



The Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship: Methodology and Case-Study Synopses

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Abstract

This Technical Memorandum reports to the project sponsors, the Commander of Canada Command and the Deputy Commander of NORAD, on Phase One of the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship project. It consists of a literature search and review to develop an understanding of the varied perspectives of authors on the history and current state of North American security and defence. Eight key decision points in the nation's history have been identified as those to serve as detailed case-studies to be analysed in Phase Two. The case studies are as follows: Confederation, Ogdensburg and Hyde Park, the Korean War, the creation of North American Aerospace Defense Command and successive renewals of the agreement, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Arctic and the post-9/11 period. The concept of strategic culture is used to assist in explaining why Canadian leadership made the decisions they did at key points in its history, to help understand the kind of information provided and sought to inform those decisions, and to use that understanding as the basis to develop specific recommendations for ways to evolve the relationship to meet the challenges faced. The analysis of the extensive literature on Canada-US relations and the specific case-studies chosen for detailed analysis has revealed gaps and possible biases that must be explored and challenged. While the attainment of this body of knowledge is worthwhile in its own right, this appreciation will assist DND/CF and the Government of Canada in its efforts to evolve both the strategic relationship and the military-to-military relationship in order to meet the challenges posed by the security environment.

Résumé

Ce document technique a pour objet de faire rapport de la première phase du projet Relations de défense stratégique canado-américaines à ses promoteurs, soit le commandant du Commandement Canada et le commandant adjoint du NORAD. Il consiste en une étude et une analyse documentaires visant à accroître la compréhension des diverses perspectives dégagées par différents auteurs sur l'histoire et l'état actuel de la sécurité et de la défense nord-américaines. Huit principaux points de décision qui ont marqué l'histoire de la nation ont été identifiés et feront l'objet d'études de cas détaillées dans le cadre de la deuxième phase du projet. Ces études de cas viseront les événements suivants : la Confédération, Ogdensburg et Hyde Park, la guerre de Corée, la mise sur pied du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord ainsi que les renouvellements successifs de l'entente établie à cette fin, la guerre du Vietnam, la crise des missiles de Cuba, l'Arctique et la période suivant le 11 Septembre. La notion de culture stratégique est employée dans le but d'expliquer les fondements des décisions prises par les officiers canadiens dans le cadre de ces événements historiques, de mieux comprendre le type d'information obtenue et recherchée afin de justifier ces décisions et de tirer parti de cette compréhension en vue de formuler des recommandations spécifiques portant sur le développement des relations pour relever les défis actuels. L'analyse de la vaste documentation sur les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis et les études de cas spécifiques sélectionnées pour une analyse en profondeur ont révélé l'existence de lacunes et de préjugés possibles qu'il est important d'étudier à fond et de débattre. Outre l'intérêt intrinsèque certain que présente l'ensemble de

connaissances visé, les fruits de cet examen aideront le MDN, les FC ainsi que le gouvernement du Canada à continuer de développer les relations stratégiques et les liens qui unissent les organisations militaires en vue de relever les défis liés à l'environnement de sécurité.

Executive Summary

The Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship: Methodology and Case-Study Synopses

B. W. Gladman and P. M. Archambault; DRDC CORA TM 2009-063; R & D pour la défense Canada – CORA; 2009.

Introduction: This project arose from a very specific issue, that is, the involvement of Canada Command in the Tri-Command Study undertaken at the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That study's purpose is to examine various ways to develop the relationship among the commanders of Canada Command, Northern Command and North American Aerospace Command. The authors considered the most appropriate strategic analysis problem was not related to proposing or examining proposed Courses of Action, but rather the set of assumptions themselves that were laid out to guide the study.

First and foremost, is it valid to assume that the two countries share a common perception of the contemporary security environment? To what extent does Canada have a "security environment" independent of that of the US? One poll, conducted soon after the first meeting of President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper, suggests that Canadians are almost evenly divided on whether Harper was correct in stating that "there is no such thing as a threat to the national security of the United States that does not represent a direct threat to Canada." This result would appear to be at odds with the construct of North America as a strategic entity, and forces those in government to subject their assumptions about the security environment to rigorous scrutiny. It is, therefore, necessary to ask a leading question as the backdrop of each case study: did Canadian and American decision-makers share common conceptions of the security environment and its implications?

Any analysis of options for the evolution of the defence arrangements between Canada and the United States would be profitably informed by, in the words of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, "the *Goldberg Rule*." This maxim assists in focusing attention on the central and critical elements of any situation by asking '*what is the story?*', rather than '*what is the problem?*'. By doing the former, rather than the latter as is the norm, one sets an appropriate context around which the real problem is illuminated. This idea will be the driving principle behind this analysis of the strategic defence relationship. The authors will argue that analysts and decision-makers should view time as a stream that carries with it that which came before, to one degree or another. In order to understand fully the current strategic defence relationship between Canada and the US, where it may be lacking or in need of evolution or drastic change, one must trace the story back to its roots. From there it is possible to understand all the pertinent factors, what has motivated decision-makers when key choices were at hand, and thus what this says about the nature of each country's 'strategic culture'. The absence of this essential context will handicap discussions at all levels in framing the follow-on discussions of how to evolve the defence relationship towards the

desired end-state. Indeed, one could go further and say that without first setting the context to which follow-on discussions can refer, there is a risk that an appropriate end-state will not be set. Understanding *the story* will assist in fixing the target cognisant of all the relevant factors. By *understanding the past* it is possible to *look to the future* with confidence and with some assurance that, in this case, the strategic defence relationship will evolve to a place that meets actual and anticipated challenges posed by the current security environment.

The concept of strategic culture is used to assist in explaining why Canadian leadership made the decisions they did at key points in its history, to help understand the kind of information provided and sought to inform those decisions, and to use that understanding as the basis to develop specific recommendations for ways to evolve the relationship to meet the challenges faced. In no way is any of this predictive or deterministic. One of the main criticisms of using strategic culture is that it lends itself to such abuse. At most, strategic culture is “the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided”. Not only is strategic culture not static, even if its main features tend to endure, assuming an ability to predict future behaviour given even a comprehensive understanding of strategic culture would be folly, as it would not account for intangible factors such as personality in influencing policy decisions. However, as Jack Snyder points out, a nation’s political culture and national style socialises individuals into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking, and “as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns...has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy.” As a result of this ‘semipermanence’ of strategic culture, new challenges would not be assessed objectively, but rather through the strategic cultural lens. This is not to say we can predict with certainty what the final decision will be in any situation, but the value of analysing the nature and factors associated with a nation’s strategic culture comes through what it provides to the decision making process and senior leadership – the essential context needed to inform those decisions, hopefully bringing an awareness and mindset required to see, in this case, where the national security architecture and military-to-military relationships need to change to meet the threats posed by the current security environment.

Results: This Technical Memorandum reports to the project sponsors, the Commander of Canada Command and the Deputy Commander of NORAD, on Phase One of the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship project. It consists of a literature search and review to develop an understanding of the varied perspectives of authors on the history and current state of North American security and defence. Eight case studies are identified and explored to identify gaps and appropriate research questions for follow-on work. The case studies are as follows: Confederation, Ogdensburg and Hyde Park, the Korean War, the creation of North American Aerospace Defense Command and successive renewals of the agreement, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Arctic and the post-9/11 period.

The purpose of this Technical Memorandum is not to reiterate what is already known about each of these key decision points, but rather to look at what scholars and commentators have written through the lens of the main question under study, which is to account for and explain the factors that shape the relationship. In so doing the value and importance of this project will be clearly articulated and established. In Phase Two, the Case-Study Analysis, primary source research will be conducted in numerous archives and private collections and supplemented with secondary source material to amass a considerable body of knowledge related to the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship and the characteristics of national

strategic culture that have shaped it. Concurrent with Phase Two will be an analysis of Government intent through their policy statements and defence and security strategies at various stages. Such analysis is essential in the determination, through the individual case-studies, of whether the chosen course of action aligned with official policy statements and the reasons why or why not.

Significance: The analysis of the extensive literature on Canada-US relations and the specific case-studies chosen for detailed analysis has revealed gaps and possible biases that must be explored and challenged. Only through rigorous analysis of the historical record can a more complete and effective appreciation be developed of the factors driving the relationship, and the nature of Canadian and American strategic culture. While the attainment of this body of knowledge is worthwhile in its own right, this appreciation will assist DND/CF and the Government of Canada in its efforts to evolve both the strategic relationship and the military-to-military relationship in order to meet the challenges posed by the security environment. Moreover, this body of knowledge and understanding can be employed to assist upcoming decisions facing the Government of Canada – from the effect on domestic and national security surrounding the Afghanistan mission and the scheduled withdrawal in 2011, the question of whether Canada and the United States can cooperate in the Arctic and overcome history that has consigned the matter to perennial friction, the re-assessment of the decision to participate in the US Ballistic Missile Defence initiative, to the exploitation of the Tri-Command study and other such decisions related to the future of the military-to-military relationship. The results of this study likely will illustrate needed changes to the mechanics of decision making within the Government of Canada.

Considerations for implementation: This body of knowledge can be deployed as a contextual backdrop to support key decisions in Canada-US defence relations.

Sommaire

Les relations de défense stratégique canado-américaines : Méthodologie et synopsis des études de cas

**B. W. Gladman et P. M. Archambault; RDDC CARO DT 2009-063; R & D pour la
défense Canada – CARO; 2009.**

Introduction : Ce projet tire ses racines d'une question spécifique, soit la participation du Commandement Canada à l'étude des trois commandements entreprise à la demande du Chef d'état-major de la Défense et du président de l'Instance collégiale des chefs d'état-major. Cette étude a pour objectif d'examiner les différentes façons de développer les relations entre les commandants du Commandement Canada, du Commandement du Nord et du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord. Les auteurs ont considéré que la question la plus pertinente pour une analyse stratégique n'était pas liée à la proposition ou à l'examen d'options, mais plutôt à l'ensemble de suppositions sur lesquelles s'appuyait l'étude.

En premier lieu, est-il fondé de supposer que les deux pays partagent une vision commune de l'environnement de sécurité actuel? Dans quelle mesure l'« environnement de sécurité » du Canada est-il indépendant de celui des États-Unis? Un sondage d'opinion, mené peu après la première rencontre entre le président Barack Obama et le premier ministre Stephen Harper, suggère que les Canadiens sont à peu près également divisés à savoir si Harper avait raison lorsqu'il a affirmé qu'« il n'existe pas de menace à la sécurité nationale des États-Unis qui ne représente pas une menace directe pour le Canada ». Ce résultat paraît contredire la notion selon laquelle l'Amérique du Nord constitue une entité stratégique et force les décideurs du gouvernement à remettre sérieusement en question leurs postulats sur l'environnement de sécurité. Il est par conséquent nécessaire de placer une question suggestive en toile de fond de chaque étude de cas : les décideurs canadiens et américains conçoivent-ils l'environnement de sécurité et ses répercussions de la même façon?

Il serait profitable que toute analyse d'options visant le développement des accords en matière de défense entre le Canada et les États-Unis tienne compte de ce que Richard Neustadt et Ernest May dénomment « la règle *Goldberg* ». Cette maxime permet de mettre en lumière les éléments centraux et critiques de toute situation en mettant au premier plan l'interrogation « de quoi est-il question? » plutôt que « quel est le problème? ». En privilégiant la première question plutôt que la deuxième, cette dernière constituant la norme, il est possible de délimiter un contexte adéquat en vue de rendre manifeste le vrai problème. Cette idée constituera le principe directeur de cette analyse des relations stratégiques en matière de défense. Les auteurs feront valoir que les analystes et les décideurs devraient considérer le temps comme un courant qui entraîne avec lui, dans une certaine mesure, les événements du passé. Afin de comprendre pleinement les relations actuelles entre le Canada et les États-Unis en matière de défense, ses lacunes, les éléments qu'il faut améliorer ou modifier en profondeur, il est nécessaire d'en retracer l'origine. Ce faisant, il est possible de comprendre tous les facteurs pertinents et les motifs qui ont orienté les décideurs au moment de prendre des décisions importantes, et ainsi de déterminer ce que ceux-ci révèlent à propos de la nature de la « culture stratégique » de chaque pays. L'absence de ce contexte essentiel

entravera les échanges menés à tous les niveaux en vue d'encadrer les discussions futures visant à faire évoluer les relations en matière de défense dans le but d'atteindre l'état final désiré. En effet, on pourrait même affirmer qu'en l'absence du contexte qui constituera le cadre des futures discussions, il existe un risque que l'état final visé ne soit pas adéquat. Le fait de comprendre *l'histoire* permettra de fixer des objectifs en tenant compte de tous les facteurs importants. En *comprenant le passé*, il est possible de *considérer l'avenir* avec confiance et en ayant l'assurance que, dans ce cas, les relations de défense stratégique évolueront de façon à relever les défis contemporains et futurs relevant de l'environnement de sécurité actuel.

La notion de culture stratégique est employée dans le but d'expliquer les fondements des décisions prises par les officiers canadiens dans le cadre de certains événements marquants de l'histoire, de mieux comprendre le type d'information obtenue et recherchée afin de justifier ces décisions et de tirer parti de cette compréhension en vue de formuler des recommandations spécifiques portant sur le développement de la relation pour relever les défis actuels. Ce processus ne se veut aucunement prédictif ou déterministe. L'une des principales critiques concernant l'usage de la notion de culture stratégique est qu'elle mène à de tels abus. La culture stratégique est tout au plus « le milieu dans lequel les idées stratégiques et les décisions de principe en matière de défense font l'objet d'un débat et de décisions ». Non seulement la culture stratégique n'est pas statique, bien que ses principales caractéristiques tendent à perdurer, mais le fait de croire qu'elle permette de prédire des comportements en se fondant sur sa compréhension, aussi exhaustive soit-elle, serait de la folie, puisque cette position ne tiendrait pas compte de facteurs immatériels qui influencent les décisions de principe, notamment la personnalité. Néanmoins, comme l'indique Jack Snyder, la culture et le style politiques propres à une nation font en sorte que les individus interagissent en se fondant sur un mode de pensée stratégique distinct et, « en conséquence de ce processus de socialisation, un ensemble de structures de croyances, d'attitudes et de comportements...devient semi-permanent, motif pour lequel ces structures constituent des éléments de la culture et ne peuvent pas être considérées comme de simples produits de politiques ». En raison de la « semi-permanence » de cette culture stratégique, les nouveaux défis ne seraient pas évalués objectivement, mais plutôt à travers le filtre stratégique issu de la culture. Ceci ne signifie aucunement que nous pouvons prédire avec certitude quelle décision sera prise dans une situation donnée. L'intérêt d'analyser la nature de la culture stratégique d'une nation et les facteurs qui y sont associés réside plutôt dans l'apport de cet examen au processus décisionnel et aux officiers supérieurs, c'est-à-dire le contexte nécessaire pour prendre des décisions éclairées, pourvu que l'on dispose de la conscience et de l'état d'esprit requis pour repérer, dans ce cas, les éléments de l'architecture de sécurité nationale et de la relation entre les organisations militaires qui doivent être modifiés afin d'affronter les menaces pesant sur l'environnement de sécurité actuel.

Résultats : Ce document technique a pour objet de faire rapport de la première phase du projet Relations de défense stratégique canado-américaines à ses promoteurs, soit le commandant du Commandement Canada et le commandant adjoint du NORAD. Il consiste en une étude et une analyse documentaires visant à accroître la compréhension des diverses perspectives dégagées par différents auteurs sur l'histoire et l'état actuel de la sécurité et de la défense nord-américaines. Huit études de cas ont été identifiées et feront l'objet d'un examen détaillé dans le but de relever les lacunes et les questions de recherche pertinentes pour de futurs travaux. Ces études de cas viseront les événements suivants : la Confédération,

Ogdensburg et Hyde Park, la guerre de Corée, la mise sur pied du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord ainsi que les renouvellements successifs de l'entente établie à cette fin, la guerre du Vietnam, la crise des missiles de Cuba, l'Arctique et la période suivant le 11 Septembre.

L'objectif de ce document technique n'est pas de répéter ce que nous savons déjà sur ces points de prise de décision, mais plutôt de se pencher sur ce que les chercheurs et les commentateurs ont écrit sur la question constituant l'objet principal de cette étude, soit de rendre compte et d'expliquer les facteurs qui façonnent les relations. Ce faisant, l'intérêt et l'importance de ce projet seront clairement exprimés et mis en évidence. Dans le cadre de la deuxième phase, l'analyse des études de cas, la recherche de sources de première main sera menée dans plusieurs archives et collections privées et sera complétée par des sources secondaires dans le but de réunir un ensemble de connaissances considérable sur les relations de défense stratégique canado-américaines et les caractéristiques des cultures stratégiques nationales qui les ont façonnées. Concurrément à la deuxième phase, une analyse des intentions du gouvernement s'appuyant sur les énoncés de principes et les stratégies de défense et de sécurité sera mise en œuvre à plusieurs niveaux. Une telle analyse est essentielle pour déterminer, par le truchement des études de cas spécifiques, si le mode d'action sélectionné était conforme aux énoncés de principes officiels ainsi que les raisons de cette conformité ou non-conformité.

Portée de l'étude : L'analyse de la vaste documentation sur les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis et les études de cas spécifiques sélectionnées pour une analyse en profondeur ont révélé l'existence de lacunes et de préjugés possibles qu'il est important d'étudier à fond et de débattre. C'est seulement grâce à une analyse rigoureuse des antécédents que nous pourrions compter sur une compréhension complète et concrète des facteurs qui modèlent la relation ainsi que de la nature des cultures stratégiques canadienne et américaine. Outre l'intérêt intrinsèque certain que présente l'ensemble de connaissances visé, les fruits de cet examen aideront le MDN, les FC ainsi que le gouvernement du Canada à continuer de développer la relation stratégique et les liens qui unissent les organisations militaires en vue de relever les défis liés à l'environnement de sécurité. De plus, cet ensemble de connaissances et cette compréhension pourront servir de cadre aux prochaines décisions que le gouvernement du Canada sera appelé à prendre concernant, entre autres, l'incidence de la mission en Afghanistan et du retrait de ce pays prévu en 2011 sur la sécurité intérieure et nationale; la possibilité d'une coopération canado-américaine dans l'Arctique, ce qui permettrait de surmonter une histoire caractérisée par des frictions constantes; la remise en question de la décision de participer au système américain de défense contre les missiles balistiques; l'exploitation de l'étude des trois commandements, et toutes autres décisions ayant trait à l'avenir des relations entre les organisations militaires. Les résultats de cette étude mettront probablement en évidence la nécessité de modifier le processus décisionnel au sein du gouvernement du Canada.

Mise en œuvre : Cet ensemble de connaissances peut être utilisé comme toile de fond pour appuyer des décisions cruciales en ce qui a trait aux relations de défense canado-américaines.

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1. Introduction

“To understand the past and to judge the present is to foresee the future.” J.F.C. Fuller

This Technical Memorandum reports on Phase One of the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship project. It consists of a literature search and review to develop an understanding of the varied perspectives of authors on the history and current state of North American security and defence. Eight key decision points in the nation's history have been identified as those to serve as detailed case-studies to be analysed in Phase Two. The purpose of this Technical Memorandum is not to reiterate what is already known about each of these key decision points, but rather to look at what scholars and commentators have written through the lens of the main question under study, which is to account for and explain the factors that shape the relationship. In so doing the value and importance of this project will be clearly articulated and established. In Phase Two, the Case-Study Analysis, primary source research will be conducted in numerous archives and private collections and supplemented with secondary source material to amass a considerable body of knowledge related to the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship and the characteristics of national strategic culture that have shaped it. Concurrent with Phase Two will be an analysis of Government intent through their policy statements and defence and security strategies at various stages. Such analysis is essential in the determination, through the individual case-studies, of whether the chosen course of action aligned with official policy statements and the reasons why or why not.

This project arose from a very specific issue, that is, the involvement of Canada Command in the Tri-Command Study undertaken at the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The study's purpose is to examine various ways to develop the relationship among the commanders of Canada Command, US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. The authors considered the most appropriate strategic analysis problem was not related to proposing or examining proposed Courses of Action, but rather the set of assumptions themselves that were laid out to guide the study. As laid out by General Renuart, Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, they are as follows:

- An attack on one country is an attack on the other and will have economic, defense, and security implications;
- The nations believe it advisable to expand military-to-military cooperation;
- Enhanced military cooperation will increase the layered defenses of all participants;
- Improving coordination and reducing seams along borders and among domains will improve the defense and security of all participating nations;
- Increasing decision time will provide decisionmakers a greater ability to respond to threats;
- Current policies do not prevent expansion of military cooperation;
- Differing international perceptions of the value and difficulty of cooperation with U.S. forces will influence the effectiveness of enhanced military cooperation;
- A change to NORAD is a politically sensitive topic;
- Canadian forces may provide a successful conduit for military cooperation with other nations;

- The lines between security and defense have become blurred;
- The concept of CANUS military cooperation is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War and offers a strong foundation for the defense of North America for the next 50 years;
- There is an excellent opportunity to consider expansion of both binational and bilateral cooperation in the areas of multidomain awareness, assistance to civil authority, and information operations.¹

Are these assumptions valid? What are the historical and contemporary sources of these assumptions, and are there any that should be questioned by decision-makers? Have previous decision-makers made similar assumptions, either implicitly or explicitly, before making decisions that shaped the Canada-US strategic defence relationship in the past? Are these assumptions at all related to, or derived from, “strategic culture?” In order to begin answering these questions, this study examines several dimensions of the Canada-United States strategic relationship with a view to setting the context for ongoing discussions and decisions related to military-to-military relationships in the foreseeable future. The expected outcome of this study will be a more complete and effective appreciation of the factors that have driven and are driving the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. In that way, decision-makers might better understand the complexity of Canada-US relations

The events of 11 September 2001 sparked a major reorganisation of the form and structure of the security and defence organisations on both sides of the border between Canada and the United States. As with all situations requiring major changes in response to significant shifts in the security environment, reorganising the configuration is far easier than making rapid and lasting shifts in the underpinning organisational culture; yet both are required. Often, the need for organisational continuity and stability precludes radical reorganisation and thought patterns in response to minor changes to the security environment. This is especially true in defence and security organisations where the chaos surrounding such changes is more keenly felt. That said, failing to detect and respond effectively to major changes in the security environment appropriately given the information at hand can prove politically, economically, and socially catastrophic. Defining the security environment is largely a subjective exercise, and therefore it is advisable to augment theoretical and analytical frameworks with the real-world awareness of the security environment and the emerging operational trends directly from those conducting strategic planning both domestically and beyond. Emerging trends can then be identified and appropriate action taken. At key times, more fundamental changes are needed, with the concomitant requirement for organisations to understand the new threat environment and seek to adjust the way they operate, and perhaps their structure, in response. It is thus worth looking at the current threat environment facing Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF), and to devote time and space to developing an understanding of the contemporary threat environment surrounding each of the case-studies that follow. Doing so sets the stage for the discussions of the degree to which key leadership comprehended the full nature of the threats faced and the other factors driving the Canada-US strategic defence relationship, and how that understanding shaped the decisions taken. Setting the context around each of the decision points to be studied is

¹ Victor E. Renuart Jr., “The Enduring Value of NORAD,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 54, 3rd Quarter 2009, pp. 95-96.

essential to answering the main question under study, which is to account for and explain those characteristics of national strategic culture that have shaped the continental defence partnership. This appreciation will assist the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF, and the Government of Canada in its efforts to evolve both the strategic relationship and the military-to-military relationship in order to meet the challenges posed by the security environment.

The Current Threat Environment

The current security environment poses myriad defence and security challenges to Canada and the Canadian Forces.² While global terrorists, using the failed and failing states that dot the international landscape as havens from which to plan and launch attacks, have become a major security threat, inter and intra-state conflict throughout the world continues to impact Canadian interests. In order to meet these challenges effectively, the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) provided a new Government of Canada (GoC) vision for the CF requiring fundamental changes to its organization and culture. In this vision, reinforced in the recent *Canada First Defence Strategy*, Canada is now viewed as a single operational theatre, and this, in turn, explains the rationale behind the establishment of Canada Command that will focus on what Canadian governments have consistently said is the top priority for the CF, the defence of Canada.³ As General R. Hillier, the previous Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), once said, the creation of Canada Command was as much about a cultural change as an organisational change. At times, “cultural responses may become so dogmatic that problems will be manipulated to fit the culture’s preferred expectations and solutions. Cultures can define and defy reality.”⁴ The old paradigm, by which Canada was viewed as a secure base from which to generate forces for international deployment, is no longer appropriate.

At the end of the Cold War, a surprising diversity of analysts held that major interstate wars were a thing of the past, and that a more peaceful era, fuelled by liberal democracy and the free market’s triumph over communism, would spread throughout the world.⁵ In the following decade, it became all too apparent that these optimistic

² This section on the current threat environment is a modified version of that appearing in Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, *An Effects-Based Approach to Operations in the Domestic and Continental Operating Environment: A Case for Pragmatism*, (Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM 2008-033), pp. 35-38.

³ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: 2008), pp. 7-8; Government of Canada, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, (Ottawa: 2005), foreword, also pp. 17 and 19.

⁴ Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), p. 5.

⁵ John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 240-242; Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, available at http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf#search='the%20end%20of%20history%20the%20national%20interest'; Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), pp. 378–385; Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 395–425. For opposing views of this argument, see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71 (Summer 1993), 22–49; Samuel Huntington, *The*

prognostications had failed to develop, and that violent clashes and international strife would remain major and enduring features of the post-Cold War security environment.

While the character of conflict can change, its underlying nature endures. Thus, there is some value in a study of classical military theory to inform analysts about its persistent nature. Such analysis may serve to disabuse some from the more fanciful notions surrounding current military concept development, or at least expose them to the stream of time from which pragmatism may flow. As true now as then, for example, Carl von Clausewitz argued that no matter the variety of conflict across the spectrum, it always was characterised by a violent clash of wills pulled between his ‘paradoxical’ trinity of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, the play of chance and probability, and rationality of policy.⁶ For the foreseeable future, conflict likely will range from inter-state and intra-state warfare to asymmetric threats to the Canadian homeland from transnational terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, which have the willingness to cause a level of damage and destruction once solely reserved for nation-states. Indeed, the nightmare scenario of a nexus between a terrorist attack and weapons of mass destruction has forced Western societies to view their national security somewhat differently, including enhancing law enforcement and other domestic security practices, and by drawing stronger links between the military and lead civil authorities.⁷ Amidst some of the transatlantic tensions that arose in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a degree of strategic convergence is evident. Differences in emphasis mean that a coherent high-level international focus on the terror threat is proving difficult to sustain, even among Western allies that have suffered civilian casualties in terror attacks.⁸ However, while there are differences between the European tendency to emphasize ‘conditions’ and the American tendency to emphasize ideology at the strategic level, there is evidence of considerable agreement among Western allies that 9/11 demonstrated the existence of a new type of threat, at least in terms of scale and potential for destruction.⁹ As a result, governments on both sides

Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and perhaps the most concise criticism, Joseph Nye, “What New World Order?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 71 No.2, (Spring 1993), pp. 83–96.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

⁷ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), pp. 9–12; *The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* (Washington: The White House, 2003), available at: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf; Richard A. Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness. US Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” *International Security*, Vol. 25 No. 4, (Spring 2001), 147–86; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Assessing the Risks*, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 9–11; Thomas J. Badey, “Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 2001), 39–45; Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Autumn 1985), 507–516; J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor *et al.*, “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” available online at <http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm>.

⁸ David Omand, “Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy,” *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2005-2006, pp. 107-116.

⁹ For a view of how US and European approaches to terrorism and proliferation are tilting toward convergence more than divergence, see Anna I. Zakharchenko, “The E.U. and U.S. Strategies Against Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study”, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, January 2007).

of the Atlantic continue to adjust their national security policies, legislation and practices in order to provide for earlier and more efficient cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement in terrorism cases. European and American views may differ, but their respective approaches to terrorism, while perhaps rhetorically divergent, have much in common.¹⁰

As the war on terror, or whatever moniker the ‘long war’ is given, carries on into the foreseeable future, undoubtedly one of the great challenges confronting Canada “in the years ahead will be defining an appropriate strategy that can deal with the inevitable shifts in US strategic focus as it responds to the evolving war on terrorism.”¹¹ Domestic, continental, and international security are linked, although not in the ways most think, and defence must begin with the clear articulation of national interests. The defence of the homeland and its interests must be conducted both at home and, in the case of the CF, abroad mostly as a part of a larger coalition effort.

Neither the United States nor Canada has chosen to meet the challenge of the international terrorist threat by improving domestic security alone. Instead, both countries have a demonstrated preference both to enhance homeland security while simultaneously seeking to eliminate the sanctuaries of the world’s failed and failing states that terrorists use as bases from which to train and launch attacks. Avoiding one area at the expense of the other leads to the dynamic Anthony Cordesman has described as ‘squeezing the balloon’, by which squeezing one area simply causes another to expand.¹² For example, focusing solely on domestic defence merely pushes the attackers to the relatively safe havens where they can train to exploit the seams in even the most robust domestic security and defence structure. A comprehensive strategy must give balanced attention to homeland defence and the engagement of potential adversaries in the areas from which they threaten. In this sense, homeland defence begins in operations abroad intended to shape the security environment in the nation’s (or the strategic entity that is North America) interests.

Achieving these ends will require an increased focus on security cooperation with the US, but reflective of the interrelated nature of domestic and international security, will also require a level of involvement in interventions involving ‘coalitions of the willing’ in the failing regions of the developing world that terrorists and trans-national criminals have used as havens from which to launch domestic attacks.¹³ But operations abroad can provide fodder for terrorists’ information war, forcing Canada and its close allies to become more proficient at countering this important aspect of enemy strategy.

¹⁰ A useful review of some of these developments is provided in Michael Jacobson, *The West at War: U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post September 11*, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006).

¹¹ Peter Johnston and Michael Roi, *The Future Security Environment 2025*, ORD Project Report PR 2003/14 (Ottawa: September 2003), p. 31.

¹² Anthony H. Cordesman, *Overview: Defending America. Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defence* (12 December 2000). Cordesman’s Report is available on the website of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at <http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/overprininvestnmd.pdf>

¹³ Ralph Peters, *Beyond Terror. Strategy in a Changing World*, (New York: Stackpole Books, 2002), p. 325; Stephen J. Blank, “The Future of Transcaspian Security,” *Strategic Studies Institute Paper*, (August 2002), pp. 18–19 available at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB111.pdf>; Jeffery Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” *Parameters*, Vol. 32 No.2 (Summer 2002), pp. 5–7.

For instance, the al Qaeda-inspired terrorists who carried out the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, succeeded in changing the outcome of the subsequent federal election and, as a result, the course of Spanish foreign policy. The offer of a truce by al Qaeda leadership thereafter to other European nations if they followed suit shows a degree of strategic acumen that should not be underestimated. Dividing the United States from its coalition allies in Afghanistan and Iraq might have little military impact, but it certainly erodes the perception of American legitimacy: Anti-Americanism and resentment of US power potentially can drive politics in many countries.¹⁴

As Canada engages the enemy abroad, particularly in Afghanistan, there may be ‘blowback’ attacks similar to those on Madrid or London. As a result, it may be true that Canada will be challenged to define an “appropriate strategy that can deal with the inevitable shifts in US strategic focus as it responds to the evolving war on terrorism,” so too will Canada have to continue developing strategy to deal with terrorists at home and abroad. And a good deal of that strategy will be the need to shape the information environment. As the 2007 New York City Police Department study of home-grown terrorists (including the so-called ‘Toronto 18’) shows, our understanding of that threat has evolved. Before 9/11, the NYPD would have considered the planning for an attack to be the initial indicator of a threat; they now see the process of radicalization as the initial indicator, the culmination of which is a terrorist attack.¹⁵ Ultimately, then, the domestic and international links in the security environment are not just based on the means by and through which Canada chooses to pursue its national interests, but also about the ends Canada seeks in shaping the security environment. In other words, the security environment is not an entity that exists in a complex world external to Canada; Canada is part of it. To what extent, however, does Canada have a “security environment” independent of that of the US? One poll, conducted soon after the first meeting of President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper, suggests that Canadians are almost evenly divided on whether Harper was correct in stating that “there is no such thing as a threat to the national security of the United States that does not represent a direct threat to Canada.”¹⁶ This result would appear to be at odds with the construct of North America as a strategic entity, and forces those in government to subject their assumptions about the security environment to rigorous scrutiny. It is, therefore, necessary to ask a leading question as the backdrop of each case study: did Canadian and American decision-makers share common conceptions of the security environment and its implications?

¹⁴ Mark Burgess, “Explaining Religious Terrorism Part 2: Politics, Religion and the Suspension of the Ethical”, (Center for Defence Information, 23 August 2004).

(<http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2384>)

¹⁵ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, (New York City Police Department, 2007), pp. 82-85.

¹⁶ Nik Nanos, “Canadians Agree: We’re America’s Best Friend; They’re Less Sure a Threat to the US Also Threatens Canada,” *Policy Options*, (April 2009), pp. 56-59.

2. Case-Study Synopses

“If everyone is thinking alike, someone isn’t thinking.” General George S. Patton

The question of whether the post-September 11, 2001 world represents a radical departure from previous patterns, or is merely the culmination of the evolution of the post-Cold War security environment, has been the subject of much debate. While such questions are of interest, they are less important than the recognition that Canada, and indeed the Western world, is at a key decision point in its history. How Canada and others choose to respond to the threat posed by the existential ‘long-war’ against the jihadist threat, while simultaneously contending with the threats considered more familiar and traditional, ultimately will determine their success and place in the world. The study of history – both recent operational experience and that which is more distant – has some value in the formulation of an appropriate response. Doing so is not an easy task, but given the truism that “the future has no place to come from but the past,” history has some predictive value.¹⁷ This does not mean the future must always unfold as it did in the past, hence the oft-quoted tendency of the military attempting to fight the last war. However, even departures from previous patterns are evident, to varying degrees, in the recent operational experience and history if properly analysed by those appropriately trained. While the exact nature of the future remains unknown and unknowable, many of its general features and contours are presently evident. Thus, although care must be taken in exploiting the predictive value of history, this does not diminish its importance, especially in terms of developing a more complete picture of how past decision-makers conceived of history, their place in it and how much they differentiated between what they knew, what they assumed, and what they guessed at the time they took decisions. Indeed, the process in place to provide key information and analysis to support decisions is telling.

Any analysis of options for the evolution of the defence arrangements between Canada and the United States would be profitably informed by, in the words of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, “the *Goldberg Rule*.”¹⁸ This maxim assists in focusing attention on the central and critical elements of any situation by asking ‘*what is the story?*’, rather than ‘*what is the problem?*’. By doing the former, rather than the latter as is the norm, one sets an appropriate context around which the real problem is illuminated. This idea will be the driving principle behind this analysis of the strategic defence relationship. The authors will argue that analysts and decision-makers should view time as a stream that carries with it that which came before, to one degree or another. In order to understand fully the current strategic defence relationship between Canada and the US, where it may be lacking or in need of evolution or drastic change, one must trace the story back to its roots. From there it is possible to understand all the pertinent factors, what has motivated decision-makers when key choices were at hand, and thus what this says about the nature of each country’s ‘strategic culture’. The absence of this essential context will handicap discussions at all levels in framing the follow-on discussions of how to evolve the defence relationship towards the desired end-state.

¹⁷ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p.251.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

Indeed, one could go further and say that without first setting the context to which follow-on discussions can refer, there is a risk that an appropriate end-state will not be set. Understanding *the story* will assist in fixing the target cognisant of all the relevant factors. By *understanding the past* it is possible to *look to the future* with confidence and with some assurance that, in this case, the strategic defence relationship will evolve to a place that meets actual and anticipated challenges posed by the current security environment.¹⁹ However, using historical analysis is fraught with difficulties that must be understood and mitigated to the degree possible.

Sir Michael Howard has argued that professional historians must be aware of the limitations of their profession and be sceptical of those who claim to draw conceptual lessons from history to form binding precedents for future triumph.²⁰ While this note of caution seems warranted, “the study of history, properly pursued, has particular relevance in an age of unprecedented change.”²¹ In other words, despite Howard’s apprehension, key decision points where tough choices are called for provide the “unique circumstances in which historical study can prove not only helpful but perhaps indispensable.”²² In particular, the study of history can provide a theoretical or mental framework for looking at change over a period of time. In terms of understanding the factors involved in critical decisions, the nature of the threats to be met, and the appropriate course to chart, one thing seems certain: how one looks at the future can very much depend upon how one thinks about the past. The study of history “provides the only real evidence against which we can test strategic concepts” and “has advantages in strategic discussion: it is real, it is unclassified, and we know who won.”²³ Moreover, the serious and deep study of history by analysts and those responsible for, in this case, charting the future strategic defence relationship can enable “them to operate within the complex variables of past, present and future.”²⁴

As most professional historians can attest, using historical analysis in this manner is fraught with difficulties, both in terms of the historical record and with themselves. On the one hand, historians always must be aware of the idiosyncrasies and personal interests that living in the present bring. In both studying and writing history, it is important to assess past events and developments without forcing them into the straightjacket of proving one’s point in the context of a current debate or discussion.²⁵ In doing so, historians must contend

¹⁹ For an understanding of the value of historical analysis for strategic planning see Brad W. Gladman and Michael Roi, *Look to the Future, Understand the Past: The Limitations of Alternative Futures Methodologies*, (Ottawa: DRDC CORA TR 2005-10, 2005).

²⁰ Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 10–11.

²¹ Gordon Connell-Smith and Howell Lloyd, *The Relevance of History* (London: Heinemann, 1972), p. 3.

²² Scot Robertson, “The Development of Royal Air Force Strategic Bombing Doctrine between the Wars: A Revolution in Military Affairs?,” *Airpower Journal* (Spring 1998), p. 37.

²³ John Reeve, “Maritime Strategy and Defence of the Archipelagic Inner Arc,” *Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre Working Paper No.5*, (Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2001), p. 2. Available at <http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/workingpapers/Working%20Paper%205.pdf>.

²⁴ Alan Ryan, “Thinking Across Time: Concurrent Historical Analysis on Military Operations,” *Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No.14*. (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2001), p. 10.

²⁵ This phenomenon can be seen in some of the current debates on the value or limitations of heavy armour for future warfighting, as each new development in the ongoing war in Iraq is used to prove or disprove the case. Much of this analysis needs to be more dispassionate, attempting to understand what ‘really’ happened and continues to happen in Iraq. A major step in the right direction is provided by Murray and Scales, *The Iraq War: A Military History*.

simultaneously with at best an imperfect historical record upon which to base their interpretation of ‘what really happened’, and also deal at times with distorted evidence, as “memory fails or as participants actively warp the record to improve their appearance before the bar of history.”²⁶ In their monograph on the early stages of the recent Iraq conflict, Williamson Murray and Robert Scales have argued that the “historian’s job, fraught with obstacles though it may be, is to make some sense of what is always an ambiguous, incomplete, and sometimes contradictory record.”²⁷ Despite these methodological impediments, historical analysis, properly conceived and employed, remains one of the best tools to understand the essential factors surrounding any key decision. Although Leopold von Ranke’s desire to see history written and understood ‘as it actually was’ may be an unattainable goal, it is still one for which scholars should strive.²⁸ In both writing and studying history, it is important to judge past acts by their own standards, if they are judged at all, and not through a current paradigm.²⁹ From this will come a more nuanced understanding of the factors involved in motivating historical actors and situations, serving to educate an understanding of present and future concerns.³⁰

Drawing upon history through an analysis of case-studies is a useful exercise in understanding why things developed as they did and what that tells us about future directions. However, a rigorous methodology must be adopted in their development or one risks falling victim to the all too frequent tendency by defence and security personnel to view history as a ‘grab-bag’ from which to pull useful quotes or tidbits to support preferred solutions or perceptions. This predilection is similar to studying military history by focusing too much attention on ‘bullets, buttons, and bayonets’ at the expense of the bigger picture – what Territorial Army Brigadier and British historian Richard Holmes has termed “military pornography.”³¹ In so doing, the more important lessons often are missed. A superficial analysis of a case-study can be as dangerous as ignoring history altogether, as Harvard historian Ernest May pointed out more than thirty years ago when writing about the rather haphazard way policy-makers use historical analogies. He wrote that when “resorting to an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness or even ask in what ways it might be misleading.”³² Thus, great pains will be taken to avoid falling victim to this tendency by delving into both primary and secondary source material, and by tracing the story back as far as is appropriate – in this case, back to its roots.

²⁶ Murray and Scales, *The Iraq War: A Military History*, p. 13.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.130.

²⁹ Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 21-22.

³⁰ For an elegantly argued attack on ‘presentism’ see A.O. Lovejoy, “Present Standpoints and Past History,” Hans Meyerhoff (ed.), *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959); also see William H. Dray, *On History and Philosophers of History*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989), chapter 8.

³¹ Richard Holmes, *Acts of War: the behaviour of men in battle*, (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 61.

³² Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. xi. For a thorough analysis of historical case studies and their use, see Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History in Decision Making*.

This approach differs from that adopted by the Bi-National Planning Group in its final report in 2006, where its references to the long-standing defence relationship between the two countries extend only back to the Ogdensburg declaration of 1940.³³ The brief narrative provided suggests a corner was turned following this declaration away from previous, implicitly negative, patterns and towards a new era of uncompromising cooperation. From this somewhat unsophisticated characterisation of the strategic defence relationship between the two countries have flowed some courses of action that have proven completely unacceptable on one or both sides of the border. Thus, the driving principle behind this study will be to attempt a painstaking, thorough analysis of the historical and contemporary dimensions of the Canada-United States strategic relationship with a view to setting the context for ongoing discussions and decisions related to military-to-military relationships in the foreseeable future. In so doing, this study will help to account for and explain those characteristics of national strategic culture that have driven, and continue to drive, this most important relationship.

A Word on Strategic Culture

There has been some scholarly work devoted to the idea of strategic culture, but almost none specifically devoted to discussions of Canadian strategic culture.³⁴ This study's main focus is to identify those characteristics of Canadian and American strategic culture that have shaped the Canada-US continental defence relationship. Thus, a brief description of what

³³ *Bi-National Planning Group Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, (Colorado Springs: BPG, 2006), pp. 2, 5, 6, and G-2.

³⁴ Colin S. Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture", *Parameters*, (Winter 1984); Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3, (2003); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jack L. Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations," (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977); Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999); Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (London: Croom, Helm, 1979); Valerie M. Hudson, ed., *Culture and Foreign Policy*, (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Michael Evans, "The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005," Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 306, February 2005; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1995); Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (1995); Bruce R. Vaughn, "Australia's Strategic Identity Post-September 11 in Context: Implications for the War Against Terror in Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2004); Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force," *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4, (2004); Caroline F. Ziemke, Phillippe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, "Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence," *Institute for Defense Analyses*, November 2000; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 3, (November 2005); Theo Farrell, "Strategic Culture and American Empire," *SAIS Review*, Volume 25, Number 2, (Summer-Fall 2005); Major Kimberly A. Crider, "Strategic Implications of Culture: Historical Analysis of China's Culture and Implications for United States Policy," Air Command and Staff College, *Wright Flyer* No. 8 (September 1999); Jack Snyder, "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War," *International Organization*, 2003; Glen Fisher, *Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, 2nd edition, (Intercultural Press, October 1997); Per M. Martinsen, "The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – a Strategic Culture in the Making," Paper prepared for the ECPR Conference, Section 17 Europe and Global Security Marburg, 18-21 September 2003.

strategic culture means in this context is warranted. This description is preliminary, but will be developed fully through the course of the follow-on analysis.

A nation's strategic culture does not appear simply in and of itself, but rather flows from its own unique history and experience. As Colin Gray notes, "American strategists have always known, deep down, that Soviet, French, British, and other approaches to security issues differed from their own in good part because Soviet, French, and British policymakers were heirs to distinctive national perspectives."³⁵ From a nation's unique history and experience comes its political culture and national style in how its leadership deals with others, something that has been debated by political scientists for over half a century.³⁶ It is from its political culture that its strategic culture is developed and built, referring to modes of thought and action on defence and security matters. All of this is influenced by historical, geopolitical, economic, and other such factors that will be identified and explained in detail throughout this study.³⁷

The concept of strategic culture will be used in this study to assist in explaining why Canadian leadership made the decisions they did at key points in its history, to help understand the kind of information provided and sought to inform those decisions, and to use that understanding as the basis to develop specific recommendations for ways to evolve the relationship to meet the challenges faced. In no way is any of this predictive or deterministic. One of the main criticisms of using strategic culture is that it lends itself to such abuse. At most, strategic culture is "the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided".³⁸ Not only is strategic culture not static, even if its main features tend to endure, assuming an ability to predict future behaviour given even a comprehensive understanding of strategic culture would be folly, as it would not account for intangible factors such as personality in influencing policy decisions. However, as Jack Snyder points out, a nation's political culture and national style socialises individuals into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking, and "as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns...has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of 'cultural' rather than mere policy."³⁹ As a result of this 'semipermanence' of strategic culture, new challenges would not be assessed objectively, but rather through the strategic cultural lens. This is not to say we can predict with certainty what the final decision will be in any situation, but the value of analysing the nature and factors associated with a nation's strategic culture comes through what it provides to the decision making process and senior leadership – the essential context needed to inform those decisions, hopefully bringing

³⁵ Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 26.

³⁶ Dennis Kavanaugh, *Political Culture*, (London: Macmillan, 1972); Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1979); Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*, (New York: Knopf, 1983); Alan Pendleton Grimes, *American Political Thought*, (New York: Holt, 1955); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Bert A. Rockman, *Studying Elite Political Culture: Problems in Design and Interpretation*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

³⁷ Colin Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 28.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, p. 8.

an awareness and mindset required to see, in this case, where the national security architecture and military-to-military relationships need to change to meet the threats posed by the current security environment. An essential part of any key government decision, setting this context is but the first step in what must be a determined effort to overcome parochialism and the seemingly inevitable active and passive resistance mounted by organisations as they transform. In that sense, strategic culture is a useful analytical tool not only to explain past actions but also in the way preconceived notions of what is possible for Canada can limit the range of strategic level decisions as they arise.

Confederation

This case-study will focus on whether the long-standing military threat posed by the US was the main driver behind Canadian Confederation. In answering this question, the related issues to be addressed include how key figures perceived and understood the threat posed by the US, whether the public fears of US annexation of Canada were exploited to press the Confederation agenda, and the role of the British government in support of Confederation and as a driver of the US threat to Canada. The impact of other factors such as the possible ideological, economic, and political roots of Confederation will be analysed to see if those texts that form the accepted national narrative explain sufficiently the reasons for the decision taken.⁴⁰ The purpose of this case-study will be to understand the relevant factors shaping the defence relationship at its outset in this critical period in the nation's history, and their impact on its later evolution. In so doing, the roots of what would become a Canadian 'strategic culture' will be identified, something lacking in full description in the current historiography.

The close economic, social, and political ties Canada and the US now enjoy are undeniable and have a long history, but despite recent claims that the level of cooperation enjoyed today has consistently been close throughout the history of both nations, the reality is somewhat different. In a recent speech to the Conference of Defence Associations Annual General Meeting, the Commander of NORAD and US Northern Command, General Victor Renuart, argued that "We have been friends for centuries. We have been partners for centuries."⁴¹ In another recent speech to Georgetown University, he argued that Canada is "a great partner, have[sic] been our friend, fought at our side, really as long as our history has been alive, even in the Civil War."⁴² This laudable but inaccurate sentiment is not unique to the military leadership. In a recent press conference with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, US President Barack Obama claimed that "the very success of our friendship throughout history demands that we renew and deepen our co-operation".⁴³ While it is difficult to question the latter conviction, this study will illustrate that the nature and level of cooperation and friendship enjoyed currently has not always been the case, and that the

⁴⁰ In determining those texts and articles which form the accepted narrative, the authors' judgement will have to suffice. While not entirely objective, one would expect to find broad agreement amongst professional historians studying these topics.

⁴¹ Remarks by General Victor Renuart Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM to the Conference of Defence Associations 72nd Annual General Meeting, Ottawa, Canada 27 February 2009.

⁴² Remarks by General Victor Renuart Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM Georgetown University 27 January 2009.

⁴³ "PM, Obama talk economy, environment and security," accessed 20 February 2009 at:

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090218/obama_visit_090219/20090219?hub=TopStories

relationship has been as strongly shaped by both the negative and positive experiences. In fact, the two sides have at times fought wars, which belie the claim of continual friendship throughout history. Thus, assuming a consistent level of cooperation and friendship ignores central aspects of the relationship which may, in turn, lead to recommendations for its evolution that are unpalatable to voters, and thus politicians, on either side of the border.

In a similar fashion, a recent report on Canada-US relations for the US Congress by the Congressional Research Service argued that over “the past century U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation has been close”, but the evidence provided in support began with the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD).⁴⁴ There is no reference to the period from 1906 to 1940, more than a third of ‘the past century’. The reader is thus left to believe that the time of the Ogdensburg declaration and the PJBD adequately characterise the defence relationship, and that the relationship in the preceding period was as close. Standing in sharp contrast to this portrayal, it “is a continuing source of amusement to Canadian military historians that the first interwar defence plan put together by Canada’s tiny interwar military had at its heart a Canadian cavalry attack into the US Midwest.”⁴⁵ While at times there has been congruity in approach, at other times and over other issues different perspectives have soured the relationship, based perhaps on the personalities involved or other factors this study will illuminate. In so doing, the nature of Canadian and American strategic culture will be better understood, as will areas requiring attention in the national security framework and the mechanics of decision making within Government of Canada. The purpose of this and the other synopses in this current report is not to explore each of these case-studies in great depth, but rather to identify them with a view to setting the parameters around which the detailed case-studies can follow.

While this case-study will focus on Canadian Confederation, the story behind British North America’s relations with the United States begins far in advance of that event. Indeed, some authors hold that the US “revolution that created the republic also created Canada.”⁴⁶ Despite this, it took nearly a century for the frontier to assume its final shape, causing some scholars to argue – some more strongly than others – that the military threat posed by the US was the key factor in the adoption of Confederation shortly after the end of the US Civil War in 1865.⁴⁷ This explanation forms part of the accepted national narrative, itself consisting of a

⁴⁴ Carl Ek, et. al., *CRS Report for Congress: Canada-U.S. Relations*, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, updated 1 May 2006), p. CRS-9.

⁴⁵ David Bercuson, “Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September,” in David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus*, (Ottawa: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 123.

⁴⁶ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p.2.

⁴⁷ For examples of this trend, see Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*, Fourth Edition, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999), pp. 80-84, Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*, (London: 1967), C.P. Stacey, *The Undefended Border: The Myth and the Reality*, (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1962). Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of the Undefended Border: Preparing for War in North America 1867-1909*, (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), C.P. Stacey, “Confederation: The Atmosphere of Crisis,” in Edith G. Firth, ed., *Profiles of a Province: Studies in the History of Ontario*, (Toronto: Ontario Historical Association, 1967), pp. 73-79, Hereward Senior, *The Last Invasion of*

few key texts mostly written in the mid-1960s when the government opened the gates on funding for research into Confederation to mark its centennial.⁴⁸ In many cases, the narrative portrayed Confederation as both an inevitability and a triumph for the country, complete with a feel-good sense of accomplishment in honour of the nation's centennial. Moreover, those provinces that either resisted or refused Confederation frequently were portrayed as being wrong and foolish in rejecting the logic of Confederation, and the generous gifts it offered.⁴⁹ While more recent scholarship has challenged some of this thinking, the endurance of these texts as the generally accepted national narrative is remarkable.⁵⁰ For present purposes, the intent is to re-examine these texts, other secondary literature, and primary sources in a new light – one which examines the factors at play in shaping the strategic defence relationship from the American Revolution through to Confederation. After all, this period really was the beginning of the strategic defence relationship that has persisted (albeit in a quite different form) to this day. To understand fully the nature of this relationship and what has shaped it, the story must be traced back to its roots.

The military threat posed by the US stems from the break of the thirteen colonies with Britain during the US War of Independence from 1775-1783. The background and course of this war is captured adequately in the existing historiography, and there will be little need to reiterate this narrative in the case-study.⁵¹ However, given that one of the driving complaints

Canada: The Fenian Raiders, 1866-1870, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), C.P. Stacey, "The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier," *American Historical Review*, LVI (October, 1950).

⁴⁸ The main accounts of the coming of Confederation remain W.L. Morton, *The Critical Years: The Union of British North America 1857-1873*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), Donald Creighton, *The Road to Confederation: The Emergence of Canada 1863-1867*, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1964), and P. B. Waite, *The Life and Times of Confederation 1864-1867: Newspapers, and the Union of British North America*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).

⁴⁹ William Menzies Whitelaw, *The Maritimes and Canada before Confederation*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. xix, Chester Martin, *Foundations of Canadian Nationhood*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), p. 290, Waite, *The Life and Times of Confederation 1864-1867*, p. 14, W.S. MacNutt, *New Brunswick: A history: 1784-1867*, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1963), p. 460, Francis Bolger, *Prince Edward Island and Confederation 1863-1873*, (Charlottetown: St. Dunstan's University Press, 1964), p. 14, Creighton, *The Road to Confederation*, p. 154, Morton, *The Critical Years*, p. 277.

⁵⁰ For examples of this more recent scholarship see Ged Martin, *Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 1837-67*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), Ralph C. Nelson, Walter C. Soderlund, Ronald H. Wagenberg and E. Donald Briggs, "Canadian Confederation as a Case-study in Community Formation," in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1990), James L. Sturgis, "The Opposition to Confederation in Nova Scotia, 1864-1868," in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, Ged Martin, "The Case Against Confederation," in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, Phillip A. Buckner, "The Maritimes and Confederation: A Reassessment," in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, Frederick Jones, "The Antis Gain the Day: Newfoundland and Confederation, 1864-1869," in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, Ged Martin, "Launching Canadian Confederation: Means to Ends, 1836-1864," *The Historical Journal*, Vol.27, No.3, (September 1984), pp. 575-602, Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.XX No.1 (March 1987), pp. 18-29.

⁵¹ For examples of this extensive historiography see Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763-1776*, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), John R. Alden, *A History of the American Revolution*, (New York: Knopf, 1969), Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), Colin Bonwick, *The American Revolution*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991),

by the thirteen colonies leading to the revolution were the so-called intolerable acts, of which the Quebec Act was one, it was clear that British North America would be a focus of attention for the revolutionaries. The Quebec Act, in the context of growing dissatisfaction with British rule, was passed in response to concern in London that the French Canadians might also support the growing revolt. To secure the allegiance of the French Canadian population, the governors James Murray and Guy Carleton promoted the need for a compromise between the conflicting demands of the bifurcated society in the colonies that would become British North America (BNA). The result of this need was the 1774 Quebec Act.⁵² While the Act was not enforced outside of Quebec, it served to anger the colonial governments of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia by significantly expanding Quebec to the upper Mississippi and Ohio rivers, and through its legal and religious tenets. Indeed, the Quebec Act was identified in the declaration of independence as a major grievance. As a result, Quebec formed a focus of attention for more than just military reasons, although military reasons there were.

The need to prevent a repetition of the French and Indian raiding parties that had hit American inhabitants of the settlements bordering Canada during the Seven Years' or French-Indian War, and to keep Canada from being used "as a base for attacks...it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrence and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned."⁵³ The Continental Congress initially had sought a way to involve the French Canadians as the fourteenth colony, with the goal of removing British rule from the primarily

Christie, Ian R., and Benjamin W. Labaree, *Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution*, (New York: Norton, 1976), Jack Rakove, *The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress*, (New York: Knopf, 1979), Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench, eds., *The Press and the American Revolution*, (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1980), Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), Edward Countryman, *The American Revolution*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), Robert A. Becker, *Revolution, Reform, and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763-1783*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), Jack P. Greene, ed., *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits*, (New York: New York University Press, 1978), Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., *The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social Movement*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), Warren I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. I: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Lester D. Langley, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750-1850*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), Forrest McDonald, *E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic, 1776-1790*, 2nd ed., (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), Edmund Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), Paul A. Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789, Vol. II Oxford History of the United States*, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), John Reid, *Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), Douglas Southall Freeman, *George Washington: A Biography*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), and arguably the best source on this topic is Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).

⁵² Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada 1763-1871*, pp. 26-28.

⁵³ A. T. Mahan, *The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1913), p. 6.

francophone province of Quebec and projecting the northern flank from British attack. But when that plan failed, Congress authorised an invasion of Canada.

There were two separate expeditions undertaken to capture Montreal and Quebec City. On 16 September 1775, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery left Fort Ticonderoga with roughly 1,700 militiamen, capturing Montreal on 13 November.⁵⁴ The governor of Quebec, General Guy Carleton, managed to escape to Quebec City. The second expedition, led by the infamous Colonel Benedict Arnold, was beset by numerous problems in its journey north, losing almost half of the 1,100 men. By the time Arnold reached Quebec City in early November, he had only 600 men left, and they were not in good shape.⁵⁵ Augmented by Montgomery's force, Quebec City was attacked on 31 December, but Carleton's forces soundly defeated them. The siege of Quebec City lasted until the spring of 1776, when a squadron of British ships under Captain Charles Douglas arrived to relieve the siege.

Another attempt was made to take Quebec City, but failed at Trois-Rivières on 8 June 1776.⁵⁶ Carleton then launched his own invasion, defeating Arnold at the Battle of Valcour Island in October and pushing the Americans back to Fort Ticonderoga, where the invasion of Canada had begun. In some important respects, this invasion ended as a disaster for the Americans by costing them any support base in Britain or their colonies.⁵⁷ In another way, however, Arnold's efforts in 1776 paid some dividends, delaying a full-scale British counteroffensive until the Saratoga campaign of 1777.

The analysis of the period from the War of Independence through to Canadian Confederation will have to consider the impact of the military campaigns during the Revolutionary period on how the leadership on both sides of the border viewed the other, and how this differed from the public views given the influx of Loyalists during and after the conflict. Moreover, another factor that cannot be avoided is the bifurcated nature of Canadian society's French and English populations, and how this influenced these perceptions and the response. As well, the perspective of the British Government in London and its changing view of its role in North America will have to be considered.⁵⁸ Collectively, the detailed analysis of these issues from the Revolutionary period through to Confederation will form the foundation upon which to the larger question of whether the military threat posed by the US was the main driver behind Canadian Confederation can be answered. Moreover, this study will help to fill another gap in the historiography by attempting to understand the nature of what would become the Canadian and American strategic cultures at this formative period in both nations' histories.

⁵⁴ Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada 1763-1871*, p.34.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.39.

⁵⁷ J. Stephen Watson, *The Reign of George III, 1760-1815*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p.203.

⁵⁸ Ged Martin has argued that pre-existing British support for Canadian Confederation was an essential element in its success. While there is some truth in this notion, the issues of the factors motivating Canadian political leadership are not addressed. See Ged Martin, *Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 1837-67*.

War of 1812

In looking at the next major conflict in North America, the War of 1812, this study will focus on whether the war was merely “the culmination of the post-revolution tensions between Britain and the United States rather than a pointer to the future,” or a result of serious rivalry and tension between the two entities.⁵⁹ In either case, it tells much about the perception of the threat and its causes, and whether it was sufficiently profound to reinforce the notion that this threat was the main driver behind Confederation. As with the Revolutionary period, the impact of the war’s military campaigns on how the leadership on both sides of the border viewed the other must be assessed in the context of the British presence as a driver of the US threat, and the British Government’s changing view of its role in North America.

There are many good histories covering the causes and course of this war both on land and at sea, as well as narratives providing the Canadian, British, and American perspectives.⁶⁰ Of the sources that collectively define the accepted national narrative of the War of 1812, the most enduring title continues to be *The Incredible War of 1812*, written by John Mackay Hitsman in 1965.⁶¹ While devoting little attention to the war on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts and none to the war at sea, his account of the part of the war along the Canada-US border is very detailed and still a relevant source. Indeed, as evidence of this work being part of the accepted national narrative one can point to the recently revised issue by another leading scholar of the War of 1812, Donald Graves.⁶² The book’s main point clearly shows that the successful defence of Canada owed far more to the presence and abilities of the British regular troops than to the militia than was commonly believed. It thus challenged the ‘militia myth’, which was an enduring feature of the war’s narrative, while at the same time providing an account of internal Canadian politics and their affect on the war. Both the original and revised editions are essential sources in a study of the British and Canadian standpoint, but provide few insights into the questions this study will answer.

⁵⁹ Gordon T. Stewart, *The American Response to Canada Since 1776*, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992), p.9.

⁶⁰ J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), Desmond Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence*, (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), G.F.G Stanley, *The War of 1812: Land Operations*, (Toronto: Canadian War Museum Historical Publications, 1983), Wesley B. Turner, *British Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), A.T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*, (London : S. Low, Marston, 1905), J. Mackay Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), Donald E. Graves, *Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999). Robin Reilly, *The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812*, revised edition, (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002). Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 1814*, revised edition, (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1997), Robert Malcomson, *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814*, (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1998).

⁶¹ J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History*.

⁶² J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History*, updated by Donald Graves, (Robin Brass Studio, 1999).

In particular, while devoting attention to the reasons behind Governor Sir George Prevost's often maligned strategy during the war, Hitsman raises as many questions as he answers. For example, his initially sympathetic appraisal of Prevost changes to criticism, raising the questions of what factors motivated him throughout the campaign, and whether these reflected the perceptions and preferences of the Canadian public and British government. Initially, the author applauds Prevost's cautious and defensive strategy as resting upon the firm foundation of wishing to avoid overly offensive action that "unite the people in the American States", since "the government at home could derive no substantial advantage from any disgrace we might inflict on them, whilst the more important concerns of the country are committed in Europe."⁶³ Later, however, this evaluation takes on a somewhat negative tone when in 1814 Napoleon's defeat in Europe freed British forces for action in North America. The author then argues that "the Plattsburg fiasco was the result of having a defensive minded general in charge of operations once the tide had turned." In either case, the questions of how this conflict shaped the relationship, how the leadership on both sides of the border viewed the other, and how this differed from public perception, if at all, and the British Government's changing view of its role in North America, are not answered fully in this useful study.

Of the studies that focus on the American perspective of the War of 1812, John Mahon's *The War of 1812* is still one of the most useful in that it provides a narrative of events from the British standpoint while focusing on the American. Its value comes less from the specific detail of events than from its balanced analysis, which tries and largely succeeds in focusing not on the causes of the war, which "tries to place the operations of the War of 1812 precisely within the politics and culture of the time."⁶⁴ In doing so, this work provides a unique perspective on the foundation of the early strategic relationship, some judgement on whether the occasional bellicose rhetoric reflected a sincere desire to annex Canada, and the impact of the war on public perceptions. On balance, though, it devotes insufficient attention to the issues this study will address.

Rhetoric or not, though, on 18 June 1812, at the height of the Napoleonic conflict, the US declared war on Great Britain and struck at Canada, the only British possession on the continent. As Desmond Morton has said, the "War of 1812 was not a struggle of equals. Seven and a half million Americans were at war with half a million neighbours."⁶⁵ Under such circumstances, it seemed only prudent to act defensively and attempt to exploit enemy mistakes. That General Sir George Prevost sought to husband his scarce military resources speaks to his assessment of the threat posed and the capacity of the US to carry it out, but his continuance of this strategy once the tide had turned remains largely unexplained. The preparations made by Major General Sir Isaac Brock, the administrator of Upper Canada, demonstrate his sophisticated understanding of the situation. Through the fostering of important native allies under the leadership of the Shawnee war Chief Tecumseh, the British found themselves better prepared for the conflict than their more numerous opponents. The Indian attacks kept the north-west American frontier in turmoil, and enabled the British to capture Michilimackinac and Detroit, thus preventing the US from marching up the traditional Champlain-Richelieu invasion route and seizing Montreal, a first step in cutting the lines of

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 84-85.

⁶⁴ John K. Mahon, *The War of 1812*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), p. viii.

⁶⁵ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p. 55.

communication between Upper and Lower Canada. While Prevost likely overestimated the American capacity to conduct the war, he was correct in his assessment of the American intended course of action.⁶⁶ The strategy adopted initially made a mockery of Thomas Jefferson's remark that capturing Canada was "a mere matter of marching", and this case-study will have to assess the lasting impact of this campaign on the desire (aside from the occasional rhetoric) to annex Canada and the degree to which these experiences shaped the Canadian response. One area that must be analysed is the Rush-Bagot treaty which resulted from the war and how illustrative this is of the true desire to annex Canada, thus supporting or detracting from the idea that the US threat was the primary motivation behind Confederation.

Rush-Bagot

After the end of the War of 1812, specifically 15 November 1815, US Secretary of State James Monroe directed the American Minister in London, John Quincy Adams, to propose an arrangement "respecting the naval forces to be kept on the [Great] Lakes by both governments, as will demonstrate their pacific policy and secure their peace."⁶⁷ The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, was cautious. On the one hand, Britain had no desire to maintain "a number of armed vessels parading about the Lakes in time of peace", but also knew that complete naval disarmament would benefit US interests far more than those of Britain or Canada.⁶⁸ British naval superiority on the Great Lakes was essential in any future war with the US. As is frequently the case, the economic realities of affording a large naval presence drove the negotiations. The resulting agreement was completed through an exchange of diplomatic notes from the British Minister in Washington, Charles Bagot, and acting head of the State Department, Richard Rush, rather than through a treaty.⁶⁹ Interestingly, very shortly after the agreement went into effect, neither side chose to maintain even those vessels permitted, and while both sides spent considerable resources annually on the maintenance of their mothballed fleets, Commodore Robert Barrie of the Royal Navy noted that on 31 October, 1819, "the American ships are nearly as rotten as our own."⁷⁰ What this says about the true US intentions to Canada, and indeed Canadian and British motivations, requires further work through the exploration of the same primary and secondary sources, but with this study's unique lens.

The US Civil War

One of the strongest proponents of the view that the success of the confederation movement in 1867 was in large measure a consequence of the deterioration of Canadian-American relations during the Civil War is Robin Winks, whose work on the subject is widely regarded and justifiably forms part of the accepted national narrative.⁷¹ His treatment of the main issues of the conflict is both balanced and fair. For example, his main argument is that the loss of reciprocal trade with the United States through its abrogation of the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Bradford Perkins, *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States 1812-1823*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 240, Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada*, p. 113.

⁶⁸ Histman, *Safeguarding Canada*, p.113.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.114.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 115.

⁷¹ Robin W. Winks, *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years*, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).

Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 pointed to the need for closer economic cooperation between the colonies, while concerns that the victorious Union army might attack Canada to punish perceived British support for the South made political union essential to a more effective defence. Furthermore, on the important issue of the perception of the crisis in Canada and Britain, Winks shows that President Lincoln's initial subordination of the slavery question to the preservation of the Union affected public opinion in Britain and Canada, and alienated a potentially strong anti-slavery sympathy for the North. Moreover, his treatment of whether Canadian leadership and public opinion was pro-North or pro-South during the war is quite balanced. He finds that George Brown's *Toronto Globe* was the only BNA paper consistently supporting the North, and he presents strong evidence that the 'Trent' incident hardened the anti-North attitude in Canada, which he carefully distinguishes from pro-South outlook.

Winks' treatment of how the senior leadership on both sides dealt with the many misunderstandings and deliberate insults is one area this project must re-examine through its unique lens. While he fairly portrays Lord Monck and President Lincoln as having kept their heads amidst these crises, and how the latter had to restrain his bellicose Secretary of State, Seward, his analysis of the primary sources does not reveal the degree to which each side viewed war as the inevitable result of this tension. Why Seward boasted "that Nature designs that this whole continent...shall be, sooner or later, within the magic circle of the American Union", and yet did little or nothing to attain this desired end-state is something not adequately explained.⁷² Yet he does provide some evidence of popular opinion that is worthwhile to this study. In particular, he provides the opinion of James Gordon Bennett of the *New York Herald*, the most forceful journalist in the United States at the time, which urged the North to abandon the South and take Canada instead. The Canadian fears of growing US anger and military power reached a climax during the crisis over the 'Trent' only to subside and then rise again as border incidents continued. The most incident notable of these attempts was the October 1864 St. Albans raid, where a handful of Confederate soldiers crossed the Canadian border and robbed banks in a small Vermont town. The incident greatly incensed northern opinion, caused the US to give and then withdraw notice of its intention to terminate the Rush-Bagot agreement. Of course, St. Albans and its aftermath coincided with the Fenian scare, and there is evidence that Macdonald conflated the threat somewhat with that of the US in order to achieve his political ends.⁷³ Nonetheless, while Winks' argument is strong on certain issues, and entirely convincing on others, the perception of the threat on both sides of the border by key figures, how public opinion was used to press an agenda, and how this has shaped the strategic relationship between the two countries, are areas requiring further work.

⁷² Quoted in William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 38; see also Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: the Politics of Partnership*, p.3, and Scott Kaufman and John A Soares, Jr., "Sagacious Beyond Praise"? Winfield Scott and Anglo-American-Canadian Border Diplomacy, 1837-1860", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 30 No 1 (January 2006), for another example of how a bellicose annexationist consciously worked to prevent the escalation of border disputes into a full-fledged conflict that may have realised his desires.

⁷³ Winks, *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years*, pp. 322-326.

Economic Issues

In addition to the military threat posed by the US, the economic drivers of Confederation will have to be considered in this case-study, as many scholars argue were a far more significant influence than the US military threat. By far the most enduring and influential works of the so-called Laurentian school are those by Donald Creighton.⁷⁴ His works, heavily influenced by those of Harold Innis, argue that economic factors based on the St. Lawrence River as the “inspiration and basis of a transcontinental, east-west system, both commercial and political in character” were central features along the road to Confederation.⁷⁵ The questions of whether Creighton and Innis’ theme that Confederation was the triumph of Canadian nationalism “over the forces of continentalism” is convincing, and the degree to which it diminishes the argument that the military threat from the US was the main driver of Confederation, will be analysed in this case-study.⁷⁶ After all, in the opinion of some at the time, the “lower provinces added no more strength than extra sections of a fishing rod”, magnifying the costs of defending a growing country and destroying the value of Confederation for the Maritime colonies at the very least.⁷⁷ These factors along with the related issues of how key figures perceived and understood the threat posed by the US and what sources informed this view, whether public fears of US annexation of Canada were exploited to press the Confederation agenda, and the role of the British government in support of Confederation and as the source of US antagonism need further exploration through the lens of their role in shaping the strategic relationship. Collectively, these factors will give a better understanding of the nature of what would become a Canadian and American strategic culture at this formative time in both nations’ history.

Ogdensburg and Hyde Park: Toward a New Strategic Entity?

When John Diefenbaker’s Tories were elected in 1957, Canadian Anglophiles saw the last chance to resurrect Canada’s trade and social links to the Mother Country. When that failed, a host of polemical obituaries for Canada’s existence as a distinct North American nation appeared in Canadian universities and media. Notable historians such as Donald Creighton and W.L. Morton charged that the Liberals, in power from 1935 to 1957, ‘sold out’ Canada to the US, submitting to American corporations, foreign policy and demands for bases, leaving Canada with little or no autonomy by the late 1950’s. Equally vehement in his distrust of Canadian liberalism, George Grant, the eminent political philosopher, resolutely placed the blame for Canada’s withdrawal from Britain’s political influence at the feet of William Lyon Mackenzie King, the long-serving Canadian Prime Minister. The continentalist

⁷⁴ Donald Creighton, *Dominion of the North: A History of Canada*, (Toronto: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), Donald Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002 reprint), Donald Creighton, *The Road to Confederation: the emergence of Canada, 1863-1867*, (Toronto: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).

⁷⁵ Donald Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence*, p.iii. See also Brian Tennyson, “Economic Nationalism, Confederation and Nova Scotia,” in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, p. 130. Creighton’s work seems influenced by Harold Innis, especially *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999 reprint).

⁷⁶ Brian Tennyson, “Economic Nationalism, Confederation and Nova Scotia,” in Ged Martin, ed., *The Causes of Canadian Confederation*, p.131.

⁷⁷ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p.84

philosophy and policies of Mackenzie King, Grant argued in his *Lament For a Nation*, shunned Britain as a counterbalance to the US; it was essential for Canada to sustain its nationhood against the threat of the American behemoth.⁷⁸ Grant does admit that Canada had to 'throw in her lot' to continental defence vis-à-vis Ogdensburg and Hyde Park. However, he does make a pertinent observation about the decision-making process and context by expressing his dismay that "King and his associates in External Affairs did not seem to recognize the perilous situation that the new circumstances entailed... How little the American alliance was balanced by any defence of national independence."⁷⁹ In other words, Grant seemed amazed that there was so little input into the decisions taken in 1940 and 1941.

That was because King dominated decision making in Ottawa, and he had no intention of mobilizing massively for war. Nonetheless, the Ogdensburg agreement of August 1940, issued by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, established a "Permanent Joint Board on Defence" to "consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere." The initiative was very much Roosevelt's. Eight months later, in April 1941, the two leaders announced the Hyde Park Declaration, stating "as a general principle that in mobilizing the resources of this continent each country should provide the other with the defence articles which it is best able to produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programs should be coordinated to this end."⁸⁰ King and his Deputy Minister of Finance, Clifford Clark, appear to have driven this agreement.⁸¹ These two agreements between Canada and the United States in the early years of the Second World War are viewed in Canadian historiography as landmark occasions. C.P. Stacey, in his comprehensive study of Canada's war policies, *Arms, Men and Governments*, stated that Ogdensburg "marked for better or worse, as we can now see, the beginning of a new era in Canadian-American relations."⁸² According to Gordon Stewart, in his adept study *The American Response to Canada Since 1776*, both the Hyde Park and Ogdensburg agreements marked the 'symbolic' and 'practical' shifts toward North American integration. Stewart uses a selection of State Department material to indicate that, from an American point of view, both the economic and trade agreements were the result of long term goals toward increased

⁷⁸ W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto, 1963); Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century* (Toronto, 1970); George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto, 1965).

⁷⁹ Grant, p. 50.

⁸⁰ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p 339 and 490.

⁸¹ C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies* (vol. II: 1921-1948 The Mackenzie King Era), Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981. pp. 315-317.

⁸² Stacey, p. 339. For standard accounts of the wartime relationship and the centrality of Ogdensburg and Hyde Park to it, see also S.W. Dzuiban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959); J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 114-158; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1960), pp. 364-409; Robert D. Cuff, and Jack L. Granatstein, *Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in War-Time From the Great War to the Cold War*, (Toronto: Hakkert, 1977), pp. 69-92; J.C. Arnell, "The Development of Joint North American Defence," *Queen's Quarterly* vol. 77 (Summer 1970), pp. 190-204; Hugh Keenleyside, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945," *International Journal* vol. 9 (Spring 1954), pp. 107-124.

integration (what some might call 'hegemony').⁸³ Citing a narrative written by C.P. Stacey,⁸⁴ Jack English called Ogdensburg a "changing of the guard in Canadian external relations, while Jack Granatstein suggested that Ogdensburg was indicative that "the United States had definitively replaced the United Kingdom as Canada's senior defence partner."⁸⁵

English and Granatstein differ, however, in their interpretation of Canadian actions during that dismal period that brought about the Canada-US agreements. France fell in June 1940 leaving Britain alone to fight Hitler. The Mother Country was not in a position militarily to defend Canada, and increasingly unable to pay for military equipment built in Canada. Granatstein argues that Canada had no choice but to seek help from the United States because Britain was so weak. English suggests that Canada, during the critical period between France's fall and the US entry into the war in December 1941, failed to do what Borden had done during the First World War – use the country's military contribution to gain political status. King, English asserts, missed the opportunity to work within the Commonwealth during those early days to gain a "voice in the strategic direction of the war."⁸⁶

There is no question that these two agreements were of consequence, and not only because it was certainly a giant leap from each country's perception of the other as possible belligerents not so many years before.⁸⁷ Notably, the 'neutral' US agreed a defence pact with a belligerent nation – a deliberate move toward creating a 'strategic entity' that saw defence and security as mutually inclusive. As the PJBD began working immediately, it made a number of recommendations that were implemented in the name of continental defence, such as sharing military information and enhancing the defence of Newfoundland (still a British colony), but the driver of the relationship was the seventh recommendation, calling for a plan for the defence of North America. Two joint plans were prepared throughout the war. The first Canada-US Basic Defence Plan 1940 (Basic Plan No. 1), dealt with the short term implications of British defeat, mainly the need to protect Atlantic approaches to deny Germany the use of 'stepping stones' on the seaboard. The second, "Joint Canada-US Basic Defence Plan No.2" (ABC-22) was ancillary to ABC-1, the Anglo-American plan for the defeat of Germany and Italy. ABC-22 came into effect when the US entered the war in December 1941, but the intended 'mutual cooperation' was marred somewhat by US Army requirements for unity of command under an American officer in Newfoundland, although the

⁸³ Gordon Stewart, *The American Response to Canada Since 1776* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1992), p. 153.

⁸⁴ As cited by English, C.P. Stacey, "The Turning-Point: Canadian-American Relations During the Roosevelt-King Era," *Canada: A Historical Magazine* Vol. 1 (1973), pp. 1-19.

⁸⁵ English also correctly points out that it was just a press release at the time, but Canada incorporated the agreement in its Treaty Series as part of an order-in-council, while Roosevelt left it at the executive level, not sending it for Senate ratification. John Alan English, "Not an Equilateral Triangle: Canada's Strategic Relationship with the United States and Britain, 1939-1945, p. 163; fn 65; J.L. Granatstein, *The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963*," in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1993), p. 131.

⁸⁶ English, p. 151.

⁸⁷ Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 167-191 and Preston, Richard A., *The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), pp. 216-217.

War Department stopped the idea from going any further.⁸⁸ C.P. Stacey suggests this was an example of “the value of the PJBD as an international lubricant,” but given that the War Department squashed the Army’s proposal before it ever made it to the PJBD, this is a confusing conclusion, and points to the need to further review documents related to command and control matters during the war, especially those that formed the basis of advice to the Cabinet War Committee.⁸⁹ This is not to denigrate the use of the PJBD, but rather to demonstrate that indirect connections between decisions and circumstances can be misleading. The US Army might have considered operational efficiency to be paramount in its analysis of command and control arrangements, but the War Department appears to have been more astute in its understanding of Canadian politics. Still, in those early days, Canadian officials remained concerned that ABC-22 was only a subordinate plan to ABC-1, and therefore Canada forces remained subject to the overall strategic direction of the US and Britain.⁹⁰

Canada’s requirement for autonomy at the operational level, and sensitivities that arose when it was perceived to be threatened, was a product of post-Confederation Canadian national narrative. A fundamental theme of that narrative remains the country’s economic, social and political growth during the period of the two world wars. Canada-US relations changed fundamentally because of Canada’s increased independence from Britain, signified by recognition of Dominion status in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and Canada’s newfound right to conduct its own foreign and domestic affairs. There is no shortage of literature on this period, easily characterized in terms of national struggle and transition.⁹¹ However, the symbiotic relationship between the demands put upon governments to mobilize for total war and sustain the effort brought about ‘national struggle’ among all the belligerents, and ‘transition’ was not merely a parochial Canadian experience, but a function of changes to the international balance of power. Total war brought about, or coincided with, the end of empire (Austria-Hungary and Ottoman), revolution (Russia), totalitarian movements (Russia, Italy and German) and the general shift in economic and military power from Britain to the United States.⁹²

⁸⁸ For an examination of RCN-USN relations on the east coast, see W. Lund, “The Royal Canadian Navy’s Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic: 1941-1943, in Jim Boutillier, *The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982) and, of course, Marc Milner’s *North Atlantic Run* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

⁸⁹ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p. 364.

⁹⁰ Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: 1992), pp. 193-195.

⁹¹ Consider the following introduction to Ralph Allen’s contribution to the Canadian History Series: “In the sunlit year of 1910 an unsuspecting g Canada began the most painful and momentous years of its education for nationhood. For all it knew of what lay ahead, it might have been a happy child swinging a five-cent scribbler in one hand and a shiny new pencil box in the other on the way to the first day of school. Canada’s nationhood was already more than half won and the rest was within certain grasp. But the education to make it fruitful had a long way yet to go. The phase now beginning on the threshold of a new general election was to see bitter conflicts within the country’s borders and draw it deeply into two wars beyond them. It was to revolutionize Canada’s economy, its individual way of living, its philosophy of government, and its whole attitude and relation to the world.” It would be hard to concoct a more Whiggish interpretation of Canadian history. See Ralph Allen’s splendid work, *Ordeal By Fire: Canada 1910-1945* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1961), p. 1.

⁹² See, for example, D.C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of some of the new scholarship on the

Within that context of growing American power, in the post- Confederation period, several Canada-US disagreements emerged that tested and shaped the strategic relationship that would mature during the world wars. Most, not surprisingly, related to fisheries or commercial disputes and to what extent Canada would pursue and obtain free trade with America. John A. Macdonald's National Policy was designed in no small part to buttress Canadian manufacturing by imposing tariffs on imports, and he won the 1891 election in part because of his impassioned pleas to reject the Liberal platform of free trade. The "Reciprocity election" of 1911 led to another defeat of Liberal reciprocity, albeit a more restricted version than the 1891 version, and allowed to Robert Borden's Conservatives to govern after fifteen years of Wilfrid Laurier.

Borden would preside over Canada's efforts in the Great War, and use those efforts, represented in blood and treasure, to push for more autonomy within the British Empire, and subsequently Commonwealth. Circumstances demanded for this push, which came about not just because of war, but after many years of Britain's signalled inability and unwillingness to compete with the United States in North America, a sober fact that gradually became more defined as the 19th century came to a close. For its part, 'exceptionalist' America shored up its hemispheric walls in Venezuela, finally getting London to agree to arbitration over a boundary dispute with British Guinea, annexed Hawaii and controlled Puerto Rico. The Monroe Doctrine dictated as much. Washington also effectively won its case in the Alaska Boundary dispute, the arbitrational panel, including the British representative, granting the US most of its claim, and leaving what is usually considered to be a sense of betrayal by Ottawa toward London, but nonetheless the key step toward Canada-US rapprochement.⁹³ Of course, British actions reflected its rapprochement with the United States as well. As Barry Gough points out in his excellent study of the Royal Navy's role off the Pacific coast of North America during the century leading to the First World War, there was increasingly less the severely stretched Royal Navy could do against the growing US fleet in the Pacific even if it so desired. By 1905, Whitehall had given up clinging to the defence even of Halifax and Esquimalt from possible American attack, choosing to rely more formally on cordial relations instead.⁹⁴ Britain's strategic withdrawal from the Western hemisphere largely was complete, but it only was part of a redistribution of naval strength and the building of a new system of alliances, like that with Japan struck in 1902, drawn up to concentrate more forces in the North Sea to face the growing German presence there.

Implicit in this argument is the idea that Hyde Park and Ogdensburg were a deliberate departure from the Imperial connection to the continental cage. Exploring the period between Ogdensburg and Hyde Park thus becomes integral to our understanding of how the Mackenzie King government (and thus largely King himself) perceived the impact and implications of these agreements. Was he, in fact, deliberately taking Canada away from the Mother Country in those dark days for the Empire, in order to move Canada closer to the US in terms of

understanding of total war and its impact on the 20th century, see Roger Chickering and Stig Forster, *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁹³ Granatstein, JL and Hillmer, NA, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1994), p. 35-36.

⁹⁴ Barry M. Gough, *The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America 1810-1914* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), pp. 236-237.

strategic alignment? Or, was the lynchpin concept – the idea that, as Winston Churchill put it, Canada was the “binder-together of the English-speaking peoples – more central to King’s behaviour? He certainly sold Ogdensburg to Parliament that way, arguing that the American safety net allowed Canada to move ever increasing war supplies and men to Britain. King said much the same thing after Hyde Park. An agreement really meant to solve Canada’s chronic trade deficit with the US, King told Parliament repeatedly that its most beneficial effect was allowing Canada to give “maximum aid to Britain.”⁹⁵

Yet, that military affinity was threatened by Britain’s decline. In his provocative essay, *How Britain’s Weakness Forced Canada Into the Arms of the United States*, J.L. Granatstein marked the start of that shift at the end of the First World War, declaring it substantially completed by 1945.⁹⁶ In 1960 and 1961, a spate of articles in Canadian newspapers and magazines appeared describing how Canada was drifting away from an increasingly ineffective Britain and Commonwealth. In *Saturday Night*, Charles Taylor declared that “Britannia No Longer Rules the Waves,” noting that Britain’s shipbuilding industry declined from 51 percent of the world’s tonnage in 1947 to only 15% in 1960. Taylor also outlined the shrinking of the Royal Navy, which now languished a distant third behind the US and Soviet navies in terms of ship numbers and tonnage. In *Maclean’s*, Professor M.S. Donnelly wrote that “we should revive the Commonwealth -- or admit it’s dead.” Donnelly rightly pointed out that the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference was another waste of time for a “do-nothing organization.” Also in *Saturday Night*, Charles Gordon announced that “The Ties With Britain Are Loosening.” Canada had little choice but to succumb to US dominance in economic and military matters, Gordon argued, because Britain was no longer a viable alternative in either field.⁹⁷

He was correct, if not imaginative. It had been impossible for Canada to shun the tide of US economic or military power that grew to dominance in the 1950’s since at least the First World War. The Hyde Park and Ogdensburg agreements undoubtedly did much to bring the two countries much closer in terms of economics and defence. But that process, at least on the economic side, started at least as early as the Reciprocal Trade Treaty signed by the Roosevelt and newly re-elected Mackenzie King governments in 1935. The agreement came about after RB Bennett’s government failed to find an imperial solution to the Depression and, even though it was restricted, mainly to protect against Canadian agricultural products, marked a turning point away from imperial preferences.

Still, despite Mackenzie King’s insistence that Hyde Park represented a permanent significance in terms of a “common plan for the economic defence of the western hemisphere,” Hyde Park took place in the context of broader Anglo-American financial

⁹⁵ As cited in Thompson, John Herd and Randall, Stephen J., *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994), p. 155. On the role of scientific lynchpin, especially in the area of radar, see Donald Avery, *The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology During the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

⁹⁶ J.L. Granatstein, *How Britain’s Weakness Forced Canada Into the Arms of the United States* (Toronto, 1989).

⁹⁷ Charles Taylor, “Britannia No Longer Rules the Waves,” in *Saturday Night*, 20 February 1960; M.S. Donnelly, “Revive the Commonwealth - Or Admit It’s Dead”, in *Maclean’s* 23 April 1960; Donald Gordon, “The Ties With Britain Are Loosening”, *Saturday Night*, 18 February 1961.

diplomacy, born of the inability of London to continue paying for American, or Canadian, orders, while Canada was running low of US dollars itself. In essence, Canada had a trade deficit with the US, balanced by a surplus with Britain and other European and Commonwealth countries. As a result, Canada needed help from the US in order to continue helping Britain. With Lend-Lease, the necessity of cash payments during the war ceased, and America was able to more out rightly support the Allied war effort. However, as Britain obtained the lend-lease treaty with the US, officials in Ottawa worried that Britain might increasingly divert wartime orders to the US from Canada, thereby affecting Canada's ability to keep vital industries viable. The Hyde Park agreement committed the US to purchasing some \$300 million of equipment within year, and also allowed for Britain to obtain products in Canada under lend-lease. In fact, then, while Canadian historians might focus on Hyde Park as the key step toward integrated defence production, culminating in the Defence Production Sharing Agreements in the 1950s, it was the Lend-Lease agreement between the US and Britain that created the opportunity for Hyde Park. Robert Cuff and Jack Granatstein do point this out in one of the major works on the period, but neglect to explicitly demonstrate that it was not only the strategic entity of North America that was being shaped, but more likely the balance of power within the Anglosphere.⁹⁸ As Britain fought for its economic life, America offered life support and Canada made it through the war without having to rely on lend-lease.

In examining the different perceptions of Hyde Park between the US and Canada, it is necessary to move to the post-war period. For instance, Mackenzie King might have thought the agreement a permanent arrangement, but the US did not. When trying to procure F-86s in 1947, for instance, Canada discovered that the US had allowed the Hyde Park Agreement to lapse at war's end. The agreement, in effect, established a single North American market for weapons production and the manufacture of war materials. After it lapsed, however, the Buy American Act of 1933 (suspended for that special case) applied to arms trade between the two countries. That Act protected US arms manufacturers by guaranteeing them government contracts, and restricted exports of arms to equipment deemed surplus to US needs. In 1946, Canada had arranged for a line of credit in Washington with which to buy surplus military equipment, but, because of emergency measures taken by Ottawa to restrict the outward flow of US dollars in 1947, its use was severely limited.⁹⁹ On 30 June 1948, Congress passed Public Law 862, which prohibited even surplus military equipment to be supplied to foreign governments. Eventually, CD Howe was able to arrange purchase of the F-86s, but it is noteworthy that Canada was not dragged kicking and screaming into the American economic and military "empire." Rather, Ottawa wanted a grand North American military-industrial complex, wherein both countries produced and freely traded standardized weapons and equipment -- much of which would go to European allies as part of US assistance.¹⁰⁰ After 1948, the new St. Laurent government lobbied hard in the US to resurrect Hyde Park and buy equipment in Canada under the new Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The situation was similar to that of 1940 – Canada wanted to sell to US to obtain the US dollars needed to purchase necessary equipment and parts in the US. The character of Canada's arms trade with the US and UK now fit into the broader trading patterns of each relationship. By 1949, 70%

⁹⁸ Cuff, Robert D., and Jack L. Granatstein, *Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in War-Time From the Great War to the Cold War*, Toronto, Hakkert, 1977, pp. 69-92.

⁹⁹ (DHist) 112. 3M2 (D220), Reid to Atherton, No. 20, 24 January 1948

¹⁰⁰ (NAC) RG 24, volume 21556, file 120, Aide Memoire presented by Canadian Embassy, Washington to the State Department; Cabinet Conclusions, 18 May 1948.

of Canadian imports were from the US, only 11% from Britain. A full 50% of Canadian exports went to the US, but only 23%, and falling, to the UK.¹⁰¹ By 1950, defence minister Brooke Claxton was able to announce that his US counterpart in the Buy America Act to allow for a modest amount of purchases from Canada, hailing it as a major step in the integration of defence production.¹⁰² Clearly, then, the perception of Hyde Park's permanence was not universally held, as Ottawa had to lobby hard to resurrect it after the war. This case study will have to re-examine the evidence amassed to support these.

At the very least, this episode demonstrates that Canada actively sought integration in pursuit of national interest. In the period, between 1940, is Grant's lament over the lack of "balance" a fair criticism of Canadian strategic culture as it was developing? Further investigation of the documentary record is necessary to determine to what extent this perceived need was considered. Review will have to include the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee and the Military Cooperation Committee, especially as the latter tried to find a way to achieve agreement on principles of collaboration to be carried into post-war.¹⁰³ It is necessary to examine as much as possible the assumptions and analysis that led John Holmes, an official in External at the time, to make the following statement based on the conclusions of the February 1945 Cabinet War Committee document, "Post-War Defence Relationship with the United States": "...although Canada-United States relations were unlikely to prejudice friendship there was a possibility of the United States being moved to exert undue pressure on Canada because of differences of attitude towards events in other parts of the world."¹⁰⁴

So, as we consider again George Grant, it is unconvincing that he called for "balance" without really articulating what exactly Canada was losing in assuming a closer alliance with the US, or what it might have gained by "balance" – except of course, an emotional attachment to the Mother Country born of Loyalist sentiment. Furthermore, Canada did indeed take steps to defend autonomy and sovereignty very soon after Hyde Park by asserting itself against real or imagined US "threats" in the North.* That abstract "threat" has driven Canadian scholarship, aided by the abundance of fodder for historians of US-Canadian defence relations in the 1940's and 1950's. The Hyde Park Agreement on economic co-operation, the formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the establishment of US bases in Newfoundland all carried over from war to post-war. The combined efforts at continental defence, made necessary by advances in weapons and delivery systems at the disposal of the Soviet Union, brought a sometimes reluctant Canada even more under the influence of the American defence community, what Jack Granatstein calls the "Americanization" of Canadian military establishments.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Bruce Muirhead, *The Development of Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 183-186.

¹⁰² House of Commons *Debates*, 19 May 1950.

¹⁰³ PJBD Recommendation 36, dealing with a host of exchange, equipment and standardization matters, are discussed in the Arctic case study.

¹⁰⁴ Holmes, John W., *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 170.

* See Arctic case study, pages...

¹⁰⁵ J.L. Granatstein, "The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963", in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto, 1993).

Still, while Grant might have been overly incensed by his distrust of things American, his point about the decision-making process is well taken. Was there any thinking about “balance” within External? What about other ministries, especially defence? Was military advice sought and given before the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park decisions were made? To what extent did Canadian and American decision-makers take a long view of the strategic defence relationship when deliberating on the implications of relevant decisions? Did the exigencies of war forge a common view of existential threats whereby a threat to one country was necessarily a threat to both? Did differences between political and bureaucratic or military assessments of continental defence emerge? For the most part, discussion of threats will encompass maritime approaches, especially given the German U-boat menace that emerged in both wars, but were there staff level discussions of what else might constitute future threats to the continent and, if so, when did they begin? While post-hostilities planning began earnestly in 1943, for instance, is it possible to determine what sorts of planning inputs or political restraints/guidance shaped how the future Soviet threat was perceived? In other words, within the machinery of government in both countries, what were the debates, disagreements and decision points that related to continental defence? To what extent did Canada and the United States consider the bilateral principles and practices, as opposed to just the new organizations like the PJBD, forged during the Second World War to be just defence related and nothing more? Did Canadian policy-makers see closer ties as a means to enhance “sovereignty” or as a means to surrender it? More precisely, which assumptions about the limits of continental integration were explicit, which were implicit, and to what extent did Canadian officials see the country’s future strategic alignment as primarily North American rather than the British Commonwealth as the centre of gravity?

Viewed in hindsight, that last question seems fanciful at best. As Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer point out, Canadian officials “had to know” that Britain’s “power and prestige were on the wane.” Furthermore, they conclude that “the Second World War made Canada more North American.”¹⁰⁶ On the surface, this is an apt observation, almost intuitively obvious. With British power in decline and American power on the rise, an international shift accelerated, if not created by, total war, the entire Euro-Atlantic community’s future would be more US-centric than before. The question, however, always haunts: did Canadian officials deliberately set Canada down that path or was it an inevitable departure from its British heritage and close geopolitical ties? Were those ties in fact mutually exclusive from closer ties to the US? What of the North Atlantic Triangle and the broader concept of the Anglosphere to explain the context of Canada’s “Americanization?”

Extant literature, as cited in developing this short conceptual framework for analyzing what might be considered the origins of the “strategic entity,” is weighty on the subject of Canada-US wartime relations, but it does not answer definitively these several questions satisfactorily, all of which are necessary to consider in according this period of the Second World War – up to America’s entry – as key not only to the future Canada-US relations but also to understanding how such decisions were made.¹⁰⁷ It is intended to take a fresh look at the primary sources in order to compare the military planning processes and military-military

¹⁰⁶ Granatstein and Hillmer, pp. 161-162.

¹⁰⁷ Most students of this period rely heavily on Stacey’s *Arms, Men and Governments*. See, for example, English, “Not an Equilateral Triangle,” fn 15.

relationships then with those of today, sketched out in the final case study. Further issues might include rounding out the actions of Canada and the US involving Newfoundland with those related to Greenland and St. Pierre and Miquelon.¹⁰⁸ Canada's period of being an "atomic power" and wartime collaborator with the US and Britain is also a potential area of investigation as elements of Canada-US relations during the war are extended to the next case study, Korea. It may also be necessary to examine the military-to-military relationship in the period between the end of hostilities and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to determine if civilian and military leadership were marching in step.

Korean War

The decision by Canadian political leaders to become involved in the Korean conflict of 1950-53 raises many questions, some of which have been dealt with adequately in the existing historiography. But from the perspective of how those leaders perceived the threat posed by the Communist ideology, and more importantly the Red Army and Soviet strategic forces, and the degree to which the policy of containment was seen as a means to protect the homeland are issues that remain largely unexplained. While some of the literature hints at these matters, they have not been satisfactorily pursued, and there is reason to do so. The current global terrorist threat and that posed by the Communist ideology are both existential in their intent. The former seeks to attack directly the interests and way of life of the Western world, so too did the latter. An understanding of the degree to which the Communist threat was understood as such, and the factors that motivated the decision to become involved in its containment at this point and not at others will reveal much about the nature of Canadian strategic culture. Moreover, it will assist in the development of a better understanding of the realities of decision making in the Government of Canada at that time and since, and may assist in explaining the current response to the Global War on Terror. In so doing, this case-study will contribute to answering the main question under study – to account for and explain the characteristics of national strategic culture that drive the strategic defence relationship. But only through a rigorous and dispassionate analysis of the events surrounding the decisions taken can these characteristics be understood and a series of reasoned and supported assumptions be developed to inform those responsible for advancing the relationship to meet current and future challenges.

¹⁰⁸ Canada's efforts in 1940 centered on securing the Ivigtut cryolite mines from Germany, which had overrun Denmark in April. Canada sent an "expedition", but not an "expeditionary force". See James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada (tome II Appeasement and Rearmament)* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 171. As to St. Pierre-Miquelon, Roosevelt and Canada's Cabinet War Committee wanted Canada to take over the islands to secure the wireless station after the fall of France. This became a PJBD position. However, a "Free French" force eventually left from Newfoundland to seize the islands for De Gaulle, despite assurances from the Admiral leading the force that no action would be taken in light of Canadian intentions. Churchill had favoured Free French action, and Canada hesitated, waiting for London and Washington to agree first. See Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, pp. 370-373.

The course of Canada's military role in the Korean conflict has been well studied and analysed, and there will be little need to reiterate this narrative in the case-study.¹⁰⁹ However, the texts that form the accepted national narrative do not provide an adequate explanation of the questions upon which this study will focus. The common argument in these sources is that Canada, in its capacity as a middle power in the Cold War, aligned itself with the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but also sought to maintain a level of independence from the unilateral tendencies of its powerful southern neighbour. While this somewhat sweeping and rather broad generalisation has an element of truth within, the specific issue that will focus the analysis for this case-study is the extent to which the leadership in both countries was motivated by a common perception of the threat to North American security, and how this shaped the decisions taken.

One of the most enduring studies examining Canada's policy during the Korean War is Denis Stairs', *Diplomacy of Constraint*. His focus is purely the political and diplomatic aspects, and he diverts little attention to the military events in the course of the conflict.¹¹⁰ The author's central theme is that Canadian diplomatic efforts mainly sought to impose multilateral constraints by maximising the role of the United Nations in the war, all in order to moderate the unilateral tendencies of American power. The analysis starts with a discussion of American efforts to resolve disputes arising from the Korean partition in the late 1940s, and finishes with an assessment of Canada's role in the 1954 Geneva Conference. While a solid and useful source for a study of the political and diplomatic efforts during the Korean conflict, and one that is often and deservedly referenced, it devotes insufficient space and attention to analysing the factors surrounding the true motivations of Canadian decision makers. Its focus on attempts to constrain a super-power is instructive, showing the difficulty in doing so and the resulting strain on relations, which both the memoirs of Lester B. Pearson and Dean Acheson confirm.¹¹¹

What is remarkable about Stairs' work is its staying power, having remained a standard source in bibliographies for the past thirty years, but more recent scholarship has

¹⁰⁹ For examples of this literature see C. C. McDougall, "Canadian Volunteers Prepare for Combat." *Army Informational Digest*, Vol. 6 No. 6, (1951), pp. 54-57; Canadian Army Headquarters, General Staff Historical Section, *Canada's Army in Korea: A short Official History*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1956), Canada, Army Headquarters, General Staff Historical Section, *Canada's Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-53, and Their Aftermath*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1956), Herbert F. Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effect on the Defence Policy of Canada*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1966), John Melady, *Canada's Forgotten War*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), Charles McNair, "The Royal Canadian Navy in Korea," *Army Informational Digest*, Vol. 6 No. 11, (1951), pp. 50-53, John D. Harbron, "Royal Canadian Navy at Peace 1945-1955: The Uncertain Heritage," *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. 73, (1966), Thor Grimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in the Korean War, 1950-1953*, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965), David Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: the Canadian Army in the Korean War*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).

¹¹⁰ Denis Stairs, *Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

¹¹¹ Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, 3 Vols., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972-1975, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

begun to challenge his assumptions and conclusions. Robert S. Prince's article "The Limits of Constraint" re-examined Stairs' analysis and concluded that there were limitations on the constraining role Canadian diplomats followed. Furthermore, and of relevance to this case-study, he argues that Canadian diplomacy was "itself constrained by the need to preserve unity among the Western allies, by the desire to safeguard Canadian influence in Washington for more vital issues, and by the shared Cold War assumptions which dominated both Canadian and American perceptions of events in Korea."¹¹² Herein lies the heart of the issue upon which this case-study will focus. On the one hand, some scholars have argued that the "St. Laurent government considered the mess to be solely a US adventure ripe with danger for Canada" but, on the other hand, some hold that St. Laurent himself viewed the conflict as "a breach in the outer defences of the Free World".¹¹³ It is these two seemingly conflicting perspectives that this case-study will attempt to reconcile. The bulk of the historiography does provide some assistance in this task, but illustrates the need to examine the primary record through the lens of this specific study. In so doing, the issue of whether Canadian political leadership understood that the defence of the continent began abroad, and what information was drawn upon and from what departments to shape this appreciation, will be addressed. This understanding will help to explain not only the nature of Canadian strategic culture at this point, but also how decisions were made within the Government of Canada and how all this has shaped the Canada-US strategic defence relationship.

Aside from Lester B. Pearson's memoirs and articles, which provide insights into his role during the Korean War years, and the work of a few scholars since, only a small number of secondary sources provide any insights into these issues.¹¹⁴ Rajeshwar Dayal strongly lauds Pearson's efforts during the conflict, but his analysis does not address the issues upon which this case-study will focus.¹¹⁵ Similarly, R. A. MacKay's work editing speeches and documents on Canadian foreign policy from the end of World War Two to just after the end of the Korean War is a useful resource for this study, but provides no specific analysis of any relevance for present purposes.¹¹⁶ Of those sources dealing with Canadian policy in Asia following the Second World War, Henry F. Angus' contemporary account is the most useful, followed closely by Paul Evans and B. Michael Frolic's examination of Canadian policy towards Communist China.¹¹⁷ Both of these works will doubtless be consulted for this case-study, but neither provides any relevant analysis for the question under study.

Those sources dealing specifically with Canada-US defence relations are important to an understanding of the degree to which Canadian political leadership appreciated the nature

¹¹² Robert S. Prince, "The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American relations and the Korean War, 1950-51," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 27, Issue 4, (Winter 1992), p. 129.

¹¹³ Peter Archambault, "The Informal Alliance: Anglo-Canadian Defence Relations, 1945-1960," (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Calgary, 1997), pp. 199-200, David Bercuson, *True Patriot: A Biography of Brooke Claxton 1898-1960*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 211-212.

¹¹⁴ Lester B. Pearson, "The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.30 No. 1 (1951), Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*.

¹¹⁵ Rajeshwar Dayal, "The Power of Wisdom," *International Journal*, Vol.29 No.1 (1973-74).

¹¹⁶ R. A. MacKay, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971).

¹¹⁷ Henry F. Angus, *Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), Paul Evans and B. Michael Frolic, eds., *Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1970*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

of the threats faced, how the defence of the continent could be enhanced through operations abroad, and how these perceptions shaped the defence relationship. Of particular importance in this regard are works by Melvin Conant, Joe Jockel, and Joel Sokolsky, all of which deal with Canada-US cooperation in the development of Arctic air defence systems in the 1950s and deal at some length with the impact of the Korean War.¹¹⁸ More general works place Canada's role in the Korean War within a broader historical perspective of Canada-US relations. Of particular importance are works by Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, and Robert Bothwell, though none view the problem through this study's distinctive lens.¹¹⁹

Another perspective that must be considered is the degree to which considerations of the North Atlantic Triangle (Canada, the US, and Great Britain), first postulated by John Brebner more than sixty years ago but later augmented to include the NATO alliance, impacted the decision making process.¹²⁰ In this context, renowned Canadian military historian Charles P. Stacey has been one of the few to suggest that the Korean War reoriented what he describes as Canada's pre-1950 independent role, because of the perceived threat of a Soviet attack.¹²¹ While few specifics are offered about the degree to which the decision to cooperate in the Korean conflict was motivated by a shared perception of the threat between Canadian and US political leadership and Stacey is careful to point out that this cooperation took place within Canada's pattern of avoiding too great a dependence on the US, his argument that international developments forced closer cooperation is convincing. That said, the type of operations, and certainly the location, was not anticipated by the Canadian Army, which deployed as part of the Commonwealth Division.¹²²

More recently, historian Jack Granatstein has expanded upon this argument to suggest that Canada shifted its emphasis from Britain to the US. He argues that the decline in Britain's fortunes, beginning at the end of the First World War and largely complete by the end of the Second World War, and the corresponding rise in American involvement in international affairs combined to force Canada to shift its ties from Britain to the US. While Canada did what it could to slow Britain's decline, the latter's economic and military frailty led to its

¹¹⁸ Melvin Conant, *The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America*, (New York: Harper's, 1962), Joel Sokolsky, *Defending Canada: US-Canadian Defense Policies*, (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1989), Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), Joseph Jockel, *Canada in NORAD 1957-2007: A History*, (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).

¹¹⁹ J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*, (New York: Twayne, 1992).

¹²⁰ John Bartlett Brebner, *The North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain*, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1947), David Haglund, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End*, (Toronto: Irwin, 2000).

¹²¹ Charles P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military Cooperation, 1940-1961" in David R. Denner, ed., *Canadian-United States Treaty Relations*, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1963).

¹²² Peter Archambault and DJ Bercuson, "'We Didn't Plan for This Type of War': The Canadian Army in Korea, 1950-1952," Paper read to the 1995 meeting of the Organization for the Study of the National History of Canada, Ottawa, November 1995.

political weakness, which forced Canada into the US camp.¹²³ More recent scholarship has argued that those “general conclusions adequately describe the broad sweep of Anglo-Canadian relations, particularly in trade matters. Granatstein’s brief treatment of the post-1945 defence relationship is, however, dismissive and inadequate.”¹²⁴ The degree to which Canadian ties to Britain, the NATO alliance, and the UN served as a counterweight to US influence, and the reasons why or why not, are all issues that must be reconciled before a full understanding of the factors involved in the decision can be developed.

North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)

The election of John Diefenbaker’s Tory party in 1957 was a boon to Canadian Anglophiles, who thought it the perfect, and perhaps last, chance to reinforce cultural and trade ties to Great Britain. Diefenbaker was himself in favour of such a path, despite the many and significant obstacles in doing so, and this emotional attachment to Britain undoubtedly was part of his appeal to many voters at the time. Yet the trends all favoured tightening relations with the US. In the late 1950s fewer Canadians were of British origin, and the bulk of Canadian exports headed south rather than over the Atlantic. Still, a lingering attachment to Britain remained, and may have influenced ‘the Chief’s’ thinking on continental defence issues. The very different personal relationships between Diefenbaker and the two US presidents in office during his time as Prime Minister also must have affected his approach to continental defence. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Diefenbaker shared a warm relationship, which doubtless influenced his approach to continental defence initiatives like the formation of NORAD. This contrasted sharply with his frosty, to say the very least, affiliation with the ‘Imperial President’ John F. Kennedy. This relationship never improved and may have clouded and complicated discussions of the threats to the continent and what to do about them. What sources of information and perspectives were sought by ‘Dief’ and his cabinet in their deliberations, as well as the role of personal relations between leaders, will tell much about Canadian strategic culture and the mechanics of decision making within the Government of Canada at this time. In drawing out those factors that shaped the continental defence partnership, the context of the time cannot be ignored. This period was a time of growing anti-Americanism, both amongst the ‘chattering classes’ in Canadian society and in many of those writing at the time, something which seemed to accelerate with the approach of the Canadian centennial. This context always plays a role in government decision making, but for defence decisions during crises is made more acute by the absence of an appropriate national security architecture that ensures, to the degree possible, that those making the decisions are provided with the necessary information and key perspectives on the situation.

In the years that he was prime minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker faced several well-known defence policy problems. His handling of them has been the subject of considerable comment ever since. In particular, the speedy approval of the NORAD agreement is one of the more hotly debated issues, both then and since. One aspect of this decision that has received insufficient attention, and which will focus the analysis in this case-study, is the degree to which the two governments were guided by a common perception of the existential threat to the continent posed first by Soviet bombers and later by its ICBMs and

¹²³ J. L. Granatstein, *How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1989).

¹²⁴ Peter Archambault, “The Informal Alliance: Anglo-Canadian Defence Relations, 1945-1960,” p. 4.

strategic forces. Related questions that will be addressed are: were the military-to-military relations immune from the to and fro of political rhetoric, did the inter-governmental relations set their tone, or in this case did the military-to-military relationship set the tone for inter-governmental relations? All of these questions will help shape a response to the main question under study, which is to account for and explain the characteristics of national strategic culture at this point in the nation's history. As well, this case-study will look at the context surrounding the periodic NORAD renewal discussion, especially those where the NORAD mission changed, seeking to shed light on the degree to which senior military and political leadership shared a common perception of the threats faced. It will look at what information was sought and provided to Cabinet prior to these decisions, whether that resulted in a better appreciation of the situation or not, and what that says about the mechanics of decision making within the Government of Canada. With this tight focus, there clearly are gaps in the existing historiography that this case-study will help to fill. It will not only challenge some of the enduring assumptions underpinning much of the literature, but by looking at the historical record through a different lens, hopefully it will add a new perspective to supplement the accepted national narrative. The ultimate aim is to support senior leadership in its efforts to evolve the strategic defence relationship to meet current and anticipated challenges.

Of the fairly extensive historiography on the North American Air Defense Command's formation, the perspectives are quite different. Some sources offer more assertion than reasoned argument, and are not convincing. For example, Gerard Vano argues in *Canada: The Strategic and Military Pawn*, that the establishment of "an early-warning radar system in the 1950s and the North American Air Defense Command tended to jeopardize Canadian sovereignty, for although both constituted a joint Canadian-American effort, they were effectively American operations."¹²⁵ Similarly, in his contribution to *Alliances and Illusions*, John Warnock details what he calls Canada's subservience within NORAD and depicts Canada as having employed self-denying policies that the US did not reciprocate.¹²⁶ There are additional titles that offer equally dismissive and inadequate assessments of the importance of NORAD and its role in continental defence, as well as the degree to which the Canadian government understood the nature of the threat faced and that the bi-national command was an appropriate response.¹²⁷ This study will challenge those perspectives and their intellectual underpinnings. Even those studies that explore these issues dispassionately and in some depth do not address the main questions upon which this case-study will focus.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Gerard S. Vano, *Canada: The Strategic and Military Pawn*, (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 101.

¹²⁶ Lewis Hertzman, John Warnock, and Thomas Hockin, *Alliances & Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question*, (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1969), pp. 43-84.

¹²⁷ For a few examples of the numerous titles offering a somewhat polemical tone to this issue and Canadian Defence Policy in general see Andrew Brewin, *Stand on Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), Peter C. Newman, *True North Not Strong and Free*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983), John Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada*, (Toronto: New Press, 1970), David Cox, *Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective*, Aurora Papers 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada & the United States 1963-1968*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, (Athens GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997).

¹²⁸ For example, Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

Students of this period of Canadian history, and of the broader questions of Canadian defence and foreign policy, have found Joseph T. Jockel's *No Boundaries Upstairs* an essential account of the origins of the North American Air Defense Command. Based on painstaking research, Jockel traces the evolution of US and Canadian defence policy in both the United States and Canada from the end of the Second World War until 1957-1958, when NORAD came into being. His dispassionate historical analysis of the relationship between senior Canadian political and military leadership illustrates one that was at least cool and at times strained, particularly between key figures in the Department of External Affairs and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes. At the same time, Jockel argues that senior Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and United States Air Force (USAF) officers got on very well indeed, and it was they who developed the NORAD concept. The frosty relations and lack of collegiality between External Affairs and National Defence forced Foulkes to do an end run around External Affairs in his attempt to get the deal approved. He took the proposal to the Minister of National Defence directly, George Pearkes, who convinced Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to sign the document quickly, and without reference to Cabinet, the Cabinet Defence Committee, or External Affairs.

This incident illustrates how in the context of a lack of appropriate decision-support mechanisms and processes, personal relations can, and Jockel argues they did, lead to the protracted embarrassment of Minister of National Defence George Pearkes, and indeed of John Diefenbaker and his government. Jockel's argument that Foulkes' actions misled his elected masters likely is true as far as it goes, but the degree to which Government of Canada officials and political leadership understood and appreciated the threat and the required response and perhaps fumbled the execution, are not fully explored. While tracing accurately the strategic and political impulses behind that partnership, identifying the friction that arose around Canadian sovereignty concerns and US indifference to them, and demonstrating that the strategic outlooks of Ottawa and Washington differed little, insufficient attention is paid to the questions this study will help to answer. Indeed, although this is a useful source and a competent narrative, it generally avoids the wider currents of culture and politics shaping the Canadian-American partnership. It is these issues upon which this case-study will focus.

Joseph Jockel's latest book *Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007* also is a useful narrative tracing Canadian involvement in the bi-national command through its history as the threat shifted from Soviet bombers to ballistic missiles to the current threat environment. Its focus mainly is on NORAD's implications for the Canadian air force, and for the defence of Canadian airspace. It examines the touchy issue of NORAD's role in warning of nuclear attack, as well as the equally sensitive decision not to participate in missile defence. It also looks at the role of Canadians within the NORAD command structure in exercising operational control over Canadian and American forces which for some time were equipped with nuclear-tipped air defence weapons. It also provides some analysis of the bi-national command's impact on Canadian sovereignty. Moreover, it outlines both Ottawa's goals and reservations with the NORAD agreements from 1958 to the most recent renewal in 2006. However, the one issue largely absent in this very readable and useful book is any detailed analysis of how well informed Canadian political leadership was regarding the nature of the Soviet bomber threat to the continent in the period leading up to the decision to create the bi-national command, and the degree to which this understanding influenced the decision taken.

Another enduring and often quoted text forming part of the accepted national narrative is Melvin Conant's *The Long Polar Watch*, which has remained a standard reference on the subject of continental defence during the Cold War from the early 1960s.¹²⁹ Conant's main argument is that Canadian political leadership paid only lip-service to their role in continental defence, failing to act in accordance with some of its basic requirements in the early 1960s. As evidence of this, Conant points to the decision to encourage the US to place anti-bomber missile defences on Canadian soil and then refusing to allow them to be equipped with the nuclear warheads needed to make them effective. Furthermore, while somewhat petulantly demanding to be heard on major decisions, the Canadian leadership failed to accept even a reasonable share of the costs and offered frail and incoherent reasons to justify their position. The Diefenbaker government, likely for good reason, receives the majority of Conant's blame, until the return of Pearson and the Liberals which he suggests returned sanity, common sense, and genuine cooperation in continental defence.

Conant's narrative displays a firm understanding of many of the traditions, aspirations, and apprehensions that existed at the time, and thus this source will be of significant value in the re-examination of the historical record surrounding the decision. In particular, Conant outlines how at times very comfortable allies displayed odd and inexplicable behaviour in continental defence. He argues this comfort led to fears of being taken for granted, and makes the important point that Canadians often were and are equally guilty of taking the Americans for granted. As with all allies, Canadians took pains to ensure their views were taken into account before decisions were adopted which directly concerned them, illustrating the fear of appearing to be a US satellite in a time of increasing economic, cultural, and military integration. What Conant does not address in sufficient depth is the degree to which the leadership understood the threats faced, and the degree to which this understanding interacted with other political imperatives to shape the approach to continental defence. Moreover, as this study will show, the conduct of a distinctive foreign policy based on clearly articulated interests would not only enable Canadians to understand the need to contribute to continental defence, illustrate how operations overseas contribute to domestic security, and would help to reassure the Canadians that their country is not being viewed as simply a US satellite. One area complicating this seemingly obvious and easy approach is the bifurcated nature of Canadian society. While Conant's work hints at some of these issues, the historical record has never been examined with this study's unique lens, and there is reason to do so.

Ann Denholm Crosby's work *Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making* sets lofty goals which it largely fails to meet.¹³⁰ Its purpose was to be a scholarly treatment of Canada's experience in NORAD from its origins as an air defence command through its continually evolving role with the advent of the Soviet missile threat, to its potential role in ballistic missile defence. At each stage of its evolution came decisions both by Washington and Ottawa concerning defence, sovereignty, economic interests, and foreign policy goals that one hoped would shed light on the factors motivating these key decisions. However, given the numerous and glaring factual errors within the book, one is unwilling to trust the conclusions

¹²⁹ Melvin Conant, *The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

¹³⁰ Ann Denholm Crosby, *Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making: Constructing Canada's Role in NORAD, 1958-96*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

drawn and must question the thoroughness of the analysis. For example, the author claims, without offering any sources, that during the Cuban Missile Crisis “Canadian forces assigned to the NORAD command were put on alert on October 22, the same time as the US forces.”¹³¹ Similarly, the author claims that the Canadian forces assigned to NORAD went on alert during the 1973 Middle East war.¹³² These charges are not substantiated and if true show that the Canadian government had no control over its forces assigned to NORAD.

In addition to these factual errors, the author demonstrates a repeated lack of understanding of the very different terms ‘operational command’ and ‘operational control’, something which has been a source of misunderstanding and even misrepresentation in the discussion of NORAD and Canadian sovereignty ever since its formation. Moreover, the author argues that the adoption of a flexible response approach in 1967 was a major shift in US strategic thinking from deterrence based on mutually assured destruction “to deterrence that included a limited war-fighting option.”¹³³ This unsubstantiated claim reflects a lack of understanding of the strategic relationship between mutually assured destruction and flexible response, and also the chronology of events.¹³⁴

These errors of fact and interpretation are made worse by the author’s difficult writing style. In one instance, the author describes the Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the US as not having been “ordained by exogenous natural laws of cohabitation.”¹³⁵ This is only a minor irritation, but the author provides little new information or analysis about a central issue in the decision to form NORAD – the degree to which leadership on both sides of the border was motivated by a common perception of the threats faced and that NORAD was a reasoned means to meet them. Instead, and likely justified, Canadian politicians are castigated for having adopted a much too passive role in NORAD. Thus, without evidence of a thorough analysis of the historical record, and especially defence records, this work provides little of value to the questions upon which this case-study will focus.

Thus, while there is some literature that paints a picture of confusion and misunderstanding at the senior political level in Canada about the nature of the Soviet bomber threat and NORAD’s role in countering it, and a failure to comprehend that entering into a treaty level agreement to defend against it actually was an expression of sovereignty, there clearly is room for further research and analysis to challenge the assumptions underpinning this picture. The analysis of the historical record through the lens of this study will be of use to future decisions concerning Canada-US relations by illuminating the factors at play in this decision and future ones, what those factors say about Canadian strategic culture and the mechanics of decision making within the Government of Canada, and their impact in shaping the Canada-US strategic defence relationship.

Cuban Missile Crisis

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 31.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 65.

¹³⁴ See Joseph T. Jockel, “Review of Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making: Constructing Canada’s Role in NORAD, 1958-96” by Ann Denholm Crosby, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32 No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 412-413.

¹³⁵ Ann Denholm Crosby, *Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making: Constructing Canada’s Role in NORAD, 1958-96*, p. 22.

The background to and course of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been adequately covered in the existing historiography, whose narrative covers the preamble to the conflict and the course of the conflict itself. Not surprisingly, much of the narrative focuses on the game of chicken between the two Cold War superpowers.¹³⁶ But the literature focusing on the Canadian involvement in the crisis, and more specifically analysing the factors motivating Prime Minister Diefenbaker's decisions, is surprisingly sparse. Moreover, later accounts, including Diefenbaker's memoirs, seem at odds with other versions of the events, leading to confusion over which factors influenced the decision to delay approving the increased readiness level for the Canadian Forces. Was it a lack of appreciation of the nature of the threat, anger at a lack of consultation that blinded Canadian leadership to its nature, or was this the only defence available for Diefenbaker who had so badly gauged Canadian public opinion on these issues, rather than the specific course of the crisis, will serve to focus the analysis for this case-study.

In short, however, the narrative of events begins with intelligence reports showing the Soviets installing ballistic missiles in Cuba capable of hitting US and Canadian targets, which forced President John Kennedy to establish an American naval blockade of the island and threaten further action if preparation of the sites continued. As is often argued, tensions between the Kennedy administration and the Diefenbaker government over its failure to cut ties with Communist Cuba and the latter's belief that the US position on Cuba was unbalanced, caused Kennedy to inform the Canadians only an hour and a half in advance of

¹³⁶ For examples of this voluminous literature, see Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis*, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), John M. Young, *When the Russians Blink: The U.S. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Washington: History and Museum Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991), Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, ed. *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989*, (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1991), Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), James Daniel, *Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), Edward C. Keefer, Charles S. Sampson and Louis J. Smith. *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Vol. 9, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Dan Caldwell, *The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1989), Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Random House, 1991), Abram Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), David Detzer, *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (New York: Crowell, 1979), Herbert Samuel Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis, October 1962*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), Robert A. Divine, ed. *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: M. Wiener Publishers, 1988), Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), Roger Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), William J. Medland, *The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary*, (New York: Praeger, 1988), Anatoli I. Gribkov, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), Robert Smith Thompson, *The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), Mark J. White, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1996).

the blockade announcement.¹³⁷ As historian Richard Neustadt has noted, on the Cuba problem began the spiral effect of “muddled perceptions, stifled communications, and disappointed expectations.”¹³⁸

The result of these factors was the Canadian government’s hesitation in responding to the American request to increase the Canadian Forces alert status to Defence Condition (DEFCON) 3, only resolved after lengthy Cabinet debates on 23-24 October when they finally and very quietly acquiesced. The existing historiography consistently paints a picture of Canadian political leadership fearing that a Canadian alert would further provoke the Soviets, especially in the context of what many in the Canadian Cabinet felt were unbalanced American policies towards Cuba. These fears, the argument continues, combined with anger over a lack of advance consultation and concerns about implications for Canadian policy on nuclear weapons, all of which led to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green’s reluctance to agree to Kennedy’s request. As the Soviet ships approached the quarantine zone later in the week, however, the position of the Minister of National Defence, Douglas Harkness, gained support and the alert was approved.

As is frequently argued, Canada's hesitant response reflected in part the desire of the prime minister and others to preserve the independence of Canadian foreign policy and to maintain a balanced posture in crisis conditions – not to be seen to be too close to the American position for sovereignty reasons. The delay, however, was widely criticised both at the time and since, contributing to a growing perception of the indecisiveness of the Diefenbaker government during a crisis that was as much a threat to Canada as the US. Moreover, it exacerbated the already difficult relations with the Kennedy administration. While Diefenbaker and President Dwight D. Eisenhower shared a warm relationship, the rapport with the ‘Imperial President’ Kennedy could not have been more stark. Their relationship was frosty at best and never improved; this may have clouded and complicated discussions of the threat to the continent posed by Communist missiles and what to do about it. The literature covers these issues, often tangentially as part of a larger narrative. But what is lacking in most is, amongst other things, what sources of information and perspectives were sought by and pushed to ‘Dief’ and his cabinet in their deliberations, and whether the process in place to provide this information was a key factor in the resulting fiasco. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the very limited historiography specifically dealing with the Canadian role in the crisis does not delve into sufficient depth with these issues and leaves as many questions as it answers. The important issues of the factors that motivated Canadian political leadership to dither in the face of what was a dire threat to the continent, and what that says about Canadian strategic culture and the mechanics of decision making, are issues upon which this case-study will focus. The seeming failure to grasp the nature of the threat to both Canada and the US posed by the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba, and the desire by Diefenbaker to preserve an independent foreign policy and to make the point that Canadian

¹³⁷ This argument appears in many sources to varying degrees of importance as a factor in how events unfolded. For examples of this see Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 48 No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 160-161, John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, p. 218, Robert Reford, *Canada and Three Crises*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), pp. 147-217, and J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), pp. 203-204.

¹³⁸ Richard E. Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 56.

leadership needed to be engaged earlier than it had been in this instance, are insufficiently explained and inadequate; this case-study will assist in clarifying these important issues.

In doing so, this study must tackle the accepted interpretation of what actually happened, beginning with that written during and immediately after the crisis, in part to illustrate both the mechanics of decision making and the nature of Canadian strategic culture, but also to determine the degree to which this interpretation shaped key decisions taken shortly thereafter. Showing how, for example, the interpretations of the handling of this crisis may have influenced decisions on the unification of the armed forces and whether this was appropriate will, in the context of a similar assessment in each case-study, reveal much about patterns in government decision making, the difficulty but considerable value in correctly using historical analogy to inform current and future decisions; all of this will enable an understanding leading to clear recommendations.

There was much written shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis both by journalists and scholars that tended to put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the ex-prime minister John Diefenbaker. Most notably was Peter Newman's book *Renegade in Power* originally published in 1963, and whose title speaks volumes.¹³⁹ Newman emphasised 'Dief's' inherent indecisiveness as a key contributor to the fiasco, and this perspective quickly became central to much of the subsequent literature. Reinforcing Newman's viewpoint was an article written by Robert Spencer in 1962, which provided more detail on the course of the crisis and also pointed to Diefenbaker's shortcomings in terms of taking the country's defence seriously and in his lack of decisiveness.¹⁴⁰ Another key title written shortly after the crisis, but focusing more on NORAD and the nuclear weapons controversy that formed a major part of the fallout from this incident, is Jon McLin's *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957*.¹⁴¹ His discussion focuses on the systemic problems associated with having a defence relationship between unequal partners, and ways to mitigate them. James Minifie's work *Open at the Top* emphasised the difficulties in Canada adopting an independent foreign policy, and actually praised Diefenbaker's delay in raising the alert level of the CF as assisting in preventing the crisis from escalating.¹⁴² Showing astounding naiveté, Minifie not only praised indecision and confused decision-making, but used this experience to argue for total independence from the US. Collectively, these sources give some insight into what was being said about the handling of the crisis at the time and just afterwards, and the degree to which these perspectives shaped the subsequent literature and decisions on defence matters at the time. Doing so will reveal much about the nature of Canadian strategic culture, as well as the mechanics of decision-making within the Government of Canada.

¹³⁹ Peter C. Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963).

¹⁴⁰ Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," *Canadian Annual Review, 1962*, quoted in Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 34.

¹⁴¹ Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). Also see Sean M. Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War*, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

¹⁴² James M. Minifie, *Open at the Top: Reflections on US-Canada Relations*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964).

Since the time of the crisis, its handling has received a great deal of attention from scholars, many of which show signs of being influenced by what has become the conventional wisdom. Some of that work is useful to this study, while some is shallow and used to trumpet independence from the US.¹⁴³ Patrick Nicholson's work on the Diefenbaker government sketches out the deep differences of opinion within the cabinet on this matter.¹⁴⁴ But although it shed new light on some aspects of the mechanics of decision-making within government, it leaves more questions than it answers. In particular, while he emphasises Diefenbaker's personal turmoil over the appropriate response to the NORAD request and whether it would provoke the Soviets, but stops short of explaining that indecision. Peter Layton's contribution to the literature paints a detailed picture on the various political decisions surrounding the crisis, and gives a good assessment of its impact on Canada-US relations. But again leaves many questions unanswered, probably due to lack of access to the appropriate files. In particular, the with question of whether 'Dief' knew of the crisis before Livingston Merchant arrived to brief him is asked, but he was unable to answer it.

The late 1970s saw the publication of a few personal accounts of the crisis.¹⁴⁵ The second volume of John Diefenbaker's memoirs was published and contained many irregularities in its persistent claim of American betrayal by not consulting with him before the US took any action.¹⁴⁶ At roughly the same time, two important articles were written on the crisis, one by Jocelyn Maynard Ghent and another by Howard Letner.¹⁴⁷ Ghent's article points to the steady deterioration of relations between Diefenbaker and Kennedy in the prelude to the crisis, and focuses on Pearson's exploitation of this troubled relationship. Letner argued that the crisis was a turning point in Canada-US relations that led the US to question Canada's reliability as an ally. Ghent wrote two other influential pieces on the conflict which provide more detail on the Canadian military response, but "technical errors in describing the Canadian military structure and its working relationship with the American services...detract from an otherwise sound analysis."¹⁴⁸ Although useful to this case-study, these sources shed little direct light on the issues upon which this study will focus.

A very small number of works written in the late 1970s and early 1980s provide more of a starting point for this analysis. Jack Granatstein's biography of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, gives some detail on Diefenbaker's mistrust of External Affairs, and the different perspectives of Defence and External Affairs on continental

¹⁴³ For an example of the latter, see John W. Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada*, (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

¹⁴⁴ Patrick Nicholson, *Vision and Indecision*, (Toronto: Longmans, 1968).

¹⁴⁵ Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life, Volume II – So Many Worlds*, (Ottawa: Deneau, 1976), Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, vol. 3.

¹⁴⁶ John G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada: The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977).

¹⁴⁷ Howard H. Letner, "Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIX (Oct. 1976), Jocelyn M. Ghent, "Did He Fall or Was He Pushed? The Kennedy Administration and the Collapse of the Diefenbaker Government" *International History Review*, (April 1979).

¹⁴⁸ The article is Jocelyn M. Ghent, "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." For a description of the technical errors see Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, p. 38.

defence matters.¹⁴⁹ Complimenting this work is Reginald Roy's biography of defence minister Major-General George Pearkes, which outlines Diefenbaker's mistrust of the military, and how this precluded the development of a coherent defence policy. But it stops short of a full explanation of the degree to which this mistrust blocked advice from key military figures from reaching the cabinet during this crisis, and what, in turn, this says about Canadian strategic culture and the mechanics of decision-making within the Government of Canada at this critical time.

The most commonly cited source on the Canadian involvement in this crisis is Peter Haydon's *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis*.¹⁵⁰ Haydon's book begins by surveying the literature on Canada's role in the crisis to identify the main issues and what scholars have said about them, most of those sources have been reviewed above. As discussed, of particular importance was Diefenbaker's refusal to heighten the readiness of the Canadian forces as well as his obvious disapproval of Kennedy's style of crisis management. From here, Haydon outlines the state of Canada-US relations, the agreements for continental defence, and the structure of the Canadian military. All of this sets the stage for a detailed and critical analysis of Canada's role in the crisis, and its political and military performance.

Haydon's analysis brings more clarity to the context in which both the Canadian military and political leaders operated during this crisis. His analysis includes some of the factors that may have motivated Diefenbaker, but these are fairly traditional and include the threats that the speed with which a nuclear exchange could be brought about posed to Canadian sovereignty, and the issue of Diefenbaker's indecisiveness. In particular, Haydon clearly argues that Diefenbaker's reluctance to order a heightened alert for Canadian forces was not due to indecisiveness as some scholars have surmised, but rather was deliberate and based on a variety of political considerations. Of these, Haydon rejects out of hand the often quoted complaint that the US had not fulfilled its obligation to consult with Canadian political leadership before ordering a heightened NORAD alert. On the more important issue of whether this incident represented a collapse of political control of the Canadian military, Haydon argues convincingly that during the crisis the decision-making process was in disarray because of a confused command structure, accentuated by having a Prime Minister without knowledge of military matters and distrustful of senior military leaders. In such circumstances, Haydon argues, Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness' "decision to put the Canadian military on an alert state and to allow operational commanders to honour the joint continental defence commitments without reference to cabinet prevented an even greater national embarrassment."¹⁵¹ Haydon continues by saying that while Harkness technically broke the rules, "he did so for the best reasons."¹⁵² While understandable, this explanation leaves some important questions unanswered, or insufficiently so.

In the discussion of whether this incident reflected the collapse of civilian control of the military, one issue of importance to this study is not explored sufficiently. That is, what level of decision support was available to the Prime Minister to make an appropriate decision

¹⁴⁹ J. L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence*, (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1981), Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977).

¹⁵⁰ Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

and from what departments did he consult, and what does this say about the mechanics of decision-making within the Government of Canada at that time? Some of the lessons from this incident thus have enduring value. While Haydon supports the view that had Diefenbaker sought and considered advice from Canadian military leaders on their perception of the situation, there would have been less needless delay putting the security of North America at risk. While there is some truth in this argument, the real issue for this study is what, if any, mechanisms were in place to ensure this and other advice reached those charged with making these decisions – in this case the Prime Minister and Cabinet. To extend this a bit further, this incident may serve as an example of the need for a national security apparatus to bring the relevant factors forward in a timely fashion to ensure the leadership is armed adequately to make decisions. This is not to say that this information will be heeded, or that it will bring Canadian political leadership into line with their American counterparts on all issues. Rather, the processes through which this understanding is developed and presented to senior leadership increases the likelihood that they will develop a common perception of the threat. How that threat is dealt with will be the subject of debate, but with the advantage of beginning armed with a deeper understanding.

Thus, this crisis and its confused handling by Canadian political leadership will serve as a useful case-study in the quest to account for and explain those factors of national strategic culture that have driven and continue to drive the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. A re-examination of the historical record through the lens of this study will assist in the development of a better understanding of the degree to which the military-to-military relations were immune from the tensions and the to and fro of political rhetoric. Moreover, analysis will focus on determining how well the Canadian political leadership understand the nature of the threat faced, and the reasons why this was so. This, in turn, will illuminate much about the mechanics of decision-making within the Government of Canada, the nature of Canadian strategic culture at this point in time, the civil-military relations before and during the crisis, and the lessons that can be drawn out for current purposes.

Vietnam

While Canada sent forces to Korea and participated substantively in the war for three years, resulting in over 500 fatalities, Ottawa did not do so for the war in Vietnam.¹⁵³ Korea was, for Canada, a theatre of the Cold War, made legitimate by the UN Security Council and the broad coalition of Western forces, especially those that, with Canada, comprised the Commonwealth Division, which fought to contain communist expansion to South Korea. The situation in Vietnam developed in similar ways to that of Korea. Vietnam was also divided into a communist ‘north’ supported by China and/or the Soviet Union and a non-communist ‘south’ that needed western assistance to remain independent. To generalize, both were fronts in the Cold War, and must be understood as such, even if their specific narratives might differ in important ways.

Given those similarities, this case study will attack a variety of questions that will consider national strategic culture and the mechanics of decision-making in the Government of Canada at the time: Why was Ottawa eager to fight in one Asian conflict, Korea, but not in the other, Vietnam? Why was one deemed worthy of Canada’s blood and treasure and the

¹⁵³ Canada did contribute troops to the International Control Commission in 1973.

other not? Did Canadian policy-makers approach two conflicts in the same way, especially in the way they measured both Canadian national interests and US national interests, and the extent to which they overlapped or diverged? It might even be appropriate to ask to what extent policy-makers and strategists in Ottawa were able to think about the Vietnam War in any way other than in the context of Canada-US relations – in other words, did Ottawa have a strategic view of Indochina independent of reacting to US actions there? Vietnam coincided with so many other tumultuous and far-reaching political, economic and social issues that affected the relationship, and certainly became rich fodder for the activist post St. Laurent governments, namely those of Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau, looking to ‘define’ Canada in various degrees of nationalistic, anti-American terms.¹⁵⁴ The 1960s was the decade of Canada’s centennial, which seemed to fuel sentimental opinion about Canada, its British past and seemingly American future.

Canadian Anglophiles, for instance, had seen the election of John Diefenbaker’s Tories in 1957 as the last chance to resurrect Canada’s trade and social links to the Mother Country. On 21 June 1957, John Diefenbaker became the first Conservative Prime Minister since R.B. Bennett. ‘The Chief’ was an Anglophile, and remained attached emotionally to the British connection despite the weakening social and economic links between the two countries. The ratio of Canadians of British to non-British origin was declining. Evidence of the economic pull of the US could be found in imports, exports and US branch plants scattered through Canadian industry. In 1957, only 9% of Canadian exports went to the UK, while 71% went to the US. Emotional attachment to Britain lingered on in several segments of the Canadian population, however. Politically, Anglophiles tended to gather in the Conservative Party, where rhetoric about the American behemoth was commonplace. To many Canadians, therefore, Diefenbaker offered an opportunity to re-establish traditional ties to Britain.

During the election campaign, Diefenbaker uttered to the press that he would divert 15% of Canada’s import trade to the UK. It was a foolish idea. In his memoirs, Diefenbaker dismissed his promise as merely an off-the-cuff remark, not intended seriously. But Diefenbaker’s image was constructed by such outlandish remarks, which joined in the choir of anti-Americanism becoming increasingly popular in Canada. The chilly relationship between Diefenbaker and President John F. Kennedy symbolized, if not helped to define, the chill. This story is accounted for in the literature on the period, and of particular interest is what it revealed about the different perceptions of the Soviet threat and what to do about it.¹⁵⁵ The Kennedy administration considered the matter urgent, and perceived the threat to evident in Southeast Asia insurgency, meddling in Iran and Berlin and, certainly, Cuba, among others. Charging that the Republicans had gone soft on defence, allowing America to fall behind in both nuclear and conventional forces, the ‘Imperial Presidency’ vowed to confront Communism, including in Southeast Asia. Diefenbaker began his prime ministership in 1957 as a Cold Warrior, but his Cabinet, especially his external affairs minister Howard Green who led an anti-nuclear department, was not of the same mind about the Soviet or communist

¹⁵⁴ David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, *Derailed: The Betrayal of the National Dream*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994).

¹⁵⁵ See, for instance, Knowlton Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990); Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Policy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989)

threat.¹⁵⁶ Dithering over the acceptance of nuclear warheads in Canada resulted, even though ‘Dief’ had decided to go that route in 1959, and there appeared to be an increasing divide in how the two countries were conceiving of their security.¹⁵⁷

The nuclear weapons problem was remedied, at least temporarily, when Pearson was elected in 1963. With Diefenbaker now out of office, a host of polemical obituaries for Canada’s existence as a distinct North American nation appeared in Canadian universities and media. Notable historians such as Donald Creighton and W.L. Morton charged that the Liberals, in power from 1935 to 1957, ‘sold out’ Canada to the US, submitting to American corporations, foreign policy and demands for bases, leaving Canada with little or no autonomy by the late 1950s. Equally vehement in his distrust of Canadian liberalism, George Grant, the eminent political philosopher, resolutely placed the blame for Canada’s withdrawal from Britain’s political influence at the feet of William Lyon Mackenzie King, the long-serving Canadian Prime Minister. The continentalist philosophy and policies of Mackenzie King, Grant argued in his *Lament For a Nation*, shunned Britain as a counterbalance to the US; it was essential for Canada to sustain its nationhood against the threat of the American behemoth.¹⁵⁸ Donald Creighton’s anger seeps through the pages of his *Centenary Series* contribution, noting snidely that Lester Pearson’s tenure at External Affairs from 1948 to 1957 “coincided very neatly with the first great advance of American control and influence over every aspect of Canadian life.”¹⁵⁹ This case study will need to evaluate the accuracy of this contention in the context of defence relations and the tendency toward interpreting Canada’s relationship toward the United States in this period as one increasingly of vassal to master.

The Vietnam War developed in this backdrop of Canadian soul searching and nationalist emotion. Ivan Head, Pierre Trudeau’s foreign policy guru, was able to use this sentiment and economic concerns about balance of trade with the US as a justification for taking Canadian foreign policy in what he claimed were new directions, such as dismissing the concepts of ‘roles and influence’ in foreign relations in favour of encouraging ‘Net Human Benefits’ and the like.¹⁶⁰ As to whether Vietnam was the primary driver of Trudeau foreign and economic policy adventures, such as the Third Option (no different fundamentally than Diefenbaker’s previous flirtation with unreality) of developing trade in Europe and Asia in

¹⁵⁶ On Kennedy, see Richard Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy*, (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Arthur Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

¹⁵⁷ The publishing of James Minifie’s *Peacemaker or Powdermonkey* in 1960 was indicative of growing sentiment of those, like Howard Green, who favoured disarmament over advancing the West’s nuclear posture and thought Canada should concentrate on a peacekeeping role in the United Nations. James Minifie, *Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada’s Role in a Revolutionary World*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960). The nuclear divide was also within Cabinet, however, resulting in the resignation of the defence minister, Douglas Harkness and his associate, Pierre Sevigny, over Diefenbaker’s renegeing on the nuclear promise.

¹⁵⁸ W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963); Donald Creighton, *Canada’s First Century* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970) and *Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976); George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).

¹⁵⁹ Creighton, *Forked Road*, p. 240.

¹⁶⁰ Ivan L. Head, “The Foreign Policy of the New Canada,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No.2, (January 1972).

order to offset American dominance, is another question to be explored in the context of the economic and cultural nationalism that flowered in the 1960s and fuelled anti-Americanism.¹⁶¹ One former Ambassador to Canada Enders made the causal connection between Vietnam and the nationalist anti-Americanism led by the CCF.¹⁶² In Canada, Vietnam also became a symbol of anti-Americanism in a very concrete sense, as ‘draft dodgers’ made their way to Canada in large numbers.¹⁶³

Sentiment and emotion aside, however, Canada was never ‘not involved’ in Vietnam, as activities related to the war spanned the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments in three broad areas. First, along with Poland and India, Canada was appointed to the International Control Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1954 to implement the Geneva Accords that resulted from Ho Chi Minh and General Giap’s defeat of French forces in Indochina.¹⁶⁴ Second, Canada and its diplomats were involved in various efforts to make peace. Third, under Defence Production Sharing Agreements, Canada sold weapons, explosives and equipment to the United States throughout the period, and, of course, some of this materiel made it to Vietnam. Fourth, Canada was the scene of anti-war protest and activism, magnified by the exodus of US draft dodgers to Canada throughout the war, and deepened by the bombing of North Vietnam, which prompted Ottawa, specifically Prime Minister Lester Pearson, to criticize US actions.

As a matter of Canada-US relations, Vietnam is a story reasonably well covered.¹⁶⁵ General works tend to dedicate considerable space to summarize the narrative, and invariably the Johnson-Pearson scene at Camp David is prominent, often treated as a metaphor for the asymmetric relationship. Johnson, livid at Pearson’s remarks at Temple University in April 1965 suggesting that a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder had commenced in February with limited air strikes in retaliation for a Viet Cong raid of an American base) might give Hanoi an opportunity “to inject some flexibility into their policy”, apparently berated Pearson, grabbing him and shouting that “you don’t piss on your

¹⁶¹ For an account of this period and the many elements of national life, see JL Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

¹⁶² Stewart, Gordon T., *The American Response to Canada Since 1776*.

¹⁶³ Over 50,000 “dodgers” and “deserters” migrated to Canada during the Vietnam War, a process not embraced by Ottawa until 1969. See John Hagan, “Narrowing the Gap By Widening the Conflict: Power Politics, Symbols of Sovereignty, and the American Vietnam War Resisters’ Migration to Canada,” *Law and Society Review*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2000), pp. 607-650.

¹⁶⁴ Canada was a Western member, Poland was a Soviet bloc member and India represented non-aligned nations.

¹⁶⁵ Key works include Douglas Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986); James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Vol. 5: Indochina: The Roots of Complicity*, (Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1983). Canada and the Vietnam War is often covered as part of the broader Asian question both in terms of Canada-US relations and foreign policy. Indicative texts are John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, 2 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), pp. 188-221; Edegard E Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *An Introduction to Canadian American Relations*, 2nd. Ed., (Scarborough: Nelson, 1989) pp. 215-240; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994), pp. 228-256 and J.L. Granatstein and N. Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1994), pp. 215-245.

neighbour's rug."¹⁶⁶ Some treatments of this incident tend to be flippant in their treatment, suggesting, for example that Pearson merely had the 'temerity' to suggest that stopping the bombing might get Hanoi to the peace table, out of a desire to see the war contained, thereby keeping Canada out of "a wider war as a reluctant participant."¹⁶⁷ The speech, given in the context of the recent signing of the Auto Pact, which effectively provided for free trade on automobiles and parts, and of net benefit to Canada, seemed ill-timed.¹⁶⁸ The political troubles for Pearson were twofold: his relationship with Johnson never recovered and, domestically, he was accused by nationalists of actually being too soft on America and not going further in condemning Rolling Thunder. Walter Gordon, his minister of finance, was one of those nationalists.¹⁶⁹ Pearson's speech was actually broadly supportive of America's challenge in Vietnam was typical of "'spurious wars of national liberation' which are really wars of communist domination."¹⁷⁰ Contrary to his popular image, Pearson was never soft on Communism or gleefully anti-American. Just after Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in 1946, as Ambassador to the United States, Pearson had declared that Moscow would not be deterred "so much by an increase in the strength of speech as by the diminishing size of the stick" (referring to post-war reductions in the US armed forces).¹⁷¹ This case study will, therefore, account for how Pearson's views were based on simply a reading of global power relationships and how Canada fit in or a rigorous assessment of Vietnam as a theatre of the Cold War.

The story of the Pearson-Johnson years and the tensions that marred them is accounted for well by Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968*. Donaghy demonstrates, through an extensive use of government documents mainly from the State Department and External Affairs, memoir and secondary material, that the alliance was never so fragile as to suffer extensive damage even during this turbulent period. This is very much a diplomatic history, describing the challenges Canadian policy-makers faced in managing their affairs while the continent integrated while the Cold War raged in the Far East. Donaghy deals with defence, trade, the question(s) of what to do about Communist China, nuclear weapons, 'cultural sovereignty' and, of course, the frosty relationship between

¹⁶⁶ Lawrence Martin, *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1982), p. 226; Greg Donaghy, "Minding the Minister: Pearson, Martin and American Policy in Asia 1963-1967," in Norman Hillmer, ed., *Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator* (Montreal, Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 1999), p. 131.

¹⁶⁷ JL Granatstein, et al, *Nation: Canada Since Confederation*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986), p. 486.

¹⁶⁸ As the "third person in the room," McGeorge Bundy's opinion was that the content of the speech was not the problem, but rather where he chose to make his remarks, on his way to meet with the President. McGeorge Bundy, "Canada, The Exceptionally Favored: An American Perspective," in Lansing Lamont and J. Duncan Edmonds, *Friends So Different: Essays on Canada and the United States in the 1980s*, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989), p. 238.

¹⁶⁹ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*, (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1992), p. 97. Also see Walter Gordon, *A Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966); Denis Smith, *Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon*, (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973); Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the rise of Canadian nationalism*, (Montreal: McGill – Queen's University Press, 1999).

¹⁷⁰ John Herd Thompson Randall, Stephen J., *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, p. 234.

¹⁷¹ (NAC) MG 26 L. 47 file: D-50-2 (1949)

Pearson and Johnson – ‘tolerant allies’ indeed. Of significance, however, is what is missing in Donaghy’s documentary record – those of the Department of National Defence.¹⁷²

Especially on the subject of Vietnam, this is a puzzling void, and one on which this case study will pay some attention. In particular, the degree to which the defence department and, more importantly, the professional military leadership were being asked for advice on the strategic situation in the Far East or for their assessments of American, Viet Cong or Chinese capabilities, will be analysed. Moreover, another area this case study will attend to is determining the extent to which Canada’s position on Vietnam at any given time was being developed with or without military advice as a necessary element of strategic assessments? It is, of course, possible that such advice was contained in External Affairs files, but further examination will clarify the sources and processes by which Canadian leaders made decisions.

Why does this matter? It is always important to consider all available evidence in historical analysis, in this case it will give a more complete picture of what has become an implicit assumption of most literature on Canada and the Vietnam War: that Canadian governments were compelled to carve out a distinctive Canadian position on the war to assuage nationalists and not appear to be subordinate. The question is, however, appear to whom to be subordinate? It is common for political observers to suggest the existence of pressures that influence decisions without defining them or providing evidence that they were real. Donaghy, for instance, suggests that Pearson was “caught by domestic demands for a distinctive response to the Asian crisis”, which he suggests was a requirement to look like a peacemaker, and by American expectations of alliance loyalty.¹⁷³ Assuming he is correct about the existence of ‘domestic pressures,’ however, what does that say about Canadian strategic culture during the Vietnam War? That foreign and defence policy was simply the calculus between domestic pressures (whatever they were) and American leadership?¹⁷⁴ Because little scholarly attention has been paid to these questions, this study will help to fill the gap in the historiography.

Of course, some commentators, and even some scholars, have suggested that Canada was indeed looking after national interests by not splitting irrevocably from America, but try to make a case for that being a bad thing. Published in 1986, Victor Levant’s *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War* is the most notable of this school.¹⁷⁵ Building on previous works such as Charles Taylor’s *Snow Job* and James Eayrs’s *Indochina: Roots of Complicity*, Levant asserts that, far from being a neutral peacemaker on the ICC, Canada assisted the United States and South Vietnam in subverting the Geneva Accords of

¹⁷² Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States 1963-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).

¹⁷³ Donaghy, p. 123.

¹⁷⁴ Polling did show that 27 percent of Canadians in 1957 stated their belief that America had too much influence on Canada; by 1974 that number increased to 57 percent. Granatstein J. L., and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990), p.41. For American perceptions of Canada, see also John Kirton and Robert Bothwell, “A Proud and Powerful Country: American Attitudes Toward Canada 1963-1976,” *Queen’s Quarterly*, Vol. 92, No. 1, (Spring 1985), pp. 108-126.

¹⁷⁵ Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War*, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986).

1954 that called for elections and reunification of Vietnam.¹⁷⁶ Levant records a litany of misdeeds executed by Canadian representatives on the ICC, including spying for the United States (Canada was one of the few western countries permitted in North Vietnam), legitimated Rolling Thunder in one minority report, ‘ran interference’ for America’s defoliant program in South Vietnam and, generally, acted as Washington’s minion in the conflict, carried threats to Hanoi.¹⁷⁷ Levant’s notion of ‘complicity’ in its ICC activities was not novel, as Eayrs had already covered that ground, at least until 1957, examining the Western bent of Canadian commissioners to all three bodies (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), outlining how Canada provided intelligence to the CIA, but also received US intelligence that helped commissioners in their duties in Indochina.¹⁷⁸ Unlike Levant, however, at least Eayrs points out that Poland was no less blatant in its support for communist objectives.¹⁷⁹

Central to the arguments both of Eayrs and Levant is the implicit notion that there was such a thing as a ‘neutral’ position during the Cold War, and that somehow Canada was above the fray of normal international *realpolitik*. Where Eayrs suggests that Canadian ICC policy in Indochina was at best designed to meet two incompatible ends, impartiality in its monitoring of the Geneva Accords and protection of US interests there, Levant describes Canada as a duplicitous, near colonial, power. Levant’s blunt instrument is the Defence Production Sharing Agreements, under which Canada was able to sell to the United States about two and a half billion dollars worth of military goods between 1965 and 1973.¹⁸⁰ Levant also argues that Canadian aid to South Vietnam was generated less by the humanitarian sentiment than it was by Canada’s growing economic ties to Asia, especially dependence on Asia, and Asia by way of the US, for several raw materials and finished goods.¹⁸¹ In general, Levant’s analysis of Canadian actions reflects a Marxian approach to the international system and Canada’s place in it, and therefore should be challenged by review of documents on which he relies to make his claims. His basic claim, however, that Canadian and American ‘elites’ came upon a common view of the world, and therefore a common view of the economic basis of the struggle in Vietnam, implies a deterministic interpretation of how decisions are made. Canada and the United States, as capitalist countries, necessarily would try to exploit Asia and use the communist bogeyman to do so. As Canada fed the US war machine in Vietnam, that argument goes, any differences over tactics such as strategic

¹⁷⁶ Eayrs, James, *In Defence of Canada, vol. 5: Indochina: The Roots of Complicity*; Charles Taylor, *Canada, the United States and Vietnam 1954-1973* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1974).

¹⁷⁷ Levant, p. 5. The usual example given of Canada’s loyalty to US, as opposed to ICC, objectives is the minority report on US bombings of North Vietnam Canada produced in February 1965. India and Poland had condemned the bombings, but Canada pointed to North Vietnamese incursion as the cause of instability in South Vietnam. John Warnock started making the case for Canadian “complicity” long before Levant. See his *Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada*, (Toronto: New Press, 1970), pp. 284-287.

¹⁷⁸ Eayrs, pp. 242-250.

¹⁷⁹ Eayrs, p. 212.

¹⁸⁰ The Defence Production Sharing Agreements are well covered in Willoughby, pp. 164-174 and John Kirton, “The Consequences of Integration: The Defence Production Sharing Agreement,” in W. Andrew Axline, ed., *Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974)

¹⁸¹ Levant, pp. 51-94.

bombing were only differences of degree and not kind. Canadian sales to the US therefore brought nothing but ‘blood money’ to cure Canada’s balance of payments problems.¹⁸²

Levant’s angry take on Ottawa’s complicity in Vietnam is balanced nicely by the best overall scholarly work on Canada and Vietnam, Douglas Ross’s *In The Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973*. Ross rejects the idea that policy-making in Ottawa was driven by any all embracing rational scheme. Ross argues that the Canadian policy system acted ‘cybernetically,’ tracked several issues, most prominently the possibility of the Washington using nuclear weapons, while attempting “to keep each within a tolerable range of values.”¹⁸³ Those values were defined by three ‘policy tendencies’, namely the “liberal-moderate, conservative and left-liberal.” The dominant tendency was ‘liberal-moderate,’ which effectively meant promoting peace, while preserving an appropriate role for Canada in the ICCs, but all the while maintaining sufficiently close relations with the US to enable Canada to influence its decisions.¹⁸⁴ Ross suggests that Canadian behaviour was ‘adaptive’ as opposed to ‘purposive’, and, in keeping with a cybernetic process, information flow was restricted to that which supported basic assumptions, and little attempt was made to ‘understand the external environment.’ In effect, Ross paints a convincing picture of policy-makers little interested in innovation, but strongly committed to the objective of doing whatever it took to avoid the use of nuclear weapons while not upsetting the “fundamental harmony of Canada-US relations.”¹⁸⁵ In effect, that meant quiet diplomacy, not quiet complicity.¹⁸⁶ This was the type of approach that provided for Ottawa to send an experienced diplomat like Chester Ronning on peace-feeler missions to Hanoi in 1966, even if they failed. However, that did not stop the Pearson government from publicly criticizing US strategy when the pressure built in 1966 and 1967 to do so.¹⁸⁷ While Ross offers a more balanced view of decision-making and the context in which Ottawa operated, he, like Levant and Eayrs, does not appear to have examined many DND files other than public documents.¹⁸⁸

The basic assumptions of the policy-making system, including the primary Cabinet members Pearson and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin and Department of External Affairs, were likely driven by what Sean Maloney has described as the Canadian peacekeeping myth, and carried forth from the late 1950s.¹⁸⁹ That myth is multi-dimensional,

¹⁸² Levant, p. 61.

¹⁸³ Douglas Ross, *In The Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 385. For a

¹⁸⁴ Ross, p. 11.

¹⁸⁵ Ross, p. 379.

¹⁸⁶ In the frantic nationalism of the late 1960s, a typical attack on “quiet diplomacy” was Stephen Clarkson ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968)

¹⁸⁷ Ross, pp. 282-292; Donaghy, pp. 132-140. In Canadian studies, the Ronning missions receive significant attention. In longer overviews of the Vietnam, it is accorded less. Stanley Karnow, for instance, mentioned Ronning as one of several “entrants in the obstacle course” for a Nobel Peace Prize. See his *Vietnam, A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War*, (New York: Viking, 1983), pp. 491-492.

¹⁸⁸ Ross provides no bibliography, but a cursory review of his footnotes indicates no citation of DND files.

¹⁸⁹ It is important to remember that Cabinet solidarity was not a given, and Pearson and Martin disagreed on approaches to Vietnam and China. See Greg Donaghy, “Minding the Minister: Pearson, Martin and American Policy in Asia 1963-1967,” in Norman Hillmer, ed., *Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator* (Montreal, Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1999).

but for the purposes of the Vietnam case study consists of the ‘unmilitary people’ notion, the ‘neutral or quasi-neutral’ Cold War player notion and the ‘morally superior to America’ notion that Canada behaves for altruistic objectives and not those related to national interests.¹⁹⁰ In examining how these assumptions framed Canada’s strategic culture throughout the two decades of the Vietnam narrative, it will be necessary to test Ross’s theoretical model of cybernetic policy-making.¹⁹¹ Were alternative views sought on decisions related to support of the war? Was Ottawa simply adapting to events as they occurred? Did the decision-making process include the full spectrum of strategic level advice on the situation and how it fit into broader Cold War imperatives? In particular, there is little in the prominent literature to suggest that DND and the CF were active participants in the process.

Re-examining Vietnam, in particular the Pearson years but also its impact on Trudeau’s approach to foreign and defence policy, in light of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship is important not just to determine the bureaucratic processes in Ottawa, but also because it spans a two decade long period of the trials and tribulations experienced by those who intuitively seemed to understand the reality of the ‘strategic entity’ that the continent had become. The best example of those trials might be that of the Arnold Heeney, who had twice served as Ambassador to the United States and Livingston Merchant, twice the Ambassador to Canada were asked by Pearson and Johnson in 1964 to work out “acceptable principles which would make it easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other policies of interest to each other.”¹⁹² Their recommendations, contained in the report *Principles for Partnership*, were not accepted, in no small part because one of them looked too much like an excuse for the continuation of quiet diplomacy, but it was an important symbol of the types of challenges Ottawa faces in codifying the strategic relationship with the US in all dimensions. Further research would have to examine bureaucratic inputs and responses to this report on both sides of the border, particularly as they show how different department officials, Cabinet ministers and other commentators reacted to it or advised on it. This may provide some insight into what remained the same or might have changed in the years between Canada’s commitment to NATO, Korea, NORAD, and perhaps ‘cybernetic’ approach to Vietnam, which was as much a part of the Cold War as were those other commitments even if many Canadian policy-makers thought otherwise.

¹⁹⁰ Sean M. Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970*, (St. Catherine’s: Vanwell, 2002), p. 2. See also, as cited by Maloney, George Stanley, *Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People*, revised ed. (Toronto: Macmillan and & Co., 1961), p. 1; Blair Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada Postwar to Present 1945-1967*, (Toronto: Doubleday, 1967); Phillip Resnick, “Canadian Defence Policy and the American Empire,” in *Close the 49th Parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 95-115; Hugh Hood, “Moral Obligation: Canadian Thing,” in *Canada: A Guide to the Peacable Kingdom*, William Kilbourn, ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 29-35; Pierre Berton, *Why We Act Like Canadians: A Personal Exploration of Our National Character*, (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 34-52.

¹⁹¹ For one view of the theoretical model, see John Steibruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

¹⁹² Arnold Heeney, *The Things That Are Caesar’s: The Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 189-199.

Arctic

Unlike the other case studies considered in this report, this one deals not with a specific conflict or decision point, but rather the role of a geographical place – the North - in the making of decisions. While many economic, social and political questions have raised the ire of Canadian nationalists and the spectre of anti-Americanism, the very nature of the ‘North’ or the ‘Arctic’ question has put it at the centre of bilateral defence relations many times as a physical, as opposed to a cultural, threat to Canadian sovereignty. As ‘Arctic sovereignty’ looms large once again in Canadian political debate, it is worthwhile to account for how the problem has played out in the past, as Canadian interest in the Arctic has waxed and waned on a number of occasions since Confederation. It is commonplace to consider that interest primarily as a defensive measure against the United States, oft cited as Canada’s main threat in the North.¹⁹³ In this case study, we will consider whether this perceived threat is genuine on the part of Canadian decision makers or a manufactured one intended to reinforce other elements of defence and foreign policy, or even to exploit domestic prejudices at the expense of other political objectives.

There is little doubt that the Arctic, or, alternatively, the North, holds a special place in Canada’s identity, both historical and contemporary. Strategist Kenneth Eyre, writing in 1987, described that place most succinctly when he observed that “The ‘North’ to Canadians is more of an idea than a place.”¹⁹⁴ While Eyre dealt mainly with the military aspects of what constitutes ‘the North,’ as a concept relating to “those lands and seas beyond the frontier, beyond the national transportation grid,” his main point is an apt descriptor of Canada’s Northern narrative. For most Canadians, their attachment to the North is spawned by the notion that it is synonymous with the country itself. The North has been called “part of Canada’s greatness,” and a recent study suggests that “In its most basic sense, the Arctic and the Northwest Passage is symbolic of Canada’s destiny.”¹⁹⁵ Canada is, after all, the ‘True North strong and free.’ Canada’s ‘northernness’ is indisputable, but the stark contrast between that and the equally undeniable ‘southernness’ of the United States is palpable.

Such abstract notions have not arisen by accident, as Canadian nationalists have used it repeatedly and skilfully to define their country as a distinct North American nation. In the pre-Confederation period, political leaders like George Brown and John A. Macdonald cited potential American expansion to Rupert’s Land and the Northwest Territories as a reason for Canadian acquisition of the vast lands from the Hudson’s Bay Company.¹⁹⁶ In the uncertain years after Confederation, when Loyalist sentiment stoked the country’s suspicion of the United States, the Canada First movement used the image of Canadians as sturdy and disciplined ‘Northmen’ to contrast with the more frivolous and excessive Americans of the

¹⁹³ For instance, consider this matter-of-fact assertion: “...during the last 40 years the greatest practical threat to Canadian aspirations in the Arctic has been posed, curiously enough, by its formidable ally to the south, the United States of America.,” in N.D. Bankes, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic, 1947-1987,” *Arctic*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1987), p. 285

¹⁹⁴ Kenneth Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North: 1947-87,” *Arctic*, Vol.40, No.4 (December 1987), p.292.

¹⁹⁵ Kyle D. Christensen, “Arctic Maritime Security and Defence: Canadian Northern Security Opportunities and Challenges,” DRDC CORA Technical Report TR2005/01, February 2005, p. 2

¹⁹⁶ Canada acquired Ruperts Land and the North-Western Territory from the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1870.

South.¹⁹⁷ Historically, the North's importance in the general history of Canada-US relations is significant *because* of how it generates that sort of symbolic nationalistic rhetoric. As Jack Granatstein points out, this rhetoric is rooted in the context of the long history of Canadian anti-Americanism which, "has for two centuries been a central buttress of the national identity."¹⁹⁸ As such, the North is a critical piece of Canada's national narrative, a good part of which relies on the existence of 'the other' in North America, because Canadian policy-makers seem to have embraced the region as the nexus of the endless struggle between sovereignty and security.

Shelagh Grant has chronicled how Ottawa tried to deal with that struggle, real or perceived, in the active years surrounding the Second World War. *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950*, is her meticulously researched study of how sovereign control of the North and defence against possible attacks came to dominate activity and spending among other government programs related to social, economic and political development of the region. Grant's study shows how the 'new North', hitherto treated with little interest in Ottawa, was given a military emphasis in the sovereignty, security and stewardship decisions made by governments in this critical period.¹⁹⁹ Of course, the key events for her examination involved the U.S. military build-up in the North that accelerated after the attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent US entry into the war. The Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements provided a framework for wartime collaboration. Canada-US activity in the North comprised a series of projects building air and land routes to Alaska and the CANOL pipeline and road from Norman Wells to Whitehorse. All of these projects had been proposed in various ways before the war, but became urgent for the United States especially after Pearl Harbor and increased concern over the Japanese threat to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and even the threat of a Nazi presence in Siberia – just across the Bering Strait. For the United States, that meant bases in Alaska and the ability to supply them. The Northwest Staging Route, comprised of airfields throughout Western Canada and Alaska, provided the capability for the US to ferry men, supplies and aircraft to Alaska, but also provided a route for the movement of lend-lease aircraft to the Soviet Union, critical to the overall war effort.²⁰⁰ A chain of air bases called the Crimson Route was built to provide a route northeast to Europe.

For Washington, Northern defence projects were approached within a 'framework for hemisphere defense' that became national policy after the Munich crisis of 1938. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild compiled ably the various defence plans and actions that comprised this 'framework,' which was a throwback to Monroe Doctrine principles of guarding against

¹⁹⁷ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States in the 1990s* (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), pp. 13-14.

¹⁹⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism*, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 4.

¹⁹⁹ Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988). Readers should also consult Morris Zaslow, *The Northward Expansion of Canada 1914-1967* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988) for a study of development, both centralized and local.

²⁰⁰ The role of the route in lend-lease is chronicled in Bob Hesketh, ed., *Three Northern Wartime Projects* (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, 1996), p. 32

foreign intrusion.²⁰¹ While American activities in the North were part of its broad hemispheric defence program that looked to secure territory against possible threats, especially by Japan, most literature on Ottawa's perspective argue that the Government considered US activities in the North as more of a potential threat to Canada's physical control over its territory than any potential Japanese incursions. King was no stranger to suspicions about US motives, and his operating political philosophy and world view are well known.²⁰² Still, despite Hyde Park and Ogdensburg, he managed to express a degree of shock that the US Government actually was going to launch head-first into mobilization.

In *Canada's War*, Jack Granatstein points out that Mackenzie King was particularly paranoid of Alaska Highway construction. The PJBD recommended the highway a month earlier, "to be constructed along the general line of the existing airway."²⁰³ In March 1942, four months after the US entered the war, King commiserated with Malcolm Macdonald, the British High Commissioner to Canada, over America's apparent manipulation of potential threats to build the highway, which was "less intended for protection against the Japanese than as one of the fingers of the hand which America is placing more or less over the whole of the Western hemisphere."²⁰⁴ King's attitude of dismay at US motives and expressed surprise over the seriousness with which Washington approached the North was perhaps naïve, but also a misreading of American strategic culture. To expect timidity from the United States after Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt's 'day that will live in infamy' speech possibly was naïve, but definitely was disingenuous. After all, the United States had been attacked and was now fully at war.

Bernd Horn has examined the place of Canada-US relations in the North during the Second World War and made the reasonable observation that, because of US activities in the Second World War, Canada's "northern security became focussed primarily on protecting national sovereignty from the encroachment of an ally rather than the guarding of an unprotected flank from hostile invasion."²⁰⁵ While there is little question that the presence of American troops in Canada's North was a major bugbear for Canadian politicians during the war, what is less clear is whether the concerns were legitimate or contrived.

There is evidence that Washington viewed its Northern activities as temporary and driven by war-time 'big picture' requirements as opposed to being 'imperialistic' in design.²⁰⁶ Throughout the war, the strategic significance of the North gradually decreased, and so did American military activity. Ottawa bought back control of the North by reimbursing the US Government for Northern defence projects after the cessation of hostilities. The US was also

²⁰¹ Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1960), p. 3.

²⁰² King bios

²⁰³ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1970), p. 346.

²⁰⁴ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 321.

²⁰⁵ Lt Col Bernd Horn, "Gateway to Invasion or the Curse of Geography? The Canadian Arctic and the Question of Security, 1939-1999," in Bernd Horn, ed. *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience* (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2002), p. 311.

²⁰⁶ Stanley Dzuiban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1959), p. 172.

quick to pull its military personnel out of Canadian territory, putting to rest any idea that its presence on Canadian territory was anything but temporary. Indeed, it is difficult to square the image of imperialist America with that of Hugh Keenlyside's remarks on the activities of the PJBD:

At all times the United States representatives recognized the political impracticality of any development of the kind [acquiring title to naval and air bases in Canada] and scrupulously avoided proposing any step that would constitute a violation of Canadian sovereignty.²⁰⁷

Real or imagined, however, Canadian attitudes toward the US, perhaps best symbolized by that of Mackenzie King, concentrated on US insensitivities to Canadian sovereignty.²⁰⁸ The literature is less satisfactory in explaining why Ottawa was caught so off-guard by the speed with which the US undertook its move north. Did this reflect an inability to understand American strategic culture, or was it simply indicative of Canadian strategic culture? Did Canadian decision makers lack so deeply in sufficient information or advice? Did they not know which questions to ask to understand more fully US intent? A closer reading of Cabinet documents and political memoir with this question in mind may tell us more about the sources and motivations for Canadian perceptions of US determination.

Furthermore, such examination should indicate to what extent Canadian decision makers anticipated how war-time reactive behaviour vis-à-vis the Arctic would become a pattern in post-war years. Bernd Horn argues that the experience of the Second World War caused Mackenzie King and his government to insure against "further American encroachment in the Arctic." Referring to early post-war American and Canadian assessments of the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union, Horn shows that Washington was treating the Arctic as a continental defence problem, while Ottawa's support for a defence build-up in the North was motivated not by security "but remained one of countering perceived American penetration in the interest of sovereignty." Horn also outlines the accepted threat perceptions shared by Canada and the US, in particular the former's certainty that the latter was exaggerating the threat posed by the former.²⁰⁹ Ron Purver suggests that "Canadian analysts – while self-admittedly hampered by a lack of independent sources of intelligence were, on the whole, at least initially, far less alarmist than their American counterparts intentions and/or the pace of the developing military threat." He goes further, though, and also suggests that the threat itself was 'questionable' and that Canadian efforts were required more to counter "a massive American over-reaction, with all the pressures that would bring to bear on Canadian sovereignty in the area."²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Thomas M. Tynan, "Canadian-American Relations in the Arctic: The Effect of Environmental Influences Upon Territorial Claims, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July 1979), p. 411.

²⁰⁸ R. J. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic," in *The Arctic Frontier*, ed. R. St. J. Macdonald (Toronto, 1966), p. 262.

²⁰⁹ Horn, pp. 318-319.

²¹⁰ Ron Purver, "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy, 1945 to the Present," David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 82. Unfortunately, Purver offers no evidence of why Canadian analysis was superior to American, or on what basis such a comparative assessment should be made.

Unfortunately, Purver offers no evidence of why Canadian analysis was superior to American, or on what basis such a comparison of threat assessments should be made. It is possible to emphasize those differences too much, however, as Canadian and American assessments of the developing Soviet threat were not substantively different. As Lawrence Aronsen points out, between 1945 and 1947, Ottawa was in the process of shifting its primary intelligence relationship from Britain to the United States, and was understandably pressured to develop 'made in Canada' assessments. To that end, he argues that there were some differences between Canadian and American views of Soviet intentions and capabilities, especially which should be emphasized in assessing threats in the 'air-atomic age', but also concludes that his examination of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee's assessment of 1947 supports recent scholarship that the Western allies were largely consistent in their assessments of the Soviet threat.²¹¹

Of course, to the venerable Mackenzie King, military affairs generally were troublesome and to be avoided as much as possible. Canada's defence programme itself was far from settled, and defence policy in general drifted through 1946. Service Chiefs and the Government were both certain of the most likely threat to Canada -- the Soviet Union -- but wholly uncertain of what to do about it. No external defence commitments, financial or otherwise, could be made until the Cabinet decided how much money would be available for defence.²¹² Much like its Labour counterpart in London, the King government's emphasis on building a benevolent state was first and foremost in its objectives; defence was something Canada grudgingly had to deal with because of the nature of the Soviet threat and Canada's moralistic goal of collective security and multinational cooperation.²¹³

Thus, King's approach to the Arctic was very much driven by the goal of cutting the military, while trying to contain unwanted publicity of defence discussions with the US. Between 20 and 23 May 1946, the newly-formed Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) approved two documents: an "appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-US security," and the "Joint Canadian-US Basic Security Plan." In the appreciation, the planners outlined their assessment of the strategic threat to North America. Within three to five years, the document warned, a potential enemy (none was specified) could possess atomic weaponry. North America could be vulnerable to attacks from "guided missiles, rockets or aircraft launched from submarines and from Arctic bases seized for the purpose," or even long range bombardment of its vital industrial areas. The security plan called for "a comprehensive air warning, meteorological and communications system," extensive air bases for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft defences. With King's blessing, the MCC continued throughout the year to add specific proposals to the Basic Security Plan²¹⁴

As it has been suggested that the 1946 US request for the construction of several weather stations was a "threat of unilateral action [that] led to major concerns within the Canadian government" because it would initiate US reconnaissance flights that might

²¹¹ Lawrence Aronsen, "Preparing for Armageddon: JIC 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p. 506.

²¹² National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 2, 16/7 Cabinet minutes, 6 November 1946.

²¹³ (NAC), Mackenzie King Diaries, 13 November 1946; Privy Council Officer Records volume 246. Memorandum for the Prime Minister re: Defence Discussions, 12 November 1946.

²¹⁴ Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, pp. 33-35

compromise Canadian sector claims west of Greenland, it is essential to validate, as much as possible, those concerns and whether they drove early post-war Canadian continental defence activity more than the perceived Soviet threat.²¹⁵ There is little question that, once the decision was taken in 1947 to establish the stations, five in all, Ottawa wanted to give the public impression that it was in charge. As CD Howe, the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, told the House of Commons, the US was merely assisting Canada in constructing and operating the stations, which will be run and manned by Canada. Of course, Canada was slow to man the stations, US personnel were present until 1972, but this episode demonstrates the King government's tendency to operate reactively to US suggestions, despite the wartime experience that might have demonstrated the need for Canada to think in terms of defence of a continental strategic entity. As it is, we are left with the impression that Ottawa considered Canada's defence requirements to be independent of those of Washington's.²¹⁶

King was outraged by a *Financial Post* article which claimed that US authorities had given Canada an ultimatum to fortify her northern frontier or allow America to take over. The *Post* ran a similar article three weeks later, concluding that "the moral is clear: Canada must quickly get a policy of her own for developing the North or someone else may insist on doing it for us."²¹⁷ Mackenzie King rebuffed the article in the House of Commons, stating that the US was not pressuring Canada into any formal treaty arrangements. Because the plans had not been approved by the Cabinet or Parliament, that was true. A cursory examination of documents, however, shows that King was getting advice that supported continuing relations between the military staffs as if a *de facto* alliance existed, but on a low profile and sensitive to overzealous reporters.²¹⁸

The point of this example is simple: analysis of the Arctic-related decisions made by Mackenzie King and his government during the Second World War and immediately after must differentiate between the politics of sovereignty and nationalism and the more sober assessment of interests, threat perception and the limits in Ottawa's knowledge of Soviet intentions and capabilities with respect to North American security. Or, and perhaps more importantly, our assessment must determine to what extent concern over US threats to Arctic sovereignty was real or a bogeyman to draw attention from Ottawa's lack of activity in the North, that came to be contrasted so sharply with the US surge there in the first half of the 1940s. In other words, was the King government working on a sound strategic framework for its defence activities in the Arctic or acting out of embarrassment over its lack of action? If there was no need to counter potential Soviet lodgements in the North, by seizing wartime airstrips for instance, why was the Army reorganized for a brief period to an air-transportable

²¹⁵ The stations were vital not only because they "provided information for aircraft in flight, but also because in some cases their airstrips could be used as possible secondary bases if needed." Grant, p, 214. It was normal throughout the Cold War for the two sides to be standoffish even on what seems to be insignificant meteorological and monitoring proposals. See O. Young, *Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1992), as cited in Douglas C. Nord, "Searching for the North in North American Foreign Policies: Canada and the United States," *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, (Summer, 2007), Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 210.

²¹⁶ Bankes, p. 287. The apparent concern was that the US might justify claims to unexplored territory.

²¹⁷ *Financial Post*, 29 June; 6 July 1946.

²¹⁸ (NAC) RG 25, G2 Acc 84-85, volume 11, file 9061-40. Memorandum for the Prime Minister; Cabinet Defence Committee, minutes of 20 June 1946. DO (46) 20th meeting.

brigade (the Mobile Striking Force) to deal with such a scenario?²¹⁹ Why did the King Government cite its inability to sail in Arctic waters as the reason to send the carrier HMCS *Warrior* back to the UK in 1947 in favour of HMCS *Magnificent*?²²⁰ To what extent did Canada's military leadership think strategically about the North as a fundamental planning responsibility as opposed to a diversion from more critical commitments overseas as part of United Nations or NATO alliance missions? Was Canada really trying to take an international approach to the Arctic after 1945 in order to emphasize scientific and developmental collaboration or, as Lester Pearson put it in a 1946 article for *Foreign Affairs*, "Peaceful development in cooperation with all the Northern nations is Canada's sole desire. In that development the Canadian accent is on resources and research, not on strategy and politics."²²¹ Really?

These are questions we must answer, because the weather station controversy was a harbinger of future reaction to continental defence initiatives in those early Cold War days, in all a critical decision point in the narrative of Canada's story of Arctic sovereignty. Consider, for instance, how the DEW-line initiative has been perceived by various commentators and scholars. John Warnock suggested that the 1955 DEW line agreement was a surrender of Canadian sovereignty in the North.²²² Gordon Smith argued that Canada was justified in worrying about a creeping US threat to Canadian sovereignty in the North, even though he admitted that Canadian rights were fully protected. In 1959, James Eayrs was alarmed that the agreement meant that, "de facto control of the Canadian North has passed into American hands."²²³ Possibly in keeping with previous examples of diverting attention from military activity, Shelagh Grant suggests that the St. Laurent government's 1955 announcement of a new Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources was not just a coincidence. In the same way, she argues, the next prime minister, John Diefenbaker, would espouse a 'Northern Vision' coincidentally with the creation of NORAD.²²⁴ These possible connections must be examined further in order to understand the place of the North in Canada's strategic culture. If nothing else, it certainly would help to validate Joseph Nye's observation that increased "transnational interactions... may stimulate nationalism."²²⁵

²¹⁹ The Canadian Army allocated substantial resources to the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), which consisted of three airborne battalions and, hypothetically, RCAF air mobile support (which really was only sufficient to lift one battalion). See Sean M. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence 1948-1955," *Canadian Military History*, volume 2, number 2, Autumn 1993.

²²⁰ (NAC) RG 25 A 12, volume 2119, file AR 10208, vol. 2. "RCN acquisition of ships from UK," Norman Robertson to Lester Pearson, 12 February 1947; Brooke Claxton to Lester Pearson, 11 February 1947; Cabinet Conclusions, 14 January 1947. *Magnificent* and two destroyers visited Churchill in the summer of 1948, the next year, a frigate trained in Frobisher Bay and, in 1950, a vessel participated in a joint US-Canadian scientific project in the Chukchi Sea. The Government also announced its plan to build an arctic patrol vessel for the navy. HMCS Labrador, an icebreaker, would be the first warship to transit the Northwest Passage, but it was duly transferred to the Coast Guard in 1957. See JM Lemming, "HMCS Labrador and the Canadian Arctic," James A. Boutilier, ed. *RCN in Retrospect* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), p. 286.

²²¹ L.B. Pearson, "Canada Looks 'Down North,'" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, (1946), p. 644.

²²² John Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada* (Toronto: 1970), p. 114.

²²³ Warnock, Smith and Eayrs are cited in Tynan, p. 413.

²²⁴ Grant, p. 247.

²²⁵ Annette Baker Fox, et al., eds., *Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 402.

In terms of its strategic significance other than as a transit way for Soviet missiles, the Arctic declined through the remainder of the 1950s and 1960s; there was not even a mention of the Arctic in the 1964 White Paper.²²⁶ While Canadian sovereignty over the land mass of the Arctic Archipelago appeared to Canadian policy-makers as beyond question after the Second World War,²²⁷ except for the potential of new discoveries that surrounded the weather station controversy, the next sovereignty episode involved Arctic maritime jurisdictional claims. While there is a substantial amount of literature on the legal aspects of this very specialized issue of international law, this study needs to focus on significant episodes and decisions made in the context of the Arctic sovereignty narrative.

For the most part, those episodes revolve around the Northwest Passage and the internal waters issue (which is really a combination of up to seven passages that connect the Bering Strait to the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay²²⁸), but they also include claims of jurisdiction, such as Canada's ability to enforce pollution law in the Arctic waters. There is much written about differences between Canadian and American legal positions on the Northwest Passage.²²⁹ Canada claims it is internal waters contained in the straight baselines of the Arctic Archipelago, with no right of passage; the United States maintains that it is an international strait and, as such, should be allowed uncontested free passage along the lines of the custom in other such waters, such as the Straits of Malacca.²³⁰ Put simply, Canada tends to view the Passage in largely nationalistic terms, fitting into its limited international role, while the United States approaches the Passage within the context of its global role, wherein decisions normally have implications and effects in other regions.²³¹

The two primary Cold War episodes that drove maritime Arctic politics were the voyages of the *Manhattan* in 1969 and 1970, and that of the *Polar Sea* in 1985. Both were, and remain, seen as affronts to Canadian sovereignty. After the discovery of oil reserves off Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, the Humble Oil super tanker SS *Manhattan* sailed to test the viability of

²²⁶ Paul Hellyer, White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964).

²²⁷ Bankes, pp. 292-299.

²²⁸ Donat Pharand, "The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit," *Ocean Development & International Law*, 38:3-69, 2007. pp. 29-30.

²²⁹ A capable overview of some of the legal issues surrounding the issue of Arctic sovereignty is Lieutenant-Commander Guy Killaby, "'Great Game in a Cold Climate': Canada's Arctic Sovereignty in Question," *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2005-2006.

²³⁰ Some examples of the ample literature on the Northwest Passage include Donat Pharand, *Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Morris Zaslow, ed., *A Century of Canada's Arctic Islands, 1880-1980* (Canada: Royal Society of Canada, 1981); Franklyn Griffiths, *The Politics of the Northwest Passage* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen's University Press, 1987); Rob Huebert, "Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty – The Return to Canada's Third Ocean," in *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2007); Donat Pharand, "The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit," *Ocean Development & International Law*, 38:3-69, 2007.

²³¹ *National Security Presidential Directive 66*, issued in January 2009, states the position as thus: "Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits."

year-around transport of oil from Alaska to the East Coast via the Northwest Passage. Humble did not ask Canada for permission, but the Canadian Coast Guard nonetheless provided Coast Guard escort icebreakers for each cruise, perhaps as a symbol of ownership.²³² The incident prompted the Trudeau government, after substantial media pressure decrying Ottawa's soft stance on sovereignty, to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act to extend Canada's territorial waters from 3 to 12 nautical miles. The government also passed a second piece of legislation, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which created a zone for pollution prevention up to 100 miles from the mainland by regulation of, among other things, hull and fuel tank specifications, manning, pilotage and imposed obligations upon shippers regarding insurance and indemnity.²³³

Based primarily upon their different interpretations of internal/international waters with respect to the Northwest Passage, Ottawa and Washington took different views on whether the legislation itself was even legitimate, Canada going so far as to deny the International Court's jurisdiction to rule on the dispute, sparking the United States to charge that Canada was taking unnecessary 'unilateral' action.²³⁴ President Nixon supposedly refused to take a call from Trudeau to discuss the new policy, and American attempts to mobilize a conference to tackle the issue from a multilateral perspective failed. In their study on Trudeau and Canadian foreign policy, Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein suggested that "some Canadian officials, and Senator Paul Martin," supported the notion of international jurisdiction, "but they did their complaining in private." However, there is no source provided for this statement, and therefore no evidence as to how that advice was given or on what basis it was formulated.²³⁵ We need to investigate the way these points of view were generated and included in the decision-making process. While Paul Martin reviewed his position in his memoir, we lack a comprehensive view of the Manhattan crisis and its handling based on primary sources.²³⁶

As Canada was claiming specialized jurisdiction more so than territorial sovereignty in the 1970 surge of law-making, one scholar suggests that it is "unclear... why claims to territorial sovereignty and associated arguments were not pressed more forcefully in 1970."²³⁷ This is a question that further research must consider, specifically in the context of what strategic or long term considerations were part of the Cabinet discussions in 1970, as well as the type of advice being advanced by the bureaucracy to various ministers.

The issue of transit through the Northwest Passage and the implications for innocent passage appeared again in political debate 15 years later when, in 1985, the US Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Sea* transited it on its voyage from Greenland to Alaska. Descriptions of this event are often inconsistent and not fully explored, especially as to whether permission was

²³² Eyre, p. 296.

²³³ Franklyn Griffiths, ed. *Politics of the Northwest Passage* (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), pp. 69-70.

²³⁴ Fox, *et al*, pp. 171-172.

²³⁵ JI Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 81.

²³⁶ John Kirton and Don Munton provided a synopsis of events, entitled "The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath" in Franklyn Griffiths, *Politics of the Northwest Passage* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1987), pp. 67-97.

²³⁷ Bankes, p. 289.

granted by Ottawa for the transit. Marc Milner, for instance, suggests that the passage of the Polar Sea “without permission was a slight that could not be ignored.”²³⁸ Permission was not sought, but it was indeed given, and Canadian observers were aboard.²³⁹ To confuse matters further, Donat Pharand states that notification was given, but Canada responded that it considered all waters of the Archipelago as

historic internal waters and that a request for authorization would be necessary. The United States refused to make such a request and, eventually, the two governments agreed that the transit would take place without prejudice to their respective legal positions. The transit did take place without any request and, indeed, the United States later denied that it even had given Canada prior notice. Nevertheless, there was good cooperation between the officials of both countries and three Canadian representatives were accepted aboard: one from the navy, another from the coast guard, and the third from the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.²⁴⁰

A similar legislative flurry resulted from the event, again after considerable media pressure, this time by order-in-council to claim waters landward of the baselines as historical internal waters, and therefore not subject to the convention of right of innocent passage.²⁴¹

While the complex issues surrounding the Law of the Sea are substantive and a critical part of Canada-US relations, this study is most interested in the connection between this incident and the broader story of the role of these Arctic-related incidents to the foreign and defence policies of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments. In general, Trudeau ended up emphasizing sovereignty and continental defence as a result of its security policy reviews, perhaps exploiting, or perpetuating, the Canadian public’s paranoia that Manhattan was only an indication of what was to come. In 1971, Maxwell Cohen observed that “Manhattan’s two voyages made Canadians feel that they were on the edge of another American “steal” of Canadian resources and “rights” which had to be dealt with at once by firm governmental action.”²⁴² If this reflected the sentiments of Canadians, it certainly is indicative of a vague anti-Americanism rather than a well considered strategic perspective? That is perhaps to be expected of an uninformed public, but was the sentiment used cynically as a reason to reorient, and reduce, the Canadian military, especially in light of the halving of NATO commitments?²⁴³ Trudeau’s defence policy, articulated in the 1971 White Paper, *Defence in*

²³⁸ Marc Milner, *Canada’s Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 292.

²³⁹ Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, “Still Unresolved After Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946-1998,” *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Fall 1999, Vol. 29, Issue 3, p. 411.

²⁴⁰ Pharand, p. 39.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58. Pharand has considered historical waters and straight baselines as two possible legal bases for Canada’s claim that waters inside the Archipelago are its internal waters. He discounts the former and suggests that the latter, straight baselines, is sufficient.

²⁴² Maxwell Cohen, “The Arctic and the National Interest,” *International Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (1970-1971), p. 72.

²⁴³ For an entertaining, if polemical, indictment of Trudeau’s defence policies, see Gerald Porter, *In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years* (Publication location unknown: Deneau and Greenberg, 1978)

the 70s, emphasized the primary mission of protecting sovereignty, despite the Government's position that, other than the uncertainty surrounding the Northwest Passage, "there was no challenge to Canadian sovereignty over northern lands, either continental or archipelagic. Similarly, territorial waters and the Arctic seabed were seen as being firmly within Canada's sovereignty."²⁴⁴ But was a military response to a non-military problem appropriate? Did it matter to policy-makers? The main task given to the CF in the sovereignty program was surveillance, but no new capabilities were planned to provide it.

In a similar vein, the Polar Sea episode occurred in the run-up to *Challenge and Commitment*, the 1987 White Paper on Defence, the Mulroney government's attempt to invigorate Canada's military that had declined to such an extent.²⁴⁵ Again, protection of sovereignty, and particularly Arctic sovereignty, was used to guide defence policy and programs. Specifically, the White Paper called for a North American Air Defence Modernization Program (North Warning System), five Forward Operating Locations for CF-18s north of 60, a northern training centre, an icebreaker and, most significantly, a fleet of nuclear submarines, ostensibly part of a move toward building a "three-ocean navy."²⁴⁶ As Kenneth Eyre pointed out in his seminal piece on the military in the Arctic, the White Paper, "when viewed from a "northern" perspective is a striking document: it contains not one but three polar projection maps to illustrate various defence-related realities and perceptions."²⁴⁷

Notwithstanding the air of unreality that blanketed the 1987 White Paper, which was shelved soon after as the Cold War ended, the question we must consider is to what extent Cabinet deliberations and advice from bureaucrats emphasized using perceived American threats to Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic to justify increased defence spending? Was the concept of a continental strategic entity lost in the discussions of sovereignty? Even though most of the big ticket items proposed in 1987 never materialized, was the 'vague uneasiness' Ottawa tends to associate with US activities in the Arctic sufficiently entrenched to guide further policy on the north, including that contained in the 1994 White Paper and even the current emphasis on Arctic sovereignty being employed by the government of Stephen Harper?²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ Eyre, p. 297.

²⁴⁵ In 1985, a US admiral also told Congress that US submarines travelled to the North Pole annually, and announced contracts for additional under-ice capable submarines. Adam Lajeunesse, "Sovereignty, Security and the Canadian Nuclear Submarine Program," *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2007-2008, p. 76.

²⁴⁶ Government of Canada, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa, 1987), p.49.

²⁴⁷ Eyre, p. 298. It may also be too easy to overemphasize the 1987 White Paper's attention to the Arctic as a strategic driver. Commenting shortly after the document's release, Harriet Critchley suggests it was only a marginal reinforcement of previous policies, but she only used the statement in the White Paper itself that "The Government has reviewed our defence effort. This review has confirmed that Canadian defence policy, as it has evolved since the Second World War, is essentially sound." W. Harriet Critchley, "The Arctic", *International Journal*, Vol. 42 (Autumn, 1987), p. 773. This does not answer the question, however, of why the Arctic as a symbol of Canadian priorities was so markedly used.

²⁴⁸ Two recent overviews of the wide variety of current perspectives on how to conceive of the Arctic and its significance as a security issue demonstrate the difficulties associated with strategic planning. See Franklyn Griffiths, The Honourable Paul Okalik, Suzanne Lalonde, Rob Huebert and Whitney Lackenbauer, "Canada's Arctic Interests and Responsibilities," *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. 65, No. 4,

How much of Canada's Arctic-related defence policies are driven by nationalist objectives based on the myth of the 'Northmen'? Do American political leaders intend for their actions in the Arctic to be seen as threatening to Canada or, more specifically, is the charge that Americans are insensitive to Canada's sovereignty justified? Is it possible for Canada and the United States to approach the North within the framework of a continental 'strategic entity' or has the Arctic always been clearly not part of the 'undefended border?' These questions will guide our examination of documentary evidence on the issue of Arctic sovereignty as it arose in the various decision points identified herein, and will possibly serve as the basis for interviews with policy-makers that have been involved either in legislative or regulatory activity related to the North.

Canada-US Post 9/11

Jack Snyder coined the term 'strategic culture' in 1977, defining it as "the body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and the perceptual parameters of strategic debate."²⁴⁹ Applying these parameters to Canadian and American approaches to the post-9/11 security environment allows us to determine the extent to which the political and military leaders (or, in Snyder's words, "the national strategic community") perceived of new threats and necessary responses in similar or distinct ways. Put simply, did the new security environment strengthen or weaken the North American 'strategic entity?'

It is a truism that Canada and the United States face a myriad of complex defence and security challenges. While global terrorists, using the failed and failing states that dot the international landscape as havens from which to plan and launch attacks, have become a major security threat, inter and intra-state conflict throughout the world continues to affect Canadians and Canadian interests. The old paradigm, by which Canada was viewed as a secure base from which to generate forces for international deployment, no longer fits the times (if it ever did). The new security environment has forced change to the national security structures of both countries that have much in common, despite evidence that threat perception differs on the two sides of the border, especially that posed by terrorism.²⁵⁰ Differences in perception aside, these threats, epitomized by the 9/11 attacks, brought about the demand for more information sharing *within* the two countries among departments of government. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the US, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (now Public Safety Canada) resulted.

2008, and Brian Macdonald, ed., "Vimy Paper 2007: Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic," (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007).

²⁴⁹ Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1977) R-2154-AF, p. 9

²⁵⁰ See, for example, The Canada Institute, One Issue Two Voices, "Threat Perceptions in the United States and Canada Assessing the public's attitudes toward security and risk in North America," Woodrow Wilson International Institute for Scholars, November 2005 (<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/threats.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2008).

Despite the stand-up of US Northern Command and Canada Command and the implication of change in military roles, especially in Canada, related to the application of military force domestically in the two countries, as in all democracies, will remain a controversial and politically sensitive topic.²⁵¹ However, 9/11 has demonstrated that the nature of the threats being confronted by both countries has evolved. National security planning has to contend with traditional hazards such as natural disasters and minor urban unrest, but also transnational terrorists and cult groups potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, organized and armed urban unrest, and the violent potential of private paramilitary groups.²⁵² As Sean Maloney pointed out, even before 9/11, it is also reasonable to assume that “threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number” in this century and that this will “presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military’s role in containing and neutralizing those threats.”²⁵³ Indeed, this assertion was the main driver behind the establishment of Canada Command, with the authority to plan for and conduct routine and contingency operations within its area of responsibility (AOR).

The Canada Command Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is instructive regarding the types of operations the command is expecting and prepared to conduct. It argues that

Canada COM will conduct operations to detect, deter, prevent, pre-empt and defeat threats and aggression aimed at Canada within the area of responsibility. When requested, Canada COM will provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management, in order to protect and defend Canada.²⁵⁴

Inherent in this mission statement is an understanding that for many operations Canada Command will be in support of another Government department, reflecting both the seam that exists between security and defence threats ([figure 1](#)) and the legislated reality of domestic operations. This reality has been a consistent feature of domestic operations, but the threat environment now faced has added a degree of ambiguity regarding who has responsibility and more importantly the capability to deal effectively with terrorist threats. Many unanswered questions remain. Is a terrorist attack a criminal act, a conventional attack on Canada, or both? The ultimate goal is to stop attacks from taking place, but doing so risks successful prosecution or the security of the intelligence sources that revealed the plot. These concerns lead to other questions: how should terrorist cells be broken up, and at what stage in their evolution? If stopped too early, what impact will there be on subsequent prosecution? What about their sources of finance that enable training and the acquisition of materials to be used in attacks? There are multiple agencies and departments involved in developing responses to these questions, further emphasising the need for a multi-agency approach to their resolution.

²⁵¹ See <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=4175>

²⁵² Sean M. Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997), p. 135.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command Concept of Operations*, (version 3, 3 April 2006), p. 1-3.




Figure 1: The 'Seam' Between Defence and Security

The majority of the threats confronting Western societies do not recognise national boundaries except as obstacles to their ends. For example, drug smugglers routinely operate across the border between Canada and the US, as well as that between US and Mexico. Moreover, the unique nature of the continental partnership between Canada, the US, and Mexico makes it essential to view these threats, and their more serious conventional and asymmetric brethren, as targeting not only individual countries, but the strategic entity making up the North American continent. The Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America (SPP) is a significant step towards the acknowledgement of the considerable economic, military, and social ties between the three states.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, it is an acknowledgment that security and economic prosperity are mutually reinforcing.²⁵⁶ In the case of the Canada-US economic relationship, it is important to note that close to two billion dollars worth of trade flows between the two countries every day.²⁵⁷ While of critical importance to both countries, this is only one aspect of the relationship and is not the only thing threatened. Meeting these threats requires the mobilisation of defence and security forces on both sides of the border, each of which is closely connected to its counterparts. To get a sense of the breadth and depth of the important Canada-US defence relationship, for example, one need only consider that there are more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements between Canada and the United States,

²⁵⁵ *The Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America*, accessed online 14 January 2008 at: <http://www.spp.gov/>.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command Concept of Operations*, (version 3, 3 April 2006), p. 5-1.

as well as more than 250 MOUs between the two defence departments, and roughly 145 bilateral fora in which Canada/US defence issues are discussed.²⁵⁸ Not all of these agreements deal with domestic issues alone, but domestic defence and security should start far from a nation's shores and, in the current international security environment, is intimately related to international security.

A consequence of the increasingly globalized and interwoven world has been the blurring of the boundaries between the three broad geo-strategic imperatives of the CF – the defence of Canada, cooperation with the US to ensure the defence of North America, and selected contributions to operations aimed at maintaining international peace and stability. Events in other regions can, and frequently do, have immediate and significant ramifications in North America. Thus, the traditional approach of looking at the CF's principal defence roles of domestic, continental, and international operations in isolation is no longer appropriate, if it ever really was. In many ways, these traditional roles have merged and are now interdependent layers in the nation's defence. Domestic security is increasingly related to continental security, which is, to a degree, contingent on international security.

The point of this discussion is to illustrate that the threats faced target not only specific countries but also the strategic entity of the North American continent. Canada and the United States are indivisible in terms of potential attacks and aftershocks involving weapons of mass destruction, but also only divisible to a degree in terms of being a target for terrorists. An appropriate response to these threats would require a national security policy and follow-on strategy that clearly articulates the national interests and how domestic and international security relate, and charts a clear course towards a layered defence of the homeland.²⁵⁹ The policy and strategy should also articulate where Canadian and US interests are parallel or identical, or may even differ, in order to guide Canadian approaches both to its bilateral and international security affairs. Of course, this assumes that Canada controls its own national security agenda, an assessment not shared by some scholars who see "military integration" of Canada and the US as a main driver of the "historical construction of hegemony."²⁶⁰ Are Canadian policy-makers, then, locked into a historical narrative that has gradually choked their freedom of action?

Some form of this question tends to creep into most studies of Canada's international security policy, and invites polemical attacks on America's 'imperial' disregard for the sensitivities of smaller powers who otherwise might be opposed to US 'hegemony.' One recent edited collection, aptly entitled *Canada and the New American Empire*, relentlessly attacks by assertion the Bush administration's response to 9/11 as militaristic and opportunistic in its empire building. Generally lamenting Canada's lack of spine in resisting American aggression, the contributors are of the 'anti-war' camp, scantily acknowledging any legitimate security concerns on behalf of the US, and intimating that the US itself is more of a

²⁵⁸ Brad Gladman and Michael Roi, "Defence Commitment – Capability Gap Analysis", Version 3, 01 October 2004, p.1.

²⁵⁹ Integration for operational efficiency's sake is the basis of a proposal for merging NORAD and NorthCOM into a new organization to be named NADO (North American Defence Organization). See Todd Charles David, "We Need a North American Defence Organization," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (October 2007, Vol. 133, Issue 10), pp. 42-47.

²⁶⁰ Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox, "Global Order, US Hegemony and Military Integration: The Canadian-American Defence Relationship," *International Political Sociology* (2008), vol. 2, p. 306.

threat to international security than jihadism or Saddam Hussein-like dictators with the ability to use WMDs. Reminiscent of many anti-American Canadian nationalists of times past, Senator Douglas Roche asks “Who does Canada need more: the United States or the UN?”, as though Canada could somehow shun the realities of being part of the continental strategic entity.²⁶¹

Even more serious scholars could not resist the spectre of post-9/11 ‘revolutionary’ America as the backdrop of Canada’s limited choices. *Coping With the American Colossus* and *While Canada Slept* are two such titles. The latter, by Andrew Cohen, laments Canada’s lack of will and capability to do very much internationally. The former, published just as Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, paints in the introduction a decidedly biased picture of unilateral America forging coalitions of the willing and forcing its will in its efforts to remake the international security environment after 9/11. In his contribution to the text, however, Frank Harvey demonstrates the flimsiness of the “US unilateralism vs. European/Canadian multilateralism” mantra by showing how multilateralism is only a process, no better or worse than unilateralism and, for that matter, usually only comes about because of a unilateral gambit. That was certainly the case in the run up to Resolution 1441, where only the threat of US action forced the Security Council to take action. US and British hard power forced the likes of France, Russia and China to make the UN Security Council work, albeit clumsily. Harvey attacks Canada’s addiction to process rather than results as the default option for a country that has divested itself of the ability to do more.²⁶² This sentiment is echoed in Jack Granatstein’s 2006 *Whose War is it? How Canada Can Survive in the Post 9/11 World*²⁶³, but challenged in a recent study that suggests too much has been made about Canada’s lack of military capability since the early 1990s. ‘Reviving realism’ in the defence debate, Phillippe Lagasse and Paul Robinson argue, shows not only that Canadian defence was well managed from 1994 to 2003, but then gave way yet again to a commitment-capability gap in large measure because of unjustified US-driven threat inflation and the resulting substantial deployment to Afghanistan. In fact, the authors question the centrality of expeditionary operations in general to Canadian national interests. Specifically, the authors reject one of the main tenets of the post-9/11 security environment – namely that it is in Canada’s interests to help its allies to keep failed states, such as Afghanistan, from becoming safe havens for groups like Al Qaeda.²⁶⁴ This approach rejects the notion that international, continental and domestic dimensions of security are interrelated because of the threats of jihadism and WMD-equipped tyrants. Notably, the authors suggest that international stability writ large is only indirectly in Canada’s interest to maintain and, even then, Canada can only play a circumscribed role therein.

This ‘realist’ approach to Canadian defence policy today and into the foreseeable future presupposes that the terrorist and WMD threat has been exaggerated, and therefore the response, mainly in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres, have been disproportionate to the

²⁶¹ George Melnyk, *Canada and the New American Empire* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004), p. 29.

²⁶² David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Canada Among Nations 2003. Coping with the American Colossus*, Ottawa, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 1-18; 200-218.

²⁶³ Jack Granatstein, *Whose War is it? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007)

²⁶⁴ Phillippe Lagasse and Paul Robinson, *Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate* (Kingston, On: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2008)

threat. There are, of course, many Canadian voices defending this position.²⁶⁵ There may be some credibility to this argument, but it requires an assumption that the threat would have dissipated on its own after 9/11 if the West had not taken aggressive action, both military and legislative, to defeat it. It is, therefore, somewhat of an apologist framework in that one can find attributes of realism in any defence policy and any defence budget, as subsequent analysis is framed by a subjective, and asserted, security environment. It also dismisses the role of military force in shaping, as opposed to merely responding to, the security environment.²⁶⁶

If Lagasse and Robinson are correct, and Canada's defence policy went astray in 2003, the question of concern for this case-study is how Canada-US relations related to that development. More specifically, to what extent did a desire to gain favour in Washington lead to the deployment to Kandahar, the event to which Lagasse and Robinson attribute the principal responsibility for CF post 2003 'overstretch'? According to Janice Steyn and Eugene Lang, it was substantial. They argue that Gen Rick Hillier, within a month of becoming Chief of Defence Staff in 2005, wanted Canada's military commitment to Afghanistan to "go far beyond deploying a single PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] as an exit strategy from Kabul... Hillier wanted a deployment that would get Canada deeper and deeper into the most troubled part of Afghanistan. It was heavy lifting. And it was an initiative that would impress the Pentagon and even George Bush." Stein and Lang make the connection between Canada's decision not to participate fully in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and a need "to do something significant for Washington – something that the Pentagon really valued – to compensate."²⁶⁷ Later, they also suggest that the perceived need was largely fabricated by officials at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), and that there was little evidence on the part of US officials that the BMD decision was at all significant to the US.²⁶⁸

As the book relies almost entirely on interviews and secondary sources, however, further research – including primary source and interviews with decision-makers – will be necessary to determine the validity of their argument.²⁶⁹ It will be necessary to examine, as much as possible, the type of information and advice being generated by the relevant departments, in this case the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and DND, and to what extent this influenced Martin and Harper (and their Cabinets). If Stein and Lang are correct, then Ottawa's judgments that BMD was not a critical enabler of the post-9/11 strategic entity while a major combat role in southern Afghanistan was exactly such, resulted from short-term political expediency more so than strategic military rationale. While

²⁶⁵ See, for example, Melnyk, but also Kent Roach, *September 11: Consequences for Canada* (Kingston, On: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003)

²⁶⁶ Lagasse and Robinson, p. 95 and 101.

²⁶⁷ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin, 2007), p. 181.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-177. For an interesting discussion of the challenges faced by both Ottawa and London in developing a coherent policy in response to Washington's "open invitation" to participate in May 2003, see Andrew Richter, "A Question of Defense: How American Allies Are Responding to the US Missile Defense Program," *Comparative Strategy*, 23: 2004, pp. 143-172.

²⁶⁹ As one of the authors, Eugene Lang, was a participant in the decision-making process, his views, either written or verbal, are best viewed as a primary/secondary source hybrid.

Stein and Lang suggest that the 2002 deployment to Kandahar²⁷⁰ was therefore the start of an unexpected war in a country Canada knew nothing about, they also suggest that the decision space for Afghanistan, BMD and the War on Terror in general was set by Canada-US relations above all else.²⁷¹

It should be no surprise that Canada's highest foreign policy priority is maintaining good relations with the United States. Returning, however, to the question of how much Canada controls its national security agenda because of the overshadowing American alliance, Stein and Lang suggest that bureaucrats and politicians have different views. They claim, for instance, that officials in NDHQ constantly warned of potential American blowback if Canada declined to participate in BMD, but suggest that, politically, there was no evidence for that claim. If that was the case, it may be that the 'blowback' suggested was strictly related to military operational interests of the type experienced after Ottawa's decision not to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As Richard Gimblett points out, after that decision, the Canadian commander of the naval task group was immediately cut-off to "certain elements of intelligence" previously taken for granted.²⁷² Some work has been undertaken to measure the benefits of access to US intelligence to Canadian military operations since the Second World War.²⁷³ This case-study will have to examine the problem in the post-9/11 world, and how the preservation of that access is a consideration of Canadian decision-makers. Some observers suggest that Canada needs more independent intelligence capabilities, largely because Canada and the US may pose a threat to each other, or even house a potential 'borderless' threat to the other.²⁷⁴

In light of the accumulated evidence captured in less contemporary circumstances, this case study will examine the extent to which Canada and the United States, and various departments, agencies and key decision-makers therein, have viewed their respective national, continental and international security environments since 9/11. This will be accomplished through comparisons of documentary evidence and interviews of key decision-makers on both sides of the border. The focus will be on decisions related to political, organizational and operational initiatives made since 9/11, the objective being to measure the degree of like-mindedness in assessments of threats faced and responses taken. Namely, these specific decision-points are as follows*:

²⁷⁰ Canada sent forces to Kandahar as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, but also in 2006 as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For a good overview of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, see John Manley et al, *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2008)

²⁷¹ Ibid, p. 21.

²⁷² Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism* (Ottawa: Golden Light Publishing, 2004), p. 116.

²⁷³ Major H.A. Skaarup, *An Intelligence Advantage: Collective Security Benefits gained by Canada through the sharing of Military Intelligence with the United States of America* (M.A. Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1997)

²⁷⁴ Francis Kofi Abiew, *Canadian Defence and the Canada-US Strategic Partnership*, Conference Report. (Ottawa: Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2002), p. 29

* This chart will be completed in the final report, and will be replicated for the other case studies as appropriate. The question marks will be replaced by an assessment of the characteristics demonstrated of a North American strategic entity.

Decision Point	United States	Canada	North America
Post 9/11 Strategic Guidance	National Security Strategy 2002/2006	National Security Policy 2004	Bi-National Planning Group
Afghanistan	Oct 2001-present	Jan 2002-present	?
Iraq	March 2003-present	Not a coalition member	?
Military Reorg	USNORTHCOM	Canada Command	Civil Assistance Plan/Tri-Command
HLS/PSEPC	Major reorganization DHS	Consolidation of EMC Sol Gen/ PS Act	?
BMD	Yes	No, but agreed to NORAD provision of warning	?
Legislation	Patriot Act/HLS Act Intelligence Reform Act	Anti-Terrorism Act/Public Safety Act	?

3. Conclusions

“There are no significant bugs in our released software that any significant number of users want fixed.” Bill Gates

The analysis of the extensive literature on Canada-US relations and the specific case-studies chosen for detailed analysis has revealed gaps and possible biases that must be explored and challenged. Only through rigorous analysis of the historical record can a more complete and effective appreciation be developed of the factors driving the relationship, and the nature of Canadian and American strategic culture. While the attainment of this body of knowledge is worthwhile in its own right, this appreciation will assist DND/CF and the Government of Canada in its efforts to evolve both the strategic relationship and the military-to-military relationship in order to meet the challenges posed by the security environment. Moreover, this body of knowledge and understanding can be employed to assist upcoming decisions facing the Government of Canada – from the effect on domestic and national security surrounding the Afghanistan mission and the scheduled withdrawal in 2011, the re-assessment of the decision to participate in the US Ballistic Missile Defence initiative, to the exploitation of the Tri-Command study and other such decisions related to the future of the military-to-military relationship. The results of this study likely will illustrate needed changes to the mechanics of decision making within the Government of Canada.

As noted political scientist Colin Gray has observed, scholars debate whether “American culture, or a supposedly “objective” foreign material reality, ultimately commands policy and strategy. The debate is foolish. In practice, Americans attempt what they are able, as they perceive and interpret international conditions, in a manner that cannot help reflecting American cultural influence.”²⁷⁵ Thus, the comprehension of what has shaped and continues to shape the strategic relationship between the two countries requires a more sophisticated comprehension of the strategic culture of both countries, something that has not been undertaken in support of previous efforts to shape this most important strategic relationship. In the absence of this refined understanding, the formulation of workable options becomes problematic at best.

A nation’s unique strategic culture does not spring into being quickly or easily, but rather is built through a distinctive national experience that, in turn, shapes its national style in behaviour. When attempting to chart a course to the future, analysts and decision-makers should understand that “the future has no place to come from but the past,” and view time as a stream that carries that which came before to one degree or another.²⁷⁶ In order to understand fully the current Canada-US strategic defence relationship, and where it may be lacking or in need of evolution or drastic change, the complete story must be understood, not just back to the Ogdensburg declaration. Armed with a deeper understanding of the pertinent factors

²⁷⁵ Colin S. Gray, *After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy*, (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), p. vi.

²⁷⁶ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*, p. 251.

motivating decision-makers when key choices were at hand will serve to frame the follow-on discussions of how to evolve the defence relationship towards the desired end-state as part of a Whole of Government approach.²⁷⁷ Indeed, one could go further and say that without first setting the context to which these follow-on discussions can refer, there is a risk of setting an inappropriate end-state. Understanding the full story will assist in fixing the target cognisant of all the relevant factors.

This Technical Memorandum, the first in this Strategic Defence Relationship project, asks many questions that existing literature can often be relied upon to answer, but not always from the angle of reconstructing events in the context of the day, and in the mind of the decision-maker of the day. In order to ‘see time as a stream,’ and to imagine what previous decision-makers have faced, it follows that the case studies, when completed, will indicate, to the degree possible, what type of information and advice decision-makers sought and were given in the different contexts developed in these case studies. Only through a re-examination of primary sources can some of these troublesome questions be examined with a view to encouraging current decision-makers to accept the case study approach as a way to think through current choices.

For instance, to what extent was an American threat a primary consideration of the fathers of Confederation? For decision makers of the 1860s, when did the story of an American threat start? Did Mackenzie King, his Cabinet and senior bureaucrats think in terms of a North American ‘strategic entity’ or just war-time exigencies when they considered and agreed to the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements? Almost a decade later, to what extent did the St. Laurent government, largely including the key individuals of Ogdensburg and Hyde Park, see a link between defeating the communist enemy abroad in Korea and security of the continent at home? Did Ottawa’s appreciation of the Soviet or communist threat diminish or change when it came time to take several decisions related to Vietnam? Why was the government’s approach to the two conflicts so much different or, indeed, was it so much different? What views and assumptions did civilian and decision makers take into the decision to form NORAD, and the subsequent renewals? What information did those in DND and External Affairs have at their disposal to support these decisions? Who thought of NORAD in terms of its boon to sovereignty for Canada and who thought of it as a threat to sovereignty? And why did they feel so?

Sovereignty also is a timeless characteristic of Canada’s approaches to Arctic security and defence. Have, and if so why, decision-makers been quick to assume that it is threatened by the US or that military means are best to assert a sovereignty claim? Is it appropriate to frame Arctic issues in adversarial terms or should the underlying principles of the continental ‘strategic entity’ guide decisions? This question is central to the Arctic file as it once again looms large on the national political agenda. Can Canada and the United States cooperate in the Arctic or has history and its interpretation consigned the matter to perennial friction? Harper’s assertive stance on Arctic sovereignty, after all, pre-dated President Bush’s January 2009 policy directive on the Arctic that guides ten Cabinet departments in their activities

²⁷⁷ For a full discussion of the military contribution to a Whole of Government or Comprehensive Approach, see Brad Gladman and Peter Archambault, *An Effects-Based Approach to Operations in the Domestic and Continental Operating Environment: A Case for Pragmatism*, Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM 2008-033.

related to national and homeland security in the region. The directive states that “The United States... has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests.”²⁷⁸ This case study will also account for current Arctic-related decisions within the Canada-US context. Many other issues are a product of the post-9/11 security environment and the final Technical Report will have to account for whether they should be treated as stand alone policy and strategy decisions or as part of a more complex strategic relationship that requires coordination to be effective and consistent. For instance, what assumptions should be carried into decisions regarding the tri-command relationship of NORAD, Canada Command and US Northern Command, and which should be questioned or discarded? What role should Canada-US strategic relations have in shaping the decision to end, or change the focus of, the current CF deployment to Afghanistan in 2011? What historical lessons can be drawn from these case studies that can inform future considerations of Canada’s role in Ballistic Missile Defence?

The next Technical Memorandum will consist of the first full case study: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case will focus on accounting for why the Diefenbaker government delayed increasing the increased readiness level for the CF as requested by Washington, and the role played by the mechanics of Canadian Government decision-making at the time. Was the Diefenbaker government well informed of the Soviet threat as it had developed, and why or why not? To what extent did the tensions between Diefenbaker and President Kennedy, and specifically the former’s active desire to be perceived to be pursuing independent foreign policy, influence his decision? And what does all this reveal about the nature of Canadian and American strategic culture? By reconstructing the events and decision-making processes that existed at the political, bureaucratic and military domains, the case will begin to build the ‘story’ of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. While it might be more logical to begin at the beginning with Confederation, the Missile Crisis offers the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of the case method with a relatively constrained set of conditions and a single, distinct decision-point that occurred in a high pressure, high stakes context.

Through a better understanding how past decisions were made and shaped future decisions related to the Canada-US strategic defence relationship, it is possible to look to the future with confidence and with some assurance that today’s decision makers have at their disposal a body of knowledge related to the assumptions, biases and motivations that have shaped the relationship throughout Canadian history. As the project moves forward, therefore, it potentially will serve the dual purpose of providing a means of decision support, while also serving as a teaching tool, most likely for the Canadian Forces College, for instruction both of Canada-US relations courses and those concerned with the evolution of Canada’s strategic culture.

²⁷⁸ White House Office of the Press Secretary, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD – 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD -- 25

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List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CanadaCOM	Canada Command
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CANUS	Canada-US
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DEFCON	Defence Condition
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DPS	Defence Policy Statement
GoC	Government of Canada
ICC	International Control Commission
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
MCC	Military Cooperation Committee
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NYPD	New York Police Department
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team

RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USNORTHCOM	US Northern Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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13. ABSTRACT

This Technical Memorandum reports to the project sponsors, the Commander of Canada Command and the Deputy Commander of NORAD, on Phase One of the Canada-US Strategic Defence Relationship project. It consists of a literature search and review to develop an understanding of the varied perspectives of authors on the history and current state of North American security and defence. Eight key decision points in the nation's history have been identified as those to serve as detailed case-studies to be analysed in Phase Two. The case studies are as follows: Confederation, Ogdensburg and Hyde Park, the Korean War, the creation of North American Aerospace Defense Command and successive renewals of the agreement, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Arctic and the post-9/11 period. The concept of strategic culture is used to assist in explaining why Canadian leadership made the decisions they did at key points in its history, to help understand the kind of information provided and sought to inform those decisions, and to use that understanding as the basis to develop specific recommendations for ways to evolve the relationship to meet the challenges faced. The analysis of the extensive literature on Canada-US relations and the specific case-studies chosen for detailed analysis has revealed gaps and possible biases that must be explored and challenged. While the attainment of this body of knowledge is worthwhile in its own right, this appreciation will assist DND/CF and the Government of Canada in its efforts to evolve both the strategic relationship and the military-to-military relationship in order to meet the challenges posed by the security environment.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS

Canada-US, Strategic Culture, Confederation, Ogdensburg, Hyde Park, Korean War, NORAD, Vietnam War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Arctic, Post-911 World, National Security Architecture, Government Decision-Making, Continental Defence



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