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
**ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING EFFICACY**

By

Mr. Sandy Babcock

OCTOBER 2003

OTTAWA, CANADA



OPERATIONAL RESEARCH DIVISION

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to assess the efficacy of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Using qualitative analysis to categorize these missions as successful, partially successful or unsuccessful, the location, timing, duration, size, interstate versus intrastate peacekeeping, and peacekeeper density of missions are then examined against the level of success encountered. The results of this study suggest that some of these factors do provide limited indications of the chances for mission success.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	I
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	II
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CONFLICT RESOLUTION.....	5
CONFLICT CONTAINMENT.....	7
LIMITING CASUALTIES.....	7
OVERALL SUCCESS.....	9
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON TRAITS.....	11
LOCATION.....	12
INTERSTATE VERSUS INTRASTATE PEACEKEEPING.....	13
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS BY DECADE.....	14
MISSION STRENGTH.....	16
.....	18
FIGURE 7: PEACEKEEPER DENSITY.....	18
CONCLUSION.....	18

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: LOCATION.....	13
FIGURE 2: INTERSTATE VERSUS INTRASTATE CONFLICT.....	14
FIGURE 3: MISSION EFFECTIVENESS BY DECADE.....	15
FIGURE 4: MISSION DURATION.....	16
FIGURE 5: MISSION DURATION AND LOCATION.....	17
FIGURE 6: MISSION STRENGTH.....	18
FIGURE 7: PEACEKEEPER DENSITY.....	19

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ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING EFFICACY¹

INTRODUCTION

1. For more than 50 years, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions have been one of the cornerstones of international efforts to restore or support governance and stability. Since the first UN-sponsored deployment in June 1948 to supervise a truce in an Arab-Israeli conflict,² peacekeeping has grown to include such diverse roles as observance of ceasefire agreements, establishment of a buffer zone between warring parties, supervision of elections, delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance, and overseeing the withdrawal of armed forces from an occupied territory. These missions, which now total 57³, have met with a varying degree of effectiveness.
2. The purpose of this paper is to offer an assessment of the efficacy of UN peacekeeping. A range of techniques will be used to consider this issue, leading to an analysis seeking to identify common attributes of successful peacekeeping missions. This will be achieved through several qualitative⁴ appraisals of the success rate of peacekeeping efforts, and analyses associated with the location, duration, size, interstate versus intrastate peacekeeping, and peacekeeper density of missions.⁵ Moreover, an analysis will be conducted of whether peacekeeping effectiveness has improved or diminished over time.

¹ An earlier version of this document was presented at the Cornwallis VIII Conference at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 9 Apr 03.

² United Nations, 1996. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, p. 13.

³ For a full listing of UN peacekeeping missions, see www.un.org/Depts/dpko/. While other peacekeeping missions have occurred, this study is restricted to those with a UN mandate.

⁴ The wide variation of conditions and factors makes any attempt at a quantitative analysis of peacekeeping mission efficacy difficult. For instance, how would such considerations as terrain, intensity of conflict, military capabilities of combatants, and weather be weighed and compared from the various missions over more than 50 years? While qualitative analysis has its limitations, it appears most suited for this study.

⁵ Of the 57 peacekeeping missions to date, 47 will be included in this study; the ten missions not included in this study were excluded because sufficient information was not available to allow their inclusion. While the 47 missions included do not provide a sufficient database for definitive study, especially when broken down into smaller categories, they do provide a reasonable basis from which to consider the efficacy of peacekeeping missions. A full listing of the missions considered in this analysis is provided at Annex A.

3. A common criticism of the UN peacekeeping process relates to the difficulty encountered at times in achieving sufficient consensus to allow action to be taken. As early as 1950, a Canadian diplomat reported:

I have referred to the dangerously false thinking now in the ascendant at UN meetings ... the type of thinking which confuses a mere declaration of aspirations with a real improvement in human rights, which would substitute an empty resolution to outlaw war, for the slow, heart-breaking work of trying to remove the causes of war ... In short, I mean the whole mechanistic, declaratory approach which constantly evades or overlooks the fundamental point that resolutions and declarations of this nature are merely a cruel deception ... Our own country's history – with its background of pragmatic and workable, but superficially illogical political arrangements – clearly refutes the validity of this doctrinaire approach.⁶

4. Examples abound since the founding of the UN to the present of conflicts for which there was no UN peacekeeping involvement, including various African civil wars of independence. Peacekeeping missions have also tended not to be authorized when involving the interests of a permanent member of the Security Council, such as was the case with the British in Malaysia, the French in Algeria, the Soviets in Afghanistan, or the Chinese in Vietnam. Moreover, UN peacekeeping missions tend not to be sanctioned when there are no prospects for peace; quite often, before becoming involved, the UN obtains agreement from the conflicting parties regarding its intervention. For instance, the prolonged conflict between the Angolan government and rebels did not see UN participation until, after more than a decade of fighting, the two sides agreed to attempt to resolve their differences. Even so, peacekeeping efforts in Angola have encountered significant difficulties associated with oversight of disarmament measures and the continuing violence.⁷ A more successful example of this kind of UN involvement is the 1992-1994 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Notwithstanding a history of conflict and distrust between the Mozambique government and the rebel group *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO), the UN was instrumental in demobilizing the rebels, delivering humanitarian aid throughout the country and ensuring a free and fair election.⁸

⁶ National Archives of Canada, Record Group 25, Volume 6460, file 5475-FA-40, Part 1, memorandum H.H. Carter to Holmes, 18 May 1950, quoted from Sean M. Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970*, St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2002, p. 39.

⁷ For details on difficulties in achieving peace in Angola, see various issues of the Angolan Peace Monitor (i.e. Issue No. 1, Vol IX, 3 Oct 02, at www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0901.htm) or related web links such as <http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/angolainfo/updatemajjune01.htm>.

⁸ *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 319-338.

5. The 1989 fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent shift from bipolarism to an international security environment dominated by a single superpower seemed to herald a “New World Order” in which the UN could take a more proactive role. At the request of the Security Council, in 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali tabled *An Agenda for Peace*, which was to serve as the framework for an enhanced peace and security role for the UN. The building blocks in support of this were preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building. The UN embraced this opportunity, as epitomized by the tripling of peacekeeping missions, the quadrupling of the number of related resolutions, a seven-fold increase in the number of economic sanctions and growth of an annual peacekeeping budget from \$US230 million to \$US3.6 billion between 1989-1999.⁹ Responding to re-emerging nationalist rivalries, religious fanaticism and ancient enmities, the post-Cold War powers initially collaborated with one another and it became easier to pass security-related resolutions leading to the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The early 1990s successes in Namibia, Cambodia and Central America appeared to support the concept of greater UN peacekeeping involvement. However, subsequent missions to Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia caused nations to re-assess the utility of such efforts. National interests once more became prominent and countries disagreed about who was the aggressor and about what to do – a situation reminiscent of the Cold War period. As well, the international community discovered that aggressors were not always weak, isolated and vulnerable to collective pressure.¹⁰ As a consequence of these and other factors, as one observer noted in 1997, Security Council resolutions have tended to represent momentary political compromises amongst its members rather than serious commitments and consistent action.¹¹
6. A body of work exists that examines the level of success experienced by UN peacekeeping missions.¹² For instance, Heldt has argued persuasively that the

⁹ Michael W. Doyle, “Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping”, pp. 2-3, in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in the New Century*, edited by Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, Rowan & Littlefield: London, 1998.

¹⁰ Jerzy Ciecchanski, “Enforcement Measures under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War”, p. 83, in *The UN, Peace and Force*, edited by Michael Pugh, Frank Cass: London, 1997.

¹¹ Ibid. See also Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1999, p. 30. In part as a response to this, the UN has attempted to improve the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) (Brahimi Report), dated 21 August 2000, and Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502), dated 20 October 2000, refers. The results of these efforts are not yet known.

¹² See, for example, Marjorie Ann Brown, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues*, Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, 1999, Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1993, and Duane Bratt, “Assessing the

ethnicity and perceived impartiality of a mission's commander influences the likelihood of a mission's success.¹³ For the purposes of this study, the criteria and methodology developed by Bratt, which was based upon prior work by Brown and Diehl, will be used and extended to include some of the more recent UN missions. This analysis will examine the efficacy of peacekeeping missions, from the very first such deployment in 1948 concluding with the recent missions for which adequate information is available, on the basis of mandate performance, conflict resolution, containment of the conflict, and the limiting of casualties.¹⁴ Assessments of casualties will include not only combatant deaths, but also indirect deaths resulting from disease, famine, land mines and terrorist activities.¹⁵

MANDATE PERFORMANCE

7. The success of a peacekeeping mission may be judged on the basis of its ability to accomplish what it set out to do. Accordingly, mandate performance as a criterion of peacekeeping efficacy was used to determine whether the ensuing mission satisfied the Security Council resolution. A mission was considered a success if it substantively satisfied its mandate, a partial success if it satisfied segments of its mandate and unsuccessful if it failed to satisfy most of or its entire mandate. It is acknowledged that, by itself, a mission's mandate may be an inadequate basis for assessing efficacy, since it may represent a political compromise tailored to then-current circumstances that fails to address the more difficult issues at stake. Further, as shown in Bosnia with the UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP missions, it is possible for a mandate to be changed. Still, it does provide a reasonable benchmark and a place to begin this analysis.

TABLE I MANDATE PERFORMANCE¹⁶

Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations, pp. 64-81, in Pugh.

¹³ Berger Heldt, "Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions", p. 125, in *Analysis for Assessment, Evaluation and Crisis Management*, edited by Alexander Woodcock and David Davis, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Cornwallis, 2002.

¹⁴ While the four identified criteria cannot be interpreted as exhaustive, this study will limit itself to these. Consideration may be given at a later time to expanding the evaluation criteria to include such factors as political, economic and social stability.

¹⁵ Bratt, p. 66, refers. Unlike Bratt, this paper will not divide UNOSOM and UNAMIR into two different missions, but will count each as one. Moreover, MINUGUA, UNPSG, UNMIBH, UNMOP, UNTAES, MINURCA, UNAVEM III, UNMOSIL, MONUA and UNTAET have been added. Additionally, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH, all of which relate to recent efforts to professionalize police forces in Haiti, UNMEE, UNAMSIL, UNAMA, UNMISSET, UNMIK, MONUC and MINUCI have not been included in this study due to the recentness or nature of the missions or the lack of sufficient information on which to base an analysis. Annex A provides a synopsis of the missions and data used in this study.

¹⁶ Bratt, p. 71, amended and expanded as noted in the previous footnote. Moreover, this assessment found that, contrary to Bratt's evaluation, the UNGOMAP mission did not fully achieve its mandate (in regards to the requirement of non-interference and non-intervention of parties in each other's affairs). Accordingly, this table has assessed UNGOMAP as being "partially successful" vice Bratt's "successful" viewpoint.

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Partially Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
UNEF I, UNSF, UNFICYP, DOMREP, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNDOF, MINUGUA, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, ONUCA, UNIKOM, UNASOG, UNMOP, UNPREDEP, ONUSAL, UNPSG, UNOMIG, ONUMOZ, UNMIBH, UNTAES	ONUC, UNTAC, UNMIH, UNTAET, MINURCA, UNGOMAP	UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIFIL, MINURSO, UNOMUR, UNOMIL, UNAMIR, UNMOT, UNAMIC, UNCRO, UNOSOM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, UNOMSIL, MONUA
Total: 22	6	19

8. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which lasted from January-May 1997, is an example of complete mandate success. Established to provide humanitarian assistance, the mandate was expanded to include observation of a formal cessation of hostilities, the separation of forces, and demobilization of the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG). These tasks were successfully completed and, in May 1997, the mission withdrew.¹⁷ As an example of partial mandate success, from April 1998-February 2000, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was established to assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, maintain law and order, assist with disarmament and disposal of weapons, and support for elections. While the security environment improved in the Central African Republic during MINURCA, the weak military and law enforcement apparatus in place after the departure of the mission encountered limited success in stopping violence and supporting the government, as shown by a coup attempt in May 2001 and the eventual overthrow of the government in 2003.¹⁸ On the other hand, United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established in July 1998 to monitor security conditions, disarmament and demobilization of the Revolutionary United Front. Notwithstanding the agreement of the opposing parties to UN intervention, the conflict and human rights abuses continued, resulting in this mission being judged as being unsuccessful in achieving its mandate.¹⁹

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

9. While conflict resolution might not be the stated aim of a mission, it is an integral component of any attempt to achieve sustained peace (which, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as the absence of political, ethnic and religious violence). A mission was considered successful in this category if it facilitated or helped make possible a peace

¹⁷ www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/MINUGUA.htm

¹⁸ www.africaaction.org/docs99/car9909.htm and news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/newsid_1369000/1369635.stm .

¹⁹ www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/mission/unosil.htm and <http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-sle/index>

or power sharing agreement or created the conditions for such an agreement, partially successful if elements of a peace or power sharing agreement were established, and unsuccessful if such an agreement or the conditions for an agreement were not established. Admittedly, there are limitations to this category, including uncertainty about how to assess a return to hostilities following the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. Despite such shortcomings, this category remains an indicator of the UN's success at peacekeeping.

TABLE II²⁰

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Partially Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
UNSF, DOMREP, UNEF II, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, ONUCA, ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNASOG, UNPREDEP, UNTAES, UNMOP, UNMIBH, UNTAET, MINUGUA	ONUC, UNIIMOG, UNTAC, UNMIH	UNOGIL, UNMOGIP, UNEF I, UNTSO, UNYOM, UNICYP, UNIPOM, UNDOF, UNAVEM II, UNGOMAP, UNOMUR, UNIFIL, MINURSO, UNAMIR, UNOMIG, UNOMIL, UNMOT, UNAMIC, UNOSOM I, UNCRO, UNPROFOR, UNIKOM, UNPSG, UNAVEM III, UNOMSIL
Total: 15	4	28

10. The 1965-1966 Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) provides a long-term example of successful conflict resolution. In response to a political crisis brought about by a coup, a small, three-person UN team was dispatched, which successfully negotiated an agreement between Dominican factions, the Organization of American States, and the US military, which had landed to protect American interests. Additionally, the involvement of the United Nations was critical to the subsequent conduct of open elections and the resultant establishment of an elected civilian government.²¹ The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which was deployed from July 1960-June 1964, was assessed as a partial success because it helped expel foreign military intervention and helped restore an elected government, but ethnic tensions and inequities remained. A compelling example of a failure to resolve conflict is the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which was unable to restore peace, stability, law and order. Moreover, it is notable that, in comparison to the other tables in this study, UN peacekeeping missions have encountered the least success in their attempts to resolve conflict. This suggests that UN peacekeeping should be used cautiously as a means of stopping conflict.

²⁰ Bratt, p. 73, amended and expanded as noted in footnote 14.

²¹ *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 649-658.

CONFLICT CONTAINMENT

11. The third area of analysis, the containment of conflict, looks to determine the UN's success in stopping a conflict from spreading directly or indirectly (i.e. population displacement) to include neighbouring states, one of the major powers or other international actors. A mission was considered successful if a conflict was fully contained, partially successful if the mission minimized the spreading of the conflict and unsuccessful if it failed to stop the conflict from spreading. As shown in Table III, the sole use of this method seems to suggest a high degree of success for peacekeeping.

TABLE III²²
CONFLICT CONTAINMENT

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Partially Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
UNEF I, UNSF, DOMREP, UNOMIL, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNDOF, UNGOMAP, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, UNAVEM II, ONUCA, ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNTAC, UNPREDEP, UNAMIC, UNASOG, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNOSOM II, UNMOP, MONUA, UNPSG, UNAVEM III, UNTAET, MINUGUA	UNMOGIP, ONUC, UNIIMOG, UNCRO, MINURSO, UNOMIG, UNICYP, MINURCA, UNMIH	UNTSO, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIFIL, UNOMUR, UNMOT, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I, UNAMIR, UNOMSIL
Total: 28	9	10

12. As an example of successful conflict containment, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which operated from March 1992-September 1993, is noteworthy. Following the involvement of the UN, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia and China ceased providing support to the Khmer Rouge.²³ The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) may be viewed as partially successful due to the indirect involvement of other nations on both sides of the conflict through financial support and military aid.²⁴ United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) is an example of a failure to contain a conflict, as there was a massive migration into neighbouring countries by refugees seeking to escape tribal violence during this mission.

LIMITING CASUALTIES

13. Any determination of the efficacy of peacekeeping must be influenced by how effective intervention was in limiting the number of combatant and non-combatant

²² Bratt, p. 75, amended and expanded as detailed in footnote 14.

²³ Bratt, p. 75.

²⁴ www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/uniimog.htm, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/iran-iraq.htm, and www.factmonster.com/ce6/history/A0825449.html.

casualties. A mission was considered successful in this category if casualties were fully largely avoided, partially successful if casualties were reduced but not eliminated and unsuccessful if it did not affect the occurrence of casualties. However, problems exist in using this as a measurement, as, for example, it is impossible to distinguish whether the instance of casualties is being reduced due to UN intervention or due to the fact that the more vulnerable citizens of a society have already died (i.e. the young during a famine).²⁵ Accordingly, this means of assessing the efficacy of a peacekeeping mission, like each of the other approaches, must be viewed as inconclusive.

²⁵ Bratt, p. 70.

TABLE IV²⁶
LIMITING CASUALTIES

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Partially Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
UNEF I, UNSF, DOMREP, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNDOF, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, UNIKOM, ONUSAL, MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNASOG, UNAMIC, UNPREDEP, UNTAC, UNTAES, UNMOP, UNTAET, UNMIBH, MINUGUA	UNICYP, ONUCA, UNMIH, UNOMIG, MINURCA	UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, ONUC, UNYOM, UNIFIL, UNGOMAP, UNAVEM II, UNOMUR, UNOMIL, UNSPG, UNMOT, UNCRO, UNOMSIL, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I, UNAMIR, UNOSOM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA
Total: 22	5	20

14. An example of a mission successful in limiting casualties was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which operated along the Suez, the Sinai and eventually into the Gaza strip, between November 1956 and June 1967. This deployment helped, for a period, to interrupt hostilities between Egypt and Israel, and prevented the armed intervention of France and the United Kingdom. The long-running United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNICYP), from 1964 to present, represents a partial success in limiting casualties. While the tensions remain between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and ethnic- and politically-motivated violence still occurs from time to time, the maintenance of a buffer zone between the two groups has been instrumental in maintaining a relative peace on the island. Finally, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995 is a profound example of the failure to limit casualties, with instances of UN forces standing aside as Serbs massacred Bosnian Muslims (i.e. 7000 victims in Srebrenica).²⁷

OVERALL SUCCESS

15. Using the preceding four analyses as a starting point, it is possible to conduct an assessment of the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. This overall assessment was based upon the following model:

- a. the preceding four analyses were given an equal weighting;
- b. each incidence of mission success was given a score of 1, partial mission success was scored as .5, and an unsuccessful mission was scored as 0;
- c. a cumulative score of 3-4 placed a mission in the overall successful category, a score of 1.5-2.5 placed a mission in the partially successful category and a score of 0-1 meant that a mission was considered unsuccessful overall.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 78 amended and expanded as detailed in footnote 14.

²⁷ Steven Edwards, "Failure of the Security Council a blow to Chrétien government", *National Post*, Wednesday, 16 March 2003, p. A9.

16. Use of this model resulted in a number of differences from Bratt's findings. For instance, Bratt assessed the UNEF I, UNIPOM and UNDOF missions as being partially successful overall. The preceding analyses agreed with his conclusions that these missions each had been successful in relation to mandate, conflict containment and limiting casualties, but unsuccessful in relation to conflict resolution. Use of the above model resulted in these three missions having a cumulative score of three, thereby placing them in the successful category overall.²⁸

TABLE V²⁹
OVERALL SUCCESS

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Partially Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>
UNEF I, UNSF, DOMREP, UNEF II, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, UNASOG, ONUCA, UNTAES, UNPREDEP, UNTAET, UNTAC, UNMIBH, MINUGUA, UNMOP, UNIPOM, UNIKOM, UNIIMOG	UNICYP, UNMIH, ONUC, UNOMIG, UNAMIC, UNPSG, MINURCA, MINURSO, UNGOMAP	UNTSO, UNMOGIP, MONUA, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIFIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNCRO, UNOSOM I, UNMOT, UNOMUR, UNPROFOR, UNOMSIL, UNOMIL, UNOSOM II, UNAMIR
Total: 21	9	17

²⁸ Bratt, p. 78. There are additional disagreements with Bratt's findings. For instance, UNAMIC was found to have been a partial success vice Bratt's view of it having been unsuccessful. While UNAMIC may have failed to achieve its mandate, a factor in this was its termination because of the creation of a larger, longer and ultimately successful mission, UNTAC. Moreover, its success in relation to conflict containment and limitation of casualties gave it an overall score of two, which the model used places as a partial success. Annex A includes a summary of each mission's cumulative score.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 79 amended and expanded as detailed in footnotes 14 and 27.

17. From this perspective, it appears that UN peacekeeping missions have a slightly better chance of being successful than unsuccessful, with 44.7 % of the missions being judged as being successful and 36.2 % as being unsuccessful. It is noted that while there are some differences between Table I, relating to mandate performance, and Table V, relating to overall success, the net results of the two assessments are fundamentally comparable with respect to the frequency of mission success.³⁰ While, as mentioned in paragraph 7, mandate performance may be criticized as the basis for analyzing the successfulness of peacekeeping missions, the essential commonality between the two results suggests that an assessment solely of mandate performance provides a fairly accurate representation of the chances for overall success. This implies that pre-deployment concerns about the viability of a mission's mandate may provide a reasonably true forewarning about the chances for mission success. Still, political considerations may require such missions to proceed.

18. It was also noted that the prior presence of a UN mission in an area, whether successful or not, is not a reliable indicator of potential success for follow-on missions. For example, whereas UNAVEM I to Angola was considered a success, the subsequent UNAVEM II and III, and MONUA missions all were considered unsuccessful. Similarly, as demonstrated by the successful UNPREDEP mission following the unsuccessful UNPROFOR deployment, a previous failure does not preclude subsequent success.

19. While the qualitative nature of the analyses of the various criteria does provide some room for interpretation, the essentially bi-polar results of the various assessments suggest that the majority of UN peacekeeping missions will either be successful or unsuccessful – there is relatively small middle ground between these two extremes. The conceptual linkage between mandate performance as a criterion and the other criteria (conflict resolution, conflict containment, and casualty limitation) may be a factor in the similarity between the various assessments. As noted in footnote 14, the development of additional evaluation criteria may provide further insights into why peacekeeping missions predominantly clearly succeed or fail.

THE SEARCH FOR COMMON TRAITS

20. The preceding analysis of overall mission success will now be used to assess missions for common traits associated with mission success or the lack thereof, including from the perspective of location, interstate versus intrastate conflict, decade of occurrence, mission size and peacekeeper density. However, in advance of this, a cautionary note is warranted. Given the limited number of missions analysed and the

³⁰ In comparing how Table V differs from Table I, three missions moved from being assessed as successful to partially successful (UNICYP, UNOMIC, and UNPSG), two missions moved from being assessed as partially successful to successful (UNTAET and UNTAC), and two missions went from unsuccessful to partially successful (UNAMIC and MINURSO).

disparate conditions of each, it is difficult (and likely impossible) to reach any definitive conclusions regarding common traits of successful (or unsuccessful) peacekeeping missions. Accordingly, the following analyses must be viewed with healthy scepticism and a critical eye. Yet this does not detract from the ability to make observations, suggest trends and derive insights that may serve to inform decision-makers and planners.

LOCATION

21. The geographic location of a mission has shown, in at least one instance, some suggestion of the likelihood of mission success. Of the 16 missions dispatched to Africa, more than half were unsuccessful and only a quarter were successful (56.3 % unsuccessful, 25 % successful, 18.7 % partially successful). If the successful UNASOG mission, which was only two months long and involved nine people, is discounted, only one in five African peacekeeping missions (with three successful, three partially successful and nine unsuccessful) may be viewed, from this perspective, as having been successful. On the other hand, although dealing with a sum total of only five peacekeeping missions to the area, deployments to Central America have enjoyed a far greater chance of success, with 80 % falling in the successful category and the remaining mission being assessed as partially successful. Figure 1 depicts the mission success rate based upon location.




Figure 1³¹: Location


22. This perspective does not consider associated factors, such as how long a nation has been independent, its colonial heritage (if any), maturity of its political infrastructure,

³¹ For the purposes of this chart and those that follow, data related to Haiti will be captured under the Central American heading and Cyprus will be captured under the Middle East heading. For this and the following charts, S refers to Successful, PS refers to Partial Success, and US refers to Unsuccessful. Also, a summary of the details used in each of the charts that follow may be found at Annex A.

societal, ethnic and religious homogeneity, and external considerations as the role and influence of a major or regional power (i.e. Monroe Doctrine). These will be treated as outside the scope of this study.

INTERSTATE VERSUS INTRASTATE PEACEKEEPING

23. For the purposes of this analysis, interstate peacekeeping is considered to have taken place when more than one state is directly involved in a conflict and intrastate peacekeeping is considered to have taken place when activities are focused within the national boundaries of and by a single state. Financial, ideological or moral support, or the provision of arms for one side or the other in an intrastate conflict by external state or non-state actors is not considered, for the purpose of this analysis, sufficient to categorize such a conflict as interstate in the absence of one nation moving to invade another.³² A review of the interstate peacekeeping missions indicates that there were 10 successful missions, a single partially successful mission and four unsuccessful missions, for a total of 15. In reference to intrastate peacekeeping, 11 were successful, eight were partially successful and 13 were unsuccessful, for a total of 32. This suggests that two-thirds of all UN peacekeeping missions relate to intrastate matters, that interstate missions have traditionally had a good chance of success (at 66.7 %) and that intrastate peacekeeping essentially have an equal chance being successful or unsuccessful. Figure 2 graphically contrasts the success rate of inter- and intrastate conflicts.



³² The UNOGIL and UNOMUR deployments were designed to stop the host nation from being used to smuggle arms or personnel into a second nation by various actors (from Lebanon into Israel and from Uganda into Rwanda respectively). Both of these missions were assessed as being intrastate deployments. Also, while the UNTAET deployment into East Timor occurred before it was formally recognized as an independent nation, this mission's role in supervising the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor led to it being assessed as interstate. While Greece and Turkey troops have been directly involved in Cyprus, for the majority of the UNICYP mission this has not been true; accordingly, this mission was assessed as intrastate. Annex A identifies the status of the various missions as interstate or intrastate.

Figure 2: Interstate Versus Intrastate Conflict

MISSION EFFECTIVENESS BY DECADE

24. Using the start date of peacekeeping missions as the point of departure, it is quickly evident that any thought that the fall of the Iron Curtain would herald a period of peace was misguided, since just over 60 % of the peacekeeping missions for this study began during the 1990s. Moreover, a comparison of peacekeeping mission efficacy by decade suggests that there is no significant trend over time regarding whether the UN has become better or worse at creating the conditions for a successful mission. Although missions begun in the 1980s had a high incidence of success (with four of five being assessed as successful and the remaining mission falling into the partially successful category), a sampling of only five missions is too small a basis from which to make generalizations. Still, the relative successfulness of these 1980s missions may have contributed to the environment in which the proactive 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* was produced. While the 1990s may have seen a higher incidence of mission failure than other decades, there were almost as many successes. Figure 3 provides an overview of peacekeeping mission effectiveness and frequency by decade.




Figure 3: Mission Effectiveness by Decade

MISSION DURATION³³

25. Whether the duration of a mission has any influence on a mission's chances for success will be examined next. Figure 4 depicts the averaging of the number of months of the missions by the familiar successful, partially successful and unsuccessful categories. For the purposes of this analysis, since some missions have lasted up to 55 years, the 13 missions of over five years duration (six successful, three partially successful and four unsuccessful) have been capped at 60 months. Sixty months was used as the longest input for missions, since that amount time provided adequate indicators of how the mission was going.




Figure 4: Mission Duration (in months)

26. With the upper bound established at 60, the average mission length appears to be 33.5 months long, with no significant variation between the various mission categories (successful 33.6 months, partially successful 35.9 months and unsuccessful 32.2 months). Therefore, the overall duration of a mission does not appear to influence a mission's likelihood of success.

27. Figure 5 attempts to find a correlation between typical mission length (again capping mission length to 60 months) and location. European, Asian, African and Central American missions averaged 35.9, 32, 27.4 and 25.6 months each respectively,

³³ A factor to be considered in association with assessing a mission's duration is whether, because of its mandate, a mission was destined to end by a specified date. However, this consideration proved to be difficult to integrate into these results; for example, UNDOF, which began in May 1974, has its mandate renewed every six months. As another example, UNAMIC was ended before the completion of its mandate in order to combine it with another mission, UNTAC. Accordingly, the relationship between mission duration and mission mandate will be treated as beyond the scope of this paper.

while Middle Eastern missions, with seven of the ten deployments into the area being assessed the maximum value of 60, typically were 47.1 months long. This suggests that the average Middle Eastern mission is longer than those taking place elsewhere. This figure also suggests that African and Central American deployments tend to be a little shorter than elsewhere.




Figure 5: Mission Duration and Location

MISSION STRENGTH³⁴

28. Undoubtedly UN planners take into consideration the complexity and dangers posed when determining a mission's size, as well as the nature of the mission in question (i.e. peacekeeping versus peacemaking). With this in mind, it is reasonable to question whether the number of personnel deployed as part of a UN force influences the likelihood of mission success. When using the maximum number of troops, military support personnel, military observers, and police officers deployed during a mission as a baseline, Figure 6 suggests that the average mission size has been 4206 personnel, successful missions have averaged 3527 personnel, partially successful missions have averaged 3444.9 personnel and unsuccessful missions have averaged 5639.9. Moreover, it is noted that the two largest UN peacekeeping deployments (UNOSOM II at 28,000, and UNPROFOR at 39,402) fell within the unsuccessful category and that the removal of

³⁴ Another perspective in this area that could be explored is the ratio of peacekeepers to general population. Such a study would face numerous challenges – finding reliable census information, sometimes for border areas between countries or regions within a country in which government infrastructure has broken down, for a specific period sometimes over up to fifty years ago. Moreover, perhaps the ratio of peacekeeper to general population is not as important as the ratio of peacekeepers to combatants. This point is addressed in a subsequent footnote. In view of the challenges with determining the ratio of peacekeepers to general population, this issue is being treated as beyond the scope of this paper.

those two missions from consideration drops the average unsuccessful mission strength to 1681.1. Accordingly, any attempt to link mission strength with the likelihood of success must be treated with caution.





Figure 6: Mission Strength

29. Moreover, in addition to the considerations mentioned above, the area of the country to which the mission is deployed must be considered a factor when looking at mission size.³⁵ Using the limited data provided at Annex B, it appears that the peacekeeper density³⁶ for successful missions was an average .1052 peacekeepers per square kilometre. For partially successful missions, there was an average of .0945 peacekeepers per square kilometre, and for unsuccessful missions, there was a significantly smaller average of .0500 peacekeepers per square kilometre. Again, these figures must be viewed critically. Still, this review suggests that the average unsuccessful peacekeeping mission has just 47.2 % of the peacekeeper density of the average successful mission and 52.9 % of the density of partially successful missions. Figure 7 depicts the relationship between mission success and peacekeeper density.

³⁵ I am indebted to my colleagues at the Cornwallis VIII conference for the suggestion to explore this aspect.

³⁶ While the number of combatants in relation to area and to peacekeeper density may also provide interesting insights into the prospects for peacekeeping mission success, it is often difficult to obtain reliable data on the strength of non-governmental combatants (i.e. the exact number of Hutus engaged in attacks on the Tutsis during the initial part of the UNAMIR mission likely will never be known). Accordingly, combatant density will not be addressed as part of this study.



**Figure 7: Peacekeeper Density
(per square kilometer)**

CONCLUSION

30. In summary, this study suggests a number of things. UN peacekeeping missions, which have performed an ever-increasing range of duties, appear to have a slightly better chance of success than of failure. Overall, of the 47 peacekeeping missions considered in this study, 21 were considered successful, nine were found to be partially successful and another 17 were assessed as unsuccessful. It is also important to note that while the number of peacekeeping missions has increased significantly since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 1992 release of *An Agenda for Peace*, the rate of success appears to be essentially unchanged over time. Of the 29 missions since 1990 reviewed, 11 were successful, six met with partial success and 12 were unsuccessful. This suggests that the United Nations and member nations have realized a relatively consistent degree of success in the peacekeeping missions over time.

31. It is difficult to generalize about mission characteristics that have contributed to success. It appears that African missions have encountered a somewhat higher proportion of failure than elsewhere. Middle Eastern missions have tended to be longer and Central American missions have enjoyed a high degree of success. Deployments associated with interstate conflict seem to have a relatively good chance of success and intrastate deployments appear to have about an equal chance of being successful or unsuccessful. Additionally, unsuccessful missions have averaged a fairly significant smaller peacekeeper density than other missions. Still, given the small number of

missions involved and the wide differences in mission size, mandate, area, etc, these observations cannot be considered definitive.

32. Numerous opportunities remain for additional research related to UN peacekeeping. For instance, does the nationality mixture of the peacekeeping force influence the chances of success? Is there any difference between the success rate of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions? In the African context, is there any correlation between the origin and duration of imperial occupation and the chances for peacekeeping success? How does the interest of major powers in a region influence peacekeeping missions? These and other questions deserve further research.

33. In conclusion, location and peacekeeper density seem to provide a partial indication of the chances for a successful peacekeeping mission. Location also provides some suggestion concerning the duration of missions. While the evidence is certainly not strong enough to be considered a reliable basis on which to forecast mission success, it does provide food for thought for UN and national planners in their attempts to restore or support governance and stability.

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ANNEX A
DOR(JOINT) RN 2003/07
OCTOBER 2003

PEACEKEEPING MISSION DATABASE

DOMREP – Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic

Duration: May 1965-October 1966 (18 months)

Size: 3 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

MINUGUA – United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

Duration: January 1997-May 1997 (5 months)

Size: 188 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

MINURCA – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic

Duration: April 1998-February 2000 (23 months)

Size: 1374 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1.5

MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Duration: April 1991-present (60+ months)

Size: 242 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1.5

MONUA – United Nations Mission in Angola

Duration: June 1997-February 1999 (21 months)

Size: 3568 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1

ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo

Duration: July 1960-June 1964 (48 months)

Size: 19,828 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1.5

ONUCA – United Nations Observer Group in Central America

Duration: November 1989-January 1992 (27 months)

Size: 1060 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3.5

ONUMOZ – United Nations Operation in Mozambique

Duration: December 1992-December 1994 (25 months)

Size: 8123 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

ONUSAL – United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

Duration: July 1991-April 1995 (45 months)

Size: 1019 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNAMIC – United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

Duration: October 1991-March 1992 (6 months)

Size: 1504 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 2

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

Duration: October 1993-March 1996 (28 months)

Size: 5610 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNASOG – United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group

Duration: May-June 1994 (2 months)

Size: 9 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNAVEM I – United Nations Angola Verification Mission I

Duration: December 1988-May 1991 (30 months)

Size: 70 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNAVEM II – United Nations Angola Verification Mission II

Duration: May 1991-February 1995 (45 months)

Size: 583 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1

UNAVEM III – United Nations Angola Verification Mission III

Duration: February 1995-June 1997 (29 months)

Size: 368 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1

UNCRO – United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation

Duration: March 1995-January 1996 (11 months)

Size: 7071 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: .5

UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Duration: May 1974-present (60+ months)

Size: currently 1043 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNEF I – First United Nations Emergency Force

Duration: November 1956-June 1967 (60+ months)

Size: 6073 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNEF II – Second United Nations Emergency Force

Duration: October 1973-July 1979 (60+ months)

Size: 6973 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNGOMAP – United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Duration: May 1988-March 1990 (23 months)

Size: 50 Status: Partially Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 1.5

UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Duration: March 1964-Present (60+ months)

Size: 6275 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 2

UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Duration: March 1978-Present (60+ months)

Size: 2023 (February 2003) Status: Unsuccessful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNIIMOG – United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

Duration: August 1988-February 1991 (30 months)

Size: 400 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNIKOM – United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

Duration: April 1991-2003 (60+ months)

Size: 1111 (February 2003) Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNIPOM – United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission

Duration: September 1965-March 1966 (7 months)

Size: 96 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNMIBH – United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Duration: December 1995-December 2002 (60+ months)

Size: 2047 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNMIH – United Nations Mission in Haiti

Duration: September 1993-June 1996 (33 months)

Size: 1500 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 2

UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan

Duration: January 1949-Present (60+ months)

Size: 45 Status: Unsuccessful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: .5

UNMOP – United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

Duration: February 1996-December 2002 (60+ months)

Size: 28 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNMOT – United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

Duration: December 1994-May 2000 (60+ months)

Size: 81 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNOGIL – United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon

Duration: June-December 1958 (7 months)

Size: 591 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

Duration: August 1993-present (60+ months)

Size: 117 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 2

UNOMIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

Duration: September 1993-September 1997 (49 months)

Size: 368 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1

UNOMSIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

Duration: July 1998-October 1999 (15 months)

Size: 209 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNOMUR – United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

Duration: June 1993-September 1994 (15 months)

Size: 81 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNOSOM I – United Nations Operation in Somalia I

Duration: April 1992-March 1993 (12 months)

Size: 4269 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNOSOM II – United Nations Operation in Somalia II

Duration: March 1993-March 1995 (25 months)

Size: 28,000 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 1

UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

Duration: March 1995-February 1999 (48 months)

Size: 1110 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force

Duration: February 1992-March 1995 (37 months)

Size: 39,402 Status: Unsuccessful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNPSG – United Nations Civilian Police Support Group

Duration: January 1998-October 1998 (10 months)

Size: 114 Status: Partially Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 2

UNSF – United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)

Duration: October 1962-April 1963 (7 months)

Size: 1576 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Duration: March 1992-September 1993 (19 months)

Size: 22,000 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 3

UNTAES – United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

Duration: January 1996-January 1998 (25 months)

Size: 2847 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor

Duration: October 1999-Present (46 months)

Size: 10,790 Status: Successful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 3.5

UNTAG – United Nations Transition Assistance Group

Duration: April 1989-March 1990 (12 months)

Size: 7500 Status: Successful/Intrastate

Cumulative Score: 4

UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

Duration: May 1948-Present (60+ months)

Size: 155 Status: Unsuccessful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 0

UNYOM – United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

Duration: July 1963-September 1964 (14 months)

Size: 189 Status: Unsuccessful/Interstate

Cumulative Score: 0

ANNEX B
DOR(JOINT) RN 2003/07
OCTOBER 2003

PEACEKEEPER DENSITY³⁷

<u>Country</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Peacekeepers</u>	<u>Density</u>
Angola	UNAVEM I (S)	1,246,700	70	.0001
	UNAVEM II (US)		583	.0005
	UNAVEM III (US)		368	.0003
	MONUA (US)		3568	.0028
Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH (S)	51,129	2047	.0400
Cambodia	UNAMIC (PS)	181,040	1504	.0083
	UNTAC (S)		22000	.1215
Central African Republic	MINURCA (PS)	622,984	1374	.0022
Congo	ONUC (PS)	2,345,410	19828	.0084
Croatia	UNCRO (US)	56,542	7071	.1250
	UNPSG (PS)		114	.0020
	UNTAES (S)		2847	.0503
Cyprus	UNICYP (PS)	9,250	6275	.6783
East Timor	UNTAET (S)	15,007	10790	.7189
El Salvador	ONUSAL (S)	21,040	1019	.0484

³⁷ Area is indicated in square kilometres. All area information was obtained from the CIA World Fact Book 2002 website. Density represents the number of peacekeepers per square kilometre. The symbols (S), (PS) and (US) represent whether the missions were successful, partially successful or unsuccessful, as detailed in Table V. In instances where the area for a mission is undefined or where a mission is located on the border between two countries, the missions in question have been excluded from this table (UNEF I and II, UNDOF, UNSF, UNIPOM, UNIIMOG, UNIKOM, UNASOG, UNMOP, UNPROFOR, ONUCA, UNTSO, UNGOMAP, UNOMUR, and UNMOGIP). Since the DOMREP mission had only three personnel who were supported by an undefined number of foreign troops not under the UN mandate, this mission also was excluded from this table.

Georgia	UNOMIG (PS)	69,700	117	.0016
Guatemala	MINUGUA (S)	108,890	188	.0099
Haïti	UNMIH (PS)	27,750	1500	.0540
Lebanon	UNOGIL (US)	10,400	591	.0568
	UNIFIL (US)		2023	.1945
Liberia	UNOMIL (US)	113,700	368	.0032
Macedonia	UNPREDEP (S)	25,333	1110	.0438
Mozambique	ONUMOZ (S)	801,590	8123	.0101
Namibia	UNTAG (S)	825,418	7500	.0090
Rwanda	UNAMIR (US)	26,338	5610	.2130
Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL (US)	71,740	209	.0029
Somalia	UNOSOM I (US)	637,657	4269	.0066
	UNOSOM II (US)		28000	.0439
Tajikistan	UNMOT (US)	143,100	81	.0005
Western Sahara	MINURSO (PS)	266,000	242	.0009
Yemen	UNYOM (US)	527,970	189	.0003

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This study seeks to assess the efficacy of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Using qualitative analysis to categorize these missions as successful, partially successful or unsuccessful, the location, timing, duration, size, interstate versus intrastate peacekeeping, and peacekeeper density of missions are then examined against the level of success encountered. The results of this study suggest that some of these factors do provide limited indications of the chances for mission success.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

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