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# Interagency Training for Comprehensive Operations:

*Government Partners' Perceptions of Exercise Maple Guardian*

*Megan M. Thompson  
Angela R. Febbraro  
Ann-Renee Blais*

**Defence R&D Canada**  
Technical Report  
DRDC Toronto TR 2010-079  
June 2010

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In conducting the research described in this report, the investigators adhered to the policies and procedures set out in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical conduct for research involving humans, National Council on Ethics in Human Research, Ottawa, 1998 as issued jointly by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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## Abstract

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Thirty-nine members of Other Government Departments (OGDs), including 14 from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 11 from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and 14 from civilian police organizations (CIVPOL), completed a short questionnaire assessing their perceptions of the training effectiveness of Exercise Maple Guardian (EX MG), a large, realistic Canadian Forces (CF) pre-deployment training exercise. Members of OGDs rated the value of the training quite positively in terms of the degree of contact they had with members of the CF during the exercise and as preparation to work with the CF when deployed. Average ratings were less favourable with respect to the degree of contact with the Afghan role players during the exercise, and in terms of the resultant perceived value of the training as preparation to work with members of the Afghan population while deployed. Analyses revealed that CIDA, DFAIT and CIVPOL members rated the training effectiveness equally in terms of working with the CF. However, the CIDA group rated the training as being significantly more useful in terms of their ability to work with members of the Afghan population than did the DFAIT group (the CIVPOL group did not differ from either of the other two groups). Both the CIDA and the CIVPOL groups indicated that the training had provided them with more effective tools/skills for working with the Afghan public than did the DFAIT group. Results of analysis of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. In addition, respondents recommended several ways to enhance the training, in terms of ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training itself, incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs as well as Afghan culture and history into the training exercise, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process.

## Résumé

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Trente-neuf membres d'autres ministères, dont 14 de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), 11 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI) et 14 membres d'organismes civils de police (CIVPOL) ont rempli un court questionnaire servant à évaluer leurs perceptions de l'efficacité de la formation qu'ils ont reçue durant l'exercice *Maple Guardian* (Ex MG), un exercice réaliste d'envergure des Forces canadiennes (FC) préalable à un déploiement en mission. Les membres d'autres ministères ont jugé la formation très valable du point de vue des contacts qu'ils ont eus avec les militaires durant l'exercice et de leur préparation à la collaboration avec les FC durant le déploiement. La moyenne des résultats est moins favorable quant aux contacts établis avec les intervenants afghans durant l'exercice et quant à la valeur perçue de la formation pour se préparer à collaborer avec les membres de la population afghane durant le déploiement. Il ressort des analyses que les membres de l'ACDI, du MAECI et des CIVPOL ont tous également trouvé la formation efficace pour renforcer la collaboration avec les FC. Pour sa part, le groupe de l'ACDI a classé la formation comme beaucoup plus utile pour l'amélioration de son aptitude à travailler avec les membres de la population afghane que le groupe du MAECI (le groupe des CIVPOL a obtenu des résultats semblables aux deux autres groupes). Les groupes de l'ACDI et des CIVPOL ont jugé que la formation leur a offert des outils/techniques plus efficaces pour travailler avec le public afghan que le groupe du MAECI. Les résultats de l'analyse des réponses aux questions ouvertes reflètent majoritairement les résultats de l'enquête quantitative. Les répondants ont en outre recommandé plusieurs moyens d'améliorer la formation, par exemple bien préparer les autres ministères à la formation comme telle, intégrer à l'exercice de plus amples renseignements sur les rôles et les responsabilités des autres ministères de même que sur la culture afghane, et faire intervenir les autres ministères plus tôt durant la planification de l'exercice.

## Executive Summary

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### **Interagency Training for Comprehensive Operations: Government Partners' Perceptions of Exercise Maple Guardian**

**Megan M. Thompson; Angela R. Febraro; Ann-Renee Blais; DRDC Toronto TR 2010-079; Defence R&D Canada □ Toronto; June 2010.**

The complexity associated with the majority of contemporary missions has led the Canadian government to increasingly adopt a comprehensive approach (CA) to operations which is embodied, in part, by increased collaboration among whole of government (WoG) partners and the local or indigenous population in the mission area. Ideally, this approach affords greater opportunities for effective collaboration among the different CA players, ultimately increasing operational effectiveness and responsiveness. Despite its promise, recent reviews have documented the range of challenges to comprehensive operations. One of the consistent themes in terms of interventions that will ameliorate at least some of these challenges to CA is the establishment of realistic mission-centric training for WoG team partners who will work together within a comprehensive approach.

Recognizing the importance of training to mission success, and arguably having the greatest capacity to undertake training of this nature, the Canadian Forces (CF) has extended invitations to their WoG partners (i.e., members of Other Government Departments or OGDs) to participate in a variety of CF education and training activities. The largest of these involves a 3-week pre-deployment training activity, EXERCISE Maple Guardian (EX MG). The current research documents the OGD members' subjective assessments of this training. First, we assessed levels of knowledge and experience of the OGD members with respect to the mission in Afghanistan, the CF, and the Afghan population prior to EX MG, and then asked about the degree of contact with the CF and Afghan role players during the exercise. We asked a number of questions concerning their assessments of the effectiveness of the training in preparing them to work effectively with members of the CF and with members of the Afghan population while deployed, and any suggestions they might have to further improve the training experience.

A total of 39 OGD members volunteered to complete the survey, including 11 from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 14 from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and 14 members of civilian police organizations (CIVPOL). Initial descriptive results indicated that, on average, respondents reported some prior knowledge of the Afghan mission. OGD participants also indicated slightly to somewhat more than a little prior knowledge of and contact with members of the CF. Perhaps not surprisingly, the reported average level of prior contact with members of the Afghan population or "public" was quite limited and the mean score for the degree of prior knowledge of the Afghan people was slightly higher, reflecting a score midway between a little and some prior knowledge.

In general, participants reported a high level of contact with the CF both during EX MG and more informally outside of the exercise scenarios, and rated EX MG as a valuable training experience, especially in terms of learning more about the CF, how it operates and the individual CF members with whom they would be working most closely when deployed. In comparison, OGD participants indicated a lesser degree of contact with the Afghan role players both during the

exercise and in terms of informal interactions, and rated the training experience as somewhat less positive in terms of working with members of the Afghan population when deployed. For instance, the average scores across participants were lower regarding the amount learned (i.e., midway between "a little" and "some") than was seen for results concerning the CF. Similar results were also evident for the mean perceived usefulness of EX MG in terms of working with members of the Afghan public while deployed. The sample also indicated that on average they had received few tools to work with members of the Afghan people and that EX MG had had only a little impact on their ability to interact with members of the Afghan population while deployed.

Correlational analyses were also conducted to determine relationships between various experiential variables and perceptions of training effectiveness, both in relation to the CF and the Afghan public. Overall, the greater the prior knowledge of the CF the participants reported, the greater the perceived usefulness of EX MG as preparation for working with the CF during a future deployment. Moreover, the higher the level of contact with the CF during EX MG scenarios, the greater the amount learned about the CF and the greater the perceived usefulness of the training for working with the CF. Results concerning the Afghan public revealed some similarities but also important differences compared to the pattern of results regarding the CF. In particular, the level of contact with the Afghan role players during the EX MG scenarios was, in general, *not* significantly associated with higher perceptions of training effectiveness as had been the case for the CF.

Finally, group differences of training effectiveness based on OGD affiliation were investigated. On average, the CIDA group rated the EX MG training as being more effective in terms of their ability to work with members of the Afghan population than did the DFAIT group (while the average for the CIVPOL group did not differ from the CIDA or DFAIT groups). Both the CIDA and the CIVPOL groups had significantly higher ratings of the effectiveness of the tools/skills provided by EX MG to work with the Afghan public than did the DFAIT group.

Results of analysis of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. For example, respondents, overall, felt that they learned a great deal from the training exercise about the CF's organizational structure, culture and planning processes, and that the training helped them to establish useful relationships with the CF (and other) personnel with whom they would be working in theatre. However, in comparison, respondents reported learning less about the Afghan culture and people from EX MG. In addition, respondents recommended several ways to enhance the training, in terms of ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training itself, incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs as well as Afghan culture and history into the training exercise, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process. Taken together these results are informative for future interagency training design. The report concludes with recommendations for areas of future research.

## Sommaire

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### La formation interorganismes aux fins d'opérations globales : Perceptions des partenaires gouvernementaux de l'exercice *Maple Guardian*

Megan M. Thompson; Angela R. Febraro; Anne-Renée Biais; RDDC Toronto  
RT 2010-079; R & D pour la défense Canada - Toronto; mars 2010.

La complexité des missions contemporaines a poussé le gouvernement du Canada à adopter progressivement une approche globale face aux opérations, fondée en partie sur une intervention pangouvernementale concertée. Idéalement, cette approche offre plus de possibilités de coordination et de collaboration entre différents ministères et organismes gouvernementaux, ce qui aurait normalement pour effet d'améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle et la capacité de réaction. Même si l'approche globale était prometteuse, on a fait état récemment de l' éventail des défis que pose une coordination interorganismes efficace. Une des solutions le plus souvent proposées pour aplanir au moins une partie des obstacles à l'approche globale est l'établissement d'une formation interorganismes à l'intention des partenaires de l'équipe pangouvernementale.

Conscientes de l'importance de la formation pour la réussite des missions, les Forces canadiennes (FC) ont invité leurs partenaires gouvernementaux (c.-à-d. les membres d'autres ministères) à participer à une gamme d'activités de sensibilisation et de formation, dont la plus importante était l'exercice *Maple Guardian* (Ex MG), une instruction préalable au déploiement d'une durée de trois semaines. L'étude actuelle rend compte de l'évaluation subjective de cette formation par les membres d'autres ministères. Nous avons d'abord évalué les niveaux de connaissance et d'expérience des membres d'autres ministères par rapport à la mission en Afghanistan, aux FC et à la population afghane avant l'Ex MG, puis nous les avons interrogés sur leur degré de contact avec les participants des FC et les intervenants afghans durant l'exercice. Nous leur avons demandé d'évaluer l'efficacité de la formation pour leur préparation à une collaboration efficace avec les membres des FC et avec la population afghane durant le déploiement, et nous les avons invités à nous proposer des moyens d'améliorer l'expérience de la formation.

Au total, 39 membres d'autres ministères ont accepté de remplir le questionnaire, dont 11 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), 14 de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) et 14 membres d'organismes civils de police (CIVPOL). Selon les premiers résultats descriptifs, les répondants avaient en moyenne une certaine connaissance préalable de la mission en Afghanistan. Les participants d'autres ministères ont aussi indiqué qu'ils avaient acquis une certaine connaissance des FC et établi des contacts avec des membres des FC. Fait probablement non surprenant, le degré de contact préalable avec des membres de la population ou du public afghan était en moyenne très limité et le degré de connaissance préalable du peuple afghan était en moyenne légèrement supérieur, ce qui donne un résultat situé à mi-chemin entre une faible et une certaine connaissance préalable.

En règle générale, les participants ont indiqué avoir beaucoup d'échanges avec les FC aussi bien durant l'Ex MG qu'en titre informel en dehors des scénarios d'exercice. Ils ont classé l'Ex MG comme une expérience de formation valable, en ce sens qu'ils ont pu en apprendre davantage sur

les FC, leur fonctionnement et les militaires avec qui ils travailleront plus étroitement en déploiement. Par comparaison, les participants d'autres ministères ont indiqué avoir eu peu de contacts avec les intervenants afghans durant l'exercice et à titre informel, et ils ont jugé l'expérience de formation comme un peu moins utile pour favoriser la collaboration avec la population afghane durant le déploiement. Par exemple, les résultats pour tous les participants étaient en moyenne plus faibles quant aux apprentissages (c.-à-d., à mi-chemin entre une faible et une certaine connaissance) que les résultats concernant les FC exclusivement. Les résultats étaient semblables aussi en ce qui concerne l'utilité moyenne perçue de l'Ex MG pour la collaboration avec les membres du public afghan durant le déploiement. Il ressort également de l'échantillon qu'en moyenne, les répondants ont reçu peu d'outils pour travailler avec les membres de la population afghane et que l'Ex MG a eu très peu d'incidence sur leur aptitude à interagir avec les membres de la population afghane durant le déploiement.

Par ailleurs, pour l'ensemble des participants, ceux qui détenaient un plus faible niveau de connaissance préalable concernant la mission ont obtenu des résultats supérieurs d'apprentissage sur les FC durant l'exercice. Une meilleure connaissance préalable des FC était généralement associée à des résultats supérieurs pour ce qui est de l'utilité de l'Ex MG pour une collaboration éventuelle avec les FC. Les résultats ont aussi révélé qu'un plus faible niveau de connaissance préalable concernant les Afghans était associé à l'acquisition de plus de connaissances sur leur sujet suite à la participation des répondants à l'Ex MG. Cependant, par contraste avec les résultats concernant les FC, un *plus faible* niveau de connaissance préalable des Afghans était associé à des résultats supérieurs d'affirmation voulant que la formation ait offert aux membres d'autres ministères des outils efficaces et une meilleure aptitude à travailler avec les membres du public afghan et à la perception selon laquelle l'aptitude à collaborer de manière efficace avec les membres du public afghan s'est améliorée suite à la participation à l'exercice.

Enfin, on a examiné les écarts entre les groupes de répondants relativement à l'efficacité de la formation selon l'affiliation des ministères. En moyenne, les membres du groupe de l'ACDI ont jugé la formation de l'Ex MG plus efficace pour le renforcement de leur aptitude à collaborer avec les membres de la population afghane que ceux du groupe du MAECI (la moyenne du groupe des CIVPOL n'était pas différente de celle des groupes de l'ACDI ou du MAECI). Les groupes de l'ACDI aussi bien que des CIVPOL ont jugé les outils/techniques offerts par l'Ex MG pour travailler avec le public afghan comme sensiblement plus utiles que le groupe du MAECI.

Les résultats de l'analyse des réponses aux questions ouvertes reflètent majoritairement les résultats de l'enquête quantitative. Par exemple, les répondants estimaient dans l'ensemble avoir beaucoup appris de l'exercice de formation en ce qui concerne la structure hiérarchique, la culture et les mécanismes de planification des FC. Ils jugent que la formation les a aidés à établir des relations utiles avec des membres des FC (et d'autres effectifs) avec qui ils auront à collaborer sur le théâtre. Les répondants ont toutefois dit avoir moins appris de l'Ex MG au sujet de la culture et de la population afghanes. Les répondants ont en outre recommandé plusieurs moyens d'améliorer la formation, notamment d'assurer une préparation adéquate des autres ministères à la formation comme telle, d'intégrer dans l'exercice de plus amples renseignements sur les rôles et les responsabilités des autres ministères et sur la culture afghane, et de faire intervenir d'autres ministères plus tôt durant la planification de l'exercice.

Les résultats de cette étude sont examinés du point de vue de leur utilité pour la conception de séances de formation interorganismes, et des pistes de recherches ultérieures sont recommandées.

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# 1 Background

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## 1.1 The Comprehensive Approach (CA) to Operations

Contemporary military expeditionary operations (e.g., in Kosovo, Bosnia, Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and most recently, in Haiti) are increasingly undertaken in response to crises in which governments do not exist, or have become incapable or are uninterested in providing for the basic needs and governance of its people (Patrick & Brown, 2007). Beyond the extreme levels of physical deprivations for local populations that ensue, such states can become settings for asymmetrical activities (Arreguin-Toft, 2001) and havens for terrorist and insurgent groups that strike and then hide from detection within the local populace (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; see also Metz, 2007). Certainly, establishing and maintaining security remains a key in addressing such crises. However, providing humanitarian relief and development opportunities, and supporting the creation and sustainment of good governance, are also critical to addressing the scope and depth of the needs of the people of such states, with the ultimate goal of weaning such states from foreign assistance and intervention (Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Simms, 2008; St-Louis, 2009). The governance and development aspects of these missions involve "winning the peace" [and] can take years and require skills in areas where the military doesn't have a great deal of expertise" (Magnuson, 2009, p. 36). As a result of these new missions, multifaceted, and perhaps more importantly, integrated responses are increasingly seen as critical to ensuring long-term success.

Accordingly, the governments of several Western countries, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations have adopted a holistic or comprehensive approach (CA) to operations (de Coning, 2008; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Olson & Gregorian, 2007). The CA involves many players, including the military and other government departments (OGDs), non-governmental and international organizations, the local population in crisis areas, and the local nascent government. For militaries the CA entails an increasing emphasis on two relatively new features: interagency coordination within a whole of government (WoG) response, and an increased focus on and interaction with the local population.

A CA is assumed to be associated with a variety of benefits, including a foundational unity of purpose; an increase in the situational awareness of all players in a complex operational space; the promotion of timely and accurate information dissemination and sharing; and an increase in the coordination of efforts and activities (Leslie et al., 2008; Simms, 2008). A CA is also expected to reduce instances of duplication of effort and, worse still, instances of working at cross purposes (Wentz, 2006; see also Spence 2002; van der Kloet, 2006). With more situational awareness in the mission area, WoG responses are envisioned to be more agile and responsive to changing needs on the ground. Consequently, the ultimate result is "a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process" (de Coning, 2008, p. 3).

## 1.2 Whole of Government (WoG) Responses Within the CA

Although usually centered on the 3D triad of defence, diplomacy, and development, WoG approaches often also now include other relevant departments and agencies including border security, and correctional, justice, and drug enforcement government agencies. Ideally, the WoG response within the CA would entail a team of different government departmental partners that provide complementary expertise, skills, and resources, in order to accomplish a variety of

mission objectives, thereby developing and providing lasting solutions to complex missions (Leslie et al., 2008).

Within Canada, currently these WoG coordination efforts begin with the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, comprised of all relevant government department ministers including the ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, National Defence, Public Safety, and State (Agriculture). This committee considers the defence, development, diplomatic and security concerns related to Afghanistan at a strategic level and monitors the progress of Canadian priorities in Afghanistan (Canadian Committee on Afghanistan website, 2010). Also reflecting the Government of Canada's WoG strategy is the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)-led Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Stood up in 2005, START's mandate is to synchronize Canada's WoG policy and programs within fragile states and to facilitate coordinated responses to crises (conflicts and natural disasters) requiring whole-of-government action (START website, 2010; see also Abbaszadeh et al., 2008).

The WoG construct has certainly been incorporated within CF concept development and doctrine:

In today's security environment where conflict often involves myriad ethnic, religious, ideological, and material drivers, an ability to bring to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion is increasingly essential to achieving effective results. Such a force would employ diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of operations as needed. (Leslie et al., 2008, p. 11)

Similarly, the recent Canadian Military Doctrine Manual explicitly addresses the WoG approach as the way ahead for operations:

In complex contemporary crises, activities and effects from a wide range of government participants need to be coordinated. The CF contribution to this Canadian Whole of Government (WoG) approach identifies an effects-based philosophy in seeking to stimulate, wherever possible, a cooperative culture and collaborative working environment between government departments and agencies. (Canadian Military Doctrine, 2009, 6-4-5)

The Canadian government's WoG approach to operations continues in theatre. This is particularly evident via the close association between the civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), the senior civilian in charge of development and governance issues in Kandahar province, and the Commander of Task Force Kandahar, who commands all Canadian Forces (CF) assets and leads on security issues. The two positions have equal levels of authority (and have separate chains of command back to Canada), but work very closely together to ensure that the WoG efforts in support of Canadian objectives in Afghanistan are synchronized. Perhaps the best-recognized embodiment of the WoG approach within Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) construct. Similar to the approach of most other nations, the Canadian PRT contains members of the CF, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DFAIT, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and members of other civilian police (CIVPOL) elements (see Abbaszadeh, et al., 2008; Patrick & Brown, 2007). Within the Canadian Battle group Headquarters in Kandahar, a Development and a Political Officer position exist (and other subject matters experts as necessary), in order to maximize opportunities for ready consultation.

### **1.3 Interacting with Local Populations Within a CA**

The CA also involves increased focus on and interactions with local populations, acknowledging that they are the true centre of gravity in complex missions (Aylwin-Foster, 2010; Eyre, 2006; NATO, 2010; Springer, 2010). As Longhurst (2007) has noted, "Whenever a military force [has] deploy[ed] somewhere, whether it is for a peace support operation, for humanitarian assistance, or for warfighting, there is always a civilian dimension to consider" (p. 57). Indeed, winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population is now assumed to be fundamental to gain overall support for the mission (Brown & Adams, 2010; van der Kloet, 2006). Nor is this focus expected to be short-lived. Gizewski and Rostek (2007) have pointed out that future missions, "are likely to be as much about gaining legitimacy among the surrounding populations as engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries" (p. 59). Thus, the effectiveness of the relationships that are established are paramount as local publics can be a valuable resource to understand various aspects of the mission and human terrain including the presence and tactics of insurgents and terrorists (van der Kloet, 2006). Effective relationships also allow for open communication concerning the needs of the local populace. Conversely, poor relationships with the local populations can fundamentally jeopardize a mission and undermine the military's ability to provide support and assistance to the local population, as well as increase a volatile security situation on the ground (van der Kloet, 2006).

Governance and development missions have long been undertaken internationally (Francois, 1995), and have always involved establishing good collaborative relationships with local populations and governments. However, undertaking such activities within the high security threats associated with many recent missions such as is the case in Afghanistan, is a relatively new experience for many government departments. Nonetheless, reflecting both the need to work together in a WoG fashion, as well as the importance in establishing positive relations with local publics for mission effectiveness within the Afghan mission, the governments of many nations, including Canada, build on the existing relationship building strengths that have been the mainstay of governance and development missions within the context of PRTs, comprised of governmental and military partners whose explicit focus is to work with locals to understand their needs and to work to promote measures that may address these needs (Brown & Adams, 2010). The CF is also increasing its emphasis on its civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) capability in order to further ensure good communication and effective working relationships between the deployed CF military component and the local population (Brown & Adams, 2010).

### **1.4 The Challenge of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) to Operations**

The literature to date has ably documented the challenges to effective interagency coordination within comprehensive operations. These include conflicting political agendas, or at least incompatible objectives, organizational structure disparities (hierarchical and centralized vs. flat and decentralized), incompatible financial, knowledge management and communication systems, different approaches to planning and time frames associated with activities, little or no corporate memory, few formal lessons learned mechanisms, poor funding and personnel shortfalls, and "competition for resources and agency profile" (Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 13; see also de Coning, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006; Winslow, 2002). Such philosophical and organizational differences and competition can readily contribute to the development and maintenance of stereotypes, which in

the absence of positive opportunities of interaction can continue to undermine effective collaboration for WoG partners.

Other literature has evocatively described the challenges associated with establishing effective relationships with members of local populations. For instance, the high level of human suffering creates a level of stress which can easily precipitate volatile reactions and misunderstandings. Moreover, the multitude of factors that give rise to a comprehensive mission are difficult to control. Using the example of current operations in Afghanistan, Horn (2006), has noted that although coalition forces must demonstrate that they are capable of providing a secure environment in order to maintain the good will of the local Afghan public, it is difficult if not impossible to stop all acts of violence. For instance, as coalition forces are increasingly becoming the targets of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bomber activity, military personnel must take the necessary actions to protect themselves. At times this may entail driving convoys aggressively down the centre of the road, which forces local traffic to move to the shoulders. Unfortunately, such actions can alienate Afghan locals and ultimately, push them to be more supportive of the insurgents (Horn, 2006). Likewise, if other governmental partners within a CA make promises tied to a certain timeline and are unable to make progress due to a high security threat, they may be seen as ineffective or even renegeing on promises. Similarly if foreign initiatives do not take into account the voice and needs of the local population, even delivering on such initiatives may not be met with the support of the local population.

Despite these real and varied challenges, it is paramount that all players within the comprehensive context focus on building relationships each other. Indeed, the comprehensive "environment is about people and relationships" building understanding, respect, and trust" (Simms 2008, p. 23). At a fundamental level, this requires particular skill and abilities with respect to communication and cultural awareness, including sensitivity to the variety of differences at organizational levels with government partners and at more traditionally cultural levels with the host nation (van der Kloet, 2006). For instance, within Afghanistan, the importance of the tribal system, the focus on honour, and the perceived impact of the betrayal of honour are all critical subtleties that may be lost to those outside of or unfamiliar with the Afghan culture (Brown & Adams, 2010). In the case of both the interagency and public components of the CA, understanding other cultures, social conventions and authority structures is critical to building trust and confidence within the WoG team and with local populations (de Coning, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Okros, 2008, Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006; van der Kloet, 2006; Winslow, 2002). Thus, CF and OGD personnel who possess a higher level of understanding of the various organizational mandates, structures and cultures as well as the culture within the area of operations prior to deployment should be better prepared for the mission and may be able to build better collaborative relationships.

### **1.4.1 Integrated Training**

There have been calls for integrated training opportunities as one way to mitigate at least some of the challenges that can hinder the success of WoG missions. For instance, Jenny (2001) concluded that "Training should be thought of as one of the most important factors for the success of future [interagency] actions. " Indeed, training is arguably the best way to foster understanding " As such, it significantly helps in bridging the culture gap and in fostering mutual respect. In turn, this facilitates a clear division of labour and helps create channels of communication which will prove of great help should any possible misunderstanding arise during the mission" (p. 31). Similar calls for WoG training have been made by members of the military

community (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; Leslie et al., 2008; US Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2006).

Despite these calls, relatively few opportunities currently exist for truly integrated training (see, e.g., Carafano, 2008), and certainly even fewer of these will occur in highly realistic scenario-based training that provides ample opportunity for hands-on experience. One tangible reason for this is that it can be extremely difficult to synchronize the schedules of these diverse and busy agencies (Chief of Review Services, 2007). Another reason is that developing complex, highly realistic live scenario-based training is extremely time, labor, and personnel intensive and the associated costs of such training are often prohibitive.

However, militaries have long recognized the importance of intensive training and of training together to ensure mission success. Moreover militaries have the greatest capacity to undertake training of this nature, given their overall size, as well as the amount of time, money and personnel that are regularly devoted to on-going and mission-specific training. Indeed, not only is the CF fully committed to undertaking highly realistic mission-centric training, in the past few years it has consistently invited Canadian OGD members to these training opportunities (Thompson & Gill, in progress).

The largest of these theatre-specific training opportunities for members of the Canadian WoG team is EXERCISE MAPLE GUARDIAN (EX MG). Conducted over 3 weeks, the exercise recreates an Afghan environment with a goal of providing as realistic an experience as possible for the training audience to practice the skills that they will be called upon to use in their upcoming deployment.

The training area is designed to replicate a 360 degree battle where the enemy can be anywhere at any time or can blend into the local population to hide. Everything from IED attacks to village shuras are practiced to perfect the necessary skills of all soldiers, no matter the rank. □ In addition to all of the military units involved, several other Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Other Government Departments (OGDs) are present in Wainwright practicing their skills. Some of these include the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). With these civilian agencies working along side the military, it makes it much easier to not only to win the war, but to win the hearts and the minds of the locals caught within the fighting. □

(LFWA Training website/Exercise Maple Guardian, 2009)

After Action Reviews (AARs) have routinely collected information concerning the value and effectiveness of EX MG, although the primary focus of these reviews has been lessons learned and exercise refinement from the point of view of the military, who remain the primary training audience of EX MG. As useful as these are, it is also the case that there has been little systematic assessment of such integrated training from the perspective of the other WoG players.

## 2 Objectives of the Current Research

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The current research was designed to complement the existing EX MG AAR, by systematically documenting the perceptions of members of OGDs regarding the EX MG training experience in terms of two key elements of the comprehensive approach to operations: interactions with the military, and interactions with the local Afghan population (i.e., Afghan-Canadians role playing members of the local Afghan population). We began by assessing the average prior experience of the OGD members in terms of their knowledge of the Afghan mission, as well as their prior contact with the CF and the Afghan people. We also wanted to determine the average degree of contact and interaction between the OGD members and the CF and the Afghan role players during the 3 weeks of the exercise, both during the exercise scenarios as well as more informally outside of the scenarios (e.g., during meals). In addition, we sought to determine perceptions of the training effectiveness of EX MG from the perspectives of the OGD participants. Finally, we collected their thoughts as to measures that might improve the EX MG training experience from their point of view. Beyond documenting the average responses across all respondents, we also sought to determine if the experience variables were related to perceived training effectiveness in any systematic way.

Our goal is to provide the results of these analyses that can be provided directly to key CF and OGD directorates in order to inform and influence future training formulation. Beyond this important immediate outcome, the research findings summarized in the current report support the objectives of two applied research projects (ARPs) being conducted within the Organizational Behaviour (OB) Group of the Collaborative Performance and Learning (CPL) Section at Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) □ Toronto: the ARP on Interagency Trust (14ci) and the ARP on JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (12og). Consistent with the mandate of DRDC Toronto, these projects are addressed from a human sciences perspective, specifically the perspectives of social and organizational psychology. The objectives of both of these projects is to understand the key social and organizational issues that affect working in a comprehensive mission, with a goal to improve the ability of decision makers to address issues based on systematic feedback from the people who do the jobs, and to enhance training for these contexts.

## 3 Method

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### 3.1.1 Participants

A total of 59 members of Canadian OGDs, including DFAIT, CIDA, CSC, and various civilian police agencies, including the RCMP, and EX MG attendees. Of these, 40 volunteered to complete a short survey that assessed their perceptions of the training experience afforded them by participation in EX MG, resulting in a participation rate of 68%. Of this sample, 35 indicated that they would be deploying on the next rotation to Afghanistan (4 were not deploying, and 1 did not answer). One individual's responses could not be included due to missing data, leaving an overall sample size of 39. Within the final sample of 39, 14 respondents were affiliated with CIDA, 14 respondents were members of various civilian police (CIVPOL) organizations including the RCMP,<sup>1</sup> and 11 individuals listed their employer as DFAIT. The length of employment in these agencies and organization ranged from less than 2 weeks to 36 years, with a mean length of 8 years. Respondents were deploying to Afghanistan in a variety of roles, including as governmental advisors and in various development, governance, political, policing and mentoring roles at various levels of seniority.

### 3.1.2 Procedure

All participants were approached by a DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) team member and their representative, who were attending EX MG in support of the Battle Group 2021 ARP. After an overview of the intent of the research was provided, OGD volunteers were given a questionnaire package that included a written introduction to the mandate of DRDC Toronto and to the two ARPs being supported by the questionnaire study (Interagency Trust; JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain), as well as the names and contact information of the project managers of the two ARPs. Instructions for questionnaire completion and for return of the completed questionnaire were also provided, and the rights of research participants were outlined.

The questionnaire itself was designed to be anonymous and thus involved unsigned consent procedures. The questionnaire began with standard demographic questions and then included a series of questions designed to assess the OGD participants' training-related experiences during EX MG with respect to interactions with members of the CF and with Afghan role players. A final page of the questionnaire asked for those individuals who might be interested in being contacted to participate in subsequent research and asked them to provide as complete contact information as they were able to provide at the time of EX MG (see Appendix A for Questionnaire). After the questionnaires were returned to the CORA representative they were sent to the investigators at DRDC Toronto, who separated the contact information from the respondent data, which were identified only by a subject number.

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<sup>1</sup> Members of CSC were included in the police category.  
DRDC Toronto TR 2010-079

## 4 Results

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### 4.1 Overview

Descriptive statistics were first computed in order to provide a sense of the level of prior knowledge of the mission, the CF and the Afghan public, the degree of contact with both the CF and the Afghan public prior to EX MG, as well various indices of the OGD members' perceptions of training effectiveness. (In addition, frequencies were also computed for relevant variables; see Appendix B). Correlational analyses were also conducted to determine if there was a relationship between these experiential variables and perceptions of training effectiveness. Finally, to determine whether or not the different OGD agencies had different views of the training, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the effects of Agency affiliation on our indices of perceptions of training effectiveness. As this is an exploratory study, we elected to adopt a relatively liberal alpha level of  $p \leq .10$  (two-tailed) and did not adjust for multiple tests given the small sample sizes for the correlational and ANOVA analyses.

The survey also included open-ended questions that asked OGD participants to expand on their quantitative responses regarding their assessments of the training effectiveness, by providing specific examples of how the training was useful, the specific skills or tools that the training provided to them, and how they felt that the training had impacted on their ability to work with members of the CF and members of the Afghan public in a future deployment. These qualitative responses to the open-ended items in the questionnaire were entered into Word/Excel and then imported into NVivo8 (QSR International, 2009) for qualitative analysis. NVivo 8 is a software package that assists qualitative researchers in analyzing rich, in-depth data sources, by arranging the information, as well as enabling the subsequent sorting and classification of text or interview data, thereby allowing trends to emerge from within the data sets. Major themes that emerged from these open-ended responses and that further illuminate the quantitative results are also presented.

### 4.2 Descriptive Results

#### 4.2.1 Means for Knowledge and Contact Variables

We first present the mean and the standard deviations for the full sample of the experiential variables (i.e., prior knowledge and contact, contact during EX MG scenarios, informal contact outside EX MG scenarios, i.e., chats during meals, etc.) that were assessed in this study for the full sample. The average level of prior knowledge of the Afghan mission was 3.38, suggesting slightly more than "some" degree of prior knowledge of the mission across respondents. As Table 1 indicates, on average, the respondents reported a prior contact level of 2.49 or mid-way between "a little" and "some" prior contact with the CF prior to the exercise. The average level of knowledge of the CF prior to the exercise was slightly higher at 2.69, representing a little less than "some" level of prior knowledge.

The respondents reported a high level of contact with members of the CF during the exercise itself, with the mean across respondents being above 3.84, close to the optimal score of 4 or "a great deal." As might be anticipated, the average amount of contact with the CF outside of the exercise proper was slightly lower than during the exercise, but respondents continued to indicate

having “some” degree of informal contact with the CF outside of the exercise proper, with a mean score of 3.16.

Table 1: Descriptives for Level of Contact and Knowledge Variables

	Full Sample (N=39)						
	The CF		The Afghan Public/Role Players		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>d</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>			
What was your degree of contact with _____ prior to this Maple Guardian exercise?	2.49	1.07	1.82	1.07	3.58	.001	.63
What was your level of knowledge of _____ prior to this Maple Guardian exercise?	2.69	0.83	2.50	0.79	1.13	.265	.24
How much contact did you have with _____ <i>within</i> the Maple Guardian exercise itself?	3.84	0.36	2.35	0.66	13.54	<.001	2.75
How much contact did you have with _____ <i>outside</i> the Maple Guardian exercise (i.e., evenings, meals)	3.16	0.99	1.35	0.57	10.37	<.001	2.21

*M*= Mean, *SD* = Standard Deviation, *t* = t-test, *p* = probability level, *d* = delta

We also asked for ratings of prior experience with the Afghan population generally and with the Afghan role players who participated in EX MG. As Table 1 shows, degree of contact with members of the Afghan population prior to the exercise was fairly limited, with the average degree of prior contact being 1.82 (i.e., close to but still less than a rating of “a little”). Prior level of knowledge concerning the Afghan population was slightly higher, yielding a mean score of 2.50, or midway between “a little” and “some.” Table 1 also reveals that the average degree of contact with the Afghan role players was generally rated slightly above “a little.” With little contact occurring within the exercise proper, it is perhaps not surprising that the amount of more informal contact that occurred between the Afghan role players and OGD members was 1.35, indicating an average rating of just above “no contact.” Finally, as Table 1 also shows, the levels of knowledge and contact with members of the CF were significantly greater than were the levels of knowledge and contact with members of the Afghan public, and this trend was significant in all cases except one. More remarkably, the effect sizes were generally indicative of medium-to-large differences between the means (in standardized units).

#### 4.2.2 Means for Training Effectiveness Variables

Table 2 presents descriptive results concerning the OGD members’ perceptions of the training effectiveness of EX MG. Specifically, we asked participants to indicate the amount that they had

learned, the effectiveness of the tools or skills provided by the training, the usefulness of the training, and the perceived impact of the training on their ability to work effectively with the CF and with members of the Afghan population while on a future deployment.

Table 2: Descriptives for Learning Effectiveness Variables

	Full Sample ( N = 39)						
	The CF		The Afghan Public/Role Players		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>d</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>			
How much have you learned about _____ as a result of this training exercise?	3.64	0.58	2.47	0.97	7.58	<.001	1.43
Has this training provided you with effective tools to work with member(s) of _____?	3.34	0.87	2.11	0.91	7.78	<.001	1.39
How useful was this training experience as preparation for working with _____ during the Afghanistan mission?	3.77	0.54	2.63	1.06	5.87	<.001	1.36
Has this training impacted your ability to work effectively with members of _____?	3.56	0.68	2.11	0.91	7.23	<.001	1.41

*M*= Mean, *SD* = Standard Deviation, *t* = t-test, *p* = probability level, *d* = delta

As Table 2 illustrates, OGD participants were quite positive about the learning opportunity afforded by EX MG in terms of the amount learned about the CF, yielding a mean of 3.64 (close to a rating of [a great deal]). Similar results were evident for ratings of the usefulness of the EX MG training experience as preparation for working with the CF while in Afghanistan (*M* = 3.77). Likewise, OGD members also rated the training as providing them with more than [some] effective tools and skills to work with the CF. Finally, the mean score for the degree to which the training had affected the ability to work with members of the CF was 3.56 out of a possible 4, indicating an average score of between [some] and [a lot].

Table 2 also presents the means and standard deviations associated with OGD member perceptions of the training experience in terms of interacting with members of the Afghan population when they deploy. As Table 2 shows, results here generally were lower than was the case for the usefulness of the training for future interactions with members of the CF. For instance, the average ratings for the amount that OGD participants felt they had learned about the Afghan population as a result of the training was a score of 2.47, or mid-way between a rating of [a little] and [some]. The mean score for the perceived usefulness of the training to assist OGD members in working with the Afghan population was slightly higher at 2.63, but still fell below an average rating of [some]. Finally, average scores were 2.11 for both the perceived degree to which the training had provided the OGD members with effective tools/skills to work with the

Afghan population, and the degree to which the training was perceived to have impacted their ability to work with members of the Afghan population in a future deployment. In both cases, these average scores indicated a response to these questions as only "a little." Indeed, as Table 2 also shows, the levels of training effectiveness in terms of interacting with members of the CF were significantly greater than were the levels of training effectiveness in terms of interacting with members of the Afghan public. More remarkably, the effect sizes were all quite large, suggestive of large differences between the means (in standardized units).

### 4.2.3 Correlational Results

#### 4.2.3.1 The CF

For these analyses, we used both Pearson's  $r$  and Spearman's  $\rho$  (i.e., as some may argue that the data are at best ordinal, given its 4-point rating scale). We investigated whether or not the participants' prior knowledge (about the mission and of the CF) were related to their perception of the training benefits of EX MG. Firstly, as might be anticipated, the higher the participants' prior knowledge about the Afghan mission, the higher the prior knowledge of the CF,  $r = .50, p = .001$ . Further, as indicated in Table 3, higher participants' prior knowledge about the CF was associated with higher prior contact with the CF,  $r = .59, p = .001$ , while level of prior knowledge of the CF was largely unrelated to the other assessed variables. However, using our criteria of  $p = .10$ , the greater the prior knowledge of the CF, the greater the perceived usefulness of EX MG as preparation for working with the CF while deployed,  $r = .25, p = .13^2$ . Perhaps most importantly for the present purposes, the higher the level of contact with the CF within EX MG scenarios, the greater the amount learned about the CF ( $r = .35, p = .03$ ), the more the training was perceived to provide the OGD participants with effective tools and skills to work with the CF ( $r = .50, p < .001$ ), the greater the perceived usefulness of EX MG as preparation for working with the CF while deployed ( $r = .62, p = .001$ ), and the greater the degree to which the EX MG training was perceived to impact the OGD participants' ability to work effectively with members of the CF ( $r = .35, p = .03$ ). Interestingly, higher contact with the CF outside of the EX MG scenarios was only related to the perceived usefulness of the training as preparation for working with the CF while deployed ( $r = .32, p = .05$ ) but was unrelated to other items associated with the perceived effectiveness of the training.

#### 4.2.3.2 The Afghan Public

We also investigated whether or not the participants' prior knowledge might be related to perceived training effectiveness in relation to the Afghan public (once again, we used both Pearson's  $r$  and Spearman's  $\rho$ ). As was the case above, the participants' prior knowledge about the mission was positively related to their prior knowledge of the Afghan people,  $r = .37, p = .02$ . In addition, and not surprisingly, participants' degree of prior knowledge of the Afghan people was positively related to their prior degree of contact with the Afghan people,  $r = .87, p = .001$ , and also to the degree of contact they had with the Afghan role players outside of the EX MG scenarios ( $r = .40, p = .01$ ). The lower their prior knowledge of the Afghan people, the greater the amount that OGD members learned about them as a result of EX MG,  $r = -.35, p = .03$ . Moreover, the higher the rated amount learned about the Afghan people as a result of the EX MG

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<sup>2</sup> This relationship reached statistical significance only when assessed with Spearman's  $\rho$ .

training, the more tools and skills were provided by the training ( $r = .72, p = .001$ ), the higher the rated usefulness of the training as preparation for working with the Afghan people while deployed ( $r = .71, p = .001$ ) and the greater the perceived impact of EX MG on the respondents' ability to work effectively with the Afghan population ( $r = .59, p = .001$ ).

Higher perceived provision of effective tools and skills was again positively related to higher perceptions of the usefulness of the training as preparation for working with the Afghan population during deployment ( $r = .59, p = .001$ ) and to the degree to which the training was perceived to impact the OGD members' ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan population ( $r = .80, p = .001$ ). Finally, the usefulness of the training as preparation for working with the Afghan population during deployment was positively related to the degree to which the training was seen to impact the OGD members' ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan population ( $r = .57, p = .001$ ).

Although in some instances the results of the correlational analyses in relation to the Afghan public replicated the results obtained in relation to the CF, there were also important differences. In particular, level of contact with the Afghan role players during the EX MG scenarios was *not* significantly associated with higher perceptions of training effectiveness as had been the case for the CF, save for the perception of the usefulness of the training experience as preparation for working with members of the Afghan population during deployment ( $r = .35, p = .05$ ). While positively correlated with the amount of contact with the Afghan role players during EX MG scenarios, the other measures of perceived training effectiveness, such as the amount learned about the Afghan people ( $r = .22, ns$ ), the degree to which the training provided skills and tools for the deployment ( $r = .18, ns$ ), and the degree to which the EX MG training impacted their ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan population ( $r = .13, ns$ ), did not reach our probability cutoff criteria. Rather, in this case, reported amount learned about the Afghan people as a result of the exercise was more consistently and positively correlated with perceptions of training effectiveness (provision of effective tools/skills:  $r = .72, p = .001$ ; usefulness of training for working with the Afghan population during deployment:  $r = .71, p = .001$ ; degree of impact of training on ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan population:  $r = .59, p = .001$ ).

Table 3: Pearson's Correlations of CF Contact, Knowledge and EX MG Training Effectiveness Variables (N = 39)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Degree of Prior Contact with the CF	Degree of Prior Knowledge of the CF	Degree of Contact with the CF During EX MG Scenarios	Degree of Contact with the CF Outside of EX MG Scenarios	Amount Learned About the CF as a Result of EX MG	Skills/Tools to Work Effectively with the CF Provided by EX MG	Usefulness of EX MG as Preparation to Work with the CF While Deployed	Impact of EX MG on your Ability to Work Effectively with Members of the CF
1	--	.59 **	.05	.008	-.22	.15	.20	.01
2		--	-.005	.10	0.29	.25	.25	.13
3			--	.21	.35*	.50**	.62**	.35*
4				--	.09	-.10	.32*	.10
5					--	.30	.32*	.26
6						--	.51**	.51**
7							--	.44**

\*\*  $p = .001$ , \*  $p = .05$

Table 4: Pearson's Correlations of Afghan Contact, Knowledge and EX MG Training Effectiveness

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Degree of Prior Contact with the Afghan People	Degree of Prior Knowledge of the Afghan People	Degree of Contact with Afghan Role Players During EX MG Scenarios	Degree of Contact with Afghan Role Players Outside of EX MG Scenarios	Amount Learned About the Afghan People as a Result of EX MG	Skills/Tools to Work Effectively with the Afghan People Provided by EX MG	Usefulness of EX MG as Preparation to Work with the Afghan People While Deployed	Impact of EX MG on your Ability to Work Effectively with Members of the Afghan Population
1	--	.87**	.14	.20*	-.35*	-.14	-.27	-.15
2		--	.29	.40**	-.24	-.03	-.16	-.07
3			--	.26	.22	.18	.35*	.13
4				--	-.02	.21	.14	.17
5					--	.72**	.71**	.59**
6						--	.59**	.80**
7							--	.57**

\*\*  $p = .001$ , \*  $p = .05$

## 4.2.4 Mean Differences Across Agencies

### 4.2.4.1 Members of the CF

Finally, we conducted parametric and nonparametric one-way ANOVAs to test whether or not members from particular OGD agencies had significantly different perceptions of the value of the EX MG training experience. Dependent variables were the amount that the participants learned about the CF as a result of EX MG, its perceived usefulness as preparation for working with the CF, its impact on the ability to work effectively with members of the CF, and the degree to which the EX MG provided the OGD members with effective tools/skills to work with members of the CF. The factor, Agency, with three levels (i.e., CIDA, DFAIT, CIVPOL), was between-subjects. Parametric results indicated that the agencies did not differ significantly with respect to their mean ratings on any of their perceptions of the value of the MG training experience for their future work with the CF while deployed<sup>3</sup>.

### 4.2.4.2 Afghan Public

As above, we conducted parametric and nonparametric one-way ANOVAs to determine whether or not agency affiliation had an effect on the amount that the participants learned about the Afghan public as a result of EX MG, its usefulness as preparation for working with the Afghan public, its impact on the ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan public, and the degree to which EX MG has provided them with effective tools/skills to work with members of the Afghan public. In this case, the parametric ANOVAs revealed main effects of agency affiliation on the impact of EX MG on participants' ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan public and on the degree to which it provided them with effective tools/skills to work with members of the Afghan public,  $F(2, 22.50) = 6.99$ ,  $MSE = 0.84$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .17$  and  $F(2, 36) = 4.87$ ,  $MSE = 0.69$ ,  $p = .013$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .21$ , respectively<sup>4</sup>. Post-hoc (i.e., both parametric and nonparametric) tests showed that members of CIDA ( $n = 14$ ,  $M = 2.84$ ,  $SD = 0.85$ ) perceived a significantly greater impact of the EX MG training on their ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan public than did members of DFAIT ( $n = 11$ ,  $M = 1.85$ ,  $SD = 0.43$ ),  $t(23) = 3.49$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $d = 1.41$ . Means for the CIVPOL group were not significantly different from either the CIDA or the DFAIT groups. Similarly, members of CIDA ( $n = 14$ ,  $M = 2.44$ ,  $SD = 0.75$ ) and of CIVPOL ( $n = 14$ ,  $M = 2.29$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ) perceived EX MG as having provided them with a significantly greater degree of effective tools/skills to work with members of the Afghan public than did members of DFAIT ( $n = 11$ ,  $M = 1.45$ ,  $SD = 0.52$ ),  $t(23) = 3.73$ ,  $p = .001$ ,  $d = 1.50$  and  $t(23) = 2.36$ ,  $p = .027$ ,  $d = 0.95$ , respectively<sup>5</sup>.

## 4.3 Qualitative Results

To analyze the major themes that emerged from the open-ended survey questions, and to further illuminate the quantitative results, NVivo8, a qualitative research software package, was used. Below is a presentation of the major themes that emerged from the open-ended survey responses.

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<sup>3</sup> Nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs resulted in the same findings.

<sup>4</sup> Nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs resulted in the same findings.

<sup>5</sup> Nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests resulted in the same findings.

These responses were provided by participants in relation to survey questions concerning what they felt they had learned as a result of EX MG (e.g., the impact of the training on future collaboration; the tools they gained for more effective collaboration), in terms of working with both the CF and the Afghan public. In addition, respondents also provided recommendations for enhancing EX MG that might better meet the needs of civilians deploying to Afghanistan. Excerpts from these responses are presented for illustrative purposes.

Results of analysis of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. One of the most salient themes that emerged concerned what respondents learned about the CF as a result of EX MG. Overall, respondents felt that they learned a great deal from the training exercise about the CF; 34 respondents, or the vast majority of the sample, wrote comments to this effect, whereas only a single respondent indicated that they had learned little about the CF as a result of the training. In particular, the majority of respondents (26) indicated that the training had taught them about CF organizational structure, including the roles and responsibilities of various CF units (e.g., the role of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), the KPRT (Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team), J5 (Joint Planning), AARs (After Action Reviews), OMLT (Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, POMLT (Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams)), about various CF standard operational practices (SOPs), and about the chain of command. As one respondent commented, "I learned to outreach with CF, to understand their roles and responsibilities. I got the chance to spend time with my team members almost 24 [hours] a day. I am more aware of how to deal with them in [a] difficult situation." Similarly, another respondent wrote: "The exercise has been invaluable in teaching me how the military as an operation functions." One respondent indicated that they had "learned a great deal about CF operations, which has prepared [them] to work as part of an integrated team." In addition to learning about CF organizational structure, but related to this, a number of respondents (12) noted that they learned through the exercise about CF or military organizational culture, including the CF's "way of thinking," the "importance of approaching issues at the correct rank level," and military language. Further, several respondents (10) related what they had learned about CF planning processes (e.g., the Operational Planning Process or OPP) through the exercise. One respondent indicated that they now had a "deeper understanding and respect for the CF and its planning and operational modalities" as a result of the training. Similarly, another respondent reported learning about the "military perspective in regards to planning and operations." In contrast, only 1 respondent (mentioned above) wrote that "A few days in the field with [the] CF is not enough to become proficient with how they operate."

In addition to learning about CF organizational structure, culture, and planning processes, nearly one half of respondents (17) reported that the training had helped them to establish useful relationships with the CF (and other) personnel with whom they would be working in theatre. This was a second key theme that emerged from the survey responses. As one respondent summed it up, "It was useful to meet people I am deploying with." Others shared this view, as reflected in the following comments:

"Face time with [the] military allows for the formation of relationships which will assist in the work environment over in [Afghanistan]."

"The exercise offers the opportunity to meet and build relationships with people in CF/OGD[s] that we expect to work with on the mission -- this is invaluable."

"I feel ready to work with CF members. I look forward to [being] with them once again!"

□ I got to know many of the people I will be working with in the field -- this was great. □

In contrast to the many positive comments reflecting the perceived usefulness of the training in terms of learning about the CF and establishing useful relationships, the open-ended survey responses told a somewhat different story about what respondents felt that they had learned about the Afghan culture and people as a result of EX MG. This represented a third major theme that emerged from the survey responses. Only 12 respondents (slightly less than one third of the sample) offered positive comments about what they had learned of the Afghan culture and people as a result of the exercise. For instance, these respondents reported that they had learned about shuras, maliks, and mullahs; about Afghan customs and attitudes towards women; about local decision-making processes and hierarchy; and about engaging with key leaders. One respondent indicated that the training had taught them to "treat [the] Afghan public respectfully [and] as equals." Another respondent commented that "working with Afghans will be easier now after seeing up front their methods at [shuras], etc." On the other hand, 14 respondents (slightly more than one-third of the sample) indicated that they had learned relatively little about the Afghan culture and people as a result of this training exercise. In particular, several (8) respondents mentioned that they had had little interaction or contact with the Afghan role players, whether during the exercise proper or during informal periods. Some explicitly stated that they would have liked more interaction with the Afghan public, as did the following respondent: "I would [have] liked more contacts with Afghan people; it is a must." Similarly, another stated that there were "[t]oo few Afghan role players to work with inside and outside [the] exercise. No time for quality [outside the box] interaction." Another respondent stated: "While I attended a number of shuras, I learned very little about Afghan tradition and culture from the exercise." Interestingly, and consistent with the quantitative survey results, only 2 of the 12 respondents who offered positive comments regarding what was learned about the Afghan culture and people were respondents from the DFAIT group, whereas a greater number of respondents from the CIVPOL (5) and CIDA (4) group offered positive respondents. On the other hand, of the 14 respondents who felt that the training had taught them relatively little about the Afghan culture and people, one-half of those respondents were from the CIVPOL group (7); 5 were from the DFAIT group, but (consistent with the quantitative results) none were from the CIDA group. As noted above, many of the negative comments focused on the lack of contact or interaction with the Afghan role players throughout the EX MG; this was noted by 6 of the 7 respondents from the CIVPOL group who offered such negative comments.

In addition to the major themes presented above, the majority of survey respondents (33) also recommended ways to enhance EX MG as a training exercise. Certainly, the dominant theme that emerged here (reflected in the comments of 14 participants) concerned the need to ensure adequate preparation of OGDs for the EX MG training itself. One respondent noted, for instance, the need to have a brief on "how the mission is structured PRIOR [to] the exercise." Similarly, another respondent suggested the need to have "[t]raining for the training," arguing that "it would be useful to receive briefings on how a military operation functions and the roles/responsibilities of the various units. This would provide us with more time to focus on the exercise." Echoing this, another respondent stated: "We very much require training prior to arriving to the EX -- including CF 101, structure of [the] PRT, as well as our own roles and responsibilities." In the same vein, some respondents noted the importance of having cultural training (presumably about the Afghan culture) prior to EX MG, as did the following respondent: "The Maple Guardian exercise would have been more practical if we had received cultural training beforehand [and] then [we] would have had a better understanding of what to expect." Another respondent offered this: "The CF train for months prior to MG and have detailed briefings on what MG will entail, whereas civilians mostly go in blind. As a result, we are not able to fully contribute and

engage with Afghan [and] CF colleagues. More briefings and pre-MG transparency would make it more useful. □

Of note, some participants focused on the need to ensure adequate preparation for *both* CF and OGD trainees: □More pre-exercise prep for military [and] civilians about each other's roles, mandate, objectives and protocol.□ This relates to a second important theme (expressed in the comments of 9 respondents) that emerged from the recommendations of respondents: the importance of incorporating more information about OGDs (in addition to information about the CF) into EX MG. As one respondent wrote, □CF Personnel should be better informed on the actual roles of the civilian elements being deployed to Afghanistan; [this] will enhance the integration process.□ Indeed, while one respondent □[s]aw excellent integration with military,□ another respondent remarked: □We need mechanisms to bridge the military way towards greater understanding [and] integration of civilian ways which are not that bad.□<sup>6</sup> Along the same lines, another respondent felt that □[m]ost [CF members] are completely unfamiliar with [the] duties, tasks and responsibilities of civilian Whole of Government partners, i.e., CIDA, DFAIT, CSC and CIVPOL.□ Similarly, one respondent suggested the need for the CF to learn more about CIVPOL (e.g., through □proper briefing of the CF of our tasks [and] responsibilities as CIVPOL□); another respondent suggested the need for the □PRT [to] visit Ottawa in [the] early part of [the] road to high readiness to learn about CIDA and DFAIT;□ and another respondent suggested that □[c]apabilities briefings by civilian agencies to CF personnel (i.e., DFAIT, CIVPOL, CIDA, CSC)□ might be useful. Furthermore, 3 respondents suggested the need to better integrate OGDs into the planning process for EX MG (e.g., for J5 and J35), or to include them at an earlier stage of the planning process, in order to □ensure respect/accuracy of their doctrine, function(s) [and] practice in Ex Scenarios.□

In addition to incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs into EX MG, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage of the exercise planning process, a few respondents (4) recommended incorporating more information about Afghan culture and history into the training exercise, as did the following respondent, who suggested the need for □more cultural and historical training -- particularly of the last 25 years of Afghanistan and the history of the Canadian mission.□ Similarly, another respondent suggested the need for □[m]ore training on the Afghan culture and more interaction with Afghan interpreters.□

One final theme (reflected in the recommendation of 4 respondents) concerned the technical aspects of EX MG. Suggestions here involved the need to have □[e]quipment (comms) prepared and available at the beginning of exercise.□ Similarly, another respondent suggested that □[w]orkstations [and] USB drives should be set up/ready at the very beginning of the Ex so that we can do a better job.□ Regarding the realism of the training, only a few respondents (3) made comments. Two respondents felt that it was realistic, as did the following respondent: □It has provided me with an effective and realistic exercise that has enabled me to practice my future role prior to deployment and learn from my mistakes without effect.□ However, one respondent remarked: "It give[s] us an idea of what we will live but the reality is always different, we all know it is a scenario and some are not real actors, if they were professionals it would be different.□ Finally, in regard to the WoG approach, the following respondent wrote of the exercise: □[It] helps me [a] great deal to understand [r]oles and responsibilities of both components, [c]ivilian and military within our One Team One Mission umbrella.□

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<sup>6</sup> This comment, noted by a tenth participant, was not offered as a □training recommendation□ per se, but was provided as an example of what was learned from the exercise. It is included here for its relevance.

In summary, the results of analysis of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. Overall, respondents felt that they learned a great deal from the training exercise about the CF's organizational structure, culture and planning processes, and that the training helped them to establish useful relationships with the CF (and other) personnel with whom they would be working in theatre. However, in comparison, respondents reported learning less about the Afghan culture and people from EX MG. In addition, respondents recommended several ways to enhance the training, in terms of ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training itself, incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs as well as Afghan culture and history into the training exercise, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process.

## 5 Discussion

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The complexity associated with the majority of contemporary missions has led the Canadian government to increasingly adopt a CA to operations embodied, in part, by a coordinated WoG response. Ideally, this approach affords greater opportunities for coordination and collaboration, ultimately increasing operational effectiveness and responsiveness. Despite the promise of the CA, recent reviews have documented the range of challenges to effective interagency coordination. One of the consistent themes in terms of interventions that will ameliorate at least some of the challenges to CA is the establishment of interagency training for WoG team partners.

Understanding this requirement both for themselves and for OGDs, and having the greatest capacity for large-scale training, the CF has opened a number of their training exercises to members of OGDs. Perhaps the largest of these training opportunities is EX MG, which originally was developed to provide as realistic a mission-specific training experience as possible for personnel about to deploy to OP ATHENA. To this end, deployment scenarios are updated regularly to reflect the evolving environment in the Afghan theatre. While EX MG remains the final confirmation training for CF Battle Groups that are about to deploy to Afghanistan under OP ATHENA, the CF has made continuing efforts to invite Canadian OGD members to contribute to the development of the scenarios within EX MG and to attend the exercise in order to provide a realistic venue for interagency training for the Canadian WoG team.

AARs are routinely conducted as an integral part of EX MG, and the results of these are used to inform further training. To complement this existing approach, the objective of the current research was to begin to more systematically quantify the assessment of training experiences from the perspective of members of OGDs who attended the CF pre-deployment training exercise. We wanted to begin by documenting the level of knowledge concerning the Afghan mission that OGD participants had prior to attending the EX MG exercise, as well as their prior contact with members of the CF and members of the Afghan people. We also wanted to determine the amount of contact that took place between the OGD members and members of the CF and the Afghan role players during the actual EX MG scenarios, as well as the degree of less formal contact with both groups, for instance through informal chats, during meals, and so on.

Additional questions explored the OGD members' perceptions of training effectiveness. Here we assessed the OGD members' perceptions of the amount learned, the usefulness of the training, the tools or skills learned, and the impact of the training on OGD members' ability to perform while deployed. Each of these questions was posed with respect to the CF and the Afghan public. We also sought to determine if prior knowledge and contact, as well as the amount of contact during EX MG, were related to perceptions of training effectiveness. Finally, we sought to determine if the perceptions of training effectiveness differed for OGD members from different agencies. We felt that quantifying the answers to these questions would be of value to assist EX MG trainers to further tailor EX MG scenarios. As well, these results may be of some use to senior staff within the Canadian OGD community in terms of future training requirements and activities. To that end, we developed a short pilot questionnaire that was administered to OGD attendees at a recent EX MG, understanding that the number and scope of the questions we could ask would be limited by the high intensity of the training schedule, the relatively small number of OGD participants, as well as the nature of the EX MG training experience (we will return to this issue below).

Initial descriptive results indicated that, on average, respondents reported some prior knowledge of the Afghan mission. OGD participants also indicated slightly to a little prior knowledge of, and

contact with, members of the CF. Perhaps not surprisingly, the reported average level of prior contact with members of the Afghan public was quite limited and the mean score for the degree of prior knowledge of the Afghan people was slightly higher, reflecting a score midway between a little and some prior knowledge.

The reported degree of contact between the OGD participants and members of the CF during the three weeks of EX MG was overall quite positive. For instance, OGD members reported a mean score for degree of contact with the CF during the exercise scenarios proper that was close to the optimal possible score of "a great deal" of contact. Although the degree of informal contact with the CF was less than was the case during the exercise itself, the average for this variable still indicated that some contact occurred informally as well. Average scores across the sample for the degree of contact with the Afghan role players were not as high as those seen for contact with the CF. Specifically, the mean score for contact with the Afghan role players during the exercise scenarios indicated slightly more than "a little" contact. Informal contact yielded a lower mean score, in comparison, indicating almost no contact with the Afghan role players outside the exercise specifically. Importantly, statistical tests revealed that the OGD members experienced significantly greater contact with the CF members than with the Afghan role players.

The effectiveness of the learning experience afforded by EX MG with respect to the CF was rated quite positively by the OGD members. For instance, in general they indicated that they had learned a great deal about the CF and rated the experience as being useful as preparation for working with the CF when deployed. On average, OGD members indicated that the training had provided them with some effective tools and skills to work with the military, and that EX MG had between some and a lot of effect on their ability to work with members of the CF.

Given the lower degree of prior contact with and knowledge of the Afghan people, and the reported lower amount of contact with the Afghan role players during EX MG and informally, it is not surprising that the average ratings for the training effectiveness of EX MG were also lower in this respect. More specifically, the average rating for the amount learned was midway between a little and some. Similar results were also evident for the mean perceived usefulness of EX MG in terms of working with members of the Afghan public while deployed. The respondents indicated that on average they had received only a few tools and that EX MG had had only a little impact on their ability to interact with members of the Afghan population while deployed. Finally, the OGD members' ratings of the effectiveness of the EX MG training in terms of future interactions with the CF while deployed were significantly higher than were the ratings of training effectiveness of EX MG with respect to future interactions with members of the local Afghan population when deployed.

We also sought to determine if the experiential variables were associated with the perceived training effectiveness of EX MG. Our results showed a trend toward higher prior knowledge of the CF being associated with higher ratings of the usefulness of the EX MG training in terms of future work with the CF. Moreover, results showed that the higher the level of contact with the CF during EX MG scenarios, the greater the amount learned about the CF and the greater the perceived usefulness of the training, in terms of providing OGD participants with effective tools and skills to work with the CF, preparing OGD members for working with the CF while deployed, and impacting OGD participants' ability to work effectively with members of the CF. In contrast, level of contact with the Afghan role players during the EX MG scenarios was generally *not* significantly associated with higher perceptions of training effectiveness.

Finally, we sought to determine whether or not there were significant differences in perceptions of EX MG training effectiveness in terms of working with the CF or the Afghan public while

deployed based upon agency affiliation of the participants. Here, results showed that the exercise was perceived as equally valuable on all training effectiveness measures related to the CF for the CIDA, DFAIT and CIVPOL groups. Results differed, however, for perceptions of training effectiveness with respect to working with members of the Afghan public while deployed, with statistically significant group differences emerging with respect to perceptions of the degree to which EX MG provided the OGD members with effective tools to work with the Afghan public while deployed and the OGD members' perceived ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan population when deployed. Specifically, members of CIDA rated the EX MG training as more effective in terms of their ability to work with members of the Afghan population during deployment than did members of DFAIT, while members of the CIVPOL group did not differ significantly from either the CIDA or DFAIT groups. Finally, both the CIDA and the CIVPOL groups had significantly higher ratings of the effectiveness of the tools/skills to work with the Afghan public that were provided by the EX MG training than did the DFAIT group.

Analyses of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. Respondents, overall, indicated that they learned a great deal from the training exercise about the CF's organizational structure, culture and planning processes, and that the training helped them to establish useful relationships with the CF and other personnel with whom they would be working in theatre. However, respondents reported learning comparatively less about the Afghan culture and people from EX MG. This theme was particularly apparent among members of the CIVPOL group and DFAIT groups and, from the ratings data, does not appear to be related to having a great deal of prior knowledge of the Afghan public. Respondents also recommended several ways to enhance the training, in terms of ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training itself, incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs as well as Afghan culture into the training exercise, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process.

## **5.1 Future Research**

These results begin to investigate the issue of the perceived effectiveness of a realistic pre-deployment training exercise to address the interagency training needs of Canadian WoG partners. We recognize that this work, while having value, still represents only a first step in terms of understanding these needs and that much more work needs to be done to develop a more complete understanding of the potential of interagency training in facilitating WoG effectiveness. First, while perceptions of training effectiveness represent one marker of training effectiveness, other behavioural measures of training effectiveness, such as performance during scenarios, would also be highly compelling. Measures such as these would certainly be a challenge to obtain within EX MG, as it is conducted based on a "free play" approach. At EX MG, course instructors do set out particular scenarios within the context of the three-week exercise; however, consistent with the complexity and dynamic nature of the Afghan mission, not all scenarios unfold in exactly the same way, but rather often evolve based on the unique decisions and responses of the primary training audience. These decisions and actions in turn can affect the development of the next scenario within the exercise. Moreover, the senior commanders can elect to have specific scenario injections that will be unique to the primary training audience's needs and requirements. Thus, EX MG cannot provide the level of control or replication within scenarios that would normally be the case in, for example, a short-duration simulation or laboratory-based study. While not an issue from a training perspective, and, indeed, the flexibility inherent in free play maximizes the training experience and benefits, the non-standardized nature of the exercise does limit the extent to which the same set of behavioural outcomes measures can be used across exercises and samples. Nonetheless, future work might be devoted to determining what

behavioural or performance-associated metrics that address WoG effectiveness can be gleaned from EX MG. For instance, observer-controllers and mentors are a crucial part of the MG training environment. If they complete standard assessments as part of their role, and if these can be accessed, then these assessments may provide additional sources of valuable dependent variables. At the very least, the information contained in such assessments could be used to further inform findings based upon the perceptions of the training audience.

Another issue, however, relates to the development of data that will address the predictive validity of the ratings obtained within the context of EX MG. To address this issue, future research should strive to incorporate longitudinal designs, for instance, by obtaining ratings of training effectiveness from OGD members both prior to and while they are deployed, as well as in post-deployment. A further issue relates more to the WoG paradigm itself. Specifically, the current research surveyed OGD members concerning the amount of contact with and training effectiveness regarding CF members and Afghan role players. However, this design does not incorporate the perceptions of CF members in relation to the development of their knowledge and understanding of their OGD partners (or the Afghan public). As indicated by the open-ended responses to the survey questions in the present study, OGD members would like to see more knowledge of the roles of OGDs integrated into the EX MG training design, so that CF personnel could have a better understanding of these roles. Future work in this area should well consider the addition of CF perceptions to further inform and elucidate this WoG training. Finally, collaborative research with other nations that also provide similar WoG training should also be pursued.

Note as well that the correlational techniques utilized in the current study only test for linear relationships between variables of interest and more complex associations such as curvilinear relationships will not be evident using such techniques. For instance, it could be the case that having no prior knowledge of the groups (the CF or the Afghan public) may require too steep a learning curve to make the exercise maximally valuable, whereas having a high level of prior knowledge might make much of the training lessons redundant with previous knowledge, also leading to a reduction in perceived training effectiveness. Indeed, it may be that some optimal moderate level of prior knowledge regarding the CF and the Afghan public would make the EX MG training experience understandable enough to result in optimal training value. Still, the results seen here provide a good starting point and are deserving of replication. Subsequent studies with larger samples may allow for the testing of alternative hypotheses concerning the relationships among these variables, as well as the testing of more complex associations between variables, the testing of mediating factors such as previous deployment experience, and the testing of other outcome variables such as the development of trust.

In particular, it would be interesting to see whether or not the overall differences obtained between the training experience with respect to working with the CF and working with members of the Afghan population consistently appear. If so, this may suggest that additional work might need to be undertaken with regard to this aspect of the training, for instance, by adding opportunities for OGD trainees to interact with the Afghan role players during the three weeks, certainly within the exercise scenarios, and also, if feasible, by providing additional opportunities to interact informally with the Afghan role players. Moreover, it would be valuable to determine whether or not the differences that emerged with respect to the perceptions of the DFAIT trainees are also evident in subsequent studies. If so, this may suggest that perhaps the training experience, possibly in terms of the specific scenarios used, is of less relevance to the DFAIT members attending EX MG compared to other groups and that other scenario elements might be more central to DFAIT needs.

Finally, in addition to incorporating the perspectives of CF personnel regarding the effectiveness of this pre-deployment training exercise, future research on EX MG (and other WoG training experiences) should also seek to incorporate the perspectives of the local Afghan public (most likely, Afghan role players). By obtaining a range of different perspectives, and by including the perspectives of all the salient players within a comprehensive approach, a more complete understanding of the effectiveness of training programs relevant to such an approach may be gleaned.

## **5.2 Summary and Conclusion**

The results of this research suggest that OGD members who attended EX MG found the experience to be of value to them in terms of what they learned about the CF, working with the CF while deployed, the skills and tools that the training provided them to work with members of the CF, and their ability to work with members of the CF in their upcoming deployment. Results regarding perceptions of the training experience as it related to working with members of the Afghan population were not as positive, however. Specifically, not only were the mean ratings of the degree of contact with the Afghan role players lower than was the case regarding contact with the CF, so were the OGD members' ratings of the perceived training effectiveness of EX MG as it relates to their future work with members of the Afghan population while deployed. In particular, the mean ratings provided by members of the DFAIT group were significantly lower in this respect than was the case on average for the CIDA group. The results of the open-ended survey questions largely supported these findings. In addition, OGD members recommended enhancements to the training exercise (e.g., ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training, incorporating more information about OGDs and Afghan culture and history into the training, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process). Although representing only a starting point, the present results do begin to illuminate important aspects of this interagency training experience from the perspective of Canadian OGD WoG partners. Future work should further this line of investigation and include the perspectives of CF personnel as well as the local public regarding the effectiveness of such training.

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## List of acronyms

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ANOVA	Analysis of variance
AARs	After Action Reviews
ARPs	Applied Research Projects
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police Organizations
CORA	Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
CPL	Collaborative Performance & Learning
CSC	Correctional Service of Canada
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research & Development Canada
EX MG	Exercise Maple Guardian
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public
M	Mean
MSE	Mean Squared Error
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
OB	Organizational Behaviour
OGDs	Other Government Departments
OPP	Operational Planning Procedures
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RoCK	Representative of Canada in Kandahar
SD	Standard Deviation
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
START	Stabilization and Reconstructions Task Force
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WoG	Whole of Government

## Appendix A - Questionnaire

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DRDC Toronto is a human sciences laboratory within Defence Research and Development Canada, an Agency within DND. Two new research projects look specifically at the human aspects of working within the comprehensive approach to operations. One explores issues related to the development and maintenance of Interagency Trust. The other explores the dynamics of interacting with different aspects of the public domain, including the local population, the media, etc.

The objectives of both of these projects is to understand the key social and organizational issues that affect working in a comprehensive mission, with a goal to improve the ability of decision makers to address issues based on systematic feedback from the people who do the jobs, and to improve training for these contexts. With this in mind we wondered whether you might answer a few questions related directly to your training experience related to Ex Maple Guardian and a few questions that describe yourself in general terms.

<b>Please Note:</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Your answers are confidential and your participation is completely voluntary.</li><li>2. Your answers will be assigned a unique identification number. Your name will be kept confidential and separate from the data file.</li><li>3. Only authorized researchers will have access to the data and only group results are presented.</li><li>4. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. People may have differing experiences and we are interested in what your experiences are.</li><li>5. We appreciate your input and ask that you be as honest as possible so that our information accurately reflects your experience and the things that are important to you.</li></ol> <p><b>~PLEASE FEEL FREE TO KEEP THIS FIRST SHEET FOR YOUR FUTURE INFORMATION~</b></p>
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1. What agency are you working for & in what capacity (e.g., DFAIT/ Civpol)?

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2. How long have you been on your current deployment?

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3. How many times have you deployed in a WoG mission 0 1 2 3 4/>

4. How many times have you deployed to Afghanistan? 0 1 2 3 4/>

5. What was your level of knowledge about the mission in Afghanistan prior to Maple Guardian?

- None             A little             Some             A great deal

Please answer each of the following questions with respect to the CF and the Afghan public or Afghan role players at Maple Guardian:	The CF 1- None/Nothing/Not at all 2- A Little 3- Some/Somewhat 4- A Great Deal	The Afghan Public: 1- None/Nothing/Not at all 2- A Little 3- Some/Somewhat 4- A Great Deal
1. What was your degree of contact with _____ prior to this Maple Guardian exercise?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
2. What was your level of knowledge of _____ prior to this Maple Guardian exercise?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
3. How much contact did you have with _____ during this Maple Guardian exercise?		
a. During the exercise specifically?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
b. Outside of the exercise (e.g. informal conversations)?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
4. How much have you learned about _____ as a result of this training exercise?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4

Can you give examples of what you have learned?			
5. How useful was this training experience as preparation for working with the ____ during the Afghanistan mission?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	⇒	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
6. Has this training impacted your ability to work effectively with members of ____ ?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	⇒	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
Please explain.			
7. Has this training provided you with effective tools to work with member(s) of ____ ?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	⇒	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
Please explain.			
8. Would you have any training recommendations that might better meet the needs of civilians deploying to Afghanistan?			

In order to have the best quality of information possible, we need people like you who would be willing to be contacted in the future by a member of our research team about your ongoing experiences in the context of a comprehensive approach to operations. This will provide valuable information to better inform decision makers about the important issues arising in these operations.

If you are willing to be contacted, please fill out as much of the information below as you know at this point in time. Note that indicating your name does not commit you to future participation, only that you are willing to be contacted in the future. You are, of course, free to decline to participate at any point in time.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Permanent Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Email Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Would you be willing to be contacted while you are deployed?    Yes    No

Deployment Contact Info (including e-mail if possible):

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

*Thank you for your time. Please feel free to contact us with any questions and comments.*

Sincerely,  
Dr. Megan M. Thompson, Ph.D.  
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DRDC Toronto  
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## Appendix B □ Frequencies

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### Level of Prior Contact with/Knowledge of

#### CF

A majority (60%) of the sample (i.e., 24 respondents) reported having □little□ or □no□ prior contact with the military whereas 16 respondents (40%) reported □some□ or □a great deal□ of contact with the CF prior to EX MG. Similarly, 37.5% of the sample (17 respondents) reported □no□ or □little□ knowledge of the CF prior to MG, with 57% (23 respondents) reporting □some□ or □a great deal□ of knowledge of the CF prior to MG (see Table 2).

#### Afghan Public

Notably the number reporting no prior contact with the Afghan Public was 22 respondents or 55% of the OGD sample, with 8 (20%) reporting □a little□ prior contact, and only 4 (10.3%) and 5 (12.5%) of the sample reporting □some□ or □a great deal□ of contact prior to the MG exercise, respectively. Levels of prior knowledge of the Afghan public prior to MG were largely consistent with responses to the prior contact question in that 25 respondents (i.e., 60% of the sample) reported either □no□ (1) or □a little□ (24) prior knowledge of the Afghan public. Only 14 respondents (35%) reported □some□ (8/20.5%) or □a great deal□ (6/15%) of knowledge concerning the Afghan public prior to MG.

### Level of Contact with During MG

#### CF

The majority of respondents reported □a great deal□ of contact with the CF during the exercise proper. Indeed 33 (or 82.5% of) respondents indicated having □a great deal□ of contact, with 6 (15%) reporting □some□ level of contact. No OGD members reported having □no□ or only □a little□ contact with the military during the exercise.

a. CF - During this exercise specifically?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Some/Somewhat	6	15.0	15.4	15.4
	A Great Deal	33	82.5	84.6	100.0
	Total	39	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	2.5		
	Total	40	100.0		

#### Afghan Role Players

Results of similar analyses concerning interactions with the Afghan public revealed a different pattern of results for OGD EX MG trainees. For instance, a total of 23 respondents (57.5%) had either "no contact" (4 or 10%) or only "a little" contact (19/47%) with the Afghan role players during the exercise. Although 14 respondents (35%) reported having "some" degree of contact with the Afghan role players, only 1 (2.5%) person reported having "a great deal" of contact with the Afghan role players during the exercise.

**a. AF - During this exercise specifically?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	4	10.0	10.5	10.5
	A Little	19	47.5	50.0	60.5
	Some/Somewhat	14	35.0	36.8	97.4
	A Great Deal	1	2.5	2.6	100.0
	Total	38	95.0	100.0	
Missing	System	2	5.0		
	Total	40	100.0		

**Level of Contact outside of MG**

**CF**

As the training audience for EX MG are together 24 hours a day, we also wanted to determine if there was contact with the CF outside of specific exercise activities (i.e., via informal conversations). The respondents also reported a fair amount of contact with the CF outside of exercise activities, with 19 OGD members (47.5%) reporting "a great deal" of this sort of informal contact, and a further 12 (30%) reporting "some" degree of informal interaction with members of the CF during EX MG. A further 8 OGD personnel reported only "a little" (4) or "no" interactions occurring outside of the MG exercise.

**b. CF - Outside of the exercise? (e.g., informal conversations)?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
--	--	-----------	---------	---------------	--------------------

Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	4	10.0	10.3	10.3
	A Little	4	10.0	10.3	20.5
	Some/Somewhat	12	30.0	30.8	51.3
	A Great Deal	19	47.5	48.7	100.0
	Total	39	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	2.5		
	Total	40	100.0		

### Afghan Role Players

Not surprisingly, results indicated that even less informal contacts outside of the exercise proper occurred between members of the OGDs and the Afghan role players than was the case during the exercise or with members of the CF. Fully 27 individuals (67.5%) reported "no" informal contact with the Afghan role players outside of the exercise, with a further 9 (22.5%) reporting only "a little" contact occurring outside the exercise. Only 2 individuals (5%) reported "some" contact and no one reported having "a great deal" of contact with the Afghan role players outside of the exercise.

#### b. Af - Outside of the exercise? (e.g., informal conversations)?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	27	67.5	71.1	71.1
	A Little	9	22.5	23.7	94.7
	Some/Somewhat	2	5.0	5.3	100.0
	Total	38	95.0	100.0	
Missing	System	2	5.0		
	Total	40	100.0		

### Amount Learned as a Result of this Training Exercise.

#### CF

The vast majority of OGD participants indicated that they had learned "a great deal" about the CF (28/70%) as a result of the training experience. A further 10 (25%) indicated that they had learned

□somewhat□more about the CF as a result of the exercise, with only 2 individuals (5%) indicating that they had learned only □a little□about the CF as a result of the exercise.

**How much have you learned about the CF as a result of this training exercise?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid A Little	2	5.0	5.0	5.0
Some/Somewhat	10	25.0	25.0	30.0
A Great Deal	28	70.0	70.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	

**Afghan Public**

Consistent with the results concerning degree or level of interaction with Afghan role players within the training exercise, the largest percentage of our respondents reported that they learned only □a little□(15 or 37.5%) about the Afghan public as a result of this training experience. Nonetheless, 18 respondents (45%) indicated that they had learned either □somewhat□(11/27.5%) or □a great deal□ (7/17.5%) about the Afghanistan population via their participation in this exercise.

**How much have you learned about the Afghan public as a result of this training exercise?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid None/Nothing/Not at all	6	15.0	15.4	15.4
A Little	15	37.5	38.5	53.8
Some/Somewhat	11	27.5	28.2	82.1
A Great Deal	7	17.5	17.9	100.0
Total	39	97.5	100.0	
Missing System	1	2.5		
Total	40	100.0		

**Usefulness of MG as preparation for Afghan Mission**

**Working with the CF in Afghanistan**

**How useful was this training experience as preparation for working with the CF during the Afghanistan mission?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid A Little	2	5.0	5.0	5.0
Some/Somewhat	5	12.5	12.5	17.5
A Great Deal	33	82.5	82.5	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	

A vast majority of OGD participants (33 respondents, or 82.5%) reported that the MG training opportunity had "a great deal" of usefulness as preparation for working with the CF during the upcoming mission. A further 5 (12.5%) indicated that the training was "somewhat" useful in this regard; only 2 individuals indicated that the experience had only "a little" use (5%), and no participants reported that the training was not at all useful.

### **Working with the Afghan Public**

The pattern of results concerning the perceived usefulness of the training differed with respect to respondents' perceptions of working with the Afghan public during their upcoming mission. There was a bi-modal distribution here, with 12 (30%) reporting that the experience had "a great deal" of usefulness in terms of working with Afghans during their upcoming mission, but an almost equal number of respondents (13/32.5%) reporting the experience to be only "a little" useful in this respect. A further 8 (20%) reported the experience to be "somewhat" useful and 6 individuals (15%) indicated that the experience was "not at all" useful.

**How useful was this training experience as preparation for working with the Afghan Public during the Afghanistan mission?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	6	15.0	15.4	15.4
	A Little	13	32.5	33.3	48.7
	Some/Somewhat	8	20.0	20.5	69.2
	A Great Deal	12	30.0	30.8	100.0
	Total	39	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	2.5		
	Total	40	100.0		

**Degree to which MG has impacted on your ability to work effectively**

**With members of the CF**

**Has this training impacted your ability to work effectively with members of the CF?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	1	2.5	2.5	2.5
	A Little	1	2.5	2.5	5.0
	Some/Somewhat	12	30.0	30.0	35.0
	A Great Deal	26	65.0	65.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	

We also asked participants about the degree to which the MG training impacted their perceived ability to work effectively with members of the CF. Again results here were overwhelmingly positive, with the vast majority of respondents reporting that the training had either "somewhat" (12/30%) or "a great deal" (26/65%) of impact. Only 2 people reported that the training had only "a little" or "no impact on their ability to work effectively with members of the CF.

**With Members of the Afghan Public**

Consistent with the pattern that was seen previously, the largest percentage of OGD respondents rated EX MG as having "a little" training value in terms of their ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan public (17/45.9%). The remaining responses were about equally split across the remaining categories of "no" (7/17.5%), "some" (6/16.2%) and "a great deal" (7/17.5%) of impact on their ability to interact with members of the Afghan public.

**Has this training impacted your ability to work effectively with members of the Afghan Public?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	7	17.5	18.9	18.9
	A Little	17	42.5	45.9	64.9
	Some/Somewhat	6	15.0	16.2	81.1
	A Great Deal	7	17.5	18.9	100.0
	Total	37	92.5	100.0	
Missing	System	3	7.5		
	Total	40	100.0		

**Degree to which MG has provided you with effective tools to work**

**With Members of the CF**

Respondents were extremely positive in terms of their responses to this question. The majority of respondents (22/55%) reported that the MG training had provided them with "a great deal" of effective tools to work with the CF in Afghanistan. A further 11 (27.5%) indicated that the training had provided them with "some" effective tools with which to work with the CF in Afghanistan. Only 6 respondents indicated that the MG training had provided them with only "a little" (4/10%) or "no" (2/5%) effective tools.

**Has this training provided you with effective tools to work with member(s) of the CF?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	2	5.0	5.1	5.1
	A Little	4	10.0	10.3	15.4
	Some/Somewhat	11	27.5	28.2	43.6
	A Great Deal	22	55.0	56.4	100.0
	Total	39	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	2.5		
	Total	40	100.0		

**With the Afghan Public**

In contrast to the above, 70% of respondents indicated that the MG training had provided them with **no** (10/25%) or only **a little** (18/45%) in terms of effective tools to work effectively with members of the Afghan public while deployed on their upcoming mission. Only 25% of respondents indicated that the training experience provided them with **some** (6/15%) or **a great deal** (4/10%) of effective tools to work with the Afghan public.

**Has this training provided you with effective tools to work with member(s) of the Afghan Public?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None/Nothing/Not at all	10	25.0	26.3	26.3
	A Little	18	45.0	47.4	73.7
	Some/Somewhat	6	15.0	15.8	89.5
	A Great Deal	4	10.0	10.5	100.0
	Total	38	95.0	100.0	
Missing	System	2	5.0		
	Total	40	100.0		

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<b>4. AUTHORS</b> <small>(First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.)</small>  <b>M.M. Thompson ; A.R. Febraro ; A-R. Blais</b>		
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- (U) 39 members of Other Government Departments (OGDs) including 14 from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 11 from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and 14 members of civilian police organizations (CIVPOL), completed a short questionnaire assessing their perceptions of the training effectiveness of Exercise Maple Guardian (EX MG), a large, realistic Canadian Forces (CF) pre-deployment training exercise. Members of OGDs rated the value of the training quite positively in terms of the degree of contact they had with members of the CF during the exercise and as preparation to work with the CF when deployed. Average ratings were less favourable with respect to the degree of contact with the Afghan role players during the exercise, and in terms of the resultant perceived value of the training as preparation to work with members of the Afghan population while deployed. Analyses revealed that CIDA, DFAIT and CIVPOL members rated the training effectiveness equally in terms of working with the CF. However, the CIDA group rated the training as being significantly more useful in terms of their ability to work with members of the Afghan population than did the DFAIT group (the CIVPOL group did not differ from either of the other two groups). Both the CIDA and the CIVPOL groups indicated that the training had provided them with more effective tools/skills for working with the Afghan public than did the DFAIT group. Results of analysis of the open-ended survey responses largely echoed the quantitative survey findings. In addition, respondents recommended several ways to enhance the training, in terms of ensuring adequate preparation of OGDs for the training itself, incorporating more information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs as well as Afghan culture into the training exercise, and engaging OGDs at an earlier stage in the exercise planning process.
- (U) Trente-neuf membres d'autres ministères, dont 14 de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), 11 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI) et 14 membres d'organismes civils de police (CIVPOL) ont rempli un court questionnaire servant à évaluer leurs perceptions de l'efficacité de la formation qu'ils ont reçue durant l'exercice Maple Guardian (Ex MG), un exercice réaliste d'envergure des Forces canadiennes (FC) préalable à un déploiement en mission. Les membres d'autres ministères ont jugé la formation très valable du point de vue des contacts qu'ils ont eus avec les militaires durant l'exercice et de leur préparation à la collaboration avec les FC durant le déploiement. La moyenne des résultats est moins favorable quant aux contacts établis avec les intervenants afghans durant l'exercice et quant à la valeur perçue de la formation pour se préparer à collaborer avec les membres de la population afghane durant le déploiement. Il ressort des analyses que les membres de l'ACDI, du MAECI et des CIVPOL ont tous également trouvé la formation efficace pour renforcer la collaboration avec les FC. Pour sa part, le groupe de l'ACDI a classé la formation comme beaucoup plus utile pour l'amélioration de son aptitude à travailler avec les membres de la population afghane que le groupe du MAECI (le groupe des CIVPOL a obtenu des résultats semblables aux deux autres groupes). Les groupes de l'ACDI et des CIVPOL ont jugé que la formation leur a offert des outils/techniques plus efficaces pour travailler avec le public afghan que le groupe du MAECI. Les résultats de l'analyse des réponses aux questions ouvertes reflètent majoritairement les résultats de l'enquête quantitative. Les répondants ont en outre recommandé plusieurs moyens d'améliorer la formation, par exemple bien préparer les autres ministères à la formation comme telle, intégrer à l'exercice de plus amples renseignements sur les rôles et les responsabilités

des autres ministères de même que sur la culture afghane, et faire intervenir les autres ministères plus tôt durant la planification de l'exercice.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) Interagency training; Comprehensive Operations; government partners; perceptions

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