not really what’s important. You need your body armour and you know full, full protective personal protective ensemble’ and they’re like, ‘Oh, we don’t have any of that. Can we get the issued in at the PRT?’ You know, so we had to now procure all this protective kit for these ten or fifteen guys that were coming. It finally got sorted, it’s just...that gap in understanding and we had that within...the PRT sometimes.”

He shared another example with new civilians.

“Guys would show up, because they are new...with open toed shoes, no gloves, things like that. But you just have to explain to them. Some of them try to be a little graphic about it, you know, ‘If you wear that stuff and we get blown up, you’re gonna burn, you know, so wear the protective gloves you’re given so that your hands don’t get burned off.’ ‘Oh, ok’...sometimes that worked and other times...you just give them a fair ribbing, you know, ‘See what everybody else is wearing? Go back and get it.’ Of course that causes delays because they’ve gotta go back to their room and rummage through their shit to find it.”

To resolve this, he said he exercised some “polite education” and, depending on who it is, “a little bit of ribbing.”

However, the failure to understand the situation and the impacts on others can seriously diminish trust, and in some cases have a lasting impression. For example, one OGD mentioned how one of her colleagues chose to wear “flip-flops” on patrol. When she was told that flip-flops were not regulation, she pulled rank, offending the soldiers.

These examples show some of the nuances of working to establish interpersonal trust within an interagency context. As representatives of their respective organizations, it is vital for boundary spanners to establish credibility in order to secure trust as building relations with partnering organizations may require making a personal and lasting connection with their representatives. Participant responses suggest that this requires demonstrating competence (work hard, provide relevant and terse input, and deliver), the desire to work with others from another organization (motivation), and confidence in one’s own position (knowing your file). Indeed, one CF SME mentioned that the officers in his company embraced the WoG approach because they (his officers) were “mature,” and “confident...in their role,” which meant that they could listen and consider “someone else’s point of view” without feeling threatened.

In addition, there was also evidence of category-based trust (i.e., trust that emerges in the absence of direct and personal experience) within the interpersonal interactions. Reputation, for example,

was noted as a critical influence within this domain. Behaving in ways that are in alignment with established norms and standards (predictability) is noted as another way to build trust. On the whole, then, there was good evidence about how trust within the interagency context can be both built and hindered through the interpersonal interactions of WoG players.

3.3 Making WoG Work!

Even though there was evidence of the challenges in fully articulating the WoG approach, it is equally important to elaborate on key examples that show discrete efforts to make the WoG approach maximally effective. For example, one CF commander detailed four steps that he and his civilian counterparts made at the start of the mission that essentially set a positive tone. He began by identifying the three lines of operation for COIN, including security, governance, and development, and emphasizing the full integration of these for mission success. To accomplish this, he did the following,

“the first thing I did was I kicked my Deputy [Commander] out of his office which was next door to mine and moved her [Senior Civilian] in there. So visually it looks right, it was the Commander and you have the Senior Civilian and they’re in the same executive suite so that, you know, people immediately recognize that they’re co-equals...number two...we looked across the headquarters for areas where we needed to be integrated...the guys that do the campaign plan, so the people that are looking out six months a year, two years, that needed to have a civilian component because military planners don’t have that level of expertise. So I think it was three or four civilians from both CIDA and DFAIT that were added to that team or stuck into the campaign planning cell. The second piece was Intelligence...we needed people to analyze the tribal structures to figure out, you know, who the informal power brokers are in the province, so you, you know which belly button to push to make something happen...it’s certainly augmented or made even more effective if you throw some civilian analysts into the mix. So we put two civilians into what was then called the White SA [Situation Awareness] Cell...The third area is public affairs...if you’re trying to get your message out...you need to do more than just the military stories...and then...visitors. You’re absolutely inundated in these places by visitors and many of them are Ministers from these other Ministries. So constantly, and they’re constantly handled by military people...so we put civilians into the Visit Cell.”

He argued that this was an effective means to ensure a WoG approach to operations. This quote is an excellent example of many of the issues explored in previous sections of this report. This commander recognized that the WoG approach is most fully articulated when the structures that underlie it are aligned and clearly reflect a WoG strategy. Moving the senior civilian in the same executive suite as the senior commander gives a very strong message about how power is divided and, indeed, about how collaboration will proceed. Bringing in other civilians as a more integral part of the planning process is another indication of implicit trust and respect for them and their input, and a clear indication of the willingness to work collaboratively.

Another OGD SME provided an example of how he and his counterparts worked effectively in a WoG context.

“One of the interesting things we did actually is early days, DND would do it’s reporting, Foreign Affairs would do it’s reporting, and CIDA would do it’s reporting and we sort of said...If were supposed to be 3D, to do a single report...so we created a mini board that contained Chief of Staff and the political advisor and development advisor where we all



contributed a piece. And it was still probably 85% military...and we all went through it and said 'Well I don't understand any of this. This we have to change. And I don't understand this bit.' And we were all reading each other's things to the point where, you know, we were submitting what became a very meaty...weekly report. It's called the PMESIR – the Political Military Economic Social and Intelligence Report...it was a single report that was our sort of first attempt at really, you know, showing that we're...a team on the ground...teamwork on the ground worked really, really well. You're physically out looking, your officers are right next to each other, you live together, eat together, sleep together."

Again, rather than continuing to work within their prescribed organizational silos, this participant describes individuals working together to merge their efforts into a single consolidated report rather than three separate reports. This small change literally shows the emergence of teamwork, and the willingness to share information, even information that is often staunchly protected.

Despite all of the organizational challenges facing boundary spanners detailed in the sections above, these examples show the power of individuals and good leadership to develop solutions that promote more effective instantiation of the WoG approach under tough operational constraints.

3.4 Training and Education

Participants were asked to consider what is necessary for training and education for future WoG operations. They emphasized the need to keep a record of the lessons learned in Afghanistan.

- *"There isn't really any follow-up or any system to say here are the opportunities or here is where we see, from a whole government perspective, something that will carry us forward to the next time that we are going to try and do something like we've attempted in Afghanistan. Whether that's a specialized unit for civil military cooperation in DND or in DFAIT where you bring together all of the people with experience in Afghanistan to really create new doctrine or just be prepared to lead when this kind of thing comes on the political hot seat again."*
- *"Is that knowledge and experience going to...go the way of the dodo once we leave that theatre?"*

Similarly, they believed that all of the different organizations should have staff with the requisite knowledge at the ready for any future WoG engagements.

- *"You need to continue to develop and foster a cadre of people who can do this for the future...we don't have training capacity like the military, so again it's largely a default of the military to keep this up."*
- *"I don't think there was a perfect character in terms of a civilian, what I do think is that they need to be properly trained. So it's not about whether I'm an outgoing or an introverted person, it's about being prepared with the right tools to do the job... Why wouldn't I say give you a year and ruffle [sic] at NATO HQ. Six months of training on the J5 training course. Six months at the Headquarters working on the file, and then deploying you abroad...that's the kind of HR [Human Resources] strategy that [is] needed."*

Also, the military training for civilians ought to be relevant.

- *“I got the Hostile Environment training. It was three days. I think what I got was the older version, which was totally inappropriate...it was a big waste of time...I think it’s the government covering their ass and saying, you know, ‘We’re doing due diligence.’ But for me to have training on a human rights bias by a senior NCO is useless...when I deployed, our training packages weren’t there...and I was deployed with three weeks’ notice. So the time was quite limited.”*
- *“Although [Maple Guardian] it’s not perfect, it does prepare people for how things are gonna work on the ground.”*

Training and education about how to work within the WoG context should not be one way (i.e., OGDs being taught about the military); rather CF should also receive education from OGDs. Moreover, training and education should not be the responsibility of the CF alone. There should be greater inclusion from the outset from WoG partners. The CF should show a willingness to cross pollinate, i.e., occupy positions within DFAIT and CIDA in order to learn more about the organizations.

- *“Introduce at some level mandatory you know whole-of-government training for, for our military partners, so whether it’s you know you do it at RMC [Royal Military College] for Second Lieutenants as a course you know, this is CIDA 101, this is DFAIT 101 or this is whole-of-government 101. That’s... or you do it for the Captain’s, that college course, you do it for the Lieutenant Colonel’s course, you do it for the Junior Generals course...group of civilians saying ‘And this is what we would do.’ and ‘What about this?’ and ‘Don’t forget about this!’ and you’re constantly given that perspective...”*
- *“We [DFAIT] haven’t done a very good job at times of inviting Canadian Forces outside of the policy shop at the DND, inviting Canadian Forces Personnel to participate in some of the training around policy issues... We should be reaching out better.”*
- *“The CF will identify and develop the training package and execute it and then come to us and say we need you to play this role or we need you to be an NGO or a something. So it’s all done after the fact, we just need a couple of civilians to fill the spots. That’s happening less now, we need to be...when we know that the training is around a whole-of-government deployment, for example, we need to be part of the early stages of planning. We need people who’ve done it and...are good at capturing the lessons from real life experiences to be part of the front end of training...we can find opportunities to input strategically...But it can’t be done, in our view, if it’s just after the fact.”*
- *“It’s called a comprehensive approach right...It’s being written...no one’s seen it. We’ve never seen it. CIDA’s never seen it. So a bunch of guys in uniform are writing up the comprehensive approach on how to work with CIDA and Foreign Affairs, and they are waiting to show us essentially a draft final product. Whereas, the product that I worked on [for] whole-of-government deployment...we had our first meeting, having not written a thing. Said ‘This is what we want to do...what are ideas, what’s important’ and everyone around the table right...every page it was shared. Whereas, we’re gonna get ‘Here’s our finished copy. We’re happy with this. If you’d like to make some changes...’ And when I first got word of it, it was like... ‘We’ll give you about ten days to turn this around’ ...it’s almost comical and...some people in this office would say it’s malicious.”*

- *“The second most coveted position for a Lieutenant Colonel [in the Australian Army] is the rotational position at the department of Foreign Affairs because that’s seen as a real career builder. It’s very important.”*

Training and education must be integrated and shoulder to shoulder.

- *“Number one point is nothing is... you can’t replace personal contact with you know training or doctrine, whatever it is you need, you do need to rub shoulders with people in order to get inside their mind and see how they think...we [CF] do training for these operations...we need to have everybody there, full participation. And that’s often a problem with the other government departments because...they don’t view it as an imperative the same way we do.”*

As a whole, then, training and education for the interagency context must be cumulative. Lessons learned need to be captured as they emerge from operations and must be integrated into current and future training. Participant responses also underscored the need to ensure that the training system continuously produces a group of personnel with the necessary skills at the ready to operate in a WoG or comprehensive capacity. Training needs to be relevant, multi-directional (i.e., training coming from the CF as well as from OGDs in order to ensure that all WoG partner perspectives are represented), and integrated, in order to allow personnel from all agencies to understand the perspectives, abilities and limitations of others.

4. Discussion

The goal of this study was to further understand the impact of interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) on collaboration efforts between civil and military actors in a WoG approach to operations (such as Afghanistan and Haiti). This required investigating some of the pertinent trust literature (see Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear & Brown, 2011) as well as consultation with subject matter experts with experience operating in a WoG context. From these first-hand accounts, we highlighted several instances that signalled both interpersonal and interorganizational trust issues.

In general and despite the often very challenging circumstances within Canadian WoG missions, participants spoke highly of their WoG partners, signalling a degree of interpersonal trust. For example, CF members were described as well-educated and professional by their civilian partners, whereas civilians were described as confident, intelligent and enthusiastic by their CF partners. Many participant accounts also indicated that they worked very hard in theatre at an interpersonal level to make WoG work, despite the challenges at the higher levels in Ottawa and differences in organizational strategies (e.g., common goals), systems (e.g., planning), structure (i.e., number of personnel), and staff (e.g., knowledge and expertise). As one participant acknowledged, there will be tensions in “headquarters,” but “WoG works its best” on the ground, where people have to “cut the crap and just get right to it.” Developing trust on the ground may be made easier because WoG partners are co-located, unlike the situation at headquarters in Ottawa (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Co-location may make objectives and intentions more readily accessible to one’s collaboration partner.

However, many participants representing civilian organizations (primarily DFAIT and CIDA), mentioned that they had to establish their credibility with their CF partners in theatre, implying that trust was not presumptively bestowed, but needed to be earned. According to the literature, a person gains trust if he or she is perceived to possess the skills, motivation, and competence to meet the demands of the situation (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Being seen to consistently fulfil one’s role and obligations strengthens trust because it lessens the risk of unknown or unanticipated outcomes (Adams & Webb, 2003). Participants said that they established credibility by demonstrating that they could “*deliver, deliver, deliver*” with “*quality input*” on a timely basis to meet the operational pace and requirements of the CF in the field. Data suggest that interpersonal (or person-based) trust between partners in the WoG context emerged over time, once they got to know one another and were able to predict each other’s conduct.

But OGD participants indicated that establishing their credibility was a huge challenge for a number of reasons, including their marginal representation on the ground in Afghanistan; working within a complex military system; the failure of many CF partners to know what to expect of them (as civilian partners); and because of the reputation of their organization, based on its operational history. When working with others from different organizations, as important as interpersonal trust is, interorganizational issues will also shape judgments of trustworthiness. According to the literature, interorganizational trust is also predicated on established institutional frameworks (McKnight et al., 1998; Wehmeyer, Reimer, & Schneider, 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004). From this perspective, trust will emerge to the extent that partnering organizations have common beliefs, shared values, similar business structures and practices, and adhere to norms for specific behaviours. Indeed, initial trust between organizations without a shared history is said to be in part institutionally based (McKnight et al.). Moreover, both research and theory show that an

organization's good reputation makes it a more desirable and trustworthy partner (Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; cited in Sydow, 1998). A strong institutional framework and a good reputation are potential enablers for interorganizational trust, especially when counterparts have little or no previous experience.

However, despite their assertions that WoG approach was generally effective and that their collaboration partners were generally competent and good to work with, participant recollections signalled a lack of institutional level trust. Evidence from participants suggested that trust in well-intentioned organizational representatives may be thwarted if the organization that they represent fails to fulfil its commitments. Indeed, SME first-hand accounts revealed a number of organizational factors that acted as barriers to trust and presented challenges to collaboration with the WoG context.

Participant accounts showed a number of organizational systems that may have hindered trust development. For example, CF participants often viewed their OGD partners as being too slow when it came to CF operational planning. Both civilian and CF WoG participants thought that the centralized authority in Ottawa made it hard for OGD representatives to keep pace with their CF partners in the field who worked under more decentralized authority. Moreover, some participants (both civilian and military) argued that operational planning was relatively new to OGDs when compared to the complex CF process. In their defence, some OGD participants said that their relative rates of representation in comparison to CF partners (e.g., "*one civilian has about seven or eight counterparts in headquarters*") may have resulted in CF partners overlooking the levels of effort that they had exerted. This systemic difference may have led to OGD representatives' actual competency being underestimated, and could have negatively impacted judgements of trust. OGD participants also argued that the CF did not always include them in the early stages of planning and did not always plan in a fully transparent way. This, they argued, made it difficult to add value after the fact. Moreover, OGDs complained that the CF often planned without seeking the appropriate counsel and input from experts, specifically in relation to development and humanitarian relief efforts.

Another organizational system that may have discouraged interorganizational trust among WoG partners related to failed expectations surrounding project support. According to OGD SMEs, DFAIT and CIDA were blamed for not providing funding to CF endorsed projects, which may have eroded trust during the early stages of the mission in Afghanistan. This was remedied by making money "*more readily accessible*" and by empowering field representatives to use their own discretion on behalf of CIDA and DFAIT.

Participant accounts indicated that the divergence in organizational systems made working together challenging. They recounted that the ability of OGDs to "*deliver*" in theatre was not always in alignment with CF expectations. Consequently, CF participants reported having to lower their expectations about what OGDs could actually accomplish. In short, they could not reliably count on their WoG partners to fulfil what at least some of the CF members believed to be their (OGDs) roles and responsibilities for the mission. As institutional based trust among partners can be facilitated by having similar organizational systems and ways of conducting business (Wehmeyer et al., 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004), this failure to synchronize expectations and outcomes through consistently meeting partners' expectations could have eroded interorganizational trust.

Differences in organizational structure may also have acted as barriers to trust in the WoG context. Indeed, despite being supportive of the CF in general, one OGD from CIDA argued that the CF itself did not have enough "*boots on the ground*" to secure non-permissive and hostile areas in

preparation for development efforts, despite the fact that this was the CF's role. He expressed his lack of trust, stating that he had been "*led down the wrong path*" or lied to by the CF, and consequently felt "*betrayed*." This example shows that the perceived failure of one organizational partner to live up to unrealistic (or at least difficult to deliver) expectations may have been misconstrued as a lack of competency, rather than as a product of varying organizational capacity (e.g., not enough personnel provided by the organization). This illustrates the power of misattributions even within the organizational context.

As well, OGD SMEs mentioned that, at the beginning of the mission in Afghanistan, they were few in number. This made it extremely difficult for them to work with the complex military system, to keep up with the required practices (e.g., "*onerous narrative reporting*"), and to provide valued input to operational planning in a timely manner. Even though organizational structures need not be identical, the experiences described by participants suggest that these structures must either match or align themselves adequately (e.g., providing enough civilians to have adequate participation/integration in planning) to meet the requirements of the shared task.

Both CF and OGD SMEs emphasized the need to ensure that the right personnel are sent to work within a WoG context of operations. However, there was some evidence that preconceived notions about the exact nature of competent and trustworthy partners may have influenced perceptions of other counterparts. Participants reported that age and perceived level of experience of OGD representatives in theatre may have prevented initial trust. OGD SMEs thought (accurately or inaccurately) that their CF partners perceived them as too young and inexperienced for the role that they were assuming. It was explained that OGDs in operations were often relatively junior, because within their systems, field experience is viewed as a boost to one's career. However, this was reported as not the case for the senior personnel. The fact that OGD partners are often younger and sometimes have less field experience than their CF partners may have biased at least initial judgements of competency and hence trustworthiness. Moreover, the knowledge (generalist as opposed to specialist) and expertise that the OGDs had was questioned given the particular context and operational needs in Afghanistan. At the same time, many OGDs argued that the CF had a lack of general understanding of governance, development and humanitarian relief operations. But these criticisms resided more at the organizational level rather than at the person-based level.

In sum, the data suggested that organizational differences, most notably in systems, structures and staffing, negatively impacted collaboration efforts in WoG operations, which signalled a lack of interorganizational trust. Establishing institutionally based trust is obviously more difficult if these organizational factors prevent WoG partners from aligning and accomplishing mission goals and objectives. On the other hand, participants representing their organizations in operations (i.e., boundary spanners) reported having sidestepped these organizational challenges by demonstrating their credibility and establishing good personal relationships with their WoG partners. It was also mentioned that some of the organizational issues in Afghanistan (e.g., adding more civilians to the PRT and empowering OGD representatives in theatre) were resolved as the mission progressed, which also promoted more effective collaboration. This also may have fostered interpersonal trust.

At the same time, however, participant recollections also seemed to reflect an underlying lack of interorganizational trust, as their accounts often centred on the challenges they had confronted. Future research, therefore, might include a more sustained analysis of the current data, examining the strategies that people used to build and maintain trust at the interpersonal level, despite the perceived lack of interorganizational level. The data is a very rich source to uncover other issues that emerged in operations that impacted collaboration, including power struggles and stereotype formation, maintenance, and reduction.

Moreover, future research should try to determine the extent to which judgements of trustworthiness are based at the interpersonal or interorganizational level, and whether the impacts of these different types of trust vary under different conditions. Data suggest that despite a lack of interorganizational trust, participants established trust at the interpersonal level. How does this dynamic impact institutionally based trust? Does trust at the interpersonal level make up for a lack of trust at the interorganizational level? What strategies are invoked to re-establish trust at the interorganizational level when this has been violated? In either case, it would also be worthwhile to establish how well these judgements of trustworthiness are actually calibrated.

Another potential stream of research could include validating part of the preliminary framework for CF collaboration in a JIMP operational context developed in previous research (Thomson et al., 2010). Specifically, what is the impact of interorganizational trust on collaboration and its outcomes? Exactly how does trust influence satisfaction with the process? Participant recollections suggest a degree of ambivalence with respect to their collaboration effort. How much of this is based on the lack of interorganizational trust? And how does this impact their motivation to participate in future WoG operations? Moreover, what kind of collaboration strategies are invoked with a high degree of interagency trust? How do other conditions for collaboration outlined in the framework (such as shared power) impact interorganizational trust?

Another goal of this research was to consider how collaboration, including interagency trust, can be facilitated through pre-deployment training and education initiatives. According to participants, training and education for the interagency context must be cumulative. Lessons learned need to be captured as they emerge from operations and integrated into future training. Participant responses also underscored the need to ensure that the training system continuously produces a group of personnel with the necessary skills at the ready to operate in a WoG or comprehensive capacity. It needs to be relevant, multi-directional (i.e., training coming from the CF as well as from OGDs in order to ensure that all WoG partner perspectives are represented), and integrated, in order to allow personnel from all agencies to understand the perspectives, abilities and limitations of others. Sharing participant responses and recommendations with the official CF training and education system, including Land Forces Doctrine and Training System and Canadian Defence Academy, may begin the process of incorporating pertinent research findings regarding interagency trust and WoG collaboration into CF training and education mechanisms.

5. References

- ADAMS, B.D., BRYANT, D.J. & WEBB, R.D. (2001). Trust in teams literature review. DRDC T No. CR-2001-042. Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- ADAMS, B.D. & WEBB, R.D. (2003). Trust development in small teams. DRDC T No. CR-2003-016. Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada.
- BACHMANN, R. (2001). Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations. *Organization Studies*, 22, 337-365.
- Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine (2009). CFJP01 National Defence Doctrine B-GJ-005-000/FP-001.
- FRIEDMAN, R.A. & PODOLNY, J. (1992). Differentiation of boundary spanning roles: Labor negotiations and implications for role conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 37(1), 28-47.
- JANOWICZ-PANJAITAN, M. & KRISHNAN, R. (2009). Measures for dealing with competence and integrity violations of interorganizational trust at the corporate and operating levels of organizational hierarchy. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46, 245-268.
- KOESZEGI, S. T. (2004). Trust-building strategies in inter-organizational negotiations. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 19, 640-660.
- LANGFORD, B.E. & HUNSICKER, F. (2006). An integrated view of the relationship between the organization and its environment. Retrieved on Dec. 10, 2007.
<http://www.westga.edu/~bquest/1996/model.html>
- MAYER, R. C., DAVIS, J. H., & SCHOORMAN, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *The Academy of Management Review*, 20, 709-734.
- MCKNIGHT, D.H., CUMMINGS, L.L., & CHERVANY, N.L. (1998). Initial trust formation in new organizational relationships. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 473-490.
- SCHWEITZER, M., HERSHEY, J., & BRADLOW, E. (2006). Promises and Lies: Restoring Violated Trust. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 101(1), 1-19.
- SHAPIRO, D., SHEPPARD, B., & CHERASKIN, L. (1992). Business on a handshake. *Negotiation Journal*, 8(4), 365-377.
- SYDOW, J. (1998). Understanding the constitution of interorganizational trust. In: Lane, C., & Bachmann, R. (Eds.). (1998). *Trust Within and Between Organizations* (p. 31-63). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- THOMSON, M.H., ADAMS, B.D., HALL, C.D. & FLEAR, C.R. (2010). Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment. In progress for Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto, ON.
- THOMSON, M.H., ADAMS, B.D., HALL, C.D., BROWN, A.B. & FLEAR, C.R. (2011). Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the public in operations. In progress for Defence Research and Development Canada-Toronto, ON.



THOMSON, M.H., ADAMS, B.D., HALL, C.D., FLEAR, C.R. & BROWN, A.B. (2011). Five themes impacting collaboration in a joint interagency multinational public context of operations. In progress for Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto, ON.

WEHMEYER, K., RIEMER, K., & SCHNEIDER, B. (2001). Roles and trust in interorganizational systems. Eighth Research Symposium on Emerging Electronic Markets, p. 1-14.

ZAHEER, A., MCEVILY, B., & PERRONE, V. (1998). Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. *Organization Science*, 9, 141-159.



- 1 LCol Jeff Stouffer STOUFFER.JM@forces.gc.ca
CDA:
- 1 Dr. Grace Scoppio GRAZIA.SCOPPIO@forces.gc.ca
CEFCOM:
- 1 Dr.Katherine Banko KATHERINE.BANKO@forces.gc.ca
SJS:
- 1 Dr. Michael Roi ROI.MJ@forces.gc.ca

18 TOTAL LIST PART 2

20 TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

Annex A: Information Letter

Dear Participant:

Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) Toronto is conducting research to improve the effectiveness of collaboration among the diverse actors in an operational field setting, often referred to as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) or the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) approach to operations. Based upon your experience in this area we are asking for your participation in this research effort. The purpose of the current study is to utilize the expertise and experience of individuals who have worked in these missions to increase our understanding of the nature of collaboration between the CF and other actors, such as various governmental agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, the media, and local populations in order to highlight factors that facilitate or frustrate the process of collaboration, and to identify strategies to improve collaboration in a contemporary operational setting, such as Afghanistan.

As you are aware, the changing nature of international conflict has resulted in militaries increasingly taking on roles in support of humanitarian relief and reconstruction, a field traditionally belonging to civilian organizations. Although there is an emerging international literature highlighting the continuing challenges in this area, few studies have explored the issue thoroughly from a Canadian perspective. Thus, the objective of the present study is to gain a better understanding of collaboration within these new operational environments when agencies and personnel must work together in order to accomplish their respective goals. Again the goal of this research is to meet with experienced individuals like yourself, and to understand the issues from your perspective. Your experiences and insights will be used in a variety of ways:

- 1) to begin to identify the core elements and themes for promoting civil-military collaborations in an operational setting;
- 2) for the potential future development of realistic training and education vignettes or scenarios;
- 3) to identify best practices or lessons learned through the detailing of collaboration strategies employed in theatre; and
- 4) as the basis of future laboratory and field/survey studies.

Your candid experience operating in this capacity is vital for developing an inclusive and detailed picture of civil-military collaboration in an operational setting.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 2 hours of your time to participate in a one-on-one meeting to share your personal experiences of collaborating while in the field. SME meetings will be held in person. We will travel to meet with you. Alternatively, if an in-person meeting is not possible, a phone discussion can be arranged at your convenience.

In general, the idea for the meeting is that you will describe the collaboration context(s) in which you have been involved, the factors that either facilitated or frustrated collaboration, and any strategies that you used to ensure effective collaboration. We will also ask you what kinds of things you would do differently in hindsight to ensure successful collaboration and why, and what kinds of things you would like in advance of operations (e.g., training opportunities) that would facilitate effective collaboration.

We recognize that you are busy and that participating in this study takes up your time. We are able to give you a small remuneration for your time in the amount of \$40.00.

The information that you provide in the meeting will be kept anonymous and in order to ensure the confidentiality of yourself and others, we ask that you do not mention specific individuals or groups by name, or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups, in the course of this meeting. This acts as protection to you in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request. Please also note that your comments during the meeting are covered by the Privacy Act, and that any information that may identify you personally cannot be released without your consent.

With your consent, the meeting will be audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis and will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the research teams involved with this or ensuing projects. We will use a code number rather than a name to further ensure anonymity. Once our meeting has been transcribed, if you would like, you will be provided with a copy so that you may review the contents, point out any errors in the transcription, and indicate any aspects you feel might be identifying characteristics. Any material used in the write-up of the final report or subsequent publications or presentations will have any and all identifying characteristics removed. If you wish, you can choose not to be audio-recorded but still participate in this research (in this event, the researcher will take detailed notes during your meeting).

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, a topic of discussion makes you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer or skip any question, end the discussion, or withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached Voluntary Consent Form, as well as the Biographical Data Form. We will collect these when we convene for our meeting with you.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) has approved this study (Revised Protocol L-692A, Amendment #2). If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the project leads for this research, Dr. Megan M. Thompson or Dr. Angela Febbraro, whose contact information is listed below. You may also contact the Chair of the HREC at DRDC Toronto, Dr. Jack Landolt, at Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or (416) 635-2120.

Sincerely,

<p>Dr. Angela Febbraro Project Manager JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca DRDC Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3M 3B9 Tel: (416) 635-2000 ext: 3120 Fax: (416) 635-2191</p>	<p>Dr. Megan M. Thompson, Project Manager, Interagency Trust Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca DRDC Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9 Tel: 416-635-2040 Fax: (416) 635-2191</p>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Annex B: Voluntary Consent Form

Title: Discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the JIMP Domain

Principal Investigator: Michael Thomson, Humansystems Inc.

Principal DRDC Investigator: Dr. Angela Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Co-Investigators: Dr. Megan M. Thompson, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; Dr. Barb Adams, Humansystems Inc.; Dr. Tara Holton, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto

Thrusts: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain (PG2); 14ci, Interagency Trust (PG4)

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate in the study entitled, “Discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the JIMP Domain” (Protocol Protocol L-692A, Amendment #2). I have read the information letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research study and have any questions about this study answered by contacting either Dr. Angela R. Febbraro at 416-635-2000 Extension 3120 or Dr. Megan M. Thompson at 416-635-2040.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a single one-on-one meeting lasting approximately 2 hours, which will be audio-recorded only with my consent. I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form. I understand that the audio-recorded meeting will be transcribed, and that I will have an opportunity to read and comment on the transcription if I so choose. I also have the option of participating in this study without being audio-taped, in which case the researcher will take notes during the meeting.

I have been told that risks associated with this research are minimal. However, if when discussing topics I feel uncomfortable, I may move on to another topic. I also understand that I may terminate my participation at any time. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly anonymous and will not be revealed to anyone other than the research team without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Principal DRDC Investigator or other DRDC Investigators, and that these data too will be treated as strictly anonymous and will not be revealed to anyone other than the research team without my consent.

I understand that my data will be protected under the Government Security Policy (GSP) and not revealed to anyone other than the DRDC-affiliated Investigator(s) or external investigators from the sponsoring agency without my consent except as data unidentified as to source.

I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to the data and/or any publication arising from this study. While experimental data may be reviewed by an internal or external research audit committee I understand that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I understand that, as a Government Institution, DRDC is committed to protecting my personal information. Although copies of research reports and research data (including the database

pertaining to this project) held in Federal government files may be disclosed under the Access to Information Act, I understand that prior to releasing the requested information, the Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) screens the data in accordance with the Privacy Act in order to ensure that individual identities, including indirect identification due to the collection of a series unique details that taken together might serve to identify me (e.g., occupation, position and deployment-related history), are protected. I have also been told that I should not mention specific individuals or groups by name or provide enough details to identify individuals or groups in the course of this meeting, as protection to me in the unlikely event of an Access to Information request.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration of \$40.00.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication or presentation arising from this study.

For Civilian Participants:

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

For Canadian Forces (CF) members only: I understand that I am considered to be on duty for disciplinary, administrative and Pension Act purposes during my participation in this study.

Participant's name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence R&D Canada –Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120,
Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (Project Manager, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain Project)



Dr. Megan M. Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2040, Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca (Project Manager, Interagency Trust Project)

Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, Jack.Landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.



This page intentionally left blank.

Annex C: Biographical Data Form

1. Age _____

2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):

Male

Female

3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):

Single

Married

Divorced

Widowed

Common-Law

4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):

Some High School

Completed High School

Some College

Completed College

Some Trade School

Completed Trade School

Some University

Completed Undergraduate Degree

University Professional Degree



- Some Graduate Courses
- Master's Degree
- Doctorate

5. Country of birth: _____

6. Heritage/ethnicity: _____

7. Number of years ___working for...: _____

8. Current occupation with...: _____

9. Names of organizations previously worked for: _____

10. How long have you worked (in months) for the following other organizations:

11. Frequency of contact with the Canadian Forces or other military in field work?
very frequent___frequent___infrequent___very infrequent___not at all___

12. Have you ever served in the Canadian Forces or another military? Y ___ N ___ (if yes, please specify) _____

13. Operations (overseas and domestic, purpose, organization, time and duration):

14. First language:

- English
- French
- Other (please specify) _____

Annex D: Discussion Protocol

Discussions with SMEs Working in JIMP Domain

Discussion Questions

5.1 I. Introduction:

Thank you for participating in this meeting. We appreciate that you have taken the time to speak with us today to share some of your experiences related to collaboration in an operational setting. As we mentioned in our initial contact with you, this meeting is meant to help us gain a better understanding of the factors that promote effective collaboration and those factors that frustrate the ability to work well with others. We are also interested in understanding the particular contexts in which you had to work with others from other organizations while in the field. This will help broaden our understanding of the nature of collaboration in the context of comprehensive missions. This understanding will assist us in a variety of ways, including the development of a conceptual framework depicting collaboration within comprehensive missions, compiling lessons learned, and the development of potential training and education scenarios for the Canadian Forces.

For this part of the project, we'd like you to describe a particular experience that you had working with another person/organization in the field, including information such as why you needed to collaborate, who you worked with, etc. This will help us capture the full context of your experience. As you describe your experience, we'll ask you particular open-ended questions to help guide the discussion. If you feel that you have already answered the question, just please say that you have, and we'll proceed to the next question. We recognize that working with other people from diverse organizations is a really complex activity, and that interactions can have both positive and negative elements.

Of course, your participation is voluntary. As such, we ask that you recount only the experiences and details that you are comfortable sharing, and feel free to skip any question that you would prefer not to answer. We want to stress that your identity will be kept anonymous and anything that you say will be kept anonymous as to source. We also ask that you do not use any identifying information that may compromise your identity or the identity of those you have worked with in the field. We will review the transcripts as well to ensure that no identifying information is included. If you wish, we can provide you with a copy of the transcript so that you may review for content and for any points that you would like us to delete.

Before we get started, I would like to ask if we could audio-record our meeting, so that we can ensure the accuracy of your comments. This will also help us when we analyze all of the SME discussions. Again, everything that you say will be kept anonymous as to source. May we proceed on that basis?



5.2 II. Career Background:

We'd like to begin by asking you to talk a little bit about your career history. Please include how long have you worked as an/with...(e.g., NGO, OGD, CF, etc.), how you came to work with... (e.g., NGO, OGD, CF, etc.), why were you interested in a career working with..., what kinds of roles have you had while a member of..., etc.

Are there any other aspects of your career history that you would like to share before we move on to discuss actual collaboration experiences?

5.3 III. Setting the Collaboration Context:

I'd like to provide you with a general definition of collaboration, just so that we're on the same page. Collaboration has been defined as:

"a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible"
(Gray, 1989, p. 5).

With this in mind, I'd like to move on to discuss your experiences collaborating with...(organization). When we work with other people, things sometimes go well and sometimes not so well. When responding to the following questions, we'd like you to consider an example of a good collaborating experience and a bad collaborating experience. Before we begin, however, we'd like you to describe generally these experiences. For example, where were you, why did you have to collaborate with...(organization), etc.? Here, we're looking specifically at trying to get a picture of the situation that you were in (e.g., time pressure, uncertainty, high risk). This will give us a frame of reference for the following questions.

5.4 Negotiation Process

Now we'd like you to take us through the process of collaboration in your example in more detail.

1) What kind of rapport did you have with your collaboration partner(s)? What kinds of things influenced the level of rapport that you had with your partner?

How did this impact collaboration?

2) Thinking back, would you have done anything differently to better establish rapport? If so, what would you have done?

How do you think this would have helped?

- What might your collaboration partner(s) have done differently and how would this have impacted collaboration?

3) Collaborative partners often rely on the sharing of information because each person often has a somewhat different part of “the puzzle”. Describe the sharing of information between you and your collaboration partner(s). How did you and your partner share information, and/or what type of information did you share?

How did this impact collaboration?

- In hindsight, what kinds of things would you do differently with respect to sharing information?
 - What impact do you think would this have on collaboration?

4) Would you say that both you and your collaboration partner(s) were able to effectively communicate your respective goals to one another during collaboration?

Why do you say that?

- Is there anything you would have done differently to communicate these more effectively? If so what?
 - How would this have helped, do you think?

5) Is there anything you wish your collaboration partner would have done differently when communicating about goals? If so what?

How would that have helped?

6) How did you ensure that your organization’s goals were met during collaboration?

Please describe a situation within the collaborative partnership in which your organization’s goals were not met.

- What particular challenges arose?
 - How did you overcome these challenges?
 - Do you think that your collaboration partner(s) goals were met?

7) Were your organization’s goals aligned well with your collaboration partner’s organization’s goals?

(If no...) In what ways were they not aligned?

- How did misaligned goals impact collaboration?

8) Negotiation is often described as requiring a “give and take relationship”. What do you think you gave your negotiation partner that they needed or wanted?

Did they want more than what you were prepared to give?

- Were there times when you felt that you gave up too much when collaborating? (If necessary, ask what they gave up.)
 - Please describe why you think that?
 - In what way did this impact collaboration?

9) What were you able to get from your partner when collaborating? In other words, were you able to get all that you wanted or needed?



Could you please elaborate a little further on this point?

- Were they willing to cooperate?
 - In what way did this impact collaboration?

5.5 Trust

10) Could you count on your collaboration partner(s) to meet your needs and interests?

Why (or why not)?

- Please describe ways in which your collaboration partner(s) met (or did not meet) your needs and interests during collaboration.

11) Was your collaboration partner(s) able to keep his or her word during your collaboration?

Please describe instances where this was not the case.

- What prompted this, do you think?
 - What did this do to future collaboration efforts?
 - How did you address this?

12) Was it clear to you what your collaboration partner's intentions were for collaborating with you?

Would you say that he or she was open and honest throughout the collaboration?

- What gave you that impression or how did you gauge that?
 - How did your impression of your collaborating partner's intentions impact collaboration?

13) To what extent did you see your collaboration partner as competent? Please describe the level of expertise of your collaboration partner(s).

Why do you describe it this way?

- How did this impact collaboration?

14) To what extent did you feel that your input was valued by your collaboration partner?

Why do you say that?

5.6 Perceptions

15) When you first began collaborating, what was your initial perception of your collaboration partner(s) as an individual?

What qualities or characteristics did they have that you thought might help or hinder building a good relationship with them?

- What qualities or characteristics did they have that you thought might help or hinder your ability to work with them?

16) Did your initial impression of your partner change over the course of the collaboration? If so, in what way?

Why do you think this impression changed (or did not change)?

17) Did you get any sense of what your collaboration partner's impression of you was at the beginning of your collaboration with them?

Were your partner's knowledge and beliefs about you positive or negative, and what factors do you believe might have influenced these impressions?

18) Do you think their initial impression of you changed over the course of the collaboration? If so, in what way?

Why do you think their impression changed (or did not change)?

19) What did you know or believe about the organization that your partner represented before meeting with them?

In what ways did that make a difference in your ability to work with them?

5.7 Power Differences, Roles and Responsibilities

20) In many collaborative situations, one of the elements is knowing who is responsible for what or identification of the roles of each collaboration party. How did you and your collaboration partner work out who had responsibility for completion of required tasks while you were collaborating?

21) Considering your need to collaborate with...(organization)..., would you say that you were more dependent on their input, were they more dependent on your input, or was the dependence mutual in order to achieve your goals?

Why was this?

- How did this impact your ability to collaborate with them?

22) From the perspective of organizational mandates, how did you see your role relative to your partner?

To what extent did your roles overlap and in what ways did they overlap.

- How was this decided?

23) Please describe a time in collaboration when you thought that it was within your jurisdiction to take the lead of the situation but your collaborating partner did not see it that way.

Why did you think it was your role to lead?

- How did you address this challenge?



Were you able to convince your collaboration partner that it was your role?

- (If yes...) How did they do that?
 - What was the overall impact on collaboration?

24) Please describe a time in collaboration when the other party thought that it was within their jurisdiction to take the lead of the situation but you did not see it that way.

Do you know why they thought it was their role to lead?

- How did you address this challenge?
 - Was your partner able to convince you that it was their role?
 - (If yes...) How did you do that?
 - What was the overall impact on collaboration?

5.8 Identity

25) Did you understand and relate to your collaboration partner's position?

Why is that?

- How did this influence collaboration?
 - Were there similarities between you that helped you to relate to your collaboration partner's position?

26) Did you believe that they understood and related to your position?

Why is that?

- How did this influence collaboration?

27) How did your organization's values and principles influence collaboration?

Were these values distinct from your collaborating partner's organization's values?

- How did you reconcile these differences?

28) To what extent did you see your collaboration partner as respecting the unique abilities and qualities that you as an individual brought "to the table"?

29) To what extent did you see your collaboration partner as respecting the unique abilities and qualities that the organization that you represent brought "to the table"?

30) Was your sense of what you were trying to accomplish supported or diminished by your partner and how did this occur?

What impact did this have on what you were able to accomplish together?

31) Did you ever feel the need to distance yourself (i.e., to assert your distinctiveness) from your collaboration partner at either a personal or organizational level? If so, why?

32) To what extent did you see you and your partner as working as a unified team that was “on the same page”? If this was not the case, how did your views differ?

5.9 Training

33) Thinking about the WoG or Comprehensive Approach to operations, what kind of training did you receive from your organization just prior to deployment that helped you collaborate effectively in an interagency or comprehensive operational context?

In hindsight, what kind of training do you think you could (or should) have received from your organization during the course of your career more generally that may have helped you collaborate more effectively in an interagency or comprehensive operational context?

34) If you were to go back, what would you do differently to prepare you to ensure a high degree of effective collaboration with...(OGDs/OGAs, the CF, or the public)?

What kind of things would you do differently while you were there?

35) Thinking about collaborating within an interagency or comprehensive operating context, what advice would you give to your colleague before he or she deployed?

Why would you give them that advice?

36) Please describe the kind of person who would work effectively with others from other organizations in a WoG or Comprehensive operations. What kinds of characteristics would this person have do you think?

5.10 Conclusion

37) I wonder if you could describe for us the kind of working relationship you had with your collaboration partner. In other words, how would you describe the relationship in general?

And why do you describe it this way?

38) In conclusion, is there anything that you'd like to add that we didn't discuss already but you'd like us to include in our report?

Thank you very much for all of your valuable input.



This page intentionally left blank.

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)		
<p>1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.)</p> <p>Humansystems® Incorporated 111 Farquhar St. Guelph, ON N1H 3N4</p>	<p>2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)</p> <p>UNCLASSIFIED (NON-CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC A REVIEW: GCEC JUNE 2010</p>	
<p>3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.)</p> <p>Interagency Trust in the Whole of Government Approach to Canadian Forces Operations:: Subject Matter Expert Discussions</p>		
<p>4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used)</p> <p>M. H. Thomson; B.D. Adams; C.D. Hall; A.L. Brown; C. Flear</p>		
<p>5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.)</p> <p>March 2012</p>	<p>6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">26</p>	<p>6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1</p>
<p>7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)</p> <p>Contract Report</p>		
<p>8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.)</p> <p>Defence R&D Canada – Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9</p>		
<p>9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)</p>	<p>9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">W7711-09-8158/001/TOR</p>	
<p>10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.)</p>	<p>10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DRDC Toronto CR 2011-175</p>	
<p>11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)</p> <p>Unlimited</p>		
<p>12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.))</p> <p>Unlimited</p>		

13. **ABSTRACT** (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of other government departments (OGDs) in order to achieve a full range of national objectives. The Whole of Government (WoG) approach aims to consolidate the Government of Canada's (GoC) strategic policy regarding international engagements. However, in practice, some WoG partners have limited experience working together and have different organizational cultures, which may hinder effective collaboration in practice. The purpose of this study was 1) to further understand the impact of interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) on collaboration efforts between civil and military actors in a WoG approach to operations, and 2) to generate recommendations for CF education and training regarding interagency collaboration. To this end, a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) were consulted to elicit their first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre, specifically highlighting those instances that signalled trust. Participant recollections revealed a number of organizational factors (e.g., strategy, systems, structure, and staffing) that may impede interorganizational trust in the WoG context. Civilian participants mentioned that they had to establish their credibility working in theatre by consistently delivering high quality input on a timely basis. Interpersonal trust was developed over time. Participants recommended that WoG education and training need to be fully integrated with the participation of both civilian and military agencies.

Dans le cadre des opérations en cours (p. ex. celles menées en Afghanistan et en Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à travailler en étroite collaboration avec un certain nombre d'autres ministères en vue de réaliser tout un éventail d'objectifs nationaux. L'approche pangouvernementale vise à unifier la politique stratégique élaborée par le gouvernement du Canada (GC) en vue de s'acquitter de ses engagements sur la scène internationale. Toutefois, dans la pratique, certains partenaires de l'approche pangouvernementale ont rarement eu l'occasion de travailler ensemble et appartiennent à des organisations aux cultures différentes, ce qui peut nuire à l'efficacité de leur collaboration. La présente étude visait à 1) mieux comprendre l'incidence de la confiance entre les organismes (ou entre les organisations) sur les efforts de collaboration entre les acteurs civils et militaires dans le cadre d'une approche pangouvernementale des opérations, et 2) recommander des programmes d'éducation et de formation en matière de collaboration inter-organismes. À cette fin, on a consulté un certain nombre d'experts en la matière (EM) afin qu'ils racontent leurs expériences liées à la collaboration sur le théâtre en mettant l'accent, tout particulièrement, sur les événements qui témoignaient d'un climat de confiance. D'après les souvenirs des participants, certains facteurs organisationnels (p. ex. la stratégie, les systèmes, la structure et la dotation) pourraient nuire à la confiance inter-organisationnelle dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Les participants civils ont indiqué qu'ils avaient dû établir leur crédibilité sur le théâtre en produisant de manière constante un produit de haute qualité dans les délais prescrits. La confiance entre les personnes se gagnait au fil du temps.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

other government departments (OGDs); Whole of Government (WoG) approach; organizational cultures; collaboration; interagency trust; training