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Scenario consolidation for C2 urban operations S&T validation

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Abstract

The design of command and control systems is a complex task. A critical prerequisite for conducting meaningful research and development (R&D) of command and control (C2) systems is an understanding of the context in which users must perform their tasks – at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels – and for a given scenario. This document is the first in a series of documents that carefully define context for multiple C2 perspectives by proposing a realistic and relevant urban operations scenario. The scenario proposed herein supports robust experimental analyses of decision support systems for command and control design and, more specifically, the information fusion processes underlying decision support systems. The core of the proposed scenario is based on “Urban Challenge 2005” – originally developed for a Kingston Staff College (Canada) exercise – and enriched over time through international collaboration and a NATO Research and Technology (RTO) study. The enriched scenario is presented in an integrated context, and describes Military Strikes in Atlantis. This document proposes a realistic and relevant scenario useful for testing concepts and prototypes for decision support command and control systems.

Résumé

La conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle n'est pas une tâche facile. Un des prérequis souhaitables est la compréhension du contexte d'utilisation de tels systèmes, tant sur les plans stratégique, opérationnel, que tactique. Ce document se veut être un point de départ – le premier d'une série – vers l'atteinte de ce prérequis. Cet objectif est étudié sous l'angle d'une proposition de scénario significatif. Un scénario peut offrir sous certains aspects les avantages d'un laboratoire expérimental, puisqu'il est une représentation simplifiée de la réalité. Le contexte particulier duquel ce document émane est la conception de systèmes d'aide à la décision pour le commandement et contrôle, plus spécifiquement ses aspects liés à la fusion d'informations. Ce document présente un scénario existant, dont la forme originale a été enrichie. Le cœur de ce scénario a été proposé initialement pour un exercice du Collège d'État-major de Kingston (Canada). Il a été enrichi par la suite par un groupe de recherche de l'OTAN. Ce document présente le scénario initial, les ajouts apportés par le groupe de l'OTAN, et une intégration sommaire dans le cadre du scénario Military Strikes in Atlantis. L'objectif de ce document consiste donc à proposer un scénario significatif pour valider et tester des concepts et/ou prototypes de systèmes d'aide à la décision lors de la conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle.

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Executive summary

Scenario consolidation for C2 urban operations S&T validation

L. Pigeon, É. Bossé ; DRDC-Valcartier TR 2009-215; Defence R&D Canada – Valcartier; December 2010.

The design of command and control systems is a complex task. The design of C2 systems requires the consideration of multiple interrelated factors and constraints which do not lend themselves to simple analyses. This document focuses on the definition of a scenario that allows for the stressful testing of C2 concepts and prototypes, in a realistic laboratory environment where individual system components can be effectively evaluated. Key to testing C2 concepts and prototypes is a good understanding of lessons-learned and likely future operations. A critical prerequisite for conducting meaningful research and development (R&D) of command and control (C2) systems is an understanding of the context in which users must perform their tasks for a given scenario: at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels

This document is the first in a series of documents that carefully define context for multiple C2 perspectives through a proposed urban operations scenario. The scenario proposed is realistic and relevant. Urban operations typically require well-coordinated efforts across multiple echelons of command to achieve the goals of the mission. The scenario in this document allows for the stressful testing of C2 concepts and prototypes in a realistic laboratory environment where individual contributions to effective C2 can be evaluated in a controlled fashion. Every care has been taken to define urban operations and vignettes where the context is representative of likely classes of future events. The context of the urban operations scenario herein is tailored to enable the evaluation of the information fusion processes that support decision support systems for command and control (C2). An enhanced knowledge of the effects of information fusion processes on the design of C2 systems will inform the identification of future R&D objectives, as well as future system concepts.

The core of the proposed scenario is based on “Urban Challenge 2005” – originally developed for a Kingston Staff College (Canada) exercise - and enriched over time through international collaboration and a NATO Research and Technology (RTO) study. The enriched scenario describes Military Strikes in Atlantis.. The resultant scenario and context supports the urban operations experimental work that has been assigned to the TTCP-C3I-TP1 working group. A forthcoming document will present an integration of both scenarios. The integration of these two scenarios will require careful attention to contextual coherence between the two. The authors of this document envision a third document that will include two more scenarios from the Joint Forces Command Urban Operations Office: “Counterinsurgency in Port Lewis, 2015-2021” and “The attack on Qabus 2027”.

Sommaire

Scenario consolidation for C2 urban operations S&T validation

L. Pigeon, É. Bossé ; RDDC-Valcartier TR 2009-215; R et D pour la défense Canada – Valcartier; décembre 2010.

La conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle n'est pas une tâche facile. Elle nécessite la mise en commun de plusieurs facteurs, impliquant souvent des contraintes difficiles à évaluer. Afin de tester des concepts et/ou des prototypes, il devient nécessaire d'avoir de bonnes connaissances des leçons apprises, ainsi que des opérations actuelles et futures. Un des prérequis souhaitables est la compréhension du cadre d'utilisation de tels systèmes, tant sur les plans stratégique, opérationnel, que tactique. Pour les intervenants en R et D, il est capital de comprendre le cadre d'application lié au problème étudié ainsi que les potentiels utilisateurs et leurs tâches dans un tel cadre.

Ce document se veut être un point de départ – premier d'une série – vers l'atteinte de ce pré requis. Cet objectif est étudié sous l'angle d'une proposition d'un scénario significatif. Le scénario retenu traite d'une opération urbaine. Ces opérations sont reconnues comme étant des cas aux limites. Les vignettes retenues se veulent être représentatives de la complexité d'un tel contexte. Un scénario peut offrir sous certains aspects les avantages d'un laboratoire expérimental puisqu'il est une représentation simplifiée de la réalité. Le contexte spécifique duquel ce document émane est la conception de systèmes d'aide à la décision pour le commandement et contrôle, plus spécifiquement ses aspects liés à la fusion d'informations. Le scénario se veut ainsi être un outil qui permet aux intervenants de la communauté de la R&D d'avoir une image du contexte d'application de leurs concepts et ainsi de valider ces derniers.

Ce document présente un scénario existant, dont la forme originale a été enrichie. Le cœur de ce scénario a été proposé originalement pour un exercice du Collège d'État Major de Kingston (Canada) tenu en 2002 et intitulé « Urban Challenge 2025 ». Il a été enrichi par la suite par un groupe de recherche RTO de l'OTAN, surtout par l'ajout de détails sur les aspects tactiques des vignettes originales. Ce document présente le scénario original, les ajouts apportés par le groupe de l'OTAN, et une intégration sommaire dans le contexte du scénario Military Strikes in Atlantis (Frappes Militaires à Atlantis). Un objectif spécifique consiste ici à offrir une dimension « opérations urbaines » au contexte expérimental du groupe TTCP-C3I-TP1 qui traite des aspects de fusion d'information. Un deuxième document suivant celui-ci est envisagé pour présenter l'intégration des deux scénarios précédents. Ceci implique une recherche plus élaborée de cohérence entre les deux scénarios. Certaines mentions sont aussi faites par rapport à deux autres scénarios proposés par Joint Forces Command – Urban Operations Office. Le premier est intitulé “Counterinsurgency in Port Lewis, 2015-2021” (Contre-insurgence à Port Lewis, 2015-2021). Le second est intitulé “The attack on Qabus 2027” (Une attaque sur Qabus en 2027). L'objectif de ce document consiste donc à proposer un scénario significatif pour valider et tester des concepts et/ou prototypes de systèmes d'aide à la décision lors de la conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle.

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1. Introduction and Context

The design of command and control systems is a complex task. A critical prerequisite for conducting meaningful research and development (R&D) of command and control (C2) systems is an understanding of the context in which users must perform their tasks – at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels – and for a given scenario. Key to testing C2 concepts and prototypes is a good understanding of lessons-learned and likely future operations. Risks inherent in a simulated scenario include that of finding a local maxima solution – due to an overly simplistic representation of reality – when the goal was to find a global maxima. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that the Services, Functional Components, and civil authorities (e.g. Army, Navy, air, and civil authorities) use different taxonomies and document their knowledge in multiple dimensions: including at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

A critical prerequisite for conducting meaningful research and development (R&D) of command and control (C2) systems is an understanding of the context in which users must perform their tasks for a given scenario: at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The principles of systems engineering may be useful to address issues that the scenario cannot. In addition, the fields of human-factors and cognitive performance are necessary to consider during R&D. The goal in combining the strengths of these various disciplines is to achieve a scenario that most closely represents reality, and allows the R&D community to design, experiment, validate, and benchmark C2 system designs

This document is the first in a series of documents that carefully define a relevant and realistic scenario to support R&D. The scenario is intended to stress command and control capabilities between and between units and across multiple echelons of command. Urban operations typically require well-coordinated and well-synchronized efforts across multiple echelons of command and between tactical units.[2]. Global urbanization over the next 20 years will create an increasingly demanding operational environment for military forces. These mission areas are likely to take on increased importance, as future adversaries choose to fight in urban areas to offset the tactical advantages of a more sophisticated force. It will not be possible to ignore the challenges created by this multi-dimensional battlespace, including the presence of non-combatants and complex civilian infrastructures. An army must be capable of fighting and winning throughout the phases of conflict and in the environment where decisive action is required. Any force that cannot operate effectively in both urban and other battlespaces will be severely restricted in its future responsiveness [3]. Historical and contemporary operations in urban environments (e.g. Stalingrad, Hue, Mogadishu, Grozny, Bagdad, Kandahar) are considered by many to be as complex as those of traditional warfare. Urban operations require the integration and coordination of military activities with a wide range of resources across the spectrum of civil organizations, NGOs, and the media, and at all level of command.

The scenario proposed herein seeks to produce as realistic a view of urban operations as is possible in a laboratory environment. Great care has been used in defining the urban operations context. The vignettes are based on problems that have either been encountered, or are considered representative of a class of problems that may be encountered in the future.

The problems embedded in the scenario contain a wide variety of interests to both peaceful actors and hostile actors. These include, for example, territory, infrastructure, population control, navigation, crime, terrorist or suicide bomber detection, interception and engagement.

Although the proposed scenario could be used to support multiple R&D goals, the context is specifically tailored to support the experimentation and exploration of decision support systems for command and control (C2) design; specifically, information fusion processes. Focusing the context on the end goal is important. This approach is consistent with the following advice [4] “Before you set out on a journey, you should know your destination”. An enhanced knowledge of the effects of information fusion processes on the design of C2 systems will inform the identification of future R&D objectives, as well as future system concepts.

The main body of the scenario was developed for a Kingston Staff College (Canada) exercise held in 2002 entitled “Urban Challenge 2025” [3]. Thanks are offered here to the military and civilian staffs of the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) – now the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs (DLCD). The scenario was subsequently enriched over time through international collaboration and a NATO Research and Technology (RTO) study. The scenario is also useful as a tool to help defense and civilian actors understand the complexities of urban operations. Improvements from various communities (e.g. military, scientific) have contributed greatly to enriching the scenario.

The DLSC also produced a scenario entitled “Crisis in Zefra” [5] that the authors plan to address in a subsequent document. The scenario was exercised for a week by staff and collaborators. While the exercise resulted in good observations, the scenario did not adequately represent realistic urban operation from the strategic to tactical levels. It was later enriched by a NATO Research and Technology (RTO) study that provided detail to the original “Urban Challenge” tactical level vignettes [6][7]. To define vignettes enrichments, military personnel and scientists wargamed the original “Urban Challenge” scenario in more specific contexts. These contexts were limited to three mission types: crisis response operations, defensive operations, and offensive operations. All of these were developed and exercised from a C2 perspective.

In this document, the original scenario and its NATO enrichments are presented together and integrated in the following scenario context – Military Strikes in Atlantis [8]. This was done to provide the urban operations dimension to the experimental context of the TTCP-C3I-TP1 working group. However, the integration is limited to an insertion of the urban scenario on the fictitious map created for the “Military Strikes in Atlantis” scenario.

A subsequent document to this one will present an integration of both scenarios. Integrating these two scenarios will require forcing a coherence between the two scenarios: i.e. aligning actors, locations, and time-history such that a single context results. This will meet the objectives of potential users such as the TTCP-C3I-TP1.

The authors of this document envision a third document that will include two more scenarios from the Joint Forces Command Urban Operations Office: “Counterinsurgency in Port Lewis, 2015-2021” and “The attack on Qabus 2027”. The first scenario addresses a domestic counterinsurgency context precipitated by an outbreak of bacterial meningitis and influenza.

The second, entitled “The attack on Qabus 2027”, addresses an overseas urban operations context. As previously mentioned, the series of documents produced by these authors are a ‘work in progress’ and they are open to input regarding the addition of new features and vignettes. The only constraint on contributions is that they be consistent with the purpose of this document and help in the R&D processes. In this vein, inputs made by the Canadian Force Exercise Reaction Royale (held in the Quebec City area from April 30th to May 7th 2008) might be included in future iterations of this report. Specifically, CBRNE events and domestic coalition operations may be added.

1.1 Objective of this document

The goal of this document is to propose a relevant and realistic urban operations scenario that allows for the testing of concepts and prototypes of decision support systems for command and control design.

1.2 Plan of this document

Section two of this document presents the main body of the scenario “Urban Challenge 2025” developed by DLSC. Section three presents general orders given for the mission associated with the scenario. Sections four, five, and six present three vignettes from the original scenario including details added by NATO-RTO-IST-046. Section seven presents a succinct integration – a first step - of the “Urban Challenge 2025” scenario to the context of the scenario “Atlantis”. Finally, the conclusion presents a review of the objectives and a roadmap for future work in this area.

2. Urban Challenge 2025 - Scenario

This section presents the main body of the scenario “Urban Challenge 2025” developed by DLSC. The text and figures were selected, gathered and organized by the authors of this report. The main body of the text is from the documents associated with the exercise referred as Future Army Experiment: Operations in the Urban Battlespace [3].

The scenario is based on a hypothetical NATO Coalition response to political instability in a nation on the brink of civil war. The Canadian Contingent (Brigade Group) is initially tasked to conduct stability operations. However the situation deteriorates due to breakaway factions supported by a rogue military force, who seek to impose their will through a campaign of terror. The NATO Coalition role will be to restore order by neutralizing the military capability of the factions threatening regional stability. Within the Coalition’s campaign plan, the Canadian Contingent is tasked with an area that includes a portion of the region’s capital. The scenario use detailed aspects of Kingston’s (CA) geography in a larger fictional setting.

The scenario is comprised of three separate vignettes not connected in time, but which together provide a framework for examining urban operations. The first vignette is a Crisis Response Operation wherein the CA Brigade Group develops its concept of operation for the initial deployment inside the capital. The second and third vignettes are defensive and offensive operations that include Battle Group level concepts of operations. Each vignette shares the same socio-political, geographic and military background. However, they are not interrelated in terms of game play. The intent is to frame a problem, develop a plan to solve the problem, and examine solutions and methods to gather insights.

2.1 Situation

Political ownership of BATUMI Province, an area predominantly occupied by ethnic-Bowl inhabitants, has for decades been an issue of major concern to two nations claiming its ownership: the mostly ethnic-Zack ALLIANCE OF CAUCASUS STATES (ACS) and the mostly ethnic-Caspian state of MAZURA. The ACS is a powerful socialist state known as a destabilizing influence in the Caspian region. MAZURA, once forcibly retained as a member state of the ACS, gained its independence at the turn of the 20th Century after numerous battles for independence.

BATUMI had been a province of MAZURA until 1940, when the ACS seized control of the province in a quest to expand its territory, influence and economic growth prospects. Although many inhabitants of BATUMI were indifferent to the take-over at the time, most living in the province now resent ACS repression of Bowl and Caspian ethnic groups living in BATUMI. Economic growth and social progress made in MAZURA, one of NATO’s newest members, have embittered the Batumis, who recognize no solution to the economic hardships in the ACS and BATUMI. Economic difficulties, social repression and political turmoil in the ACS have heightened interest among Batumis that the province could someday re-unite with MAZURA so that they could share the economic, social and political benefits enjoyed by Mazurans.

The ACS, for its part, has never achieved the benefits it had expected to gain through seizure and occupation of BATUMI. Expectations of economic growth in the province never materialized, and the ACS suffered diplomatic isolation because of its at-times heavy-handed approach to repressing civil liberties and social unrest in BATUMI. The ACS leadership and security forces have also had to contend with the security problem posed by guerrillas of the Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) and Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) who have attacked ACS military and economic targets in BATUMI and elsewhere within the ACS. Many analysts and commentators have speculated that the ACS has been compelled to take drastic actions within BATUMI to placate Zack nationalists in BATUMI who point to historical ties between the province and the capital of the ACS.

The presence and diverse political desires of the Bowl ethnic group along the MAZURA-ACS southern border are of concern to the political leadership in both the ACS and MAZURA. Most Bowl faction leaders in the ACS want to unite their territory with MAZURA, while some Bowl factions in MAZURA want to form an autonomous state with the Bowl minority of the ACS. Both desires serve to complicate discovery of diplomatic solutions for the region, and pose threats to regional stability and security forces operating in the area.

In 2015, NATO Coalition forces defeated an ACS invasion of southern MAZURA. Resulting refugee and displaced person movement, coupled with the continued threat of ACS military hostility and instability in BATUMI, led NATO in 2016 to extend the mandate of its forces in MAZURA until 2026.

As the economic situation in the ACS and BATUMI continued to deteriorate, tensions related to BATUMI heightened. Anti-Zack violence by both the BLB and BFF against ACS economic and military targets intensified. This was growing membership in the Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP) and Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF), both formed in 2017 to promote Zack nationalist ambitions and retention of BATUMI as a province within the ACS.

ACS repression of the ethnic Bowl and Caspian minority groups in BATUMI during the period 2018-2023 resulted in international condemnation of violence in BATUMI and the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions: UNSCR 1353/2023; and UNSCR 1359/2023, which imposed economic sanctions on the ACS.

Economic decline, diplomatic isolation and UN sanctions led to the election of moderates in 2024 to replace radicals in the ACS federal government. On 28 December 2024, at the Toronto Conference, the ACS leadership agreed to conduct a phased withdrawal of their security forces from BATUMI during 2025 with a view to returning control of the province to MAZURA on 1 October 2025. In exchange for the loss of territory, the ACS leadership saw this as an opportunity to secure monetary loans; make a goodwill gesture to the UN and international community; end BLB/BFF terrorist attacks in ACS cities; have sanctions lifted; obtain Western economic aid; restore domestic confidence in the ACS government; and avoid a second military confrontation with, and defeat by, NATO forces.

Zack nationalists, particularly Zack loyalists of the ZLP in BATUMI, and in the Army and Air Force, vowed that BATUMI would remain part of the ACS. A campaign of intimidation against ethnic minorities in BATUMI, condemned by UNSCR 1368/2024, culminated in massive defections of Zack soldiers from 5 (ACS) Motor Rifle Division when it began the

first phase of its announced withdrawal from BATUMI in March 2025. Deserters and members of the ZLF seized armories throughout BATUMI, compelling the ACS to abandon plans for a phased withdrawal of troops. Although several companies of Special Forces troops may have been directed to remain in BATUMI to assist the ZLF, all other ACS security forces elements were ordered to immediately depart the province.

On 20 April 2025, in response to UNSCR 1377/2025, NATO troops stationed in MAZURA were given a new mission to “restore stability in BATUMI,” where a small contingent of UN Military Observers and Field Service employees serving as the UN Mission in BATUMI (UNMIB) were providing reports to the UN Secretary General and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian support. On 27 April 2025, Canadian troops deployed to Batumigrad, BATUMI’s provincial capital where Zack nationalists, some Zack student and union leaders, and armed Zack deserters stood opposed to NATO involvement in BATUMI affairs. BMB and BFF leaders welcomed the imminent arrival of NATO troops, but stated that Bowl political and guerrilla leaders would “set the agenda.”

2.2 History

2.2.1 Regional Entities

Batumi is a province of the ALLIANCE OF CAUCASUS STATES (ACS). Largely ethnic Bowl, the province borders on the mostly ethnic Caspian state of Mazura and other provinces within the mostly ethnic Zack ACS.



Figure 1: Ethnic area – Batumi Province

2.2.2 Recent Developments.

Batumi had been a province of Mazura until 1940, when the ACS seized control of the province in a quest to expand its territory, influence and economic growth prospects. Although many inhabitants of Batumi were indifferent to the take-over at the time, most living in the province now resent ACS repression of Bowl and Caspian ethnic groups living in Batumi. Economic growth and social progress made in Mazura have embittered the Batumis, who recognise no solution to the economic hardships in the ACS and Batumi. Economic difficulties, social repression and political turmoil in the ACS have heightened interest among most Batumis that political re-unification with Mazura can be achieved so that those in Batumi Province can share the economic, social and political benefits enjoyed by Mazurans.

The ACS, for its part, never achieved the benefits it had anticipated gaining through seizure and occupation of Batumi. Expectations of economic growth in the province never materialized, and the ACS suffered diplomatic isolation because of its at times heavy-handed approach to repressing civil liberties and social unrest in Batumi. The ACS leadership and security forces have also had to contend with the security problem posed by guerrillas of the Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) and Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) who have attacked ACS military and economic targets in Batumi and elsewhere within the ACS. Many analysts and commentators have speculated that the ACS leadership was compelled to take drastic actions within Batumi to placate ethnic Zack nationalists in Batumi who point to historical ties between the province and the capital of the ACS.

The presence and diverse political desires of the Bowl ethnic group along the Mazura-ACS southern border are of concern to the political leadership in both the ACS and Mazura. Most Bowl faction leaders in the ACS want to unite their territory with Mazura, while some Bowl factions in Mazura want to form an autonomous state with the Bowl minority of the ACS. Both desires serve to complicate discovery of diplomatic solutions for the region, and pose threats to regional stability and security forces operating in the area.

In 2015, an ACS invasion of southern Mazura was defeated by NATO Coalition forces. Resulting refugee and displaced person movement, coupled with the continued threat of ACS military hostility and instability in Batumi, led NATO in 2016 to extend the mandate of its forces in Mazura until 2026.

As the economic situation in the ACS and Batumi continued to deteriorate, tensions related to Batumi's desire for separation from the ACS heightened. Anti-Zack violence by both the BLB and BFF against ACS economic and military targets intensified. There was also growing membership in the Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP) and Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF), both formed in 2017 to promote Zack nationalist ambitions and retention of Batumi as a province within the ACS.

ACS repression of the ethnic Bowl and Caspian minority groups in Batumi during the period 2018-2023 resulted in international condemnation of violence in Batumi and the passage of two UN Security Council Resolutions: UNSCR 1353/2023 and UNSCR 1359/2023.

Economic decline, diplomatic isolation and UN sanctions led to the election of moderates in 2024 to replace radicals in the ACS federal government. On 28 December 2024, at the Toronto Conference, the ACS leadership agreed to conduct a phased withdrawal of their security forces from Batumi during 2025 with a view to returning control of the province to Mazura on 1 October 2025. In exchange for the loss of territory, the ACS leadership saw this as an opportunity to do the following:

- a. secure monetary loans;
- b. make a goodwill gesture to the UN and international community;
- c. end BLB/BFF terrorist attacks in ACS cities;
- d. have sanctions lifted;
- e. obtain Western economic aid;
- f. restore domestic confidence in the ACS government; and
- g. avoid a second military confrontation with, and almost certain defeat by, NATO forces.

Ethnic Zack nationalists in the ZLP, ZLF, ACS Army and Air Force vowed that Batumi would remain part of the ACS. A campaign of intimidation against ethnic minorities in Batumi, condemned by UNSCR 1368/2024, culminated in massive defections of Zack soldiers from 5 (ACS) Motor Rifle Division (MRD) when the MRD began the first phase of its announced withdrawal from Batumi in March 2025. Deserters and members of the ZLF seized armories throughout Batumi, compelling the ACS to abandon plans for a phased withdrawal of troops. Although several companies of Special Forces troops may have been directed to remain in Batumi to assist the ZLF, all other ACS security forces elements (less the Batumi Provincial Police) were ordered to immediately depart the province.

On 20 April 2025, in response to UNSCR 1377/2025, NATO troops stationed in Mazura were ordered to “restore stability in Batumi,” where a small contingent of UN Military Observers and Field Service employees serving as the UN Mission in BATUMI (UNMIB) were providing reports to the UN Secretary General and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian support. On 27 April 2025, Canadian troops deployed to Batumigrad, Batumi’s provincial capital where Zack nationalists, some Zack student and union leaders, and armed Zack deserters stood opposed to NATO involvement in Batumi affairs. Leaders of the BLB, BFF and Bowl Democratic Party welcomed the imminent arrival of NATO troops, but stated that ethnic Bowl political and guerrilla leaders would “set the agenda” and serve as the “approving” authority for NATO activities in the ethnic Bowl homeland.

2.3 Demography

2.3.1 Population

Batumi Province has a population of one million. 75 percent are ethnic Bowl, 20 percent are ethnic Caspian and 5 percent are ethnic Zack. The capital city, Batumigrad, has a population of 600,000, equally divided among the three major ethnic groups.

2.3.2 Religion

Religion is an important part in the lives of the people of Batumi Province, even more so given the political turbulence and violence witnessed during the past number of years. Although religion is not a divisive issue, church membership is considered important. Church leaders have deplored the violence, but most often have not called upon their congregations to endeavor to resolve issues peacefully or live harmoniously in a multi-confessional society. There are three major religious groups in the Province. Most ethnic Caspians are Presbyterian, while the majority of ethnic Zack are Prus Orthodox and most ethnic Bowl are Roman Catholic. In Batumigrad, each major religion has a religious centre of importance that symbolizes ethnic identity and serves as a community focal point:

- a. St George Cathedral (ethnic Zack);
- b. St Mary's Cathedral (ethnic Bowl); and
- c. St Andrew's Church (ethnic Caspian).

2.3.3 Education

The literacy rate is very high among adults, and education is compulsory until the age of 16. Primary and secondary schools, although funded by the government, are associated with one of the three religions in the province. The University of Batumigrad has a good reputation as an institution of higher learning; there are three post-secondary education institutions in the city of Sudplass that cater to technical and high technology learning.

2.3.4 Political Parties

The five political parties exercising most influence over events in Batumi Province are as follows:

- a. ACS - Alliance Federation Party (AFP). The AFP, led by President Andres Miklos, was elected to power in 2024. Although a socialist party, the views and policies of its leader and members are less extreme than those found in the National Maintenance Party, the chief political rival of the AFP. President Miklos has endeavoured to restore international relations and revitalize the economy of the ACS. The Governor of Batumi Province, Petr Meshden, and the mayors of all major urban areas are members of the ruling AFP. The AFP holds the majority of seats in the Batumi Provincial Legislature, with the remainder held by members of the NMP;

b. ACS - National Maintenance Party (NMP). The NMP, led by former President Basil Presents, was soundly defeated in the 2024 national election. This radical party had alienated the West, along with ethnic minorities living within the ACS. Its extreme socialist economic policies contributed to the economic turmoil now experienced throughout the ACS, including Batumi Province. As a consequence of the party's desires to annex eastern Mazura, President Presents embroiled the ACS in a losing military conflict against NATO forces in 2015;

c. ACS (Bowl Province) - Bowl Democratic Party (BDP). This fledgling party, formed in 2016, champions the rights of the ethnic Bowl population in Batumi Province. A wing has also formed in southeastern Mazura. Although it lacks political experience, it is very popular among the ethnic Bowl population in Batumi Province. Members of the party, led by Stan Bellish, have voiced their intention to compete in Mazuran-supervised provincial elections in 2026;

d. ACS (Bowl Province) - Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP). Maria Cliver leads the ZLP, formed in 2017 to champion the rights of the ethnic Zack population in Batumi Province. The party has unofficial but close ties with the Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF), also formed in 2017 in reaction to growing demands among ethnic Bowl and ethnic Caspian citizens residing in Batumi Province for the province to once again be part of Mazura;

e. Mazura - Mazuran National Coalition Party (MNCP). This party is the governing party. Led by Karla Tenfold, the party has been in power since 2011. It is democratic liberal in its leaning, and has voiced its desire to have Batumi Province become a province of Mazura; and

f. Mazura – Mazuran United Party (MUP). Members of this party now form the official opposition. This party is also supportive of efforts to restore Mazuran sovereignty over Batumi Province.

2.3.5 Key Leaders

The following list of personalities, whose profiles are presented separately, are influential. More details about personalities could be found in annex A.

a. ACS:

- (1) AFP Leader and President ACS – Andres Miklos;
- (2) NMP Leader and Former President ACS – Basil P. Presents; and
- (3) Chairman of Defence – Konstantine Havlich;

b. Batumi Province:

- (1) Governor - Petre Meshden;
- (2) Commander 5 (ACS) MRD (withdrawn) - Major-General C. Harnott;

- (3) BDP Leader – Stan Bellish;
- (4) ZLP Leader – Maria Cliver;
- (5) BPP Chief – Inspector Commander J.G. Clousseault;
- (6) ZLF Leader – unknown;
- (7) Senior Ranking Deserter – Colonel B. Hatterna; and
- (8) UNMIB Commander – Colonel N. Maki (Fin);

c. Batumigrad:

- (1) Mayor - Katherine Cooperly;
- (2) Chief of Police (BPP) - Captain Julien Jareski
- (3) ZLF Company Commander (Batumigrad) – Henders Listnom;
- (4) BLB Leader and Batumigrad City Commander – Karter Wahl; and
- (5) BFF Leader and Batumigrad City Commander – Patrik Ayotte;

d. Mazura:

- (1) MNCP Leader and Prime Minister – Karla Tenfold;
- (2) MUP Leader and Leader of the Opposition – Daryl Fasting; and
- (3) Minister of State for Defence – Sendra Arkan.

2.3.6 Crime

An increase in petty crime and offences that are more serious has accompanied the deteriorating standard of living situation in Batumi Province. Even the imposition of labor/punishment camps and some harsh penalties by the previous government failed to deter citizens from breaking laws. The number and frequency of serious offences have increased during the past three years because of growing political unrest, economic problems, unemployment, a growing trade in narcotics, corruption in the judicial and political system at national and local level, and the growing influence of the black market and organized crime.

Easy access to small arms encourages selection of violence as the option of choice in conflict resolution or economic gain.

2.3.7 Legal System

The ACS legal system, characterized as fairly progressive, uses a tribunal of three judges rather than a jury system to determine guilt and sentence offenders. Advocates plead for their clients; the public and media have a constitutional right to attend all trials. Death sentences, even though rare, can be given for serious crimes, such as murder and treason. Otherwise, punishments and sentences are generally consistent with those found in Canada. There is one level of appeal, handling both convictions and sentences. Courts and jails are located in all urban areas, with the Provincial Prison, Provincial Court and Court of Appeal all located in Batumigrad. In an effort to win international favor and quell domestic unrest, the newly elected government has closed punishment camps established under the former regime. There is a clear delineation of responsibilities for the judicial, police and political functions in the legal system.

2.3.8 Police

Batumi has a small, well-trained gendarmerie known as the Batumi Provincial Police (BPP). This force has few high technology items of equipment. Notwithstanding, it is an effective police force capable of criminal investigation, VIP protection, HUMINT gathering and control of small crowds. It is headquartered near the Provincial Legislature in Batumigrad. Members of the Force are drawn from the local population; most officers in Batumi Province are ethnic Bowl even though leadership of the force was, and still is, predominantly ethnic Zack. The ethnic composition of the Force in Batumigrad is equally divided among the three ethnic groups, with senior officers being mostly ethnic Bowl. Charges of brutality by Force members against all ethnic groups in and outside the capital city during the past several months are largely unsubstantiated; most are attributed to “rumor mongering” in an attempt to spread fear or support calls for UNMIB/NATO presence. During March 2025, as a gesture to protest the withdrawal of ACS troops from Batumi, the Provincial Police Chief resigned and departed the province. A competent ethnic Bowl security officer who, in the past, stated his desire for Batumi to become an ethnically pure Bowl province replaced him.

2.3.9 Defense

Following the ACS-Mazura War of 2015, which saw the defeat of 6 (ACS) Division, elements of 5 (ACS) MRD were garrisoned in Batumi Province. These elements, in accordance with the agreements reached at the Toronto Conference (28 December 2024), began withdrawing from Batumi Province during March 2025 just as the first UNMIB elements were arriving. An orderly security handover process involving 5 (ACS) MRD, the BPP and UNMIB failed to occur given rising tension and violence in the Province, prompted by the initial stages of 5 (ACS) MRD’s withdrawal and heightened by the sudden departure of the remainder of ACS troops from the province.

2.3.10 Military Service

All males and females before their thirtieth year of life must serve a two-year period of compulsory military service. Voluntary service beyond this point is accepted by approximately 15 percent of those in uniform. Officers must complete two years of service in the ranks as a conscript before being eligible for selection for commissioned service. Those who volunteer for military service enlist for five-year periods. All medically fit citizens up to the age of 40 who are not members of the BPP or otherwise exempt must report for 15 days of service each year as a reservist at a lower readiness state unit garrisoned near an urban area. Professional soldiers are well trained and well led, although their skills and motivation are generally less than observed in Western armies. Reservists have basic skills only, but have sufficient knowledge and discipline to fight effectively on home terrain.

2.4 Geography

2.4.1 Topography

Batumi Province has high rolling hills to the north and east, and generally flat plains in the interior. There is a narrow coastal plain along the southern coast. Major rivers dissect the line of hills to the north and east. A mix of coniferous and deciduous trees covers 30 percent of the province; of the remaining space, 35 percent is covered by arable fields and pastures, 10 percent by urban areas, 15 percent is non-usable for pastoral use, and 10 percent is suitable for eventual development of coal and other non-precious ore mining.

2.4.2 Hydrography

There are two major rivers: the Robertsseau in the north and the Steelscott in the east. Both rivers dissect a range of high hills and are navigable by commercial traffic. The ACS has several bridges across both rivers, and ferry traffic connects the provincial capital with points in the ACS to the east and north. The rivers and their tributaries are used extensively for irrigation and some hydro-electricity production. Pollution is a major problem for Batumi Province and elsewhere in the ACS, and significant costs must be expended to purify the water for drinking.

2.4.3 Climate/Weather

Batumi Province has a continental climate with hot summers and cold winters. The average January temperature is -5 degrees Celsius and the average July temperature is 23 degrees Celsius. Average annual precipitation totals 367mm. Regions with high hills experience cold, windy conditions during winter.

2.4.4 Urban Areas

The province has several small towns and villages. The six major urban areas in the province are as follows:

a. Batumigrad (pop 250,000). The provincial capital has a population equally divided among the three ethnic groups. Major businesses are associated with banking and agricultural trade.

Locals also rely on the provincial legislature, courts, prison and university for employment. The city is connected by ferry to three other cities in the ACS;

b. Bowlvil (pop 150,000). This mostly ethnic Bowl city in the western interior has a 35 percent ethnic Caspian population. It lies on the western edge of the fertile agricultural area, and as such employs many in agriculture related activities and businesses;

c. Brenmorrow (pop 150,000). This interior city located to the south of the capital has a population that is 80 percent ethnic Bowl. Many in the city work on the hydroelectric dam, in the small port area, or on a few light industries drawing power from the dam;

d. Camerroy (pop 150,000). This city built along the southern banks of the Robertsseau River is linked by a major bridge to the ACS province to its north. Approximately 80 percent of the population is ethnic Bowl. Many in the city are involved in trade, transportation and light industry;

e. Merckgrad (pop 150,000). This southern city is located where the Steelscott River meets the Black Sea. Approximately 80 percent of the population is ethnic Bowl. Most commercial activity revolves around trade and port activities; and

f. Sudplass (pop 150,000). This mostly ethnic Bowl city in the southwest corner of the province has a 35 percent ethnic Caspian population. Most are employed in the small business sector or in various high technology start-up firms. The city is also known for several centres of higher learning. Figure 2 presents a map of the main cities in the area of operation.




Figure 2 : Main cities in the area of operations

2.5 Economy

2.5.1 Industry, Agriculture and Fishing

Although the industrial base elsewhere in the ACS is well developed, Batumi province lacks the heavy industries of the provinces to its north and east. There is a small hydroelectric dam on the Steelscott River, southeast of Brenmorrow, which produces most of the province's hydroelectric needs. The fishing industry along the Black Sea coast is not particularly lucrative, but it does meet employment needs in the south. Fishing in the rivers and streams is not a major industry.

2.5.2 Trade

Batumi Province does not have well developed trade relations with other nations. Most production is aimed at meeting the needs of Batumi's population, or satisfying needs of neighbouring provinces of the ACS. Approximately 80 percent of Batumi's trade is done with other provinces of the ACS; the remaining 20 percent is done with Mazura.

2.5.3 Taxation

Taxation rates are generally high. The rates, however, are consistent with those found elsewhere in the ACS. They are much higher than those found in Mazura.

2.5.4 Unemployment

The rate of employment for the past ten years has been steady, at approximately 16 percent. This relatively high rate has been another major source of discontent with the population, particularly in urban areas. In southern Mazura, by comparison, the rate of unemployment has averaged 8 percent for the past ten years. The fluctuation difference in both Mazura and Batumi Province has been no more than 2 percent. Unemployment is a major concern of student and influential union leaders. Interestingly, many of these leaders believe that continued association with the socialist state of the ACS would remedy their problems rather than reunification with the democratic state of Mazura with its Western free enterprise system. Some demonstrations orchestrated by student and union leaders to protest the unemployment problem, and suggestions that the government was considering adoption of a more free enterprise approach to resolving economic difficulties, have turned violent.

2.6 Infrastructure

2.6.1 General

Although the province has some infrastructure comparable to western standards, the economic downturn experienced by the ACS has had a detrimental impact on the province's ability to repair and develop its infrastructure to the same level as that in Mazura or indeed elsewhere in the ACS. This has been a major cause of discontent for those living in the province.

2.6.2 Transportation

Batumi Province has approximately 1,000 kilometers of railroad track. The country is also served by 3,000 kilometers of all-weather roads, of which some 1,000 kilometers are paved. There are some 50,000 kilometers of gravel and earth roads in rural areas. All major urban areas are served with well-maintained road and rail lines; however, the economic downturn during the era of the former regime has left many roads in a state of neglect. The rail network is fairly well maintained. There is a significant reliance on sea transport in coastal regions.

2.6.3 Ports

The province has one major port on the Black Sea at Merckgrad. This port has heavy-lift cranes capable of handling sea container movement and roll-on/roll-off cargo. There are several small harbours along the Black Sea coast, however these are generally too small for other than the local fishing industry. Two other smaller harbours, at Batumigrad and Camerroy, serve river traffic and have light cranes. The hydroelectric dam cuts the Steelscott River at Brenmorrow, preventing sea traffic from moving farther north or farther south than the dam area. Brenmorrow does not have major port facilities. All ports are in a state of disrepair.

2.6.4 Airports

The only large airport in the province, capable of supporting large-scale passenger and freight movement, is located south of Batumigrad. Each of the other urban areas has an airstrip and facilities capable of supporting C-130 traffic. All airports and airfields have significantly decayed infrastructure and require upgrading. Although connecting flights exist between Batumigrad and other major cities within the ACS, Mazura and some other neighbouring European cities, Batumigrad has never been a popular enough destination for the ACS to invest in airport infrastructure in Batumi's provincial capital.

2.6.5 Information Technology

The province relies to a great extent on computers and information technology to conduct the affairs of business, banking and government.

2.6.6 Communications

The ACS had made some strides in expanding its communications system before the economic downturn. In Batumi Province, most families and businesses in major urban areas have telephones, and many in rural areas do as well. There is a rudimentary cell phone system, although it is less sophisticated than the one found in Mazura. Only the affluent and businesses that employ more than a few people have access to facsimile machines and the Internet. Access to the national television station and a number of radio stations are possible throughout the province. Each urban area has one major radio station broadcasting 24 hours per day, and one or two smaller ones. The province has one major radio station comparable to CBC Radio, which broadcasts news, views and music 24 hours per day from Batumigrad.

2.6.7 Health

By regional standards, the health system is quite good. Sufficient hospitals and clinics exist to serve the population in all urban areas, with health support in rural areas being less available. Major surgical work is done at hospitals in Batumigrad or elsewhere in the ACS.

2.6.8 Batumigrad

Key infrastructure in the capital include the city's industrial park, water treatment facility, sewage facility, oil and gas storage facility, natural gas control station, bulk food distribution centre, legislative buildings, court house, city hall, library, prison, and university.

2.7 Armed factions and security forces

2.7.1 General

With the exception of deserters and Special Forces elements, all ACS soldiers have obeyed the orders of the ACS military leadership and withdrawn from Batumi Province. In the Batumigrad area are BPP officers, two ethnic Bowl guerrilla groups, one ethnic Zack guerrilla group, and numerous well-armed but largely disorganized ethnic Zack deserters stating their preparedness to take whatever conventional and unconventional military actions necessary to ensure that Batumi Province remains a part of the ACS.

2.7.2 Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB)

Tracing its history to the Second World War, when Batumi became a province of the ACS, the BLB violently opposes ACS rule and domination through a campaign of intimidation and attack. Headquartered in Batumigrad, it has cells operating throughout Batumi Province. Operatives also conduct terrorist-style attacks elsewhere in the ACS. Of the two groups operating in Batumi, only this group has adopted a more moderate approach to key issues. The BLB is equipped with a variety of modern light weapons, including anti-tank missiles and anti-air weapons. Although the BDP has publicly disavowed any association with the BLB, or with their violence, many in the party sympathize with, and possibly support, the BLB.

2.7.3 Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF)

This violent guerrilla group, formed in the 1980s when many ethnic Bowl citizens of Batumi Province expressed non-confidence in the BLB, is more radical than the BLB. The stated aim of its violence is to purge Batumi Province of all ethnic Zack people. Leadership within the BFF is split over whether Batumi should reunite with Mazura, or become a separate, independent state. Organized in cells, it has been as successful as the BLB in retaining popular support in the ethnic Bowl population of Batumi Province. The BFF is equipped with a variety of modern light weapons, including anti-tank missiles and anti-air weapons. Although the BDP has publicly disavowed any association with the BFF, or with its violence, only a few in the party are believed to be sympathetic with the BFF.

2.7.4 Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF)

In 2017, given the heightened activity of the ethnic Bowl guerrilla movements against the ACS and ethnic Zack community, and the apparent inability of ACS security forces to prevent such attacks, the ZLF was formed. The ZLF, the military arm of the Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP) founded at the same time, was formed with the specific intent of promoting the political aims of the ZLP, protecting the ethnic Zack population in Batumi, deterring terrorist acts by ethnic Bowl guerrillas, and conducting reprisal actions to demonstrate ethnic Zack resolve. Very little is known about the ZLF, except that it is organized in cells both inside and outside the capital region. It has sufficient strength to operate at company-size in Batumigrad, with another company assessed to be operating outside the capital. The ZLF is armed with a variety of small arms, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft missiles.

2.7.5 ACS Ethnic Zack Deserters

In March 2025, when 5 (ACS) MRD began withdrawing from Batumi Province, ethnic Zack individuals and sub-units deserted. Many fled with their arms, vehicles and ammunition to Batumigrad where the seat of power, key provincial institutions, and majority of the ethnic Zack population in Batumi Province lived. These former soldiers, many of whom had only a few years of compulsory service in the army of the ACS, are nonetheless considered very capable and determined fighters prepared to wage a determined fight against any who attempt to defeat or disarm them. Although they lack a sophisticated command and control apparatus at higher levels, they are assessed to be well led at lower levels. If defeated in conventional confrontations they will probably resort to guerrilla operations as part of the ZLF.

2.7.6 ACS Forces (in Batumi)

The ACS possesses a military with a full range of conventional combat capability – air, land and sea. Its armed forces use equipment and tactical doctrine loosely based on earlier generation Soviet designs. Its command and control assets are very competent but not considered to be state-of-the-art. When the ACS ordered 5 (ACS) MRD to withdraw from Batumi Province, the order was met with open defiance by ethnic Zack soldiers serving with the Division. Rather than abandon the ethnic Zack population and watch Batumi Province come under Mazuran sovereignty, many ethnic Zack soldiers deserted individually or in sub-unit strength. These warriors have vowed to protect ethnic Zack citizens of Batumi Province, particularly those in Batumigrad, from the retaliatory violence they claim will occur once Mazuran soldiers who remember the 2015 war enter the province. Although the ACS political leadership openly claimed it does not support ethnic Zack deserters or the ZLF, the political and military leadership of the ACS did not make significant efforts to dissuade desertion. Moreover, it is assessed that possibly as many two lightly armed Special Forces companies were secretly directed by the ACS leadership to remain behind in Batumi Province to provide discreet training advice and assistance to the ZLF and ethnic Zack deserters.

2.7.7 Mazuran Forces (in Batumi)

Mazura, respecting expressed fears that its soldiers want to enter Batumi to carry out reprisal actions against ethnic Zacks for the 2015 ACS invasion of southeastern Mazura, agreed not to send its forces into Batumi Province for a period of at least five years after the province

becomes Mazuran territory. The ACS agreed to relinquish sovereign control of Batumi only on the understanding that only non-Mazuran NATO soldiers would participate in the handover and that UNMIB would remain in the province for a period of five years to supervise the process and prevent Mazuran atrocities or acts of reprisal. Several Mazuran advisors and planners will accompany NATO forces into Batumi Province to prepare for the eventual presence of Mazuran soldiers, but their presence will be low key and they will have no command authority in UNMIB or NATO activities to restore order in the province.

2.7.8 Batumi Provincial Police (BPP)

With approximately 600 officers, 200 of which are located in the capital city region, the BPP is well trained but poorly prepared to handle all criminal investigation, crime prevention and civil order duties in a city that has grown increasingly dysfunctional and violent. Many ethnic Zack members of the BPP reportedly quit to join the ZLF or deserters once 5 (ACS) MRD began to withdraw; this has not been independently confirmed. If true, this not only reduced the numbers of police available to respond to emergencies and regular duties, but also gave the ZLF and deserters valuable information concerning police knowledge of ZLF activities and structures. Most of the remaining members of the BPP in Batumigrad are ethnic Bowl and ethnic Caspian. Some ethnic Zack officers remain on the Force, a situation that has a calming effect on some in the ethnic Zack community but nonetheless serves to fracture the Force and lead to suspicion and friction among the Force's membership. In Batumigrad, the BPP has approximately 20 patrol cars, three tactical teams and six snipers. Outside the city, the Force has another 80 patrol cars, 10 tactical teams and 15 snipers.

2.7.9 UN Mission in Batumi (UNMIB)

UNMIB arrived recently in Batumi to assist with humanitarian operations and monitor, as a condition of the Toronto Agreement, any abuse of ethnic community members after the withdrawal of ACS military forces from Batumi Province. UNMIB is composed of a small group of UN Military Observers located in Batumi Province, with 20 located in Batumigrad. There is a small Field Service element as well assisting in coordinating NGO humanitarian support. As NATO prepares to deploy into Batumi Province, UNMIB is preparing to withdraw given that it's tasks will be performed by NATO elements.

Table 1 presents a summary of the events timeline. Table 2 presents issues of strategic, operational and tactical significance. It includes end states, centers of gravity, objectives and critical vulnerabilities associated with each identified organization.

DATE	EVENT
2015	ACS invasion of southern Mazura defeated by NATO Coalition forces
	Batumi Province demands re-unification with Mazura
	UN seeks assistance resolving humanitarian problem in Mazura (UNSCR 1270)
2016	NATO extends mandate for forces in Mazura until 2026 to train Mazuran forces, assist in humanitarian efforts in southern Mazura, and respond to regional instability
2017	Economic situation throughout ACS worsens; Mazuran prosperity increases
	Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP) and Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF) formed in Batumi Province
	Anti-Zack violence by Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) and Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) in Batumi Province escalates
2018-2023	BLB and BFF attacks worsen throughout ACS
	ACS repression creates refugee and displaced person problem in Batumi Province and southern Mazura
	UN condemns violence in Batumi Province (UNSCR 1353) and imposes economic sanctions (UNSCR 1359)
2024	Moderate government in ACS elected as ACS economy collapses, domestic unrest heightens, and terrorist attacks by Batumi guerrillas in ACS cities intensify
	Western diplomatic initiatives and IMF offer entice ACS leadership to announce that it will offer to relinquish control of Batumi Province in 2025
	Zack loyalists vow to keep Batumi Province part of ACS
Nov:	UN condemns violence in Batumi Province (UNSCR 1368)
Dec:	The ACS leadership promises (Toronto Agreement – 28 December 2024) a phased withdrawal of troops from Batumi Province and turnover of the province to Mazura effective 1 October 2025 to fulfill the following goals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ goodwill gesture to UN and international community ◆ means to end terrorist attacks in ACS cities ◆ measure to prompt lifting of UN sanctions against ACS ◆ attempt to obtain Western economic aid to restore the ACS economy and placate the population in the ACS ◆ strategy to avoid a second military confrontation with, and defeat by, NATO forces
2025Mar:	5 (ACS) MRD begins withdrawal from Batumi Province, triggering massive defections of Zack soldiers in 5 MRD and occupation of armouries in Batumi Province by rebel soldiers and members of ZLF
1 Apr:	Defections and dramatic increase in violence against federal ACS forces cause ACS government to abandon phased withdrawal plan and order immediate withdrawal of ACS military and security forces from Batumi Province. Heightened violence and tension in Batumi Province result.
7 Apr:	Governor of Batumi Province assassinated by unknown assailants
10 Apr:	UN calls upon international community to assist in restoration of order in Batumi Province (UNSCR 1377)
20 Apr	NATO troops in MAZURA receive new mission, to “restore stability in Batumi Province”
27 Apr	Canadian troops deploy to Batumi

Table 1. Summary of the events timeline

ISSUES OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

END STATES, CENTRES OF GRAVITY, OBJECTIVES AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

	NATO	SECESSIONISTS (BOWL) (BLB & BFF)	LOYALISTS (ZACK)	
			ZLF	DESERTERS
Strategic End State	*Armed threat eliminated and civil order in Batumi restored	*Mazuran provincial status regained	*ACS provincial status retained	*ACS provincial status retained
Strategic Centre of Gravity	*Confidence in NATO of Batumi population	*Support of ethnic Bowl population	*Support of ethnic Zack population	*Support of ethnic Zack population
Strategic Objectives	*Conditions for orderly transition of political control established *Environment for political transition to Mazuran control secured *Freedom for movement and activities of NGOs achieved *Military conditions IAW UNSCRs established *Civil-mil coop (national level) achieved *Law and order restored *Humanitarian support efforts assisted	*Power in new political alignment in province attained *Benefit of NATO presence gained	*Benefit from defector presence and support gained	*Benefit from military and other links to ACS gained *International support for legitimacy of loyalist cause acquired
Operational	*Ability to conduct military operations in Batumigrad that gain	*Ability to retain UN and NATO support	*Ability to discredit those who support the political transition of	*Ability to sustain resolve of deserters

Centre of Gravity	and preserve the confidence of the Batumi population		Batumi Province	
Operational Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Security in Batumigrad established *Support to UNMIB provided *Successful Info Ops Campaign waged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *ZLF and deserters discredited *Support of ethnic Caspians gained *"Protector" of Bowl ethnic group status strengthened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *NATO discredited *BLB/BFF discredited *UNMIB and NGO activities disrupted *Intimidation campaign against ethnic Bowl and ethnic-Caspian populations succeeds in destabilising situation *Priority status vis-à-vis the deserters as "protector" of ethnic Zack group established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *NATO discredited *BLB/BFF discredited *"Protector" of ethnic-Zack population status gained
Tactical Centre of Gravity	*Ability to conduct quick, effective and measured military response to provocations, disturbances and acts of aggression	*Ability to maintain control of activities of cells and members to ensure atrocities/provocations do not lead to loss of UN/ NATO support	*Ability to keep ZLF identities and intentions concealed	*Ability to maintain combat cohesion and leadership
Tactical Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Disarming of factions achieved *Info Ops successfully conducted *Armed presence respected *Proven rapid reaction capability developed and maintained *Civil-mil cooperation (local level) achieved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Links to organised crime (finances) exploited *Non-attributable terrorist attacks against ethnic-Zack population made *ZLF and deserter HVT/ HPTs successfully attacked *Image as entity most relied upon by NATO and Bowl ethnic population to achieve military success, law and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Student & union unrest exploited *Links to organised crime (finances and arms/ munitions) exploited *Info Ops successfully conducted *Terrorist acts successfully conducted *Covert destabilising activity successfully conducted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Military attacks against BLB/ BFF successfully conducted *Info Ops successfully conducted *Overt defiance of NATO/ UNMIB through sovereignty demonstrations (eg road blocks, occupation of VPs, taxation, declarations, etc) successfully conducted

		order, and ethnic Bowl end-state desires achieved		*NATO/UNMIB freedom of movement denied and/or restricted as successful “show of force” and “demonstration of sovereignty”
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Morale and UNSC support *Professional soldiers *Superior technology *Air, maritime and space-based support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *UNSC resolutions and international support for political transition to occur *NATO Coalition support *Two guerrilla forces *Knowledge of terrain, culture and people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Military parity with Bowl secessionist forces *Some Zack nationalist, student and union leader support *Knowledge of terrain, culture and people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Military superiority against Bowl secessionist forces *Covert support from ACS *Knowledge of terrain, culture and people
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Force protection and extended LOCs Political resolve and casualties *Political-military actions of Bowl ethnic factions in Batumi *Extremist actions of agitators and criminal elements *Urban area restricts observation, movement and action *Exposure brought about by dispersion *Computer-network attack *Terrorist attack *Weak Provincial Police Force *Hostile PSYOP (Moral high ground, resolve, collateral damage, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Divided political aims (ie independence vs uniting with Mazura) *Sense limitations reduce situational awareness *Excessive actions by extremists *Influence of NATO/UN to control outcome, actions and ambitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Military inferiority against NATO forces *UNSC resolutions and lack of international support *ACS no longer openly supports loyalists *Guerrilla actions in Batumi draw international and some local condemnation *Limited numbers of arms and personnel *Sense limitations reduce situational awareness *Complete loyalty of members *Coordination of paramilitary effort 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Military inferiority against NATO forces *UNSC resolutions and lack of international support *ACS no longer openly supports loyalists *Guerrilla actions in Batumi and in ACS draw international and some local condemnation *Urban area restricts observation, movement and action *Semi-isolation (LOC to deserters outside city unusable) *Coordination of military

	actions of “allied” BLB/BFF, etc)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Freedom of movement disruptions *Reliance on concealment and force-on-force shortfalls *Financial support tenuous *Limited access to arms and munitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> effort *Freedom of movement for mechanized/ motorized assets *Force-on-force shortfall *Resupply and maintenance
Critical Vulnerabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Incomplete knowledge of terrain, culture and people *Inability to protect all infrastructure, VPs and VIPs *Sense limitations, including insufficient HUMINT, prevent 100% situational awareness/ knowledge of threat intentions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Insufficient arms and personnel to defeat Zack loyalist forces *Guerrilla actions in Batumi and in ACS draw international and some local condemnation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *NATO high technology means to gather and process information, including link analysis capabilities *Swaying of ethnic-Zack popular support by NATO PSYOP effort *Excessive actions by extremists leading to further erosion of moral standing and exposure to NATO/ secessionist PSYOP attack *Coordination of military effort *Freedom of movement disruptions *Reliance on concealment and force-on-force shortfalls *Financial support tenuous *Access to arms and munitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Need to conceal high-value assets from detection and destruction *Decentralized structure can result in excessive actions leading to alienation and greater difficulty gaining international support *Coordination of military effort *Freedom of movement for mechanized/ motorized assets *Force-on-force shortfall *Resupply and maintenance

ETHNIC GROUP END-STATE DESIRES AND TOLERANCES

	MAJORITY	MINORITY
BOWL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Re-unification with Mazura - Support to armed ethnic Bowl elements - Full support of NATO/ UNMIB presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Independence - Participation in armed element groups - Limited support of NATO/UNMIB presence
CASPIAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Re-unification with Mazura - No support to armed ethnic Bowl elements - Full support of NATO/ UNMIB presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Re-unification with Mazura - Limited support to armed Bowl elements - Full support of NATO/UNMIB presence
ZACK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Status quo - Support to armed elements acting in defiance - Non-violent opposition to NATO/UNMIB presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Status quo - Participation in armed element groups - Violent opposition to NATO/UNMIB presence

Table 2. Issues of strategic, operational and tactical significance including end states, centers of gravity, objectives and critical vulnerabilities associated with each identified organization.

3. Urban Challenge 2025 – General orders

This section presents the scenario's orders and their associated context.

3.1 Orders from Commander JTF Batumi

Excerpts from Commander JTF Batumi Op O 01 dated 20 Apr 25

3.1.1 Batumi Force Mission

BFOR, in accordance with UNSCR 1377, is to:

- a. Restore order and maintain a secure environment in Batumi,
- b. Provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Batumi (UNMIB)

in order to promote stability in the region.

3.1.2 Execution

- a. Concept of Operations:

(1) My intent is to restore order through a strong physical presence and robust deterrence capability. As part of a coalition working to achieve lasting peace in the destabilized region, we must be seen as a credible and strong force by all. We must demonstrate to armed factions our commitment to achieving the goals set out by the UN. We cannot afford to lose the support of the population, and will continuously endeavor to strengthen our image as lawful and fair in all our dealings with local leaders, factions and community members. Close Operations are to be focused on deterring violence, disarming factions and maintaining law and order. Force profile is vital and to be successful BFOR must retain popular support. Before taking whatever decisive actions are required to fulfill our mandate, we will first gain a understanding of the threat and the environmental context of the threat. Before we enter the AO and throughout the term of our presence, we will shape the battle space by means of a unified information operations campaign, promoting our message of stability and the benefits achieved by pursuing non-violent means and to remedy problems. Shaping operations designed to isolate rebel forces and guerrillas physically and morally are vital to our success. Overwhelming force applied against only those who participate, or against those who aid or abet, in violent actions is critical to achieving long-term stability. Our actions will be precise in both accuracy and scale of response. Only by focusing our actions against those who oppose peaceful means will we be able to instill confidence and bring lasting peace and stability. Deep Operations will focus on influencing, educating and convincing all parties that political solutions are lasting solutions and that they are better off with the NATO security presence than without. The HQ BFOR Deep Operations Group (DOG) will act as my focus for this work bringing together Media, PSYOPS and G5 under an integrated information campaign closely linked to UNMIB. We will assist UNMIB to create conditions within which political solutions can be achieved, economic renewal can occur and humanitarian

needs met. Rear Operations are those that facilitate freedom of movement, operation of UNMIB and International Organizations. They also include force protection and sustainment of the force.

(2) Our operational design will focus on two Lines of Operations- security and supporting the work of UNMIB. Bdes are to develop their operations along the following lines:

(a) Security

- i. Remove the threat posed by armed factions to political stability.
- ii. Deter internal threats to stability.
- iii. Influence public perceptions.
- iv. Secure key infrastructure and sites of critical cultural, political and commercial importance.
- v. Maintain BFOR cohesion and integrity.
- vi. Ensure public safety and order.
- vii. Provide force protection.

(b) Supporting UNMIB

- i. Support emergency humanitarian assistance.
- ii. Assist humanitarian agencies.
- iii. Support UNMIB credibility and operations.

Through these Lines of Operation I will be developing two mission essential supporting lines, to which I expect you to contribute.

(c) Information Operations. Overarching all that we do will be the battle for the will of the people. I plan a proactive operational information campaign designed to shape indigenous perception toward social harmony, isolating violent factions from the people and promoting NATO's role in assisting in the end to violent means.

(d) Intelligence and Understanding. Continuous intelligence gathering and information operations will support the principal lines. We must have an understanding of the atmosphere, intentions and ethnic groups perceptions and of opposing factions. We must identify the influential members of society and how we can influence their opinion towards our aims.

(3) Main Effort. My Main Effort will be to remove the threat posed by factions through active deterrence, direct action when required and information operations activities.

(4) End State. The desired End State, will occur when the following are met:

i. military conditions called for in UNSCR 1377 exist- specifically that all armed factions obstructing or endangering the peace process are disarmed;

ii. security conditions are such that UNMIB and NGOs can effectively work to assist Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs); and

iii. A secure environment in which civil institutions and government can function to determine their political future, without fear of destabilizing external or internal aggression has been achieved.

3.1.3 Tasks

CA Brigade

(a) Security

i. Disarmament of factions in BATUMIGRAD within boundaries.

ii. Provide a secure environment for ZACK, BOWL and CASPIAN communities within boundaries.

iii. Secure important city utilities and critical infrastructure within AO.

iv. Secure the Batumigrad Provincial Legislative Building and Provincial Court House.

v. Secure city schools located within areas of real, perceived or potential ethnic tension.

vi. Secure important cultural sites within AO.

vii. Secure the Batumi Aluminum Plant, the Batumi Centre Business Park complex and other assessed commercial areas of importance.

(b) Support to UNMIB

i. Provide emergency humanitarian assistance, as necessary, within boundaries.

ii. Create the conditions for the orderly return of IDPs

iii. Assist government and NGOs/humanitarian agencies within boundaries.

iv. Assist in promoting UNMIB mission within boundaries.

b. Co-ordinating Instructions

- (1) The Civilian Military Operations (CMO) Directive (supporting UNMIB) is at Annex A.
- (2) The Information Operations Plan is at Annex B (Not issued)
- (3) The critical sites list for Batumigrad is at Annex C. This list details sites of significant cultural, political, commercial and civil infrastructure.
- (4) EOD. Priority for EOD is mission critical tasks and tasks to remove immediate threat to life. Joint Services Operations Cell (JSEODOC) is the focus for all EOD activity. The EOD Directive is at Annex D (Not issued).
- (5) Intelligence Collection Plan. A G2 Directive on IR and collection matrix is at Annex E. (Not issued)
- (6) Civilian Casualties Medical Policy. In the case of a genuine emergency beyond local capacity, we will accept, transport and treat civilian casualties. First line civilian coverage is the Batumigrad General Hospital. The Medical directive is at Annex F (Not issued).
- (7) ROE. See CA ROE dated 20 Apr 02. For exercise purposes, the reference ROE is not issued, however, ROE guidance is provided at Annex G. In all actions, we must apply the principal of minimum force. Our use of force must be sufficient to achieve the purpose and no more.
- (8) Legitimacy. It is essential that we act within the confines of the mandate as described in UNSCR1377. Any failure to do so will strip us of our legitimacy and authority and ultimately degrade BFOR integrity and credibility. A copy of UNSCR 1377 is at Annex H.

3.1.4 Combat service support

a. CSS Concept. It is my intent that BFOR should be able to undertake its mission without CSS constraint and that the CSS elements of the BFOR should contribute to all aspects of the mission, including the intelligence effort and force posture. Although CSS is a national responsibility within BFOR, I wish the Force to achieve the highest degree of multinational interoperability, within the terms of the MOU between Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), to ensure the effects of any constraints are minimized. My HQ will take the lead in fostering CSS co-operation and providing advice and support concentrating on deconfliction and co-ordination across the logistics spectrum. My CSS main effort is ensuring the freedom of action of BFOR.

3.2 Civilian military operations (CMO) directive

3.2.1 Situation

The cause of the current situation in Batumi has its origins in a myriad of economic, cultural and ethnic factors. The response to such a complex emergency must involve the Batumi population and many different military and civilian agencies. It must be remembered that part of the regeneration process is the supporting and handover to civilian agencies. We must not generate solutions to immediate problems that create a dependency upon military presence.

CMO is one of the Comd's principal lines of operation. The main requirement is to assist UNMIB with its mission. In particular to provide: emergency humanitarian assistance, assist humanitarian agencies and support UNMIB's creditability and operations.

3.2.2 Execution

Concept of CMO. Intent: To support the creation of the conditions in which UNMIB, IOs and NGOs can conduct timely humanitarian assistance operations and in which UMINB can establish itself as the civil presence and formally take the lead in restoring political, economic and humanitarian renewal. Endstate: success is achieved when the required humanitarian assistance is delivered in a timely manner and UNMIB is able to plan and conduct operations unimpeded by significant threat of violence. CMO Operations: will be integrated at every level of operations. The BFOR CMO cell will coordinate Batumi wide provincial operations, with Bdes and BGs establishing municipal and county cells to maintain or establish a point of contact with the civilian populations, IOs and NGOs. Liaison is to be established at each level with UNMIB representatives and every assistance possible is to be given to them. CIMIC projects are to identify, coordinate and executed within capabilities of Bdes and units in support of the Comd's intent. Priorities: The current priority is emergency assistance to IDPs.

3.2.3 Tasks

The following is a list of CMO tasks that must be conducted by Bdes and units as appropriate to the situation in their AOR.

a. Deep.

(1) Facilitate information exchange and co-operation between Bde and UNMIB, IOs, NGOs and the civilian population. Co-operation to improve the security of the vulnerable, minimise the impact of Bde operations on non-military and de-conflict military and non-military activities and achieve the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantage for the Bdes. (CIMIC Centre(s), LOs)

(2) Conduct information gathering and when appropriate analysis to support UNMIB, IOs and NGOs that are supported by BFOR. (G2/G3)

(3) Support the legitimization of the BFOR and UNMIB mission and civil information campaign. (Media ops and PSYOPS).

- b. Close- Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
 - (1) As necessary provide emergency HA. (All)
 - (2) Within capabilities, assist with the maintenance of essential public utilities. (Engrs/BGs)
- c. Close- Civil Administration (CA). Within capabilities support the CA by:
 - (1) Maintaining a secure environment until this responsibility can be assumed by UNMIB Police and local police forces. (BGs)
 - (2) When necessary, in the absence of representation by the CA and when clear direction is available, fulfill core civil functions until these can be handed over. (BGs)
- d. Rear. As necessary sustain UNMIB within boundaries.

CO-ORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

Co-ordination. The BFOR CMO Conference will be held on every second Wed of the month at 1330 hrs at BFOR HQ.

3.3 Critical site list for Batumigrad

The next site list the critical sites for the scenario and their relative link in “real life” i.e. localization within the City of Kingston (Ontario) Canada.

Hospitals- Batumigrad Hotel Dieu- (GR UD 812 984) 166 Brock Street and Batumigrad General Hospital-(GR UD 807 976) 76 Stuart Street.

Schools- Ecole Cathedral – (Gr UD 810 984) 301 Johnson street, St Mary’s Separate School-(GR UD 810 984) 671Brock Street, Central Public School-(GR UD 813 987) 237 Sydenham Street and Batumigrad (Queens) University main campus location (GR SQ 8097) centred on University Ave.

Churches- Zack’s Prus Orthodox Cathedral- GR UD 815 982, (St George Cathedral- King Street East), Bowl’s Roman Catholic Cathedral- GR UD UD 809 984, (St Mary’s Cathedral- 279 Johnson Street), and the Caspian Presbyterian Church- GR UD 810 986, (St Andrew’s Presbyterian- 130 Clergy Street East).

Political- Batumigrad Provincial Legislative Building- GR UD 817 982 (Kingston City Hall-Ontario Street) and Provincial Court House- Gr UD 810 982 (Frontenac County Court House-Court Street). City Utilities- Batumigrad water purification plant GR UD 799 973 (King Street West and Beverley Street), hydro, natural gas and sewer main lines and infrastructure are notionally provided.

Commercial- Batumi Aluminium Plant Gr SQ UE 79 00 (ALCAN Aluminium Limit Plant- Sir John A MacDonald Rd and Counter Streets) and Batumi Centre Business Park complex GR SG UE 81 00 (Kingston City Centre Business Park- bounded by Division, Stephen, Montreal Streets and Elliot Ave) and Batumigrad oil refinery GR UE 816 997 (River and Rideau Streets).

Former ACS Garrisons- Fort Frontenac at GR UD 820 986 and ACS (PWOR) Armories at GR UD 813 987.

3.4 ROE

3.4.1 Commander aide-memoire

Effective: 20 Apr 25

(For exercise purposes only the CA ROE guidance is provided. HICON will provide further direction if additional clarification is required. Canadian ROEs are issued from the CDS. In multi-national operations, nations promulgate ROE that are consistent with their national requirements, but those ROE must be compliant with Force ROE. Below is an example of a ROE Guidance card for unit level use.)

BFOR ROE are orders, not guidance. Any changes to ROE must be approved by the CDS.

All information contained in the BFOR Soldier's Card is contained in this Aide-Memoire.

3.4.2 Threats

The soldiers under your command will depend on you to know and understand the threats, and the available responses to those threats. There are four basic types of threats:

- a. "Attack" means the use of force against NATO-led forces.
- b. "Imminent Attack" means that the use of force against NATO-led forces is about to occur, and the need to defend is manifest, instant and overwhelming.
- c. "Hostile Act" covers a broad range of threats to Friendly Forces falling short of an attack or an imminent attack (e.g., restricting the movement of Friendly forces, breaching or attempting to breach the security of a BFOR military compound, the use of force against property and persons other than NATO-led forces.
- d. "Hostile Intent" means the capability, preparation and intention to use force (e.g., chambering a round, firing a warning shot) against friendly forces, persons with designated special status, property with designated special status, or mission essential force property.

3.4.3 Use of force - general

- a. You may use force in two situations: in self defense against an actual or imminent attack; and

- b. when authorized by the ROE

You must use the minimum force that is necessary to accomplish your mission. In certain circumstances, deadly force may be the appropriate level of minimum force.

The force you use must be proportional to the threat you face.

You must obey the Code of Conduct that is included in this ROE.

3.4.4 Use of force – self defense

You may use force, up to and including DEADLY FORCE, in self-defense against an actual attack or an imminent attack.

Self-defense includes defense of yourself, others in your unit, other friendly forces and any persons you have been assigned to protect.

The use of the minimum necessary force applies to self-defense.

If you must act in self-defense, you may use whatever weapons you have been issued if they are necessary and they are proportional to the threat you face, including crew-served weapons, without seeking approval from Higher HQ. (This includes all less than lethal weapons.)

As a commander, you are responsible for the use of force by the troops under your command and control. You must know and apply the ROE.

3.4.5 Deadly force

As well as in self-defense, the use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized:

- a. PERSONS. To defend Friendly Forces and Persons of Designated Special Status (PDSS) from hostile acts or hostile intent Your troops must know when they are defending PDSS.
- b. PROPERTY. To defend Mission Essential Force Property (MESP) or Property with Designated Special Status (PDSS) from an immediate threat of death or destruction. Your troops must know when they are defending these types of property.
- c. SERIOUS CRIMES. To stop any person who is committing, or threatening to commit, a serious crime (such as murder, rape or torture), where there is no other way to prevent the act.

MISSION. The use of force, up to and including deadly force IAW the ROE, may be authorized by the on-scene commander to carry out lawful assigned duties.

These include:

- a. preventing attempts by a Hostile Forces/Belligerents to prevent friendly forces from discharging their duties;

- b. defending against intrusion by Hostile Forces/ Belligerents into Military Restricted Areas or other designated areas
- c. using force against Hostile Forces/Belligerents that have previously committed, but are not presently committing, a hostile act provided that such action is reasonably proximate (recent) and is timely, necessary and uses force proportionate to the threat;
- d. disarming individuals or groups that represent an actual threat to security of friendly forces.

3.4.6 Non-deadly force

In the following circumstances, the maximum force that you may use is non-deadly force:

- a. **PROPERTY.** To defend Force Property that is not Mission Essential from an immediate threat of theft or destruction.
- b. **DETENTION.** To detain anyone who obstructs friendly forces, enters or attempts to enter an area controlled by friendly forces, attempts or commits assault against friendly forces, attacks friendly force property, or commits or threatens to commit a serious crime.
- c. **ESCAPE.** To stop or capture a fleeing detainee.
- d. **OTHER SITUATIONS.** The use of non-deadly force is authorized IAW the ROE to carry out lawful assigned duties.

STEPS IN APPLYING FORCE

The on-scene commander always controls the use of force. Where the situation permits, any force used shall be applied in the following sequence:

- a. **CHALLENGING/WARNING.** Repeated verbal/visual warnings or challenges until it is clear that they have been heard/seen.
- b. **PHYSICAL MEANS.** Use of physical means such as pushing striking and restraining if it is appropriate and tactically sound

UNLESS YOU ARE ACTING IN SELF DEFENCE OR YOU ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER YOU WILL NOT PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT.

- c. **SHOW OF ARMED FORCE.** Ready your weapon to show the resolve to use deadly force.
- d. **WARNING SHOT.** At a safe point of aim.
- e. **FIRING AIMED SHOTS.** Engage the identified target with the minimum necessary rounds to re-establish control of the situation. Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. Take all reasonable steps to avoid collateral damage.

If in a particular situation the delay involved in following each of these steps in order would not be tactically sound, or would compromise the right of self-defense, those steps that are unsound should be omitted.

Any use of force, of any kind, must be recorded and reported as soon as possible to the chain of command.

3.4.7 Verbal challenge when warning shots authorized

You are to challenge in English by shouting: “NATO! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!”

3.4.8 Weapon control

As a commander you are responsible for the state of readiness for personal and crew-served weapons. Unless ordered otherwise, weapons will normally contain a magazine in the weapon. When you are the on-scene commander, you have the authority to order weapons readied or charged in circumstances where deadly force is authorized and the situation requires the chambering of a round.

3.4.9 Mission essential force property

The following are current Mission Essential Force Property, any changes to these must be approved by the chain of command(Nationally CDS/CDCS):

- a. Weapons and ammunition;
- b. A vehicles
- c. Command posts
- d. Communications equipment
- e. Medical facilities; and
- f. Other properties that may be designated through the chain of command.

3.4.10 Use of non-lethal weapons

The use of individual non-lethal weapons is not restricted when authorized by the ROE. Collective non-lethal weapons systems i.e. those non lethal weapons that are designed to incapacitate more than one person are restricted to Section Commander and above.

3.4.11 Code of conduct

1. Engage only opposing forces and military objectives.

2. In accomplishing your mission, use only the necessary force that causes the least amount of collateral civilian damage.
3. Do not alter your weapons or ammunition to cause increased suffering, or use unauthorized weapons or ammunition
4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect civilian property
5. Do not attack those who surrender. Disarm them and detain them.
6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accordance with the standards set by the Third Geneva Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is prohibited.
7. Collect all wounded and sick and provide them with the same treatment, whether friend or foe.
8. Looting is prohibited.
9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc) and places of worship.
10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and other recognized symbols of Humanitarian Agencies.
11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict. Disobedience of the law of armed conflict is a crime.

3.5 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377/2025

10 APRIL 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions dating from UNSCR 1270 (2015) until now,

Alarmed by the increasing threat to stability and civil rights of those living in Batumi Province,

Alarmed by the loss of life within the Alliance of Caucasus States (ACS) caused by those claiming to seek political changes in Batumi Province,

Alarmed by the sudden departure of ACS military and security forces from Batumi Province, contrary to the phased withdrawal timings established on 28 December 2024 for the orderly transition of control of Batumi Province from the ACS to Mazura,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereign and territorial integrity of Mazura, the ACS and all other states in the region,

Determining that the situation in Batumi Province, and indeed the entire region, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from instability and repressive security force actions on behalf of the government of the ACS, and determined to prevent further such losses,

Condemning all parties that actively promote destabilization and civil liberty repression in the region to the detriment of good and lawful peace,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Mazura-ACS crisis adopted on 28 October 2024,

Determined to restore order and security in Batumi Province and the region,

1. Demands that those Member States and parties co-operating, aiding or abetting those groups and individuals responsible for causing loss of innocent life and destabilizing the security situation in Batumi Province to cease and desist in provision of such aid and co-operation;
2. Insists that all unlawful armed factions obstructing or endangering the peace process surrender their weapons and munitions to UN sanctioned forces in a manner prescribed by them;
3. Requests all States to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required to restore security and stability in Batumi Province,
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international military and police presence in Batumi Province to assist in the restoration of security and order,
5. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations in Batumi Province, and
6. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to assist in the right and lawful transfer of the ACS territory known as Batumi Province, together with its rightful assets and populations, to the lawful custody of the state of Mazura for legal and proper care and management.
7. Hereby rescinds the measures authorized by UNSCR 1359 (2023) imposing economic sanctions against the ACS as a gesture of gratitude for the cooperation and goodwill expressed by the government of the ACS toward efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve peaceful resolution to the Batumi Province difficulties.

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

4. Urban Challenge 2025 – Vignette 1: Crisis response operation

4.1 Situation

a. Armed Factions. Continuing violence by paramilitaries and guerrilla factions within Batumigrad and throughout the Province of Batumi has created a crisis. Since the recent withdrawal of ACS Forces, a breakdown of law and order and an increase in ethnically motivated terror attacks has created unrest and tension. IDPs fearful of continued bloodshed have fled to the capital from rural areas. In the past several weeks, violence ranging from random drive by shooting and fire bombings, to deliberate attacks by paramilitary groups on important political, cultural and commercial sites, has dramatically increased. The assassination of the moderate Governor of Batumi on 19 Apr, followed by the passing of UNSCR 1377 (see UNSCR 1377 Serial 7 Annex C) by the UN Security Council, led to the deployment of a NATO Coalition Force to the Province of Batumi. See Common Operating Picture (COP) Capture (Red) 281800Z Apr 25 for the most recent intelligence update.

b. Friendly Forces (NATO). National rapid reaction forces have augmented NATO Coalition Forces currently in MAZURA. GE, CA, FR, IT, SP, UK, US and NE have deployed rapid reaction Bdes, maritime assets, and air resources to the region. The GE JTF Comd has assigned AOs, with the CA Bde AO centred on Batumigrad, the GE Bde to the North, the UK Bde to the West and the US Bde to the East. Remaining Bdes are located in the southern border regions of the Province of Batumi. See COP Capture (Blue) 281800Z Apr 25 for the Blue force AOs.

4.2 CA Commander's planning guidance

Reference: Batumi Force Op O 01 dated 20 Apr 25

4.2.1 Mission analysis

1. Comd NATO Joint Task Force (COMJTF) Intent and Concept.

a. The Comd's intent is to restore order by a strong physical presence and robust deterrence capability deployed forward into the Batumigrad and the remainder of the province. The presence of NATO forces throughout the region will demonstrate our resolve to deter factional conflicts. It will also enable active information and shaping operations to isolate the armed factions from the population. To enable us to take decisive action to fulfill our mandate, we will actively gain a comprehensive knowledge of the threat and the environment.

b. In order to achieve long-term stability it is imperative that force is applied against only those who participate, or aid in violent actions. Our actions will be precise but overwhelming for the targeted party. We cannot afford to lose the support of the population and must continuously endeavour to strengthen our image as lawful and fair in all our dealings with local leaders, factions and members of all ethnic groups. Only by focusing our actions against

those who oppose peaceful means will we be able to install confidence, reduce fear in the general population, and bring lasting peace and stability. Our firm action and unrelenting resolve to remove those who promote violent means will be our moral high ground and serve notice to all who would oppose us that they will suffer the consequences if they chose violence instead of peaceful processes. In addition, we will assist UNMIB to create conditions within which political solutions can be achieved, economic renewal can occur and humanitarian needs met. Our operational design will focus on two lines of operations- security and supporting the work of UNMIB.

c. My Main Effort will be to remove the threats posed by armed factions through active deterrence, direct action when required and information operations activities.

2. Batumi FOR Endstate. The End State, will occur when the following are met:

a. Military conditions called for in UNSCR 1377 exist- specifically that all armed factions obstructing or endangering the peace process are disarmed;

b. Security conditions are such that UNMIB and NGOs can effectively work to assist Internal Displaced Persons, (IDPs); and

c. A secure environment in which civil institutions and government can function to determine their political future, without fear of destabilizing external or internal aggression has been achieved.

3. CA Bde Assigned Tasks.

a. Disarmament of armed factions in BATUMIGRAD within boundaries.

b. Provide a secure environment for ZACK, BOWL and CASPIAN communities within boundaries.

c. Create the conditions for the orderly return of IDPs

d. Secure key city utilities and critical infrastructure.

e. Secure the Batumigrad Provincial Legislative Building and Provincial Court House.

f. Secure key cultural sites within AO

g. Secure city schools located within areas of real, perceived or potential ethnic tension:

h. Secure the Batumi Aluminum Plant, the Batumi Centre Business Park complex and other assessed commercial areas of importance.

i. Provide emergency humanitarian assistance, as necessary, within boundaries.

j. Assist government and NGOs/humanitarian agencies within boundaries.

k. Assist in promoting UNMIB mission within boundaries.

4. CA Bde Implied Tasks.

- a. Deploy into Batumigrad.
- b. Stabilize areas of ethnic tension.
- c. Conduct In and establish direct lines of communication with municipal government, provincial government, the BPP force, and local community leaders of all ethnic groups, factions, NGO agencies and adjacent NATO force elements.
- d. Identify and coordinate the security for important Batumigrad infrastructure and political, cultural and commercial sites.
- e. Locate and seize the armaments of paramilitaries and rebels within boundaries.
- f. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by opening and securing routes and maintaining security for delivery.
- g. Conduct an effective Information campaign (and in particular PSYOPs).
- h. Integrate the support of higher assets- Avn, Air, Information Ops, Intel Collection, and Engineers etc

5. Constraints

- a. I have identified no significant constraints and encourage further examination of this aspect. I am fully aware of the complexities involved with multi-national operations and planning with UN and international agencies.

4.2.2 Mission statement

6. To establish and maintain a secure environment in order to set the conditions for UMBIB success.

4.2.3 Intent

7. Comd's Analysis. Options to consider for basing COAs-

- a. One Base. Operations originate from one or two large secured base in the city of Batumigrad. This permits a secure point for logistics and addresses force protection concerns. All patrolling and security to move to and from the central secure location. No specific AOs are assigned.
- b. Multiple Dispersed Bases. Numerous secured smaller bases established in suitable locations within the city. Size ranges from sub-unit to unit plus strengths based on modular task tailoring according to their specific AOs and tasks.

4.2.4 Assumptions

8. Base staff planning on the following assumptions:

a. The CA Bde is located in a FAA immediately North of Batumigrad and deployment into Batumigrad will be unopposed.

b. The CA Bde strength will be at 100 %.

c. Air supremacy exists. A threat to air ops exists posed by SA 15 and SA 18 AD wpns.

d. Any ACS Special Forces located in Batumi will only provide assistance in training and the provision of information about NATO force capabilities. No ACS Forces will participate in overt attack or actions against NATO Forces.

e. The BPP forces are professional police forces (multi-ethnic) that will cooperate in sharing information and reporting violence regardless of which ethnic group initiates it however individual police officers may alter reports to favour their ethnic group or share information on impending operations.

f. NGOs agencies desire to go about their work without association or reliance on NATO protection. They expect NATO to provide security guarantees and if possible assist with transporting and delivering aid.

g. Batumigrad citizens and municipal authorities remain divided along ethnic lines due to increasing violent incidents. Civic officials will offer overt cooperation but are capable of covert actions to hamper NATO efforts.

h. Significant portions of the Batumigrad population is initially ambivalent toward the NATO Force but they can be influenced by the outcome of early operations. The level of increasing violence has caused mainstream ethnic groups to favor an immediate stop to violence, and a cooling off period, followed by negotiations to resolve differences.

4.2.5 Possible courses of action

9. Based on my initial estimate of the situation, I have identified two friendly COA for further development by the staff.

a. COA 1- Decentralized Approach. Establish multiple dispersed secured camps across Batumigrad including all ethnic areas and near important cultural, political and commercial sites. This will demonstrate NATO's commitment to the people by immediate interaction; provide wide area coverage for information gathering and immersion in the fabric of Batumigrad. I am willing to accept the risk of terror attacks to gain the benefit of increased HUMINT, and acceptance and linkage with the people. This will provide the basis from which we can understand, and shape our enemies. Isolation of our enemies from the people is vital to our success but coupled with it is the need to maintain the support of the people. I assess that a more decentralized approach across Batumigrad can provide the opportunity to achieve each goal. Decentralized meaning dispersion in all ethnic areas, tasked tailored forces

designed to “own “ their areas in all aspects –security, linkages to locals, information and intimate knowledge of the urban environment and coordination with UNIB and NGOs activities.

b. The COA 2- Centralized Approach. Establish one or two large secured camps situated in a Zack and Bowl ethnic areas. Sited to provide enhanced collective security, secure logistics and rapid reaction to critical locations, these camps provide firm bases from which to conduct operations. No specific AOs are assigned and are forces task tailored to deal with the important cultural, political and commercial sites within their areas. Security would be achieved at important sites by continuous security presence not based on set defensive positions but by a patrolling presence and reaction capability. The intent would be to establish a security presence and grow our understanding by interaction over time. Force protection, a deterrence presence and precision actions against a threat would be the first priorities, followed by acquiring a wider understanding of our AO.

4.2.6 Specific guidance

10. The staff is to pay particular attention to the following when developing COAs:

a. The support of the populations cannot be jeopardized for short-term tactical gain;

b. Collateral damage to non-combatants and to important infrastructure must be assessed in relation to our goal of defeating the enemy. The potential consequences of indiscriminate fire will be articulated to the force. Our soldiers must understand the consequences of their actions and have confidence in their ability to protect themselves using minimum force necessary;

c. Force protection will be an important factor but not an over riding factor in devising a concept of operations. I am willing to accept risk to protect critical sites and to achieve the HUMINT contacts required to identify and isolate the enemy from the general population. Critical sites are those cultural, political, religious and civil administrative and infrastructure sites that hold significant symbolism in the community. Examples would be churches, schools, hospitals, courthouses, parliaments, utilities hubs and important commercial complexes;

d. The aspect of coordination and security with UNIB and NGOs is important and should carefully considered. I want specific troops tasked to support their efforts;

e. Our actions and information campaign will convey the clear message that we are unrelenting in our resolve and firm and fair in actions and that those who oppose us by violent means will suffer the consequences of their actions; and

f. Sustainment. I want a robust sustainment plan that will enable us to preserve our freedom of movement and action. I am very concerned about lines of communication within the urban environment, for both replenishment and medical evacuation efforts. We must be cognizant of the ease with which roads can be blocked and the vulnerability of soft skinned vehicles. I want a sustainment plan that can be adapted easily and effectively to operate under conditions of a rapidly increasing threat posture and without having a secure rear area. The line of communication to the edge of our Bde boundary will be secured by JTF resources and by our

flanking formations. The JTF Commander is a great believer in coalition cooperation and we can be assured of the bulk delivery of combat supplies to our AO. However, coalition resources are not available for operations within our sector.

4.2.7 Main effort

11. My Main Effort will be to remove the threat posed by armed factions opposed to the peaceful restoration of stability through active deterrence and information operations activities. To do this I will: isolate them from the population physically and psychologically, disarm them and use minimum force necessary to prevent them from attacking/destroying others.

4.2.8 Centers of gravity (CoG)

12. I assess the following as our CoGs:

- a. Political/strategic: The confidence of the Batumi population in NATO.
- b. Operational: NATO ability to conduct military operations (in Batumigrad) that gain and preserve the confidence of the Batumi population.
- c. Tactical: Our ability to conduct rapid, effective and measured military response to provocations, disturbances and acts of aggression.

13. I assess the following other parties CoGs as:

a. Secessionists (Bowl ethnic- BLB & BFF):

- (1) Political/strategic: Support of the ethnic Bowl population.
- (2) Operational: Ability to retain UN and NATO Support.
- (3) Tactical: Ability to maintain control of activities of cells and members to ensure atrocities/provocations do not lead to loss of UN/NATO support.

b. Loyalists (Zacks- ZLF and ACS deserters)

- (1) Political/strategic: Support of ethnic Zack Population.
- (2) Operational: ZLF- Ability to discredit those who support the political transition of Baumi Province, ACS deserters- Ability to sustain resolve of deserters.
- (3) Tactical: ZLF – Ability to keep ZLF identities and intentions concealed, ACS deserters- Ability to maintain combat cohesion and leadership.

4.2.9 Critical vulnerabilities

14. I assess our critical vulnerabilities to be the following:

- a. Strategic vulnerabilities: NATO Coalition resolve to continue with the mission.
 - b. Tactical vulnerabilities:
 - i. The inability to accurately (forecast) assess the time, place and type of potential attacks and therefore our forces inability to protect all critical locations/ people throughout the Batumigrad.
 - ii. The dispersion of our forces to protect the high value targets that exposes them to increased risk.
 - iii. Lack of a robust HUMINT collection framework.
 - iv. Urban area restricts our movement and sensing capabilities.
15. I assess the other parties critical vulnerabilities to be:
- a. Loyalists (Zacks- ZLF and ACS deserters)
 - (1) The retention of the Zack population's support.
 - (2) Reliance on concealment.
 - (3) Force on force under match.
 - b. Secessionists (Bowl ethnic- BLB & BFF):
 - (1) Excessive actions by extremists.
 - (2) Divided political aims of independence verses uniting with Mazura.
 - (3) Influence of NATO? UN to control outcome, actions and ambitions.

4.3 Commander critical information requirements (CCIRs)

16. Priority Intelligent Requirements (PIRs). Several immediate concerns are the enemy lines of operation, identification and force composition. How and when will the enemy attack? The sentiments of the various ethnic factions and communities in relation to current developments, etc. The death of any member of the local population by violence or accident involving NATO Forces.

17. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs). Details on flanking forces and higher levels resources. Any NATO Forces engaging any organized opposition group. Any major pers, eqpt or other deficiencies that will restrict the employment of any bde unit.

18. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EFFI). How can I prevent the armed factions from understanding and anticipating our actions?

4.3.1 Critical events to be considered

19. Staff are to pay particular attention to the following issues:

- a. Information campaign – designed to isolate the paramilitaries and guerrilla factions from the Zack population.
- b. HUMINT- collection to understand the dynamics of the culture, and people of Batumigrad.
- c. Non-lethal weapons or options that reduce the potential of collateral damage to non-combatants and critical infrastructure.

4.3.2 Conclusion

20. While I understand that the above guidance is my no means all encompassing nor complete, it should serve as a good common basis for staff planning. This is an operation set amongst the people and we must be mindful not to distance ourselves from them by hasty actions or shortsighted solutions. Our support to UNMIB is vital to help the people in a direct and visible way. We must retain the moral high ground and gather the information on those that will oppose us. Concurrently we will inform and influence the all parties to engage in negotiations rather than violence. Unrelenting resolve and firm action will be our hallmarks. I expect the staff will identify and raise additional issues and concerns that must be resolved in order to complete our mission.

4.4 Decision-making and commanding [7]

In this vignette the battalion will set up a compound for the battalion in Batumigrad. The battalion has the responsibility of an area in the city with a majority of Zack population. The building for the compound is already chosen and inspected. First a provisional battalion command post will be created. The first CEV company and a Sense platoon will take care of the security in the area around the compound. The second CEV company will organize the situation at the compound and the first MEV company will patrol the battleground AOR The second MEV company is battleground reserve.

Events that might occur in this vignette are:

- The main route is blocked by a crash between two trucks. It is unclear if this blockade is on purpose.
- A vehicle of own troops is involved in a traffic incident. Three soldiers are injured and two Zack people are killed. The Zack population is starting to revolt against the NATO troops.




Figure 3: Vignette 1 Crisis response operation: city entry

4.4.1 Decision-making

The tasks the battalion will perform are as follows:

- With UAV's the main route and an alternative route are explored.
- The Sense company is conducting surveillance operations in the BG AOR
- A MEV company will drive through the main route and at the route vehicles are left behind to take in positions in order to keep the route open and take care of the traffic.
- After crossing the main intersection a platoon takes position in order to keep the route open.
- Another CEV company and MEV company occupy key area's in the AOR.
- After entering the district a CEV company is taking control of the area by establishing observation posts (and possible some checkpoints) and conducting patrols. The population is not favoring the NATO forces, however large threats are not expected.

Information needed to set up this plan.

- The required speed of deployment. This influences the amount of routes the units will use to arrive in the area.
- The threat. Is the population against it or not and how large is the chance of barricades at the main route? This influences the amount of routes (or alternative routes prepared for), the use of weapons and the intensity of checkpoints.

- The condition of the roads and possible choke points.
- Geographical information to determine suitable locations for observation posts (where do roads cross?).
- Activities of the population. Will there be a market or are all people in houses?
- Where are Zack factions located and how will they act? This influences the segmentation of the area and the routes of the NATO forces to deploy first.
- What are possible situations the observation posts or patrols might be challenged with? Humanitarian situation, people begging for food. Threats and attacks.

4.4.2 Commanding

Information requirements during conduct of the plan, since this information was not certain at the decision making phase (thus should be verified) or might be dynamic (rapidly changing).

Battalion level:

- Progress of deployment of companies
- Reaction of the population

Company level (the company that is taking care of the security of the area):

- Progress of deployment of platoons. The platoon that should take in positions at the bridge and the two platoons that take in observation posts and conduct patrols in the area. Which soldiers are at what observation post and what is the situation.
- Reaction of the population
- The ability to use roads. Are roads blocked and are roads passable for heavy equipment.

Platoon and group level (the platoon that is securing the three bridges):

- Progress on creating the position on the intersection by the three groups.
- Possible threats in the near neighborhood of the intersection. Are there buildings in the neighborhood that overview the intersection?
- The time new troops will arrive and pass the bridge. The extent of traffic.

Additional information requirement at event 1 (blockade at the main route):

Battalion level:

- The expected duration of the blockade and the progress of own forces in passing this intersection. To determine if the clearance of another route is necessary.
- What is the possibility of escalation of the incident? To determine if the other unit should be tasked to deescalate and to determine guidelines for the company.

Company level:

- Is the situation set up or a coincidence? If the situation is set up, what are the underlying grounds.
- Amount of vehicles that is involved in the incident
- Amount of people involved in situation.

Platoon and group level:

- Is the situation set up or a coincidence? If the situation is set up, what are the underlying grounds.
- Who is responsible for dealing with a traffic accident? The local police (BPP) or not? What are the ROE in this case?
- Background (ethnic, member of a faction) of people involved in the situation.

5. Urban Challenge 2025 – Vignette 2: Defensive operation

5.1 Situation

a. Armed Factions. Open fighting has erupted in Batumigrad and across the province following a week of riots at the Batumigrad University main campus, heightened levels of violence elsewhere in the capital, and the assassinations of Zack Liberation Party (ZLP) leader Maria Cliver and the reputed leader of the Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF) in Batumi Province during a riot. The security situation quickly deteriorated, with all armed factions openly engaging in small skirmishes and terror attacks against ethnic symbolic sites across the province. A deliberate attack by ethnic Zack elements on NATO forces at the main Batumigrad University campus led to a number of NATO casualties and concerns that further attacks were imminent. Loyalist (Zack) deserter forces currently control the Batumigrad University campus, and in conjunction with ZLF elements have openly attacked NATO forces in a number of locations near the campus. The upswing in violence has prompted the Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) and Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) to target Zack civilians and cultural sites at an unprecedented high level. See COP Capture (Red) 301800Z Apr 25;

b. Assessment. Loyalists, bolstered by their recent tactical success in controlling the university, are preparing to expand their control over other important Batumigrad sites. This includes plans to control the downtown Batumigrad and drive out the Bowl ethnic community situated in the city core. It remains unclear if competing armed Zack elements will adopt a greater measure of coordination in their attempts to achieve their aims. Secessionists will continue to target the Zack ethnic community to disrupt and weaken ethnic Zack factions and cause panic among the ethnic Zack population; and

c. Friendly Forces. BFOR has come under extreme pressure across Batumi province to take immediate action to restore stability in the region and in particular the capital where armed factions have targeted NATO forces and civilians. The BFOR Comd has ordered MNBs to adopt a defensive posture and protect areas presently under their control concurrent with NATO planning to re-establish a secure environment. The NATO rapid reaction land force is currently deployed and committed in Brenmorrow to assist in restoring order and protecting the Zack minority under attack by Secessionists armed factions. The CA Bde retains control of the majority of Batumigrad; however, one of the BGs has suffered significant casualties. Surprised by the sudden escalation of conflict, the BG that held Batumigrad University was badly mauled, losing more than 15 % of its strength in soldiers and equipment. The mauled BG is presently holding in a defensive posture to the North of the university and protecting important sites within their AO. The remainder of the Bde has been ordered to adopt a defensive posture, and continue protecting critical sites within the AO while the Bde plans a counter move to regain the initiative, defeat armed factions currently controlling the university, and re-establish control in Batumigrad. See COP Capture (Blue) 301800Z Apr 25.

5.2 Decision-making and commanding [7]

After a week of riots at the university campus the intensity of the riots were enlarged by the assassination of a high ZLP official. The ZLF are shooting Bowl students at the campus. The heavy weapons of the ACS deserters are stored at a NATO controlled site, however a large amount of manportable weapons are still available to ZLF and ACS deserters. The battlegroup commander is on speaking term with the leader of ZLP Mrs. Maria Cliver.

The Batumi Police Force is active and cooperating with NATO forces. The Batumigrad police can muster a platoon for crowd and riot control. However policemen receive only a small pay and cannot completely trusted to be impartial.

The QRF platoon of the battalion has detected this shooting and reports that some hundreds of people are involved in this incident. Civilian casualties are being evacuated in civilian ambulances. The international press provides live TV pictures of the event. The platoon takes a defending position in the street at the exit of the campus. The company responsible for the area in which the campus is situated tries to contain the situation by isolating the campus. However this is hard because Bowl people want to enter the campus to take revenge on the Zack people and Zack people want to exit the campus. Next to this escalation between Zack and Bowl people, the ZLF and ACS deserters take advantage of the situation by creating chaos and trying to expand their control over important Batumigrad sites.

BOWL BFF fighters are located in buildings in the close neighborhood of the campus that is outside of the AOR of the battalion. The battalion is trying to deny the entry of these BFF fighters and is observing the Battlegroup border area.

Events that might occur in this vignette are:

- The student counselor is arriving at the NATO troops outside of the campus and would like to enter the campus in order to get grip on the situation. It is unclear if he will be able to deescalate the situation.
- The ZLF breaks through the blocking position of one of the platoons of the NATO forces and enters the university terrain.




Figure 4: Vignette 2 Defensive operation - Riots

5.2.1 Decision-making

The tasks the battalion will perform are as follows:

- The Sense company is conducting surveillance operations in the BG AOR
- A CEV company conducts patrols in the AOR. The campus is included in their AOR.
- The two MEV companies are conducting patrols in their AOR. They can after reorganization provide an additional reserve of a half CEV platoon.
- The second CEV company is tied up in guard duties of the base and ACS weapon storage sites

Information needed to set up this plan.

- The required speed of deployment. Is the company able to block the entrances to the campus
- The threat. Is the population against it or not and how large is the chance of barricades at the main route? This influences the amount of routes (or alternative routes prepared for), the use of weapons and the intensity of checkpoints.
- Geographical information to determine suitable locations for observation posts (where do roads cross?).
- Activities of the population. Will there be a market or are all people in houses?
- Where are ZLF snipers located and how will they act?

5.2.2 Commanding

Information requirements during conduct of the plan, since this information was not certain at the decision making phase (thus should be verified) or might be dynamic (rapidly changing).

Battalion level:

- Progress of redeployment of companies
- Reaction of the Zack and BOWL population
- Activities of the Batumi Police

Company level (the company that is taking care of the security of the campus):

- Progress of deployment of platoons. Can the area of the campus effectively being isolated. Which soldiers are at what observation post and what is the situation.
- Reaction of the population
- The ability to use roads towards the campus. Are roads blocked and are roads passable for heavy equipment.

Platoon and group level (the QRF platoon that is securing the approaches to the campus):

- Progress on creating checkpoints on the approaches by the three groups.
- Possible locations of the snipers in the neighborhood that overview the checkpoints?
- Are there buildings in the neighborhood that overview the intersection?

Additional information requirement at event 1 (breaching the defense perimeter):

Battalion level:

- The exact location of the penetration of the defense perimeter?
- Are Zack combatants and non-combatants mixed up?
- What is the possibility of escalation of the incident? To determine if the other unit should be tasked to deescalate and to determine guidelines for the company.
- Possibility for cooperation with the Batumi Police Force
- Is the route between the campus and the battlegroup base still open for casevac?

Company level:

- Is the situation set up or a coincidence? If the situation is set up, what are the underlying grounds.
- Amount of vehicles that is involved in the incident
- Amount of people involved in situation.

Platoon and group level:

- Is the situation set up or a coincidence? If the situation is set up, what are the underlying grounds.
- Who is responsible for dealing with Riot control? The local police (BPP) or not? What are the ROE in this case? Are they able to deal with this problem.
- Background (ethnic, member of a faction) of people involved in the situation.

6. Urban Challenge 2025 – Vignette 3: Offensive operation

6.1 Situation

Armed Factions. Continuing violence by paramilitaries and guerrilla factions within Batumigrad and throughout the Province of Batumi has created a crisis. Since the recent withdrawal of ACS Forces, a breakdown of law and order and an increase in ethnically motivated terror attacks has created unrest and tension. IDPs fearful of continued bloodshed have fled to the capital from rural areas. In the past several weeks, violence ranging from random drive by shooting and fire bombings, to deliberate attacks by paramilitary groups on important political, cultural and commercial sites, has dramatically increased. The assassination of the moderate Governor of Batumi on 19 Apr, followed by the passing of UNSCR 1377 (see UNSCR 1377 Serial 7 Annex C) by the UN Security Council, led to the deployment of a NATO Coalition Force to the Province of Batumi. See Common Operating Picture (COP) Capture (Red) 281800Z Apr 25 for the most recent intelligence update.

Last week's riots at the Batumigrad University main campus and Provincial Legislative Building further escalated tensions and open conflict by armed factions. These riots were followed by seizure of the Batumigrad Provincial Legislative Building by Zack deserters who, in apparent collaboration with the Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF), now control the downtown core and approaches to it. Additional street barricades and the presence of small crowds of angry civilians are present in all ethnic neighbourhoods of Batumigrad. Secessionist armed factions - the Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) and Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) - are actively targeting Zack civilians and cultural sites. See Common Operating Picture (COP) Capture (Red) 011800Z May 02 for the most recent intelligence update.

Assessment. Zack loyalists, bolstered by their recent tactical success in controlling the downtown core, are preparing to expand their control over important Batumigrad sites and appear intent on driving out from the city core ethnic Bowl and Caspian inhabitants. Secessionists will probably continue to target the Zack ethnic community to weaken Zack loyalist morale and armed factions.

Friendly Forces. BFOR has come under extreme pressure across Batumi province to take immediate action to restore stability in the region. BFOR Comd's intent is to restore order and re-establish a secure environment in order that re-unification of Batumi Province with Mazura can be achieved peacefully. The first priority is to create a secure environment in Batumi Province, protecting important sites from control or damage by armed factions. The NATO main effort calls for restoration of order in the capital and protection of important civil infrastructure, cultural, political and commercial sites. The CA Bde has been assigned the core of Batumigrad. See COP Capture (Blue) 011800Z May 25 for the Blue force update.

6.2 Decision-making and commanding [7]

After the riots the ZLF and ACS deserters have seized the Provincial Legislative Building and they now control downtown core and approaches to it. Additional street barricades and the presence of small crowds of angry Zack civilians are present. The BFF and BLB are attacking the Zack civilians and cultural sites. An unknown faction has seized a weapon storage site and heavy weapons are under their control. The battalion has to regain the control of this area to create a stable situation again. The ZLF and ACS deserters have prepared barricades and are present at all corners of the two main streets in the downtown area. They might also be present in and at the top of buildings. The battalion will try to isolate the area and expand control.

Events that might occur in this vignette are:

- ZLF and ACS deserters have concentrated their forces and conduct an ambush at the NATO forces and they destroyed two CEV vehicles and pinned down a Cev platoon.
- Zack population is blocking the road and is angry against the NATO forces.




Figure 5: Vignette 2 Offensive operation – Clearing legislative building

6.2.1 Decision-making

The tasks the battalion will perform are as follows:

- The Sense company is conducting surveillance operations in the BG AOR
- Two CEV companies prepare to retake the block
- Two MEV companies secure the area to prevent Zack ZLF reinforcements coming in and escaping of ZACK ZLF armed people.
- Logistic personnel perform guard duties at the base and the remaining ACS weapon storage sites.
- Brig reserve (a CEV coy) is not expected to be in the AOR sooner than 4 hours away

Information needed to set up this plan.

- The required speed of deployment. Are the MEV companies able to block the entrances to the Legislative building.
- The threat. Geographical information to determine suitable locations for checkpoints.
- Where are ZLF battle positions located and how many heavy weapons have they seized?
- Are BFF personnel involved in seizing the weapon storage site and have they seized heavy weapons.
- Will BFF personnel get involved in the crises?

6.2.2 Commanding

Information requirements during conduct of the plan, since this information was not certain at the decision making phase (thus should be verified) or might be dynamic (rapidly changing).

Battalion level:

- Progress of deployment of companies
- Reaction of the BOWL and ZACK population
- Activities of the Batumi Police Force
- Location and activity of the brigade reserve

Company level (the company that is taking care of the security of the area):

- Progress of redeployment of platoons. Can the building effectively being isolated
- Can the building be approached without being detected
- Reaction of the population
- The ability to use roads. Are roads blocked and are roads passable for heavy equipment.

Platoon and group level (the CEV platoon that is assaulting the building):

- Progress on the approach to the building by the three groups.
- Location of the enemy heavy equipment
- Strength of opposing forces
- Are there possible hostages or non-combatants inside of the building.

- The time new troops will arrive and pass the bridge. The extent of traffic.

Additional information requirement at event 1 (ambush):

Battalion level:

- The exact location of the Ambush site
- Can the ambush site be isolated
- Is the brigade reserve able to free the ambushed platoon
- How is the situation on the ambush site
- Is the route between the ambush site and the BG Base still open for casevac

Company level: (Brigade reserve)

- Is the situation set up or a coincidence? If the situation is set up, what are the underlying grounds.
- Amount of weapons and people involved in the ambush
- Amount of people involved in situation.
- Amount of casualties to be evacuated

Platoon and group level: (Brigade reserve)

- What are the ROEs in this case?
- What is the exact location of the ambush
- Background (ethnic, member of a faction) of people involved in the situation.

7. Integration with “Military Strikes in Atlantis”: A first step

The goal to create an urban operations scenario in a physically larger scale and joint context lead to an integration of the previous “Urban Challenge 2025” with “Military Strikes in Atlantis”.

“Military Strikes in Atlantis” describes a vignette [8] using the Atlantis geopolitical context as used in the exercise “Final Lance 2000”. This vignette created situations that were expected to trigger situation assessment agents such as maneuver detection, clustering, and commercial air corridor, etc. The action of the vignette is centered on a 2-ship convoy being simultaneously attacked by submarine and aircrafts. The two surprised attacks occur while other activities are taking place in order to complicate the assessment of the situation. Those activities include commercial air and maritime traffic, observation of whale migration, and other military operations such as surveillance air patrolling and missile deployment. The document provides enough technical information so the vignette can easily amplified to include the participation of the other units of the naval task group. As for the current document, [8] was written to stimulate and test situation assessment algorithms being developed in the defense R&D community.

For the moment, the integration is most basic, restricted to a mapping of the figure 1 area to the general context of Atlantis illustrated in figure 6. The result is presented in figure 7.

A subsequent document to this report will present an integration of both scenarios. Integrating these two scenarios will require forcing a coherence between the two scenarios: i.e. aligning actors, locations, and time-history such that a single context results. This will meet the objectives of potential users such as the TTCPC-C3I-TP1.



Figure 6: Geographical map of Atlantis



Figure 7: Possible location of the Urban Challenge 2025 scenario within the Atlantis context

8. Conclusion

The goal of this document is to propose a relevant and realistic urban operations scenario that allows for the testing of concepts and prototypes of decision support systems for command and control design.

8.1 Review of the objective

The goal of this effort was to provide a robust experimental tool to the R&D community to design, test, validate, and benchmark command and control prototypes and concepts in a realistic urban operations scenario.

This document is the first in a series of documents that carefully define a relevant and realistic scenario to support R&D. The scenario is intended to stress command and control capabilities between and between units and across multiple echelons of command. Urban operations typically require well-coordinated and well-synchronized efforts across multiple echelons of command and between tactical units. The principles of systems engineering may be useful to address issues that the scenario cannot. In addition, the fields of human-factors and cognitive performance are necessary to consider during R&D. The goal in combining the strengths of these various disciplines is to achieve a scenario that most closely represents reality, and allows the R&D community to design, experiment, validate, and benchmark C2 system designs

This document presented an existing scenario enriched along time and international collaborations. It is a work in progress, and the authors welcome constructive inputs. The authors are open to input regarding the addition of new features and vignettes. The only constraint on contributions is that they be consistent with the purpose of this document and help in the R&D processes. It is a first step toward representing urban operations in the geographically wide context of “Military Strikes in Atlantis” scenario.

8.2 Roadmap

A subsequent document to this one will present an integration of both scenarios; i.e. “Urban Challenge 2025” and “Military Strikes in Atlantis”. Integrating these two scenarios will require forcing a coherence between the two scenarios: i.e. aligning actors, locations, and time-history such that a single context results. This will meet the objectives of potential users such as the TTCP-C3I-TP1.

The authors of this document envision a third document that will include two more scenarios from the Joint Forces Command Urban Operations Office: “Counterinsurgency in Port Lewis, 2015-2021” and “The attack on Qabus 2027”. The first scenario addresses a domestic counterinsurgency context precipitated by an outbreak of bacterial meningitis and influenza. The second, entitled “The attack on Qabus 2027”, addresses an overseas urban operations context. As previously mentioned, the series of documents produced by these authors are a ‘work in progress’ and they are open to input regarding the addition of new features and

vignettes. The only constraint on contributions is that they be consistent with the purpose of this document and help in the R&D processes. In this vein, inputs made by the Canadian Force Exercise Reaction Royale (held in the Quebec City area from April 30th to May 7th 2008) might be included in future iterations of this report. Specifically, CBRNE events and domestic coalition operations may be added.

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9. Annex A: Personality profiles

MIKLOS, Andres

Position: Alliance Federation Party (AFP) Leader and President of ACS

Place of Birth: Arlotte, ACS

Date of Birth: 14 February 1966

Education: BA Political Studies, MA Political Studies (University of Harj, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: AFP

Personality: President Miklos is a leader of strong convictions who is inclined to take action even if short-term losses are encountered. As a strong nationalist, he has shown himself as a politician who places the interest of his country foremost. He relies on his own perceptions and has often overridden advice offered by his government ministers. His ethnic Zack background is important to him, and it is improbable that he will ignore the plight of ethnic Zacks. He has never championed the use of violence, but can take strong measures to curb dissension and turmoil. As a statesman, there are limits to how far he can be trusted.

Background and Views: President Miklos was elected to power in 2024 on a platform promising economic renewal, international reconciliation, and an end to terrorist violence in the ACS. Although a socialist throughout his political career, he is viewed as a moderate political leader who can bring domestic stability and take initial steps toward restoring prestige to the much-maligned reputation of the ACS brought about by the poor domestic, human rights, and international relations record of his predecessor, President B. Presents. His willingness to accept the terms of the Toronto Agreement in 2024 highlight his analytical capability, bargaining capability, and willingness to achieve long-term gain at the cost of territory of no strategic consequence.

PRESENTS, Basil

Position: National Maintenance Party (NMP) Leader and former President of ACS

Place of Birth: Dementill, ACS

Date of Birth: 5 April 1955

Education: BA History, MA History (University of Karlstadt, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: NMP

Personality: Former President Presents is a leader of strong convictions who has demonstrated a willingness to take ruthless action to suppress dissent – political or social. A strong nationalist, he has shown himself capable of defying NATO and taking military action against a neighbouring state to gain greater territory and economic wealth. As a political leader, he relied on his government ministers, party apparatus and state security forces to maintain control. He was strongly pro-Zack in all his affairs, but gave the appearance of supporting the ethnic Bowl population to further his strategic goals during the 2015 War. Human rights were of little concern, and laws enacted by him and since repealed indicated how important having control over the media and any who defied him was to him. He is a strong believer in military preparedness and use of armed might to intimidate internal and external opponents.

Background and Views: President Presents was elected to power in 2010 on a platform promising strength, international respect, and an end to Mazuran occupation of claimed ACS territory in southeastern Mazura. Holding strong socialist views, he legislated economic reforms that in the end crippled the economy of the ACS and lowered the standard of living of all citizens. He has condemned the efforts of the newly elected government to seek reconciliation on the international stage, and remains convinced that his economic plan will work if given time. He has vowed never to appear before any international tribunal to answer questions pertaining to his human rights record or conduct of his military during the 2015 War.

HAVLICH, Konstantine

Position: Chairman of Defence

Place of Birth: Kriegerstadt, ACS

Date of Birth: 11 September 1970

Education: BSc Physics (University of Kriegerstadt, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: AFP

Personality: Impulsive and quick to act, Chairman of Defence Havlich has a strong personality and ambitions to become President. Unwilling to tolerate or suffer setbacks, he will abandon plans or activities that show promise of revealing any weakness that could invite criticism. His personal ambition is more important than his concern for any ethnic group. He is supportive of the President, and is viewed by many to have been instrumental in his party achieving electoral victory in 2024. Nonetheless, he is anxious to take over leadership of the Party.

Background and Views: Chairman of Defence Havlich was first elected to power in 2013. He is a moderate who quietly criticized involvement of the ACS in the 2015 War. He is pro-ethnic Zack, and the outpouring of support from most in the ACS for the ethnic Zack in Batumi Province has placed him in the uncomfortable position of having to support the President while at the same time sensing the need to satisfy pundits and voters in the ACS. He is pro-West only insofar as this position invites Western economic aid and international monetary fund support for the reinvigoration of the collapsing ACS economy.

MESHDEN, Petre

Position: Batumi Province Governor

Place of Birth: Sudplass, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 20 November 1972

Education: BA Economics (University of Batumigrad, ACS), MA Economics (London School of Economics)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: AFP

Personality: Strong and decisive, but a moderate in his approach to most issues, Governor Meshden has an ability to think independently. His political ambitions have kept him from always voicing his opinion when criticism of government policy would have served his country and promoted peaceful co-existence with neighbouring states.

Background and Views: Governor Meshden served as Chairman of Finance 2005-2007; he was appointed Governor by the President in 2024. He is generally pro-West in his leaning, seeing the advantages of having a free enterprise system. Notwithstanding, loyalty to the President and Party permit him limited opportunity to voice his support for a manifest change in the political allegiance of Batumi Province. It remains unclear if Meshden will seek to challenge others in 2026 during elections for provincial leadership, or if he will seek residence elsewhere in the ACS. His failure to condemn the ACS invasion of southeastern Mazura during the 2015 War was noted by the Mazuran political leadership and media. This alone may compel Meshden to remain a citizen of the ACS.

Update: On 7 April 2025, 48 hours after this profile was prepared, Governor Meshden was assassinated in a shooting attack by unknown assailants.

HARNOTT, Major General Clause

Position: Commander 5 (ACS) Motor Rifle Division

Place of Birth: Hegsdorf, ACS

Date of Birth: 20 November 1970

Education: BA History (University of Batumigrad, ACS), MA Military Science (Allethelm University, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: nil

Personality: Domineering, competent and ambitious, Maj-Gen Harnott appears tired at the end of a long and stressful career.

Background and Views: This infantry officer rose quickly through the ranks to become commander of 5 MRD. During the 2015 War, he served on the General Staff and personally did not participate in action against NATO forces in Mazura. He studied in Batumigrad during his youth, and received a degree at the University of Batumigrad. His close ties with the city and province of Batumi made him a natural fit to command the MRD that eventually was garrisoned in Batumi Province. He will retire from military service in 2026, and plans to take a research and fellowship position offered to him at Allethelm University.

BELLISH, Stan

Position: Bowl Democratic Party (BDP) Leader

Place of Birth: Brenmorrow, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 23 July 1980

Education: BA Social Psychology (University of Batumigrad, ACS), M Ed (Allethelm University, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: BDP

Personality: Stan Bellish has an intellectual approach to problem-solving, and has an adventurous approach to life that is reflected in his political style as well.

Background and Views: Stan Bellish became the leader of the BDP when it was founded in 2016. Considered an intellectual by his peers and supporters, Bellish had no difficulty swaying others in the ethnic Bowl community on both sides of the border to accept his views on many issues. Although many of his peers argue that Batumi Province should seek autonomy rather than separation from the ACS and re-integration with Mazura, Bellish has been consistent in his call for re-unification of Batumi Province with Mazura. Bellish has developed and maintained working relationships with the Governor of the Province, former head of the Batumi Provincial Police and leaders of the Alliance Federation Party, even though these relationships can best be summarized as strained. Bellish has openly denounced the violence of both the Bowl Liberation Brigade (BLB) and Bowl Freedom Fighters, but many believe that he already has established power-sharing agreements with leaders of the less radical BLB in the event that Batumi Province becomes a Mazuran province. Concerning UNMIB and NATO presence, Bellish has repeatedly stated that both international organizations are arriving in support of the BDP, which he claims is the only entity that truly and legitimately reflects the ambitions, desires and interests of the Bowl community. Bellish is expected to posture himself as the approving authority for both UNMIB and NATO activities and deployments in Batumi Province.

CLIVER, Maria

Position: Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP) Leader

Place of Birth: Helgrow, ACS

Date of Birth: 23 July 1981

Education: BA Anthropology (University of Maliksun, ACS), M Ed (Allethelm University, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: ZLP

Personality: Intelligent, aggressive and rebellious, Maria Cliver poses a challenge to stability in the Province.

Background and Views: Maria Cliver was one of two prominent ZLP members - one who has since abandoned politics and returned to the ACS and another who was killed in a Bowl Liberation Brigade or Bowl Freedom Fighter ambush two years ago – who founded the ZLP in 2017. Cliver is a staunch ACS nationalist who was born in Camerroy, Batumi. She is defiantly proud of her ethnic Zack heritage, and believes that the only way to fight against growing ethnic Bowl nationalism, ethnic Caspian calls to Mazura for assistance, and increasing attacks by ethnic Bowl guerrillas is through political action by a party in Batumi Province dedicated to defend ethnic Zack interests. She has not formally aligned her party with the Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF), but it is widely believed that the ZLF is the military wing of the ZLP. Regardless, both the ZLP and ZLF appear to undertake coordinated actions and it is no coincidence that both elements openly support the actions and policies of the other. Cliver's party, although opposed to many policies of the Alliance Federation Party and National Maintenance Party, receives from these other two ACS political parties funding and policy advice. The ZLP is most popular in areas where a large percentage of ethnic Zack voters reside, such as in Batumigrad. Nonetheless, the party has never been successful in winning a seat in the national assembly of the ACS given the minority status of the ethnic Zack population in Batumi Province and the regional focus of the ZLP.

CLOUSSEAULT, Inspector Commander JG

Position: Batumi Provincial Police Chief

Place of Birth: Merckgrad, Batumi

Date of Birth: 23 July 1974

Education: BA Sociology (University of Batumigrad, ACS), MA Criminology (University of Budapest, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: nil

Personality: Known as an experienced, competent and fair security officer, Inspector-Commander Clousseault is also hard-working. His “non-inclusive” views on a multi-ethnic province, however, could pose problems.

Background and Views: Inspector-Commander Clousseault has served with the BPP since 1995. Experienced in many aspects of police work, he was appointed to his post by the Governor of Batumi at the beginning of March 2025 when the previous BPP Chief resigned to voice his objections to the departure of ACS military forces from the province. Many predict that Inspector-Commander Clousseault will have great difficulties restoring some semblance of unity to what was never really a completely unified police force. Lacking sufficient equipment and personnel, the BPP is now confronted with serious divisions along ethnic lines within the force. Those ethnic Zack officers who remain in the force are treated with suspicion by ethnic Bowl and ethnic Caspian officers and community members. This suspicion is reinforced by the sudden departure from the force of many ethnic Zack officers, rumoured to have joined the ranks of the Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF) and/or ACS deserters. Policing in Batumigrad and elsewhere in the province of Batumi will be even more difficult in the days ahead if departed members of the force reveal police procedures and information to the ZLF and ACS deserters. The new BPP Chief, as his first priority, will have to restore public confidence in his force, badly shaken by unsubstantiated allegations made by all ethnic groups of police wrong-doing and brutality. Confidence building will be particularly difficult in the ethnic Caspian and ethnic Zack community, where earlier statements expressing Clousseault’s desire for Batumi to become an ethnically pure Bowl province have been widely published.

(unknown)

Position: Zack Loyalist Forces (ZLF) Leader

Place of Birth: unknown

Date of Birth: unknown

Education: unknown

Ethnic Background: suspected Zack

Party Affiliation: possibly ZLP

Personality: Rumoured to be tough and uncaring, this leader of unknown identity poses a major security risk to UNMIB and NATO forces.

Background and Views: The ZLF leader allegedly was instrumental in founding the ZLF in 2017, at the same time that Maria Cliver and others formed the Zack Loyalist Party (ZLP). It is probable that Cliver knows the identity of the ZLF leader, and that both know intimate details of each other's political announcements and guerrilla events before they occur. The ZLF leader has been cautious structuring a loosely knit organization of cells capable of some coordinated action. Given the ZLF's record of conducting hostile attacks against ethnic Bowl targets, ethnic Bowl guerrilla forces, and ethnic Caspian community centres, it is probable that the ZLF leader is not inhibited from conducting further actions by individuals and small groups against traditional targets. Moreover, NATO and UNMIB can expect the ZLF leader to direct his or her cells to attack UNMIB and NATO targets if either international force is perceived as favouring non-Zack ethnic groups or the restoration of Batumi Province to Mazuran sovereign control. Given the deteriorating security situation in Batumi, particularly in Batumigrad where a sizable ethnic Zack minority resides, it can be expected that the ZLF will cautiously approach retired ethnic Zack police officials, deserting ACS soldiers, and ethnic Zack community members to join or otherwise support their growing movement.

HATTERNA, Colonel B

Position: Senior Ranking (ACS) Deserter

Place of Birth: Batumigrad, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 16 June 1975

Education: BSc Chemistry (University of Batumigrad, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: possibly ZLP

Personality: This experienced and competent commander was respected and admired by many in the ACS.

Background and Views: Colonel Hatterna joined the ACS in 1993 and was commissioned in 1997. He has extensive mechanized infantry experience, and spent three years as a junior officer in a parachute unit where he studied Special Forces operations. He performed well in all command appointments and attended three staff courses during his career. Colonel Hatterna had a reputation as a diligent officer who respected those who served under his command, regardless of their ethnicity. He was serving as G3 of 5 (ACS) MRD, and was three years from retirement when he deserted, citing a need for ethnic Zack military personnel to return to Batumi Province to protect the ethnic Zack population from the arrival of marauding Mazuran soldiers. Colonel Hatterna has the knowledge and means to fight in an urban environment. Given that many deserters are disenchanted with the ACS military for departing Batumi Province and not supporting the ethnic Zack population, it remains to be seen if Hatterna can take charge of the disorganized groups of deserters in Batumigrad. If he can, he will probably attempt to demonstrate their collective strength in acts intended to defy NATO and UNMIB presence. Although it is assessed that Hatterna will prefer not to openly confront NATO forces in a battle of attrition, violent clashes against small or isolated NATO and UNMIB elements to demonstrate the resolve and strength of the deserters cannot be discounted. Hatterna can be counted on to use information operations, asymmetric attack, and possibly Zack Loyalist Forces support in an urban operations campaign. Most deserters lack extensive military experience, so Hatterna will rely upon their knowledge of terrain in and around Batumigrad to defeat any that pose a military threat to him.

MAKI, Colonel N.

Position: UN Mission in BATUMI Commander (Fin)

(Note: Further details not required. UNMIB withdrew from theatre upon arrival of NATO forces.)

COOPERLY, Katherine

Position: Mayor of Batumigrad

Place of Birth: Bowlvil, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 12 May 1971

Education: BA Criminology (University of Batumigrad, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: AFP

Personality: This city official has very good political instincts and is willing to cooperate with UNMIB and NATO forces.

Background and Views: Katherine Cooperly is a relatively new member of the AFP, and only recently elected (2023) to the post of City Mayor. Cooperly's electoral success was attributed to her ability to derive support from both the ethnic Bowl and ethnic Caspian electorate in the capital. She campaigned on a platform to build consensus among all ethnic groups, but she failed to inspire the ethnic Zack population. She has hinted that she intends to campaign as a member of the Bowl Democratic Party (BDP) for the post of Batumigrad Mayor in the 2026 national elections, but it is unclear whether the BDP will accept her or any other former AFP politician into the party.

JARESKI, Captain Julien

Position: Chief of Police (Batumigrad)

Place of Birth: Batumigrad, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 12 May 1973

Education: BA History (University of Batumigrad, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: nil

Personality: This senior officer of the Batumi Provincial Police (BPP) is an efficient administrator, but one who has difficulty controlling inter-ethnic friction within his force.

Background and Views: Captain Julien Jareski was selected by the Chief of the BPP in 2021 to command the BPP force in Batumigrad. He has a fairly comprehensive understanding of police work, having attended various police seminars and workshops throughout the ACS and Europe. His major failing has been his inability to quash dissent within the Batumigrad Police Force, or to inspire those living within the ethnic groups in Batumigrad of his vision for a safe and secure environment. He maintains close working relationships with both the Mayor of Batumigrad and the BPP Chief, and claims he will cooperate fully with UNMIB and NATO forces in Batumi. Captain Jareski was personally implicated in a charge of police brutality against several ethnic Zack citizens two years ago, but charges were never laid. Accusations of police cover-up in this case persist.

LISTNOM, Henders

Position: ZLF Company Commander (Batumigrad)

Place of Birth: Endriks, ACS

Date of Birth: 12 May 1975

Education: BA Sociology (University of Kriegerstadt, ACS), BA Anthropology (University of Maliksun, ACS),

Ethnic Background: Zack

Party Affiliation: suspected ZLP

Personality: This leader of the ZLF has a reputation for taking vengeful actions against ethnic Bowl leaders and ordinary citizens whenever the Batumi Liberation Brigade (BLB) or Batumi Freedom Fighters (BFF) claim responsibility for attacks.

Background and Views: Henders Listnom joined the ZLF when it was founded in 2017. He has claimed that only through armed intimidation and acts of retaliation can the ethnic Zack population be protected from BLB and BFF atrocities. He distrusts the Batumi Provincial Police, pointing to their ineffectiveness to protect the ethnic Zack community throughout Batumi Province. He developed close ties with Maria Cliver, leader of the Zack Liberation Party, while he was a student at the University of Maliksun. It is unclear, however, whether he is an actual party member. He spent 7 years in the army; claims from his followers that Listnom served in a Special Forces unit have never been substantiated.

WAHL, Karter

Position: Bowl Liberation Brigade (Batumiograd City Commander)

Place of Birth: Batumiograd, Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 12 May 1993

Education: BA Political Studies (University of Batumiograd, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: suspected BDP

Personality: This charismatic guerrilla group leader commands a well-organised group of cells in Batumiograd. He is particularly embittered about the loss of family members in a Zack Liberation Force attack a year ago. Nonetheless, he is considered an idealist in search of a reformed political process and re-unification with Mazura where many of his relatives live.

Background and Views: Karter Wahl joined the BLB in 2015. Raised and educated in Batumiograd, he has a well-established network of sympathizers and a thorough knowledge of the city. He may have political aspirations with the Bowl Democratic Party (BDP), and may indeed already be a member. He is wanted by the Batumi Provincial Police on numerous charges stemming from his guerrilla activities.

AYOTTE, Patrik

Position: Bowl Freedom Fighters (Batumi City Commander)

Place of Birth: Batumi, ACS

Date of Birth: 1 July 1987

Education: BA Biology (University of Batumi, ACS)

Ethnic Background: Bowl

Party Affiliation: suspected BDP

Personality: This guerrilla group leader commands a well-organised group of cells in Batumi. He is the more radical, and less idealistic, of the two guerrilla leaders in Batumi.

Background and Views: Patrik Ayotte joined the BFF in 2011. Raised and educated in Batumi, he has a well-established network of sympathizers and a thorough knowledge of the city. Although some in the BFF within Batumi are suspected of desiring a return of Batumi Province to Mazur rule, Ayotte is a firm believer in outright independence for the province as the best means of serving the Bowl people. The BFF has claimed responsibility for most terrorist attacks in the ACS outside Batumi Province, and has claimed responsibility for many attacks against ethnic Zakh leaders and citizens within the province. He is wanted by the Batumi Provincial Police on numerous charges stemming from his guerrilla activities.

TENFOLD, Karla

Position: Mazuran National Coalition Party (MNCP) Leader and Prime Minister

Place of Birth: Halgrath, Mazura

Date of Birth: 14 August 1966

Education: BSc Chemistry (University of Altenville, Mazura)

Ethnic Background: Caspian

Party Affiliation: MNCP

Personality: This charismatic political leader, popular with Western leaders, is democratic and forward-looking in her views.

Background and Views: Elected to her first mandate as Prime Minister in 2018, Karla Tenfold has worked hard to right the economy and remedy problems in southern Mazura stemming from the 2015 War with the ACS. She has worked hard to convince her party and country that re-unification of the Bowl Province with Mazura can be peacefully achieved. Lobbying of foreign leaders, and sensitive negotiations with the new leadership in the ACS prior to the Toronto Conference of December 2024, succeeded in paving the way for the re-unification process to begin. Although Tenfold's popularity is mostly ethnic Caspian based, she is also popular among many ethnic Bowl voters in southern Mazura making any claim by the Bowl Democratic Party (BDP) to automatic political leadership of Batumi Province once it becomes part of Mazura problematic for the BDP.

FASTING, Daryl

Position: Mazuran United Party (MUP) Leader and Opposition Leader

Place of Birth: Kahneora, Mazura

Date of Birth: 7 September 1962

Education: BA Psychology (University of Bullenburg, Mazura), MA Social Psychology (University of Nenndleburg, Mazura)

Ethnic Background: Caspian

Party Affiliation: MUP

Personality: This cautious and pragmatic politician, viewed as a consensus builder, retains a fairly high level of confidence within his party despite two failing campaigns under his leadership.

Background and Views: Defeated in the 2018 election, and again in 2023, Daryl Fasting remains an influential and respected politician throughout Mazura. His leadership during the 2015 War against the ACS was viewed positively by most in Mazura; however, his failure to turn around the softening economy after the war and several scandals within his party led to defeat of his party and positioning as the opposition party. Fasting has supported the move to regain Batumi Province as sovereign Mazuran territory. His political support is derived almost exclusively from ethnic Caspian voters; most ethnic Zacks despise Fasting because of his call upon NATO for support in the 2015 War.

ARKAN, Sendra

Position: Mazuran Minister of State for Defence

Place of Birth: Nenndleburg, Mazura

Date of Birth: 18 December 1976

Education: BSc, MSc and PhD Biology (University of Bullenburg, Mazura)

Ethnic Background: Caspian

Party Affiliation: MNCP

Personality: This former university professor is known for her ability to analyse problems and develop innovative solutions. Without much political experience and no military experience, she was elected to this high profile position because of her long-standing support to the MNCP and party leader.

Background and Views: Elected in 2018 and 2023, Arkan was recently appointed to the Defence Ministry. She has responded well to the challenge, and gained the confidence of senior members of the Ministry. She has voiced her concern to government colleagues and the media over allegations that Mazuran troops will conduct reprisal actions in Batumi Province as a means to exact revenge for the 2015 War. Rather than have this allegation and fear thwart efforts to re-unite Batumi Province with Mazura, Arkan is highly supportive of the initiative to have NATO and UNMIB troops restore stability in Batumi Province as pre-conditions for the political re-unification process.

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La conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle n'est pas une tâche facile. Un des prérequis souhaitables est la compréhension du contexte d'utilisation de tels systèmes, tant sur les plans stratégique, opérationnel, que tactique. Ce document se veut être un point de départ – le premier d'une série – vers l'atteinte de ce prérequis. Cet objectif est étudié sous l'angle d'une proposition de scénario significatif. Un scénario peut offrir sous certains aspects les avantages d'un laboratoire expérimental, puisqu'il est une représentation simplifiée de la réalité. Le contexte particulier duquel ce document émane est la conception de systèmes d'aide à la décision pour le commandement et contrôle, plus spécifiquement ses aspects liés à la fusion d'informations. Ce document présente un scénario existant, dont la forme originale a été enrichie. Le cœur de ce scénario a été proposé initialement pour un exercice du Collège d'État-major de Kingston (Canada). Il a été enrichi par la suite par un groupe de recherche de l'OTAN. Ce document présente le scénario initial, les ajouts apportés par le groupe de l'OTAN, et une intégration sommaire dans le cadre du scénario Military Strikes in Atlantis. L'objectif de ce document consiste donc à proposer un scénario significatif pour valider et tester des concepts et/ou prototypes de systèmes d'aide à la décision lors de la conception de systèmes de commandement et contrôle.

14. MOTS-CLÉS, DESCRIPTEURS OU RENSEIGNEMENTS SPÉCIAUX (Expressions ou mots significatifs du point de vue technique, qui caractérisent un document et peuvent aider à le cataloguer. Il faut choisir des termes qui n'exigent pas de cote de sécurité. Des renseignements tels que le modèle de l'équipement, la marque de fabrique, le nom de code du projet militaire, la situation géographique, peuvent servir de mots-clés. Si possible, on doit choisir des mots-clés d'un thésaurus, par exemple le "Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TESTS)". Nommer ce thésaurus. Si l'on ne peut pas trouver de termes non classifiés, il faut indiquer la classification de chaque terme comme on le fait avec le titre.)

Scenario, fusion d'informations, opérations urbaines

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